Abstract
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
As technology advances with each passing day, societies also continue to evolve. In this process of evolution the internet, with the social networking sites it contains, has become an indispensable part of our daily lives. The scale that online sharing has reached, and the development of information technologies that make it possible to access and store large amounts of data, have given rise to the demand of individuals for the erasure of data that they do not wish others to know and for the prevention of its dissemination, in other words the “right to be forgotten”. The right to be forgotten, which came onto the agenda with the Google judgment delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2014, has been the subject of many recent national and international instruments and court decisions.
With the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, which entered into force on 25 May 2018, the right to be forgotten acquired legal status as a right for the first time, under the name “right to erasure”. Although the right to be forgotten has not yet found a place in any legislation in Türkiye, the Personal Data Protection Board is seen to have taken certain steps on the subject. This study aims to outline the framework of the right to be forgotten as a whole at the stage now reached.
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger* / Gülçin Gümüş*
SUMMARY
As technology advances day by day, societies continue to evolve. In this process of evolution, the internet, with the social networking sites it contains, has become an indispensable part of our daily lives. The scale reached by online sharing and the development of information technologies that make it possible to access and store vast quantities of data have given rise to the demand of individuals that data they do not wish others to know be erased and that their dissemination be prevented – in other words, to the “right to be forgotten”. The right to be forgotten, which came onto the agenda with the Google judgment delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2014, has been the subject of many recent national and international regulations and court decisions. With the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, which entered into force on 25 May 2018, the right to be forgotten acquired legal status as a right for the first time, under the name “right to erasure”. Although the right to be forgotten has not yet found its place in any statutory provision in Türkiye, it can be seen that certain steps have been taken on the matter by the Personal Data Protection Board. At the present stage, this study aims to draw the framework of the right to be forgotten as a whole.
Keywords: Right to be forgotten, right to erasure, personal data, protection of personal data, European Union General Data Protection Regulation.
ABSTRACT
With the advancement of technology day by day, societies continue to evolve. In this evolution process, the internet is an indispensable part of our daily lives with its social networking sites. The size of online sharing and the development of information technologies that allow access to and storage of a large number of data have led to the demand for the deletion and prevention of the dissemination of data that individuals do not want to be known by others, or in other words, the “right to be forgotten”. The right to be forgotten, which came to the agenda with the Google decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2014, has been the subject of many current national and international regulations and court decisions. The right to be forgotten has gained legal status as a right under the name of "right to erasure" for the first time with the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, which entered into force on 25 May 2018. Although the right to be forgotten has not yet found a place in a legal regulation in Turkey, it is seen that some steps have been taken by the Personal Data Protection Board. This study aims to draw the framework of the right to be forgotten as a whole at the current stage.
Keywords: The right to be forgotten, the right to erasure, personal data, personal data protection law, European Union General Data Protection Regulation.
INTRODUCTION
Jean Valjean is a galley convict; he was convicted of theft, and although he was released with the words “you are free now” once the sentence imposed on him had come to an end, he never became free. After serving his sentence, Valjean tries to return to life, but he cannot. For he is driven away from every place he goes to for lodging and food, no innkeeper is willing to take him in, and every door he knocks on is shut in his face because he is a galley convict. He therefore turns into a man who feels hatred towards people, towards society and towards life. Completing his sentence does not mean freedom for Valjean: he has served his term in the galleys and finished it, yet his past will never let go of him.1
This situation brings the following questions to mind:
1. Is Jean Valjean right to want his past to be forgotten?
2. On the other hand, is the offence he committed not also a part of history?
3. Do the innkeepers who refuse to accept Valjean, and society, not have a right to know this?
4. Is this information news to be presented to the public?
5. How is a balance to be struck between these rights?
6. If Jean Valjean’s interests prevail, is it really possible for his past to be forgotten?
Human beings, free by nature and constantly developing, have been trying since the beginning of their existence to discover the secrets of a happy2 and free3 life. For this, there is no doubt that man needs a life worthy of human dignity. The most fundamental requirement for such a life, in turn, is that man be endowed with the rights and freedoms he must have simply by virtue of being human.
Proceeding from the principle that man should live in a manner worthy of human dignity and be able to develop his physical and moral integrity throughout his life, the concept of human rights seeks to determine the most fundamental rights and freedoms that a person must have.4 While human rights law is reflected above all in rights that may be regarded as more fundamental, such as the right to life, the right to health and the right not to be subjected to torture, changing times and developing technology have created a need for new rights to protect the human being.5 For human rights, whose limits were recognised, determined and regulated according to the conditions of the period in which they emerged, are beginning to fall short of protecting the human being adequately.
In this sense, the greatest need has manifested itself in the growing transparency of the individual and the steady narrowing of his sphere of intimacy as technology develops. Whereas at first it was considered sufficient to protect only information relating to private life, over time the need arose to protect every kind of data belonging to the individual. In this way the right to respect for private life came to be recognised, albeit under different names, such as the confidentiality of private life, respect for private and family life, and the protection of private life. In line with this, and independently of it, the right to the protection of personal data was recognised, which is based on the principle that not only data relating to the individual’s private life but all data capable of identifying him must be protected.
The right to be forgotten, too, was regarded, particularly when it first emerged, as a right derived from the right to the protection of personal data.6 Later, however, a debate arose as to whether the right to be forgotten exists as a stand-alone right, independent of the right to the protection of personal data. As the right that has aroused the most curiosity and interest among the rights that have come onto the agenda with the growing awareness of data protection, the right to be forgotten envisages that personal data be forgotten, particularly in the digital environment. This right is one of the newest debates that information technologies have generated in the field of law, and it is a new type of right that has emerged because of information technologies, which enable a person to be remembered by third parties for a long time through his data.
The subject of this study is accordingly the right to be forgotten in all its aspects, from its emergence to the present day. In our study we shall examine how this right emerged through an international judicial decision and then became the subject of international legislation, and after identifying the foundations on which it rests, we shall try to show the point it has reached today both internationally, in the light of legislation and judicial decisions, and in Türkiye, in the light of the decisions of the Court of Cassation and the regulatory acts of the Personal Data Protection Board. In this context, we shall try to determine the place and importance of the right to be forgotten within human rights and within the right to the protection of personal data. The basis of the study can therefore be summarised as follows:
“What does the right to be forgotten signify, where did it suddenly come from, what is its present state and where is it heading?”
In this way, we aim to explain not only the place of this right in the legal order and in legislation but also the philosophical foundations on which it rests, and thus to enable the essence of the right to be forgotten to be understood as a whole.
I. THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
As with the universe, the world and life itself, man too is in constant motion and change. As the famous philosopher Heraclitus said, “No one bathes in the same river twice, for neither the river nor the man is the same any longer. The only thing that does not change is change itself.” Indeed, this is one of the greatest paradoxes of the theory of sanctions, an important part of criminal law. The person who entered prison twenty years ago for committing a serious offence and the person who leaves that prison twenty years later are not the same person. This holds true both for that person’s physiological make-up and for his psychological make-up. Consequently, a person does not want to be constantly associated with his past – especially with its negative aspects. For this reason, being forgotten is, beyond being a right, an indispensable need for the human being. Friedrich Nietzsche, too, sought to express man’s need to forget in the course of living his life as follows: “It is altogether impossible to live at all without forgetting.”7
The right to be forgotten is, in general terms, a new concept that enables individuals to exercise control over their personal data by requesting the removal of any information about them found in various media. This right was first recognised by the European Court of Justice and by certain judges in Argentina8 and was subsequently supported by the data protection authorities of many European countries as well.
The starting point of the right is the premise that it may have harmful consequences for information capable of identifying individuals to remain accessible to third parties even after very many years have passed.
Since the storage of data over very long periods is possible largely thanks to digital systems and technological tools, the field of information technology occupies an important place both as a cause and as a consequence of the right. For today’s technology makes it possible to store, copy, reproduce and process large quantities of data.9 On the other hand, the use of social media, which consist largely of data-sharing sites, pushes people towards sharing more rather than towards confidentiality and privacy. In particular, with the growing number of internet users and the emergence of the internet of things as a hyper-network linking works, writings and concepts to one another, huge quantities of data measurable in zettabytes or petabytes10 are produced and shared on the internet every day.11 Proportionally, the great majority of the data shared in this way consists of personal data. It should also be borne in mind that these personal data are used by the artificial intelligence software that has developed considerably in recent times, and that a piece of personal data about to be forgotten in some corner of the internet is used in the training of this software, in its processing of data and in its generation of new data.
Accordingly, the concrete cases that give rise to the right to be forgotten are also largely based on events taking place in the digital environment. However, although this will be discussed in detail below, it should not be forgotten that data kept in physical form also fall within the scope of the right to be forgotten.
Since what is to be erased under the right to be forgotten is personal data, this right rests first and foremost on the concepts of privacy and data protection. At the same time, it is closely related to intellectual property, reputation and the right to recognition. Criminal law, and in particular the theory of sanctions, is also relevant to the subject as regards the situation of offenders. For the idea that persons who have committed offences should not be constantly associated with and stigmatised by those offences once they have served their sentences and a certain period of time has elapsed thereafter occupies an important place in criminal law.12
At the same time, there is also a group that takes a critical approach to the right on the grounds that the right to be forgotten conflicts with freedom of expression and may cause history to repeat itself. There is also a concern that the right affects a large part of society on a mass scale and that perpetrators who have committed offences may cover up and conceal their offences by means of this right. Consequently, although the right to be forgotten is treated by some as a much-needed fundamental right, it is by no means accepted absolutely by everyone.
Although the right to be forgotten was first shaped by Directive 95/46/EC, it essentially came onto the agenda and began to be debated with the judgment delivered in 2014 by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which will be examined in detail below. Finally, with the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which entered into force on 25 May 2018, it acquired a normative regulation (at least as far as EU Member States are concerned). In this way the right to be forgotten acquired legal status as a right for the first time, under the name “right to erasure”. Although the right to be forgotten has not yet found its place in any statutory provision in Türkiye, it can be seen that certain steps have also been taken on the matter by the Personal Data Protection Board. In court practice, the existence of the right to be forgotten is recognised through case law, especially with regard to the application of Law No. 5651.
It should be noted that, although the GDPR introduced provisions on the erasure of personal data, it does not shed light on the theoretical or philosophical debates concerning the right to be forgotten. Therefore, while an important development has taken place in that the GDPR has placed the right to be forgotten on a statutory footing, it must be said that this alone cannot be a solution to the issue.
A. The Need for a Right to Be Forgotten
A young man contracted the HIV virus as a result of the torture inflicted on people by the illegal armed organisation he had joined and the aggravated sexual assaults he committed in the course of it, and was expelled from the organisation when it came to light that he was a carrier of the virus. He was then tried for the offences he had committed, sent to prison and served his sentence. When he wanted to return to his normal life, however, difficulties began because of both the offences he had committed and his illness: he was shunned by his family, could not find work, could not make friends and realised that everyone was talking about him. Exhausted by this situation, the young man could no longer live with the burden of his past; he no longer wanted to be associated with his past, he wanted to forget it and make a new start. How can we get out of this impasse? What kind of category of right is needed for this?
The internet is a universal, open and vast information space without central control or authority. This information space allows any user to publish his personal photographs, to share his comments and views and even to lay bare all his social relationships before third parties. Another person may also publish any information, true or deceptive, and associate it with that user. As a result, because the sources of the internet are by its nature unlimited and diverse, people find it difficult to control the dissemination of information about themselves. Moreover, there is no certainty whatsoever as to the accuracy, validity or reliability of such information with regard to the person to whom it allegedly relates.
The real problem, however, is that information of this kind relates to people in the real world: in this way people can be harmed, their reputations damaged and their privacy endangered!13
At this point, first of all, the following striking words should be cited about the internet, which has given rise to concepts such as big data, personal data and the right to be forgotten: “Information on the internet is not only accessible but also eternal”.14
The dangers that the internet poses to personal information can be summarised as follows:
• The web does not forget: Once a piece of information has been published on the internet, it can be sent elsewhere and becomes almost impossible to erase. Even if some copies of this information can be deleted, it is always possible that it remains elsewhere.
Attention was also drawn to this danger of the internet in the statement “protect your personal information because the internet never forgets” made by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada on 27 January 2011.15 The statement described the existing danger as follows:
• “You may not realise it, but whenever you go online, you create an identity through the words and images you post and the activities you engage in. This can become part of your reputation, and it can be lasting. Once online, personal information can be difficult to remove. While it may be possible to delete it in one place, there may be versions or copies stored elsewhere that you cannot control. Digital storage is cheap and computer memory is plentiful. Unlike people, the web never forgets. That is why it is important to think about what you do online and to protect your information at all times.” As to the risks entailed by the information on the Web not being erased, the statement drew particular attention to the fact that such information can be used to embarrass people or damage their reputation. Further risks described were that businesses may track this information without informing people and without obtaining their consent, and that the information may, in a manner causing significant personal and financial harm,
be stolen and used. It is considered that, on a web that never forgets, there is a strong public interest in blocking access to personal information that damages people’s reputations.16No single user can control the entire Web: The absence of a central authority and the existence of independent spaces such as social networking sites or blogs governed by different policies make it difficult to control the information available and to create national legislation. Nevertheless, data subjects must have certain rights in order to be able to defend themselves against data that “shape how others perceive them” and that “are the subject of public criticism”.17The impact of information on the Web: On the other hand, it has been shown that information on the Web affects the lives of individuals in one way or another. With each passing day there are more studies showing that information appearing in the mass media and escaping the control of those to whom it relates causes damage to privacy and reputation.18
A survey conducted in 2013 to examine the effects of information on social media on careers19 first found that two thirds of young people were not worried that their use of social media might damage their future career prospects. The same study, however, revealed that ten per cent of young people had been rejected for a job because of their social media profiles and that seven out of ten people responsible for recruitment had rejected candidates on the basis of information found on the Web.
Catherine Davis, president of the Parent Teacher Association, expressed the seriousness of the issue as follows:20 “At the moment, a silly teenage mistake can have a huge impact, and these records can remain for the rest of their lives.” If we had reason to worry that a piece of information about us would be remembered for a longer time, would we express our views on every trivial piece of gossip so freely, would we share our personal
experiences, would we make political comments – or would we censor ourselves?21
This has been explained by saying that the chilling effect of a perfect memory will change our behaviour. Indeed, Stacy Snyder,22 a teacher whose job application was rejected because of information she had shared on the internet, gave the following warning on the subject: “Be careful what you post online.” Andrew Feldmar, a psychotherapist who was detained while crossing from Canada into the United States and banned from entering the United States because reports were found on the internet that he had used narcotic and stimulant substances some forty years earlier, added: “I should warn people that the electronic footprints they leave on the internet will be used against them. They cannot be erased.”23
The fact that an individual’s past is never forgotten causes more problems and harm than criticism of or attacks on his honour or reputation. A person’s inability to escape his past, the remembering of everything in his past exactly as it was, may have adverse effects on the process of building his future. Being reminded of any event or fact in its entirety also prevents the individual from being forgiving towards himself.24
As regards the impact of information on the internet, the American entrepreneur J. D. Lasica pointed out as early as 1998, long before these problems came onto the agenda, that no attention was being paid to the consequences of the internet’s enormous memory : “Everything you publish on the internet may one day come back to haunt you. Accordingly, the traces left online remain even if we try to move away from them: just like a shadow, our online life follows us wherever we go”.25
Thanks to its effect of permanence, the internet preserves bad memories, past recollections, writings, photographs or videos that we may later wish to deny or not to remember. Although forgetting is a normal activity for human beings, it contradicts what is expected of computers: for in the information age, when our data in the computer environment are lost, this is regarded as a failure.26
For human beings, on the other hand, the retention of data such as criminal records and credit histories means that individuals have no chance of being forgotten, either institutionally or socially. Indeed, attention has been drawn to the fact that new technologies affect social forgetting. While attention has rightly been drawn to how widespread data collection practices have become, it has also been underlined that such practices have effects on social memory and reduce forgetting.27
Read together, all of this makes it possible to say that, in order to be happy and free in the most fundamental areas of their lives, such as their working, private and social lives, individuals need information about them, particularly in digital environments, to be erased after a certain time.
In today’s world, this right includes a person’s right to access personal data about him stored and/or processed by others, to control them and sometimes to request their erasure. In practice, the right to be forgotten acts as a shield against media platforms, since these platforms, availing themselves of the right to report news, share a great deal of data, including personal data. Across the internet as a whole, and in e-commerce in particular, this right serves as a tool enabling a person to know and control information concerning his own personal data and possibly to have them erased.28
B. The Emergence of the Right
The right to be forgotten is not only one of the newest rights to have come onto the agenda with the formation and growth of awareness of data protection, but also one of those that have attracted the most interest. Although there is debate as to whether such a right really exists and, if so, what its scope and limits are, there exists a right to be forgotten which emerged to serve as a safeguard against the dangers created by the possibilities offered by information technologies and to meet a present-day need, which has also been recognised over time in decisions of judicial authorities, and which envisages that the data subject be forgotten. Accordingly, an individual whose information was obtained, collected or processed long ago and who no longer has any right of control over those data does not have to bear today the burden of an event that took place at that time. At this point we should note that the event need not necessarily be such as to create a negative judgment about the person. In our day, when personal data are protected in and of themselves, the mere presence of personal data in an event that took place long ago and over which the data subject no longer has any power of participation or control should be sufficient for this right to be invoked.
The first decision concerning the right to be forgotten related to the liability of search engines. The case was brought in 2009 against Google and Yahoo by Milorad (Michael) Trkulja, a 62-year-old living in Melbourne, Australia. The claimant Trkulja alleged that, when the name “Tony Mokbel”, known as a drug baron, was searched on Google and Yahoo, his own name appeared among the results, and that this harmed his personality rights. Although the claimant had been shot in the past, it had never been proven that this incident had anything to do with drug trafficking; nevertheless, searches on Google produced results to that effect. In its defence, Google stated that it was not a content provider and that the search results were automatically retrieved from news sites. The Australian court did not hold Google liable for the content presented; it held, however, that after the claimant had applied to Google, Google should have stopped listing this content. Finding in favour of Trkulja in the action he had brought, the court awarded him damages of 208,000 dollars against Google. This decision is the first known decision on the right to be forgotten and to erasure directed specifically at search engines.29 In the period that followed, the issue continued to come before judicial authorities and gained a little more acceptance with each passing day.
At the end of all these needs and developments, a new type of right emerged in data protection, and thus in the field of information technology: the right to be forgotten30.
C. The Google Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union
1. The Importance and Impact of Internet Search Engines
It is an indisputable fact that the social benefit of internet search engines is enormous. Every day, people all over the world use search engines for various activities such as shopping, research and entertainment, as well as to engage with new ideas or to keep abreast of global developments. Search engines therefore play an effective role in securing fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and access to information in today’s information society31.
In addition to the benefits mentioned above, internet search engines have also raised a number of privacy concerns. In this respect, a twofold distinction can be made:
(1) those relating to the users of search engine services, and (2) those relating to the targets of the search.32 The first group focuses on the privacy claims of persons who use internet search engines. When searching for information online, individuals reveal a great deal of information about themselves – their personal interests, travel plans, political beliefs, sexual preferences, medical conditions and so on. In fact, the data in a search engine’s query log are far more revealing than the content of a private e-mail or telephone conversation.33 The second group consists of the privacy claims of the “targets of the search”. Internet search engines have made it relatively easy to find information about almost anyone. The personal data of a person about whom information is sought by means of a search engine – data that would otherwise remain scattered across company websites, newspaper articles, social network pages, blogs and so on, and that would be very difficult to bring together into a meaningful whole – can easily be collected, and a comprehensive profile of a particular person can thus be created. As a result, people today take a greater interest in the information obtained through search engines, attach importance to it and take it into account in various decision-making processes (recruitment, forming friendships, criminal profiling and so on).34 Especially today, with the use of artificial intelligence, this has become an even easier task. Today even human resources companies, when managing recruitment processes on behalf of their clients, rely on artificial intelligence software that uses these data.
Because of the effects described above, internet search engine service providers face requests for the removal of particular references from search results. For example, individuals may ask a search engine to stop displaying in its search results one or more web pages containing personal data about them. The removal from search results of references to content that is harmful or that infringes privacy without consent can bring considerable relief to the persons affected. At the same time, such a mechanism raises a series of questions: Are search engine providers under an obligation to comply with such requests? Does it make any difference whether the content in question was published lawfully? Should a search engine provider be entrusted with striking the balance between freedom of expression and privacy? These questions lie at the very heart of the Google v. Spain case decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union on 13 May 2014.35
2. The Judgment
The “Google judgment”36 of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “Court”), which intensified interest in and curiosity about the right to be forgotten, is highly significant in that it ensured that this right was also recognised by judicial decisions.37 In the case giving rise to the judgment, a Spanish lawyer named Costeja González claimed that the fact that, when he searched his own name on the Google search engine, newspaper reports were still accessible containing information that he had long ago been forced to sell his property in order to restructure his social security debts constituted a breach of Directive 95/46/EC. Finding in favour of the applicant, the Court, in its judgment of 13 May 2014, relied on Article 12 of the Directive, concerning the data subject’s right of access, and held that personal data published under a person’s name must be erased where, having become invalid or irrelevant, they go beyond their purpose.
The Court did not consider it reasonable that, although the personal information in question had become outdated, it disclosed the data subject’s personal data and financial information, and that this information could still reach a wide audience 10-15 years after the original events. Although these events caused significant moral and economic harm at the time they took place, the circumstances that had led to its publication no longer existed at the time of the proceedings.
The conclusions reached by the Court in answer to the questions referred to it that relate to the right to be forgotten can be summarised as follows:
• Can Google’s activities relating to data published by third parties
be regarded as “processing of data” within the meaning of Article 2(b) of the Directive?38
According to Google, the activity of search engines does not constitute data processing, since it relates to all information available on the internet without any distinction being made between personal data and other information.39
In its examination on this point, the Court drew support from its own decisions in which it had held that the operation of loading personal information onto an internet page constitutes data processing within the meaning of the Directive. Moreover, as regards the main proceedings, the data found, indexed, stored and made available to users by search engines include information relating to identified or identifiable natural persons.40 A search engine collects such data, then records and organises them within the framework of its indexing programmes, stores them on its servers and makes them available to its users in the form of search results.41 In this context, the Court found that the operations listed in Article 2(b) of the Directive were being performed and held that such operations can be classified as data processing.
• Is a search engine, in the context of these activities, to be regarded for the purposes of Article 2(d) of the Directive
as a controller?
In its defence, Google put forward several reasons why it was not a controller. The most important arguments it advanced as to why a search engine provider should not be regarded as a “controller” within the meaning of Art. 2(d) of Directive 95/46/EC are the following: To be regarded as a “controller”, the entity concerned must first of all have the purpose of processing personal data. Google’s search engine, however, indexes websites “indiscriminately” (that is, without targeting personal data as such). Therefore, the search engine provider cannot be considered to act as a “controller” for the processing of the personal data contained on those websites. Rather, the person or entity to be regarded as the “controller” of those data is the publisher of the information. Google’s involvement with the data is, by the very nature of what it does, purely “ancillary”, since the search engine merely makes information published by others more easily accessible. If a publisher decides, for whatever reason, to remove certain information from its website, that information is removed from Google’s index after a certain time and no longer appears in the search results. Consequently, Google argued that the role of a search engine should be regarded as that of an “intermediary” as defined in Articles 12-14 of Directive 2000/31 or as that of a telecommunications service provider as explained in recital 47 of Directive 95/46/EC.42
Against these views of Google, the European Commission and the EU Member States put forward counter-arguments pointing in a very different direction. According to these views, a distinction must first be drawn between the processing activities of publishers (content providers) and those of search engines. Search engines carry out many operations (collection, storage, analysis and ranking of website content and so on) that are entirely different from those carried out by the publisher of the information. Both the purposes and the means of these operations are determined exclusively by the search engine providers. Consequently, search engines should be regarded not merely as “intermediaries” but as providers of a “value-added service” for which they bear their own responsibility. To strengthen this argument, it was submitted that the harm in question resulted mainly from Google’s activities, because if the content had not been so easily accessible through the search engine, the damage to the reputation of the claimant (Gonzales) would have been much smaller.43
The Court first pointed out that, in order to ensure effective and complete protection of data subjects, both the wording and the purpose of Article 2(d) of the Directive must be interpreted broadly. In an examination conducted in this context, it would be wrong to exclude the search engine from the scope of that provision on the ground that it has no control over the personal data published on third parties’ web pages.44
Furthermore, according to the Court, the processing of data by search engine operators must be regarded as distinct from and additional to the processing carried out on the websites to which the search results relate.45 Consequently, the Court concluded that search engines must be regarded as controllers on the ground that they process personal data and play a decisive role in that processing.46
While there are different views as to whether search engines are to be regarded as controllers in the context of this activity, the majority shares the Court’s view. Simon Hughes, a Member of the United Kingdom Parliament at the time the judgment was delivered, argued, in line with the Court’s judgment, that search engines should be regarded as controllers. For these search engines are, as it were, a gateway to the system and generally decide whether personal data are to be processed in the first place. Accordingly, being a controller should not be confined to deciding on the purpose of processing: if you are the gateway to the system, the mere fact that you are an intermediary does not mean that you are not a controller.47
Along the same lines, Chris Scott,48 a former partner of the firm Schillings, considers that Google does not merely provide information passively but also shapes the search results. In his view, there is a competitive environment among search engines, and the aim of search engines seeking to get ahead in this competition is to help users find exactly what they want. For this reason, throughout this process, search engines perform a function that, through the use of algorithms, helps to determine the manner and purposes of the processing of data.49
On the other hand, there are also contrary views on this matter. Professor Neil Cameron, for example, stated that he does not consider search engines to be controllers within the meaning of the Directive and that he agrees with the opinion submitted on the case by Advocate General Jääskinen.50
In his opinion, Advocate General Jääskinen states: “Where internet search engine service providers are regarded as controllers in respect of their personal data processing activities, Article 6(2) of the Directive obliges them to weigh the interests of the controller, or of the third parties in whose interests the processing is carried out, against those of the data subjects. As the Court examined in ASNEF and FECEMD, whether the data in question are already available in public sources is a matter relevant to striking this balance.”51
• Can such information, although it was lawfully published by third parties,
be condemned to oblivion under Articles 12 and 14 of the Directive?
