1 April 2018Murat Volkan DülgerArticle

About this work

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

The article examines the protection of personal data in the context of human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms. It first sets out the concept of personal data and the international and national rules. It then discusses the place of personal data protection within the right to privacy and the other fundamental rights, and whether it is an independent right. The assessment is made in the light of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Court.

Keywords

  • personal data
  • human rights
  • fundamental rights and freedoms
  • protection of personal data
  • privacy of personal data

Full text

This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

İstanbul Medipol Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 5 (1), Spring 2018

The Protection of Personal Data in the Context of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights and Freedoms*

Personel Data Protection in The Context of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights and Freedoms

Murat Volkan DÜLGER**

ABSTRACT

The subject of this article is the protection of personal data within the context of human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms. For this purpose, the scope of the right to protection of personal data has been stated by first explaining the notion of personal data and both the international and domestic regulations related to the subject. After that, the boundaries of human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms have been explained, and place of right to protection of personal data especially in right of privacy and other fundamental rights have been determined. Thus, the issue of whether the right to protection of personal data is an independent right have been tried to be resolved. In this context, Constitutional Court’s and European Court of Human Rights’ points on view on the issue have been evaluated by explaining their decisions about the issue. As a result, the place of the right to protection of personal data especially in the right of privacy and the other fundamental rights and freedoms, has been tried to be determined in the light of European Court of Human Rights and Constitutional Court decisions.

Keywords: personal data, human rights, fundemantal rights and freedoms, protection of personal data, privacy of personal data.

Introduction

Since personal data consist of information that belongs to the human being, identifies the human being and stems, at root, from the human being’s being human, they have in fact existed since the beginning of humanity. Nevertheless, they were not regarded as a legal sphere, a legal interest, in need of protection. However, the development of information technologies, the spread of the internet and, in particular, the increase in the possibilities for exchanging information that came with the development of communication networks began to give rise to threats of a different nature to persons and their data. On that basis, the idea underlying the threats that arose has been that information belonging to individuals passes into the hands of third parties who have no connection with, or interest in,

that information, and that such information is processed by third parties, whether lawfully or unlawfully. In this way, it becomes possible to gain access to, and to process, every kind of information capable of identifying persons, including information relating to their private lives. It is on account of these dangers, which have emerged in our day, that the problems relating to the protection of personal data have come to be better understood and that work in this direction has begun.

Today, with the enactment of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK) and, once the dates set by the Law had passed, the entry into force of all the obligations it prescribes, the current practical problems of data protection law have come to the fore. Underlying this branch of law, however, is the “right to request the protection of personal data”, which is counted among human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms. It is precisely this right that forms the subject of this article.

As can be seen, the fact that the protection of data belonging to persons has become so imperative stems essentially from the importance of human rights. For this reason, in order to gain a better grasp of the process by which data protection law emerged and of its development, I shall examine personal data below in the context of human rights and of the European Convention on Human Rights, in which human rights are regulated in the most comprehensive manner. In connection with this, I shall also touch on the judgments delivered on the subject by the European Court of Human Rights, which was established in order to ensure the protection and implementation of those human rights. I shall furthermore examine and assess the subject within the framework of fundamental rights and freedoms, which are the manifestation of human rights in the Constitution, and in the light of the judgments that the Constitutional Court has delivered on this matter. In this way, I shall attempt to address, in a comparative manner, the influence of supranational law and of the decisions of supranational judicial bodies on national law and on the highest national judicial body.

I. The Concept of Personal Data

Although there is no clear and exhaustive answer to the question of what personal data means and which data do or do not fall within the scope of personal data, it is accepted that any information relating to an identified or identifiable person is personal data. Accordingly, every kind of information we can think of that serves to identify a person is that person’s personal data. This is the definition accepted in supranational, international and national legislation alike, as well as in practice and in legal scholarship.

The scope of personal data is explained in the explanatory memorandum of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data, the basic legal instrument in the field of personal data. It has been made clear that personal data means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person and that, in this context, not only information ensuring the definite identification of the individual, such as his name, surname, date of birth and place of birth, but also information on the person’s physical, family, economic, social and other characteristics is regarded as personal data.

In sum, it is stated that all cases which enable the person to be identified, whether because the information carries concrete content expressing the person’s physical, economic, cultural, social or psychological identity or as a result of its being linked to any record such as an identity, tax or insurance number, fall within this scope.

On this basis, we arrive at the conclusion that personal data has three basic elements:

• The existence of data: In Law No. 6698 and in international legislation, the scope of data is defined as “any information”.

• The existence of an identified or identifiable person: The main point of debate here concerns what is to be understood by the concept of person. Although the prevailing view is that only natural persons should be protected, there are also views that argue the contrary. In national legislation, only data belonging to natural persons are protected. Since I consider that the protection of personal data must be assessed within the framework of fundamental human rights, it is appropriate that the protection is directed at natural persons. Here, however, some question marks may arise as to the status and fate of data that belong to legal persons but are linked to natural persons. First of all, legal personality is a construct that we accept in the world of law, and in essence it has no personality independent of the natural person. For this reason, even data which are held within a legal person and can be said to belong to legal persons should be regarded as falling within the scope of the Law in so far as they can be linked to a natural person and can identify that person.

• The data must relate to the person: What is meant here is that, by means of the data in hand, a connection can be established with the person in question so that that person can be reached, and that the data are about that person.

In addition, some personal data are defined as sensitive data or, in other words, as special categories of data. The reason why certain data are termed sensitive and are thereby placed under more effective protection is that these data stand in a closer relationship with the person’s fundamental rights and freedoms. For such a distinction has rightly been drawn out of the concern that, should the data in question be misused, the harm and suffering that may be caused to the data subject would be greater. By stating that the existence of special categories of data was accepted in order to prevent the data subjects from being victimised and exposed to discrimination, the explanatory memorandum of the Law in fact also explains which criteria were used in determining the special categories of data. The Law has laid down stricter conditions for the processing of these data and has prohibited their processing unless the adequate measures

determined by the Board have been taken. Which data are of a special nature is listed in the Law. It is not possible to regard any data other than those listed as belonging to a special category and to act accordingly. Accordingly, data relating to persons’ race, ethnic origin, political opinions, philosophical beliefs, religion, sect or other beliefs, appearance and dress, membership of associations, foundations or trade unions, health, sexual life, criminal convictions and security measures, as well as biometric and genetic data, are special categories of personal data. Since the conditions prescribed for the processing of these data differ, care must be taken at this point.

II. The Right to the Protection of Personal Data

A. Its Historical Course

The right to the protection of personal data denotes the data subject’s control over his data. It means that the person has a say in matters such as the obtaining, collection, processing or transfer of his data. The right to the protection of personal data therefore gives the right-holder the power to determine the fate of his personal data. Thus, the operations in question, when carried out on the data subject’s data without his wish, knowledge or consent, constitute a breach of the right to the protection of personal data.

I touched briefly above on the fact that personal data have in essence existed in every period in which the human being has existed, but that the importance of this concept has come to be better understood over time. Since personal data denote every kind of information capable of identifying a person, and since there is no limitation in this regard, it is possible to say that their existence runs parallel to that of the person and, consequently, that personal data have existed in every period in which the person has existed.

As I shall explain below, although personal data have become the subject of positive law provisions only in recent years, as the need arose, examples concerning the protection of personal data in fact go back a very long way. Even in literary works written in earlier times, an attempt was made to explain the importance of protecting personal data within the story. The most striking example in this regard is George Orwell’s novel “1984”, which he completed in 1948. The novel deals with the effects on the individual and on society of the State’s constant surveillance of persons, and lays bare its destructive consequences. It constructs a catastrophic scenario in which an attempt is made to bring the mind under control and destroy it, in which there is no freedom of thought and in which persons are, as it were, kept on file. In conclusion, starting from the fact that the person under surveillance becomes unable to act and his free will is extinguished, it conveys that the protection of the individual’s personal data vis-à-vis the State is indispensable for the continuation of democratic society.

Besides literary works, one of the finest examples on the subject is that the Hippocratic Oath, which has come down to the present day from the era before Christ, by stating that physicians must not disclose, by virtue of their duty of confidentiality, the data they have obtained in the course of practising their profession, speaks of the importance of health data, which constitute a special category of personal data1. As can be seen, the idea that personal data must be protected has existed since early times. In order for the individual to attain fundamental rights and freedoms such as freedom of thought and expression in a democratic society, he had not to be kept under surveillance and control by the State or other third parties and not to be made public in an identifiable manner. Only through the protection of persons’ own data could the autonomy of the individual and, consequently, a democratic legal order be secured. While the importance of the subject was thus known, when we enquire into the reasons why personal data in time became a concept that needed to be regulated by texts of positive law, we see that the greatest share belongs to the changes brought about by technological developments.

At this point, before turning to technological developments, mention must also be made of the effects of the modern State structure. In the modern State, the data of the persons who make up society are needed in order to maintain social order. Information is indispensable for the State’s legal rules, its political and military order, its diplomatic activities and the continuation of commercial life2. For this reason, State bodies collect and process data belonging to persons every day. Public institutions and bodies such as police forces, health institutions and administrative bodies need to collect, process and transfer personal data in order to be able to perform their duties. As a rule, moreover, the activities of these institutions are regulated in the relevant legislation under the heading of exceptions.

At the root of the need to regulate the protection of personal data as a right, however, lie the effects produced by technological developments. As a result of the development of information technologies, the multiplication of communication channels and the spread of the internet, data that previously existed in written form can now be transferred to the digital environment, and very large quantities of data can be stored on very small devices3. Today, within

seconds, a very large quantity of data can be recorded in a computer environment and transferred from there to another computer. The collection, processing or transfer of personal data, whether lawfully or unlawfully, has thus become quite simple. This has also been the starting point of the dangers relating to personal data. For this reason, countries have felt the need to regulate the protection of personal data as a right and have safeguarded it by statute. Although this need first emerged in Europe in the 1970s, it has today spread throughout the world.

B. The Debate as to Whether It Is an Independent Right

Because the definition of personal data is very broad and every kind of data that can be linked to a natural person falls within its scope, the right to the protection of personal data is in close contact with many rights, in particular those that are among the fundamental human rights. Human dignity, the right to informational self-determination, the right to respect for private life, freedom to express one’s thoughts, the confidentiality of private communications and freedom of conscience, religion and belief are intertwined with the protection of personal data. Indeed, some views even argue that the protection of personal data is a sub-category of, in particular, the right to respect for private life. In order to gain a better grasp of the relationship between the right to the protection of personal data and the rights in question, it is first necessary to set out briefly the views on the identification of the fundamental interest on which the protection of personal data rests and, hence, on its legal nature. There are essentially two views on this matter, and at their root lies the question of what the protection in question aims at. The question whether data constitute a right that can be disposed of is answered differently by the USA and by Continental Europe4

1. The View That It Is an Economic Right

a. The View That It Is a Property Right

In the USA, the protection of personal data is not a constitutional right; sectoral solutions have been adopted in this field. Under the influence, too, of the view that very broad protection would adversely affect the economy, an approach based on economic value has been adopted in the protection of personal data. According to this view, personal data are in the nature of a property right, and the data subject may avail himself of the rights accorded to an owner. Personal data may therefore be the subject of relationships, such as sale and lease, that the right of property affords5

This view has been criticised on the grounds that personal data cannot, by their nature, be the subject of a property right and, furthermore, that adverse consequences may arise for individuals because the responsibility lies with the individuals.

b. The View That It Is an Intellectual Property Right

Another widespread view in the USA is that personal data should be associated with intellectual property rights and protected by an approach akin to copyright6. The starting point of this idea is that, in the protection of personal data too, just as with intellectual property rights, there is an item of data belonging to the individual. Just as a person who produces works that are the product of thought, such as a book or a painting, has moral rights over the work within the scope of intellectual property rights, so too the data subject has similar rights over his data.

2. The View That It Is a Human Right

Alongside the view that regards personal data as an economic right, the view that prevails particularly in Europe is that the protection of personal data is one of the fundamental human rights7. Indeed, when we look at the basic reasons for the emergence of the right to the protection of personal data, we see that the real reason is to bring under control the danger that arises with regard to the person’s privacy and private life. The fact that the development of the right took place together with the concepts of human dignity and personality rights, which gained importance particularly after the Second World War, supports this view8

In sum, there are two kinds of economic-right view, which find support mostly in America: one explains personal data as a property right, on the premise that the person has a right of property over the data because they are his own data; the other explains them as an intellectual property right, because of their resemblance to a work in intellectual property. On the other hand, there is also the approach, found particularly in Continental Europe, which regards this right as a human right in view of the relationship between a person’s data and human dignity.

It is an indisputable fact that today, with the development of technology, economic life has become bound up with technology and that many economic activities are conducted in this way. In addition, the fact that persons’ data are becoming ever more important in fields such as advertising and commerce has led to personal data becoming an instrument for economic gain by means of technology. Although it has today become impossible to conduct economic activities without using personal data, this does not mean that personal data must be approached as an economic right.

For I consider that, while persons’ economic rights are protected on account of the economic value of personal data, it is essentially their personality rights that are protected, and that their economic interests must be regarded as an ancillary right. Otherwise, the result would be that a person’s data become the subject of a relationship akin to purchase, sale or lease, and such an approach is contrary to the basic philosophy underlying the protection of personal data.

Having touched on the approaches to the legal nature of the right to the protection of personal data, if we now turn to the question whether it is an independent right, it will be seen that legal scholarship holds differing views on this point too. As I shall examine the relationship between personal data and the right to respect for private life in detail below, in this section I shall give only a general explanation and address the question whether it is an independent right.

The first view, which treats personal data as a sub-category of the right to respect for private life, holds that, having regard to the definition and purpose of the right to respect for private life, personal data must also be dealt with within that framework9. On this view, the protection of personal data constitutes a species of the right to respect for private life that carries that right’s distinctive features within it10. There are also reasoned decisions on the subject to the effect that personal data must be assessed within the scope of respect for private life and that, in national and international instruments too, personal data are a sub-category of respect for private life11. According to the second view, which accepts the connection of personal data with the right to respect for private life but argues that their protection must be regarded as a separate right, although personal data were originally in close relation to the right in question, that protection is inadequate today and personal data must be protected as a separate right12. Although personal data may at first sight be assessed within the concept of private life, it becomes apparent that over time these two rights have separated from each other, and indeed have had to separate. Developing technology has increased the possibility of carrying out lawful or unlawful acts by using personal data, and the principles of respect for private life have proved insufficient to protect the interests in personal data. A more comprehensive protection of personal data has thus become necessary.

On the other hand, the right to respect for private life essentially governs a protection relating to the person’s private and secret sphere. That sphere consists mostly of information about one’s life which the person does not wish others to learn or which is private to him. Personal data, by contrast, need not relate to the individual’s private life. Moreover, the notion of secrecy which that right contains is apt to give rise to a mistaken perception with regard to personal data. For case law and legal scholarship are unanimous that personal data need not be confidential or secret13.

Because the right to respect for private life is insufficient to protect a person’s data, and because there is no requirement that the legal interest protected in offences relating to personal data be in the nature of a secret, I am of the opinion that the right to the protection of personal data should be regulated under a separate heading, notwithstanding its close relationship with respect for private life and the other fundamental human rights. For it is clear that the traditional approach, according to which it is not a separate right, cannot meet today’s needs. For this reason, work in this direction is increasingly being carried out at national and international level, and in current instruments a separate heading is for the most part devoted to personal data. In parallel with this, I think that in time the right to the protection of personal data will be accepted beyond dispute as a separate right14. There are already authors in legal scholarship who state that it is an original and independent fundamental right15.

The distinction between the right to respect for one’s private and family life and the right to the protection of personal data is not empty rhetoric. A person’s private and family life involves, first and foremost, the right to respect for an individual phenomenon; this right essentially consists in preventing others from interfering with one’s private and family life. In other words, it is a static, negative kind of protection. The protection of personal data, by contrast, lays down the rules governing the methods of processing data and is a dynamic kind of protection that follows the data in all data processing operations. Moreover, supervisory and other powers do not rest solely with the persons to whom the data relate, since they are vested in an independent authority (Article 8(3)). Because there is a public body responsible in this matter, protection is no longer left to the data subjects.

This is a redistribution of social and legal powers that is taking shape. It is, in fact, the end point of a long evolutionary process experienced by the concept of privacy – from its original definition as the right to be left alone to the right to keep control over one’s information and to determine how the private sphere is to be constructed16. Indeed, we are faced with what is, in a way, a rediscovery of the protection of personal data. This stems not only from the fact that the protection of personal data is regarded as a self-standing, fundamental right, but also from the fact that it is an important tool for the free development of one’s personality. Data protection is regarded as the sum of a bundle of rights that make up citizenship in the new millennium17. Thus, in Europe above all but throughout the world, awareness is growing of the necessity and importance, for securing the freedom of individuals, not only of the protection of their private lives but also of data protection. This approach is reflected in many national and international documents; most recently, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union recognises data protection as a fundamental and autonomous right. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly difficult to respect this general assumption, because internal and international security requirements, market interests and the reorganisation of public administration are moving towards the reduction of the relevant safeguards or are pushing essential guarantees towards disappearance18. One of the first and finest examples on the subject is undoubtedly the judgment of the German Constitutional Court of 15 December 1983, the ‘Census’ judgment, also known by its other name as the ‘Population Census’ judgment. The subject matter of the judgment was the Census Act adopted by the German Parliament in 1982. Although, during the debates on the Act, no consideration at all was given to the possibility that the census to be conducted might impair fundamental rights and freedoms, the provisions in question provoked a strong reaction from lawyers and the public19. In particular, as the census date fixed by the Act approached, criticism of the data to be recorded during the census and of the fact that these data would be kept open to access by certain institutions and organisations intensified20. Furthermore, the fact that the data to be obtained through the questions to be asked during the census, such as name, address, sources of income and educational status, were diverse and very numerous, and that, despite the provision that these data would be kept confidential, there was a high risk of their being used for purposes other than the census, constituted another point of criticism. For what the Act contained was not so much a simple population census as the long-term retention of the data obtained and, moreover, the possibility of their being used for other purposes as well. Concerns about the protection of personal data thus began to emerge21.

The concerns and allegations regarding the Act were brought before the German Constitutional Court by way of constitutional complaints, and the Court, concurring with them, suspended the application of the Census Act by an interim measure. As its reasoning, the Court pointed out that irreversible harm might occur if the Act were applied. Subsequently it was held that the objectionable provisions in question were incompatible with the inviolability of human dignity and the right to develop one’s personality, and these provisions were annulled22.

