22 April 2019Murat Volkan DülgerCommentary

Introduction

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

The Personal Data Protection Board is charged with performing the duties and exercising the powers conferred on it by Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK) and by the other legislation on the subject. Accordingly, it is also empowered to decide on the complaints of those who claim that their rights relating to personal data have been violated. In addition, upon a complaint, or ex officio where it learns of an alleged violation, the Board will examine whether personal data are being processed lawfully in matters falling within its remit and will take measures in this regard where necessary.

The entry into force of the KVKK and the adoption of the other legal rules on the subject drew a general framework for personal data protection law. Since then the Board, relying on these duties and powers, has been deciding concrete cases on the subject and sharing with the public, in summary form, those it considers necessary. The subject of this article is the decisions of various dates that the Board most recently published on 3 April 2019. I will discuss the decisions in particular in terms of the questions and problems in the concrete case and the Board’s approach to them, and will conclude by assessing them with my own views and suggestions.

Full text

This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger*

The Personal Data Protection Board, which is charged with performing the duties and exercising the powers conferred on it by Law No. 6698 and the other legislation on the subject, is accordingly also empowered to decide on the complaints of those who claim that their rights concerning personal data have been infringed. In addition, upon a complaint, or of its own motion where it learns of an alleged infringement, the Board will examine, in matters falling within its remit, whether personal data are being processed lawfully and, where necessary, will take measures in this regard.

Now that a general framework for the law on the protection of personal data has been drawn with the entry into force of the Law and the creation of the other legal rules on the subject, the Board, relying on these duties and powers, decides concrete cases in this field and shares with the public, in summary form, those which it considers necessary. The subject of this paper is the decisions, bearing different dates, which the Board most recently published on 3 April 2019. I shall address the decisions in particular in the context of the questions and problems arising in the concrete case and the Board’s perspective on them, and shall finally assess them with my views and suggestions and draw my conclusions.

1. The Decision Summaries Published by the Personal Data Protection Board on 3 April

a. The obligation to inform and the processes for obtaining explicit consent: Decision of 26/07/2018,

No. 2018/90

The group of companies acting as controller, which is the subject of the decision on the obligation to inform and the processes for obtaining explicit consent, receives job applications on an online platform and makes membership registration compulsory when a job application is submitted. However, by ticking a single box while completing this membership registration, the data subject who is going to apply for a job both states that he has read the information notice and gives explicit consent to the processing of personal data.

At this point, before turning to the matter that is actually the subject of the decision, namely the carrying out of the obligation to inform and the process of obtaining explicit consent together, I would like to touch on the fact that membership registration is made compulsory in order to be able to apply. Although I cannot characterise making membership registration compulsory for carrying out any transaction on an online platform as directly unlawful, I think that this situation may be dangerous in certain specific cases. Let us suppose, for example, that we are going to buy a product from a shop’s online site: this shop may be a place where we do not shop very often and which we visit only for the product in question. In that case, rather than becoming a member and giving more information in order to make that purchase, we would wish to be able to buy the product without becoming a member and to give only the contact and address details necessary for the order to be fulfilled. Indeed, otherwise one would be speaking of the collection and processing of personal data that are not necessary for, and limited to, the purpose sought to be achieved, which is contrary to the fundamental principles of the law on the protection of personal data. Consequently, making membership registration compulsory carries, even if not in every case, the possibility of producing consequences to the detriment of the data subject.

For this reason, what needs to be done in my view is to offer the data subject, alongside the steps for becoming a member of the website in question, a separate option in the form of “continue without becoming a member”. In this way the data subject will not be forced to become a member of a website which he perhaps does not expect ever to visit again. Indeed, particularly with the creation of the legislation on the subject, the growing importance attached to the protection of personal data and to privacy, and the emergence of awareness of the subject, it is seen that online platforms make it possible to carry out various transactions without becoming a member. I must state, however, that this point is different from the unlawfulness that is the subject of the decision and is merely a part of it to which I think attention should be paid.

The Board, by contrast, addressed the following points concerning the carrying out of the obligation to inform and the process of obtaining explicit consent together:

• The obligation to inform and the obtaining of explicit consent must be carried out separately!