In this context, attention must first be drawn to the nature of the information. For the information whose erasure was requested by the applicant is accurate and was lawfully disseminated. The Court nevertheless stated that, for there to be processing incompatible with the Directive, the data need not be inaccurate. Accordingly, it must be examined in particular whether the processing is inadequate, irrelevant or excessive in relation to its purposes. In this context, an incompatibility may arise from the fact that the information has not been kept up to date.52 Thus, on the basis of the provisions of the Directive, even the initially “lawful” processing of “accurate” data may, over time, become processing incompatible with the Directive. This is the case in particular where the data are no longer necessary for the purposes for which they were collected or processed at the time, where they are inadequate or irrelevant, or where they are “excessive” in relation to those purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed.53
In the light of these findings, the Court takes the view that information and links in the list of results must be erased where they are inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing carried out by the operator of the search engine.54 The Court further stated that, under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the data subject may request that his information no longer be made available to the public by being included in such a list of results.
Applying its findings and explanations to the case at hand, the Court indicated the circumstances in which the right to be forgotten may come into play and listed the elements of the right:55
• In the list of results that a user obtains from a search on Google on the basis of the name of the data subject concerned, an online daily newspaper archive that mentions the data subject’s name and the transactions he carried out in order to pay his social security debts contains “information relating to the data subject’s private life” (presence of information relating to private life).
• Given that a “period” of sixteen years has elapsed since this information concerning the data subject was first published, the data subject considers that the information should no longer appear in such a list linked to his name (passage of time).
• In the case at hand, when the public’s access to information concerning the data subject in the context of such a search is considered together with the applicant’s request, it appears that there are no particular reasons establishing a preponderant interest of the public in having access to this information (establishing a link between access by the public and the request of the data subject).
Consequently, the Court held that, in order to comply with Articles 12 and 14 of the Directive, the search engine must remove from the list of results subsequently displayed the information published by third parties as relating to the data subject. Moreover, in the light of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the request that information concerning the data subject no longer be included in the list of search results is related not only to the economic interests of the search engine operator but also to the interest of the public in having access to that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name . At this point, therefore, a balance must be struck between the interference with the data subject’s fundamental rights and the preponderant interests of the public.56
Briefly assessing this judgment of the Court, the following observations must be made with regard to the right to be forgotten:
•
•
•
•
•
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For the right to be forgotten to come into play, there must be a personal data processing activity and a controller carrying out that processing activity.
Information that was accurate and lawfully disseminated may, over time, become a personal data processing activity incompatible with the Directive. At this point, although the case at hand concerned personal data that were accurate and lawfully disseminated, there is no explanation as to whether the right to be forgotten may also be invoked against personal data published inaccurately or unlawfully.
Personal data that have become incompatible with the Directive are mostly data that are no longer necessary, are inadequate or irrelevant for the purposes for which they were collected or processed, or are “excessive” in relation to those purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed.
In such a situation, one should speak of a right of the data subject to request that his information no longer be made public.
The Court made the legal finding of the right to be forgotten by stating that this right arises from a combined reading of Articles 12 and 14 of the Directive and Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Finally, a balance must be struck between the data subject’s request that his information no longer be made public, on the one hand, and the economic interest of search engine operators as well as the interest of the public in having access to the information in question, on the other. In this way, the relationship between the right to be forgotten and other rights and freedoms was established and, as will be examined below, the basis was laid for the exceptions to the right. It is therefore clear that the right is not absolute.
Viviane Reding, who served as the European Union’s Commissioner for Justice between 2010 and 2014, welcomed the Court’s judgment, saying that it was a clear victory for the protection of Europeans’ personal data. Reding said: “The Court has confirmed the need to bring today’s data protection rules out of the ‘digital stone age’ and into today’s modern computing world.”57
3. Google’s Initiatives to Implement the Judgment
Although the Court’s judgment was delivered, in the case at hand, with regard to González, who had requested that access to information about him be restricted, it is clear that its impact is much greater. The judgment applies to all data subjects and, as mentioned above, a large number of applications on the subject were made to Google shortly after the judgment. It must therefore be said that the judgment has imposed an enormous burden even on a company as large as Google.
As part of these obligations, Google first made available to its users, on 29 May 2014, a web form through which requests for the removal of search results could be submitted.58 The requests made in this way are also reported to the public through the “Google Transparency Report”59. According to it, since 29 May 2014 requests for the removal of more than 6 million URLs have been received.
Google further stated in this web form that it removes only the results produced by a search conducted on the basis of the data subject’s name. Accordingly, it was explained that if, for example, Google approved a request by John Smith to remove an article about his trip to Paris, these results would not be displayed for queries relating to “John Smith”, but might be displayed for a query such as “trip to Paris”.60
This point is important for determining the scope of the right to be forgotten. The Court stated that the results to be removed were initially lawfully published, but that search results which subsequently became “unnecessary, inadequate, irrelevant or excessive” had become unlawful and therefore had to be removed. Google interpreted this as applying only to searches made on the basis of a name.
Indeed, the Article 29 Working Party stated in the Guidelines61 it published on the subject that the judgment affects only the results obtained from searches made on the basis of an individual’s name and does not call for the page to be deleted entirely or removed from the indexes. Accordingly, the page can still be accessed using other search terms. It was therefore concluded that the right applies to the possible different combinations of the name, including the individual’s surname or different spellings.62 Search terms relating to “pseudonyms and nicknames” also fall within this scope where it can be established that they are linked to the individual’s real identity.63
We consider the judgment to be correct in this respect as regards the right to be forgotten. Personal data consist of any information relating to a natural person or making a natural person identifiable. It is therefore possible to process personal data by processing information in very many different numbers and combinations. To require that these combinations be anticipated and kept from appearing in the search engine would be contrary to the ordinary course of life, a burden that search engines could not bear and a demand impossible to implement in the digital environment. This demand must therefore be reasonably limited. Indeed, the Court effected this limitation by its judgment.
On the other hand, in a statement made on 30 May 2014, Google announced that it had set up an Advisory Council64 to comply with the requirements of the judgment. The statement explained that the Court’s judgment had confronted Google with a difficult decision regarding the individual’s right to be forgotten and the public’s right to know, and that it had preferred to seek the help of experts so that these issues could be addressed in detail, properly assessed and put into practice. It can therefore be said that Google took positive steps to enable the judgment to be implemented.
Nonetheless, irrespective of Google’s initiatives in this direction, the question arose whether it is right to leave decisions on the removal of search results to search engines, and this has been the subject of criticism. According to this view, the fact that applications are to be made directly to search engines and are to be assessed and decided by the search engines themselves may make it difficult for the judgment to be implemented in a genuine sense.65
Finally, it is necessary to address how Google has handled the requests made to it and what criteria it has used in assessing them. This makes it possible to gain an idea of the circumstances in which the right to be forgotten will be applied and of its scope.
Google states that, in dealing with requests on the subject, it seeks to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the individual’s privacy rights as a whole and, on the other, the public’s interest in access to information as well as the rights relating to the accessibility of information, classified as the webmaster’s right to distribute information. It stated that, in assessing requests, it examines whether the search results whose removal is requested contain outdated or irrelevant information about the data subject and whether the information is of relevance to the public.66
Google explained that it conducts this process within the framework of the principles laid down by the Article 29 Working Party and that it has adopted, in particular, the following criteria:67
• Is the data subject a public figure?
• Was the content whose removal is requested made public by the data subject of his own accord?
• Could the data subject have known that the content would be publicly available?
• Do the data have a disproportionate impact on the data subject’s personal privacy?
• Do the search results contain information that puts the data subject at risk?
Google has been criticised on this point too, on the ground that it is not sufficiently transparent as to how the privacy of data subjects is balanced against the public interest. Another aspect that has been criticised is the absence of independent oversight in the application mechanism. In response to these criticisms, Google admitted that it was itself struggling to implement the judgment and stated that it was taking all necessary steps to comply with it in the best possible way.68
4. The Question Whether the Judgment Can Be Implemented
At this point, it must first be noted that the judgment applies to all search engines and therefore imposes an enormous burden on the world of information technology. Although Google was the search engine directly party to the case before the Court, the Court’s judgment is binding on all search engines, large and small. In terms of market share, Google is the largest search engine in Europe and is most likely the party that will face the majority of requests for the removal of links. Indeed, the statistics on applications published after the judgment clearly show this.69
Since this was a first, precedent-setting judgment, it is clear that, even though it does not directly bind other search engines, the same result will be reached in similar cases. The conclusions drawn from this judgment and the commentary on it therefore in fact have an indirect binding effect on other search engines as well. Search engines other than Google are thus, in a sense, also addressees of this judgment and have to take measures similar to those taken by Google.
As to whether the judgment can be implemented, Google has published the requests addressed to it: after the Court’s judgment it received, across Europe as a whole, twelve thousand requests in the first twenty-four hours and about forty thousand in the first four days.70 It was stated that the requests received within a single month meant that Google staff had to review millions of URLs. This is therefore an enormous burden even by the standards of a global company such as Google. Professor Luciano Floridi, appointed by Google as a member of the Advisory Council on the judgment, answered the question whether it was possible in practice for Google to comply with the judgment as follows: “Yes… compliance, the real issue here is not complying with the judgment”.71
Besides raising many new issues for debate, the judgment is regarded as a symbol of the express recognition of the right, in that it largely put an end to the debate on whether a right to be forgotten really exists.72 So much so that, after the judgment, there was a huge increase in the number of applications on the subject, and the courts began to recognise the data subject’s right to be forgotten.
II. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
A. Definition
Because the right to be forgotten is a new type of right, it has no settled definition either in academic studies on the subject or in international instruments. Moreover, the number of studies specifically devoted to the subject is very limited, and the statutory provisions in which the right appears have not yet reached a level that meets the need. This is connected not only with the fact that the right is very new but also with its relationship to IT law. The dynamic and complex structure of IT law makes it a field that is both constantly developing and open to debate on many points.73
Although this holds true for every branch of law, it is more striking in IT law. For while many legal rules need to be renewed as society changes and develops, the legal rules in the field of IT law depend on the development of technology. Technology, in turn, develops much faster than society changes. Indeed, technology has reached such a point that it gives direction to society; the whole world, all countries and societies, are moving in step with technological developments. The legal norms of IT law therefore require a much faster dynamism. This, in turn, makes it difficult to determine the definition and scope of concepts related to IT law.
In its most general terms, the right to be forgotten is a person’s claim to be forgotten by having access to his data blocked.74 For some reason, the individual does not wish information about him that is accessible to be reached and disseminated, and regards this as contrary to his interests. Whether this information must be accurate, and the question of its currency, will be explained below in connection with the elements of the right. Before going into these detailed explanations, however, the following questions must never be overlooked and must always be kept in mind:
– What do we protect with the right to be forgotten?
– Whom do we protect with this right?
– Against what does this right protect people?
– Against whom does this right protect people?75
In Directive 95/46/EC and the GDPR, the right to be forgotten is dealt with under erasure and is not directly defined. Accordingly, personal data must be erased where the data subject withdraws his explicit consent to the processing of personal data, or where the legitimate purposes for which the personal data are processed have ceased to exist and there is no other purpose. It has been explained that the right to be forgotten additionally entails that, where the personal data subject to erasure have been made public, the controller must take all reasonable steps to inform all processors responsible for processing those data, so that all copies of the data are erased.76
As far as our national law is concerned, the most comprehensive definition of the subject was given by the General Civil Assembly of the Court of Cassation in its decision of 17 June 2015 as follows: “The right to be forgotten is defined as the right to request, unless there is an overriding public interest, that negative events experienced in the past and contained in the digital memory be forgotten after a certain time, and that personal data which a person does not wish others to know be erased and their dissemination prevented.”
In the light of the foregoing explanations, the right to be forgotten is a new right which, by enabling individuals to request the removal of any information about them found in a physical or digital medium, ensures that they are no longer associated with the personal data in question and are forgotten, and which thus serves to give them control over their personal data.
B. Methods of Exercising the Right
The right to be forgotten can generally be exercised by four different methods: de-referencing, anonymisation, erasure and restriction of access. The question that arises here is how realistic these methods are and whether they ensure the exercise of this right.77
While memorising and remembering information requires conscious effort on the part of human beings, forgetting is a process that takes place naturally and unconsciously. Unlike the human brain, however, there has as yet been no scientific advance that would implement this mechanism for computers. On the contrary, in the world of computers forgetting is a technical challenge and requires conscious effort.78
The right to be forgotten cannot be seen merely as a right to erase information or to prevent its dissemination. In a rapidly developing technological world, this right must be understood and dealt with in a multifaceted way. In essence, the right to be forgotten is an expanding right and can also be defined as the right of individuals to better control their personal data. In the post-internet era, just as when it first emerged before the internet, this right finds its legitimacy in the recognition of individuals’ personal freedom, human dignity and right to self-fulfilment. The right to be forgotten, whose real justification is privacy, manifests itself as the individual’s right to control his personal information and to withdraw or erase it even after he has shared his data. In this context, Whitman has framed the subject very well: “the right to privacy appears as a right to informational self-determination, the right of the individual to control the kinds of information disclosed about him”.79 This approach, however, by no means implies that individuals can retain control over information that is in the public interest.80
C. Its Elements
Nevertheless, an ordinary person and an ordinary piece of information about that person are not sufficient for this right to come into play. For the right to arise and be applicable, the medium in which the information about the person is found must display certain characteristics. Understanding these characteristics in turn depends on the elements of the right to be forgotten. In this way, what exactly the right to be forgotten signifies can be better understood.
As mentioned above, although the right to be forgotten does not have clear, specific and limited elements, given that it does not yet have settled foundations, its elements can be roughly summarised as follows:
1. The Element of Personal Data Made Public81
The subject matter of a person’s right to be forgotten consists of personal data that have been made public. More precisely, the subject of a person’s request, made by exercising the right to be forgotten, for access to be blocked is his personal data that are in the public domain. By exercising this right, the person seeks to block access to his personal data. What is at issue, therefore, is the individual’s right and power to request that information which can be associated with him be forgotten. For personal data means any information that identifies or serves to identify a natural person. At this point, although the protection of personal data is closely related to the right to be forgotten, in order not to stray from the subject we confine ourselves to giving the definition of personal data and do not attempt to provide detailed information on data protection.82 After all, we shall refer frequently to the concept of personal data throughout the study, and we shall also address the right to the protection of personal data when discussing the relationship of the right to be forgotten with other rights.
While the subject matter of the individual’s right to be forgotten will be his personal data, it should be noted that these personal data must be in the public domain. In addition, the presence of the criteria explained separately below must also be assessed.
a. The Status of the Personal Data at the Moment They Were First Made Public and Disseminated
Whether the personal data that the individual may make the subject of the right to be forgotten were lawfully disseminated in the first place is important for the element of personal data. By lawful dissemination is meant that one of the conditions for the processing of personal data was present or, where none of those conditions was present at all, that the data subject had given his explicit consent.
For example, looking at the concrete cases that most frequently give rise to the right to be forgotten, one may mention the situation of a person who has committed an offence. Reporting this person as news on television channels or websites undoubtedly constitutes an interference with his private life and with his right to the protection of personal data. Nevertheless, when the person’s rights thus interfered with are weighed against freedom of expression and freedom of the press and the right to receive information in the public interest, reporting on the person is the superior interest, because society has a right to receive news. For it should not be forgotten that fundamental rights and freedoms such as the right to respect for private life and the protection of personal data may also be restricted, where the conditions are met, in accordance with the principle of proportionality.
Where there is no legitimate purpose for the processing of personal data, the explicit consent of the person concerned is required for the data to be processed. It should be noted that, in a given case, obtaining explicit consent where one of the conditions for processing personal data is present is unlawful. The individual’s explicit consent to the processing of his data – in other words, to their being made public and disseminated – or the fact that he himself made them public indicates the existence of explicit consent, and so one is again dealing with personal data that were lawful at the moment they were first published. An example is the posts made by the data subject, usually via social networking sites. With the development of technology, individuals have come to be in a position to post on the internet. Indeed, many of the posts made today are of this kind.83 A person’s dissemination of his personal data via a social networking site or any site, channel or blog of his own falls within this scope.
Consequently, personal data disseminated to the public under one of the conditions for processing personal data or on the basis of the data subject’s explicit consent are data that were lawfully disseminated at the outset.
The point to be discussed here is whether, in order for personal data to be the subject of the right to be forgotten, they must have been lawful at the moment they were first disseminated, or whether both situations qualify, irrespective of whether they were lawful or unlawful. There are different views on this matter: According to one view, information that is the subject of the right to be forgotten must have been lawfully disseminated.84 Information that was lawfully disseminated may later be made the subject of the right to be forgotten by the data subject. According to another view, one of the features that distinguishes the right to be forgotten from other rights is that its subject matter covers not only unlawful data but also data that were lawful at the time of publication. On this view, the right to be forgotten is a right applicable to data disseminated both unlawfully and lawfully.85 Some authors, without directly imposing a limitation of this kind, have pointed out that, when the cases giving rise to the right to be forgotten are examined, the information in question is generally information that was initially made public lawfully, and that the person requesting to be forgotten does not generally claim that the information was made public unlawfully or that it is inaccurate. Since a generalisation has been made here on the basis of the concrete cases to date, we consider this an accurate observation as regards the current situation86.
In our opinion, it is not possible to draw a strict distinction to the effect that the subject matter of the right to be forgotten consists only of data disseminated unlawfully or only of data disseminated lawfully. Nor, indeed, do we consider this to be correct. For where the personal data in question were first published unlawfully, there is nothing to prevent this from being made the subject of the right to be forgotten. The following situation may arise here: there is no benefit or need at all in making personal data that were unlawfully disseminated from the outset the subject of the right to be forgotten. For in such a case there is a violation of the right to the protection of personal data, which is protected more comprehensively and more clearly than the right to be forgotten, and, along with it, very probably – though not always – a violation of the right to respect for private life. Consequently, where personal data have been disseminated unlawfully, it will not be in the data subject’s interest to seek his rights by means of the right to be forgotten. In this case it would be more sensible for him to claim that his right to the protection of personal data or, where the conditions are met, his right to respect for private life has been violated. Nevertheless, we consider that a strict distinction to the effect that unlawfully disseminated data cannot be the subject of the right to be forgotten should not be drawn unless there is a statutory provision to that effect.
b. Whether the Personal Data Are Accurate
Whether the personal data that are the subject of the right to be forgotten must be accurate is another aspect of the element of personal data that needs to be discussed. There is, of course, no need to discuss at this point inaccurate information that does not identify the person. However, it is debatable what happens where personal data, although capable of pointing to a natural person, contain inaccurate or incomplete information. Such a situation arises, for example, where a person was acquitted in proceedings conducted against him but information spreads at his workplace that he was convicted in those proceedings.
In essence, personal data that were inaccurate at the moment they were first published are in a situation similar to that of personal data published unlawfully. In our opinion, here too it may be wrong to draw a line to the effect that inaccurate information can in no way be the subject of the right to be forgotten. For in this case the data subject can again avail himself, under the umbrella of the right to the protection of personal data, which is more comprehensive than the right to be forgotten, of the rights to rectification or updating of data. Here, too, it will therefore not be in his interest to resort to the right to be forgotten. However, the data subject is not obliged to request that inaccurate information about him be corrected with the accurate information either; in that case he may request its erasure directly. We must nevertheless state that there is nothing to prevent inaccurate information from being the subject of the right to be forgotten.
c. Whether the Personal Data Must Contain a Negative Judgment
Finally, as regards the element of personal data, it must be examined whether personal data that are the subject of the right to be forgotten, although lawful and accurate at the moment they were first published, must contain a negative judgment as far as the data subject is concerned. That is to say, the data in question were lawfully disseminated and carry accurate information about the data subject. In such a case, must there be negative judgments about the data subject for the right to be forgotten to come into play? Or can the right to be forgotten be exercised irrespective of whether they are negative or positive?
By a negative judgment is meant that data about the person that would disturb him are accessible. For example, a newspaper report on an offence he committed, or an image which he himself shared on his social media account but which could give rise to negative opinions about him, falls within this scope. In fact, the question to be asked here is this: Must the data necessarily contain a negative judgment about the data subject for him to be disturbed by the data being accessed? Can the data subject not, invoking entirely subjective reasons, later be disturbed by a photograph that objectively contains nothing negative? This is of course possible. A person may not want a photograph or video shared today to be accessible later, or may rely on a wish simply not to appear in the press even though the newspaper report about him is laudatory.
At this point we should note that the event need not necessarily be such as to create a negative judgment about the person. In our day, when personal data are protected in and of themselves, the mere presence of personal data in an event that took place long ago and over which the data subject no longer has any power of participation or control should be sufficient for this right to be invoked. This should therefore be left to the discretion of the data subject. For an approach whereby only bad personal data may be requested to be forgotten is incompatible with the fundamental principles of data protection law. It is the data subject who will determine what is good or bad and who will decide whether, good or bad, he wishes to be associated with that information.
2. The Element of the Person
Whether the right to be forgotten is granted only to natural persons or whether legal persons may also benefit from it is another controversial aspect of the right.
Determining whether the right to be forgotten is to be applied to legal persons is essentially a matter of one’s approach to the right. If it is regarded as a human right, it cannot be expected to apply to legal persons. If, on the other hand, one argues for the protection of the personality of legal persons as well and for preventing damage to their honour and reputation, the view that legal persons may also benefit from the right to be forgotten can be adopted.
Going back a little further, one’s approach to the right to the protection of personal data, to which the right to be forgotten is closely linked, is also important. We should state that we believe the right to the protection of personal data should be regarded as a human right.87 The right to be forgotten has principles similar to those of data protection and is, moreover, based on a person’s need to be forgotten as he goes on with his life. We therefore consider that, in view of its origin and the theoretical foundations on which it rests, the right to be forgotten should be regarded as a human right and applied only to natural persons. We must, however, also emphasise that this reflects today’s perspective and that it may change according to the role of legal persons.
Indeed, the right to be forgotten is currently applied only to natural persons. While even its application to natural persons involves a great deal of debate, the question of legal persons is still highly uncertain. Nonetheless, there have been various concrete cases involving requests that legal persons also be allowed to benefit from the right to be forgotten, and this is being debated, particularly in European countries.
As stated above, the situation of legal persons will be dealt with in detail later. At this point we must underline once again that, in the current state of the right to be forgotten, a natural person must be involved for the element of the person to be fulfilled, and that there is no practice to the contrary.
3. The Element of Time
Perhaps the most important reason why the right to be forgotten occupies a position quite different from that of other rights is the element of time. While the passage of time is of no significance for other rights, and indeed the right is usually exercised at the moment the unlawfulness and the violation occur, the situation is quite different with the right to be forgotten. More than that, whether the right to be forgotten comes into play depends precisely on the time that has elapsed; in other words, the element constituting the unlawfulness in the case of the right to be forgotten is the passage of time.
