10 September 2018Murat Volkan DülgerCommentary

Introduction

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

“Whoever does not stand on lawful ground has no right to accuse another of unlawfulness.” Although the internet is an unlimited source of information and medium of expression, it is not a lawless environment. The legal rules that apply outside the digital world apply equally to this field, to the extent that they suit its nature. The fact that the enforcement of court decisions meets certain obstacles and difficulties arising from the nature of the internet does not mean that law does not exist in this environment. At a time when even the legal status of AI entities is a matter of debate, law will without exception exist in every environment where intelligent beings, whether biological or artificial, are present and live together.

To this end, numerous legal provisions have been enacted and court decisions delivered in Türkiye and in foreign legal systems, and as a result a discipline of “IT Law” has emerged. Although technological innovations bring certain difficulties in the application of the law, these are resolved over time, and IT Law too is in search of solutions to them. By contrast, the greatest problem in the application of the law is seen to stem from the human factor. Unless civilised and cultured individuals who respect the law and one another and are capable of empathy, and a society made up of such individuals, are brought into being, the law cannot be applied as it should be or without resort to punitive methods.

Full text

This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger*

“He who does not himself stand on lawful ground has no right to accuse another of

lawlessness.”

Introduction

Although the internet is a boundless source of information and medium of expression, it is not a lawless environment. The legal rules that apply outside the digital world apply equally to this domain, to the extent compatible with its nature. That the enforcement of court decisions meets certain obstacles and difficulties arising from the nature of the internet does not mean that law does not exist in this environment. At a time when even the legal status of artificially intelligent entities is under discussion, law will without fail exist in every environment in which intelligent beings, whether biological or artificial, are present and live together.

To this end, a great deal of legislation has been enacted and many court decisions have been given in our country and in foreign legal orders, and in the end a discipline of “IT Law” has emerged. Although technological innovations bring certain difficulties in the application of the law, these are resolved over time, and IT law too is in search of solutions to them. By contrast, the greatest problem in the application of the law is seen to stem from the human factor. Unless civilised, cultured individuals who respect the law and one another and are capable of empathy, and a society made up of such individuals, are brought into being, it is not possible for the law to be applied as it should be, or without resort to punitive methods.

For example, while a no-entry sign means nothing to a wildebeest trying to reach the Mara River (Maasai Mara) during the great migration in the Serengeti in Kenya, it should – and is expected to – mean something to a person who lives in a city and in the midst of traffic, has reached a certain level of maturity and carries a driving licence in his pocket. The same holds for legal norms and court decisions. Law and legal rules have meaning only for individuals who possess a certain level of intelligence, have received a certain level of education and know that to live in society in accordance with social norms is what it is to be human. Hence merely having the biological appearance of a human being does not in itself make an individual a human being and an individual (having personality in terms of civil law is a separate matter).

The subject of this paper, then, although at first sight concepts such as information technology, technology and the internet catch the eye, is the human being who lives in society by complying with legal rules, and his acts, attitudes and conduct. The other matters are merely an occasion for setting out my criticisms of the failure to apply legal rules. Thus the main aim of the paper is, in general, my criticism of the non-enforcement of the decisions of the courts, the highest authority charged with applying the law, and of the breach of legal rules in this connection; and, in particular, to bring a solution to the problem of the non-enforcement of access-blocking decisions.

Freedom of Expression and Its Restriction

Freedom of expression, which is regarded as the foundation and source of all freedoms, must, as far as our country is concerned, be considered within the framework first of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and then of the relevant articles of the Constitution. Both instruments state that everyone has freedom of expression and give this right broad and comprehensive protection. When the provisions and decisions of the ECHR and the Constitution concerning freedom of expression are taken into account, it is seen that the following three elements are guaranteed:

• freedom to hold opinions,

• freedom to receive news, information and opinions1,

• freedom to express thoughts and opinions2.

It is thus seen that freedom of expression covers a very wide field, extending from individuals’ being able to access information and opinions, to their being able as a result to form opinions, and finally to their being able freely to express the thoughts and opinions they hold and to disseminate them to the outside world.

Nevertheless, as with the other fundamental rights and freedoms, there can be no question of unlimited protection in the case of freedom of expression either. As to the circumstances in which freedom of expression may be restricted, one must look to Article 13 of the Constitution and Articles 8-11 of the ECHR. Accordingly, a restriction of freedom of expression may be spoken of only in the following cases:

(i) the restriction must be prescribed by a law3;

(ii) the restriction must pursue a legitimate aim4;

(iii) the restriction must be necessary in a democratic society5.

Freedom of thought is therefore both a human right and a fundamental right and freedom. Although it is not unlimited, restriction depends on the existence of specific conditions, and restriction itself has its limits; these are assessed separately in each individual case. Freedom is the rule, restriction the exception.