This judgment of the German Constitutional Court is of great importance in every respect: both the fact that it laid bare the need to protect personal data and the Court’s outlook on the subject, approaching personal data from a human rights perspective, show the importance of the judgment. For the problems and concerns we encounter today with regard to personal data were perceived at that time, and by delivering a decision in the context of human rights the Court handed down a judgment far ahead of its time. A further significance of the judgment is that the Court, by assessing together the concepts of human dignity and personality rights guaranteed by the German Constitution, derived from these two rights a new right called “the right to dispose of one’s own personal data (informationelles Selbstbestimmungsrecht)”23. It was thus concluded that, in order for individuals to protect their human dignity and to be able to develop their personality, they must be able to dispose freely of their personal data, and that only in that way can a life worthy of human dignity be led and personality rights be protected; this was the first time that the importance of personal data was addressed in this manner24. Indeed, this judgment is said to be one of the noteworthy judgments delivered by the German Constitutional Court from the standpoint of both privacy and constitutional law25.

I should state that, as of today, the right to the protection of personal data is accepted as an original and independent category of right. Indeed, the protection of personal data is today recognised as a fundamental legal right of individuals in the GDPR, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2000, the Treaty of Lisbon (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and the Data Protection Convention26.

In reality, however, the right to the protection of personal data is steadily moving away from the framework of human rights and fundamental rights, for three main reasons. First, after 11 September many basic criteria changed and guarantees were reduced all over the world, as shown in particular by the Patriot Act in the USA and, in connection with it, the decisions on the transfer of air passengers’ data to the USA – as in the case of the retention of electronic communications data. Secondly, this tendency towards reducing safeguards has been extended to sectors seeking to benefit from the change in question. Thirdly, new technological opportunities continuously offer new tools for the classification, selection, social sorting and control of individuals, resulting in a definite technological drift which national and international authorities are not always able to counter adequately. In this way, some of the principles underlying the system of personal data protection are gradually being eroded. This applies, first and foremost, to the purpose specification principle and to the principle of separation between data processed by public bodies and data processed by private entities. The multifunctionality criterion is being applied, at times to an ever-increasing extent, under the pressure exerted by institutional structures. Data collected for a given purpose can thus be used for different purposes. Data processed by a given body are made available to different bodies. This means that individuals are becoming more and more transparent and that, in particular, the organs of public institutions are increasingly moving beyond any control. This in turn means a new distribution of political and social power27. Nevertheless, if we wish to preserve the democratic nature of our political system, the strong protection of personal data and its place under the umbrella of fundamental rights and freedoms must continue to be a “necessary utopia”28.

C. International Instruments

1. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)

The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), whose basic aim is, together with the advancement of democracy, human rights and citizens’ rights in the member countries, the improvement of the people’s standard of living and of the economy, the elimination of unemployment, the promotion of economic development and the promotion of the growth of world trade, was the first organisation to take a step at international level concerning the protection of personal data, by adopting in 1980 the “Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data”29. The Organisation’s need to regulate this field stems from its aim of developing the member states economically.

The “OECD Guidelines”, which set out the minimum requirement in the protection of personal data, contain the basic principles in this field and have the character of a recommendation, acknowledged that with today’s technology personal data can flow within seconds and that it has therefore become imperative to place that flow on a legal footing. These guidelines, while preventing dangers such as personal data being obtained unlawfully or kept inaccurately, or being misused by unauthorised persons, also contain recommendations as to how the flow of personal data should take place. These principles are:

• Collection limitation principle (Art. 7),

• Data quality principle (Art. 8),

• Purpose specification principle (Art. 9)

• Use limitation principle (Art. 10)

• Data security principle (Art. 11)

• Openness principle (Art. 12)

• Individual participation principle (Art. 13)

• Accountability principle (Art. 14); they are listed under the heading of basic principles of national application. By means of these guidelines the Council introduced rules aimed at protecting the freedoms of individuals and issued a recommendation stating that the member countries should enact these principles in their domestic law30. Nevertheless,

the member states are not obliged to adopt these principles, but it can be seen that today states act with these principles in mind when legislating on personal data. Indeed, these principles were also taken into account when Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data, which I shall explain in detail below, was being drafted, and they are mentioned in the general explanatory memorandum of the Law.

2. United Nations

a. Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The United Nations, which was founded in 1945 after the Second World War in response to the destructive effects of the war and whose principal aim is to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations at international level and to achieve international economic, social and cultural cooperation, also has various instruments aimed at the protection of personal data, generally within the scope of respect for private life.

First, Article 12 of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, adopted on 10 December 1948, states that no one may be subjected to an attack on his private life and that everyone has the right to be protected by law against interference with and attacks on his private life.

b. United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Furthermore, Article 17, entitled ‘Right to Privacy’, of the “United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, which entered into force in 1976, protects the person’s private life and right to privacy by providing: “No one’s private and family life, home or correspondence may be interfered with arbitrarily or unlawfully; no one’s honour or reputation may be subjected to unlawful attacks. Everyone has the right to be protected by the law against such attacks or interference.”

In General Comment No. 16 of the UN Human Rights Committee on this article, adopted at its 32nd session in 1988, it is stated that the gathering or holding of personal information on computers, in data banks or on similar devices by public authorities or by private individuals or bodies must be regulated by law, and that every individual has the right, if information concerning him is stored in personal records or databases, to ascertain what kind of information it is and for what purpose it is stored31. Proceeding from this comment, we reach the conclusion that the concept of privacy must be interpreted not as relating to the person’s private life and world of secrets, but more broadly. For it is understood that the Committee, by refraining from any statement as to the nature of the data, wished to prevent these data from being thought of merely as data relating to private life. We can say that the phrase ‘information concerning him’ used in the comment refers to any kind of information relating to the person. It is thus possible to say that the United Nations regards the right to the protection of personal data as falling within the scope of the article in question32.

In its decision of 8 June 201533 concerning the use of a camera monitoring system in the systems in which public employees carry out their activities, the 10th Chamber of the Council of State relied on the above-mentioned article of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and stated that the matter had to be addressed in terms of the taking of personal images within the scope of the principle of respect for private life. The court quashed the judgment of the Administrative Court on the grounds that there was no proportionality between the camera monitoring system and the public interest pursued by the institution, that fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law, and that personal data may be processed only in the cases provided for by law or with the person’s explicit consent.

There is also a decision of the Plenary Session of the Administrative Law Chambers of the Council of State of 9 December 2015 on this subject34. The decision concerns the practice of monitoring working hours by means of a fingerprint scanning system, fingerprints being personal data of the staff. The court stated that the right to the protection of personal data, as a special form of the right to the protection of the person’s human dignity and to the free development of his personality, denotes the protection of the individual’s rights and freedoms during the processing of personal data, and assessed “fingerprint scanning”, which amounts to obtaining personal data from the persons concerned, within the scope of the principle of “respect for private life”. On the grounds that there was no statutory basis setting out the limits, procedures and principles of the practice and that there was no guarantee that the data collected could not be used in some other way in the future, it was concluded that the practice in question was unlawful, the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also being cited among the bases.

c. Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files

We see that in the instruments adopted by the United Nations up to this point, the right to the protection of personal data has been dealt with within the scope of respect for private life. However, because, with technology, violations of this right by means of computers became widespread, the United Nations General

Assembly published on 14 December 1990 the “Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files”35. These principles are important in that they constitute the United Nations’ first instrument relating directly to the right to the protection of personal data, independently of the right to respect for private life. The principles in question are:

• Principle of lawfulness and fairness,

• Principle of accuracy,

• Principle of purpose specification,

• Principle of access by the data subject,

• Principle of non-discrimination,

• Principle of security,

• Principle of supervision and sanctions,

• Principle of transborder data flows; they are thus quite comprehensive and are of an encouraging nature. It is stated that countries should act in accordance with these principles in matters relating to personal data.

3. Council of Europe

The Council of Europe, of which Türkiye became a founding member by signing immediately after it was opened for signature, was founded in 1949, with the end of the Second World War, in order to repair the destruction caused by the war and to secure lasting peace. The greatest and most concrete step taken in pursuit of its aims by the Council, whose principal aim is to protect and strengthen the principles of human rights, the rule of law and pluralist democracy and to establish a close and indissoluble union among the member countries, was the signing of the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights is therefore attached to the Council and performs an extremely important function in this respect.

a. Convention No. 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data

It may be said that the first and most comprehensive instruments concerning the right to the protection of personal data were produced by the Council of Europe. The “Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data”, opened for signature by the Council in Strasbourg on 28 January 1981, is the first binding international convention in the field of the protection of personal data and is very important in that respect. The Convention, which entered into force on 1 October 1985, was signed by Türkiye on 28 January 1981 and became binding on Türkiye by the law of approval published in the Official Gazette No. 29656 of 17 March 2016.

The explanatory memorandum of the bill on the approval of the ratification of the Convention36 states that, owing to the rapid developments in information and communication technologies, there has been a serious increase in the recording of personal data and that the subject has therefore taken on a sensitive dimension. It underlines that Türkiye shapes its national legislation by following the international instruments on the protection of personal data and that, by the amendment made to the Constitution in 2010, this right was placed under constitutional guarantee. On these grounds it was concluded that it would be appropriate to incorporate the Convention into domestic law. Although Türkiye was among the first countries to sign the Convention, it was the last country to ratify it and bring it into force.

The significance of the Convention for our national law can be seen in concrete form in the explanatory memorandum of Law No. 6698. Indeed, the general explanatory memorandum, in which the reasons why the Law was needed are listed in detail, also refers to Convention No. 108 and underlines that the Convention was signed by Türkiye. By contrast, the dissenting opinion in the committee report on the bill contains criticism to the effect that, although Türkiye signed the Convention in 1981, it has since then behaved as though it had not signed it. Although I agree that Türkiye was very late with regard to the signing of the Convention, these criticisms no longer have any practical significance, since the Convention is now in force.

In addition, the explanatory memorandum to Article 19 of the Law, which governs the Personal Data Protection Authority, states that the Convention provides for the establishment of authorities that will perform their duties in a functionally independent manner in order to monitor and guide the application of the principles on the processing of personal data; and the explanatory memorandum to Article 21, which governs the Personal Data Protection Board, states that an independent Board is envisaged by the Convention. Thus, since the Convention has entered into force with respect to Türkiye, an attempt has been made to fulfil by concrete steps the obligations which the Convention imposes on the member countries.

By the Convention, whose principal aim is to secure in all member countries the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their rights with regard to the automatic processing of data of a personal nature concerning them, the protection of personal data was treated as a right separate from respect for private life, and an obligation was imposed on countries to legislate on the subject.

b. Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, regarding Supervisory Authorities and Transborder Data Flows

This protocol is in the nature of a supplement to Convention No. 108.

The Protocol essentially seeks to remedy the deficiency in Convention No. 108. For although the Convention regulated data processing activities, it did not provide for an independent body to supervise them37. For this reason the Additional Protocol was drawn up with regard to supervisory and competent authorities and transborder data flows. The States Parties have undertaken to designate one or more competent authorities responsible for ensuring compliance with the measures in their domestic law giving effect to the principles stated in the Convention and the Protocol.

c. European Convention on Human Rights

The “European Convention on Human Rights”, which takes as its point of reference the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948 and aims at securing the universal and effective recognition and observance of the rights declared in that Declaration, was adopted by the Council of Europe on 4 November 1950, regulating human rights and fundamental freedoms. With the protection mechanism it has established (the ECtHR), it is the most effective and best-functioning convention in the field of human rights.

Although the Convention contains no specific provision on personal data, private and family life are protected by Article 8, entitled “respect for private and family life”, which provides: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. Interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right is possible only where the interference is in accordance with the law and is a measure necessary in a democratic society for national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the country, the maintenance of order, the prevention of crime, or the protection of health or morals or of the rights and freedoms of others.”

Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) governs the right to respect for private life, family life, the privacy of the home and correspondence. The Court has interpreted these expressions broadly. Together, “private life” and “correspondence” provide legal protection for almost all the attributes and behaviour that define the identity of the individual as a human being, including the expectation of keeping interpersonal communications away from the prying eyes of the State. But this right is not absolute. Article 8(2) permits a public authority to interfere in pursuit of a wide range of “legitimate aims”, including the prevention of crime and the protection of the rights of others, provided that “the measures taken are in accordance with the law” and “necessary in a democratic society”. Accordingly, the key to the effectiveness of Article 8 in protecting privacy rights lies in the Court’s approach to the open-textured concepts of legality and necessity38.

In this part I shall confine myself to indicating the relevant article of the European Convention on Human Rights that matters to us from the standpoint of data protection law; in the following sections of the study I shall examine the subject in detail together with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

4. European Union

The European Union, which was established after the Second World War, with the aim of remedying the destructive effects of that war, by the Treaty on European Union on 7 February 1992, and whose basic aim is the promotion of peace, the safeguarding of freedom, security and justice, the support of economic and social development and the protection of the values and well-being of its citizens, has likewise taken action in this field, because the need to protect personal data rests on fundamental rights and freedoms and therefore plays an important role in the development of democratic countries. For the fact that, with the development of technology, personal data have come to influence the development of economic and commercial relations between countries, that they play a part in countries’ ensuring their security both with regard to their citizens and vis-à-vis the outside world, and that at the same time their protection is counted among the fundamental human rights has made it necessary for the European Union and its member countries to legislate on this subject.

It should be noted that the European countries are pioneers in the field of the protection of personal data. The danger of violations of personal data was foreseen there much earlier than in other countries, and work was begun with a view to taking concrete steps in this regard. The reason for this lead is that technological developments and legal awareness were more advanced. In countries where technology developed earlier, threats to personal data emerged earlier and the need for legal regulation of the subject arose. Consequently, the importance of the protection of personal data within the framework of fundamental human rights is well established in the European Union and in the domestic law of the European countries, and there is legislation providing original and effective protection in this area. At the same time, work to address the new problems emerging in parallel with developments is still continuing39.

a. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data

The Union, which began its work in the 1990s, first published on 24 October 1995 “Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data”. Article 1 of the Directive describes its purpose as protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data. The same article goes on to state that Member States may neither restrict nor prohibit the flow of personal data between Member States for reasons connected with the protection afforded.

The fact that the purpose of the Directive on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data is defined as protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons, and that several of its provisions state that the protection of personal data is indispensable for safeguarding fundamental rights, shows that the countries view personal data within the framework of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual. The text of the Directive frequently refers to the European Convention on Human Rights and speaks of the relationship of the protection of personal data with the other human rights laid down in the Convention, above all the right to privacy, and of its importance for securing those rights. When the provisions contained in the Directive are examined, the basic principles adopted are as follows:

Legitimacy: Accordingly, personal data may be processed for limited purposes, and data may not be processed without explicit consent unless one of the prescribed exceptions applies.

Purpose limitation: Personal data may be collected only for explicit, specified and legitimate reasons and may not be used contrary to the purpose of collection.

Transparency: The data subject must be informed about matters such as whether his data are being processed and, if so, for what purposes. In order that fairness may be ensured, data subjects must be granted the right to learn about the processing operations relating to their data.

Proportionality: Personal data must be adequate for the purpose for which they are processed, relevant to that purpose and up to date.

Security: The controller must take technical and functional measures against the risks that may arise in the course of the data processing activity.

Control: Data processing activities must be supervised by the national data protection authorities40.

The Directive is important because it lays down rules on matters such as the conditions under which personal data may be processed, the grounds that make data processing lawful, the fact that data may be processed for limited purposes and used only for the specified purposes, that sensitive data may be processed in exceptional cases, and that the data subject must be informed. Indeed, since a committee is provided for in Article 31, in Chapter VII entitled “Community implementing measures”, it may be said to be of a coercive nature. In addition, the fact that the Member States may neither restrict nor prohibit the transfer of personal data among themselves is another important point of the Directive. The free movement of personal data among the Member States of the European Union was thus expressly secured.

EU directives cannot be applied directly in all the EU Member States; the rules contained in a directive have to be transposed into national law. Transposition measures therefore have to be taken in each Member State. The Data Protection Directive did not achieve the intended aims and failed to ensure uniformity in the protection of personal data in the EU. As a result of the steps taken by the different EU Member States for transposition, differences arose between the laws of the Member States. A data processing activity permitted in one country could be unlawful in another because of particular practices in data processing41. For this reason, as will be seen below, the EU moved on to the GDPR.

For us, however, the really important aspect of the Directive is that it was largely taken as the basis in drafting Law No. 6698. The Law shows great similarity to and parallels with the Directive in question. Although it may be criticised for being similar on most points regardless of whether this fits our existing law, we can understand from this that an effort was made to be in harmony with the European instruments.

Because of the similarity of the Law to the Directive, we come across examples in which the Directive is cited as a basis in proceedings on the subject in our domestic law. The latest example of this is the case heard before the Constitutional Court seeking the annulment of various articles of Law No. 6698, in which the Constitutional Court took the Directive into account when reviewing constitutionality. Attention was paid to whether the articles whose annulment was sought were compatible with the Directive, and where they were, that compatibility was made the basis for rejecting the application for annulment42.

Besides Türkiye, the Directive has been the subject of many decisions delivered at international level, particularly in Europe. There are judgments which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the judicial organ of the European Union, has delivered on the basis of the Directive.

One of the most important judgments in which the Directive was examined from the standpoint of its scope and its relationship with national legislation is the “Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk” judgment. The case underlying the judgment concerned a conflict between Austrian legislation and the provisions of the Directive. Under Austrian legislation, bodies subject to audit were obliged to provide the Court of Audit with information on the remuneration of employees whose annual remuneration exceeded a certain level, so that this information could be included in a report which the Court of Audit would subsequently draw up in order to make it available to the public; those bodies claimed that such a practice was contrary to the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC. The CJEU was asked whether the Directive could be interpreted in a manner that would conflict with national legislation.

The CJEU first stated that the provisions of the Directive must be applied to every kind of activity relating to the processing of personal data. As regards the case, while it saw no objection to employers keeping records of employees’ names and salary details, it considered the sharing of these data with third parties to be unlawful, irrespective of whether the data were sensitive. It also underlined that national courts must assess the interference in terms of proportionality and of the relationship between purpose and necessity, and thereby gave its views on the relationship between the Directive and national legislation. It is a very important judgment because of the guidance it provides in determining the scope of application of the Directive and on the question whether national legislation must be compatible with the Directive43.

The most striking judgment delivered by the Court in recent times, however, is the “Google judgment” in the context of the right to be forgotten. In the case underlying the judgment, a Spanish lawyer named Costeja González claimed that the newspaper reports which appeared when he searched for his name on the Google search engine, and which contained information about his having had to sell his property a long time ago for the restructuring of his social security debts, were in breach of Directive 95/46/EC. In its judgment of 13 May 2014 the Court, finding in favour of the applicant, relied on Article 12 of the Directive, on the person’s right of access, and held that personal data published under a person’s name must be erased if, after having become invalid or irrelevant, they go beyond their purpose44.