The procedures and principles to be observed within the scope of the obligation to inform, which must be fulfilled by the controller and the persons authorised by it, were laid down by the “Communiqué on the Procedures and Principles to be Observed in Fulfilling the Obligation to Inform”, which entered into force upon its publication in the Official Gazette of 10 March 2018, No. 303561. Article 5 of the Communiqué, entitled “Procedures and principles”, regulates the matters to be observed in fulfilling this obligation in addition to, and more broadly than, the Law.

Accordingly, where the personal data processing activity is carried out on the basis of the data subject’s explicit consent, the obligation to inform and the obtaining of explicit consent must be carried out separately. From this provision it is understood, first, that the obligation to inform is an indispensable requirement even in processing activities to be carried out on the basis of the data subject’s explicit consent. The controller must undoubtedly fulfil the obligation to inform also in cases where it does not rely on any of the other conditions for processing set out in the Law and needs the data subject’s explicit consent. On this point the Communiqué goes even further and prescribes that informing the data subject and obtaining explicit consent from the data subject are also to be carried out separately. Thus, in personal data processing activities which it carries out on the basis of the data subject’s explicit consent as well, the controller must be careful on two points: that the obligation to inform continues to apply, and that it must fulfil this obligation independently of the obtaining of explicit consent.

• Fulfilment of the obligation to inform is not subject to any approval.

This point relates to the procedure and purposes of the obligation to inform. That is to say, there is no doubt that the controller must provide information to, and inform, the data subject regarding the personal data processing activity in question. This information will be given in conformity with the legislation as regards procedure, form, the means used and the time at which it is given, and in such a way as to contain the minimum particulars laid down by the Communiqué. However, no requirement has been laid down that, as a result of the controller’s informing, the data subject should give an approval in the form of “I have been given information on this matter” or “I have been informed”. Consequently, the data subject’s approval is not a condition of the obligation to inform. For the obligation to inform differs from explicit consent in procedure and purpose. Whereas obtaining explicit consent serves the purpose of basing the personal data processing activity on a legal ground, the obligation to inform ensures that the data subject is informed about the processing activity.

Does it, then, present any drawback if this condition, which has not been prescribed, is nevertheless fulfilled by the controller? Is the real drawback that this approval is also obtained together with explicit consent? Although the Board stated in the decision summary it published that fulfilment of the obligation to inform is not subject to the data subject’s approval, it did not fully address the drawbacks of this.

In my opinion, the danger that may arise at this point relates to the possibility that a false impression may be created. It must be stated that the data subject’s declaring that he has been informed in no way means that the obligation to inform has been fulfilled. For if the information given by the controller has not been provided in accordance with the provisions of the Law and the Communiqué, the data subject’s approval will not render lawful information that was given unlawfully; in other words, the data subject’s stating that he has been informed has no significance as to whether or not the obligation to inform has been fulfilled.

Just as the data subject’s declaring that he has been informed does not mean that the obligation to inform has been fulfilled, his claiming not to have been informed does not, on its own, mean that this obligation has not been fulfilled either. Controllers should not forget, however, that the provisions on the obligation to inform set out the minimum content of this obligation. Thus, on the points which the data subject wishes to have clarified, this obligation continues.

It may therefore be concluded that what is sought at this point is to prevent a false impression, in favour of the data subject. And it is precisely for this reason that the controller must obtain feedback such as “obtaining the data subject’s approval at the end of the information”, which is not prescribed as a condition in the legislation, separately from the declaration by which explicit consent is given. For the data subject is not obliged to approve the matters written in the information notice.

At this point I must emphasise that the question may come to mind whether feedback should be obtained at all. Since the burden of proving that the obligation to inform has been fulfilled lies with the controller, obtaining such a notification will be useful. The basic problem here is that the feedback is obtained together with the declaration of explicit consent to the processing of personal data; the approval or feedback relating to the information must without fail be obtained separately from the declaration of explicit consent.

Assessing these points together, the Board decided that the controller be instructed to separate the two mechanisms.

b. Persons of unknown identity cannot be regarded as controllers:

Decision of 13/09/2018, No. 2018/106

In the concrete case that is the subject of the decision, a document which the data subject had signed by virtue of his office was obtained unlawfully and shared on the internet by a person or persons of unknown identity. Furthermore, under the same user name, texts of a slanderous nature about the complainant were posted, giving the initials of the complainant’s first name and surname. The data subject thereupon applied to the Authority.

