2026Murat Volkan DülgerPresentation / talk

Abstract

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

These are the slides of the paper presented at the International Congress on the Protection of Personal Data in Police and Criminal Law (Polis ve Ceza Hukukunda Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Uluslararası Kongresi), held at the Police Academy in Ankara on 14–15 May 2026.

Text of the presentation

This text is a translation, prepared for this website, of the short prose version of the presentation. The slides, images and tables are in the PDF version.

The problem and the hypothetical scenario

This presentation was given at the International Congress on the Protection of Personal Data in Police and Criminal Law, held in Ankara on 14–15 May 2026. Communication, payment, transport, health and social interaction have largely moved onto digital platforms. In parallel, requests by public authorities for access to service providers' databases on the grounds of “combating crime” and “national security” are increasing. The approach that has evolved from the classical individualised measure towards mass surveillance can be summed up in a single sentence: “Let us first take everyone's data, and we will sift it afterwards.”

At the centre of the discussion lies a hypothetical case. The identity, contact, location, transaction and connection data of all users of a digital service provider are transferred to law enforcement and intelligence units as a continuous data flow updated monthly, without any concrete suspicion of an offence and without distinguishing between persons. In the classical measure, the target is identified first and the data relating to it are collected afterwards. In this model, by contrast, a data pool covering the whole platform is set up first, and querying takes place later. Instead of a specific person, the target is the entire universe of users; instead of suspicion, there is pre-collection; instead of a limited duration, there is continuity. We characterise this structure as a regime of “mass surveillance”.

Metadata, the mosaic effect and informational self-determination

Metadata is not the content of a communication but the information surrounding it: telephone numbers, IP addresses, session records, base station locations, connection patterns and device identifiers. Traditionally, content data was regarded as the area of most intense privacy, while traffic and subscriber data were seen as less sensitive. The judgment in Carpenter v. United States (2018) shook this assumption. Metadata can reveal a person's family, political, religious, professional and cultural life more intensively than content. According to the US Supreme Court, even 7 days of cell-site records violate a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in his physical movements.

The reason for this is the mosaic effect. When fragments of data that appear harmless on their own are brought together, an overall picture emerges that none of them could reveal alone. When quasi-identifiers such as postcode, date of birth and gender are cross-matched, individuals can be re-identified at a rate of 87–95% (the AOL and Netflix cases). Rouvroy and Berns's concept of algorithmic governmentality likewise describes how supra-individual profiles are derived from infra-individual fragments of data and how governing becomes possible without any recourse to the individual's subjectivity.

In its 1983 census judgment (Volkszählungsurteil), the German Federal Constitutional Court recognised the right to informational self-determination and emphasised that unlimited collection, storage, use and transfer would threaten the free personality. With the 2008 Online-Durchsuchung judgment, this reasoning evolved into the right to the confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems. An infrastructure of continuous data collection creates in the individual the feeling that “I am being watched at every moment”. This chilling effect leads to self-censorship, the suppression of civil society activity and the weakening of the protection of journalistic sources. Targeted collection is limited by concrete suspicion, parametric and amenable to review. Bulk and indiscriminate collection, by contrast, does not distinguish between suspects and non-suspects and turns the citizen into a data subject from the outset.

Constitutional assessment

Under Art. 13 of the Constitution, the hypothetical model cannot pass the three-stage test. Legality requires certainty, accessibility and foreseeability; in mass surveillance this standard is raised. Yet which data may be accessed under which conditions, the type of offence, the duration and the technical filter are all undefined. The legitimate aim must be demonstrated effectively, not merely on paper. Proportionality, for its part, requires the least intrusive means; where a targeted alternative is possible, mass collection with a mosaic effect is disproportionate.

The interference is directed not only at the right to the protection of personal data under Art. 20 of the Constitution but, by way of “reflection”, also at the freedom of communication under Art. 22. The Constitutional Court defines personal data as any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person; IP addresses, location, device identifiers and session data are included. The “it is only metadata” defence does not reduce the weight of the interference. Since the judgment in Malone v. the United Kingdom (1984), traffic data has been accepted as falling within the sphere of communication. There are also problems with procedural safeguards. Art. 40(2) of the Constitution imposes on the State a duty to indicate the available remedies and time limits; yet millions of users will never learn that their data have been transferred. Without notification, the right of access to a court under Art. 36 remains on paper. According to Klass v. Germany, notification and objection must function reasonably even after the surveillance has ended; indefinite non-notification does not meet the standard of Art. 13 ECHR.