As stated above, the absence of any unlawfulness at the moment personal data were first made public and disseminated means either that one of the conditions for processing was present or that the data subject’s explicit consent was relied on. In the case of unlawful processing, since the right to the protection of personal data is in any event being violated, that right can be invoked directly and there is no benefit in exercising the right to be forgotten. For if a situation detrimental to the data subject exists at the moment of publication, the data subject can assert the unlawfulness and seek his rights through the rights to the protection of private life or to the protection of personal data. In the case of personal data that were lawfully disseminated at the outset, however, the right to be forgotten comes into play later because of the time that has elapsed or because of changed circumstances. Consequently, in the case of the right to be forgotten one is mostly dealing with a situation that was lawful at the outset.
So what changes, such that the right to be forgotten can come into play with regard to a lawful situation? This is where the time elapsing between the date on which the data were first published and the moment at which the right to be forgotten is sought to be exercised comes into play. During this period, the following changes may occur in data that were lawfully disseminated at the outset:
• the purposes for which the personal data were processed cease to exist,
• inadequate, incomplete, irrelevant or erroneous information about the data subject is present,
• information that lies outside the purposes of processing or exceeds them is present, or uses and disseminations contrary to the purposes of processing take place,
• information that is excessively related to the data subject is present even in view of the purposes of processing,
• the importance of the information for the public diminishes,
• above all, the time that has elapsed, the changed circumstances and the changed person.
Looking at the first of the changes that may occur, we see a close relationship with data protection law. For in these cases a personal data processing activity that was lawful mostly becomes unlawful and is therefore subject to the data protection provisions. This is the source of the close relationship between the right to be forgotten and the right to the protection of personal data. So much so that it is even argued that the right to be forgotten forms an inseparable whole with the right to the protection of personal data and should be treated as one of its components. Although we do not share this view, we wish to underline a relationship that is close and cannot be separated by clear-cut lines. Consequently, although the first-mentioned situations are the subject of data protection law, it is also possible for these situations to come into play within the scope of the right to be forgotten.
There is, however, a question of time that goes far beyond these, and it is this area that the right to be forgotten is really about. This area is the point at which the right to be forgotten, which at times intersects with other rights, becomes distinct from them.
The importance of the element of time manifests itself, first, in the diminishing importance of information for the public as time passes. Accordingly, a historical event should no longer be revived after a long period has elapsed. The further back a piece of information dates, the greater the likelihood that private interests will prevail over public interests. For while the person’s control over information from the past increases, the importance and significance of that information for the public diminish88.
Beyond this, as stated above, life and man himself are in constant motion and change. Time is one of the greatest causes of this change. With the passage of time, circumstances and people constantly change. At the end of such a change, the individual mostly does not want to be associated with what he was before the change. Although this is mostly the case after a bad event experienced in the past, a bad event need not always have occurred. Change does not mean that someone who was bad and therefore committed an offence later turns into a very good person and no longer does wrong. Moreover, an approach in terms of purely bad or purely good people would also lead whoever is making the assessment into error.
It cannot be denied, however, that the right to be forgotten comes into play mostly after an offence has been committed or after a bad event has befallen a person. After all, even if the individual sees that he or the circumstances have changed, he mostly does not want good information disseminated about him to be forgotten. For example, the likelihood that a businessman who went through a bad period in his commercial life and went bankrupt would want to be associated with this event years later is much lower than the likelihood that another businessman would want to be associated with his successes or with the charitable work he has done, even after a very long time. In our opinion, while there is no obstacle to or drawback in the data subject’s benefiting from the right to be forgotten in such a case too, it is a concrete fact that in practice the right is used almost entirely in relation to bad events.
This is where the relationship of criminal law with the right to be forgotten comes in. For this is one of the greatest unresolved problems of criminal law. An individual is sentenced to imprisonment for very many years for an offence he has committed, but during this period the individual (the convict) who has been sentenced and whose sentence is being executed himself changes. Although it is generally believed and hoped that this will be so, this should not be perceived solely as a change for the better and forward-looking. In any event, however, change is inevitable.
Consequently, the individual changes both physically and psychologically with the passage of time. This being so, he does not want to be constantly associated with “what he was before” or, more generally, with his past. For this reason, as far as the element of time is concerned, being forgotten is not so much a wish as an indispensable need for the individual, so that he can carry on his life as he wishes and independently of the bad events he experienced in the past.
Indeed, Friedrich Nietzsche theorised this need in his work on what he called the “thesis of active forgetting”. Nietzsche based man’s need to forget on historicity.
In his view, the greatest difference between humans and animals is the difference of “historicity”: animals have no historicity and live without feeling any difference between yesterday and today. Humans, by contrast, unlike animals, have a historical consciousness, and their past is constantly with them. According to Nietzsche, the only condition for being happy is to succeed in forgetting.89
A person’s ability to forget, however, undoubtedly depends on his being forgotten. Only when he is forgotten and no longer associated with his past can he, too, forget. Consequently, leaving the other elements aside, we consider that, as regards the right to be forgotten, the element of time is important for understanding the thinking and philosophy underlying the right.
At this point the question may arise whether a certain period of time must elapse before the right to be forgotten can be invoked. We must state that an approach whereby the right may be exercised once a clearly and precisely predetermined period has elapsed is in any case incompatible with the philosophy we have sought to describe above. Nor, indeed, is this the case. However, since a person’s wish to benefit from the right to be forgotten mostly depends on a certain period having been left behind or on certain changes having taken place, it can be said that, by the very nature of the right to be forgotten, a certain amount of time has mostly passed. This does not mean, however, that there is a specific period that must elapse.
Consequently, at the heart of the right to be forgotten lies the right of the person to object, after a certain time has passed, to information about him being used in different contexts. The right to be forgotten is therefore directly linked to the concept of the autonomy of information. A piece of information about a person’s past may not have disturbed him at the time it arose; with the passage of time, however, the indexing of this information by search engines on the internet may cause various disadvantages for the data subject, and the person may not wish to be associated with that information. In this context, the right to be forgotten also includes the person’s right to change his mind or to regret the information in question. People’s unwillingness to have any information about them constantly remembered constitutes the essence of being forgotten described above; the right to be forgotten thus gives the person the opportunity to regain the control he has lost over information about him.
4. The Medium in Which the Data Are Found
Finally, it must be examined whether the right to be forgotten displays any particular feature with regard to the medium in which the personal data are found. Must the personal data to which the data subject wishes to block access be in the digital environment? Or can the right to be forgotten also be exercised with regard to personal data found in a physical medium?
At this point, we would first like to address the origin of this question. As stated earlier, the right to be forgotten came onto the agenda with the development of information technologies. Although the importance of forgetting has always been known, such protection was not needed before, because there was no medium in which data could be stored for so long that they would need to be forgotten. At the point we have now reached, however, information technologies have made this possible, enabling both the recording of very large numbers of data and their storage over long periods. That is why, although the need for data to be forgotten has always existed, the need for this to be regulated and protected by law essentially arose with information technology tools. So much so that there are views treating the right to be forgotten as a type of right belonging to IT law.
There is therefore no doubt that the legal recognition and protection of the right to be forgotten has come about essentially thanks to information technologies. Nevertheless, I do not consider it right, in view of the individual’s need to forget, to accept a right to be forgotten relating only to data in the digital environment for this reason alone. For it is possible for data found in a physical medium also to be the subject of the right to be forgotten. Indeed, in a decision of the General Civil Assembly of the Court of Cassation on the subject, which will be explained in more detail below, it was also expressly accepted, with the words “…not only for personal data in the digital environment…”, that the right to be forgotten may be applied to data found in a physical medium.
D. Purpose and Protected Values
From a broad perspective, the logic of rights and of the values they protect also supports such a right. First, individuals rightly take a great interest in keeping their data secure and therefore also show a desire to erase data concerning them. Apart from this interest, and on a much simpler approach, individuals claim a right of this kind because they believe they ought to have it.90
This idea coincides with research conducted by the University of Pennsylvania in 2009 on attitudes towards behavioural advertising. According to this research, 92% of respondents believed that there should be a law requiring websites and advertising companies to delete all information about an individual “if requested”. Although this may not appear sufficient to draw definitive conclusions, it does indicate a situation that must be taken seriously. For it shows that the right enjoys support, even if at a pragmatic level. Indeed, Google’s CEO Eric Schmidt confirmed this in a statement made on 6 May 2013.91 In his view, the lack of a delete button on the internet is a debatable and important issue, because there is a time when deletion is the right thing.92
The values that the right to be forgotten seeks to protect can be grouped under three headings. The first manifests itself across society as a whole, while the second concerns the data subject. Finally, mention can be made of the aim of preventing data pollution through erasure.
1. The Right to Be Forgotten as a Human Right
As regards the values it protects, the right to be forgotten must first be considered within the scope of human rights. At this point, rather than the debate as to whether or not the right to be forgotten is directly a human right, we would like to draw attention to a different point. The first value protected by the right to be forgotten must be considered from a perspective quite different from and broader than the safeguard and protection it provides for the data subject.
As far as the subject under examination is concerned, there is no doubt that fundamental rights and freedoms such as the right to respect for private life, freedom of expression and freedom of communication are human rights. In addition, the right to the protection of personal data is also largely regarded as a human right, although not all doubts have yet been entirely dispelled. In order to determine whether the right to be forgotten also falls within this scope, one must look at the fundamental principles adopted by the concept of human rights.
The concept of human rights can be defined as the rights that a person has from birth simply by virtue of being human, deriving from his physical and mental existence. Understanding human rights, however, is not possible merely through the definition of this concept. Human rights embody an ideal that goes far beyond and is far more comprehensive than the definition of a concept, word or phrase. For this, one must look at the concepts and events that form the basis of human rights and that can guide us as to what we should understand by human rights.
Human rights are based, first and foremost, on the protection of the individual’s physical and moral existence.93 The yardstick for a person’s ability to develop his physical and moral existence is human dignity.94 The reason for this is that, for a person’s personality to be protected and developed, he must be able to exist in a manner worthy of human dignity. According to the Constitutional Court, human dignity is the recognition of and respect for the value that a human being acquires simply by being human, whatever his situation and whatever the circumstances in which he finds himself. It is a line of conduct such that treatment falling below it deprives the human being subjected to it of his humanity.95
The idea that the rights which have emerged to remedy the adverse effects of technology on human life essentially aim to protect human dignity reveals the relationship of the right to be forgotten, too, with human dignity. With technological developments and the spread of the internet, the exposure of private life to view and the narrowing of the sphere of privacy have increased the risk of human dignity being impaired. Since human dignity constitutes a sphere too indispensable to be left in danger, new rights must be developed to protect this sphere. The right to be forgotten, although it has existed historically for a long time, is one of the rights developed on the basis of this idea. It can therefore be said that the right to be forgotten essentially aims to protect human dignity.
This relationship was in fact first set out in the “Lebach”96 decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 5 June 1973. The decision concerned a robbery of an ammunition depot of the German armed forces and the sentries who were killed and seriously wounded during the robbery. A convict who had been arrested in connection with this event and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment claimed, after a German television channel had turned the event into a documentary and frequently repeated his name, that this constituted an attack on his personality rights, and sought a ban on the documentary and damages.
The Mainz Regional Court stated that the convict was “a relative figure of contemporary history” and therefore could not rely on the right to protection of his personality. The Koblenz Court of Appeal, for its part, accepted that the case had to be assessed in conjunction with the personality rights protected by Articles 1 and 2 of the German Basic Law. Nevertheless, in its decision it found that, in view of the freedom to provide information protected by Article 5 of the Basic Law and of the fact that the convict was a figure of history, the interests of the public prevailed.
The German Federal Constitutional Court, by contrast, took a more comprehensive view of the case. It first stated that Articles 1 and 2 of the German Basic Law protect the individual’s right to free development of his personality and human dignity, as well as the sphere of autonomy within which everyone can shape his own private life by developing and protecting his personality. The Court observed that, even in its own case law, the entire sphere of private life does not, as a general rule, enjoy absolute protection. Nonetheless, neither the interest of States in preventing and suppressing crime nor the public interest can always be a legitimate justification for the violation of personality rights. Rather, the rights to free development and to respect for personality, which are closely related to human dignity, must also be taken into account.
The Federal Constitutional Court pointed out that the rights to human dignity and to the development of personality clearly conflict with the freedom to receive information and to broadcast. The resolution of this conflict depends on striking a balance. Accordingly, although the freedom to broadcast may have the effect of restricting claims based on the right of personality, the harm to personality resulting from the portrayal to the public must be proportionate to the importance of the broadcast in protecting freedom of communication.
It is precisely at this point that the Court provides a clue as to the right to be forgotten. According to it, by virtue of the constitutional guarantee of the right of personality, the media cannot be permitted to concern themselves “indefinitely” with the offender and his private sphere. Even an offender who has provoked public outrage by committing a serious offence and is condemned by everyone remains a member of the community and, in this respect, still retains the constitutionally guaranteed right to the protection of his personality.97 Even if a conviction handed down by a criminal court has been published in the public interest and met with the justified reaction of society, this cannot be a legitimate justification for normalising continued or repeated intrusions into the offender’s personal sphere. The Court stated, however, that no time limit in months and years applicable to all cases can be laid down.98
This case is highly significant in that it demonstrates the importance of the right to be forgotten with regard to human dignity and the right to develop one’s physical and moral existence. Moreover, the Court did so in the context of the freedoms to receive and to impart information. It also took the concept of historicity into account by stating that the events were part of the historical past. Since situations in which the right to be forgotten conflicts with these concepts will be dealt with separately below, at this point we confine ourselves to addressing the relevance of the case to the right to be forgotten.
Finally, we must note that human dignity and the right to develop one’s physical and moral existence are a matter that, far beyond directly concerning a single person, concerns society as a whole. We therefore consider it more appropriate to examine the values protected by the right to be forgotten in this respect under this heading.
2. The Data Subject Being Forgotten
After the values it protects in the context of human rights, the greatest impact of the right to be forgotten is undoubtedly directly on the data subject. For the person to whom the right is granted is the data subject, and it is he who will request to be forgotten.
Moving from the concept of human dignity to the data subject, the relationship of human dignity with the autonomous individual must be addressed. Accordingly, one of the most fundamental objectives that human dignity seeks to achieve is to create an autonomous sphere in which the individual can develop his physical and moral existence. Within this sphere the individual must have the opportunity to shape his own life and develop himself. In doing so, he must be able to act in accordance with his own will and not according to external factors.
For the individual, who by virtue of the concepts of human dignity and autonomy is to be able to shape his own life as he wishes, to be able to do so, he must have the same freedom over his own data. Since the autonomy of an individual who has no say over his own data cannot be spoken of, the objective of human dignity will not have been achieved either.
It is clear that an individual who believes his personal data to be vulnerable will take this situation very seriously. Individuals feel endangered if they believe that their personal information can easily be lost and fall into the hands of potential criminals or of those who wish to use it against them: “If data are vulnerable, people themselves are vulnerable; if their data are under threat, they themselves are under threat”.99
That is why the use or misuse of data can give rise to direct threats to autonomy. For there is a sense of threat that is of great significance for autonomy. People should therefore have greater control over their data and should also feel that they have this control.100
The nature of this threat to autonomy is regarded as qualitatively different from general data protection threats. For in most situations in which data processing activities involve danger, there is at least to some extent a justification on the part of the processor behind the collection and use of the data. The situation with search engines is different: search engines aim to collect data from searches, and the data subject cannot foresee what happens to the data or who collects them. This represents a new lack of control and a new set of risks.101
The way to eliminate these risks is a change in the paradigm governing the retention of data. Those who hold data should have to rely on a justification for retaining them, not on a reason for not retaining them. This, in turn, means erasing personal data unless there is a legitimate reason for retaining them.102 Consequently, in order to be able to speak of individuals’ autonomy over their personal data, the erasure of personal data must necessarily come into play.
The idea that the individual must also be autonomous with regard to his own data first came onto the agenda with the decision of the German Constitutional Court of 15 December 1983 known as the “Census” decision, also called the “Population Census” decision. The concerns arising from the fact that the Census Act, which was the subject of the decision, permitted the collection of far more data than a simple population census required, and from the danger that these data would be used for purposes other than those intended, were brought before the German Constitutional Court. By assessing together the concepts of human dignity and personality rights guaranteed by the German Basic Law, the Court derived from these two rights a new right called the “right to informational self-determination (informationelles Selbstbestimmungsrecht)”, thereby delivering a decision far ahead of its time. In this way it was established that, in order for his human dignity to be protected and for him to be able to develop his personality, the individual must be able to dispose freely of his personal data. This decision established that, from the perspective of data protection, the individual’s control over his own data is closely related to human dignity, individual freedom and the right to dispose of his own personal data (information) . It was further stated that this is one of the preconditions of a democratic society103. For the individual’s autonomy over information not only enables data protection law to protect individuals against interference with their personal data, but is also regarded as a precondition for citizens’ impartial participation in the political processes of the democratic constitutional State.104
It follows that, after human dignity and the right to develop one’s physical and moral integrity, which the right to be forgotten protects in general, it also protects, first and foremost, the data subject’s right to dispose of his personal data. At this point we consider that there is no need to mention separately that the right to the protection of personal data in general is also protected, since the subject matter of the right to be forgotten is in any case personal data, and that it is therefore more useful to look at the matter from this angle. We should nevertheless state that the right to be forgotten also pursues all the aims of data protection.
The most important difference between the right to be forgotten and the right to the protection of personal data is that the former has a psychological and philosophical dimension relating to the data subject’s need to forget. Of course, the basis of personal data protection, too, lies in the growing transparency of individuals as technology develops and in the adverse effects of surveillance on individuals, and in this context it seeks to protect human dignity. In the case of the right to be forgotten, however, what is protected is this psychological and philosophical approach itself. Consequently, another value that the right to be forgotten protects with regard to the data subject is that it ensures that he is forgotten!
Since the individual’s need to forget, and hence to be forgotten, in order to live his life as he wishes without being tied to the burden of the past has been explained in detail above, at this point, in order to avoid repetition, we confine ourselves to referring to the relevant section and to mentioning the importance of being forgotten for the individual’s life.
3. Preventing Data Pollution
With the development of information technologies, the increase in the capacity of these tools and the possibility of storing very large quantities of data on very small devices, data have come to be retained regardless of whether they are necessary or not. People retain large quantities of data either with the thought “maybe I’ll come back and look at it later” even though they no longer need it, or, anticipating that they will need it in the future, with the thought “I’ll keep it, it may come in handy later”. This is how the phenomenon we today call “data pollution” has arisen. One of the main aims of providing for an obligation to erase personal data and of giving the data subject the right to request this directly is to eliminate this pollution and prevent it from growing.
We must note, however, that this aim also lies at the basis of the right to the protection of personal data and is an aim that came later as far as the right to be forgotten is concerned.
E. Its Scope
Although the data subject’s right to erasure is also provided for in Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), the Law contains no detailed explanation of the scope of this right. Its scope will therefore be determined on the basis of the provisions of the GDPR on the subject and of the Court’s judgment explained above. Accordingly, persons have the right to request the erasure of their personal data and to prevent the processing of the data in the following cases:
1. The Personal Data Are No Longer Necessary in Relation to the Purposes for Which They Were Collected or Processed
It was explained above that, in the course of processing personal data, the controller must comply with the principles of processing for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and of retaining the data for as long as is necessary for that purpose. A data subject who notices that this obligation has not been fulfilled has the right, unless there is an exception, to request the erasure of those data.
Where the controller processes personal data on the basis of the data subject’s consent, if the data subject withdraws that consent and there is no other legal ground for the processing activity, the controller must comply with this request and erase or destroy the data in question. The Court identified this situation as the cases in which the data are no longer necessary, are inadequate or irrelevant for the purposes for which they were collected or processed, or are “excessive” in relation to those purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed.
Where the sole legal basis for the controller’s processing activity is the data subject’s explicit consent, the data subject may benefit from the right to be forgotten if he withdraws that consent and there is no other legal ground. It may be, however, that the controller also processes the personal data on other grounds. For example, where some of the personal data of the data subject are necessary for the performance of a contract concluded with the data subject, the right to be forgotten cannot be applied to those data.105
2. The Data Subject Objects to the Processing and There Are No Overriding Legitimate Grounds for the Processing
The data subject’s legal right to object to processing was examined above. A data subject who exercises this right has, in parallel, the right to request the erasure of the data concerned. It is important to note, however, that although the right to object to the processing of personal data, in particular for direct marketing purposes, is absolute, this does not trigger an absolute right to erasure. The controller may be able to rely on another legal ground, in which case the right to be forgotten does not apply. For example, where data concerning the data subject that are processed for marketing purposes are also necessary for the performance of a contract, a request for the erasure of those data cannot be made.106
3. The Personal Data Have Been Unlawfully Processed
A data subject who notices that his personal data have been or are being processed unlawfully may exercise the right to erasure in this case. Personal data in respect of which the controller has collected more data than necessary to achieve its objective, has failed to take the necessary measures in breach of its obligation of confidentiality, or has retained the data longer than necessary for the specified purpose may be the subject of this right.
4. The Personal Data Have to Be Erased for Compliance with a Legal Obligation under the Law to Which the Controller Is Subject
This will be the case in particular where the period for which personal data are to be retained is laid down in the relevant legislation. For example, a data subject who knows that, under the relevant legislation, his personal data must be retained for five years will be able to exercise the right to erasure at the end of that period. Moreover, at the end of that period the controller is in any event obliged to erase these data of its own motion.
5. The Personal Data Have Been Collected in Relation to the Provision on Online Services Offered to Children
The GDPR pays particular attention to the protection of children’s personal data in relation to online services. This right protects children against consent to the processing of their personal data being obtained at a time when they may not be aware of all the risks that may subsequently arise from the processing of their data by online service providers, and gives them the power subsequently to request the erasure of those data.107
Where the controller is obliged to erase personal data in response to such requests or circumstances, it must take reasonable steps, including the necessary technical measures, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation. Controllers must nevertheless bear in mind that the right to erasure is not an absolute right and is subject to exceptions. For example, a controller that is in any event obliged to process personal data under a legal obligation may, if it erases the personal data in question in response to an erasure request it has received, then be liable for failing to fulfil its legal obligation. At this point, therefore, we consider that it would be more appropriate for controllers to carry out the necessary assessment, taking into account the relevant statutory provisions, as to whether they really need to erase the personal data in question, and only then to carry out the erasure.
F. Exceptions to the Right
One of the important issues concerning the right to be forgotten is that a balance has to be struck between various rights. In this context, the balance between, in particular, the individual’s human dignity, his right to develop his physical and moral existence and the protection of his personal data, with which the right is most closely related, on the one hand, and the public’s freedom to access information and the freedom of information providers to present information to the public, on the other, is debated.
The main conclusion to be drawn from this, according to the view we also share, is that the right to be forgotten is not an unlimited and absolute right. While accepting this right, we consider that, where it conflicts with other fundamental rights and freedoms, a balance must be struck and being forgotten must not be accepted in absolute terms.
Since the relationship of the right to be forgotten with other fundamental rights and freedoms will be examined below under a separate heading, at this point we confine ourselves to stating that the right is not absolute and that there are exceptions to it.
G. The Problem of the Legal Basis of the Right
We must state that there is as yet no statutory provision in which the right to be forgotten is directly defined and protected, and that only some work has begun in this regard. As will be examined below, the only provision protecting the right is the GDPR provision in which the right to be forgotten is dealt with under the right to erasure. This provision, however, is regarded as insufficient, both because it does not directly recognise the right to be forgotten and because it has failed to resolve the contentious aspects of the right.
Although the right to be forgotten has not yet been expressly regulated, it is possible to accept its normative existence through the existing statutory provisions because of the rights and freedoms to which it is related. Undoubtedly, expressly placing a right on a statutory footing, and thus grounding it on a normative basis, is an important step for its protection. Even if a newly emerging right has not yet been expressly regulated in a normative source, however, it is possible to bring the new right within the scope of an existing right through a broad interpretation of similar rights. In our opinion, in such a case a right that has not been regulated by statute should also be regarded as protected. It is in this way that the protection of the right to be forgotten should be approached for the time being.
As mentioned above, the right to be forgotten is today regarded as a necessary category of right for the realisation of human dignity, one of the most fundamental objectives of the field of human rights, and for enabling the individual to develop his physical and moral existence. In this context, the existence of the right to be forgotten is an indispensable component for the adequate protection of the right to respect for private life and the right to the protection of personal data, which are expressly protected by statutory provisions.