In the light of the foregoing, it may be said that freedom of expression, which is regarded as the foundation of the other fundamental rights and freedoms, while it may be restricted in various specific circumstances, covers a far wider field than the individual’s activity of thinking alone.

Particularly in a world globalised by the invention of the internet, collective freedom of thought, and with it mass communication, has come to the fore. While the boundless nature of the internet opens the doors of infinite information to people, it also brings other problems with it.

The internet enables people to exchange information with one another within seconds. This in turn opens the way for people to become collective, that is, to organise. Thus even a single person who has nothing more than internet access can easily make his voice heard in the world and find common ground with others. But such a meeting is possible only where freedom of thought exists. In almost every sphere of people’s lives, across a wide range from their political choices to the places where they will go out or eat, the key role in shaping their decisions is played by the use of the mass media. The freedom of the mass media, in other words freedom of thought, can be destroyed entirely by blocking access to the internet and censoring the means of communication. Society can thereby be controlled in whatever direction is desired. For these reasons the printed press, social media and the internet fall within the scope of the freedom.

As stated above, freedom of thought, like the other fundamental rights and freedoms, is subject to restrictions; what must be attended to when such a restriction is imposed is simply whether the conditions under which it may be imposed are present. Particularly because of the use of the internet and the fact that almost more than half of the world’s population has access to it, situations sometimes arise such as the sharing of content that infringes personality rights in particular, and access to content has to be blocked. For unlimited freedom means the violation or curtailment of the freedoms of the other individuals in society. It is at this point that the problem which has recently been topical in the field of IT law arises: the impossibility of blocking content served under the HTTPS protocol.

The subject of this paper – which, as I explained at the outset, serves as the occasion for setting out my criticisms concerning the application of legal rules – is the fact that lawful access-blocking decisions given by the criminal courts of peace on duly made applications for blocking of access cannot be implemented by the “Union of Access Providers” on the ground that the “https” protocol is in use. More important still is the unlawful attitude and conduct of content providers who try to get round the law by saying “this decision is not addressed to us”.

The Republic of Türkiye Is a State Governed by the Rule of Law!

Another point that must be made before going into the technical detail of the subject, and which constitutes its essence, is that the Republic of Türkiye is a state governed by the rule of law. Although in recent years there have been various pieces of legislation and practices that suggest the contrary, these are matters that lie outside the law and set a bad example. At the stage of the founding of the Republic, the Republic of Türkiye formed its attitude and policy on this matter and, even if stumbling along the way and even if at times under strain in this respect, has always preserved the ideal of being a state governed by the rule of law. Nor, in spite of everything, has this been abandoned. Periodic bad practices and legislation constitute, on a long road, no more than an example from which future generations must learn a lesson “as to what must not be done”. Beyond this they have no meaning, and they do not signify that the ideal of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, which is the goal aimed at, has been abandoned.

The two most important elements, among others, of being a state governed by the rule of law are that the acts and actions of the State apparatus be transparent and accountable, and that all the individuals who make up society, the State apparatus itself included, comply with the legal rules. The obligation of all natural and legal persons, the State itself included, to comply with court decisions given on the basis of these legal rules is likewise an express provision of the Constitution.

It is precisely this obligation to comply with court decisions that is the starting point of my criticisms on the subject. In our country, where not even the President, the Ministers and the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) have the luxury or the option of “not complying” with the legal rules they themselves have laid down or with court decisions, company “x, y or z”, a press organisation or a website has no possibility of saying “I do not recognise this court decision, I will not comply, it is not addressed to me, it is not my task”. To say this and to act on it is no different from a driver who enters a road despite a no-entry sign. Those who do not comply with these decisions are civilised and members of this society only to the extent that that driver is civilised and a member of this society. Having first noted this, I shall give the necessary technical explanations and then tie the subject back to this core point.

Blocking of Access to the Internet

Although people have the freedom to form and share their thoughts on the internet, this right is not unlimited. While this right is more limited outside the digital environment, in my view it is, by virtue of the nature and philosophy of the internet, broader in the digital environment and especially on the internet. The internet is nevertheless in no way an environment without legal rules, outside the law and lawless. The ordinary legal rules and their application hold equally for the digital environment. Where content that constitutes an offence or infringes personality rights appears on the internet, it is possible to block internet communication. This forms the area in which freedom of thought is restricted. The rules on the blocking of internet communication are laid down in Law No. 5651 “on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Offences Committed by Means of Such Publications”.

Under Law No. 5651 there are four ways of blocking access. These are blocking of access by domain name, blocking of access by IP address, blocking of access to the content (URL), and blocking of access by the use of similar methods. Access-blocking decisions, other than those falling under Article 8 of the Law, are carried out by the Union of Access Providers.