The basic problem here is not so much whether the act that is the subject of the concrete case is unlawful as the nature of the application made to the Authority or, to put it more clearly, which branch of law the matter is a problem of. For there is no doubt as to the unlawfulness of the act. But is it possible for a person of unknown identity to be regarded as a controller? If such a person is not regarded as a controller, can the act in question form the subject matter of the law on the protection of personal data and, hence, of applications made to the Authority?

For this, the following points need to be considered:

• The scope of the Law

The Law covers, on the one hand, the natural persons whose personal data are processed and, on the other, the controller. The concept of controller, in turn, covers natural and legal persons who process these data by means that are “wholly or partly automated” or “non-automated, provided that they form part of a filing system”.

• The definition of the concept of controller

The controller means the natural or legal person who, in a personal data processing activity, determines the purposes and means of processing and is responsible for the establishment and management of the data filing system. To put it more clearly, a controller determines which data may be processed for which specific purposes and how and in what manner this processing activity is to be carried out. It of course makes this determination in conformity and compliance with the legislation on the subject. I must underline, however, that what is at issue here is a processing activity that in any event ought to exist and to be carried out.

From these explanations the conclusion is reached that a person of unknown identity cannot be defined as a controller within the meaning of Law No. 6698 and that, consequently, a person of unknown identity cannot be the subject of the Law or of applications made to the Authority.

• Assessment of the case from the standpoint of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK)

Because a person of unknown identity does not have the status of controller, an act committed by such a person will not fall within the subject matter of Law No. 6698 even if it is unlawful. From the standpoint of the TCK, however, it retains its character as an offence. An investigation will be initiated following a complaint to be lodged with the public prosecutor’s office of the place where the offence was committed. Where the persons who carried out the act can be identified in the course of this investigation, those persons will be regarded as the controller if they are processing the data for themselves; if they are processing the data on behalf of a legal entity or a third party, the latter will be regarded as the controller. In that case there will be both the bringing of a public prosecution against those who carried out the act and, if the conditions are met, a conviction, and, since the controller will have been identified, the imposition of an administrative sanction by the Personal Data Protection Board.

The conclusion to be drawn from this decision is that the Personal Data Protection Board does not have the possibility of conducting an investigation in the way that a public prosecutor’s office or a criminal court does. Consequently, just as it is not possible for it to take action against a controller whose identity cannot be established, it also has no means of searching for and finding that controller. Accordingly, when an application is made to the Personal Data Protection Board, the complainants must, much as in a private-law dispute, clearly indicate the identity of the controller and/or the processor.

c. Failure to comply in due time with a decision of the Board: summary of the Decision of 16/10/2018,

No. 2018/118

The main subject of the decision is the failure to comply with a Board decision given at an earlier date. Accordingly, the data subject applied to the controller for the erasure of his personal data held in the data filing system and did not receive a satisfactory reply. Having thereupon applied to the Authority on the matter, the data subject then lodged a complaint on the ground that the decision taken by the Board had likewise not been complied with by the controller.

The earlier Board decision concerned instructing the controller on the following points:

• That, of the personal data held by the controller, those whose minimum retention period has expired be erased in the first periodic destruction process in accordance with the “Regulation on the Erasure, Destruction or Anonymisation of Personal Data”, and the remainder in the periodic destruction processes carried out following the expiry of the statutory retention obligation,

• That the complainant be informed of these erasure operations, and

• That the personal data in question not be processed for any purpose other than retention.

The Board decision in question was served on the controller on 02.07.2018.

In the application made on the ground that the requirements of this decision had not been complied with, the instances of unlawfulness established were as follows:

• A Board decision must be complied with within thirty days at the latest!

Under paragraph 5 of Article 15 of Law No. 6698, entitled “Procedures and principles of examination upon complaint or ex officio”, where the Board, as a result of an examination carried out upon a complaint or of its own motion, is satisfied that an infringement exists, it decides that the instances of unlawfulness it has identified are to be remedied by the controller and serves this decision on those concerned. The requirements of this decision must be complied with by the controller concerned without delay and within thirty days at the latest from its service.

The Law has thus granted the controller a maximum period of thirty days to comply with the requirements of an infringement decision given against it. I must state that, while this period is the upper limit, not every implementation carried out before the thirty days have elapsed will be deemed lawful either. For the wording used in the provision is “without delay and within thirty days at the latest”. Accordingly, where an infringement decision has been given against it, the controller must both comply with the requirements of that decision within thirty days and not have delayed. Thus, for example, even in respect of a decision complied with within fifteen days, it may be concluded, depending on the particular features of the concrete case, that it was not duly complied with, on the ground that the controller delayed in complying with the decision. Controllers must show great attention and care in this respect.