Moreover, the fact that the right has been the subject of concrete cases and that, as explained above, these cases have found acceptance before judicial authorities has enabled the issue to come onto the agenda and be protected through case law. It would therefore be wrong to say that the right to be forgotten has no normative basis at all. It is, however, an undeniable fact that there are many contentious and uncertain points.
Nonetheless, although indirect protection may be accepted because the right is so new, this protection will soon prove insufficient in the face of constantly developing technology. We therefore consider that the right to be forgotten should be defined by statute, its scope determined and adequate and necessary safeguards provided for this right. In doing so, however, the scope of the right must be well defined, and the balance to be struck between it and the other fundamental rights and freedoms with which it may conflict must be determined with great care and attention.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN WITH CERTAIN OTHER RIGHTS
Because it concerns personal data, may relate to persons other than the data subject or to society, and is closely linked to information technologies, the right to be forgotten interacts with many other rights. This feature of the right to be forgotten means that, besides supporting or complementing certain other rights, it also conflicts with various rights. The subject of this section is the rights with which the right to be forgotten interacts in a positive or negative sense.
The right to be forgotten necessarily conflicts with other human rights or fundamental rights and freedoms, such as freedom of expression, the right to information, the right to property or the right to engage in commercial activity at home or across borders. The limits of the right to be forgotten derive from the balance between it and these rights; consequently, as with many other categories of rights, the right to be forgotten is in this sense never unlimited. In this context, the recognition and acceptance of the right to be forgotten as a right depends on the legitimacy of the limits it imposes on other fundamental rights.108
We must note that, while there is no area that is difficult to agree upon as regards the rights with which the right to be forgotten shares similar aims and protected values, there are many contentious and uncertain points as regards the rights with which it conflicts. Therefore, the rights to which it is closely linked will first be addressed briefly, and the main focus will be on the rights with which the right to be forgotten conflicts. For the intense criticism of the right and the criticism calling for it not to be applied stem from these conflicts.
In fact, neither the right to freedom of expression, nor the right to privacy, nor the right to be forgotten is an invention of the modern world. The intrinsic connection and balance between these rights have been tested for centuries and continue to be tested every day because of developments in science and technology. Indeed, cases in which the erasure of publicly available information was requested are known to have existed in the 1800s.109 However, with the increase in digital storage capacity and the advent of the internet, which allows instant and widespread communication, the frequency of utterances, images and appearances from which an individual would wish to keep himself apart has increased. Traditionally, the four walls of an individual’s home have been regarded as the limit of inquiry by third parties and by the State. Frankly, however, the adequacy of this physical limit is being questioned in the digital world, since with the spread of the internet the privacy of private life has come under threat as never before. A person’s home can no longer provide the boundaries necessary for full protection against attacks on privacy.110
By addressing both the rights whose aims and functions the right to be forgotten shares and those to which it is entirely opposed, we shall seek answers to the questions whether the right should be accepted in absolute terms, not accepted at all, or should stand in a balance between these rights, and thus try to understand where the right should stand.
A. Rights to Which the Right to Be Forgotten Is Related
We must note that, since the rights supporting the right to be forgotten have already been examined in detail throughout the study, and mainly under the headings on the elements of the right and the values it protects, at this point, in order to avoid repetition, we shall confine ourselves to a brief reminder and to references to the relevant sections.
1. As Regards the Concept of Human Rights
Here, rather than the debate as to whether the right to be forgotten can be regarded as a human right, it is necessary to address, as stated above, the close relationship of the right to be forgotten with the fundamental concepts of the field of human rights.
Human rights are based, first and foremost, on the right of the person to develop his physical and moral integrity. They link the rights that the individual has simply by virtue of being human to the rights he must have in order to be able to develop his physical and moral integrity. On the other hand, for human rights to be realised, human dignity must also be taken as a basis. In order to protect and develop his personality, the individual must be able to exist in a manner worthy of human dignity.
It is essentially here that the relationship of the right to be forgotten with the field of human rights can clearly be seen. For by means of the right to be forgotten a person puts the negative aspects of the past behind him, nurtures the hope of making a new start and thus requests the protection of his physical and moral integrity with regard to his past, his present and his future111.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) describes the very essence of the Convention as respect for human dignity and human freedom. In this context, personal autonomy is an important principle underlying these guarantees. The necessary protection must be given to the personal sphere of each individual, including every right relating to individuals’ identity.112 The Court thus characterises the concept of personal autonomy as an essential element of the guarantees provided by the Convention and concludes that, in order to secure it, the individual’s personal sphere must be protected. To this end, it is clear that the necessary protection must be provided for the individual’s personal data, which make up the largest part of his personal sphere, and that the individual must be made autonomous over this sphere. The right to be forgotten, too, is based on an individual’s autonomy to hold rights over his personal data over time.113
The protection of a person’s honour and dignity is also one of the concepts at which the right to be forgotten aims. For the fact that an event which a person wishes to be forgotten has taken place does not mean that his honour and dignity will not be protected.114
2. The Protection of Private Life
After human rights in general, the protection of private life is the most comprehensive and broadest fundamental right and freedom whose aims and values are similar to those protected by the right to be forgotten. As stated earlier, there are views holding that the right to be forgotten should be treated as a component of the protection of private life. Moreover, although the right to the protection of personal data is today also recognised as a stand-alone right, it can be seen that it is still dealt with under the heading of the protection of private life. The most basic example of this is that the ECtHR assesses concrete cases on the subject under Article 8 of the Convention, entitled “Right to respect for private and family life”. Consequently, although there are different views on the scope, nature and independence of these rights, the close relationship between them as regards their aims and values is an undeniable and incontrovertible fact.
For this reason, the protection of private life, and indeed the sub-headings of this right, must be addressed among the rights with which the right to be forgotten interacts. At this point, however, there is no need to give a detailed explanation of the concept of private life and of this right. In this context, a general framework of the protection of private life will be drawn and an attempt will be made to determine the place and importance of the right to be forgotten within it. Accordingly, only explanations aimed at setting out the relationship of this right with the right to be forgotten will be given.
a. The Protection of Private Life in General and the Right to Be Forgotten
The concept of private life refers to a complex and comprehensive sphere that cannot be defined or delimited115. Indeed, in its judgments the ECtHR, too, has avoided defining private life, seeking to prevent the concept from being restricted.
In its “Niemietz v. Germany”116 judgment, the Court took the view that it is neither possible nor necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the concept of private life.117 It stated, however, that it would be too restrictive to limit the concept to an “inner circle” in which the individual may live his own private life as he chooses and to exclude entirely from it the outside world not encompassed within that circle. The Court stated that respect for private life must also comprise, to a certain degree, the right to establish and maintain relationships with other human beings. Accordingly, the Court expressly states that private life must also include, for example, “the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings”.118
In its “Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom”119 judgment, the Court reached a similar conclusion, stating that the concept of private life is too broad to be explained in a detailed and precise manner. It characterised this concept as broader than privacy, also covering a sphere related to the outside world in which every individual can freely form and develop his personality.120
b. Privacy
The individual’s privacy is the fundamental building block of the protection of private life. For, first and foremost, the individual’s intimate sphere must be protected. Privacy constitutes an indispensable sphere for individuals. Indeed, a survey conducted in the USA on social networking sites concluded that respondents were seriously concerned about the lack of control they experienced over their private data, in which there was great interest and which were exposed to danger.121
It is therefore clear that the individual’s expectation of privacy will form the subject matter of the right to be forgotten in respect of his personal data. Although this can be said with certainty for the right to respect for private life, there are debates as regards the right to privacy. The right to privacy protects data that persons do not wish to be disclosed to the public. In the case of the right to be forgotten, by contrast, what is at issue is information that has already been disseminated to the public. It is therefore stated that, technically, the right to be forgotten cannot be protected under the right to privacy.122
c. Protection of the Person’s Reputation
The protection of an individual’s reputation is a fundamental right dealt with in the main national and international instruments either directly or within the scope of the protection of private life. The ECtHR deals with the individual’s reputation in the context of Article 8 of the Convention, which protects private life.
In this respect, the Court’s “Karakó v. Hungary”123 judgment, which contains important statements and opinions on the protection of reputation, is significant. According to the Court, the personal rights and personal integrity falling within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention are not concerned with the external evaluation of the individual. In matters of reputation, however, this evaluation is decisive: a person may lose the esteem of society, whether deservedly or not, but the individual’s integrity cannot be lost or transferred. According to the Court’s case law, reputation may sometimes be recognised as an independent right; mostly, it is protected where the allegations are entirely true, are of an offensive nature and have an inevitable direct effect on the applicant’s private life.
In our opinion, the most important aspect of the judgment is that, besides determining the nature of reputation, it draws a comparison with freedom of expression. According to the Court, Article 10 of the Convention, which governs freedom of expression, may be restricted to protect reputation. Indeed, the Court takes the view that the Article itself allows for restrictions. According to the Court, therefore, the phrase “rights of others” in Article 10(2) also covers rights of personal integrity, and may constitute the basis for restricting freedom of expression as long as the restriction imposed to protect private life is proportionate.124
Whether the content that is the subject of the right to be forgotten relates to the data subject’s reputation is important in assessing whether the right is to be applied. For a person generally wishes information damaging to his reputation to be forgotten and gives this as his reason when exercising the right to be forgotten. Most importantly, he is justified in this reasoning. That a person should want information damaging to his reputation to be forgotten is conduct to be expected of him in the ordinary course of life. Consequently, the concept of the protection of a person’s reputation, dealt with within the scope of the protection of private life, is closely related to the right to be forgotten.
3. The Right to the Protection of Personal Data
The right to the protection of personal data is the field with which the right to be forgotten is most closely related in every respect. The fact that the need for both rights arose for similar reasons, the relationship of the rights with information technologies and the importance of the digital environment, and the common aims pursued and values protected have made it impossible to separate the two rights from each other. So much so that the right to be forgotten is regarded as a complementary element, component or sub-heading of the right to the protection of personal data.
Moreover, the most important point here is that the subject matter of the right to be forgotten is in any case personal data, since it is personal data to which access is sought to be blocked by exercising the right to be forgotten. For this reason, the right to the protection of personal data undoubtedly also finds its place at every stage of the right to be forgotten.
However, since this relationship has already been addressed throughout the study and reference has been made to the right to the protection of personal data where appropriate, here, in order to avoid repetition, we confine ourselves to referring to the relevant sections and to underlining the importance, scope and degree of this relationship.
B. Rights and Concepts with Which the Right to Be Forgotten Conflicts
1. The Concept of Historicity
When the right to be forgotten is viewed from a perspective much broader than that of fundamental rights and freedoms, one of its greatest dilemmas is posed by the “phenomenon of historicity”. If the past of an individual who does not wish to bear the burden of his past is at the same time regarded as part of history, the individual’s request and the preservation of history come face to face.
Indeed, the request that the criminal records of the murderers of the German film actor Walter Sedlmayr be removed from Sedlmayr’s Wikipedia page is truly an attempt to “rewrite history”.125 However, this attempt by the convicted men was first rejected by the German Federal Court of Justice, and their subsequent application alleging a violation of their rights was declared inadmissible by the ECtHR. As a result of these decisions, the names of the convicted brothers were put back on the German-language Wikipedia page. The personal data forming history and the collective consciousness of society were thus prevented from benefiting from the right to be forgotten.
2. Freedom of Expression
The main criticism of the right to be forgotten is gathered under the heading of the right to freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is a fundamental right protected by all national and international instruments on fundamental rights and freedoms, and there are concerns that the right to be forgotten will harm this right because it conflicts with it. There are therefore views arguing that the right to be forgotten should not be recognised or, even if it is to be recognised, that it should be dealt with in a way that does not conflict with freedom of expression. In order to clarify these criticisms, the concept of freedom of expression must be understood and the matters it covers clearly determined. In this way, the points at which the right to be forgotten and freedom of expression conflict can be identified.
Freedom of expression, protected most fundamentally by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, entitled “Freedom of expression”, was examined comprehensively in the European Court of Human Rights’ “Stoll v. Switzerland”126 judgment. According to that judgment, freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and is regarded as one of the basic conditions for the self-fulfilment of the individual and of society. Under the second paragraph of that Article, this freedom applies not only to words regarded as “favourable” or to matters regarded as inoffensive or of no interest , but also to ideas and information that are inappropriate, shocking or disturbing. These are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, without which there is no democratic society. Although this freedom, like other fundamental rights and freedoms, is subject to exceptions, it must certainly be interpreted broadly, and any justification for a restriction must be convincingly established.127 It should also not be forgotten that there are limits to the limitation of freedom of expression, namely necessity in a democratic society and proportionality.
Freedom of expression means the free disclosure to the outside world of information or ideas and, likewise, free access to such information or ideas. In this context, the freedom of the content of the expression, of the subject of the expression and of the means through which the expression is provided or accessed must be secured as a whole. For if one of these is lacking, there can be no question of the effective protection of freedom of expression.
Freedom of expression includes the free disclosure of information or ideas. Disclosing information also encompasses the freedoms to disseminate information and to provide information. It follows that persons, institutions and organisations engaged in providing information must also be dealt with and protected within the framework of freedom of expression. In this context, it is clear that the press and broadcasting organisations are of particular importance.
Indeed, the ECtHR has dealt with press freedom within the scope of freedom of expression because of its activity of providing information. Accordingly, press and broadcasting organisations and their sources must be protected by law in such a way as to secure press freedom. Without this protection, the public would be prevented from being informed on matters in its interest. The protection of the press is therefore extremely important for informing the public and for the press’s ability to provide accurate and reliable information. In a democratic society, an interference with press freedom is a chilling practice incompatible with freedom of expression.128
The development of technology has made the internet the greatest means for the dissemination of information. This has been taken to a higher level with Web 2.0 technology, which allows individuals to post content themselves. The right to be forgotten is therefore also connected with Web 2.0. For Web 2.0 allows interaction, and in this way people are able to share information, pictures and videos – more generally, to express themselves.129
Consequently, today not only press organisations but also individuals, by disseminating information and posting content, are on the information-providing side of freedom of expression. The ECtHR states that freedom of expression is a right granted to everyone and that, therefore, not only organisations such as the press and the media but also natural persons must benefit from this protection.130 For this reason, everyone who provides information and content, whether a natural or a legal person, must be protected under freedom of expression.
The ECtHR has described the internet, particularly in view of user-generated content, as “an unprecedented platform for the exercise of freedom of expression”.131 Consequently, today the internet is regarded as one of the greatest means through which freedom of expression comes into play. It is therefore necessary for the press and the internet to be protected under freedom of expression. For the effective protection of freedom of expression is understood as protecting not only the expression but also the means through which this expression is voiced, disclosed or disseminated.
Consequently, there is no doubt that the internet is one of the most fundamental resources for securing and protecting freedom of expression. As far as the right to be forgotten is concerned, it is necessary to go one step further and look at the place of search engines in freedom of expression: Are search engines also to be regarded as information providers for the purposes of freedom of expression? It should be noted that, although search engines do not themselves directly disseminate information, they are used as intermediaries in its dissemination. Since, as stated above, the means through which expression is disclosed also fall within the scope of freedom of expression, search engines, as a means used to disseminate information, must likewise fall within the scope of freedom of expression.
On the other side of freedom of expression’s coverage of the provision of information lies the right to information. For individuals to obtain information, they must be able to access it. As regards the essence that this right seeks to protect, what must first be understood is that it is not essentially concerned with access to a piece of information at the individual level. What the right seeks to protect is not so much a person’s wish to access some piece of information on subjective grounds as society’s freedom to obtain information and to have access to it. This is where the link between the right and the “public interest” emerges.
Whether everyone can freely obtain information on a subject that objectively concerns society as a whole, and to which everyone should therefore have free access, depends on whether there is a “public interest”. For it is clear that, where the existence of a public interest is accepted, the right to information affords broader protection.
In the relationship with the right to be forgotten, the information to which the data subject seeks to block access and by which he wishes to be forgotten comes face to face with another individual’s right of access. It is in this respect that the concept of public interest mentioned above is important. For where an individual does not want his personal data to be accessed, there can be no question at all of protecting another person’s wish to access this information for his own personal reasons. What must be discussed here, and what genuinely comes into conflict, is what the individual’s personal data at issue under the right to be forgotten signify in terms of the concept of public interest: the question to be asked in this context is whether the individual’s right to the protection of personal data or the public interest is to prevail. Since two important interests come face to face here, we consider that the content and scope of the concepts in question must first of all be clearly and precisely determined.
It is precisely from this point onwards that the conflict between the right to be forgotten and freedom of expression begins. What the right to be forgotten seeks to achieve is the removal of a piece of personal information at the request of the data subject and the prevention of other persons’ access to that information. It follows that giving effect to a data subject’s right to be forgotten involves an interference with freedom of expression by preventing the provision of, and access to, information.
It is therefore considered that freedom of expression must have a limit in this regard. Accordingly, there are several situations in which data protection norms do not require the protection of any confidentiality. Freedom of expression, within the scope of freedom of information and the right of access to information, must also be approached in this way. In such a situation, it is difficult for the processing of personal data to go hand in hand with further strengthening the rights and interests of individuals. Under the EU directive on the re-use of public sector information, freedom of communication and the right to information, freedom of expression and freedom of access to official documents, participatory democracy and the functioning of the internal market depend on the free movement of services and information.132
What distinguishes rights relating to the confidentiality and security of data from other rights, in particular from freedom of expression under the Convention, is that they generally provide protection for individual interests. Freedom of expression, by contrast, besides being linked to personal expression and development, is also linked to societal interests, such as the presence of ideas in public fora, the proper functioning of the press, the search for truth and its being a precondition of democracy. Article 8 of the Convention, which governs the protection of private life, protects, according to the prevailing view, only individual interests such as autonomy, dignity and personal development.133
It must therefore be accepted that the right to privacy has a material scope. For Article 8 of the Convention in principle provides protection for a person’s private life, family life, correspondence and home.134 It is nevertheless worth noting that in legal scholarship privacy, too, is increasingly recognised as having a public dimension.135 The ECtHR also states that the right to privacy protects an individual’s personal development, includes protection against interference from his surroundings and may extend to matters of data protection.136
This difference relating to individual interests also has a significant effect on the types of applicants who may lodge a complaint concerning the right to privacy. In principle, the Convention allows natural persons, groups of persons and legal persons to complain of interferences with their rights under the Convention. Indeed, the ECtHR has accepted that churches may claim freedom of religion (Art. 9 ECHR), that press organisations are protected under freedom of expression (Art. 10 ECHR), and that trade unions’ claims are admissible where they seek protection of their assembly and organisational activities under freedom of expression (Art. 11 ECHR).137
The Court nevertheless states that, since Art. 8 ECHR protects only individual interests, as a rule only natural persons may invoke the rights to privacy and confidentiality. For example, where a church requested protection by the police because of concerns that its confidentiality would be breached in connection with criminal proceedings, the extent to which such a right of a civil society organisation can be protected must be determined in view of the particular nature of the right.138
It is true that, under Article 9 of the Convention, a church has the right to have the freedom of religion of its members and representatives, to exercise this freedom and to claim it in every aspect of the church’s functioning, and that everyone must respect this right. Article 8 of the Convention, by contrast, relates to an individual person rather than to a common character and outlook.139 For this reason, the Court has treated this as settled case law and has declared complaints falling outside this line inadmissible. It has stated that it may depart from this line only in exceptional circumstances: “In essence, claims by groups of natural persons alleging a violation of a right recognised in the Convention have been rejected by the Court, and the inter-State complaint procedure is rarely used (Art. 33 ECHR). This leaves open only the avenue of an application by an individual on account of a violation of his right to privacy.”140
The problem here is that a focus on natural persons and individual harm makes protection difficult in situations that do not concern a particular individual but affect large groups in society and, potentially, everyone. Given the trend towards the use of ever larger data collection systems, interest in big data cases is likely to grow. In such cases, the ECtHR is faced with the options of adhering to its strict interpretation of the victim’s individual interests and declaring the case inadmissible, or of accepting that the cases fall within its jurisdiction and abandoning or broadening its focus on individual harm.141
The Court generally chooses the second option in the following three situations:
• where it is reasonably likely that the applicant has suffered harm,
• where it is highly likely that the applicant will be affected by the practice in the future,
• where the mere existence of such a law or policy leads to a violation of Art. 8 ECHR.142
It is feared that these differences between the right to be forgotten and freedom of expression will lead to censorship. Indeed, while some explain this as a need for greater clarity as to how the right to be forgotten can be applied, others, referring to the Court of Justice’s judgment discussed above, consider that the EU has asked Google to censor the web. At this point, concerns centre on the fear that the internet will no longer be as free and open as it is now.143
Peter Fleischer, Google’s privacy counsel, pointed out that the right to be forgotten and to request the erasure of information is a very current trend, and drew attention to the danger that the issue may provide a basis for censorship, noting that data protection is increasingly being used as a justification for online censorship practices.144
In the light of all these explanations, what must first of all be understood is that there is uncertainty as to how the internet in particular, and freedom of expression in general, can coexist, be used and be applied alongside a right such as the right to be forgotten. In our opinion, therefore, ideas and arguments must first be developed to remedy this deficiency. In this way, by striking a balance between the right to be forgotten and the rights and concepts that conflict with it at certain points, it must be clearly determined how all these concepts can be used and applied together.
When personal data are processed on grounds other than the data subject’s consent, the data subject’s interests, since they are protected by the right to be forgotten, conflict with other interests, rights and freedoms: they conflict with those of the person processing the data or of persons concerned with such processing, or with certain public interests, but above all with freedom of expression and freedom of the press. For this reason, unlimited application of the right to be forgotten prevents the full preservation and integrity of archives. For the same reason, it may conflict with the duty to preserve collective memory. It constitutes an obstacle to historical research. It also has effects on business continuity, the management of employee files, the duty to keep evidence and so on, and, inevitably, in the context of the exercise of this right, the obligation to retain data for purposes of public security must also be taken into account.145
C. Balancing the Right to Be Forgotten with Other Rights and Concepts
Above, we have sought to explain the relationship of the right to be forgotten with the rights and concepts whose aims and values it shares and with those with which it conflicts. While the rights and freedoms that pursue aims in the same direction as the right to be forgotten do not present any obstacle to the application of the right, the same is not true of the rights with which it conflicts. These rights are endangered and impaired in various ways when the right to be forgotten is applied.
What, then, is to be done in this situation? Should the right to be forgotten be ignored and its recognition avoided? Should efforts be made to strike a balance between the right to be forgotten and the conflicting rights and interests so that they can operate together? Or should the right to be forgotten be accepted in its entirety and the impairment of other rights be tolerated?
It is clear that the second option is the most reasonable one in this situation. For the need for a right to be forgotten today has been explained in detail above, taking into account both the importance of forgetting in human life and the impact of personal data on the internet. In our opinion, therefore, the existence of such a right must be accepted, even though its scope and limits have not yet been very clearly determined. Indeed, the Court of Justice’s judgment and the decisions and practice of other judicial bodies also show this. At the same time, freedom of expression, whose importance and especially whose societal dimension were emphasised above, and, on the other hand, the concept of historicity must not be allowed to be impaired either.
Consequently, there can be no question of abandoning either the right to be forgotten or freedom of expression. What must be done, therefore, is to address the right to be forgotten and the other rights and freedoms in all their dimensions and to make them operate together. Under this heading, we shall try to provide explanations and shed light on the balance to be struck between the right to be forgotten and the interests that conflict with it.
First of all, however, we must state that striking this balance is, of course, not as easy as saying it. There are many reasons for this. First, applying several rights and interests without harming any of them requires the introduction of clear and precise rules on how this is to be done. For uncertainty means that rights are in danger. At the same time, it is not possible to determine definitively in advance which of the concepts of the right to be forgotten and freedom of expression will prevail, or in which cases the right to be forgotten may be applied. This certainty can only be established according to the nature of the specific case.
The main elements to be taken into account are the current lawfulness of the data subject’s personal data that are the subject of the right to be forgotten, their nature, the medium in which they are found, the time that has elapsed and, more importantly, the relationship of the information in question to the concepts of the right to information and the freedom to provide information within the scope of freedom of expression, as well as the interest it holds for the public. Consequently, a prediction such as “in this case freedom of expression is to prevail; in that case the right to be forgotten is to be applied and access to the information in question blocked” is neither possible nor a correct approach. Under this heading, therefore, rather than drawing definite and clear-cut lines, we shall try to identify what must be taken into account in striking a balance between the right to be forgotten and other rights and freedoms and which criteria may be considered.