In the Google Spain case, the problem arose in connection with the Mario Costeja case (2014), which was the subject of the preliminary question referred by the Spanish National High Court to the European Court of Justice and of which there is another example in Spain45. Mario Costeja suffered harm as a result of an advertisement placed in the newspaper La Vanguardia in 1998 for a forced sale relating to debts he owed to the social security administration. When the newspaper was digitised, Google, on a search for the name “Mario Costeja”, came to disclose personal data and financial information that were no longer current. This greatly affected the professional life of Mario Costeja, who is a lawyer. Costeja filed a petition before the Spanish Data Protection Agency (SDPA) requesting that the newspaper remove the information, but his petition was unsuccessful. The SDPA stated that the advertisement published in the newspaper La Vanguardia was lawful and that its removal would infringe freedom of expression. However, the SDPA sent a request to Google Spain and Google asking these companies to stop indexing the content in question. Google challenged the Agency’s decision (and other similar decisions) before the National High Court. It was this judicial authority that brought the question before the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. The Els Alfacs case, for its part, concerned a company that owned a campsite where a terrible tragedy occurred in 1978. At this campsite a lorry carrying propylene caused the death of two hundred people. In 2010 the company brought an action against Google Spain, which had ignored a petition requesting that the search engine stop presenting the news about the accident that appeared at the very top under the name of the campsite. The complaints concerned both the right to be forgotten and the company’s right to the protection of its honour, privacy and own image. The company wanted Google to filter the search results and to distinguish between those seeking information about the tragedy and those wishing only to obtain information about the campsite. For Google, because the search results appeared in their entirety, had caused the company to suffer serious harm. In both cases the personal information in question had been disseminated in proportion to the level of interest at the time it was first published, but the fact that this information could still reach a wide audience 10-15 years after the original events did not seem reasonable. Even if these events caused significant moral and economic damage at the time they occurred, the circumstances that had led to their publication no longer existed at the time of the proceedings46.

The fact that the judgment states that, where the processing or publication of personal data no longer serves any legitimate purpose after the data have been lawfully processed or published, the data must be erased is important both for the protection of personal

data and for the right to be forgotten. For even if personal data have been processed lawfully, once the purpose of the processing has ceased to exist no legitimate purpose remains, so that continuing to keep or process them is unlawful47. The judgment in question, in which the relevant article of the Directive was relied on, has also found a place in Turkish case law. In a decision of 17 June 2015 concerning the verbatim reproduction of the name of a victim of sexual harassment in a criminal law book, the General Civil Assembly of the Court of Cassation referred to the “Google judgment”, concluded that personal data had been violated and found in favour of the claimant48. As can be seen, Directive 95/46/EC is the subject of disputes concerning the right to the protection of personal data at national and international level. The compatibility of the facts of the case with the provisions of the Directive was examined, and a clear breach of the Directive was regarded as unlawfulness. The question whether national laws must be compatible with the Directive was also examined. It must be accepted that the provisions of the Directive are to be regarded as a general rule, while national laws must introduce provisions that are parallel to those provisions and suited to their own national laws and social structures.

Indeed, Chapter III, Section 3 of the GDPR also refers to rectification and erasure49. This is an important issue that is currently on the agenda, and it has become even more important since the Google Spain judgment. It is referred to in short as the “right to be forgotten”50.

b. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

The “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, which determines which fundamental rights the Member States are required to respect as stated in the Treaty on European Union, was signed in Nice on 7 December 2000 with the aim of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms by setting them out clearly in a charter in the light of social progress and scientific and technological developments. However, this instrument became binding with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon of 1 December 2009.

According to Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, entitled “protection of personal data”:

(1) Everyone has the right to request the protection of personal information concerning him.

(2) Such information must be used fairly, for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or of some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to information which has been collected concerning him, and the right to have it rectified.

(3) Compliance with these rules shall be supervised by an independent authority. It is very important that, in the instrument in question, which lays down the fundamental rights that the Member States of the European Union are required to respect, the right to the protection of personal data is recognised as a right separate from Article 7 of the same instrument, entitled “respect for private and family life”. For the instrument, besides treating the right to the protection of personal data within the framework of human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms, has also separated it from respect for private life and thereby made clear the importance of the right to the protection of personal data. The fact that the Charter is binding on the Member States and that the relevant article provides that compliance with the rules will be supervised by an independent authority shows that the protection of the right is “mandatory” in nature.

c. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Privacy and the Processing of Personal Information in the Electronic Communications Sector

With the emergence of electronic communications via these networks as digital possibilities increased, and with the need to take measures to protect the private sphere of users, the “Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Privacy and the Processing of Personal Information in the Electronic Communications Sector” was adopted on 12 July 2002.

This Directive frequently refers to Directive 95/46/EC; besides essentially having an effect complementary to that Directive, it aims at the protection of personal data in the field of telecommunications and communications services. It has also imposed on the Member States an obligation to transpose it into their domestic law.

d. Directive 2006/24/EC on the Retention of Communications Traffic Data

Under the impact of the bomb attack on the London Underground of 7 July 200551, the “Directive 2006/24/EC on the Retention of Communications Traffic Data” was adopted by the EU Council on 15 March 2006. The Directive, which lays down rules on communications traffic data and location data, provided that information other than the content of the communications of persons using communications services may be retained where there is suspicion of a serious crime52. However, the Directive was criticised because, by failing to set out criteria for the concept of serious crime, it conferred unlimited power on the countries in this regard, and in particular because it allowed a period of between six and twenty-four months for the exercise of that power53.

e. European Union General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR)

Today, when personal data are rapidly taking on a new dimension, a need has arisen for comprehensive reform in order to modernise the principles adopted in the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC and to guarantee citizens’ personal rights in the future in a manner suited to present-day conditions54. In particular, since with technological developments the methods of accessing, collecting and transferring personal data have begun to diversify, a new instrument adapted to developing technology has become indispensable. Moreover, the fact that the Directive was applied in different ways among the Member States of the European Union made it even more difficult to respond to changing and developing conditions55. Foremost among the events that laid bare the need for a new instrument are the allegations made in 2013 by the former CIA analyst Edward Snowden. According to these, the user information of many companies, including companies that store and process big data such as Google and Facebook, was the subject of the interception and surveillance activities of the US National Security Agency (NSA). In the face of these events, concern began to be felt in Europe for the rights of the individual, and the approach of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to legal disputes also changed56. The “Schrems judgment”57, delivered following the complaint lodged after this disclosure by Max Schrems, an Austrian Facebook user and law student, on account of Facebook’s collection of the personal data of users who are citizens of the European Union, is important in this respect and shows the Court’s approach. In that judgment it was concluded that the transfer of the personal data of EU citizens to servers located in the USA could lead to dangerous consequences in view of the rules of US law, and the existing Safe Harbour Agreement between the EU and the USA was declared invalid58. It is understood that, as a result of the Court’s judgment, personal data transfer strategies need to be reviewed and that new work is needed in this context60.

Another example showing that the existing rules were outdated and inadequate is the “Digital Rights Ireland judgment”60. The dispute arose between a company named Digital Rights Ireland and bodies within the country; it was claimed that Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC interfered disproportionately with fundamental rights and freedoms such as respect for private life and the protection of personal data. For the Directive allowed information such as user details, communication details and frequency of communication, in communications made by fixed, mobile or internet telephony, to be retained for between six months and two years for the purpose of preventing serious crime, and allowed the competent authorities of the countries to access these data. However, these activities of data retention and access to the data could also be carried out in the absence of any suspicion of crime. Nor was any notification on the matter given to the persons whose data were retained. The Court annulled the Directive in question on the grounds that the right of access which the Directive conferred on the competent authorities was not based on any criterion, that this undermined the legitimacy of the restriction imposed, and that it provided no effective protection61.

According to recital 142 of the GDPR, an individual data subject who considers that a right protected by the Regulation has been infringed has the right to compel non-profit organisations, bodies or institutions which are constituted in accordance with the laws of a Member State, pursue objectives in the public interest, are authorised, as a regulatory authority in the field of personal data protection, to lodge a complaint in place of the

applicants and are able to exercise on their behalf the data subjects’ right to a legal remedy or, if so provided in Member State law, are authorised to receive compensation on behalf of the data subject. A Member State may ensure that the institutions, bodies or organisations listed above have the right, independently of a request by the individual data subject, to lodge a complaint and, in cases where the rights of the data subject have been harmed as a result of the processing of personal data in breach of the GDPR, to seek a legal remedy on their behalf. A Member State may not permit these institutions, bodies or organisations to claim compensation on behalf of data subjects without the instruction of those persons. It can be seen that data protection and privacy groups are growing in number at both national and supranational level. Indeed, the case before the Court of Justice of the European Union on the annulment of the Data Retention Directive was taken up by a group of this kind62. In view of the concrete developments that have taken place and the judgments delivered by the CJEU, work was begun on the basis that the existing rules were inadequate and that there was a need for a new instrument that would be fully binding on the Member States of the European Union, would have to be applied as it stands and would therefore not give rise to divergent practices among the Member States.

Finally, the “General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)” was approved by the European Parliament, to enter into force on 24 May 2016. The Regulation laid down a period of two years, and its date of application was set as 25 May 201863. First of all, the question why this time a regulation rather than a directive was chosen as the legislative route is important for understanding what the European Union expects of the Regulation. The European Union explains this by reference to the fact that a regulation is a binding instrument. Accordingly, whereas the Directive merely set out a basic objective to be attained and left the manner of attaining it to the countries’ own internal structures and will, the Regulation is intended to be applied in its entirety throughout the European Union. As of the date of application, therefore, all the European countries are expected to be fully compliant with the Regulation and not to maintain rules and practices contrary to it. For the essential point on which it is meant to differ from the Directive is that it is fully binding on the countries. Moreover, this Regulation changes the data protection regime in Europe and beyond and makes it more comprehensive64.

In this context the Regulation, unlike the Directive, does not require the Member States to take measures in order for it to be applied in the fields to which it relates. So that the rules on data protection can be applied uniformly in all the Member States, the GDPR is expected to bring greater legal certainty and to remove possible obstacles to the free transfer of personal data65.

The fact that the Regulation was approved by the European Parliament, which represents the population living in the European Union, brings to mind the question whether it covers only the countries and citizens of the European Union. The European Union gives the Regulation a scope wider than the Member States. Where personal data residing in the European Union, or passing through the Member States of the Union for any reason such as goods, services or monitoring, are in contact with countries that are not members of the Union, the Regulation will be binding on those countries as well. The aim is thus to ensure that data connected with the European Union are safeguarded also as regards countries in which the right to the protection of personal data is not regulated or in which incomplete or narrow protection is afforded66.

I think that what should be understood by data residing in the European Union is personal data belonging to citizens of the European Union and personal data which, even if the persons concerned are not citizens, are in contact with the Member States of the Union. Geographical location is of no importance in this regard. For example, in the economic relations which Turkish citizens, who do not belong to a Member State of the Union, and legal persons established and operating under Turkish law have with Germany, a country of the European Union, any personal data that are in contact with Germany in the context of that relationship will be regarded as falling within the scope of the Regulation, even if the trader’s place of business and geographical location is Türkiye. In such an example, therefore, the Regulation will also be binding on the person processing data in Türkiye, and that person will be obliged to act in conformity with the Regulation; practices contrary to it will not be accepted67.

Breach of the obligations imposed by the GDPR is subject to serious sanctions. Accordingly, organisations committing a breach will be fined up to an upper limit of 4% of annual turnover or 20 million euros. This upper limit will apply in serious breaches such as failing to obtain sufficient permission from the data subject to process the data. The fact that it is the organisation’s turnover, not its profit, that is taken into account and that a percentage-based penalty rate is laid down on that basis is noteworthy as an indication of the importance the EU attaches to the subject and of the seriousness with which the new rules will be enforced68.

The main changes and innovations brought by the GDPR, which sets out to protect the citizens of the European Union from the data breaches that have been increasing since 1995, may be listed as follows69:

Increased territorial scope (extra-European Union

applicability): The greatest change envisaged and expected with the GDPR is, as I have also explained above, that its provisions are applicable to countries outside the European Union as well. Where personal data pass through the countries of the European Union, in particular in the context of economic and commercial relations, or relate to EU citizens, those data will be able to benefit from the protection of the provisions of the GDPR irrespective of geographical location70. Sanctions: The types of sanction provided for in the event of breach of the provisions introduced by the GDPR are another important innovation brought by the Regulation.

Consent of the data subject: The fact that the conditions laid down by the Regulation for the consent that must be obtained from the data subject whose personal data are to be processed have been strengthened is also important for the right to the protection of personal data.

The main changes made by the GDPR with regard to the rights of the data subject are as follows:

Breach notification: The Regulation provides that, where data breaches occur as a result of data processing activities and these breaches create a risk for the data subject, these risks must be notified by the Member States within 72 hours of the moment at which the risk becomes known. In addition, processors must, from the moment they become aware of the risk arising from the breach, notify the data subject and the controllers of the situation without delay, no specific period being laid down.

Right of access: Accordingly, among the new rights conferred on the data subject by the Regulation, the data subject has the right to obtain access to the information whether his data are being processed and, if so, for what purposes. In response to such a request the controller must give the data subject, free of charge, a copy of the relevant data in electronic form. It is possible to say that this change is a radical innovation in terms of strengthening the position of the data subject.

Right to be forgotten: The right to be forgotten, also known as data erasure, gives the data subject the right to request the erasure of his personal data and the prevention of their publication and of their transfer to potential third parties.

Data portability: This denotes the right of a data subject to receive the data concerning him which he has previously provided, in a commonly used format readable by an information system, and to transmit them to another controller.

Data privacy from the design stage (Privacy by Design): Although the principle of data protection and data privacy from the design stage has in fact existed for many years, it has been regulated by law for the first time by the GDPR. By this concept it is stated that the controller must take the necessary technical and organisational measures. Accordingly, the controller must, by establishing a specific policy, take the measures necessary to achieve data protection and data privacy from the design stage.

Data Protection Officers (DPO): The GDPR provides that in various cases a data protection officer must be designated by controllers or processors. These cases arise where the core activity of the controller or processor requires regular and systematic monitoring of data, or where its core activities require the processing of special categories of data or of data relating to criminal convictions and offences.

The data protection officers appointed must possess professional qualities and be experts in the protection of private and personal data. These persons may be chosen from among existing staff or may be an alternative service provider. In addition, the necessary contact details and the necessary resources relating to the subject must be provided to them.

Data protection officers report on the tasks they perform and submit their reports to the highest level of management. Another important point here is that these officers must not carry out operations and services that would result in a conflict of interests71.

Although the GDPR, which has been enacted in order to meet better the developing and growing needs of our time, has not yet been applied, expectations in this

regard are very high. For it is claimed to be the most important change in data privacy of the last 20 years. As I have explained in detail above, with the Regulation many existing rules have been amended and new rules have also been introduced.

I must say that Türkiye has fallen well behind in this matter. About a month after the entry into force of the Law on the Protection of Personal Data, which was drafted largely on the basis of Directive 95/46/EC, the Regulation was approved and Europe began to prepare for a new set of rules. In Türkiye, by contrast, compliance has not yet been achieved even with the rules currently in place, nor is there an environment in which it could be achieved in the near future.

D. Domestic Legislation

1. The 1982 Constitution

Today, the fact that the global flow of information has become so intense with the development of technology has increased and accelerated the work done on the right to the protection of personal data. As individuals’ data became the subject of improper use and the potential violations affecting these data increased and diversified, countries, while regulating the right to the protection of personal data comprehensively, also sought to ensure that this right enjoys the highest legal protection. The protection of personal data first came onto the agenda in the European countries and was recognised as a right by those countries. Undoubtedly, the main reasons for this lead are that the countries in question have a more developed technology and legal structure than Türkiye. For the protection of personal data came onto the agenda in the form of a need, and that need first arose in countries where violations had increased and where, accordingly, technology was more advanced. Although Türkiye was among the first countries to sign Council of Europe Convention No. 108, for a long time thereafter it was unable to take concrete steps on the subject. In time, however, the emergence of a need to protect personal data because the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals were at risk, together with the development of relations with the European countries, made legislation in this field indispensable. The provisions of the Constitution, which stands at the top of the hierarchy of norms, are binding on all the other instruments below it, and it is not possible for those instruments to contain provisions contrary to what is laid down in the Constitution. Consequently, the fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the provisions of the Constitution enjoy the highest guarantee. This has led to the conclusion that fundamental human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms, whose violation would have grave consequences and which need a high level of protection, must be protected by the Constitution.

In Article 20, entitled “Respect for Private Life”, of Part 2 of the 1982 Constitution, which governs the “Rights and Duties of the Individual”, private life and family life are counted among the fundamental rights of the person. However, the fact that modern society and technological developments have made interference with fundamental rights and freedoms easier has made it necessary, as in all other legal instruments, to introduce new provisions on this subject in the Constitution as well.

According to the additional paragraph added to Article 20 of the Constitution by Article 2 of Law No. 5982 of 7 May 2010:

“Everyone has the right to request the protection of personal data concerning him or her. This right also includes being informed about the personal data concerning oneself, having access to these data, requesting their rectification or erasure, and learning whether they are used in accordance with their purposes. Personal data may be processed only in the cases provided for by law or with the person’s explicit consent. The principles and procedures regarding the protection of personal data shall be regulated by law.”

The explanatory memorandum of the additional paragraph states that, although the Constitution contains indirect provisions aimed at the protection of personal data, these are not sufficient; that the protection of personal data is also strongly emphasised in comparative law and in the international documents to which we are a party; and that by this article everyone’s right to request the protection of personal data concerning him is guaranteed as a constitutional right.

Thus, although the right to the protection of personal data has been regulated under the heading of respect for private life, it has been given constitutional guarantee within the framework of fundamental human rights. Under the right to the protection of personal data, provision is made for the data subject’s right to be informed, to have access to the data, to request their rectification if they are inaccurate, to request their erasure where necessary and to learn for what purposes they are used. The conditions of processing are also stated. In this way the right to the protection of personal data has been stated in its general outlines, and, by providing that the rules relating to this right are to be made by law, the personal data of individuals have been protected against arbitrary interference by public authorities. Indeed, in many judgments of the Constitutional Court the right to the protection of personal data has been relied on and this right has been assessed within the framework of fundamental rights and freedoms.

In a judgment of the Constitutional Court of 2 November 201672 it is stated: “The right to the protection of personal data, as a special form of the right to the protection of human dignity and to the free development of personality, aims to protect the rights and freedoms of the individual

during the processing of personal data.” Attention was thereby drawn to the concept of human dignity. For the concept of human dignity is related to human rights and is accepted as the foundation of human rights and as a universal intrinsic value that makes a human being human and distinguishes him from other living beings73. It was also underlined that restrictions may be imposed on the protection of personal data in certain cases, but that the restrictions imposed must comply with the safeguards laid down for restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms governed by Article 13 of the Constitution. In this way the restriction of the protection of personal data was made subject to the same criteria as the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms, and the right to the protection of personal data was referred to within the framework of fundamental rights and freedoms.

At this point I shall touch only on the provisions of the Constitution relating to the right to the protection of personal data; below, in the light of the judgments of the Constitutional Court, I shall address the protection of personal data, its relationship with respect for private life and the question whether it is one of the fundamental rights and freedoms and human rights, and shall examine the subject in detail within the framework of the Court’s opinion and approach.