Where there are situations on the internet that infringe personality rights, two routes to the blocking of access are open to the holder of the right. The first is the method of giving notice directly to the content provider; the second is to apply to the criminal judgeship of peace. The criminal judgeship of peace must give its decision, and the content provider its reply to the application, within twenty-four hours at the latest.

The Conflict between Access-Blocking Decisions and the HTTPS Protocol

HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) is the communication protocol that determines the rules for the transfer of data between client and servers on the internet. This protocol has a set of rules of its own, and communication is established and data transferred within the framework of these rules. The client makes a request to the server using an internet browser, the server replies by means of various programs, and in this way one can browse the internet. HTTPS, for its part, is the HTTP protocol with the SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) protocol added to it – put more plainly, the more secure form of HTTP. Normally access to a website is blocked by intervening in the chain of transmission running in both directions between server and browser. But where HTTPS is involved, since the transmission has an encrypted chain, it is not possible to step in and block. Websites are thereby made more secure.

As was already the case in our country before Law No. 5651 entered into force to regulate the internet and continued to be the case after its entry into force, great difficulties were experienced in the enforcement of access-blocking decisions given by the courts. The court registries were expected to serve notice on all access providers one by one, and these in turn were expected to implement the decisions. It was to put an end to this chaos and difficulty that, through the “Union of Access Providers” introduced into Law No. 5651 by Article 90 of Law No. 6518 of 6.2.2014, the task and power of implementing access-blocking decisions were conferred on that Union. Paragraph 6 of the same Law, by stating that “Access-blocking decisions falling outside the scope of Article 8 of this Law shall be carried out by the access providers…”, likewise makes a point of specifying that the Union is merely an intermediary body. The reason for introducing this additional article was stated in the report of the Sub-Committee as follows:

“With a view to establishing the Union of Access Providers, a civil initiative, in order to remove the problems which decisions on the removal of content from publication and on the blocking of access to content present under existing practice and obstacles such as unenforceability and uncertainty as to the addressee; to making effective, in the processes of implementing interim measures concerning internet publications, a civil initiative formed by representatives of the sector in place of public actors and ensuring parallelism with the practice of developed countries; to making it compulsory for all service providers to be members of the Union in order to be able to continue their activities; and to determining the principles and procedures relating to the Union so established, a provision envisaging the insertion of Article 6/A into Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Offences Committed by Means of Such Publications has been added to the Draft as framework Article 97.”

As can be seen, the purpose of introducing this article is to ensure, as in modern states and societies governed by the rule of law, that these decisions touching on freedom of expression are implemented through civil society.

The Union of Access Providers, which implements the access-blocking decisions taken in Türkiye, states, however, that it cannot carry out blocking because its existing infrastructure does not permit HTTPS to be blocked. Thus a decision obtained from Turkish courts under Turkish laws cannot be applied, by a union established by a Turkish law and charged with this task, to websites publishing in Türkiye. To see the distortion in this sentence, I do not think one needs to be a lawyer.

Where the application for blocking of access is made by the method of giving notice to the content provider, the discretion lies with the content provider. Where, however, there is a decision given by the criminal judgeship of peace, there can be no question of any discretion on the part of content providers. They are in any event obliged to implement the decision in question.

This is just like the situation of a convicted person who has been sentenced to imprisonment after being tried without detention. In that case the convicted person must, under Article 19 of the Law on the Execution of Penalties and Security Measures, report to the public prosecutor’s office responsible for execution within ten days of being served with the summons sent for execution; if he does not do so, a warrant for his apprehension is issued. For just as the State has the power to punish and the duty to enforce it, so individuals have the duty to submit to that punishment. Thus, before being apprehended, the individual is allowed a period of time so that he can do what civilised people ought to do and prepare for execution, and he is expected to come of his own accord. In a modern state governed by the rule of law, what is expected of the State and of the individual is the existence of rules of this kind and compliance with them. The same holds for access-blocking decisions. What is expected of civilised individuals is that, when the court’s decision is notified to them, they implement it of their own accord without anything further being needed. There is no need for a tyrannical State and for the court decisions in question to be enforced on individuals by compulsion.

Yet it is seen that practice is not quite like this and that access-blocking decisions are not complied with in the absence of compulsion. However, neither the Turkish Criminal Code nor Law No. 5651 contains any sanction for failure to implement an access-blocking decision. In fact the legislature, rightly, could not or did not conceive of the option of a court decision not being implemented. For in modern states and societies governed by the rule of law only fugitive criminals try to evade the enforcement of the law and of court decisions – and even their flight cannot last for ever.

Indeed, this problem has a further dimension under Article 138 of the Constitution: “The legislative and executive organs and the administration are obliged to comply with court decisions; these organs and the administration may in no way alter court decisions or delay their execution.”

