2026Murat Volkan DülgerPresentation / talk

Abstract

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

These are the slides of the paper presented in the ninth session, on 5 June 2026, of the 21st Turkish Criminal Law Days (21. Türk Ceza Hukuku Günleri), held on 4–7 June 2026 at the Antalya Bar Association Congress Centre. The theme of the congress was evidence and proof in the context of the aim of reaching the material truth, in the 21st year of the Turkish criminal law reform.

Text of the presentation

This text is a translation, prepared for this website, of the short prose version of the presentation. The slides, images and tables are in the PDF version.

The asymmetry of speed and the origins of the provision

This presentation was given on 5 June 2026 at the 21st Turkish Criminal Law Days in Antalya. Its starting point is a simple observation. Classical seizure operates in weeks, whereas a bank transfer is measured in seconds and the movement of a crypto-asset in milliseconds. Through layering across a large number of accounts, the value obtained from the offence quickly becomes unreachable. Because traditional coercive measures cannot keep up with this speed, the benefit is often lost. Art. 128/A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK), introduced by Article 22 of Law No. 7571 of 24 December 2025, came into being as a response to this gap.

The provision has two driving forces. The first is international pressure. Türkiye was placed on the grey list by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on 21 October 2021 and was removed from it on 28 June 2024; the commitments to enhanced measures, however, continue. The second is the crypto-asset ecosystem. FATF Recommendation 15 set the global standard for crypto-asset service providers, and the EU's MiCA Regulation introduced a comprehensive licensing and supervision regime. Since transactions on distributed ledger technology (DLT) cannot be reversed, the speed of the intervention has become decisive.

The three layers of the provision

Art. 128/A CMK in fact brings three separate functions together in a single article. The first three paragraphs govern suspension. For the four types of offence listed in Arts. 142(2)(e), 158(1)(f), 158(1)(l) and 245 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK), a bank, a payment service provider (PSP) or a crypto-asset service provider may, where there is reasonable suspicion, suspend account transactions for up to 48 hours. This decision is taken on the basis of these actors' own assessment, without any prior judicial decision. The decision is notified immediately to the chief public prosecutor's office and to the account holder; the account holder may apply to the prosecutor's office for the suspension to be lifted, and the prosecutor decides on this request within 24 hours. The fact that no concrete limit in hours has been set for the concept of “immediately”, however, creates uncertainty. If the suspended benefit is transferred to another financial institution, the receiving institution is notified. This possibility of transfer tracing (hop-tracing) makes simultaneous intervention in the layering stage of laundering possible and becomes a tool for following cross-border flows.

The fourth and fifth paragraphs govern seizure. The rule is a judge's decision; in cases where delay would be prejudicial, seizure may also be ordered by a written order of the public prosecutor. The prosecutor's order is submitted to the judge for approval within 24 hours, and if the judge does not decide within 48 hours, the measure lapses automatically. The requirement of an expert report under Art. 128 CMK does not apply here. If, during the investigation or prosecution stage, the seized benefit is found to belong to the victim, it may be returned directly. This is a victim-centred mechanism that departs from the classical confiscation regime of Arts. 54–55 TCK and comes close to the asset recovery approach. Its safe operation, however, depends on the true right holder being identified on the basis of concrete documents and judicial assessment.

The sixth and seventh paragraphs are of a supporting nature. Natural and legal persons that take a suspension decision bear no legal liability. The aim is consistency with the “safe harbour” approach of FATF Recommendation 15 and the encouragement of correct decisions instead of over-blocking. Yet the power exercised here is functionally a public power. In view of the last paragraph of Art. 125 of the Constitution and the ECtHR's doctrine of functional attribution, the liability of the State continues in cases of gross fault and bad faith. The institutions must provide the requested information and documents within 10 days; otherwise an administrative fine of between 50,000 and 300,000 Turkish lira may be imposed. The conflict with Art. 332 CMK should be resolved in favour of Art. 128/A as the special rule, proportionality should be observed in the fine, and room should be given to the defence of force majeure.

