2026Murat Volkan DülgerPresentation / talk

Abstract

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

These are the slides of the paper presented at the IT Law Summer Camp 2026 (Bilişim Hukuku Yaz Kampı 2026), organised by the Computer Engineers’ Solidarity Association (BMDD) in Urla, Izmir, on 4–6 September 2026. The presentation deals with the placement, layering and integration stages of money laundering and with the use of financial technologies, crypto assets and artificial intelligence at these stages.

Text of the presentation

This text is a translation, prepared for this website, of the short prose version of the presentation. The slides, images and tables are in the PDF version.

Three technologies, one laundering chain

This presentation, dated September 2026, examines how fintech, crypto-assets and artificial intelligence are used in the laundering of the proceeds of crime, taking the legislation as at 3 September 2026. Each of the three technologies performs a different function in the laundering chain. Fintech provides speed: instant and irrevocable transfers make money move faster than the compliance unit's window for intervention. Crypto-assets create distance: decentralisation and pseudo-anonymity lower the cost of severing the link between source and asset. Artificial intelligence targets identity: deepfakes and synthetic identities erode know-your-customer checks. In a real scheme the three work together. An account is opened with a synthetic identity, this account is linked to a mule network fed by instant payments, and layering is carried across borders via stablecoins.

The presentation seeks answers to four questions. Are these tools used in laundering to the extent claimed? Do the regulations respond to an existing harm, or do they anticipate a potential risk? Do these technologies increase the volume and speed of laundering, or do they merely change its method? In investigations in our country, is it really these tools that are being targeted? The fourth question is the most sensitive, because in criminal law what must be targeted is the act, not the tool itself.

Conceptual framework and two separate regimes

The three classic stages of laundering, placement, layering and integration, do not disappear with new technologies. What changes is the cost, speed and detectability of each stage. In classic laundering the most expensive stage was layering; crypto-assets have reduced this cost significantly. On the other hand, the same technology produces a permanent transaction record that does not exist at all with cash.

Caution is needed with figures. The frequently quoted estimate of “2-5% of global gross domestic product” rests on a 1998 speech of the International Monetary Fund; it has no published method, and although the FATF reports the figure, it does not endorse it. According to the UNODC's 2011 estimate, on 2009 data the proceeds of crime amount to 3.6% of global gross domestic product, and the laundered portion to 2.7% (approximately 1.6 trillion US dollars). This, too, is the result of modelling and must be read with wide confidence intervals.

Turkish law has two separate regimes. At the centre of the criminal law regime stands Art. 282 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK). In its basic form, a person who takes assets derived from an offence carrying a minimum penalty of six months' imprisonment or more out of the country, or subjects them to various transactions in order to conceal their illegitimate source, faces 3-7 years' imprisonment and a judicial fine of up to 20,000 days. A person who knowingly purchases, accepts, holds or uses such assets is punished with 2-5 years' imprisonment. The preventive regime, by contrast, is based on Law No. 5549 and the Regulation on Measures; here the threshold is suspicion and the sanction is an administrative fine. A significant part of the problems in practice arises from confusing these two thresholds: a suspicious transaction report is neither a criminal charge nor, on its own, evidence.

Crypto-assets: legislation, typologies and cases

Issuing, holding, buying and selling crypto-assets is not an offence. The regulation of the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye (TCMB) (RG 16.04.2021 - 31456) prohibits only their use in payments. Law No. 7518 (RG 02.07.2024 - 32590) added crypto-asset definitions to Capital Markets Law No. 6362 and, through Art. 35/B and 35/C, an authorisation and operating regime; providing crypto-asset services without authorisation was made an offence under Art. 109/A. Crypto-asset service providers have been obliged entities vis-à-vis the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) since 2021; from 25.02.2025 the travel rule applies, and for transfers of 15,000 TL and above identity information is verified.

The central doctrinal finding of the presentation is that there is no separate category of “crypto crime”. Cryptocurrency is merely a new way of committing existing offences. A new offence is therefore not needed; existing norms must be interpreted in a technology-neutral manner. The problem is not a lack of norms but one of proof and capacity. Some authors, however, advocate special provisions on grounds of ease of proof and deterrence.

Among the typologies, three generations of mixers, peer-to-peer networks, OTC brokers, decentralised finance, privacy coins and stablecoins stand out. According to Chainalysis's 2026 report, 84% of illicit transaction volume takes place via stablecoins. On the question whether offering a mixing service is in itself participation in laundering, in our view the decisive factor is whether the service is operated with the intent to launder and directed at the proceeds of crime; a mere aim of providing privacy is not sufficient. The regulatory response to privacy coins diverges: the European Union prohibits service providers from holding them (AMLR, applicable from 10 July 2027), whereas Türkiye has no ban and only disallows remote identification for them.