Let us now return to the explanation I gave above: how is one to regard and make sense of the non-implementation by natural or legal persons of court decisions which the legislature, the executive and the administration are obliged to comply with, which they cannot even alter, and whose implementation they cannot so much as delay? In the cases before me, certain content providers (which are the web pages of press organisations) state, in spite of a court decision, that blocking of access is not possible because of a decision taken by their board of directors, and that they are not the addressees of the access-blocking decisions in question. This is plainly contrary both to the principle of the rule of law and to the Constitution.

The Solution to the Problem

The Union of Access Providers is in fact in the nature of an auxiliary body as far as the implementation of decisions is concerned. The primary responsibility for implementing decisions on the blocking of access lies with the content providers. Yet, as we encounter in practice, content providers that publish material infringing personality rights do not remove the content in spite of an access-blocking decision given by the criminal judgeship of peace. As their reason they state that they have taken a decision of the board of directors. By openly failing to implement a court decision, these institutions are engaging in acts contrary to the Constitution. No board of directors stands above the judicial power. This is what being a state governed by the rule of law requires.

This is precisely the point I am putting up for discussion here. I am not discussing whether the content whose removal was requested and ordered falls within the limits of freedom of expression. That could form the subject of a separate article, and the court decision may indeed be unlawful in that sense. The authority to which objections against these decisions lie is indicated in the relevant laws. What I am putting up for discussion here is whether a court decision, even if unlawful, is to be implemented by third parties and whether it is to be respected. What is apparent is that in our country this has suffered dreadful erosion. From the very top to the very bottom, authorities, institutions and persons have made it a right, and even a habit, not to recognise and not to comply with court decisions.

Yet law is a phenomenon that everyone needs at all times. We cannot know that the one who is strong today, who says “I determine the law”, will not be weak tomorrow and will not be crying out loudly for rights and law. Indeed, history shows us that this is exactly how it is. This applies a fortiori to the press and media organs. These organisations, which (rightly) raise the roof at the slightest injustice or unlawfulness done to them, for some reason fall silent when they themselves commit the same injustice and lawlessness. Before criticising the unlawful and unjust conduct of those who hold macro or micro power, then, we must look within ourselves and ask ourselves “how far do we act in accordance with the law, how far do we fulfil our own share of the principle of the rule of law”. He who does not himself stand on lawful ground has no right to accuse another of lawlessness.

Let us now come to our practical proposals for solving this problem:

• The Union of Access Providers is unable to block access to sites using HTTPS because it lacks the necessary infrastructure. First of all, the Union of Access Providers must be provided with the necessary infrastructure. This is above all the task of the State, which is charged with ensuring public order and peace.

• One of the most important principles of criminal law, and one that I too ardently defend, is that punishment is the last resort (ultima ratio). It is evident, however, that the sad but true fact in our country is that individuals’ compliance with the rules is secured by the deterrent effect of punishment. I regret to say that, at our level of social development, only the existence of the threat of punishment has any effect on some individuals. For this reason, there is a need in Law No. 5651 for a misdemeanour (administrative offence) entailing an administrative fine and other measures in respect of content providers that do not implement the decision given, and, in respect of the person responsible at a content

provider that intentionally fails to carry out these decisions, for an offence entailing a custodial sentence and a judicial fine and, in addition, a security measure for legal persons, to be laid down in Law No. 5651.

If this measure and legislation are adopted, I think content providers will not (be able to) adopt an attitude such as not implementing court decisions.

Footnotes

  1. Member of the faculty for Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and IT Law, Yeditepe University Faculty of Law / Attorney-at-law. ↑
  2. AİHM, “Autronic AG v. İsviçre”, 22.05.1990, B. No: 12726/87 ↑
  3. AİHM, “Lingens v. Avusturya”, 08.07.1986 B. No:9815/82; “Where the press is concerned, these principles are of particular importance. Although the press must not overstep the bounds that have been set, such as ‘the protection of the reputation of others’, it is nevertheless a task incumbent on the press to impart information and ideas on political issues, just as in other areas in which there is a public interest. Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas; the public also has a right to receive them.” To similar effect see: AİHM, “Şener v. Türkiye”, 18.07.2000, B. No: 26680/95; AİHM, “Handyside v. Birleşik Krallık”, 7.12.1976, B. No: 5493/72. ↑
  4. AİHM, “Sunday Times v. Birleşik Krallık”, 26.04.1979, B. No: 6538/74; AİHM, “Silver ve Diğerleri v. Birleşik Krallık” 25.03.1983, B. No: 6205/73. ↑
  5. AİHM, “Observer ve Guardian v. Birleşik Krallık”, 26.11.1991, B. No: 13585/88. ↑
  6. AİHM, “Dudgeon v. Birleşik Krallık”, 22.10.81, B. No: 7525/76. ↑

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