1. Balancing the Right to Be Forgotten and Freedom of Expression
In order better to understand which matters may be taken into account in the balance to be struck, the following questions must first be clarified:
a. Is the Right to Be Forgotten an Absolute Right?
In order to determine against what the right to be forgotten is to be balanced, one must first look at its nature, namely whether or not it is absolute. It was stated earlier that this right is not absolute and is subject to exceptions. Indeed, in view of the importance and nature of the rights and freedoms with which the right to be forgotten conflicts in particular, it cannot be protected in an entirely unlimited manner.
Indeed, the exceptions to Article 17 of the GDPR, which governs the right to erasure, and to paragraph 2 of that Article, under which the right to be forgotten is considered to fall, are listed in paragraph 3 of the Article. Under Article 17(3)(a) of the GDPR, information that is the subject of the right to be forgotten may not be erased to the extent that it is regarded as necessary for exercising freedom of expression and the right to information. A similar provision was contained in Article 9 and recitals 17 and 37 of Directive 95/46/EC. The expression “academic purposes” contained in the GDPR, however, was not included in Directive 95/46/EC. Accordingly, the right to erasure does not apply to the extent that processing is necessary in the following cases:
• for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information;
• for compliance with a legal obligation which requires processing under Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject, or for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;
• for reasons of public interest in the area of public health in accordance with points (h) and (i) of Article 9(2) as well as Article 9(3);
• for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1), in so far as the right referred to in paragraph 1 is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the objectives of that processing
• (e) for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.
It has thus been expressly stated that the right to be forgotten is not protected absolutely. In this context, it has been explained that it must be restricted in particular where it conflicts with the rights to freedom of expression and information. Moreover, where the personal data subject to an erasure request must be processed by law, or are necessary in the public interest, for scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, for archiving or for the defence of legal rights, the right to be forgotten will not apply in these cases either.
The situation is similar as far as our national law is concerned. Article 28 of Law No. 6698, entitled “Exceptions”, which governs the cases of full exemption, specifies the cases in which the provisions of the Law do not apply. By this Article, personal data processed for purposes of freedom of expression, scientific and historical research, public order and public interest, and by judicial authorities – which conflict with the right to be forgotten in particular – have been excluded from the scope of the Law. These cases must therefore also be regarded as limits on the right to be forgotten under the Law.
Furthermore, the Guidelines on the Right to Be Forgotten (Assessment of the Right to Be Forgotten with Specific Reference to Search Engines) published by the Personal Data Protection Board also state that the right to be forgotten is not an absolute right that data subjects can assert in all circumstances, that it is an exceptional right, and that a decision must therefore be taken in each specific case on the basis of an assessment within the framework of criteria.146
It is therefore clear that the right to be forgotten, too, is subject to restriction in line with the conditions to which the processing of personal data is subject. Although the cases in which the right to be forgotten does not apply can be determined by statutory provisions, we do not consider this sufficient.
First, we take the view that these limits have been drawn very broadly. While we believe and accept that, today, no activity, from everyday activities to professional ones, can be carried out properly without personal data being processed, we consider that this must be subject to rules laid down without impairing the essence of the right. There is no point in laying down a rule and then rendering it practically ineffective through the exceptions made to it. As far as our subject is concerned, if this attitude is adopted, one cannot go beyond creating the appearance that personal data are being protected and the right to be forgotten secured. Great care must therefore be taken with the restrictions introduced. Introducing too many exceptions restricting the exercise of the right – and, what is more, expressing these exceptions in very general and repetitive terms – cannot provide adequate protection.
On the other hand, the weakness of the legal basis of the right to be forgotten and the fact that it is not directly protected show, correspondingly, that the exceptions to the right have not been clearly determined either. We must underline that those listed above are essentially exceptions introduced in respect of the right to erasure. Consequently, there are at present no restrictions introduced with regard to the essence of the right to be forgotten. For example, there are no exceptions that directly address matters such as the impact on the internet of the personal data that would be the subject of the right, their relevance to the public and the position of the data subject.
For example, in its judgment in “M.L. and W.W. v. Germany”, the ECtHR rejected the applicants’ claim, holding that, in the specific case, in balancing the right to be forgotten against the overriding interest of the public in receiving information, the latter prevailed, and found no violation in the decision given by the German Federal Court of Justice. This judgment thus also clearly shows that the right to be forgotten is not an absolute right.
It can be seen that the GDPR also contains the provisions necessary to ensure that the right to be forgotten is not given precedence over freedom of expression and the press’s right to provide information. Accordingly, apart from the exception in Article 17(3), Article 85 of the GDPR emphasises that Member States must adopt rules on the processing of personal data for journalistic purposes and for academic, artistic and literary purposes. Under Article 2(2)(c) of the GDPR, the protection mechanisms of the GDPR likewise do not come into play where personal data are processed by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. These provisions must therefore be regarded as mechanisms preventing the right to be forgotten from prevailing over the right to freedom of expression.
Consequently, there is no doubt that the right to be forgotten is not absolute and, moreover, cannot be, given the rights and concepts with which it conflicts. Nevertheless, although the cases in which it will not be absolute cannot be delimited by definite lines, and the specific features of each case must be examined for this purpose, we consider that grounds for restriction specific and appropriate to the right should be introduced, taking into account the aims and values that the right protects.
b. Can Freedom of Expression Be Restricted?
Having established that the right to be forgotten is not absolute, one must look at the limits of freedom of expression. Freedom of expression, too, like many other fundamental rights and freedoms, is undoubtedly not absolute and may be restricted in various cases. It can therefore be said that neither the right to be forgotten nor freedom of expression is absolute. However, while the right to be forgotten is subject to the broad and numerous exceptions mentioned above, freedom of expression is subject to the provisions governing the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms. In this case, it can be said that any restriction will be much narrower in scope.
For freedom of expression to be restricted, the interference must be prescribed by law, the grounds for restriction must be interpreted narrowly, and the interference must be necessary in a democratic society and proportionate. This was discussed comprehensively in the ECtHR’s “S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom”147 judgment. Accordingly, an interference must first and foremost be capable of being regarded as “necessary in a democratic society”. The interference must pursue a legitimate aim and respond to a social need. Moreover, the right restricted must be proportionate to the aim pursued by the interference. In this context, the practice of the national authorities must be of a sufficient and necessary standard.
In its judgment in “Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom”148 the ECtHR stated that, in view of the diversity of the practices of the Contracting States, interferences and concepts may vary from case to case, and that the authorities are therefore afforded a margin of appreciation. Nevertheless, in any interference with fundamental rights and freedoms, care must be taken to strike a fair balance between the general interest of the community and the interests of the individual.149 In the light of its case law, the Court has referred to the concepts of a legitimate aim, foreseeability and equality before the law. In any event, however, the protection of human rights must come first and foremost.150
The breadth of this margin of appreciation left to the member States was likewise explained in the S. and Marper judgment mentioned above. Accordingly, the breadth of the margin of appreciation depends on a number of factors, such as the nature of the rights set out in the Convention, the importance of these rights for the individual, and the nature, method and purpose of the interference. This margin will be narrower where the right is of crucial importance for the individual’s privacy.151
In conclusion, although freedom of expression is a fundamental element for the formation and development of a democratic society, it is not absolute and may be restricted in various circumstances. Whether such a restriction is to be regarded as lawful, however, depends on the many different factors mentioned above. Consequently, although freedom of expression, like the right to be forgotten, is subject to restrictions, it should be pointed out that these restrictions are far narrower in scope than those applying to the right to be forgotten.
2. Matters to Be Taken into Account in Balancing the Rights
In the light of the foregoing, the application and exercise of the right to be forgotten raise no problem with regard to the rights that protect similar aims and values, whereas there are obstacles with regard to the rights and concepts with which it conflicts. These obstacles were explained above. However, given the need for the right to be forgotten, it is not possible either to abandon this right altogether by pointing to these conflicts. For this reason, a balance must be struck between the conflicting rights and concepts without impairing the essence of the rights, so that in concrete cases the highest and most fundamental interest deserving protection is identified and action is taken accordingly.
This is, of course, a matter that cannot be delimited in advance by firm and clear lines. Nevertheless, identifying the criteria to be taken into account in striking this balance is the first and fundamental step. Under this heading, proceeding from the view that the right to be forgotten is a necessity today, an attempt will be made to set out the matters that will help to strike a balance at the points where this right conflicts with other rights and concepts, so that it can be applied and exercised as it should be.
a. Determining the Scope of the Right to Be Forgotten
Determining the scope of the right to be forgotten is extremely important for balancing it against other rights and freedoms. The scope marks the boundary of the cases in which the right may be exercised and of those in which it will find no application; in this way, in particular, conflicting rights and concepts may be applied together, or one right may give way to the other.
At this point, the first question to be addressed is which information must be removed when the right to be forgotten is exercised. Does the data subject’s right to be forgotten mean that the personal data concerned must be removed from every medium? Or does it remove access to the personal data in relation to particular situations and searches? I should first point out that this is a debate that concerns the digital environment. When the right to be forgotten is exercised in respect of personal data found in a physical medium, there is no remedy other than removing, in other words destroying, the medium in which the personal data are contained (newspaper, magazine, book, etc.). In the digital environment, however, the situation is different: what matters here are the words with which you search in a search engine, the search results obtained, and the fact that the personal data are present in different forms in different media. Indeed, it is precisely this that places personal data in the digital environment at risk. Once personal data have entered this environment in any way, they can be used for very different purposes and can spread over a very wide area within seconds.
On this point, there are views arguing that the right to be forgotten does not in fact mean the removal or destruction of the personal data concerned, but its removal from the search results for particular searches. On this view, the EU’s so-called “right to be forgotten” merely requires the deletion of information from search engines and does not require complete removal by the content server. As a result, the websites concerned in fact remain accessible but are not listed in search results. Freedom of expression and privacy rights thus allow a relative balance to be struck in this respect.152
This is indeed the position in the Court of Justice’s Google judgment. Google stated that it understood the judgment to mean that the personal data of a data subject who wishes to exercise the right to be forgotten will not be listed in the results of searches made using his name. Consequently, the data that the data subject wishes to be forgotten in fact still exist and remain accessible; they merely do not appear before the user in particular searches.
This approach is criticised on the ground that it cannot bring about genuine forgetting. Indeed, it is impossible for information that merely fails to appear in searches made in a particular way, for example with the data subject’s name, to be genuinely forgotten. Although it may be somewhat effective in limiting the spread and accessibility of the information, it is very difficult for the right to be forgotten truly to achieve its purpose as long as the information can be reached through a search made in another way. Nevertheless, the freedom of the internet and the need to balance the right against the other rights and freedoms with which it conflicts make such a limitation unavoidable.
For this reason, in addition to defining the right to be forgotten and guaranteeing it by statutory provisions, determining its scope in this way is important for striking a balance where it conflicts with other rights and concepts.
b. Privacy by Design Standards
In this respect, privacy by design standards are regarded as a remedy for implementing and improving laws and policies on personal data as well as information security. The right to be forgotten, which, following the Court of Justice’s judgment, means the deletion of “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, excessive” data from the results listed by search engines, falls within this scope.153 There are, however, already some controversies concerning the implementation of the right. Foremost among them are the uncertainty in the decision-making process for handling requests from individuals and the process of actually removing links from the medium in which they are located. Search engines such as Google, for example, have been placed in a difficult position by obligations that require them to ensure fairness on the one hand, compliance with legal procedures on the other, and transparency as well.154
Rigo Wenning, legal counsel of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), which develops standards and guidelines to help everyone build a web based on the principles of accessibility, internationalisation, privacy and security, has proposed the standardisation of the web protocol known as “robots.txt”.155 The robots.txt file is a simple text file which, when placed in the file structure of a website, sends the search engine a signal containing a request not to be indexed and searchable. All major search engines, such as Bing, DuckDuckGo and Google, comply with the robots.txt protocol. Wenning proposed that the protocol be standardised so as to include a tagging function that would cause search engines to ignore websites only for queries containing particular search tags (such as someone’s name). In other words, a website will appear in search results as long as you do not search for a specifically tagged expression, such as a person’s name or its variants (for example “Will” for “Bill” and “William”). With this kind of standardisation, the right to be forgotten could be implemented as long as search engines such as Google act in accordance with the robots.txt protocol. Of course, it is inevitable that such a solution will have certain problems of its own.
c. Public Interest
In any balance to be struck between the right to be forgotten and the rights and concepts with which it conflicts, the public interest criterion is the most easily understood and distinguishable concrete tool. This criterion is particularly pronounced with regard to the concept of historicity and to freedom of expression. Accordingly, where a conflict arises between the two interests, the interest of the public must prevail over individual protection.
As stated above, the concepts of the protection of private life, the protection of personal data and the right to be forgotten also serve the public good because of their relationship with the field of human rights, but they essentially concern personal integrity and provide individual protection and safeguards. Freedom of expression, by contrast, has a societal perspective, particularly as regards the provision of and access to information.
It should be pointed out that, since the concept of public interest is the most important criterion for determining the limits of the right to be forgotten, this concept and its relationship with the right to be forgotten must be set out clearly. The ECtHR, however, does not yet appear to have made a clear assessment of the public interest where the right to be forgotten conflicts with freedom of expression within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention. Nevertheless, in its judgment in “Caroline von Hannover v. Germany”, the ECtHR expressed a view at least in the field of the media. The case concerned the claim to respect for her private life brought by Caroline von Hannover, who had taken legal action against photographers who took pictures of her engaged in activities of a purely private nature, entirely separate from her daily life. The Court considers that “the dissemination of information must be limited by the interest of the State and of the persons concerned in not having all their personal and private information disclosed”.156
The ECtHR’s judgment in von Hannover v. Germany clearly shows Europe’s view of the right to privacy in the context of freedom of expression and its approach to balancing a person’s right to privacy against another person’s freedom of expression where the two conflict. The balance struck between these fundamental rights reflects how private law functions between individuals. The applicant in this interesting and decisive case was Princess Caroline, the eldest daughter of Prince Rainier III of Monaco. Her claim that certain media organisations had photographed her in several places where, as she argued, she had a legitimate expectation of privacy was taken all the way to the ECtHR. Princess Caroline claimed that the publication by the media of intimate photographs of herself and her family in these places violated her right to privacy under Art. 8 ECHR. The German courts, which heard the domestic stage of the case, relied on the Princess’s position as a semi-public figure, found that her right to privacy was inherently reduced on account of her social status, and permitted the publication of the pictures on the basis of freedom of the press and of expression. The Princess then lodged an application with the ECtHR against the German State, which she claimed had breached its positive obligations under the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights with regard to the mass media.157
As a result of this application, the ECtHR found a violation by Germany. Despite the Princess’s status as a semi-public figure, the ECtHR “reiterates that the concept of private life extends to aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person’s name or a person’s picture.” The Court held that “private life ... includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity”, and that it therefore interprets Article 8 as being intended “to ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings”. This led the Court to conclude that there is “a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of ‘private life’”158.159
In reaching this conclusion, the Court accepted that the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention must be balanced against the protection of private life.160 The Court regarded the publication of the photographs as a violation of the Princess’s right to privacy because “although the applicant is known to the public, the photos published cannot be deemed to contribute to any debate of general interest to society”.161 It should not be forgotten that this judgment against the State in fact concerned a simple tort dispute involving a private person, which came before the Court “because of the constitutional dimension of the matter”. In the European approach, moreover, fundamental rights and freedoms do not merely protect the individual against violations of rights committed by the State; they also oblige the State to take adequate and positive measures to guarantee that individuals are protected against violations of their rights by other individuals. In conclusion, rather than confining the right to respect for private life to its public law dimension, the Caroline von Hannover judgment became a decision in which the alleged violation of the right to respect for private life was effectively analysed through the lens of individual rights.162 For this reason it is also an important decision for the protection of personal data and for the right to be forgotten.
In conclusion, whether the right to be forgotten can be exercised will largely be determined by the relevance of the information to the public. In this context, the points to be examined are whether the information is of use to the public in the light of the nature of the information, the position of the data subject and the time that has elapsed.
d. The Criterion of Elapsed Time
The time that has elapsed between the date on which the information concerned by the right to be forgotten was first published and the date on which it becomes the subject of the right is important for balancing the rights. I should point out that the question of time generally tips practice in favour of the right to be forgotten. This is because the length of time that has passed since personal information was first published reduces the relevance of that information to the rights and freedoms that conflict with the right to be forgotten.
On a time scale, it may be said that the further back the origin of the information goes, the more the personal interests will outweigh and prevail over the public interest. Accordingly, the direct and indirect traces of the right to be forgotten, a specific right, are surveyed starting from the general right of personality; certain important data protection concepts are examined in the light of the actual application of this new and fundamental right; and the possible legal and technological limits of this right are also taken into account.163
In conclusion, privacy concerns may prevent the disclosure of certain facts, and of facts that have previously been made public, if the information is no longer newsworthy, and may constitute a justified ground for doing so. If, however, the information is still necessary in the interest of the public, the right to be forgotten cannot be exercised.
D. The Distinction between the Right to Be Forgotten and the Right to Erasure
The fact that the right to be forgotten includes a request for the erasure of information relating to the data subject has led to its being treated together with the right to erasure. Indeed, the two rights are even seen to be used interchangeably, on the assumption that they share the same purpose and function. In addition, there are cases in which some of those who criticise the right to be forgotten on the grounds explained above take a more favourable approach towards the right to erasure.
Whether this is merely a conceptual confusion or whether the two terms are to be understood as denoting matters that also differ in content is one of the controversial points concerning the right to be forgotten. Although the right to be forgotten was initially thought to have the same purpose and scope as the right to erasure, particularly because the GDPR regulated it under the right to erasure, this view has broken down over time and given way to a debate as to whether erasure and being forgotten have different meanings. Under this heading, an attempt will be made to clarify this debate.
In our opinion, the right to erasure should not be regarded as identical with the right to be forgotten. Although the subject matter of both rights is personal data and there are similarities in the operations to be performed on the data when the rights are exercised, the starting points of the rights and the philosophies they embrace are entirely different.
We should point out that this distinction is drawn in particular by those who oppose the recognition of the right to be forgotten and propose a right to erasure instead. On this view, the right to be forgotten concerns the rewriting of history or censorship, whereas the right to erasure concerns subjecting the State to a more effective and efficient control mechanism and to limitations, and ensuring that no more data than necessary is retained for commercial purposes. It may therefore be misleading to describe this as being forgotten, because erasure is not about forgetting; it is about control.164
This view accepts that speaking of a right to be forgotten may be attractive in some respects, but considers that, with reference to the rights and concepts with which it conflicts, it falls short on more important points. The right to be forgotten could amount to a rejection of society and ultimately create an undemocratic environment, whereas the right to erasure, quite to the contrary, may serve to support and protect individuals in their interactions with society. It is therefore very easy to see the threat posed by the right to be forgotten to free speech, but a more limited and qualified right would not have the same effect. Moreover, the right to erasure will generally be subject to exceptions in situations that can be characterised as free expression. For this reason, it is also hard to conclude that there is an agenda of infringing freedom of expression behind the right to erasure.165
It is also considered that the right to be forgotten interferes with free enterprise, imposes restrictions and limitations and potentially imposes a serious financial burden. Although the same could be said of the right to erasure, it is stated that the right to erasure is more effective in striking a balance between interests and imposes appropriate and reasonable restrictions. Accordingly, the default should be that the individual can erase his data.166
While we consider that the right to be forgotten should be recognised to the extent of the balance to be struck, provided that its balancing against the conflicting rights and freedoms indicated above is taken into account, we agree with the view that the right to erasure and the right to be forgotten should not be treated as the same right. We base this, however, not on the argument that the right to erasure is good and the right to be forgotten bad, but on the fact that the two rights rest on different foundations.
It is clear that the right to be forgotten, as explained in detail above, conflicts with fundamental rights and concepts that are also of very great importance for society. Today, however, the individual’s need to forget and to be forgotten, together with the dangerous situation in which personal data find themselves as a result of the development of information technologies, plainly demonstrates the need for the right to be forgotten as well. Consequently, it must first be accepted that there is a need for the right to be forgotten and that this need cannot be met by the right to erasure, and then ways must be sought to apply this right in the most reasonable manner.
IV. THE POSITION OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN NATIONAL LAW
A. The Approach of the Decisions of the Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation
1. The Constitutional Court’s N.B.B. Judgment
Discussion of the right to be forgotten in our national law is also of recent date. The subject was first addressed in detail in the Constitutional Court’s N.B.B. judgment of 3 March 2016.167
a. The Facts
On the internet archive pages of a newspaper published nationwide, a total of three news reports, two in 1998 and one in 1999, were published concerning criminal proceedings conducted against the applicant on the allegation that he had used drugs, which had resulted in a judicial fine. Stating that the news reports about him continued to be published in the archive section of the press organisation’s website, the applicant sent the press organisation a formal notice requesting the removal of the online publication. The notice asserted that the news reports published on the website damaged the applicant’s honour and dignity, destroyed the privacy of his private life and, although he was not a well-known public figure, adversely affected his family life in particular as well as his working and social life. Having obtained no result from the notice sent to the content provider, the applicant then applied to the criminal court of peace (which, following the amendment made to the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) by Law No. 6545, became the criminal judgeship of peace as of June 2014) against the press organisation, requesting the blocking of access to the news reports in question.
The criminal court of peace first emphasised freedom of expression and of the press, stating that the task of the press is, in general, to provide information on true and current news of public interest and social concern, to prompt reflection, and to offer criticism, commentary and warnings. Examining the concrete case, however, it stated that the article had lost its currency and that there was no public interest in its news value or in keeping the report on the agenda. Concluding that the content, in its present form, constituted hurtful and distressing information about the private life of the person concerned and violated his personality rights by allowing anyone who so wished easy access to his private life, the court granted the applicant’s request for the blocking of access.
When the case came before the criminal court of first instance on an objection against that decision, the court set aside the decision to block access. As grounds for this, it stated that the news reports contained nothing that infringed the honour and dignity of the applicant who had requested the blocking of access, and that the archived report reflected the apparent truth at the date of its publication. In addition, it stated that, even though the article contained facts and opinions disturbing to the person making the request, a journalist who had no intent to violate rights could not be held liable even if the facts subsequently turned out to be untrue. The data subject thereupon lodged an application with the Constitutional Court, alleging a violation of the right to protect and improve his moral existence, and specifically of the right to the protection of personal reputation.168
b. The Judgment
The Court first assessed the application in the context of the right to the protection of personal reputation. Accordingly, the right to protect and improve one’s physical and moral existence, set out in Article 17 of the Constitution, also covers attacks on the personal honour and reputation of individuals. In this sense, the State has a negative obligation not to interfere arbitrarily with personal honour and reputation, which form part of the individual’s moral existence, and a positive obligation to prevent attacks by third parties.
Emphasising the case law of the ECtHR as well, the Court stated that the right to the protection of personal reputation is part of the right to respect for private life protected by Art. 8 ECHR.
In addition, for the right to the protection of personal reputation to be protected in concrete cases, the Court required that the attack must have attained a certain level of seriousness, that it must have been made in a manner causing prejudice to the applicant’s personal enjoyment of the right to respect for his reputation, and that the interference must not be a foreseeable consequence of the person’s own actions. However, with regard to attacks made via the internet, the Court stated that account must be taken of the accessibility and reach of this medium and of the ease with which news and ideas can be stored and preserved in it, and that news reports which, at the date of publication, did not exceed a certain threshold of seriousness or which resulted from the person’s own actions may damage a person’s honour and reputation if they remain accessible on the internet for a long time.
The Constitutional Court then established a link between the right to the protection of honour and reputation and the right to the protection of personal data. The Court found that, when publications are transferred to the internet and a link is established between a person and a news report, data belonging to the person must technically be processed on the internet, and that content providers within the meaning of Law No. 5651 are those who transfer the personal data contained in such publications to the internet and thereby make news reports about persons accessible through the newspaper archive. In this case, this relationship between the right to the protection of honour and reputation and personal data makes it necessary to assess attacks on honour and reputation on the internet in connection with the right to the protection of personal data.