In the present case, it was established that the Board served its decision containing the instructions set out above on the controller on 02.07.2018; that the controller, however, informed the complainant within the scope of the Board decision on 16.08.2018; and that this was notified to the Board by a letter dated 17.08.2018. Consequently, the controller, which under the relevant legislation was required to comply with the requirements of the infringement decision given against it by 01.08.2018 at the latest, exceeded this period and failed to comply with the decision lawfully.

Article 18(1)(c) of the Law, the article being entitled “Misdemeanours”, provides that an administrative fine of from 25,000 Turkish liras to 1,000,000 Turkish liras shall be imposed on those who fail to comply with the decisions given by the Board.

• In the notification it makes to the complainant following a Board decision, the controller must give the necessary and sufficient explanation in conformity and in keeping with that decision.

As a result of the application made to it, the Board, as stated above, issued an instruction decision on the matters of the periodic destruction processes, the informing of the complainant about these destruction processes and the processing of the data in conformity with the purpose of retention. However, in the notification which it made to the complainant, in any event after the time limit had expired, the controller gave no explanation whatsoever concerning these provisions of the decision. Yet a controller is expected to inform the data subject in detail on the matters in respect of which an infringement decision has been given against it and to abandon the practices that gave rise to the infringement. In the concrete case, however, the notification made by the controller to the complainant contained no explanation on the matters on which the Board had issued its instruction decision and thus did not go beyond a symbolic notification. It can therefore be said that the controller did not duly comply with the decision in terms of either time or substance.

d. Request by one legal entity for data belonging to another legal entity:

Decision of 19/11/2018, No. 2018/131

First of all I must state that what is meant here is not personal data held within the legal entity, but data belonging to the legal entity itself. A controller transferred data, held in electronic form, belonging to the legal entity in question to another controller, and the legal entity concerned thereupon lodged a complaint with the Authority. What was transferred, therefore, was data belonging to the legal entity.

• Data belonging to a legal person are not personal data within the scope of Law No. 6698!

Personal data, in the most general definition, are any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. Indeed, they are defined in this way in Article 3(1)(d) of the Law, the article being entitled “Definitions”. According to this definition, “the existence of a natural person” is an element of the concept of personal data, and in the absence of this element it is not possible to speak of the existence of personal data. Moreover, Article 2 of the Law, entitled “Scope”, by stating that the provisions of this Law shall apply to natural persons whose personal data are processed, leaves data belonging to legal persons outside the scope of the Law.

Under the provisions explained, it is not possible for data belonging to a legal person to be regarded as personal data within the scope of Law No. 6698 or, consequently, for the transfer of data belonging to a legal person to be the subject of the Law or of applications made to the Authority. The application made in the present case therefore falls outside the Authority’s duties and powers and is not subject to examination.

• Data belonging to natural persons within a legal entity are personal data.

Although data belonging to a legal person are not personal data within the scope of the Law, it should not be forgotten that a legal person is not independent of natural persons and that a legal entity is brought into being through natural persons. Accordingly, while it is not possible for a company’s trade name to be regarded as personal data, information such as the first name, surname or address of that company’s shareholders and authorised officers is personal data. Consequently, had the data transferred in the present case been data belonging to natural persons within the company, this situation would have been regarded as falling within the scope of the Law and could have been the subject of applications made to the Authority. I think that both controllers and the Authority should show the necessary care on this matter.

• The rights of the data subject likewise denote the rights of natural persons.

In the decision the Board also referred to Article 11 of the Law, entitled “Rights of the data subject”. It was stated that the rights regulated in that article likewise belong to natural persons, and that the rights to learn whether personal data concerning oneself are being processed and, if they have been processed, to request information in that regard may likewise be exercised by natural persons or their legal representatives.

Although there is no doubt in this respect, the reason why the Board additionally included an explanation concerning this article cannot be fully understood, because the explanations concerning the concrete case are very limited. In my opinion, in the case at hand the legal entity claiming that its data had been transferred requested information, pursuant to Article 11 of the Law, from the controller that had transferred its data and, when the request was not met, lodged a complaint with the Board in this respect as well. For this reason the Board explained that, in the concrete case, there was no situation subject to examination from the standpoint of Article 11 of the Law either. I must nevertheless express my criticism that the published summaries of the decisions do not contain enough information to be understood and assessed.