2. The Law on the Protection of Personal Data

It is a known fact that today personal data are frequently used by both the private sector and the public sector, particularly through information systems. Although this use provides certain conveniences for individuals and for those offering goods and services, it also brings with it the risk that the information in question will be abused. Dangers are likely to arise such as the obtaining, use and disclosure of individuals’ data by unauthorised persons, or, where authority exists, the exceeding of that authority, or the continued use of an authority limited to a certain period even after that period has expired. Such uses constitute a violation of the right to the protection of personal data in particular, and of the other fundamental human rights, protected both in the international conventions to which we are a party and in the Constitution.

On the other hand, it must be accepted that in today’s world, which we also call the information age, no process, from health to law and from trade to all economic activities, can function without data. It has become virtually impossible to take a step without receiving, giving or processing data. It is not possible for health institutions to operate as they do today without keeping patient data, for an employer to recruit without receiving personal data in job applications, or, even where economic activities are carried on through legal persons, for those activities to continue without using data belonging to natural persons. While these examples could be multiplied, the basic conclusion we must reach here is that daily life cannot go on without personal data. For the keeping or processing of personal data is in the interest not only of the party processing the data but, in most cases, of the data subject as well. There is therefore no doubt that personal data have become a part of our lives and that the use of these data has become a necessity.

Since, in today’s conditions, there is no dispute as to the need to use personal data, the basic problem here is how and by what means this use is to take place. All these matters need to be determined: in which situations the interests of both the party processing the data and the data subject will be protected, in which cases the right of the data subject may not be restricted, whether exceptions to this right may be introduced and, if so, when and how. For this reason the necessity of keeping and processing personal data stands opposed to the data subject’s right to the protection of his personal data, and legislation on the subject has become imperative in order to strike a reasonable balance between these two interests.

In the process of the formation of data protection law in our country, the first and most important step was in fact taken with the “Law on the Protection of Personal Data” , which entered into force on 7 April 2016 as Law No. 6698. The need for the Law may, also on the basis of the text of the explanatory memorandum of the bill, be listed point by point as follows:

• the growing importance of the protection of personal data in parallel with the growth of awareness of the protection of human rights,

• the absence in our country of a special law regulating the field of the protection of personal data as a whole and of an effective supervisory mechanism,

• the hesitation experienced in determining when the acts in question are unlawful and when they are lawful, owing to the absence of a special law to match the offences laid down in Articles 135 et seq. of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK),

• enabling the negotiating chapters conducted in the process of full membership of the European Union to progress,

• the fact that, because there is no statutory regulation on personal data, a cooperation agreement cannot be concluded between EUROPOL, which puts into practice effective cooperation between police units, and the security units of Türkiye,

• the fact that, although large quantities of special categories of personal data are kept in health institutions, there is no legal basis for this,

• the problems experienced in data sharing with regard to foreigners living in Türkiye and Turkish citizens living abroad,

• Türkiye’s commitment in its 2003 National Programme to prepare a law on personal data,

• in the economic field, the inability to carry out the data transfers needed for foreign capital to invest in Türkiye and for these investments to be managed effectively,

• the fact that Türkiye is a party to many international instruments on the protection of personal data and is required to regulate this subject in its domestic law.

As can be seen, the fact that the data kept and processed in many different fields were not based on any law, that problems and uncertainties were experienced with regard to data sharing at international level, and that human rights were consequently at risk made it imperative to legislate in this field.

The Law on the Protection of Personal Data was drafted largely on the basis of Directive 95/46/EC, mentioned above, which the Member States of the European Union put into force in order to achieve harmonisation of legislation on the protection of personal data. At the same time, the Law, which entered into force with the aim of protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons, above all respect for private life, in the processing of personal data and of regulating the obligations of natural and legal persons who process personal data and the procedures and principles they must comply with, is extremely important in that it has filled the legislative gap in question.

Although its explanatory memorandum states that unauthorised use will constitute a violation of fundamental rights and underlines that this field has developed in parallel with the protection of human rights and that the aim is to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons, the fact that the text of the Law makes no mention of a separate right to the protection of personal data also raises certain questions. For the impression may arise that the protection of personal data is not an independent right but provides indirect protection for securing fundamental rights and freedoms. Yet, in order for this right to be guaranteed more effectively, it ought to be expressly regulated as a right separate from rights that at bottom aim at similar legal protection, such as respect for private life, the inviolability of the home and the confidentiality of communications, and to be counted among the fundamental rights and freedoms of the person.

III. The Debate on Whether the Right to the Protection of Personal Data Is a Human Right in the Light of International Instruments and Domestic Legislation

A. The Concept of Human Rights

According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which constitutes the first and most comprehensive instrument for the protection of human rights at international level, human rights are the rights which every human being possesses from birth, without regard to race, sex, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion or any other status. These rights encompass a large number of rights and freedoms, such as the right to life and to travel, the right not to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment, freedom of opinion and thought, and the right to work and to receive education. Everyone is entitled to enjoy these rights and freedoms without discrimination74.

There are various provisions and decisions which form the foundation of human rights and provide guidance as to what we should understand by human rights. At this point it is necessary to mention the right to develop one’s material and spiritual existence, which is regarded as the first and most important constitutional provision. According to Article 5 of the Constitution, entitled “fundamental aims and duties of the State”, providing the conditions required for the development of the human being’s material and spiritual existence is among these aims and duties. In the Constitutional Court’s judgment on the subject of 3/10/2013, E. 2012/103, K. 2013/105, it was stated that the protection and development of the person’s material and spiritual existence is not only a right that must be respected but also an obligation that must be given effect through positive action by the State, and that the Constitution accepts as a legal presumption not the restriction but the realisation of the right in question.

The fact that all rights and freedoms are, at root, directed at strengthening the person’s material and spiritual existence ensures that this right occupies the highest rung of human rights. For the right to strengthen one’s material and spiritual existence constitutes the raison d’être of all other human rights.

The yardstick for the development of the person’s material and spiritual existence, in turn, is human dignity. The reason for this is that, for a human being to protect and develop his personality, he must be able to exist in a manner worthy of human dignity75. There is no settled and agreed definition of the concept of human dignity. Nor, indeed, is it possible to fit it into a particular definition and to determine its scope by drawing its boundaries clearly. According to the Constitutional Court, human dignity denotes the recognition of and respect for the value that a human being acquires by the mere fact of being human, whatever his situation and whatever the circumstances. It is a line of conduct such that treatment falling below it strips the human being subjected to it of his humanity76.

Article 1 of the Federal German Constitution, which is based on the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, provides that human dignity is inviolable and that to respect

and protect it is the duty of the State; Article 2 provides that everyone has the right to develop his personality in so far as he does not harm the rights of others. According to the Federal German Constitutional Court, human dignity encompasses the human being’s value as a person and his independence77.

Thus both the Turkish Constitution and the Federal German Constitution accept that the development and protection of the person’s material and spiritual rights can be achieved through respect for human dignity. Indeed, in a judgment of the Federal German Constitutional Court it was stated that the constitutional basis of the right to informational self-determination is tied to the free development of personality and to human dignity.

For human dignity to be secured and protected, fundamental human rights are in turn indispensable. Only the protection of human rights makes a dignified life possible. Accordingly, the rights which derive from the person’s physical and mental existence and which he possesses from birth by the mere fact of being human are called human rights. Since everyone possesses them irrespective of religion, language or race, it is a very broad concept. The term human rights essentially embodies an ideal. That is, it expresses not what is in this field but what ought to be78. It may thus be said that human rights do not mean only the rights recognised by the legal order. All the rights that must be granted to the human being in order to secure and protect the principle of respect for human dignity must be counted as fundamental human rights. On the other hand, the concept of fundamental rights and freedoms must also be mentioned. In determining human rights, the rules of positive law are not as important as they are in other legal disciplines. Whereas all the rights that must be granted to the human being by the mere fact of being human may be counted within this scope, the part that is protected by legal norms is called fundamental rights and freedoms. For, although generally used synonymously, the term fundamental rights and freedoms is used as the equivalent of public liberties and denotes the part of human rights that has been recognised by positive law.

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), drawn up with the aim of the universal recognition and protection of human rights, contains the provisions affording the most comprehensive protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. As regards the importance and binding force of the Convention for the member countries, there are judgments of the European Court of Human Rights to the effect that the rights laid down in the Convention must be incorporated into the domestic law of the countries. Nevertheless, when a national court examines the facts or applies the laws, the countries’ own domestic law must be taken as the basis so long as the rights and freedoms protected by the ECHR are not violated79.

B. The Place of the Right to the Protection of Personal Data among Human Rights

After the explanations as to what the concepts of human rights, fundamental rights and freedoms and personal data denote, it must be considered whether personal data can be assessed within the framework of human rights.

First of all, I should reiterate that personal data, just like human rights, denote every kind of information / data which a human being possesses by virtue of being human and which is capable of identifying him. The existence of personal data therefore runs parallel to human rights. For although the greatest factor in bringing personal data onto the agenda has been the ease with which, as technology has developed, personal data can be obtained in digital environments, it is by no means necessary for such data to be recorded in an information system in order to be able to speak of personal data. It follows as a natural consequence that, in every period in which human beings have existed, there have also been data pertaining to them. Indeed, in a decision of 26 May 201580, the 10th Chamber of the Council of State underlined that the subject of the protection of personal data has changed in parallel with the concept of human rights and with the developments that have taken place in the field of the protection of human rights, and thus assessed the concepts of personal data and human rights in terms of their historical development.

Looking at the international and national instruments on the subject, it may be said that work in this field began many years ago. Although in the early period the matter was mostly regulated under the headings “respect for private life” or “respect for private and family life”, which are counted among the fundamental rights and freedoms of the person, it can be seen that the most recent instruments have moved somewhat further away from this approach and that considerable progress has been made in this respect. Moreover, this point concerns the debate as to whether the right to the protection of personal data is a right distinct from the other rights to which it is related. For even though the relevant legislation regulates the right to request the protection of personal data within the scope of the right to respect for private life, this does not prevent the right in question from being regarded as a human right.

The fact that organisations such as the OECD, the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union – whose basic aim is to develop awareness of human rights, to promote the securing of fundamental rights and freedoms and to ensure that citizens benefit from these rights – have included the right to the protection of personal data in their instruments

strengthens the view that this right is regarded as a human right. Furthermore, although these organisations have regulated the protection of personal data under the right to respect for private life, their decisions on the subject have made it clear that the concept of private life must not be interpreted narrowly and that personal data, too, are among the fundamental rights which a person possesses and which must be protected.

In addition, the fact that the subject found a place in the Constitution of our country, under the heading of fundamental rights and freedoms, through an amendment made in 2010 in fact puts an end to the debate as to whether the right to the protection of personal data is a fundamental right.

I take the view that what should be understood by the protection of personal data is the protection of the data subject’s fundamental rights and freedoms by means of the protection of the data. For the emergence of the right in question is itself based on the State’s power of surveillance and supervision and on the need, in the face of technological developments, to prevent the violations that may arise in this respect. Data security is therefore in fact the indirect aim. What is essential is to prevent the data belonging to the individual from being stored, processed or transferred in a manner that would constitute a violation of that person’s fundamental rights and freedoms.

Although the fact that the relevant legislation does not separately mention the right to the protection of personal data is liable to create the impression that personal data need to be protected only in order to secure fundamental rights and freedoms, the protection of personal data should be regarded as a fundamental human right in its own right. The reason is that acts such as keeping, processing or transferring a person’s data against his will, or without his knowledge or consent, prevent that person from developing his material and spiritual personality, impair his ability to live in a manner compatible with his personality and with human dignity, and thus damage fundamental human rights.

In order to put an end to the debates as to whether the right to the protection of personal data is an independent right and whether it can be regarded as falling within human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms, this point needs to be clarified. Although I am of the opinion, on the basis of the constitutional provisions, the law and the relevant regulations and of the nature of the right, that it is a human right in its own right, it would be useful for this to be stated expressly. For, were such clarity to exist, the right to the protection of personal data would indisputably be able to benefit from the safeguards laid down by the instruments and organisations, both national and international, that act with the basic aim of protecting human rights. In conclusion, I consider that the protection of personal data is both a human right from the standpoint of supranational law and, from the standpoint of national law, a fundamental right and freedom regulated by a constitutional norm and by law, and that this point should be clarified by the relevant instruments and case law81.

IV. The Right to the Protection of Personal Data in the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights

I have set out above the provision relevant to our subject in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which bears the heading of respect for private and family life. That article provides for respect for a person’s private life, family life, home and correspondence and, by stating in addition that any interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right must be in accordance with the law, seeks to prevent arbitrary restrictions by administrative authorities.

Although the Convention essentially enshrines the right to respect for a person’s private life and does not directly place personal data under protection, I should point out that the article in question is of importance for data protection law. For there is no doubt that the concept of private life referred to here does not relate solely to those data of a person that are private and that he wishes to conceal from third parties. A person must have the right not to want data that belong to him, that are not secret and in whose protection he has an interest – or indeed even where he has no such interest – to be kept, shared or transferred.

Indeed, we see that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which was established to ensure the protection of the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and which provides an important supervisory mechanism, refers to personal data, and protects such data, on the basis of that article.

Since the 1980s, as applications on the subject have also increased, the Court has brought the right to the protection of personal data within the scope of the guarantees protected by the ECHR. This is highly significant. First of all, because personal data are not only a matter of human rights in themselves but are also closely related to many other fundamental rights and freedoms, it can be seen that many national and international texts and instruments on the subject refer to the case law of the ECtHR. In this respect, the fact that the subject has come before the Court, and that the Court, having concluded that it has a power of review over the subject, has decided such cases within the framework of the Convention, contributes to the development of this field. Moreover, the fact that the ECHR, which is regarded as the most comprehensive instrument in the field of human rights and which provides for the most effective supervisory mechanisms, has brought the protection of personal data

within its scope offers guidance for determining the legal nature of this right.

On the other hand, this situation is of importance principally for States that are not members of the European Union but are parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. Since the Court’s judgments are binding on the States Parties to the Convention, these countries are obliged to comply with the judgments delivered by the Court even though they are not members of the Union. Türkiye is an example: although it is not a member of the European Union, it is one of the parties to the Convention. Bearing in mind Article 90(5) of the Constitution of Türkiye, which provides that international agreements duly put into effect have the force of law, it is possible to say that the Convention has the force of law and that, where it conflicts with national laws, the provisions of the Convention will be applied. The Convention thus has the force of law and, in some cases, even ranks above the law. Accordingly, the judgments of the ECtHR, which is charged with reviewing whether the Convention is properly applied, are important for countries in Türkiye’s position82.

A. The Scope of the Concept of Private Life Referred to in Article 8 of the Convention

In various judgments the Court has stated that the concept of private life is not limited solely to a person’s private sphere or to information of a secret nature, thereby seeking to prevent the scope of private life from being construed narrowly.

In “Niemietz v. Germany”83, in which it refrained from defining the concept of private life, the Court took the view that it is neither possible nor necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of “private life”. It nevertheless stated that it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an “inner circle” in which the individual may live his own private life as he chooses and to exclude from it entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle, and that the right to private life must also comprise, to a certain degree, the establishment and maintenance of relationships with other human beings. Accordingly, private life must comprise, for example, “the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings”84, as the ECtHR expressly states85.

In similar cases dealing with the scope of private life, the Court has likewise continued to refrain from giving a clear and precise definition of private life. In “Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom” it stated that the concept of private life is too broad to be explained in a detailed and precise manner. While the Court prefers to make an assessment specific to the particular case, there is no doubt, as is apparent from its various judgments, that it regards private life as a concept broader than privacy, encompassing a sphere, connected also with the outside world, within which every individual can freely form and develop his personality86.

As is apparent from these judgments of the Court, private life should not be understood as meaning only a person’s privacy and inner circle, and the concept must be interpreted broadly. A wide area relating to the person, including the relationships he establishes in the outside world, can be assessed under the heading of private life. Since personal data need not relate to a person’s private life, one might think at first sight that they do not fall within this article; in the light of these judgments, however, it can be seen that the Court’s approach is that the protection of personal data may also fall within its scope.

Examples of judgments that help to determine what the Court includes within the scope of the concept of private life are as follows:

A person’s name: The case of “Burghartz v. Switzerland”, which came before the Court, concerns a husband’s use of his wife’s surname. In the judgment of 22 February 1994 the Court, proceeding from the fact that a name identifies a person and enables a link to be established with his family, concluded that it is a part of private life.

In “Stjerna v. Finland”, a case on a similar subject, the applicant complained that he was unable to change his surname. The Court stated that a surname is a means used to distinguish individuals from others and to express their attachment to a family, and that this matter falls within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention87. These judgments were also cited in “Güzel Erdagöz v. Türkiye”, a case in which Türkiye was the respondent, where it was stated that there is no doubt that a case concerning a person’s name is to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention.

A person’s ethnic identity: Article 8 of the Convention protects both a person’s ethnic identity and the way of life and lifestyle of persons, even where they

belong to a minority. In “Aksu v. Türkiye” the Court accepted that an individual’s ethnic identity constitutes an aspect of the physical and social identity pertaining to that person’s private life. Similarly, in “Mihai Ciubotaru v. Moldova”, where the applicant complained of the refusal of his request to change his ethnic identity, the Court held that Article 8 of the Convention had been violated because the principle of personal autonomy had been disregarded. In this case the Court characterised a Gypsy’s use of his caravan as an integral part of his way of life and ethnic identity.

A person’s gender identity/sexual life: Data concerning a person’s gender identity are undoubtedly data relating to private life, whether or not the person wishes to conceal them. The best-known example on the subject is the case of “Van Kück v. Germany”. In that judgment, which concerned gender reassignment, the Court underlined that the concept of private life protects, alongside a person’s gender identity and sexual life, the development of relationships established with other human beings, and that within the framework of personal autonomy a person has the freedom to define himself as male or female, and thus counted a person’s sexual life as falling within Article 888. A person’s photographs and images: Although the Court initially regarded only photographs published in the press as falling within Article 8, the notion of the disclosure of images was subsequently broadened and this perception changed. In “Von Hannover v. Germany”, which concerned the publication of photographs in the press, the Court noted that the concept of private life covers aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person’s name and photograph. The most striking of its later judgments is the case of “Reklos v. Greece”89. The facts of the case concern the taking of photographs of a newborn baby by a professional photographer engaged by the clinic in which the baby was born. Stating that a person’s image reveals his unique characteristics, the Court held that the mere taking of a person’s images without consent, irrespective of whether they are disseminated or printed, constitutes a violation of Article 8. More generally, the example of Reklos v. Greece emphasises that the right to privacy may be infringed by a failure to respect the individual’s subjective wishes concerning his image. In Reklos, although the right to control one’s image is most often exercised in relation to the publication of the image itself, it “also covers the individual’s right to object to the recording, conservation and reproduction of the image by another person”90, as the Court accepted91.