Referring to the concept of personal data, the Court recalled that personal data may be processed only in the cases provided for by law or with the person’s explicit consent. On the other hand, it stated that a news report made within the scope of the freedoms of expression and of the press defined in the Constitution would constitute an exception to these limits, because news and ideas uploaded to the internet within the scope of freedom of expression and of the press will often entail the use and processing of personal data as well. At the same time, the easier access to news archives resulting from the spread of the internet and the press’s extensive use of this medium has created a virtual environment that does not allow news reports about persons to be forgotten. In the face of this, the Court’s earlier decisions169 had also established that freedom of expression covers not only the freedom to disseminate thoughts and ideas but also the freedom to receive news and ideas.170
Referring also to the Google judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which we examined above, the Court stated that freedom of expression and of the press and the right to the protection of honour and reputation, which come into conflict in this process, are fundamental rights and freedoms deserving equal protection. Hence the need arose to restore the disturbed balance between the two fundamental rights. In the Court’s view, at a time when forgetting has become difficult with internet journalism, this balance can be restored by recognising the right of individuals to be forgotten with respect to their honour and reputation.171
At this point, the Court set out the matters to be examined in establishing the existence of the right to be forgotten so that it can be protected against freedom of the press and of expression:172
“In this situation, in order for an internet news report to be removed from the internet within the scope of the right to be forgotten, matters such as the content of the publication, the period for which it has remained published, whether it has lost its currency, whether it cannot be regarded as historical data, its contribution to the public interest (the value of the news from a societal point of view, whether the news sheds light on the future), whether the person who is the subject of the news is a politician or a celebrity, the subject of the news report or article, and in this context whether the news contains factual truths or
value judgments, and the public’s interest in the data in question must be examined in respect of each concrete case.”
The Court also recalled its decision173 in which it had accepted that an interference with internet access must be examined within the scope of freedom of expression and, referring to the case law of the ECtHR, stated that news archives kept on the internet fall within the scope of freedom of expression and of the press and that the removal of archived news reports from publication would constitute an interference with freedom of the press.174 On the other hand, the Court stated that the press, and hence the news reports in internet archives, must comply with the restrictions laid down for the protection of “the reputation or rights, private or family life of others”, which is one of the restrictions listed in Articles 26, 27 and 28 of the Constitution.175
In this framework, the Court first stated that the news reports from 1998 and 1999 concerning the criminal proceedings against the data subject had lost their currency, that they no longer had the news value from a societal point of view required for them to be easily accessible in the archive, and that they were not of a nature to shed light on the future either. Nor, as regards the content of the news, could it be said that its easy accessibility on the internet was necessary for historical, statistical or scientific purposes. In this context, the Court held that, in terms of the public interest, the easy accessibility of the news reports published on the internet about the applicant, a data subject who was not a political or media personality, damaged the applicant’s reputation.176
Moreover, in the Court’s view, the news reports about the applicant were reports that had to be assessed within the scope of the right to be forgotten. In this respect, having regard to the ease of access afforded by the internet, it was concluded that access to the news report in question had to be blocked in order to protect the applicant’s honour and reputation. For these reasons, the Court concluded that the dismissal of the request for the blocking of access made by the applicant, as the data subject, violated the applicant’s constitutional rights.177
In conclusion, this judgment is very important in that the Constitutional Court expressly recognised the right to be forgotten. It can be seen that the Court found that the right to be forgotten emerges as a natural consequence of the fundamental aims and duties of the State and of the person’s rights to inviolability, to his physical and moral existence, to respect for private life and to request the protection of personal data. In this framework, it is established that the Constitutional Court aimed to ensure a fair balance between freedom of expression and of the press and the person’s right to be forgotten. In this respect, the State is responsible for giving the individual the opportunity to “turn over a new leaf” by preventing others from learning about his past experiences. It is thus understood that the judgment also imposes a positive obligation on the State to protect the right to be forgotten.
2. The Constitutional Court’s Fatih Saraman Judgment
Another decision delivered in connection with the right to be forgotten is the Constitutional Court’s Fatih Saraman judgment of 27 February 2019.178
a. The Facts
In the case that was the subject of the application, the applicant had committed the offence of theft while under the age of 18 and had been convicted of that offence. After reaching the age of 18 he applied for the recruitment examination for prison guards and passed it, but he was not appointed on the basis of the security investigation conducted before recruitment, which relied on his conviction from before the age of 18. Relying on the argument that judicial archive records from before the age of 18 should not be taken into account in recruitment to public service and should not be shared with any institution or person other than the judicial authorities, the applicant first exhausted all legal remedies and then lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court.
b. The Judgment
Although the Court examined all the relevant legislation, in particular Article 20 of the Constitution and Law No. 6698, it essentially based its judgment on a violation of the right to respect for private life on the ground that Article 20 of the Constitution had been infringed. The normative bases of this judgment include, among others, Article 53(4) of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) and Article 10(3) of the Criminal Records Law No. 5352. Accordingly, although under Art. 53 TCK an offender may be deprived of certain rights, no deprivation of the right to be appointed or elected to public office may be ordered against persons who committed an offence while under the age of 18. Under Art. 10(3) of the Criminal Records Law, “Criminal record and archive records concerning persons under the age of eighteen may be requested only by chief public prosecutors’ offices, judges or courts for assessment in the context of an investigation or prosecution.” Despite these provisions, the criminal record of the applicant, who was under the age of 18 at the time of the offence, was given to another authority and, although no such deprivation is provided for in Art. 53 TCK and no decision to that effect had been made, a decision was taken not to recruit the applicant to public service.
The administration based this decision on the provisions of Law No. 4045, the “Law on Security Investigations, the Restoration of the Rights of Public Personnel Dismissed for Certain Reasons and of Those Not Admitted to Public Service, and the Amendment of Martial Law No. 1402”. Security investigations and archive searches concerning personnel to be employed in certain public posts are carried out under Law No. 4045. However, by the amendments made to Article 48 of the Civil Servants Law No. 657 by Decree Law (KHK) No. 676 of 03.10.2016 and by Law No. 7070 approving that Decree Law, it was provided that such a security investigation and archive search must be carried out in respect of everyone to be appointed to the civil service, and this investigation and search was thereby made a general requirement for appointment to public office.179
Having stated that Law No. 4045 contains no provision on how long and how personal data are to be processed, and that the regulation issued to implement this Law also contains uncertainties, the Court referred to the right to be forgotten as follows:
“It is seen that Law No. 4045 contains no provisions whatsoever concerning what information and documents are to be the subject of the security investigation and archive search, where this information is to be obtained, how and for how long it is to be retained, whether persons have the opportunity to object to the information in question, whether it is possible for the information to be deleted after a certain period or what procedure is to be followed for its deletion, the determination of public personnel with security clearance and of occupational groups, the procedures and principles of the security investigation and archive search, and the authorities that are to carry them out. In addition, it is understood that the laws contain no provision referring to Law No. 5352, which is the first law that comes to mind and should be applied in respect of final criminal convictions, and that no provision protecting individuals against arbitrariness has been included. Likewise, it is understood that the Regulation on Security Investigations and Archives does not regulate the periods for which the information obtained is to be retained, whether it is possible for the information to be deleted after a certain period or what procedure is to be followed for its deletion, or whether persons have the opportunity to object to the information in question, and that it lacks provisions that would provide safeguards for individuals’ right to respect for private life.”180
In similar terms, the Court also implicitly expressed the existence of the right to be forgotten as follows and, on that basis, established the unlawfulness in the case before it with regard to the regulation applied as well:
“Moreover, it is seen that the Regulation contains provisions stating that the information and documents containing the results of the investigation and search are to be kept indefinitely in the file of the person concerned at the security authorities, and that information concerning persons found to have an adverse record in the security investigation and archive search is to be transferred reciprocally between the Undersecretariat of the National Intelligence Organisation and the General Directorate of Security, and that persons have no opportunity to object to the information in question, nor is it possible for the information to be deleted after a certain period. In this situation, it is understood that the security investigation and archive search are not subject to objective, foreseeable and predetermined safeguards and procedures, that they are carried out entirely in accordance with the instructions of the competent authorities, and that, as such, they create a situation open to arbitrariness.”181
In the Court’s view, the provisions of Law No. 4045 failed to lay down properly the basic rules, principles and framework of the subject matter, which involves restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms. According to the Court, the Law does not contain clear and detailed rules ensuring that those to whom it applies have sufficient safeguards against abuse of authority and arbitrariness. Consequently, the provision on which the interference giving rise to the application was based does not satisfy the requirement of lawfulness.182 In conclusion, the Court found a violation of Article 20 of the Constitution.
Although the Court based its judgment on the principle of legality, it should in fact have found a violation of the “right to be forgotten”, which ought to have been expressly stated. This is because Art. 53(4) TCK and Art. 10(3) of the Criminal Records Law themselves regulate the right to be forgotten in respect of children. Accordingly, these provisions were introduced so that children are not affected for the rest of their lives by offences they committed before reaching majority, when their capacity to understand and to will was not yet fully developed, and so that such offences do not form an obstacle to their rights to education and to work. The real-life implementation of this right granted to children consists in ensuring that such special categories of personal data are neither given to nor processed by persons other than the competent authorities.
In the case that was the subject of the application, however, personal data were shared with authorities that were not competent, and, by processing these data in clear breach of the law, the person’s right to the protection of personal data, his right to work and his right to be forgotten were all violated. The Court’s judgment is therefore a correct and progressive step which underlines that, whatever the subject, no act contrary to the normative provisions may be performed and that the right to be forgotten must be fully applied.
This judgment is also a continuation of the Constitutional Court’s approach of recognising the right to be forgotten, which it adopted in the N.B.B. judgment. It is therefore a positive judgment in this respect as well.
B. The Approach of the Court of Cassation
1. The Judgment of the General Civil Assembly of the Court of Cassation of 17.06.2015
Allegations that the right to be forgotten has been violated have also been the subject of claims for compensation based on an attack on personality rights. The judgment delivered by the Court of Cassation must be addressed because it was the first time that the right to be forgotten was dealt with in Turkish law and because it contains a definition of the right.
The judgment delivered by the General Civil Assembly of the Court of Cassation (YHGK)183 concerns a claim for compensation based on an attack on personality rights resulting from the publication in a scholarly book, without anonymisation of the person’s data, of a criminal judgment delivered in another case in which the data subject was the victim.
In the case in question, the data subject stated that the court decision reproduced in a book indicated that he had been the victim of the continuing offence of sexual assault committed by abuse of the influence afforded by public office or a service relationship.
At the end of the trial, the accused, a public official, was sentenced. Following an appeal on points of law, the judgment was upheld in 2009. During both the preliminary investigation and the trial, the victim and data subject had described clearly how the sexual assault had taken place, and these statements were also reproduced in the text of the judgment. The inclusion of that judgment, with the whole incident described explicitly, in a book published in April 2010, four years after the date of the act, without the consent of the victim, became the subject of a claim for compensation by the victim and data subject. Through the right to be forgotten, the data subject seeks to shape his future freely by having an unfortunate incident in his past forgotten, in other words, the opportunity to turn over a new leaf in his life.
The YHGK approached the case as a problem of determining the limits of the right to be forgotten, and of the protection of personal data and personality rights that follows from it, on the one hand, and of the freedom of science and the arts on the other. According to the YHGK, solving the problem requires striking a fair balance between the freedom of science and the arts and the fundamental rights of the individual. The YHGK first determined the scope of the concept of personal data and set out the fundamental aims and principles underlying the protection of personal data:
“The protection of personal data is closely related to human rights. This is because the disclosure of personal data may, first and foremost, violate the right to respect for private life, and a number of other related rights may also be harmed.
The ECHR contains no provision on personal data. However, the Court has given content to the notion of personal data in its decisions on the subject. It must be stated at once that it is not possible to limit personal data numerically. However, having regard to case law and academic publications, a person’s identity, economic and digital information, nationality, opinions, race, political opinions, philosophical beliefs, religion, sect or other beliefs, membership of associations, foundations and trade unions, health information, photographs, fingerprints, health data, telephone messages, telephone directory, and the texts, photographs, sound or image recordings he writes or shares on social networking sites, which reveal the identity of the individual and make a person identifiable and characterise him, may be regarded as his personal data.
In our age, the protection of personal data is growing in importance in parallel with the steadily developing awareness of the concept of human rights and of their protection. The fundamental aim of the right to the protection of personal data is to protect the person by guaranteeing the confidentiality of the individual’s private life. The right to the protection of personal data, which is becoming an increasingly important issue in the information society, emerges as a requirement for the individual to be able to shape his own life himself, of his own free will, in a democratic State governed by the rule of law. On the other hand, the free development of the individual’s personality, the protection of his personality and the establishment of a social order composed of free individuals are possible only through the protection of the individual’s right concerning his personal data. As stated
above, this right is expressly regulated in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye.”
The YHGK then dealt with the right to be forgotten by associating it with the right to the protection of personal data while recognising it as an independent right. In this sense, according to the YHGK, the right to be forgotten in essence forms the roof of the right to the protection of personal data as regards compliance with the criteria of proportionality and reasonable time in the storage or retention of personal data. Accordingly, both rights are based on enabling individuals to dispose freely of their personal data, to make plans for the future without being held back by the past, and to prevent personal data from being used against the person.
Following this, the YHGK included in its judgment the first definition of the right to be forgotten given in our national law:
“The right to be forgotten may be expressed as the right to request, unless there is an overriding public interest, that negative events experienced in the past and contained in the digital memory be forgotten after a certain time, and that personal data which the person does not wish others to know be erased and their dissemination prevented.”
In this framework, the content of the right to be forgotten was also set out in the judgment through a two-sided examination: on the one hand, the right gives the data subject the “right to control his past” and the “right to request that certain matters be erased from his past and not be remembered”; on the other hand, those to whom it is addressed are under an obligation to take measures to ensure that certain information about the person is not used, or remembered, by third parties.
In its judgment, the YHGK further concluded that, although there are views that the subject matter of the right to be forgotten consists solely of digital data, having regard to the characteristics of the right and its relationship with human rights, it must be recognised not only for personal data in the digital environment but also for personal data kept in places easily accessible to the public.
Whether the right can be assessed under the right to respect for private life set out in Art. 8 ECHR was also addressed in the judgment. The judgment refers to the view that the “right to privacy” protected under the right to respect for private life also includes the individual’s legal interest in being able to control information about himself. Accordingly, the data subject has a legal interest in his data not being disclosed or disseminated without his consent and in others not having access to this information, in short, in his personal data remaining private.
In the concrete case, the YHGK stated that there were no special reasons demonstrating an overriding public interest, such as an important role played by the data in public life or intense public interest in the data in question; it concluded that personal data should not have appeared openly in the judgment reproduced in the scholarly work, and it granted the data subject’s claim for compensation. It should be noted, however, that the dissenting members in the minority argued that there was no need to anonymise the names appearing in court decisions, that trials are conducted in public save for exceptions and that the judgment is pronounced publicly, and that the right to respect for private life had therefore not been violated.
In this framework, the judgment is regarded as an extremely positive development in that the right to be forgotten was recognised as an independent right and defined by the courts for the first time. The judgment is also important in that failure to give effect to the right to be forgotten may become the subject of claims for compensation as an attack on personality rights.
2. The Judgment of the General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation of 30.10.2018
Another important judgment in which the right to be forgotten and freedom of expression and of the press were discussed is the judgment of the General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation concerning a newspaper report.184 The judgment concerns a complaint brought by a person who had been convicted of the offence of “detention with lustful intent” under the former Turkish Criminal Code No. 765 against the editor-in-chief who, 22 years later, featured this incident in a newspaper column. The intervening party stated that “the incident in question took place in 1991, that he was tried and sentenced on account of this incident and his sentence was suspended, that in 1998 he took up office as a manager at the Provincial Directorate of Youth Services and Sports in Osmaniye, that the publication of such a report 22 years after the incident was intended to discredit him, that there was no public interest in the report, and that his family had experienced serious difficulties as a result”.
Because of the case’s direct connection with freedom of expression and of the press, the General Criminal Assembly (YCGK) took the view that these matters should first be assessed in the light of national and international provisions, and that thereafter the right to report news and to criticise, the right to be forgotten, which has found a place in our law through case law, and the elements of the offence of insult should be examined.
In the examination carried out in this context, the international and national provisions on freedom of expression were first set out, and it was stated that freedom of expression is an indispensable condition of democracy, the foundation of many rights and freedoms and the source of personal and social development, and is for these reasons guaranteed in the broadest sense. Freedom of the press was then addressed and the exceptions to this freedom were set out. According to the YCGK, “In today’s liberal democracies, save for exceptions, the expression of thought is protected across a broad spectrum and, by being assessed within the scope of freedom of expression, is afforded the fullest enjoyment of the rights that this freedom confers”.
On the other hand, the YCGK also accepts that a balance must be struck between the freedoms to express and disseminate thought, freedom of expression and freedom of the press, and the protection of persons’ honour and reputation. It takes the view that, just as internet use requires these fundamental rights and freedoms to be protected in the virtual environment as well, it also brings interferences with these rights and freedoms onto the agenda in view of the risks it entails for matters such as respect for private life, honour and reputation, and the protection and development of physical and moral existence. The YCGK states that, because the press makes active use of the internet, the balance between freedom of expression and of the press and the dignity and reputation of individuals, which must be protected equally, has been upset in favour of freedom of the press, and that preventing this imbalance is possible by recognising the right of individuals to be forgotten.
In the light of all these considerations, the YCGK concluded that, because of a number of elements present in the concrete case, the right to be forgotten and the individual’s dignity, honour and esteem prevailed:
“When the following matters are assessed together: the article as a whole and the manner in which the expressions were used; the fact that the conviction of the intervening party on which the article was based, which under the provisions on criminal records is in principle deemed not to have occurred, concerned an incident that took place approximately twenty years before the date of the offence; the fact that, in this sense, the intervening party was entitled, within the framework of the right to be forgotten, to request that the necessary measures be taken in respect of the incident in question; the fact that, given the nature of the public office he held, the intervening party did not hold a political, media or similar position attracting particular public interest; the nature of the public office held by the intervening party; the fact that, contrary to the content of the article, the file reflects no significant change in the rank of the office held by the intervening party in the recent period; and the fact that the accused, a journalist, portrayed the intervening party’s previous conviction, which he himself had in his possession and had the opportunity to examine and assess, as the different and more serious offence of sexual abuse, although it concerned the offence of detention with lustful intent set out in Article
430(2) of TCK No. 765, it cannot be said that the report had any current value or that the public had an interest in learning about and discussing this situation; and since it is understood that the accused’s act created a real danger of destroying the trust that the public should have in the intervening party, a public official, it must be accepted that the expressions used in the article were of a degree that offended the dignity, honour and esteem of the person concerned.”
This judgment of the YCGK is extremely important in that it sets out which elements are to be assessed in applying the right to be forgotten. Accordingly, the criteria assessed by the YCGK are as follows:
• The time elapsed since the event:
One of the most important elements in applying the right to be forgotten is the time that has elapsed since the event. The YCGK underlined that 22 years had passed since the event.
• Characteristics of the person who wishes to benefit from the right to be forgotten: The YCGK stated that, given the nature of the public office he held, the intervening party did not hold a political, media or similar position attracting particular public interest.
• The currency of the content concerned by the right to be forgotten:
According to the YCGK, the report had no current value.
• The degree of accuracy of the content concerned by the right to be forgotten:
Although the right to be forgotten essentially concerns true events, the point underlined by the YCGK, namely that the event was “portrayed as different and more serious than it was”, is extremely important. It must be accepted that, where such circumstances exist, the likelihood that the right to be forgotten will be applied increases.
• Public interest:
The YCGK concluded that it could not be said that the public had an interest in learning about and discussing this situation. On the other hand, the report in question created a real danger of destroying the trust that the public should have in the intervening party, a public official.
C. The Approach of the Personal Data Protection Board
Since the right to be forgotten is directly related to the right to the protection of personal data, the way in which the Personal Data Protection Board (“KVKK”) has dealt with the subject is also extremely important. The Board first addressed the right to be forgotten in a decision it delivered in 2020 and has since published many texts on the subject.
1. The Board’s Decision No. 2020/482 of 23.06.2020
The Board first found it necessary to assess the right to be forgotten when it received various applications containing requests for “the deletion under Law No. 6698 of the names and surnames appearing in news reports on websites, or of the news reports themselves” and for “the newspaper archives in question to be subjected to technical arrangements so that they are not indexed by search engines”.185
In this assessment, the Board sought to determine the scope of the subject by referring to the relevant national and international provisions and court decisions. According to the Board, even though the right to be forgotten is not referred to as a concept in our legislation, it is clear that our law contains instruments designed to secure this right. Consequently, there is no longer any doubt that the Board recognises the right to be forgotten.
The Board then made an assessment of how applications concerning the right to be forgotten are to be handled. As a result of this assessment, the Board reached the following conclusions:
• Search engines are controllers, and the activities carried out by search engines constitute processing of personal data.
• Although the right to be forgotten is an overarching concept, applications on the subject are assessed under Art. 20(3) of the Constitution, Articles 4, 7 and 11 of Law No. 6698 and Art. 8 of the Regulation on the Erasure, Destruction or Anonymisation of Personal Data.
• Data subjects must first apply to the search engines, as controllers, with their requests for the delisting of search results, and if these applications are rejected or not answered, they may lodge a complaint with the Board. In this situation, data subjects may at the same time also have direct recourse to the courts.
• In assessing these requests, “a balancing test will be carried out between the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject and the interests the public will derive from obtaining the information in question, and which of the competing interests prevails”
will be taken into account; however, additional criteria may also come into play in each specific case.
The Board has published a text in question-and-answer form on the criteria to be taken into account in assessments concerning the right to be forgotten; all the criteria contained in this text are also included in our study.186
In addition, the “Public Announcement on Requests for the Delisting of Results Obtained in Searches Made on Search Engines Using Persons’ Names and Surnames”, which contains the decision given above by the Board and the conclusions reached in it, was published on 17.07.2020 in the same terms as the summary of the decision set out above.187 This announcement further states that it was decided that the procedures and principles set out in the decision be notified to the companies operating search engines and that the necessary action be taken to enable the right to be forgotten to be applied.
2. The Board’s Decision No. 2020/927 of 08.12.2020
This decision of the Board is extremely important in that the criteria set out in the previous decision were assessed in a concrete case.188 The case concerned news reports about an investigation opened against a person working as a faculty member at a university. Stating that his removal request sent to the search engine had been unsuccessful and that the news report in question had adversely affected his life, the applicant requested that the content in question be subjected to technical arrangements so that it would not be indexed by the search engine.
The criteria examined by the Board in relation to this application and the position in the concrete case are as follows:
| Question | Position in the concrete case |
|---|---|
| Is the content that is the subject of the application | Yes |
| accurate? | |
|---|---|
| What does the content relate to? | It relates to the working life of the data subject, and the data subject still does the same job. |
| Does the content contain special categories of personal data? | No |
| Is the content current? | Yes |
| Is there a legal obligation to publish the content? | No |
| Was the content published by the person himself? | No |
| Does the content relate to a criminal offence? | No |
Taking all these matters into account, the Board concluded that the controller’s decision not to remove the content was justified.
3. The Board’s Decision No. 2020/414 of 22.05.2020
In the case that was the subject of this decision of the Board, by contrast, a judgment delivered against the data subject in criminal proceedings appeared on a newspaper’s website.189 In the application made by the data subject’s lawyer, it was stated that the offence had been committed in 2009, that the sentence imposed had been served in full, and that the news report in question had adversely affected the data subject’s working and family life.
The newspaper that published the report raised a defence based precisely on the rights and concepts with which the right to be forgotten conflicts, stating that (i) under Art. 28(1)(c) of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), the processing of personal data within the scope of freedom of expression is a ground of justification, (ii) under Art. 26 of the Constitution, receiving and imparting news is regarded as part of freedom of expression, (iii) the report in question was written within the scope of the public’s right to receive news, (iv) freedom of the press and the media is regarded as a fourth power after the legislature, the judiciary and the executive, (v) if such reports were removed merely because the data subject found them disturbing, without regard to the public interest, the media would be in danger of becoming dysfunctional, (vi) no confidential information had been disclosed by it, and (vii) the procedures provided for under Law No. 5651 could be used for the removal of publications.
In its examination of the concrete case, the Board concluded that there was a public interest in the report and that, as between the conflicting rights, freedom of expression prevailed over personality rights; it took the view that, since the application fell within the scope of Art. 28(1)(c) of Law No. 6698, no action was required.
4. The Board’s Decision No. 2022/1201 of 10.11.2022
In its latest published decision on the subject, the Board granted the applicant’s request under the right to be forgotten and decided to instruct the controller to delist the content that was the subject of the application so that it could not be associated with the data subject’s name and surname.190 In the case that was the subject of the decision, the data subject applied with a request for the removal of a page of the Official Gazette that was reached when a search was made on the search engine using his name.