The Silk Road and Liberty Reserve cases show that systems with a centralised node can be taken down. The scale of laundering arises not from decentralisation but from the absence of supervision. The common lesson of the Tornado Cash, Cryptomixer and Prince Group cases is likewise that crypto-assets can be recovered; but this happens not by breaking the cryptography, rather through the record at the node and international cooperation.

Is the threat real or perceived?

According to Chainalysis data, illicit crypto volume rose by 162% in one year in 2025 to reach 154 billion dollars. Even so, this volume is below 1% of total on-chain volume, and the figures are revised upwards retrospectively: the 24.2 billion dollars first announced for 2023 was later raised to 46.1 billion dollars. The 2019 study by Foley, Karlsen and Putniņš is also frequently misquoted; the 46% figure relates to the number of transactions, and the 76 billion dollars is an estimate for roughly the 2017 period. Our assessment is as follows: the “low risk” finding of the 2015 UK National Risk Assessment was correct in its time, but has lost its validity today. Yet saying “the threat is real” is not the same as saying “a ban is right”.

Fintech: the invisible bulk of the volume

Crypto-assets are debated because they are visible; fintech is not debated because it is invisible. Payment and electronic money institutions, instant payment systems, neobanks and open banking are legitimate tools; the risk arises from the asymmetry between speed and supervision. With instant payments a transfer becomes final within seconds, monitoring cannot stop the transaction, and the trail is dispersed across many institutions. In mule accounts and IBAN rental, the accounts of people recruited through “easy money” advertisements on social media are used to move the proceeds of illegal betting, fraud and drugs.

Two new provisions in Turkish law deserve attention. Art. 128/A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK), introduced by Law No. 7571 (RG 25.12.2025 - 33118), allows an account to be suspended for up to 48 hours and seized where there is reasonable suspicion. Compared with the regime in German law, the architecture of safeguards is weaker as regards duration, periodic review and an effective remedy. The fourth paragraph added to Art. 158 TCK by Law No. 7589 (RG 31.07.2026 - 33326) reduces by half the penalty of a perpetrator whose contribution is limited to providing account details; it does not create a new offence. In our assessment the direction is correct, but the root of the problem is the question of intent, and the reduction must not legitimise a conviction in cases where intent is entirely absent.

Artificial intelligence: two faces of the same technology

On the criminal side, artificial intelligence makes it possible to bypass remote customer onboarding with deepfakes, to use synthetic identities and to carry out layering through autonomous agents without human intervention. Its main effect, however, is indirect: it does not radically change laundering techniques, but it multiplies the efficiency and scale of the predicate offence, especially fraud. More proceeds of crime mean more demand for laundering. On the defensive side, anomaly detection, blockchain analytics and network analysis come to the fore. This raises new questions for criminal law: how intent is to be determined in a chain of transactions generated by an autonomous system, how responsibility is to be shared, and whether the defence will be able to examine the model used against it. Türkiye has no artificial intelligence law in force. The binding rules come from remote identification legislation such as MASAK General Communiqué No. 32 and Capital Markets Board (SPK) Communiqué III-42.1.b. This is a proportionate and technology-neutral response that addresses the deepfake risk not with a general ban but by raising the technical standard of identity verification.

Regulatory response and recommendations

The regulatory architecture has three layers: FATF standards, European Union regulations (MiCA, the transfer of funds regulation, AMLR, AMLD6 and AMLA) and national legislation. According to FATF data of July 2026, 83% of countries have adopted legislation on the travel rule, and 34% were found largely compliant with Recommendation 15. Türkiye was removed from the grey list on 28.06.2024 and has built, within five years, a framework largely in line with international standards; what is really lacking lies in coordination and enforcement capacity. According to MASAK's 2023 Annual Report, suspicious transaction reports reached 601,555, but in a system without feedback this increase may also indicate defensive reporting. According to the FATF's own warning, bans may push activity beyond supervision and underground.

The recommendations are addressed to four addressees. The legislature should observe technology-neutral norms, clarity of definitions and proportionality in seizure, and should not turn general intent into a presumption in mule account cases. Supervisory authorities and law enforcement should build capacity through specialist units with continuity and swift mutual legal assistance. Obliged entities should strengthen the three lines of defence consisting of customer onboarding, transaction monitoring and governance. Finally, the presumption of innocence, the protection of personal data, the right to property and the right to a fair trial must be respected. A practice in which the mere holding of crypto-assets is treated as a source of suspicion is incompatible with the fundamental principles of criminal law. The presentation as a whole should be read as a call for moderation between inaction and overreaction.

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