• Since the request for access to the data relating to the natural persons who are the company’s shareholders and authorised officers was made not by the persons concerned themselves but by the company as a legal entity, the application in question cannot be assessed within the scope of Articles 11 and 13 of the Law.

This is a finding that is made in passing but is in fact very important. Article 11 of Law No. 6698 regulates “the rights of the data subject” and Article 13 “application to the controller”. Under Article 11, “everyone” has the right to apply to the controller. The concept of everyone includes legal persons as well as natural persons. However, the article goes on to state that everyone has, by applying to the controller, the rights “to learn whether his or her personal data are being processed” and the rights that follow. In Article 3 of the Law, entitled “Definitions”, personal data are defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person” and the data subject as “the natural person whose personal data are processed”. Accordingly, everyone whose personal data are processed has the right to apply to the controller. Those whose personal data are processed are designated in the Law as data subjects, and it is expressly stated that these can only be natural persons.

By this decision the Board has thus forestalled a misunderstanding. Legal persons have no right to request information from the controller about founders, managers, employees or other persons on the basis of Article 13 of Law No. 6698. This right is conferred solely on natural persons who are data subjects. I therefore find this decision and finding of the Board positive and apposite.

e. Failure to erase personal data: Decision of 05/12/2018, No. 2018/142

The subject of the case is the most frequently encountered matter, namely a request for “erasure of personal data”. The data subject applied to the Authority on the ground that his request for the erasure of the personal data held in the data filing system of a bank, which is the controller, had been refused by the bank.

• Personal data must be retained for “the period necessary” for the purpose!

The retention of personal data for the period necessary for the purpose is one of the most fundamental principles of data protection law, defined by both the GDPR and Law No. 6698. This principle must be understood not only as a period that is necessary and sufficient from the controller’s point of view, but also as a limitation of the retention period. For the holding of personal data, even for a legitimate purpose, is in itself a risk factor. Consequently, “the period necessary for the purpose” must be interpreted narrowly, and a common denominator must be found by limiting this period as far as possible in favour of the data subject.

Indeed, this principle is regulated by the “Regulation on the Erasure, Destruction or Anonymisation of Personal Data” to the effect that, even though they have been processed in accordance with the provisions of the Law and of other relevant laws, personal data shall be erased, destroyed or anonymised by the controller, of its own motion or at the request of the data subject, where the reasons requiring their processing cease to exist.

• Banks have the duty and the power to retain the correspondence received and the documents relating to their activities for a period of 10 years.

Although Law No. 6698 regulates the procedures and principles of the law on the protection of personal data, it cannot possibly set out one by one the rules and data retention periods of each sector. The Law has the character of a general framework on the subject; which data are to be retained for which periods in which sector is determined by means of special laws. Article 42 of Banking Law No. 5411, entitled “Retention of documents”, is an example of such special provisions. Under it, the correspondence received and the documents relating to activities shall be retained at the bank concerned for a period of ten years, provided that this is done in the manner specified in the text of the article. The use of the expression “shall be retained” in the article indicates that this is both the bank’s duty and its power.

Consequently, although limitation of the retention period of data is a fundamental principle, the retention of these data for the necessary period is at the same time an obligation under the relevant legislative provision. Turning to the present case, the Authority, in the examination it carried out in respect of the data subject’s complaint, reached the conclusion that the 10-year retention period at the bank concerned had not yet elapsed since the data subject’s last transaction. For this reason there was no action to be taken in response to the request in question.

f. Applications made to the Authority on matters falling within the remit of the judicial authorities:

Decision of 24/12/2018, No. 2018/156

First of all I must state that this decision addresses one of the problems most frequently encountered in the field of the protection of personal data. In my opinion the Board, too, sought to clarify the matter by this decision because a very large number of complaints of this kind have been lodged with it. In the case that is the subject of the decision, comments and posts with sexual, political, religious, friendship-related and similar content were made using the data subject’s personal information such as first name, surname, place of residence, height, weight and physical type, and the data subject thereupon applied to the Authority. At the same time the case was brought before the judicial authorities. The basic problem here is not whether the incident is unlawful but whether it falls within the Authority’s remit, and it is essentially this point that will be explained here.