In its examination, the Board established that the content that was the subject of the application related to the service of a notification on the data subject under the Notification Law. Under the Notification Law, the content in question was deemed to have been served fifteen days after the date of its publication in the Official Gazette. Consequently, first and foremost, there was no public interest whatsoever in the content that was the subject of the application. Moreover, more than twenty years had passed since the event that was the subject of the application, and in this sense it had lost its currency. According to the Board, although the information in the content confirmed that the data subject had been acquitted by a court decision of the offence with which he had been charged, it could nevertheless give rise to prejudice against the data subject. Finally, the content in question had no connection whatsoever with journalistic activities. Assessing all these matters together, the Board found the data subject’s request under the right to be forgotten to be justified.
It follows from this decision that the concepts to which the Board attaches the greatest importance in deciding whether a request under the right to be forgotten is justified are public interest, currency and freedom of the press.
V. THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE CONTROLLER
Since the right to be forgotten involves a request to be made by the data subject, there must also be a party to whom this request is addressed and by whom it is fulfilled. This party is undoubtedly the controller. Although certain obligations of the controller are accepted within the scope of the right to be forgotten, the fact that the right to be forgotten is not directly regulated makes it difficult to render this matter determinable. Even though it is a right recognised in particular by the case law of the courts and has been placed on a certain theoretical foundation, it is impossible to impose direct liability on the controller, since there is no express provision on the subject.
Nevertheless, the data subject’s “right to erasure/right to be forgotten” is regulated by Article 17 of the GDPR, which clarifies what the controller must do in response to a request for erasure. As we have mentioned throughout this study where relevant, and as we explained earlier under a separate heading, the right to erasure and the right to be forgotten do not have exactly the same meaning. We should therefore point out that, although the obligations to be imposed will be largely similar, they will not be identical.
For this reason, under this heading we shall attempt to determine the controller’s obligations under the right to be forgotten by providing an explanation within the framework of Article 17 of the GDPR. In this context, we shall also refer where relevant to Google’s initiatives, as explained above. Finally, we shall address the obstacles that the controller may encounter in fulfilling these requests. In this way, we shall try to make the meaning of the right to be forgotten clear from the side of both the data subject and the controller.
A. The Controller’s Duties under the Right to Be Forgotten
Article 17 of the GDPR, entitled “right to erasure (right to be forgotten)”, is the principal provision that expressly refers to the right to be forgotten. The GDPR has thus treated the right to erasure and the right to be forgotten as interchangeable.
It was not easy to have the “right to be forgotten”, which was expressly mentioned in the EU Commission’s press release of 2010, expressly included in the Regulation. While the EU Commission wanted the right to be included, the European Parliament wanted the term “right to erasure” to be used, as in the provision of Article 12 of Directive 95/46/EC. After lengthy negotiations, once the Council of the EU had also been persuaded to include the expression right to be forgotten in the Regulation, Article 17 of the Regulation came to regulate the right to erasure and the right to be forgotten together.
Nevertheless, in its explanation of the right to be forgotten under the heading of key issues of data protection law, the GDPR states that this right was regulated for the first time by the GDPR as an “addition” to the right to erasure. This matter will be addressed in more detail below. At this point, however, it is necessary to look at the article in question in order to determine the controller’s obligations under the right to be forgotten.
The first paragraph of the article regulates the controller’s obligation to erase without undue delay where the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were processed, the data subject withdraws his explicit consent and the conditions for processing are no longer met, the data subject exercises his right to object, the personal data have been unlawfully processed, an obligation to erase the personal data has arisen under the legislation to which the controller is subject, or the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society services. We should point out that what is regulated here concerns the right to the protection of personal data and governs the controller’s obligations arising from the data subject’s right to the protection of his personal data.
The second paragraph of the article, by contrast, can be seen to approach the right to be forgotten by regulating cases in which the personal data have been “made public”. Indeed, in its explanation of the right to be forgotten under the heading of key issues of data protection law, the GDPR states that this right is found in paragraph 2 of Article 17. At this point, what the controller must first do in respect of erasure, and then what it must do in respect of the right to be forgotten as an addition to erasure, is briefly explained.
Accordingly, first of all, there is no prescription or requirement as to how personal data must be erased. The only decisive factor is that, at the end of the processing operation, it is no longer possible to distinguish the personal data in question without disproportionate effort. In this context, it is regarded as sufficient that the medium containing the data has been physically destroyed or that the data have been permanently destroyed by means of special software.
The same applies under Law No. 6698. Neither the Law nor the “Regulation on the Erasure, Destruction and Anonymisation of Personal Data”191, which entered into force after the Law, prescribes how the controller must carry out erasure. While this is left to the discretion of the controller, it is stated that the controller must choose the most appropriate method having regard to the particular features of the specific circumstances.
As regards what is to be done under the right to be forgotten, certain additional obligations have been introduced. Accordingly, in order to strengthen the right to be forgotten in the online environment in particular, where the controller has made the personal data public and one of the grounds for erasure applies, it should take reasonable steps to inform all other processors of this, so that all copies of the personal data are erased.192
Frankly, it cannot be said that very significant changes have been introduced for the right to be forgotten in addition to what must be done under the obligation to erase. The only additions are that the controller must inform the other processors and that the copies must be erased. Since only reasonable steps of the controller are involved, it cannot be said that an extensive burden has been imposed in terms of communication with other controllers either. It is also unclear whether the reasonableness of particular measures is to be determined according to the subjective situation of the controller in question or according to objective criteria.193
In this regard, we consider, first, that the express statement that copies must also be erased is consistent with the aims of the right to be forgotten. This aim can be achieved only if copies of the personal data which the data subject no longer wishes to be remembered by and associated with are also erased. Otherwise, it cannot be said that forgetting has taken place or that this right has been exercised.
The obligation to erase copies laid down for the right to be forgotten should apply a fortiori to the right to erasure. Indeed, whereas copies must be erased under the right to erasure, it should be discussed how far this is necessary under the right to be forgotten. This is because, unlike erasure, being forgotten does not involve the complete deletion of personal data; rather, it makes the data harder to find, particularly on search engines. On the other hand, for both rights it is very difficult for the erasure of such copies to be given effect in real life. Among the main reasons for this difficulty is that very large data sets are copied at regular intervals, particularly in large organisations. Erasing the data relating to a single request from among these copies is not only difficult but also very costly.
We expect that a new provision will be made on this point in the future or that practice will evolve in a different direction in this respect, because in a universe of digital devices and the internet, genuine forgetting is in fact not possible.
On the other hand, the GDPR has provided for this obligation “where the controller is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data” ; in other words, the GDPR has confined this obligation to the first paragraph of the same article, which regulates the cases requiring the erasure of personal data and was explained above. Consequently, no additional situation in which the right to be forgotten may come into play has been provided for. In our opinion, this means that the right to be forgotten has not been treated separately from the right to the protection of personal data in terms of its elements, purpose and protected legal interest, because the elements and the purposes of the situations in which a right may come into play are interconnected. However, although the GDPR has introduced certain obligations in addition to the right to erasure as regards what must be done under the right to be forgotten, confining the right to be forgotten to cases in which “the personal data must be erased” narrows the function of the right.
Of course, this should not be taken to mean that a very wide scope should be laid down. In such a case, as mentioned earlier, there could be a major conflict with other fundamental rights and freedoms such as freedom of expression and the right to information. However, we consider that, in addition to the cases in which the right to erasure may be exercised, the cases in which the right to be forgotten comes into play, the foundations on which the right rests and its purposes and functions should be determined.
At this point, the initiatives of Google, the first company to be placed under an obligation to give effect to the right to be forgotten, must also be addressed. The Court of Justice’s judgment examined above is important in many respects: for the first time an obligation to give effect to the right to be forgotten was imposed, and for the first time the implementation of this obligation was required of a global company such as Google. The fact that the subject was still so unclear in many respects also made it difficult for Google to grasp its obligations under this judgment. Indeed, Google acknowledged this and expressly stated that it was struggling greatly with how to implement the judgment. The fact that the judgment entails major obligations and that millions of applications have since been made to the company clearly demonstrates this.
Nevertheless, making a web form for submitting applications publicly accessible and sharing reports on the subject with the public are important steps towards protecting the right. It is also important that this web form contains information on how the company approaches the subject and states clearly how it assesses and decides applications made under this judgment.
The fact that Google set up an Advisory Council made up of experts in the field in order to implement its obligations under the judgment as correctly as possible is a positive development, showing its effort to implement the judgment. However, this alone does not mean that Google has taken all possible measures. In any case, in a company of this size whose core business is data processing, taking all possible measures requires a certain amount of time.
In conclusion, when the right to erasure is exercised, the controller must pay attention to the following:
• How and in what manner it carries out the erasure is within its own discretion.
• The controller must determine the most reasonable of the available options.
• It must not be possible to distinguish the personal data without disproportionate effort.
In the case of the right to be forgotten, the following additional obligations apply:
First, the controller must inform all other processors of the matter.
• In this way, it must ensure that all copies of the personal data concerned by the right to be forgotten are also erased.
• The controller must take all necessary reasonable steps on both points.
• In addition to all this, in order to be able to give effect to the right to be forgotten, the controller must take appropriate technical and organisational measures enabling recipients to record personal data. In this context, a “Data Protection Management System” for recording processing activities may be useful where appropriate.194
B. The Enforceability of the Right to Be Forgotten and the Obstacle Created by HTTPS
For the right to be forgotten to be effectively protected, in addition to the obligations of controllers, the decisions of the courts, as the highest authorities charged with applying the law, must be enforced, and the law must in this sense be put into practice. In our country, however, the problems arising from the HTTPS protocol are one of the greatest obstacles to the enforceability of the right to be forgotten.
As stated earlier, the great majority of the data that form the subject matter of the right to be forgotten are found in the digital environment. The enforceability of decisions on the right to be forgotten therefore depends on the removal of such data from the digital environment, that is, in technical terms, on the blocking of access. The rules on blocking internet access and communication are laid down in Law No. 5651 on the “Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Offences Committed by Means of Such Publications”. Under Law No. 5651, there are four methods of blocking access: blocking access by domain name, blocking access by IP address, blocking access to the content (URL), and blocking access by similar methods. Decisions to block access are executed by the Association of Access Providers, with the exception of those falling under Article 8 of the Law.
Where there are situations on the internet that violate personality rights, the right holder has two routes for obtaining the blocking of access. The first is to send a warning directly to the content provider; the second is to apply to the criminal judgeship of peace. The criminal judgeship of peace must give its decision, and the content provider its reply to the application, within twenty-four hours at the latest.
HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) is the communication protocol that lays down the rules for data transfer between clients and servers on the internet. This protocol has a set of internal rules, and communication and data transfer take place within the framework of these rules. The client sends a request to the server using a web browser, the server responds by means of various programs, and in this way the internet can be browsed. HTTPS, on the other hand, is the HTTP protocol with the SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) protocol added, or, more plainly, the more secure version of HTTP. Normally, access to a website is blocked by intervening in the chain of transmission between the server and the browser. Where HTTPS is involved, however, blocking cannot be carried out by intervening in between, since the transmission takes place over an encrypted chain. In this way, websites are made more secure.
In our country, great difficulties were experienced in enforcing decisions to block access issued by the courts, a problem that existed before Law No. 5651 entered into force to regulate the internet and continued after it entered into force. Court registries were expected to serve notice on every access provider one by one, and the access providers were in turn expected to implement the decisions. It was precisely to put an end to this chaos and difficulty that the “Association of Access Providers” was introduced into Law No. 5651 by Article 90 of Law No. 6518 of 06.02.2014, and the duty and power to implement decisions to block access was given to this Association. Article 6/A(6) of the same Law, which provides that “Decisions to block access other than those within the scope of Article 8 of this Law shall be executed by the access providers…”, expressly specifies that the Association is merely an intermediary body. The reason for introducing this additional article was stated in the Sub-Committee report as follows:
“With a view to establishing the Association of Access Providers, a civil initiative, in order to remove obstacles such as non-enforceability and uncertainty as to the addressee, which are problems revealed by current practice with regard to decisions on the removal of content from publication and the blocking of access to content; to make effective a civil initiative formed by representatives of the sector, instead of public actors, in the processes of implementing interim measures concerning internet publications, and to ensure alignment with the practice of developed countries; to make membership of the Association compulsory for all service providers in order to be able to continue their activities; and to lay down the principles and procedures concerning the Association so established, a provision providing for the addition of Article 6/A to Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Offences Committed by Means of Such Publications has been added to the Bill as framework Article 97.”
As can be seen, the purpose of introducing this article is to ensure the enforcement of court decisions, as in modern States governed by the rule of law and modern societies. The Association of Access Providers, which executes the decisions to block access issued in Türkiye, states, however, that it cannot carry out blocking because its existing infrastructure does not allow HTTPS to be blocked. Consequently, a decision obtained from Turkish courts under Turkish law cannot be enforced against websites publishing in Türkiye by an association established by Turkish law and charged with this task. We think one does not need to be a lawyer to see the absurdity of this (non-)enforcement.
The Association of Access Providers is in fact an auxiliary body as regards the enforcement of decisions. The primary responsibility for enforcing decisions to block access lies with the content providers. As we encounter in practice, however, content providers that publish material violating personality rights do not remove the content despite a decision to block access issued by the criminal judgeship of peace. The most important reasons for this are that decisions to block access cannot be enforced as a result of the problems experienced with the HTTPS protocol, and that our law provides for no sanction against content providers that, despite the decision, fail to implement the court decision and do not themselves block access to the data.
In this framework, it can be seen that the greatest obstacle to the effective implementation of the legal protections introduced for the right to be forgotten arises at the stage of enforcing the court judgments delivered. What must be done at this point is, first of all, to provide the Association of Access Providers with the infrastructure necessary to block access to websites using HTTPS. One of the most important requirements of the rule of law is the enforcement of the decisions of the courts, which are the highest authorities charged with applying legal rules. Secondly, Law No. 5651 should provide for a misdemeanour (administrative offence) entailing an administrative fine and other measures against content providers that fail to comply with court decisions, and for an offence entailing a custodial sentence and a judicial fine for the person responsible at a content provider that intentionally fails to comply with such decisions, as well as security measures against legal persons.
C. The Provision Introduced by Art. 9(10) of Law No. 5651
Paragraph 10, added to Article 9 of Law No. 5651 by Law No. 7253 of 29.07.2020, introduced a provision enabling individuals to exercise the right to be forgotten with respect to search engines: “At the request of persons whose personality rights have been violated by the content of a publication on the internet, the judge may decide that the applicant’s name shall not be associated with the internet addresses that are the subject of the decision under this article”.
Thus, where the violation of personality rights under Article 9 results from personal data falling within the scope of the right to be forgotten, it has become possible not only to remove that content from online publication but also to have it removed from the search engines on which it is displayed. The point to be considered in deciding here is whether the conditions of the right to be forgotten are met. Accordingly, if, in the specific application, the rights and concepts explained above, such as historicity or freedom of expression, serve a greater interest than the person’s right to be forgotten, the appearance of the content that is the subject of the application on search engines should not be prevented, even if personality rights are being violated.
By the additional article added to Law No. 5651 by Law No. 7253 of 2020, provisions concerning social network providers have also been introduced. The obligations imposed and the rights granted to individuals by this article provide new opportunities, albeit indirect ones, for the exercise of the right to be forgotten.
CONCLUSION
As regards the right to the protection of personal data, while there were initially debates as to whether such a right existed at all, the right to be forgotten has now come to be accepted as a right derived from the right to the protection of personal data. Today, debates have emerged as to whether the right to be forgotten exists as a stand-alone right independent of the right to the protection of personal data.
The right to be forgotten, the right that has aroused the greatest curiosity and interest among the rights that have come onto the agenda with the development of awareness of the protection of personal data, provides for personal data to be forgotten, particularly in the digital environment. This right is the newest debate that information technologies have raised in the field of law, and it is a new kind of right that has emerged because of information technologies, which cause a person to be remembered, in particular for a long time, through his data.
In legal scholarship, views are now being put forward that the right to be forgotten is a right separate from the right to the protection of personal data, but that the two are, like the two sides of a coin, different rights joined to each other. We must state that we share this view.
The right to erasure should not be regarded as the same right as the right to be forgotten. Although the subject matter of both rights is personal data and there are similarities in the operations to be performed on the data when the rights are exercised, the starting points of the rights and the philosophies they embrace are entirely different. We should point out that this distinction is drawn in particular by those who oppose the recognition of the right to be forgotten and propose a right to erasure instead. On this view, the right to be forgotten concerns the rewriting of history or censorship, whereas the right to erasure concerns subjecting the State to a more effective and efficient control mechanism and to limitations, and ensuring that no more data than necessary is retained for commercial purposes. It may therefore be misleading to describe this as being forgotten, because erasure is not about forgetting; it is about control.
Because it is a new kind of right, the right to be forgotten has no agreed definition either in the academic studies on the subject or in international instruments. Moreover, the number of studies specific to the subject is very limited, particularly in Türkiye, and the statutory provisions in which the right appears have not yet reached a level that meets the need. This is due not only to the right being very new but also to its relationship with IT law. The dynamic and complex structure of IT law makes it a field that is both constantly developing and open to debate on many points. In its most general sense, the right to be forgotten is a person’s request to be forgotten by preventing access to his data. For whatever reason, the individual does not want information about himself that is accessible to be reached and disseminated, and regards this as contrary to his interests.
With the passage of time, the individual changes both physically and psychologically. That being so, he does not wish to be constantly associated with his “former self”, or, more generally, with his past. For this reason, being forgotten is, in terms of the element of time, not so much a wish as an indispensable need for the individual to be able to continue his life as he wishes and independently of the bad events he experienced in his past. Indeed, Friedrich Nietzsche theorised this need in his work on what he called the “thesis of active forgetting”. Nietzsche grounded the human need to forget in historicity. In his view, the greatest difference between humans and animals is the difference of “historicity”: animals have no sense of historicity and live without feeling any difference between yesterday and today. Humans, by contrast, unlike animals, have a historical consciousness, and their past is always with them. According to Nietzsche, the only condition for being able to be happy is to succeed in forgetting. A person’s forgetting, however, undoubtedly depends on his being forgotten. Only when he is forgotten and no longer associated with his past can he forget as well. Consequently, quite apart from the other elements of the right to be forgotten, we consider that the element of time is important for understanding the thinking and philosophy underlying the right.
Although the right to be forgotten first appeared implicitly in Directive 95/46/EC, it essentially came onto the agenda and began to be debated with the Google judgment delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2014. Most recently, it has been expressly regulated by the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which entered into force on 25 May 2018. The right to be forgotten thus acquired legal status as a right for the first time, under the name of the “right to erasure”. It should be noted that, although the GDPR introduced provisions on the erasure of personal data, it is not of a nature to clarify the theoretical or philosophical debates concerning the right to be forgotten. Therefore, although an important development has taken place with the GDPR in that the right to be forgotten has been placed on a statutory footing, it must be said that this alone cannot be a solution to the problem.
The right to be forgotten, which came onto the agenda in particular with the Google judgment delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2014, has been the subject of many recent national and international provisions and court decisions. With the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, which entered into force on 25 May 2018, the right to be forgotten acquired legal status as a right for the first time, under the name of the “right to erasure”.
In the Google judgment, the Court of Justice held that, in order to comply with Articles 12 and 14 of the Directive, the search engine must remove from the list of results subsequently displayed information relating to the data subject published by third parties. Furthermore, in the light of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a request that information relating to the data subject no longer be included in the list of search results is related not only to the economic interests of the search engine but also to the interest of the public in having access to this information in a search relating to the data subject’s name. At this point, therefore, a balance must be struck between the interference with the data subject’s fundamental rights and the overriding interests of the public. Briefly assessing this judgment of the Court of Justice, the following observations must be made concerning the right to be forgotten:
For the right to be forgotten to come into play, there must be a processing of personal data and a controller carrying out that processing. Information that was disseminated accurately and lawfully may, over time, become a processing of personal data that is incompatible with the Directive. At this point, although the concrete case involved personal data disseminated accurately and lawfully, there is no explanation as to whether the right to be forgotten may also come into play with regard to personal data published inaccurately or unlawfully. Personal data that have become incompatible with the Directive are mostly data that are no longer necessary for the purposes for which they were collected or processed, or that are inadequate, irrelevant or “excessive” in relation to those purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed. In such a case, the data subject must be said to have a right, such as the right to request that his information no longer be made available to the public. The Court of Justice made the legal finding of the right to be forgotten by stating that this right arises from Articles 12 and 14 of the Directive read together with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, a balance must be struck between the data subject’s request that his information no longer be made available to the public and the interest of the public in having access to that information, as well as the economic interest of search engine operators. In this way, the relationship of the right to be forgotten with other rights and freedoms was established, forming the basis of the exceptions to the right, as will be examined below. On the other hand, it is understood that the right is not absolute.
There are numerous judgments of the ECtHR and the CJEU concerning the right to be forgotten. In addition, in our country too, the Constitutional Court and the YHGK have delivered decisions concerning this right, and, although the KVKK does not expressly refer to this right, attempts are being made to determine the framework and content of the right through court decisions. The Personal Data Protection Board has also in fact regulated the right to be forgotten, albeit indirectly, through the “Regulation on the Erasure, Destruction and Anonymisation of Personal Data” it issued.
An important development in legal scholarship and practice in this regard is the tendency not to go to extremes with the right to be forgotten. This tendency manifests itself in particular in the ECtHR’s judgment of 28 June 2018 in “M.L. and W.W. v. Germany”. In response to the applicants’ allegation that their right to be forgotten had been violated in respect of an offence they had committed in the past, the Court concluded, as regards the overriding interest of the public, that public interest in the case had been high at the time and, given that the content had been published until shortly before the applicants’ release, that the public was interested not only in being informed about a current event but also in being able to research past events. In this framework, the task of the press is to participate in the formation of democratic opinion by making available old news items preserved in its archives that are accessible to the public. Public access to content held in news archives is a consequence of the freedom of expression set out in Art. 10 ECHR. In conclusion, for these and related reasons, the Court held that the applicants’ rights had not been violated. Consequently, this right is not unlimited; it is not always possible to grant every request concerning the right to be forgotten, both for technical reasons and because of the overriding interest of the public in the matter. This is an appropriate decision and perspective for delimiting the right to be forgotten, which was at first perceived as if it were absolute.
There are views arguing that the right to be forgotten does not in fact mean the removal or destruction of the personal data concerned, but its removal from the search results for particular searches. On this view, the EU’s so-called “right to be forgotten” merely requires the deletion of information from search engines and does not require complete removal by the content server.
As a result, the websites concerned in fact remain accessible but are not listed in search results. A relative balance between free speech and privacy interests requires this. This is indeed the position in the CJEU’s Google judgment. Google stated that it understood the judgment to mean that the personal data of a data subject who wishes to exercise the right to be forgotten will not be listed in the results of searches made using his name. Consequently, the data that the data subject wishes to be forgotten in fact still exist and remain accessible; they merely do not appear before the user in particular searches. This approach is criticised on the ground that it cannot bring about genuine forgetting. Indeed, it is impossible for information that merely fails to appear in searches made in a particular way, for example with the data subject’s name, to be genuinely forgotten. Although it may be somewhat effective in limiting the spread and accessibility of the information, it is very difficult for the right to be forgotten truly to achieve its purpose as long as the information can be reached through a search made in another way. Nevertheless, the freedom of the internet and the need to balance the right against the other rights and freedoms with which it conflicts make such a limitation unavoidable.
The most important thought we have arrived at in bringing this study to a close is that we are still only at the beginning of this matter and that much remains to be said on the subject.
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Footnotes
- Faculty member, Department of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, Faculty of Law, İstanbul Aydın University. muratdulger@aydin.edu.tr. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4034-5436. ↑
- *Master’s student in IT Law, İstanbul Aydın University. gulcin.gumus@dulger.av.tr. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0047-8293.