Additional Art. 7 of the Law on Police Duties and Powers (PVSK) grants the police a limited power of preventive interception and preventive intelligence for the purpose of preventing certain serious offences. The elements of the identity of the person concerned, the means, the IP, the scope and the duration show that the norm is designed as an individualised measure. A continuous and automatic transfer of data ceases to be a “measure” and turns into a permanent regime, and the 3-month judicial review mechanism becomes ineffective in practice. Turning the power to request information and documents into a power to hold a data pool covering millions of innocent users is a manifest excess of power (ultra vires). The exception in Art. 28 of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK) must also be interpreted narrowly; it does not amount to a constitutional exemption and does not remove the thresholds of Arts. 13 and 20.

European standards

In Weber and Saravia v. Germany (2006), the ECtHR laid down six minimum criteria, and in Big Brother Watch v. the United Kingdom (GC, 2021) it built an eight-step test by adding two further safeguards. At none of these steps, namely the definition of the types of offence and the categories of persons, the time limit, the procedure for examination and storage, transfer to third parties, the destruction regime, independent prior authorisation and ex post review, does the hypothetical model meet the standard. Roman Zakharov v. Russia (GC, 2015) stresses that discretion must be clearly indicated in the law, Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary (2016) the test of strict necessity, and Centrum för Rättvisa v. Sweden (GC, 2021) end-to-end oversight.

In EU law, the Police Directive (EU) 2016/680 lays down the principles of purpose limitation, data minimisation, limited storage, security, accountability and the rights of the data subject. Three judgments of the CJEU follow the same line. Digital Rights Ireland (2014) found the Data Retention Directive 2006/24 contrary to Arts. 7 and 8 of the Charter, Tele2 Sverige/Watson (2016) held the general and indiscriminate retention of all communications data of all subscribers to be contrary to the Charter, and La Quadrature du Net (2020) maintained this line, allowing an exception limited in time and subject to independent review only where there is a genuine, present or foreseeable serious threat to national security. A continuous flow at monthly intervals also structurally entails the risk of function creep.

Comparative constitutional law

In Germany, the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court from 1983 to 2020 (the G 10 decision and the Vorratsdatenspeicherung, Antiterrordatei, BKA-Gesetz and BND-Auslandsaufklärung judgments) reaches a common conclusion: generalised, indefinite and indiscriminate collection is an excess that the constitutional protection of rights cannot accept. In the United States, the third-party doctrine established in Smith v. Maryland (1979) has eroded. United States v. Jones (2012) treated long-term GPS tracking as a “search”, the Carpenter judgment treated access to cell-site location data as a “search” and, as a rule, made it subject to a warrant, and ACLU v. Clapper (2015) held that the NSA's bulk metadata programme exceeded the power granted under §215 of the USA Patriot Act. In the United Kingdom, the Big Brother Watch judgment did not prohibit bulk surveillance in principle but found the safeguards at the stages of selection, filtering and examination to be inadequate. In France, decision no. 2015-713 DC of the Constitutional Council subjected algorithmic analysis systems in the field of intelligence to strict review.

Data protection principles, criminal procedure and conclusion

From the standpoint of data protection principles, an “intelligence pool” destroys the core of purpose limitation, and the “potential future value” approach is the antithesis of data minimisation. The hypothetical model sets up a “surveillance by default” infrastructure, does not inform millions of people and, through the automatic monthly flow, turns the interference into a permanent infrastructure. As regards the philosophy of criminal procedure, the system of coercive measures of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) presupposes a certain degree of suspicion directed at a specific person. The logic of “take the data first, sift afterwards” does away with the link to a specific case and the requirement of stating reasons. Today the principle of nemo tenetur is a shield not only against active statements but also against the digital traces we passively generate being used against us. Generalised collection places all citizens potentially under suspicion and structurally violates the presumption of innocence. The guarantees of the rule of law are the framework for the search for the material truth.

The conclusion reached is as follows. The hypothetical decision cannot meet the thresholds of legality, certainty, necessity and proportionality under Arts. 13, 20 and 22 of the Constitution and carries the risk of impairing the essence of the right. The requirements of category, duration, oversight, ex post review and destruction under the Weber and Big Brother Watch test cannot be satisfied. The Police Directive and the CJEU trilogy reject general and indiscriminate collection. Nor can the power to request information and documents under Additional Art. 7 PVSK be turned into a power to hold a permanent data pool covering millions of users. The approach of “take everyone's data first, sift afterwards” is not a method compatible with a democratic constitutional order.

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