Personal data: Personal data that are collected, kept and processed, in particular by the State in the course of public activities, are among the most important matters falling within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention. The most illuminating example given by the Court on the subject is the judgment in “Rotaru v. Romania”92, in which the applicant alleged that the Romanian Intelligence Service held information about him that was, in particular, demeaning. As in “Niemietz v. Germany”, the Court sought to delineate the boundaries of the concept of private life and noted that establishing and developing relationships with other human beings forms part of private life. It also counted a person’s professional activities and socio-economic situation as falling within private life.

The Court found that, even where the information in question is not private, its systematic collection and storage by a public authority amounts to an interference within the meaning of Article 8 of the ECHR. In Rotaru v. Romania, intelligence files were kept by the Romanian Intelligence Service on a lawyer, relating to information about membership of a legionnaire movement and the publication of anti-government pamphlets. The Court held that even public information falls within the scope of private life where it is systematically collected and stored in files held by the authorities93. It rejected the argument that the applicant had waived his anonymity by engaging in the reported activities94.

The real significance of the judgment, however, lies in its clarification of the status of data collected by the State. The Court stated, first, that a power exercised in secret by the executive is contrary to the rule of law and entails a high risk of leading to arbitrary practices95, and that for this reason the manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on the authorities must be clearly set out and procedures affording the individual the necessary protection must be laid down.

It is highly significant that, by this judgment, the Court made clear that the collection and processing of persons’ data concerns their private life, irrespective of whether or not they are aware of it. For no distinction was drawn in respect of data kept in files by the competent authorities either; it was concluded that these, too, relate to the person’s private life. This holds all the more true where the information relates to the person’s past. Indeed, the judgment noted that there were data concerning the applicant’s life and criminal record which had been collected 50 years earlier,

and the systematic collection and storage of these data by the State was likewise found to be relevant to Article 8.

Another important aspect of this judgment is that it states that, in order to strengthen the internal management and security of data, the only persons authorised to access the relevant file and data should be persons who have been authorised solely for a specific unit and specially trained in the handling of personal data, and that they must be authorised to access the relevant database96. In addition to the examples set out above, the ECtHR has decided many other disputes concerning personal data by linking them to Article 8 of the Convention. These judgments are important for determining which personal data the Court protects. For, since no express right to the protection of personal data has been laid down, it is not clear which personal data will be protected under the Convention.

The best example showing that a person’s fingerprints and DNA profiles are protected is the judgment in “S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom”97. The facts of the case concern the taking of fingerprints and DNA samples from the applicants, S. and Michael Marper, in the course of an investigation, and the continued retention of these data after the investigation had ended.

The applicants requested the erasure of these data, but the data were not erased on the ground that, under national law, they could be retained indefinitely. Although the Court accepted that the collection and retention of these data prevent the commission of crime, it considered this to be disproportionate having regard to the legal interest infringed. It was held that cellular samples and DNA information provide information both about the person himself and about his relatives, and that this interference with health data, which are sensitive data, therefore violated Article 8 of the Convention. Accordingly, in order to avoid the indiscriminate storage of personal data in State databases, the person’s age and time-limits on storage must be taken into consideration98. The Court did, however, note in the Marper judgment that the relevant national law ensured that, following a police investigation, an individual’s samples and fingerprints could not be used by any person except for purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of a prosecution. In this context the Court reiterated that there must be minimum safeguards concerning, among other matters, duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for the destruction of data, so as to provide sufficient guarantees against abuse and arbitrariness99.

Furthermore, in the Marper judgment the Court assessed whether the continued retention of the fingerprint and DNA information, in respect of which the legitimate aim of the detection and prevention of crime was at issue, was necessary in a democratic society100. The Court censured the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the police power to retain fingerprints and DNA information, and the fact that retention could take place irrespective of the nature or gravity of the offence with which the accused was charged. It was further emphasised that the grounds for retention put forward by the police were not subject to independent review and that acquitted persons did not have sufficient opportunity to have the data removed from the national database and destroyed101. In some cases, fingerprints taken by public authorities for a legitimate purpose have not been found to be unlawful. In “McVeigh, O’Neill and Evans v. the United Kingdom”, in response to the allegation of a violation of the right to private life made by applicants whose fingerprints had been taken in the context of the investigation of a terrorist offence, the Court considered the interference to be necessary in the public interest. It held that this interference struck a reasonable balance, that more serious consequences might otherwise have ensued, and that the activities of collecting and retaining data were therefore based on legitimate aims. In “Murray v. the United Kingdom”, which likewise concerned the collection of personal information on account of a terrorist offence, the Court put forward similar reasoning. As a result of these judgments, it may be said that interferences with personal data in the context of terrorist activities are generally regarded as legitimate and necessary. Nevertheless, in the specific cases which the Court accepted as legitimate, it examined whether sufficient measures had been taken to prevent abuse of the existing provisions of national legislation. Where such measures existed, the interferences were found to be compatible with the Convention.

Similarly, the judgment in “M.S. v. Sweden”, in which a person’s medical data were considered to fall within private life, concerns the transfer, without her knowledge, of the health data of Ms M.S., who worked as a teacher, from one public body to another. The Court characterised the applicant’s data obtained during her medical examination as highly personal and sensitive, and underlined that there is no doubt that these data relate to the person’s

private life. It was further concluded that, even if the records of data of this kind are kept confidential, a transfer made without the person’s knowledge, as in the present case, amounts to disclosure, and that the right to respect for private life had therefore been violated.

In the case of “Chave née Jullien v. France”, which concerned a person’s health data, the applicant’s psychiatric treatment records continued to be kept after the treatment had ended. In this decision the Court rejected the applicant’s claim on the grounds that, although the keeping of the person’s data constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life, this interference was based on legitimate aims such as the effective running of the public service and the protection of health, and that the records were moreover kept confidential, so that the interference in question was proportionate. Interferences with health data, owing to the sensitivity of these data and to the ease and frequency with which they are violated, have been the subject of cases before the ECtHR in many different factual situations. The applications generally arise from the keeping or processing of individuals’ health data without consent, their continued retention after treatment has ended and, in particular, the transfer and disclosure of these data to other institutions and bodies, including public authorities. The Court has without hesitation characterised a person’s health data as personal data, has brought them within the scope of private life and has sought to ensure that they benefit from this protection. Indeed, almost all of the disputes on the subject have ended with a finding that the interferences with these data constituted a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The only exception has arisen where the interference was carried out with the aim of preventing more serious consequences. Moreover, this exception has also found its place in all national legislation on personal data. The ECtHR has also considered the monitoring, recording and retention of personal data relating to telephone conversations to fall within private life. In “Malone v. the United Kingdom”102, the applicant’s telephone conversations were monitored at the request of the police on the basis of consent given by the Home Office. The Court concluded that data relating to communications fall within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention and was firmly of the view that there had been an interference with the right to respect for private life103. It was held that, because the power of the public authorities to monitor telephone conversations had not been regulated by law but had been provided for by administrative means, the interference was unlawful and the right had been violated. This judgment is important in that, where a violation of the protection of personal data is at issue, the ECtHR – even though this is not expressly mentioned in the relevant article – regards it as a right “of fundamental importance” within the framework of respect for the privacy of private life and examines this right under Article 8104.

Even where records of persons’ telephone conversations are monitored by public institutions and bodies for the purpose of preventing the commission of an offence or proving an offence that has been committed, this has mostly been regarded as a violation of the right to respect for private life. Thus, in the case of “P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom”, the police, having received a report of a robbery, installed a covert listening device in the suspects’ home. The persons apprehended for the offence of attempted theft were identified by means of the voices in the telephone conversations picked up by the listening device. On account of the capacity of a person’s voice to render him identifiable, the Court considered the recording of data relating to it to fall within private life, found in favour of the applicants in the case and held that Article 8 had been violated. It is highly significant that the judgment refers to the capacity of the tone of voice to render a person identifiable. For the Court chose to determine the scope of private life by using the established definition of personal data. Thus unlawful interferences with data that enable persons to be identified will also be contrary to the relevant article of the Convention.

There is also the judgment in “Vetter v. France”, in which the Court similarly held that persons’ voices are personal data and that, for this reason, the monitoring and recording of persons’ voices by means of listening devices gives rise to a violation of the right to respect for private life even where it is carried out in the context of an investigation.

Although the ECtHR has brought the monitoring of telephone conversations within the scope of personal data and has mostly protected it under Article 8 of the Convention, it has also delivered judgments to the opposite effect. In “Figueiredo Teixeira v. Andorra”, the tapping of the telephones of a person suspected of the offence of drug trafficking and the subsequent use of this evidence at trial were characterised by the Court as an interference that was necessary and proportionate to the gravity of the offence.

I noted above that the ECtHR has brought a person’s images and photographs within the scope of private life. However, the Court has not made it a condition, for reaching the conclusion that the Convention has been violated, that the photographs and images at issue relate to the person’s private and secret world. It has been stated that situations such as the taking or keeping of a person’s images without his consent, the carrying out of these activities in secret, or

the transfer of the images taken to third parties without the person’s knowledge likewise belong to the person’s private life.

In “Vukota-Bojić v. Switzerland”, which arose when the applicant, following a road traffic accident, applied to the insurer with a request for a disability pension, the insurance company hired a private detective, obtained images of the applicant and used them against the applicant in the compensation proceedings. The fact that the Court considered these images to fall within the person’s private life even though they had been taken in a public place makes it clear that there is no requirement that the images be secret. The criterion applied here is not that the data are secret or private, but that they are collected systematically for specific purposes. The Court, which also found the national legislation inadequate in the circumstances of the case, concluded that images obtained in this way constituted an unjustified interference with the person’s private life.

Another case concerning a person’s images is “Peck v. the United Kingdom”105. In that case a camera (CCTV) installed in the street recorded images of the applicant, and the moments at which he cut his wrist were also captured in this footage. In addition, these images of the applicant were given to the media. The ECtHR, stating first of all that private life is a concept too broad to be confined within a limited definition, rightly maintained its case law of refraining from giving a precise definition of the concept. For giving a clear and definite definition of private life does not broaden the scope of protection of this right; on the contrary, it narrows it. In the judgment the Court stated that an individual’s name, sexual identity and the right to personal development and identity are personal spheres protected under Article 8, and thus, rather than defining the concept, chose to give examples that would help to determine its scope.

The disclosure of the applicant’s images without his consent was characterised as a disproportionate interference with private life. For there was no reason capable of justifying this disclosure and, since methods such as masking were not used at the time the images were handed over, sufficient safeguards were not provided either. Accordingly, in the present case, although they did not belong to the person’s private and secret life, the recording of images of him and their disclosure without any purpose and without safeguards was regarded as a violation of the right to respect for private life. In this judgment, too, it was stated that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance within the scope of the privacy of private life106.

Another matter accepted as personal data by the judgments of the ECtHR is the tracking of persons by means of GPS and the data relating thereto. The relevant case, “Uzun v. Germany”, concerns the surveillance by GPS of the applicant, who was suspected of being connected with a bomb attack, and the use of these data as evidence in the investigation conducted against him. The applicant alleged that his private life had been violated. The Court without hesitation included surveillance by GPS and the use and processing of the data obtained within the scope of private life, and accepted that the act carried out constituted an interference with this right. It nevertheless stated that the interference was based on the aims of ensuring public safety and preventing the commission of crime, and that legitimate aims therefore existed. It was held that, having regard also to the gravity of the suspected offence, the interference with the right to respect for private life was proportionate and that the Convention had therefore not been violated.

In the light of these judgments, which the European Court of Human Rights has linked to respect for private and family life, we see that the Court protects data such as a person’s name, ethnic origin and way of life/lifestyle, sexual identity, timbre of voice, telephone conversations, health data, and images and photographs under Article 8 of the Convention. Moreover, although the article in question bears the heading of respect for private and family life, this protection does not relate solely to those private and secret data which a person wishes to conceal from third parties. This shows that the right to the protection of personal data, which differs from the right to respect for private life in that the data need not be secret, is also protected under this heading. For what is to be understood by the concept of private life has not been precisely determined either, and it has been emphatically underlined in many judgments that such a determination is neither possible nor necessary. The point that is accepted beyond doubt and agreed upon in all of the Court’s judgments is that the concept of private life referred to in Article 8 of the Convention must be interpreted broadly.

Essentially from the 1980s onwards, by the judgments it has delivered in specific cases concerning personal data, the Court has linked almost all disputes concerning personal data to Article 8 of the Convention and has thus protected the right to the protection of personal data by means of the right to respect for private and family life. The reason for this is the increase in violations affecting personal data and the proliferation of the methods of violation. With the growing number of violations, great dangers arose for individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms and, although the Convention makes no express mention of the right to the protection of personal data, personal data have, through the case law of the ECtHR, taken their place among the values protected by the Convention.

B. The Requirement That Interference with the Right to the Protection of Personal Data Be Based on a Statutory Provision

Article 8(2) of the Convention regulates the conditions under which a public authority may interfere with personal data and lays down the requirement that the interference be in accordance with the law. It follows that, when public authorities interfere with citizens’ data, the interference must be based on a statutory provision that has been laid down in advance in clear and precise terms. Otherwise, whatever the reason for it, the interference in question will be unlawful.

The first point to be clarified here concerns what is meant by an interference that is in accordance with the law. This is important, because it leads to an interference with fundamental human rights being regarded as justified, and it must be determined with precision. For if human rights could be interfered with without any requirement that the interference be in accordance with the law, this would give rise to dangers for individuals, since it could lead in particular to arbitrary practices on the part of public authorities. Consequently, although human rights may be interfered with in various respects, such interferences must be carried out in conformity with conditions laid down in advance.

An interference in accordance with the law means that the acts and measures restricting fundamental rights and freedoms have a basis in the legal order and that their conditions have been determined in advance. Laws by which rights and freedoms are restricted must be clear, precise and incapable of being extended by interpretation. Moreover, in addition to how and by whom such a restriction may be carried out, the supervision and oversight to be exercised over the bodies carrying out the interferences in question, and the avenues of objection or complaint open to the individuals subjected to those interferences, must also be clearly determined.

Thus, in “Andersson v. Sweden”, which concerned a psychiatrist’s notifying the social services, as required by Swedish law, that a patient posed a danger to the patient’s child, the ECtHR stated that laws providing for interference with fundamental rights and freedoms must contain safeguards against arbitrary practices by public authorities.

The Court explained in detail, in “Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom”, the notion that interferences with fundamental rights must be prescribed by law. The subject of the case, which is unrelated to personal data, is the granting of an injunction restraining the publication of an article which the Sunday Times newspaper wished to publish while judicial proceedings were pending, on the ground that it would constitute contempt of court. In its judgment the Court examined in detail, under a separate heading, whether the interference was prescribed by law and defined this notion. In this context it took the concept of foreseeability as its basis107. Accordingly, the word law in the expression prescribed by law denotes not only statutory provisions but also unwritten law. The point to be borne in mind here, however, is that this understanding must apply in particular to countries that have a common law system.

The Court stated that the expression prescribed by law entails two requirements, namely that the law must be adequately accessible and must be formulated with sufficient clarity. Accordingly, citizens must be able to have adequate information as to the existence of the statutory provision providing for the interference, and that provision must be as clear as possible. Hence, in order to be able to say that an interference is prescribed by law, the conditions of “easy accessibility” and “foreseeability” must be satisfied.

In “Taylor-Sabori v. the United Kingdom”, decided by the Court on 22 October 2002, the applicant, who was accused of illicitly procuring a drug subject to authorisation, alleged that his right to respect for his private life had been violated after the messages sent to him had been intercepted by the police by cloning his pager. The Court found in favour of the applicant, on the ground that at the time of the events there was no legislation regulating the interception of pager messages sent via a private telecommunications system, and held that the relevant article of the Convention had been violated.

In the Court’s similar judgment of 22 December 2005 in “Wisse v. France”, two applicants, who had been placed in pre-trial detention on suspicion of having committed the offence of armed robbery, complained of an interference with their private and family life on account of the fact that their conversations with their relatives during visits in the visiting areas of the prisons had been listened to pursuant to an authorisation issued by a judge. Noting that French law did not provide sufficient clarity as to how the authorities were empowered to interfere with the private lives of detained persons, or as to the scope and manner of exercise of their discretion in this regard, the Court held that Article 8 of the Convention had been violated, thereby stressing the importance of interferences being regulated comprehensively and clearly by law.

Another important judgment delivered on this subject is “Amann v. Switzerland”108. In the case giving rise to that judgment, a telephone conversation between the applicant, Mr Amann, and a woman who worked at the Soviet Embassy was intercepted by the public prosecutor’s office, and an investigation was subsequently opened in respect of him. In addition, on the basis of the telephone conversations intercepted by the intelligence service,

information cards on him were kept in the list of “persons posing a risk to national security”. The applicant, who later learned of the cards kept on him, asked for these cards to be given to him as well, but some parts of the photocopy handed to him had been blacked out. Although the applicant thereupon requested that the cards be erased, the data concerning him were not erased, it being maintained that they were being kept on security grounds. As a last resort, Amann applied to the ECtHR, alleging that the right to respect for private life had been violated because personal data concerning him had been kept unlawfully and a card on him had been drawn up by the public prosecutor’s office, and further that his right to communication had been impeded by the tapping of her telephone. Having concluded on examination that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights, the Court went on to require, in order for that interference to be regarded as lawful, that the conditions set out in Article 8(2) of the Convention be met, namely that the interference be based on law and that it pursue the aims specified in that paragraph109. However, noting that Swiss law was vague as to the authorities’ discretion in this field, it found that the interference was not in accordance with the law and ruled in favour of the applicant. The requirement that interference with the right to the protection of personal data be based on a statutory provision has been established very clearly by the case law of the ECtHR. It is particularly important that what is to be understood by this expression, and what matters it encompasses, have been determined. On the basis of all these judgments, the stages followed by the Court under Article 8 of the Convention in deciding to uphold or reject an applicant’s complaint are as follows:

• The Court establishes whether the subject matter of the complaint is among the interests protected by Article 8 and decides whether that article is applicable to the case. If the protected legal interest cannot be regarded as falling within respect for private and family life, the examination under this article comes to an end. If, on the other hand, the article is found to be applicable, the examination continues:

• It must examine whether the facts of the case amount to a violation of Article 8. If it is found that the act or measure does not violate Article 8 of the Convention, the application is rejected; if, however, it is concluded that there has been an interference, a final examination is required in order to reach a decision:

• This time the examination will proceed under Article 8(2) of the Convention. If the restriction effected by the act or measure at issue satisfies the conditions set out in that paragraph, namely

1. that the interference is in accordance with the law, 2. that the interference pursues a legitimate aim (national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the country, the maintenance of order, the prevention of crime, the protection of health or morals or of the rights and freedoms of others),

3. that the interference is necessary in a democratic society, it is found that the Convention has not been violated and the application is rejected. In the absence of the conditions specified, on the other hand, the conclusion reached is that the relevant provision of the Convention has been violated.

C. On the Unlawful Storage, Use and Disclosure of Personal Data

The European Court of Human Rights has delivered many judgments in which it has examined acts such as the unlawful keeping or use of personal data under Article 8 of the Convention and has found that these acts give rise to a violation of that article. This is highly significant in that it makes clear that not only data relating to private life but also personal data fall within the scope of protection of the article.