• In which cases can the Board not take up for examination the applications made to it?

I must first state that what the decision has in mind is not applications made in breach of procedure, but complaints which, although made in accordance with procedure, do not fall within the Board’s duties and powers. These complaints are explained in Article 15 of the Law, entitled “Procedures and principles of examination upon complaint or ex officio”. Accordingly, while the Board will carry out the necessary examination, upon complaint or of its own motion, in matters falling within its remit, it cannot take up for examination denunciations or complaints which do not meet the conditions specified in Article 6 of the “Law on the Exercise of the Right to Petition”, No. 3071.

Under Article 6 of the Law on the Exercise of the Right to Petition, the Board will not carry out an examination in the following cases:

• Those which do not contain a specific subject (applications which do not contain or cover a specific concrete case)

• Those which relate to matters falling within the remit of the judicial authorities

• Those which do not meet one of the conditions set out in Article 4 (the petitioner’s first name, surname and signature, and business or residential address).

The Authority concluded that no assessment could be made within the scope of the Law, because the allegations forming the subject of the complaint made to it contain elements of an offence under the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) and these are in the nature of individual offences, and because, moreover, the matter had been brought before the judicial authorities. In addition, it was decided that the reply to be given to the data subject should explain the course to be followed in respect of applications to be made to the Authority under the Law.

Conclusion

As I have also repeated in my assessments of previously published decisions, I very much welcome every step taken in relation to the protection of personal data, above all because it will bring development and improvement in this field.

Undoubtedly, Board decisions are decisive and provide guidance, particularly in this field where there are still many questions and problems at the stage of application. For this reason I think that, so that they can remove the uncertainties we experience in the application of the Law and the relevant legislation and in compliance processes, the decisions to be published should be on the subjects where problems are concentrated. Indeed, I see that this consideration was also taken into account in the decisions explained above. I must state, however, that the Authority’s criterion in this respect is mostly the applications made to it. Yet I think that, in the decisions to be published, alongside the applications made to the Authority, subjects that would serve to remove the uncertainties experienced in practice should also be taken into consideration, so as to assist both the persons involved in the application of the Law and controllers. For dwelling solely on applications made by data subjects does not sufficiently ease practice; the problems existing for controllers and practitioners must at the same time be resolved and published, so that there are also fewer complaints and applications on the data subject’s side. I therefore recommend that the Board, in the applications made to it, take into consideration both the problems frequently experienced by data subjects and the situations in which controllers, who are charged with applying the Law, and persons conducting compliance processes experience uncertainty.

The basic conclusions reached with regard to the decisions explained above are as follows:

• The controller shall undoubtedly fulfil the obligation to inform also in cases where it does not rely on any of the other conditions for processing set out in the Law and needs the data subject’s explicit consent.

• Fulfilment of the obligation to inform is not subject to any approval.

• The burden of proving that the obligation to inform has been fulfilled nevertheless lies with the controller. For this reason we recommend that controllers obtain feedback on the matter in writing wherever possible, or give the notification by means that enable them to prove that they have given it.

• However, this feedback cannot be obtained at the same time as the declaration of explicit consent. The giving of explicit consent to the processing of personal data and the approval or feedback relating to the obligation to inform must be obtained separately.

• A person or persons whose identity is not known do not have the status of controller. For this reason it is not possible for this situation to be the subject of the Law or of complaints made to the Authority. If the concrete case contains any element of an offence under the TCK, unlawfulness can be alleged only by that route.

• Board decisions must be complied with without delay and within thirty days at the latest.

• In the notification it makes to the complainant following a Board decision, the controller must give the necessary and sufficient explanation in conformity and in keeping with that decision.

• Data belonging to a legal person are not personal data within the scope of Law No. 6698.

• Data belonging to natural persons within a legal entity are, however, personal data.

• Personal data must be retained for the period necessary for the purpose for which they are processed.

• Banks have the duty and the power to retain the correspondence received and the documents relating to their activities for a period of 10 years from the date of the data subject’s last transaction.

• The Authority has no power to carry out an examination in matters falling within the remit of the judicial authorities.

Footnotes

  1. Academic / Attorney-at-law. ↑
  2. For the assessment paper on the Communiqué see: https://www.academia.edu/36140084 ↑

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