- Victor HUGO, Sefiller, Çev. Volkan Yalçıntoklu, 8. Baskı, Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, İstanbul, 2019. ↑
- The renowned philosopher and scholar Farabi regards happiness as the purpose of existence. In his view, human beings exist in order to be happy and act solely for the purpose of being happy, because the ultimate goal of all life is happiness and man lives in order to attain it. Similarly, for Aristotle too, happiness has always been man’s most valuable and most fundamental goal. For details see Nurefşan BULUT USLU, Farabi ve Aristoteles’te Mutluluk Ahlakı, Kırıkkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt 8, Sayı 2, Temmuz 2018, s. 469-480. See also Mehmet Kasım ÖZGEN, Mutluluk Problemi, Artus Yayınları, İstanbul, 2017. ↑
- According to Jean Paul Sartre, one of the most important representatives of existentialist philosophy, freedom has no foundation; freedom is itself the essence of everything. Sartre treats freedom as the fundamental condition of human existence. In his view, existence is possible only through freedom. Similarly, Nikolay Berdyayev also associated freedom with the fabric of human existence. For details see Kasım MÜMİNOV, Nikolay Berdyayev ve Sartre Felsefesinde Kişilik ve Özgürlük Problemi, Dini Araştırmalar, Ocak – Haziran 2016, Cilt. 19, Sayı. 48, s. 9-24. ↑
- According to the UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person, and the human person is the central subject of human rights; see: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, s. 1, https://www.ohchr.org/en/ professionalinterest/pages/vienna.aspx. ↑
- Jack DONNELY, Universal Human Rights In Theory and Practice, 3. Baskı, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2013, s. 98. ↑
- “Since the right to be forgotten derives from the principles articulated in relation to privacy, it has always been regarded as part of the right to privacy.” See Franz WERRO, “The Right to Be Forgotten: The General Report—Congress of the International Society of Comparative Law”, in: The Right To Be Forgotten A Comparative Study of the Emergent Right’s Evolution and Application in Europe, the Americas, and Asia, Ed: Franz Werro, Springer, Charm, 2020, s. 10. ↑
- Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Hayat Dediğin Nedir Ki?, Çev. Erkan Aslan, Aylak Adam, İstanbul, 2015. ↑
- National Civil Appeals Chamber, Da Cunha v. Yahoo and Google, 10.02.2010; Da Cunha, an Argentine actress and singer, requested the removal of her photographs on Google and Yahoo, claiming that they were associated with websites of a sexual nature and that this harmed her career and her personal beliefs. Judge Virginia Simari, who sat in the case, approached the dispute in terms of freedom of expression and the individual’s right to control his own image. According to Simari, a person’s right to control his own image is one of the personality rights. Simari referred to a study written by law professor Julio César Rivera, which argues that the individual’s right to control his personal data also includes the right to prevent others from using his image. Proceeding from this, Judge Simari discussed the updating of information and the deletion of outdated information and offered important views on the foundations of the right to be forgotten. For details see Edward L. CARTER, Argentina’s Right to be Forgotten, https://law.emory.edu/eilr/content/volume-27/issue-1/recent-developments/argentinas-right-to-be-forgotten.html. ↑
- Today there is great diversification both in the number of digital and conventional documents produced and in the technological tools used to produce and store them. There has been an explosion in the flow of documents and information that must be collected, preserved and disseminated. Indeed, companies generate information at a rate whose volume can be estimated at thousands of terabytes a day. Big data from various mobile technologies, social media, online transactions, internet-connected objects and the sensors attached to them occupy a volume in the order of zettabytes or petabytes. ↑
- 1 petabyte (P) = 1,000,000 gigabytes (G); 1 zettabyte (Z) = 1,000,000 petabytes (P) = 1,000,000,000 gigabytes (G). ↑
- Abderrazak MKADMİ, Preservation and the Right to be Forgotten, Archives in The Digital Age, Volume 8, John Wiley & Sons, Londra, 2021, s. 113. ↑
- Edward L. CARTER, “The Right To Be Forgotten”, http://oxfordre.com/communication/view/ 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228613-e-189; (Çevrimiçi) 9 Mart 2019. ↑
- Yod-Samuel MARTIN / Jose M. del ALAMO, “Forget About Being Forgetting: From the Right to Oblivion to the Right of Reply”, Data Protection on the Move: Current Developments in ICT and Privacy/Data Protection, Ed: Serge Gutwirth / Ronald Leenes / Paul De Hert, Springer, Charm, 2016, s. 250. ↑
- Stefania ALESSI, “Ethernal Sunshine: The Right to be Forgotten in the European Union after the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation”, Emory International Law Review, V. 32, 2017, s. 155. ↑
- https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/news-and-announcements/2011/nr-c_110127/ . (Çevrimiçi), 27 Mayıs 2021. ↑
- Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, What are they saying about me?, s. 8: https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/1810/or_201601_e.pdf. (Çevrimiçi), 27 Mayıs 2021. ↑
- MARTIN/ALAMO, s. 250. ↑
- MARTIN/ALAMO, s. 251. ↑
- Sarah QUINN, “Facebook costing 16-34s jobs in tough economic climate”, https://ondeviceresearch.com/blog/facebook-costing-16-34s-jobs-in-tough-economic-climate, (Çevrimiçi) 27 Mayıs 2021. ↑
- Associated Press , “Naked Photos, E-Mail Get Teens in Trouble”, https://www.foxnews.com/story/naked-photos-e-mail-get-teens-in-trouble, (Çevrimiçi), 27 Mayıs 2021. ↑
- Viktor MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2009, s. 5. ↑
- In this story, which is frequently told in the context of the right to be forgotten, it is said that a photograph of Stacy Snyder, a woman living in the USA who wanted to become a teacher, holding an alcoholic drink, which she had shared on the social network MySpace in 2006, was frowned upon by the school administration and that Snyder was not allowed to become a teacher for this reason alone. In reality, however, the situation is different: Snyder trained to become a teacher at Conestoga Valley High School but was unsuccessful. Snyder tries to complete her credits at Millersville University in order to finish her four-year education. The institution that would award Snyder her teaching diploma is not Millersville University but her actual school, Conestoga Valley High School. It may be true that the school administration did not like Snyder’s photograph with alcohol on MySpace; however, although this incident had no connection with Snyder’s inability to teach, Snyder’s lawyer brought an action against Millersville University on this ground. The Court that examined the case referred in its decision to the reports on Stacy Snyder’s “student-teaching” performance at Conestoga Valley High School. According to these reports, Snyder was found inadequate in terms of knowledge, command of her subject, grammar, the communication of knowledge and the ability to establish control over students. On these grounds, the Court, finding no connection between the photograph published on MySpace and Snyder’s failure to become a teacher, dismissed the action. See Jack HERLOCKER, “Stacy Snyder and the Untruth That Won't Die”, September 22, 2015, https://medium.com/@jherlocker/stacy-snyder-and-the-untruth-that-won-t-die-549c2f525661, (Çevrimiçi), 27 Mayıs 2021. ↑
- MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, s. 4-6. ↑
- MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, s. 5. 25Ângela Guimarães PEREIRA / Lucia VESNIĆ-ALUJEVIĆA / Alessia GHEZZIA, “The Ethics of Forgetting and Remembering in the Digital World through the Eye of the Media”, The Ethics of Memory in a Digital Age: Interrogating the Right to be Forgotten, Ed. Alessia Ghezzi / Ângela Guimarães Pereira/ Lucia Vesnić- Alujević, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2014, s. 11. ↑
- PEREIRA/VESNIĆ-ALUJEVIĆA/GHEZZIA, s. 11. ↑
- PEREIRA/VESNIĆ-ALUJEVIĆA/GHEZZIA, s. 11, 12. ↑
- WERRO, s. 1, 2. ↑
- Trkulja v. Google Inc. LLC & Anor (No. 5), 2012, VSC 533, Australia Supreme Court of Victoria 12.11.2012, http://censorshipcases.wordpress.com/2013/02/16/australia-trkulja-v-google-inc-llc-anor-no-5-2012-vsc- 533-supreme-court-of-victoria12-11-2012/, (Çevrimiçi), 3 Haziran 2021. ↑
- On this concept see Meg Leta JONES, Ctrl + Z: The Right to Be Forgotten, New York University Press, New York, 2016, s. 1 vd.; Amitai ETZIONI, Privacy in a Cyber Age, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2015, s.113-122; Cécile DE TERWANGNE, “The Right to be Forgotten and Informational Autonomy in the Digital Environment”, The Ethics of Memory in a Digital Age: Interrogating the Right to be Forgotten, Ed: Alessia Ghezzi / Ângela Guimarães Pereira / Lucia Vesnić-Alujević, European Commisson, Joint Research Centre, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014, s. 82 – 101; MARTIN/ALAMO, s. 249 – 276. ↑
- Brendan VAN ALSENOY, Data Protection Law in the EU: Roles, Responsibilities and Liability, Intersentia, Cambridge – Antwerp – Chicago, 2019, s. 511. ↑
- Omer TENE, “What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines”, Utah Law Review, No. 4, 2008, s. 1440 vd. ↑
- TENE, s. 1442, 1443. ↑
- VAN ALSENOY, s. 511, 512. ↑
- VAN ALSENOY, s. 512. ↑
- Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD)–Mario Costeja González, C-131/12, 13 Mayıs 2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX %3A62012CJ0131, (Çevrimiçi), 3 Haziran 2021. ↑
- For the judgment and an assessment of it see Armağan Ebru BOZKURT YÜKSEL, Bulut Bilişimde Kişisel Verilerin Korunması, Yetkin, Ankara, 2016, s. 132 – 136. ↑
- For example, automatically indexing information published on the internet by third parties, storing it temporarily and finally making it available to internet users according to a particular order of preference. ↑
- VAN ALSENOY, s. 521, 522. ↑
- Google Spain, § 27. ↑
- Google Spain, § 28. ↑
- VAN ALSENOY, s. 522. ↑
- VAN ALSENOY, s. 522, 523. ↑
- Google Spain, § 34. ↑
- Google Spain, § 35. ↑
- Google Spain, § 41. ↑
- House of Lord, European Union Committee, EU Data Protection Law: A “Right to be Forgotten”?, 2nd Report of Session 2014–15, The Stationery Office Limited, London, 2014, s. 14, § 29. ↑
- Schillings is an international reputation and privacy consultancy made up of experts in reputation, privacy, risk consultancy, cyber security and intelligence. The firm is an Alternative Business Structure (ABS) regulated and authorised by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) of the United Kingdom. It offers services covering risk consultancy, legal services and IT security. Chris Scott is a former manager of this firm who was promoted to partner. ↑
- House of Lord, The The Select Committee on the European Union Home Affairs, Health and Education (Sub- Committee F) Inquiry on The Right to be Forgotten, 2 Temmuz 2014, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-sub-f-home-affairs-health-and-education-committee/the-right-to-be-forgotten/oral/11212.html, (Çevrimiçi), 23 Mayıs 2020. ↑
- House of Lord, Inquiry on The Right to be Forgotten, 2 Temmuz 2014. ↑
- Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, C-131/12, Google Spain SL Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD)– Maria Costeja González, 25 Haziran 2013, para, 107, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=138782&doclang=EN, (Çevrimiçi), 3 Haziran 2021. ↑
- Google Spain, § 92. ↑
- Google Spain, § 93. ↑
- Google Spain, § 94. ↑
- Google Spain, § 98. ↑
- Google Spain, § 99. ↑
- For the news report in which this statement also appears see: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/13/right-to-be-forgotten-eu-court-google-search-results. (Çevrimiçi), 3 Mart 2024. ↑
- https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/6349986?hl=en . (Çevrimiçi), 3 Mart 2024. ↑
- https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview?hl=tr . (Çevrimiçi), 3 Mart 2024. ↑
- https://support.google.com/transparencyreport/answer/7347822?hl=tr . (Çevrimiçi), 3 Mart 2024. ↑
- Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González” C - 131/12, 26 Kasım 2014, https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf. (Çevrimiçi), 3 Haziran 2021. ↑
- Working Party, s. 9, § 21. ↑
- Working Party, s. 6, § 13. ↑
- The Advisory Council’s website can be accessed at the following link: https://archive.google.com/advisorycouncil/. (Çevrimiçi), 3 Haziran 2021. ↑
- House of Lord, European Union Committee, EU Data Protection Law: A “Right to be Forgotten”?, 2nd Report of Session2014–15, The Stationery Office Limited, London, 2014, s. 15, § 36. ↑
- https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B8syaai6SSfiT0EwRUFyOENqR3M/edit?pli=1 . (Çevrimiçi), 3 Haziran 2021. ↑
- Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, s. 5. ↑
- Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, s. 5. ↑
- House of Lord, European Union Committee, EU Data Protection Law: A “Right to be Forgotten?", 2nd Report of Session 2014–15, The Stationery Office Limited, London, 2014, s. 14, § 31. ↑
- House of Lord, EU Data Protection Law: A “Right to be Forgotten?”, s. 14. ↑
- House of Lord, EU Data Protection Law: A “Right to be Forgotten?”, s. 15. ↑
- As the judgment attracted wide attention, the Article 29 Working Party carried out a special study on the subject and published guidelines on how the judgment should be interpreted. The Court expressed the view that, in the light of the potential seriousness of the impact of this processing on the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection, the rights of the data subject should, as a general rule, prevail over the economic interest of the search engine and over the interest of internet users in having access to personal information through the search engine. Nevertheless, a balance of the relevant rights and interests must be sought, and the outcome may depend on the nature and sensitivity of the data processed and on the interest of the public in having access to that particular information. For example, in the case of processing whose subject plays an important role in public life, it is clear that the interest of the public will also carry considerable weight in determining this balance. The Guidelines thus interpreted the judgment and explained how it should be understood. In this way, they sought to determine the criteria to which data protection authorities and controllers should pay attention when assessing applications on the subject. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on The Implementation of The Court of Justice of The European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González” S-131/12, 26 Kasım 2014, 14/EN, WP 225. ↑
- In this context, it should be noted that the right to be forgotten does not concern digital data alone. Even though digital technology has to a large extent brought questions concerning such rights to the fore, non-digital data also fall within the scope of this right. MKADMI, s. 151. ↑
- There are, however, narrower and simpler definitions of this concept as well; for example: “The right to be forgotten essentially consists in being able to remove from the web certain information relating to past actions that is unwanted and/or may harm or hurt an individual. It may also be implemented through the removal by search engines of one or more web pages on the basis of a person’s name and surname (deletion of the pages from search engines). In the first case we refer to the right to erasure, and in the second to the right to de-referencing.”, MKADMI, s. 150. ↑
- MKADMI, s. 150. ↑
- For the explanation in question see https://gdpr-info.eu/issues/right-to-be-forgotten/ (Çevrimiçi), 23 Mayıs 2020. ↑
- MKADMI, s. 156, 157. ↑
- MKADMI, s. 157. ↑
- James Q. WHITMAN, “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 113, No. 6, 2004, s. 1186, 1210. ↑
- WERRO, s. 18. See also Robert C. POST, “Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, The Right to be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere”, Duke Law Journal, V. 67, 2018, s. 1051. ↑
- In the national literature on the subject, this element has also been treated as the “element of information”. See Eren SÖZÜER, Unutulma Hakkı: İnsan Hakları Hukuku Perspektifinden Bir İnceleme, On İki Levha Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2017, s. 43. However, since an individual can exercise the right to be forgotten only where information that can be associated with him, that is, his personal data, is involved, I have preferred to treat this element as the element of personal data. Although the concepts of information and data will be used interchangeably in this study, I consider it more accurate to use the word data when referring to it as an element of the right. On the difference between the concepts of information and data see Murat Volkan DÜLGER, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku, 3. Baskı, Hukuk Akademisi, İstanbul, 2019, s. 153. ↑
- For details on the concept of personal data see DÜLGER, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku, (3), s. 151-176. 83A study conducted in 2017 reveals the extraordinary volume of sharing that takes place on the Web within a very short time. According to the study, in 2017 people uploaded an average of 243,000 photographs to their Facebook accounts every minute, while 350,000 posts were made on Twitter. The total of the calls made by all Skype users worldwide within one minute amounts to two million minutes. For the graphic of this study see http://www.go-globe.com/blog/things-that-happen-every-60-seconds (Çevrimiçi), 23 Mayıs 2020. ↑
- See SÖZÜER, s. 43. After expressing the view that the information must initially have been disseminated lawfully, the author states that “these characteristics may, however, differ in the various manifestations of the right to be forgotten”, but it is not clear exactly what he means at this point. ↑
- Can YAVUZ, İnternet’teki Arama Sonuçlarından Kişisel Verilerin Kaldırılması: Unutulma Hakkı, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2016, s. 55, 56. ↑
- Cemile TURGUT, Kişilik Hakkının Bir Görünümü Olarak Unutulma Hakkı, On İki Levha Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2021, s. 239. The author goes on, however, to state that where the act of making the data public was unlawful from the outset, the matter should be assessed under rights such as the protection of private life or the protection of dignity or reputation. We consider that, de lege ferenda, the right to be forgotten should also come into play with regard to data that have been made public unlawfully. ↑
- Murat Volkan DÜLGER, “İnsan Hakları ve Temel Hak ve Özgürlükler Bağlamında Kişisel Verilerin Korunması”, İstanbul Medipol Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Y. 5, S. 1, Bahar 2018, s. 77-82. ↑
- WEBER, s. 121. ↑
- Friedrich NIETZSCHE, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, Translated by: Peter Preuss, 15. Baskı, Hackett Pub Co, Cambridge, 1980. ↑
- Paul BERNAL, Internet Privacy Rights - Rights to Protect Autonomy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, s. 178. ↑
- For the interview in which this statement also appears see https://www.businessinsider.com/schmidt-internet-needs-a-delete-button-2013-5 (Çevrimiçi), 23 Mayıs 2020. ↑
- BERNAL, s. 178. ↑
- Kahan Onur ARSLAN, “İnsan Onuru ve Koruma Tedbirleri Bağlamında Temel Bir İlke Olarak İnsan Onurunun Korunması”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, S. 120, 2015, s. 156 – 157. ↑
- Ali Tarık GÜMÜŞ, “Türk Anayasasında Kişinin Maddi ve Manevi Varlığını Koruma Geliştirme Hakkı”, Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, C. 13, S. 2, 2005, s. 139. ↑
- AYM, E. 1963/132, K. 1966/29. ↑
- BVerfGE 35, 202, 5 Haziran 1973. ↑
- The Court explained this by means of the concept of the “right to be left alone”. ↑
- BVerfGE 35, 202 – Lebach, Bundesverfassungsgericht (First Division) 5 June 1973 BVerfGE 35, 202. ↑
- BERNAL, s. 176. ↑
- BERNAL, s. 176. ↑
- BERNAL, s.176. ↑
- BERNAL, s.177. At this point the author refers to the right to erasure and addresses its differences from the right to be forgotten. However, since the differences between the right to erasure and the right to be forgotten will be addressed later, the aim here is only to clarify the relationship between the concept of autonomy and the erasure of personal data. ↑
- Jef AUSLOOS, The Right to Erasure in EU Data Protection Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020, s. 27, 28. ↑
- Gerrit HORNUNG/Christoph SCHNABEL, “Data Protection in Germany I: The Population Census Decision and the Right to Informational Self Determination”, Computer Law & Security Review, Vol. 25, 2009, s. 86; AUSLOOS, s. 41. ↑
- It should be pointed out here that, under Law No. 6698, it is unlawful for the controller to obtain consent from the data subject although it can rely on some other legal ground for processing the personal data. However, there will be no problem if a new legitimate purpose arises after the request under the right to be forgotten. ↑
- Heledd LLOYD-JONES / Peter CAREY, “The Rights of Inviduals”, Data Protection: A Practical Guide to UK Law, Ed: Peter Carey, 5. Bası, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, s.144. ↑
- LLOYD-JONES/CAREY, s. 145. ↑
- WERRO, s. 2. ↑
- See Karen ELTIS / Pierre TRUDEL, Canadian Report: Delisting in the Digital Age – A Hybrid Approach to Bridge the European and American Visions of the “Right to be Forgotten”, International Academy of Comparative Law - Fukuoka Congress, 2018, s . 3. See also Amy GAJDA, “Privacy, Press, and the Right to Be Forgotten in the United States”, Washington Law Review, Vol. 93, 2018, s. 201-264. ↑
- WERRO, s. 19. ↑
- TURGUT, s. 121. See also: Olgun DEĞİRMENCİ, Yargısal İçtihatların Ortaya Çıkardığı Bir Hak: Unutulma Hakkı (Çerçevesi ve Hak Üzerine Düşünceler), Terazi Hukuk Dergisi, Cilt:13, Sayı:144, Ağustos, 2018, s. 155. ↑
- Christine Goodwin v. Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru No: 28957/95, 11 Temmuz 2002, § 90. To the same effect see Pretty v. Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru No. 2346/02, 29 Nisan 2002, § 62. ↑
- Rolf H. WEBER, The Right to be Forgotten: More Than a Pandora’s Box?, 2011, s. 121, § 3; https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-2-2-2011/3084/jipitec%202%20-%20a%20-%20weber.pdf. (Çevrimiçi), 23 Mayıs 2020. ↑
- TURGUT, s. 124. ↑
- For an examination of the effect of the right to the protection of private life on the right to be forgotten in terms of the sphere theory (public sphere, private sphere and sphere of intimacy/secrecy) see TURGUT, s. 129 – 141. ↑
- Niemietz v. Almanya, Başvuru No: 13710/88, 16 Aralık 1992, § 29. ↑
- Gilles DUTERTRE, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Kararlarından Örnekler, Avrupa Konseyi Yayınları, Strazburg, 2013, s. 201. ↑
- Orla LYNSKEY, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, s. 106. ↑
- Costello – Roberts v. Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru No: 13134/87, 26 Mart 1993. ↑
- Ivana ROAGNA, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Kapsamında Özel Hayata ve Aile Hayatına Saygı Gösterilmesi Hakkının Korunması, Avrupa Konseyi İnsan Hakları El Kitapları, Avrupa Konseyi Yayını, Strazburg, 2012, s. 12. ↑
- Roger TAYLOR, “No Privacy without Transparency”, Data Protection and Privacy: The Age of Intelligent Machines, Ed: Ronald Leenes / Rosamunde van Brakel /Serge Gutwirth/ Paul De Hert, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2017, s. 66. See also Susan B. BARNES, A Privacy Paradox: Social Networking in the United States, 2006, https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1394. (Çevrimiçi), 23 Mayıs 2020. ↑
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- Goodwin v. Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru No: 5493/72, 27 Mart 1996, § 39. ↑
- DE TERWANGNE, s. 90. ↑
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- Bart VEN DER SLOOT, “Is the Human Rights Framework Still Fit for the Big Data Era? A Discussion of the ECtHR’s Case Law on Privacy Violations Arising from Surveillance Activities”, Data Protection on the Move: Current Developments in ICT and Privacy/Data Protection, Eds: Serge Gutwirth / Ronald Leenes / Paul De Hert, Springer, Heidelberg, 2016, s. 417, 418. ↑
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- DER SLOOT, s. 418. ↑
- DER SLOOT, s. 418. ↑
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- PEREIRA/VESNIĆ-ALUJEVIĆA/GHEZZIA, s. 14. ↑
- Peter FLEISCHER, “The Right to be Forgotten, or How to Edit Your History” http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2012/01/right-to-be-forgotten-or-how-to-edit.html (Çevrimiçi), 23 Mayıs 2020. ↑
- Cécile DE TERWANGNE / Jean-Philippe MOINY, Report on the Consultation on the Modernisation of Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/TPD_documents/T-PD BUR_2011_10_en.pdf. (Çevrimiçi), 23 Mayıs 2020. ↑
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- Recital 66, https://gdpr-info.eu/recitals/no-66/. (Çevrimiçi), 23.05.2020. ↑
- Paul VOIGT / Axel VON DEM BUSSCHE, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Springer, Heidelberg, 2017, s. 163. ↑
- VOIGT/VAN DEM BUSSCHE, s. 163. ↑
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Assessment of the Amendments to the KVK Law on the Processing of Special Categories of Personal Data and the Transfer of Data Abroad” (KVK Kanunu’nda Özel Nitelikli Kişisel Verilerin İşlenmesi ve Yurt Dışına Veri Aktarımı Kapsamında Yapılan Değişikliklere İlişkin Değerlendirmeler), Academia.edu, 25 March 2024.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Our Assessment of the Decision Summaries Published by the Personal Data Protection Board on 18 July 2022” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulunun 18 Temmuz 2022 Tarihinde Yayınlanan Karar Özetlerine İlişkin Değerlendirmelerimiz), Dülger Law Office, 1 September 2022.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Use of Personal Health Data as Evidence in Divorce Proceedings” (Kişisel Sağlık Verilerinin Boşanma Davasında Delil Olarak Kullanılması), Hukuk ve Daha Fazlası Dergisi (Law and More), No. 9, June 2022, pp. 76–84.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “A Very Important Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board on Lawyers' Access to Enforcement Files Without a Power of Attorney” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulu’ndan Avukatların İcra Takip Dosyalarına Vekaletname Olmaksızın Erişebilmesine İlişkin Çok Önemli Bir Karar), Dülger Law Office, 15 August 2021.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Schrems II Judgment and Its Consequences” (Scherms II Kararı ve Sonuçları), Hukuk ve Daha Fazlası Dergisi (Law and More), No. 7, June 2021, pp. 42–55.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, Personal Data Protection Law (Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku), 4th ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2026.