One of the Court’s most important judgments on the subject is “Perry v. the United Kingdom” of 17 July 2003110, which concerns the filming of the applicant and the use of the footage in the proceedings conducted against him. In that case the applicant was detained on the ground that he was connected with a robbery; although he was subsequently released in order to take part in an identification procedure, he did not attend it. The applicant thereupon alleged that a fundamental right of his had been violated by the police, who had covertly filmed him and used the footage at trial. The ECtHR found that the use of the camera by the police went beyond its normal or expected use. Accordingly, the Court held that Article 8 of the ECHR had been violated, since the footage had not been obtained voluntarily or in circumstances in which it could reasonably be anticipated that the recordings would be made for identification purposes. Similarly, in the case of Peck v. the United Kingdom the Court found that the release by a local authority, to national and local media, of CCTV camera footage showing the applicant in a local area constituted a violation of his right111. The Court found in favour of the applicant and held that the interference with personal data was not in accordance with the law. It was stated that the method in question went beyond the normal purpose of use and, on the grounds that when taking the footage the police had not obtained the

applicant’s consent, had not notified him and had not informed him of his rights in this respect, the judgment rightly addressed the need to obtain consent for the keeping of personal data and to inform the data subject.

There is also the Court’s judgment of 25 February 1997 in “Z. v. Finland”112, to the effect that the disclosure of health data, which are classed as sensitive data, constitutes an unlawful disclosure of personal data and hence a violation of the right to the protection of personal data. In the case giving rise to the judgment, the applicant Z, a Finnish national, was married to X; their marriage ended in 1995. At that time both were HIV carriers. X learned in 1992 that he was HIV-positive, but after that date committed various sexual offences. The identity of the applicant, who was infected with HIV, and the information about her illness were disclosed, in a manner accessible to the press, in the criminal proceedings conducted against her husband for the offences of rape and attempted homicide. The applicant complained against the Finnish Government of this disclosure and of the termination of her employment contract.

Examining the complaint, the Court accepted beyond dispute that the acts complained of had infringed the applicant’s right to respect for her private life. It then proceeded to an examination under paragraph 2 of the relevant article. The Court emphasised that the matter was important because a person’s health data in particular must be respected, and because it concerns not only respect for a patient’s privacy but also the preservation of the patient’s general confidence in the medical profession and in the health services. It was further stated that the principle of respecting the confidentiality of health data is of vital importance in the legal systems of the States Parties to the Convention. For this reason the Court underlined that domestic law must afford adequate safeguards in order to prevent personal health data from being disclosed in a manner that would breach the protection afforded by Article 8 of the Convention. Ultimately it found in favour of the applicant and held that Article 8 of the Convention had definitely been violated113.

D. The Requirement That Interferences with the Right to the Protection of Personal Data Be Limited to a Legitimate Aim

The concept of legitimate aim is an indispensable element of the subject of personal data. Various pieces of legislation provide that any operation performed on personal data must, as a rule, be based on a legitimate aim. Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, too, refers to the necessity of the existence of a legitimate aim. According to that provision, the cases in which an interference with personal data is deemed to pursue a legitimate aim are defined as “a measure necessary in a democratic society for national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the country, the maintenance of order, the prevention of crime, or the protection of health or morals or of the rights and freedoms of others”.

The judgment of 6 September 1978 in “Klass and Others v. Germany”114, which is regarded as the first important judgment delivered by the Court concerning personal data, is highly significant in this respect. The subject of the case is a legislative amendment made by Germany in 1968. That law made it possible, under certain conditions, for communications by post and telecommunications to be secretly intercepted without any obligation to notify the person concerned. The applicants lodged a petition with the European Commission of Human Rights on the ground that the law in question was contrary to various provisions of the Convention, including Article 8.

The Court stated first of all that there was no doubt or dispute that the provision permitting the surveillance of communications data without notification of the persons concerned restricted the right to respect for private and family life, and that the real issue to be resolved therefore lay in Article 8(2) of the Convention. It was thus accepted that the law at issue, which provided for the collection of communications data without the consent of the persons concerned, constituted an interference with the person’s right, and the Court turned to examining whether this interference was legitimate.

As a result of the examination carried out as to the legitimacy of the interference, it was stated that Article 8(2), which sets out the exceptions to a right guaranteed by the Convention, must be interpreted narrowly, and that the power of secret surveillance of citizens, which is a characteristic of the police State, can thus be tolerated under the Convention only in so far as it is necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions115. The Court also underlined that interferences with these rights of individuals must be subject to effective supervision and that not every ground will suffice to justify such interferences116.

Another of the important judgments delivered by the Court on the subject is the case of “Leander v. Sweden” of 26 March 1987. In that case, the State

authorities gathered information about Leander’s private life by drawing on a secret data bank kept by the security officers and, using this information, rejected the job application which Leander had made to the Naval Museum. Leander, who was given no reason other than the negative outcome of the security check, was afforded no right of reply to the check and was given no right to have any error corrected, applied to the ECtHR117; the Court, although declaring that the acts carried out by way of storing and releasing the data concerning the person infringed the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention, stated that there were legitimate reasons justifying this infringement. In conclusion, it was held that the article in question had not been violated, on the grounds that the acts had been carried out in conformity with the law governing the matter and that the interference was one that was necessary in a democratic society for the purpose of protecting national security118.

Thus, although it was stated that the infringement had legitimate grounds, acts such as obtaining, storing and releasing information about a person, which in essence run counter to the right to the protection of personal data, were also examined under Article 8 of the Convention. Although this is an important judgment for establishing that the acts of storing and releasing personal data come within the protection of the Convention article, I do not consider correct the finding that the article was not violated. For even though data concerning a person may be stored by State authorities on grounds of national security, such grounds should not be sufficient for the processing of data in every case. In this sense, the exceptions set out in paragraph 2 of the article, being open to abuse, must be interpreted narrowly and must be a course resorted to only where interference has become imperative for safeguarding national security. The aspect of this judgment – in which, I believe, its early date and the fact that many instruments on the subject had not yet been adopted played a part – that ought to be important for us is that, since the 1980s, the right to the protection of personal data has also been examined under Article 8 of the Convention. Following this judgment, the judgment delivered on 7 July 1989 in “Gaskin v. the United Kingdom”119 showed that the Court had reached a more advanced level on this subject. In that case, which considered the positive obligation of the State, the applicant had been cared for by different families in the period until he came of age and asked the competent authorities to give him his foster-care records, such as by whom he had been cared for and where he had lived. The applicant’s request was refused on the ground that, under national law, the records in question had to be kept confidential, and the relevant reports were not given to him. The Court, however, stated that the principle of non-access to the State’s records will vary according to the nature and type of the information recorded. It held that the files requested by the applicant formed part of his personal sphere, since a person has a right of access to information about his childhood and development, and that the failure to give him the documents relating to his personal sphere was contrary to Article 8 of the Convention; and it stated that, although the confidentiality of public records is necessary, the applicant had a vital interest in obtaining access to the information about his own childhood120.

This judgment is highly significant because it makes clear that not every activity of public bodies has to be regarded as falling within the exceptions set out in Article 8(2) of the Convention. For although public safety may render various interferences with personal data lawful, the Court, with good reason, did not accept the explanation that the documents had to be confidential, because the interest of the individual seeking access to his personal data was the weightier one.

The judgment of 6 June 2006 in “Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden” may be cited as an example of the restriction of personal data for a legitimate aim. In that case the applicants complained that they had not been informed about the personal data concerning them kept by the Swedish police. The Court, however, stated that Article 8 of the Convention had not been violated, because these data were kept in the context of national security and the fight against terrorism and the records in question were based on information received to the effect that an attack would be carried out. It was further concluded that the national interests relating to national security and the fight against terrorism prevailed over the applicants’ interests in having access to the full extent of the information kept about them in the Security Police files.

By this judgment the Court underlined that the data subject does not have an unlimited, absolute right over his data. The reasoning of the judgment states that, although a person has the right to the protection of his personal data, this right has certain limits, that an interference on account of the country’s national security and interests falls within those limits, and that the interference was based on a legitimate aim. This is unavoidable in today’s world. For in the modern social order the collection or storage of personal data is indispensable if the State is to be able to fulfil the obligations arising from the reasons for its very existence, such as those in the military, commercial and security fields. For this reason, the limitation by various criteria of the right to the protection of personal data, like other fundamental rights and freedoms, is both

unavoidable and necessary. However, because the right in question encompasses every kind of information about an individual’s life, is a sensitive matter and is also open to abuse, these criteria for limitation must be carefully determined and laid down by law, and no situation should be created in which the right to the protection of personal data is restricted in the absence of a legitimate aim.

V. The Right to the Protection of Personal Data in the Judgments of the Constitutional Court

I have set out in detail above that, as personal data became over time a right requiring protection, and because their violation can have grave consequences for individuals, Türkiye too felt the need to legislate in this field; that an attempt was made to meet this need by the 2010 constitutional amendment; and that the right to the protection of personal data enjoys a constitutional guarantee. The right to the protection of personal data, which was placed under constitutional protection by its addition to Article 20 of the Constitution through the 2010 amendment, has also been the subject of judgments of the Constitutional Court, which reviews the conformity of laws, of all other legal provisions and of acts and measures with the provisions of the Constitution and whose decisions are final. For with this protection the way was opened for applications to the Constitutional Court against statutory provisions, acts and measures and any kind of regulation alleged to violate the right to the protection of personal data. From this standpoint, given the importance of the right to the protection of personal data, which signifies individuals having a say over the future of their data, it is highly significant and beneficial that it has been placed under the protection of the Constitution.

A. The Scope of the Concept of Private Life Referred to in Article 20 of the Constitution

The right to respect for and protection of private life accounts for a large share of the applications lodged with the Constitutional Court and is of great importance among them. The reason for this is both that the right is of great importance in every area of life and that it is mostly connected with other fundamental rights and freedoms. For the concept of private life is encountered in every area of life, and even where the principal alleged violation in a given case is based on another right, it is largely to be expected that that right will affect the protection of private life. In many of the cases before it the Court has addressed the concept of private life and has sought to define what exactly this concept means or may mean.

One of the most important judgments in which the Constitutional Court sought to explain the concept of private life is the “Serap Tortuk Application” of 21 January 2015121. The applicant was working at GATA as a nurse with the status of civilian civil servant when a disciplinary investigation was opened against her, following a report that a sexually explicit image alleged to be of the applicant had appeared on a user account opened in her name on a social networking site. At the end of the investigation the penalty of dismissal from the civil service was imposed on the applicant. The applicant argued that the sexually explicit images alleged to be of her were not of her but that, even on the assumption that they were, she had been punished for an act that had taken place within the sphere of private life and had neither occurred in the course of her duties nor been connected with them. She further maintained that it was not known how and by whom these images had been taken and that images of her obtained without her consent and knowledge constituted unlawfully obtained evidence, and on that basis claimed that her right to respect for and protection of private life had been violated.

Faced with these facts, the Court first observed that one of the legal interests protected under Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 20 of the Constitution is the “right to privacy”. It stated that the right to privacy does not consist merely of the right to be let alone, but also encompasses the individual’s legal interest in being able to control information about himself. It concluded that the individual has an interest in ensuring that any information concerning him is not disclosed or disseminated without his consent, cannot be accessed by others and cannot be used without his consent, and thus that this information remains private; and that this points to the individual’s right to informational self-determination.

Viewed from this angle, the Court interpreted private life as a conceptual and physical space in which individuals can, first and foremost, develop their own individuality and enter into the most intimate relationships with other persons. This sphere of privacy, for its part, constitutes a private sphere with which the State may interfere only for legitimate aims and only to a minimal degree. This private sphere may, however, extend into the public sphere, and wide-ranging protection may be required in order to protect the individual’s privacy. At this point the Court, referring also to the case law of the ECtHR, underlined that private life cannot be reduced to the right to privacy. Accordingly, many legal interests compatible with the free development of personality must be regarded as falling within the scope of this right and must be protected122.

In this judgment of the Court, in which it sought to explain the concept of private life and which concerns the matters that should be included within the scope of that concept,

the first point that attracts attention is that the Constitutional Court, just like the ECtHR, refrained from giving a direct definition of private life. The main reason for this is that it is very difficult to define private life. The fact that the concept both denotes a very wide area and is subjective in nature has made it impossible to determine its scope with clear and definite lines. Another reason is the possibility that giving a particular definition might entail various drawbacks. If the sphere of private life were squeezed into a particular mould, other legal interests that fall outside the sphere so defined, yet are indispensable for securing the person’s right to respect for and protection of private life or in which the person has an interest in that regard, might find no protection. Such a danger runs counter to the basic aim underlying the protection of a person’s fundamental rights and freedoms. Accordingly, in the case law it has developed the Constitutional Court, too, has consistently refrained from giving a full definition of the concept; indeed, it has expressly stated that it is not possible to give such a definition.

On the other hand, leaving the concept entirely undefined on the ground that it cannot be defined is not the right approach either. For this reason the Court, through the judgments and reasoning it has delivered in the specific cases brought before it, has sought to clarify the concept by laying down auxiliary criteria as to the scope of private life. Alongside a person’s intimate sphere, such as the right to privacy123, family life124, the freedom and secrecy of communication125 and the inviolability of the home126, data such as professional activities127, image and sound recordings128 and a person’s name129 have also been counted as falling within Article 20 of the Constitution. Thus, according to the Court, not only the data relating to a person’s secret world but also personal data outside it benefit from constitutional protection.

B. On the Right to the Protection of Personal Data Protected by Article 20(3) of the Constitution and Its Scope

Having touched upon the scope of the concept of private life in the light of the judgments of the Constitutional Court, it is necessary, in order to understand the relationship of personal data with the right to respect for private life and with other fundamental rights and freedoms, also to explain and understand the Court’s definition of personal data and its approach to the right to the protection of personal data.

In this context, the judgment of 9 April 2014, in which the Court gave detailed explanations concerning personal data following recourse to the objection procedure by the Plenary Session of the Administrative Law Chambers of the Council of State, is of importance130. The subject of the judgment is Article 51 of the Electronic Communications Law No. 5809. The judgment also has an aspect which establishes that provisions concerning personal data must be made by law. At this point, however, the Court’s explanations concerning the concept of personal data will be addressed, and the other aspect of the judgment will be dealt with in the section below.

The Court stated that personal data denote all information relating to a person, provided that the person is identified or identifiable, and that in this context, in addition to identity information such as a person’s name and date of birth, all data that render the person directly or indirectly identifiable, from hobbies to preferences, fall within this scope. It thus did not, in essence, depart from the established definition of personal data. The fact that the judgment lists examples of what may constitute personal data has also been helpful in determining the scope of the concept. Indeed, the examples listed there were used verbatim in defining personal data in the explanatory memorandum of Law No. 6698.

As for the right to the protection of personal data, it was stated that, as a special form of the protection of a person’s human dignity and of the right freely to develop one’s personality, it aims to protect the individual’s rights and freedoms during the processing of personal data. As I explained in detail above with regard to human rights, human rights manifest themselves in human dignity and in a person’s development of his material and spiritual existence. Human rights comprise the fundamental rights which a human being must have in order to protect his dignity and to be able freely to develop his personality. By stating in its judgment that the right to the protection of personal data is a special form of these two rights, the Court in essence indicated that the right to the protection of personal data has its place among human rights.

The Court stated that, as a result of developments in information technologies, many acts that were not possible by traditional methods have become capable of being carried out on personal data and personal data have acquired the character of a valuable asset for businesses, and that, on account of factors such as the resulting increase in risks and the increase in the activities of terrorist and criminal organisations directed at personal data, the protection of personal data at the highest level has become imperative. Today personal data have become the greatest means of economic gain, and a point has been reached at which trade can virtually no longer be conducted without personal data. For this reason commercial undertakings need large quantities of data and, by taking advantage of the conveniences afforded by

technology, are able to obtain these data with ease and to carry out on them any act they wish. In such a situation it is not possible to speak of individuals being able to develop their own personality in a manner befitting human dignity. There is, moreover, a danger that many legal interests protected by other fundamental rights and freedoms will also be indirectly infringed. In the face of these dangers, reference was made to the necessity of protecting personal data at the highest level. The right to the protection of personal data was thus linked to human rights and to fundamental rights and freedoms and placed under constitutional guarantee.

C. On the Requirement That the Right to the Protection of Personal Data Be Regulated by Law

According to the last sentence of paragraph 3, which was added in 2010 to Article 20 of the Constitution, headed respect for and protection of private life: “The principles and procedures relating to the protection of personal data shall be regulated by law.” The right to the protection of personal data must therefore, as a matter of principle, be regulated comprehensively by Law. On the other hand, while the framework is drawn by the Law, it is of course possible for matters not determined in the Law to be determined, provided that this is not contrary to the Law, by other legal instruments to be issued by the competent institution or body. Indeed, following Law No. 6698, numerous Regulations are being published as envisaged by the Law.

As regards the requirement that the subject be regulated by law, there is the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 10 January 2013, delivered in an action for annulment brought by members of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye131. The subject of the judgment is the provision of the relevant decree having the force of law (KHK) by which the institutions and bodies specified were empowered to request, from all public institutions and bodies and from other natural and legal persons, any information they deem necessary in connection with their duties. The members of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM), maintaining that the power conferred in relation to the protection of personal data was contrary to the Constitution, applied for its annulment.

The Court, having concluded that the rule in question was contrary to Article 91 of the Constitution, upheld the request for annulment. Under Article 91 of the Constitution, entitled “Authorisation to issue decrees having the force of law”, it is not possible, without prejudice to martial law and states of emergency, for the fundamental rights, individual rights and duties contained in the first and second chapters of Part Two of the Constitution, and the political rights and duties contained in the fourth chapter, to be regulated by decrees having the force of law.

By the Court’s annulment, as contrary to Article 91 of the Constitution, of the provision in question, which had not been provided for by Law but had been introduced by a KHK and contained a new rule concerning the protection of personal data, it was made clear that the right to the protection of personal data is one of the fundamental rights of the person.

After the requirement that provisions concerning the right to the protection of personal data be made by Law, it is necessary to address the manner in which interferences with and restrictions on this right must be carried out. Whether the right to the protection of personal data benefits from the provisions on the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms is of great importance in determining the nature of the right to the protection of personal data.

On this subject it is necessary to consider the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 28.9.2017, E. 2016/125, K. 2017/143, delivered on an application for annulment lodged with the Constitutional Court by certain members of the TBMM, who alleged that various provisions of Law No. 6698 were unlawful and requested the annulment of those provisions. By the application lodged with the Court, the annulment of various provisions and phrases of Law No. 6698 was sought on the ground that they were contrary to the Constitution.

The Constitutional Court stated that there was no doubt that some of the provisions and phrases whose annulment was sought imposed a restriction on the right to the protection of personal data, and it reviewed whether this restriction was lawful in the light of Article 13 of the Constitution, entitled “restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms”. It held that there is no unconstitutionality where the restriction in question is not contrary to what is specified in Article 13, namely the letter and spirit of the Constitution, the requirements of the democratic order of society and of the secular Republic, and the principle of proportionality132.

It is highly significant that the Court’s judgment states that interferences with the right to the protection of personal data may be carried out only in accordance with the article of the Constitution that lays down the criteria to be used in restricting fundamental rights and freedoms. For the fact that the right to the protection of personal data benefits from the high-level safeguards afforded by Article 13 clearly means that this right is counted among the fundamental rights and freedoms. In essence, this judgment, which was recently delivered by the Court, is capable of putting an end to the debates about the nature of the right.

Conclusion

The concept of personal data, which encompasses every kind of data pertaining to a person, has in essence existed ever since human beings came into existence; yet the operations and acts carried out on such data were not seen as an area in particular need of protection. With technological developments, however, in the digital world in which we live it has become very easy to commit acts such as unlawfully obtaining, storing, collecting or transferring personal data or, even where they have been lawfully obtained, using them to the detriment of the data subject, and this has given rise to great dangers for data subjects. These dangers, particularly together with concrete events such as the Census judgment which I explained in detail above, have caused individuals, too, to become concerned about the future of their own personal data. It was thus realised that unlawful acts can be carried out on personal data, in particular by taking advantage of the conveniences afforded by technological developments, and that individuals can be victimised in this way and many legal interests relating to their fundamental rights and freedoms can be harmed. This awareness led to personal data being seen as an area requiring protection.

As individuals began to feel concern about acts that might be carried out unlawfully on their personal data without their knowledge, will or consent, various international organisations began work with the aim of eliminating the dangers that had emerged. This work intensified particularly in Europe, where technology was more advanced and the legal system was also well established, and the first legal instruments were adopted in the European Union and in the national legislation of European countries. Thereafter work on the subject began in other countries as well and spread to all the countries of the world. This became indispensable for the continuation of every kind of vital activity, from economic and social activities to everyday ones. This necessity became even clearer particularly after instruments such as the GDPR, which extend geographical boundaries in terms of who is bound by the obligations imposed. As far as our country is concerned, although the problems and dangers in question emerged a long time ago, the importance of the subject has begun to be understood in recent years with the entry into force of Law No. 6698.

We see that international and national documents whose principal aim is to create awareness of human rights and to secure the fundamental rights and freedoms of the person also include the right to the protection of personal data. This right has either been regulated as an independent right in its own right or been counted under fundamental rights and freedoms that are aimed at a similar legal interest, such as the right to respect for private life. This prompts us to question the relationship between the protection of personal data and fundamental rights and freedoms, and the extent of that relationship.

The fact that personal data cover every kind of information pertaining to the individual, and that the right to the protection of personal data springs from a philosophy similar to that of various fundamental human rights, goes to prove that personal data are indisputably closely related to fundamental rights and freedoms. The real point of debate here is whether or not the right to the protection of personal data should be recognised as an independent right. All fundamental rights and freedoms resemble one another in terms of their point of departure and the ultimate aim sought to be achieved by placing these rights under protection. I regard the view that, on the basis of this resemblance alone, personal data should be regulated as a dependent right under the heading of the right to respect for private life as a traditional way of thinking. Although the relationship at issue is one in which the two are difficult to separate from each other, I consider that, having regard to the basic objective of the protection of personal data, this right should, without denying its connection with other fundamental rights and freedoms, be recognised as an independent right, so that effective protection can be secured and the necessary and sufficient safeguards established for individuals. Indeed, we see that this perception has recently begun to take hold and that many instruments regulate the right to the protection of personal data separately from rights such as respect for private and family life and the secrecy of communication.

That said, although there are efforts towards the recognition of the right to the protection of personal data as a fundamental human right, this needs to be clarified definitively. When it is borne in mind that the right to the protection of personal data is regulated in the Constitution of our country under the heading of the rights and duties of the individual, that the procedures and principles relating to the subject must be regulated by law, and that the right may be restricted only in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 13 of the Constitution, entitled “restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms”, the approach taken to the right in question is in fact already clearly apparent. I nevertheless consider that it would be useful, from the standpoint of the international instruments to which we are party, for this point to be stated expressly in the Constitution and the relevant legislation.

A similar situation exists in the European Convention on Human Rights, which is regarded as one of the most comprehensive instruments in the field of human rights. Although the right to the protection of personal data is not specifically regulated, it emerges from the judgments delivered by the European Court of Human Rights, the body responsible for applying the Convention. As I examined in detail above, in the judgments it has delivered on acts such as the unlawful retention, storage and disclosure of personal data, the Court, relying on Article 8 of the Convention, took the view that the acts in question were contrary to the Convention within the framework of fundamental rights and freedoms. Moreover, it is also clearly apparent from the Court’s judgments on the need for interference with the right to the protection of personal data to be regulated by law

and on the requirement that restrictions be based on a legitimate criterion that the right to the protection of personal data is regarded as falling within human rights.

The main conclusions reached in this study may be summarised as follows:

• Since personal data consist of information that belongs to a human being and identifies him, they have in fact existed of themselves since the beginning of humankind; yet they were not seen as a legal sphere, a legal interest, requiring protection.

• With the development of information technologies, the spread of the internet and, in particular, the increase in opportunities for exchanging information brought about by the development of communication networks, individuals came to face the danger, and to feel the concern, that information belonging to them might fall into the hands of third parties having no connection with or interest in that information and might be processed by those third parties, lawfully or unlawfully.

• Countries thus felt the need to regulate the protection of personal data as a right and sought to provide safeguards by law.

• Although this need first emerged in Europe in the 1970s, it has now spread throughout the world.

• At the international level, work on adopting and developing legal instruments on the subject has continued from the 1980s to the present day.

• The latest step in the instruments adopted at the international level is the GDPR, which was drawn up because Directive 95/46/EC had become inadequate to meet current needs and which is expected to enter into force on 25 May 2018.

• With the GDPR, the field of personal data has been drawn more broadly than under the previous instruments and the activities to be carried out on such data have been made subject to stricter conditions.

• Heavier sanctions are provided for breaches of the provisions of the GDPR than under Directive 95/46/EC.

• As regards national law, although Türkiye became a party to the international conventions on the subject, subsequently made the matter subject to sanctions through the provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) and then placed it under constitutional guarantee by an amendment to the Constitution, it was late in bringing into force Law No. 6698, which is the special law on the protection of personal data.

• Nevertheless, I regard the entry into force of the Law, late though it was, and the subsequent efforts to make the subject understood by means of legal instruments such as regulations, decisions or communiqués as positive developments

• Because personal data are closely connected with many other fundamental rights and freedoms, above all respect for and protection of private life, there is debate as to whether their protection constitutes an independent right. Although at first sight personal data appear capable of being considered within the concept of private life, I believe that these two rights have in time become separate from one another, because the principles of respect for private life were unable to eliminate the dangers of developing technology, and that an independent and separate right called the right to the protection of personal data has come into being.

• There are two different views on the fundamental interest underlying the protection of personal data: that it rests on an economic right and that it rests on a human right. Identifying the fundamental interest is important for the question whether personal data can be considered within human rights. Since I believe that what should be understood by the protection of personal data is the protection of the data subject’s fundamental rights and freedoms by means of the protection of the data, my view is that the right to the protection of personal data is one of the fundamental human rights.

• The ECtHR examines concrete cases concerning personal data under Article 8 of the Convention. It refrains from defining the concept of private life and, although the literal meaning of the term might suggest a sphere relating to a person’s secret life, the sphere of private life is seen to be construed very broadly.

• Although the fact that the Court deals with the matter under Article 8 creates the impression that the right to the protection of personal data is regarded as a right falling under respect for private life, we see that, in its assessments of concrete cases, the Court accords personal data a place of their own.

• It has been stated that personal data denote a sphere separate from the concept of private life, and that interferences with such data must be made by law, provided that they are made for a legitimate aim.

• The Court has considered the unlawful storage, use and disclosure of personal data to be a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

• In the judgments of the Constitutional Court, for their part, it is clearly seen that, as I have explained above in detail and with reasons, the right to the protection of personal data is considered within the scope of human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms.

The importance of the right to the protection of personal data is being better understood with each passing day, both in our country and internationally. Particularly today, when the personal data of individuals are, mostly on account of technological tools, so widely exposed

and open to malicious use by third parties, personal data have rightly become a field in which legal protection of the highest level must be provided. All countries of the world feel the need to adopt new rules, and the aim is to update the existing rules in parallel with the development of information technologies and to make them capable of meeting present needs. In order to give individuals sufficient safeguards with regard to their personal data, it is essential that an effective protection mechanism be ensured for those data. The best way to achieve this is to determine the nature of the right to the protection of personal data clearly by dealing with it within the scope of human rights, which enjoy the highest level of protection in international law as well. Indeed, I am convinced that in the near future the right to the protection of personal data will not only be regulated, indisputably, as a separate right, but will also be dealt with in the context of human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms.

REFERENCES

• Akgül, Aydın, Danıştay ve AİHM Kararları Işığında Kişisel Verilerin Korunması, Beta Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2014.

• Akgül, Aydın, “Kişisel Verilerin Korunmasında Yeni Bir Hak: “Unutulma Hakkı” ve AB Adalet Divanı’nın Google Kararı”, TBB Dergisi, Sayı: 116, 2016, s. 11 – 38.

• Akıncı, Ayşe Nur, “Avrupa Birliği Genel Veri Koruma Tüzüğü’nün Getirdiği Yenilikler ve Türk Hukuku Bakımından Değerlendirilmesi” , Çalışma Raporu No. 6, Kalkınma Bakanlığı Bilgi Toplu Dairesi Başkanlığı Yayını, Haziran 2017, s. 1 – 41.

• Arslan, Kahan Onur, “İnsan Onuru ve Koruma Tedbirleri Bağlamında Temel Bir İlke Olarak İnsan Onurunun Korunması”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, Sayı: 120, 2015, s. 155 – 172.

• Atak, Songül, “Avrupa Konseyi’nin Kişisel Veriler Açısından Sağladığı Temel Güvenceler”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, Sayı: 87, 2010, s. 90 – 120.

• Aydın, Erdem, “Hekimin Sır Saklama ve İhbar Yükümlülüğü”, Katkı Pediatri Dergisi, 2002, Cilt: 22, Sayı: 3, s. 302 – 311.

• Aydın, Sedat Erdem, AİHM İçtihatları Bağlamında Kişisel Verilerin Kaydedilmesi Suçu, On İki Levha Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2015.

• Azurmendi, Ana, “Spain; The Right to Be Forgotten The Right to Privacy and the Initiative: Facing the New Challenges of the Information Society”, Privacy, Data Protection and Cybersecurity in Europe, Ed.: Wolf J. Schünemann, Max-Otto Baumann, Springer, Cham, 2017, s. 17 – 30.

• Boehm, Franziska, “Information Sharing in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice—Towards a Common Standard for Data Exchange Between Agencies and EU Information Systems”, European Data Protection: In Good Health?, Ed.: Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes, Paul De Hert, Yves Poullet, Springer, Heidelberg, 2012, s. 143 – 183.

• Çelik, Yeşim, “Özel Hayatın. Gizliliğinin Yansıması Olarak Kişisel Verilerin Korunması ve Bu Bağlamda Unutulma Hakkı”, TAAD, Yıl: 8, Sayı: 32, Ekim 2017, s. 387 – 406.

• Dutertre, Gilles, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Kararlarından Örnekler, Avrupa Konseyi Yayınları, Almanya, 2003.

• Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Kanunu’nun Konu Edildiği İptal Davası Kararına İlişkin Bir Değerlendirme”, www.academia.edu, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.05.2018).

• Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Kanunu ve Türk Ceza Kanunu Bağlamında Kişisel Verilerin Ceza Normlarıyla Korunması”, İstanbul Medipol Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 3, Sayı: 2, Güz 2016, s. 101 – 167.

• Dülger, Murat Volkan, Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku, 6. Baskı, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2015.

• González Fuster, Gloria, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU, Law, Governance and Technology Series Vol.: 16, Springer, Switzerland, 2014.

• Gören, Zafer, “Türk Alman Hukukunda Kişiliğin Korunması”, Anayasa Dergisi, Sayı: 9, 1992, s. 165 – 184.

• Gözler, Kemal, Anayasa Hukukuna Giriş, Ekin Kitabevi Yayınları, Bursa, 2004.

• Gümüş, Ali Tarık, “Türk Anayasasında Kişinin Maddi ve Manevi Varlığını Koruma Geliştirme Hakkı”, Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 13, Sayı: 2, 2005,

s. 133 – 172.

• Gürsel, İlke, İşçinin Kişisel Verilerinin Korunması Hakkı, Adalet Yayınevi, 2016.

• Hornung, Gerrit; Ralf Bendrath; Andreas Pfitzmann, “Surveillance in Germany: Strategies and Counterstrategies”, Data Protection in a Profiled World, Ed.: Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul De Hert, Springer, Heidelberg, 2010, s. 139 – 156.

• Kılınç, Ümit, “İsim ve Soyisim Hakkının Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Kapsamında Korunması”, TBB Dergisi, Sayı: 89, 2010, s. 242 – 276.

• Kilkelly, Ursula, Özel Hayata ve Aile Hayatına Saygı Gösterilmesi Hakkı, İnsan Hakları El Kitapları No:1, Almanya, 2001.

• Kolenoğlu, Mustafa, “Sağlık Mesleği Mensuplarının Sır Saklama ve Suçu Bildirme Yükümlülüğü”, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi, İstanbul, 2009, s. 1 – 74.

• Korkmaz, İbrahim, Kişisel Verilerin Ceza Hukuku Kapsamında Korunması, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2017.

• Kuner, Christopher, European Data Protection Law: Corporate Compliance and Regulation, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

• Küzeci, Elif, “İstatistiki Birimler ve Bilgilerin Geleceğini Belirleme Hakkı”, İnsan Hakları Yıllığı, Cilt: 32, 2014, s. 53 – 75.

• Küzeci, Elif, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması, Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara, 2010, s. 60.

• Lambert, Paul B., Understanding the New European Data Protection Rules, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2018, s. 89 – 94.

• Lynskey, Orla, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015.

• Nardell, Gordon, “Levelling up: Data Privacy and the European Court of Human Rights”, Data Protection in a Profiled World, Ed.: Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul De Hert, Spirnger, Heidelberg, 2010, s. 43 – 52.

• Markou, Christiana, “The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: Ten Reasons Why It Should Be Forgotten”, Reforming European Data Protection Law, Ed.: Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes, Paul de Hert, Law, Governance and Technology Series Issues in Privacy and Data Protection Vol. 20, Springer, Heidelberg, 2015, s. 203 – 226.

• Mayer-Schönberger, Viktor, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age, Princeton University Press, Princeton – Oxford, 2009.

• Özman, M. Aydoğan, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Divanı’nın 1978 Yılında Verdiği Kararlar”, Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 35, Sayı: 1, 1978 s. 195 – 218.

• Poullet, Yves, “About the E-Privacy Directive: Towards a Third Generation of Data Protection Legislation?”, Data Protection in a Profiled World, Ed.: Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul De Hert, Spirnger, Heidelberg, 2010, s. 3 – 29.

• Plagemann, Gottfried, “Alman Hukukunda Gizli Soruşturmacının Kullanılması ve Gizli Soruşturmacının Yetkileri”, CHKD, Cilt: 2, Sayı: 1 – 2, 2014, s. 157 – 187.

• Roagna, Ivana, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Kapsamında Özel Hayata ve Aile Hayatına Saygı Gösterilmesi Hakkının Korunması, Avrupa Konseyi İnsan Hakları El Kitapları, Avrupa Konseyi Yayını, Strazburg, 2012.

• Rodota, Stefano, “Data Protection as a Fundamental Right”, Reinventing Data Protection?, Ed.: Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul De Hert, Cécile de Terwangne, Sjaak Nouwt, Springer, Heidelberg, 2009, s. 77 – 82.

• Sabuncu, Yavuz, “Alman Anayasa Yargısında Geçici Tedbir Kararı”, Amme İdaresi Dergisi, s. 76 – 86.

• Salihpaşaoğlu, Yaşar, “Özel Hayatın Kapsamı: Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi İçtihatları Işığında Bir Değerlendirme”, Gazi Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 17, Sayı: 3, 2013, s. 227 – 266.

• Uyar, Lema, Birleşmiş Milletler’de İnsan Hakları Yorumu, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2016.

• Weber, Rolf H.; Dominic Staiger, Transatlantic Data Protection in Practice, Springer, Zurich, 2017.

• Van der Sloot, Bart, “Legal Fundamentalism: Is Data Protection Really a Fundamental Right?”, Data Protection and Privacy: (In)visibilities and Infrastructures, Ed.: Ronald Leenes, Rosamunde van Brakel, Serge Gutwirth, Paul De Hert, Law, Governance and Technology Series, Issues in Privacy and Data Protection, Vol. 36, Springer, Cham, 2017, s. 3 – 29.

• Voigt, Paul; Axel von dem Bussche, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Practical Guide, Springer, Switzerland, 2017.

• Yılmaz, Sabire Sanem, “Tıp Alanında Kişisel Verilerin Hukuka Aykırı Olarak Verilmesinin Ceza Hukuku Açısından Değerlendirilmesi (Sır Saklama Yükümlülüğü Kapsamında)”, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi, İstanbul, 2014, s. 1 – 126.

ABSTRACT

The subject of this article is the protection of personal data in the context of human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms. To this end, the concept of personal data and the international and national instruments on the subject are first explained and the scope of the right to the protection of personal data is determined. Thereafter, the limits of human rights and of fundamental rights and freedoms are explained and the place of personal data within, in particular, respect for and protection of private life and the other fundamental rights is identified. An attempt is thus made to resolve the question whether the right to the protection of personal data is an independent right. In this context, the relevant judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and of the Constitutional Court are explained and their approaches to the subject are assessed. In conclusion, an attempt is made to determine, in the light of the judgments of the ECtHR and the Constitutional Court, the place of the right to the protection of personal data among the other fundamental rights and freedoms, above all respect for and protection of private life.

Keywords: personal data, human rights, fundamental rights and freedoms, protection of personal data, privacy of personal data.

Footnotes

  1. Date of submission of the article: 13.05.2018. Date of acceptance of the article: 28.05.2018.
  2. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Contact: volkan.dulger@dulger.av.tr.
  3. Sabire Sanem Yılmaz, “Tıp Alanında Kişisel Verilerin Hukuka Aykırı Olarak Verilmesinin Ceza Hukuku Açısından Değerlendirilmesi (Sır Saklama Yükümlülüğü Kapsamında)”, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi, İstanbul, 2014, s. 6; Erdem Aydın, “Hekimin Sır Saklama ve İhbar Yükümlülüğü”, Katkı Pediatri Dergisi, Cilt: 22, Sayı: 3, 2002, s. 302; Mustafa Kolenoğlu, “Sağlık Mesleği Mensuplarının Sır Saklama ve Suçu Bildirme Yükümlülüğü”, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi, İstanbul, 2009, s. 17. ↑
  4. Aydın Akgül, Danıştay ve AİHM Kararları Işığında Kişisel Verilerin Korunması, Beta Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2014, s. 33. ↑
  5. Murat Volkan Dülger, “Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Kanunu ve Türk Ceza Kanunu Bağlamında Kişisel Verilerin Ceza Normlarıyla Korunması”, İstanbul Medipol Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 3, Sayı: 2, Güz 2016, s. 101 – 167. ↑
  6. For information on the general framework of the protection of personal data in the USA see: Rolf H. Weber, Dominic Staiger, Transatlantic Data Protection in Practice, Springer, Zurich, 2017, s. 39 – 54. ↑
  7. İbrahim Korkmaz, Kişisel Verilerin Ceza Hukuku Kapsamında Korunması, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2017, s. 78. ↑
  8. Elif Küzeci, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması, Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara, 2010, s. 64. ↑
  9. Küzeci, s. 67. ↑
  10. Korkmaz, s. 83. ↑
  11. Dülger, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması, s. 101 – 167. ↑
  12. Yeşim Çelik, “Özel Hayatın Gizliliğinin Yansıması Olarak Kişisel Verilerin Korunması ve Bu Bağlamda Unutulma Hakkı”, TAAD, Yıl: 8, Sayı: 32, Ekim 2017, s. 391. ↑
  13. For sample decisions see: Danıştay 12. Dairesi E. 2005/6811 K. 2006/1959 T. 15.5.2006; Hatay İdare Mahkemesi E.2009/915 K. 2010/803 T. 6.7.2010 ↑
  14. Dülger, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması, s. 101 – 167. ↑
  15. For sample decisions see: YCGK, E. 2012/12-514, K. 2014/312, T. 10/06/2014; YCGK, E. 2012/12-510, K. 2014/331, T. 17/06/2014. ↑
  16. For a detailed discussion of the nature of the right to the protection of personal data see: Bart van der Sloot, “Legal Fundamentalism: Is Data Protection Really a Fundamental Right?”, Data Protection and Privacy: (In)visibilities and Infrastructures, Ed.: Ronald Leenes, Rosamunde van Brakel, Serge Gutwirth, Paul De Hert, Law, Governance and Technology Series, Issues in Privacy and Data Protection, Vol.: 36, Springer, Cham, 2017, s. 3 – 29. ↑
  17. Stefano Rodota, “Data Protection as a Fundamental Right”, Reinventing Data Protection?, Ed.: Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul De Hert, C´ecile de Terwangne, Sjaak Nouwt, Springer, Heidelberg, 2009, s. 79. ↑
  18. Rodota, s. 79 – 80. ↑
  19. Rodota, s. 80. ↑
  20. Rodota, s. 77. ↑
  21. Elif Küzeci, “İstatistiki Birimler ve Bilgilerin Geleceğini Belirleme Hakkı”, İnsan Hakları Yıllığı, Cilt: 32, 2014, s. 53. ↑
  22. Yavuz Sabuncu, “Alman Anayasa Yargısında Geçici Tedbir Kararı”, Amme İdaresi Dergisi, s. 84 dn. 31. ↑
  23. Yves Poullet, “About the E-Privacy Directive: Towards a Third Generation of Data Protection Legislation?”, Data Protection in a Profiled World, Ed.: Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul De Hert, Spirnger, Heidelberg, 2010, s. 7, dn. 12. ↑
  24. Yavuz Sabuncu, s. 84 – 85. ↑
  25. Gottfried Plagemann, “Alman Hukukunda Gizli Soruşturmacının Kullanılması ve Gizli Soruşturmacının Yetkileri”, CHKD, Cilt: 2, Sayı: 1 – 2, 2014, s. 162. ↑
  26. Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU, Law, Governance and Technology Series Volume: 16, Springer, Switzerland, 2014, s. 176. ↑
  27. Gerrit Hornung, Ralf Bendrath, Andreas Pfitzmann, “Surveillance in Germany: Strategies and Counterstrategies”, Data Protection in a Profiled World, Ed.: Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul De Hert, Spirnger, Heidelberg, 2010, s. 143. ↑
  28. Paul B. Lambert, Understanding the New European Data Protection Rules, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2018, s. 101. ↑
  29. Rodota, s. 78. ↑
  30. Rodota, s. 78. ↑
  31. http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborder flowsofpersonaldata.htm, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.05.2018). ↑
  32. Sedat Erdem Aydın, AİHM İçtihatları Bağlamında Kişisel Verilerin Kaydedilmesi Suçu, On İki Levha Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2015, s. 26. ↑
  33. Lema Uyar, Birleşmiş Milletler’de İnsan Hakları Yorumu, İstanbul, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2016, s. 33. ↑
  34. Korkmaz, s. 141. ↑
  35. E. 2014/3950 K. 2015/2774. ↑
  36. E. 2014/2242 K. 2014/2242. ↑
  37. http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ddcafaac.pdf, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.05.2018) ↑
  38. http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/1/1-0966.pdf, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.05.2018). ↑
  39. Küzeci, s. 134. ↑
  40. Gordon Nardell, “Levelling up: Data Privacy and the European Court of Human Rights”, Data Protection in a Profiled World, Ed.: Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul De Hert, Springer, Heidelberg, 2010, s. 46. ↑
  41. For the development of personal data as a fundamental right and freedom in the EU and in the EU Member States see: González Fuster, s. 1 vd. ↑
  42. Christopher Kuner, European Data Protection Law: Corporate Compliance and Regulation, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, s. 20 – 21. ↑
  43. Paul Voigt, Axel von dem Bussche, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Practical Guide, Springer, Switzerland, 2017, s. 2. ↑
  44. Murat Volkan Dülger, “Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Kanunu’nun Konu Edildiği İptal Davası Kararına İlişkin Bir Değerlendirme”, www.academia.edu, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.05.2018). ↑
  45. İlke Gürsel, İşçinin Kişisel Verilerinin Korunması Hakkı, Adalet Yayınevi, 2016, s. 107 – 109. ↑
  46. Aydın Akgül, “Kişisel Verilerin Korunmasında Yeni Bir Hak: “Unutulma Hakkı” ve AB Adalet Divanı’nın “Google Kararı”“, TBB Dergisi, Sayı: 116, 2016, s. 30 – 31. ↑
  47. The Els Alfacs case of 2010. ↑
  48. Ana Azurmendi, “Spain; The Right to Be Forgotten The Right to Privacy and the Initiative: Facing the New Challenges of the Information Society”, Privacy, Data Protection and Cybersecurity in Europe, Ed.: Wolf J. Schünemann, Max-Otto Baumann, Springer, Cham, 2017, s. 22 – 23. ↑
  49. Christiana Markou, “The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: Ten Reasons Why It Should Be Forgotten”, Reforming European Data Protection Law, Ed.: Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes, Paul de Hert- Law, Governance and Technology Series Issues in Privacy and Data Protection Vol.: 20, Springer, Heidelberg, 2015, s. 203 – 226. For detailed information on the judgment and on its relevance to and impact on Spanish and EU law see: Azurmendi, s. 17 – 30. ↑
  50. Yargıtay Hukuk Genel Kurulu, E. 2014/4-56 K. 2015/1679. ↑
  51. For the “right to be forgotten” expressly regulated in the GDPR see: Lambert, s. 197 – 207. ↑
  52. The right to be forgotten is explained by reference to a woman named Stacy Snyder. Snyder, a young American woman, had her application for a degree in education refused because she had posted on the social media website MySpace a photograph of herself taken at a party, wearing a pirate hat and drinking alcohol. The photograph was discovered by the person who was her adviser and the dean of the faculty, and it was decided that Snyder could not serve as a teacher. In legal scholarship this story is frequently referred to with the words “the web never forgets” and is expressed as the “right to be forgotten”. See: Markou, s. 203 – 204. For the Snyder case, the development of the right to be forgotten and further examples of cases and decisions see: Viktor Mayer – Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age, Princeton University Press, Princeton – Oxford, 2009, s. 1 vd. ↑
  53. For the details of the news report see: https://terortakvimi.wordpress.com/2005/07/07/200/, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.05.2018). ↑
  54. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:P DF, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.05.2018). ↑
  55. Korkmaz, s. 204. ↑
  56. Ayşe Nur Akıncı, “Avrupa Birliği Genel Veri Koruma Tüzüğü’nün Getirdiği Yenilikler ve Türk Hukuku Bakımından Değerlendirilmesi”, Çalışma Raporu, No. 6, Kalkınma Bakanlığı Bilgi Toplu Dairesi Başkanlığı Yayını, Haziran 2017, s. 4 – 5. ↑
  57. For the reasons that gave rise to the drafting of the GDPR see: Lambert, s. 89 – 94. ↑
  58. Akıncı, s. 11. ↑
  59. For the full text of the judgment see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0362, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.05.2018). ↑
  60. For the history of the problems that have arisen between the USA and the European Union in the field of the processing and storage of personal data see: Lambert, s. 5 – 22. ↑
  61. Lambert, s. 365 – 368.
  62. For the full text of the judgment see: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document. jsf?text=&docid=150642& pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&c id=612496, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.05.2018). ↑
  63. Lambert, s. 484 – 485. ↑
  64. Lambert, s. 424 – 425. ↑
  65. https://www.eugdpr.org/eugdpr.org.html, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.05.2018). ↑
  66. Lambert, s. 101. ↑
  67. Voigt, von dem Bussche, s. 2. ↑
  68. Lambert, s. 165 – 167. ↑
  69. Lambert, s. 167. ↑
  70. Lambert, s. 251 – 261; Voigt, von dem Bussche, s. 210 – 211. 68 https://www.eugdpr.org/key-changes.html, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.05.2018). ↑
  71. This is one of the most important innovations introduced by the GDPR. Although the GDPR is an EU instrument, its territorial scope does not end at the borders of the EU Member States. In today’s global economy, marked by multinational companies and cross-border data transfers, the international perspective was taken into account in this respect when the GDPR was being drawn up. The international application of the Regulation guarantees that the privacy of individuals is comprehensively ensured and that commercial competition within the EU is fair. In addition, thanks to this feature of the GDPR, the phenomenon of choosing the competent court that is likely to deliver the most favourable decision in proceedings (forum shopping), which results from the existence of different standards in the field of the protection of personal data in the EU Member States, will also be prevented. Companies will thus also be prevented from choosing, depending on their business (among other factors), the country with the lowest level of national personal data protection rules. In this way, EU legislation provides for application in a particularly wide territorial area. From a territorial point of view, it draws no distinction between the controller and the processor and lays down the same rule of territorial application for both. In essence, the GDPR will apply in the following two situations: - the processing of personal data by a controller or processor located in the EU, or – the processing of the personal data of individuals who are in the EU by a controller or processor located outside the EU. Voigt, von dem Bussche, s. 22. ↑
  72. Lambert, s. 102 – 103. ↑
  73. E. 2015/61 K. 2016/172. ↑
  74. Kahan Onur Arslan, “İnsan Onuru ve Koruma Tedbirleri Bağlamında Temel Bir İlke Olarak İnsan Onurunun Korunması”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, Sayı: 120, 2015, s. 156 – 157. ↑
  75. International Human Rights Law, http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/humanrights/, (Erişim Tarihi: 02.05.2018). ↑
  76. Ali Tarık Gümüş, “Türk Anayasasında Kişinin Maddi ve Manevi Varlığını Koruma Geliştirme Hakkı”, Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 13, Sayı: 2, 2005, s. 139. ↑
  77. E. 1963/132, K. 1966/29. ↑
  78. Zafer Gören, “Türk Alman Hukukunda Kişiliğin Korunması”, Anayasa Dergisi, Sayı: 9, 1992, s. 167. ↑
  79. Kemal Gözler, Anayasa Hukukuna Giriş, Ekin Kitabevi Yayınları, Bursa, 2004, s. 146 – 147. ↑
  80. For sample judgments see: Waite ve Kennedy v. Almanya: Başvuru No: 26083/94, Karar Tarihi: 24/02/1997; Streletz, Kessler ve Krenz v. Almanya: Başvuru No: 34044/96, 35532/97, 44801/98, Karar Tarihi: 22/03/2001. ↑
  81. E. 2011/7001 K. 2015/2573. ↑
  82. Murat Volkan Dülger, Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku, 6. Baskı, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2015, s. 633. ↑
  83. Küzeci, s. 137. ↑
  84. Gilles Dutertre, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Kararlarından Örnekler, Avrupa Konseyi Yayınları, 2013 s. 201, 16 Aralık 1992 tarihli karar, Seri A No. 251-B, s. 33 – 34. ↑
  85. Niemietz v. Almanya (1992) 16 EHRR 97, para 29. ↑
  86. Orla Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, s. 106. ↑
  87. Ivana Roagna, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Kapsamında Özel Hayata ve Aile Hayatına Saygı Gösterilmesi Hakkının Korunması, Avrupa Konseyi İnsan Hakları El Kitapları, Avrupa Konseyi Yayını, Strazburg, 2012, s. 12. ↑
  88. Ümit Kılınç, “İsim ve Soyisim Hakkının Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Kapsamında Korunması”, TBB Dergisi, Sayı: 89, 2010, s. 253 – 254. ↑
  89. Yaşar Salihpaşaoğlu, “Özel Hayatın Kapsamı: Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi İçtihatları Işığında Bir Değerlendirme”, Gazi Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 17, Sayı: 3, 2013, s. 239. ↑
  90. Reklos v. Yunanistan (Başvuru No 1234/05) 15 Ocak 2009. ↑
  91. Reklos (n 97) para 40. ↑
  92. Lynskey, s. 108. ↑
  93. Rotaru v. Romanya (Başvuru No 28341/95) 4 Mayıs 2000. ↑
  94. Rotaru (n 99) para 43 – 44. ↑
  95. Lynskey, s. 109. ↑
  96. Ursua Kilkelly, Özel Hayata ve Aile Hayatına Saygı Gösterilmesi Hakkı, İnsan Hakları El Kitapları No: 1, Almanya, 2001, s. 48. ↑
  97. Franziska Boehm, “Information Sharing in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice—Towards a Common Standard for Data Exchange Between Agencies and EU Information Systems”, European Data Protection: In Good Health?, Ed.; Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes, Paul De Hert, Yves Poullet, Springer, Heidelberg, 2012, s. 176. ↑
  98. S. ve Marper v. Birleşik Krallık (2009) 48 EHRR 50. ↑
  99. Boehm, s. 148. ↑
  100. Lynskey, s. 111. ↑
  101. Marper (n 87) para 100. ↑
  102. Marper (n 87) para 119. Lynskey, s. 112. ↑
  103. Malone v. Birleşik Krallık (1985) 7 EHRR 14. ↑
  104. In response to this judgment, the United Kingdom brought into force the Interception of Communications Act 1985 (IOCA). However, the IOCA too became the subject of litigation. In 2000, non-governmental organisations, relying on the fact that conversations between defence counsel and their clients in pending proceedings, which ought to remain confidential, were being intercepted by virtue of this Act, argued that the regime introduced by the IOCA for international communications was contrary to the standards laid down in Article 8 of the ECHR. The applicants waited until July 2008, but their patient wait was rewarded when the ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 in the case of “Liberty and others v. UK”. See: Nardell, s. 43. ↑
  105. Boehm, s. 147. ↑
  106. Peck v. Birleşik Krallık (2003) 36 EHRR 41. ↑
  107. Boehm, s. 147. ↑
  108. Boehm, s. 147. ↑
  109. Amann v. İsviçre (2000) 30 EHRR 843. ↑
  110. Boehm, s. 147; Lynskey, s. 106; Amann v. İsviçre (2000) 30 EHRR 843, para 46; Boehm, s. 147; Lynskey, s. 106. ↑
  111. Perry v. Birleşik Krallık (2004) 39 EHRR 3. ↑
  112. Lynskey, s. 109. ↑
  113. Z v. Finlandiya (1998) 25 EHRR 371. ↑
  114. Lynskey, s. 110. ↑
  115. Leander v. İsveç (1987) 9 EHRR 433. ↑
  116. M. Aydoğan Özman, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Divanı’nın 1978 Yılında Verdiği Kararlar”, Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 35, Sayı: 1, 1978, s. 210 – 211. ↑
  117. Songül Atak, “Avrupa Konseyi’nin Kişisel Veriler Açısından Sağladığı Temel Güvenceler”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, Sayı: 87, 2010, s. 103. ↑
  118. Korkmaz, s. 155. ↑
  119. Lynskey, s. 108; Atak, s. 105. ↑
  120. For detailed information on the judgment see: Gaskin v. Birleşik Krallık (1989) 12 EHRR 36. ↑
  121. Lynskey, s. 110. ↑
  122. Anayasa Mahkemesi, Serap Tortuk Başvurusu, Başvuru No: 2013/9660, 21/1/2015. ↑
  123. For judgments to the same effect see: AYM, Zafer Güvendi Başvurusu, Başvuru No: 2014/1214, 6/12/2017; AYM, Taner Alır Başvurusu, Başvuru No: 2014/ 14400, 21/11/2017; AYM, Tevfik Türkmen Başvurusu, Başvuru No: 2013/9704, 3/3/2016. ↑
  124. AYM, Suat Özcan Başvurusu, Başvuru No: 2014/12522, 8/11/2017. ↑
  125. AYM, M.Ö. Başvurusu, Başvuru No: 2017/34584, 22/3/2018. ↑
  126. AYM, Oğulcan Büyükkalkan ve Diğerleri Başvurusu, Başvuru No: 2014/17226, 10/1/2018. ↑
  127. AYM, Alaaddin Akkaşoğlu ve Akis Yayıncılık San. ve Tic. A.Ş. Başvurusu, Başvuru No: 2014/18247, 20/12/2017 ↑
  128. AYM, Bülent Polat Başvurusu, Başvuru No: 2013/7666, 10/12/2015; AYM, Z.A. Başvurusu, 2013/2928, 18/10/2017; AYM, G.G. Başvurusu, Başvuru No: 2014/16701 , 13/10/2016. ↑
  129. AYM, Orhan Kayahan Başvurusu, Başvuru No: 2014/1970, 22/11/2017. ↑
  130. AYM, Adem Yüksel (GK) Başvurusu, Başvuru No: 2013/9045, 1/6/2016 ↑
  131. AYM, Danıştay Dava Daireleri Kurulu, E. 2013/122, K. 2014/74, T. 9/4/2014, R.G.T. 26/7/2014, R.G.S. 29072 ↑
  132. AYM, E. 2011/141, K. 2013/10, T. 10/1/2013, R.G.T. 28/12/2013, R.G.S. 28865. For a judgment to the same effect see: AYM, E. 2011/107, K. 2012/184, T. 22/11/2012, R.G.T. 24/01/2014, R.G.S. 28892. ↑
  133. Dülger, Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin Kararına İlişkin Bir Değerlendirme, s. 5 – 6. ↑

Download PDF (in Turkish)

More publications on this topic