Interference first, review afterwards

In the classical interference model (Eingriffsmodell), judicial review comes first and the interference with a fundamental right follows. In Art. 128/A CMK the order is reversed: first the private actor decides, then the prosecutor, and last of all the judge. The safeguard of the judge (Richtervorbehalt) is disabled at the outset of the measure and is meant to be established afterwards. The result is a hybrid structure with a conceptual kinship to the administrative blocking power conferred on MASAK. Suspension and seizure are parts of the same process, but their natures differ. Classical seizure is reactive and focused on evidence and confiscation. Suspension, by contrast, aims to stop the financial flow before the elements of the offence have become clear and to reduce the victim's loss. The fact that a subject of private law takes the decision by exercising a public power also raises questions as to the competent jurisdiction and as to liability.

Assessment from the standpoint of fundamental rights

The right to property is examined under the three-part test in the light of Art. 35 of the Constitution and Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. As regards legality, a statutory basis alone is not enough; the quality of the norm is also required. Yet the threshold of suspicion for seizure is not specified in the provision, and no protection is provided for bona fide third parties. Combating cybercrime is clearly a legitimate aim; the real test lies in proportionality. As for the fair balance, there is no clear maximum limit for the duration of the measure, the interference risks extending to the whole of the account, the information on reasons needed for an effective objection is limited, and there is a danger of stigmatisation in the eyes of society.

The presumption of innocence (Art. 38(4) of the Constitution, Art. 6(2) ECHR) is not confined to the stage of conviction. An interference based on reasonable suspicion alone restricts the financial assets of a person who has not yet been given any status under criminal law and may create the impression of an implicit accusation. The solution is concrete reasoning and the use of neutral language in notifications. The right to an effective remedy (Art. 13 ECHR, Kudła v. Poland) requires a remedy that is accessible, speedy and capable of producing a result. The account holder's first point of contact, however, is the prosecutor's office, which is not judicial in nature. Since the minimum content of the notification (basis, concrete facts, amount) is not regulated, the account holder cannot know what to object to; this is the risk referred to in the literature as an “objection in the dark”. The three pillars of the theory of coercive measures, namely judicial review, provisional nature and proportionality, also provide the yardstick for these problems.

Comparative law

Türkiye signed the Budapest Convention in 2010 and ratified it in 2014. The “suspend – seize” structure of Art. 128/A CMK is conceptually very close to the Convention's “preserve – produce” logic. The Second Additional Protocol of 2022 offers tools for direct cooperation with the private sector, and in our view Türkiye's ratification of this text is of strategic importance. In Germany, under StPO § 111e–j, the rule is a judge's decision, and where delay would be prejudicial, judicial approval is required within one week. In the United Kingdom, an account freezing order is issued by court order within the framework of POCA 2002 and CFA 2017. In the United States, in forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. §§ 981–983, the Bajakajian and Timbs judgments impose proportionality and the Honeycutt judgment imposes the link to individual culpability. In Austria, the rule is a court decision, and in urgent cases the decision of the police or the prosecutor is subsequently submitted for judicial approval. In Italy, preventive seizure (Art. 321 CPP) is applied by decision of a judge. In France, special seizures are regulated by Loi 2010-768, the management of seized assets is entrusted to AGRASC and financial intelligence to TRACFIN, and the Constitutional Council's case law on the review of proportionality is well established. At EU level, Directive 2014/42 has been succeeded by 2024/1260, and Regulation 2018/1805, MiCA, the 2024 Anti-Money Laundering Package and AMLA complete the framework.

Three common principles can be seen in these systems: judicial review is central, proportionality is delimited by concrete criteria, and bona fide third parties are protected separately. The Turkish model deviates from them on four points. There is no direct judicial review of the initial interference, no threshold of suspicion is specified for seizure, it is not expressly stated that the interference is limited to the part that is the subject of the offence, and there is no protection of bona fide third parties.

Criticism and recommendations

Our assessment is organised along five axes: the privatisation of public power (Arts. 6, 8 and 9 of the Constitution), the problem of proportionality under Art. 13 of the Constitution, the shift from the classical model towards the paradigm of “preventive criminal procedure”, the chilling effect in the shadow of non-liability, and technical limits specific to crypto-assets, such as the practical impossibility of intervention in non-custodial wallets. The catalogue, limited to four types of offence, is also narrow. At the very least, bringing Arts. 243, 244 and 245/A TCK within the scope is rational from a systematic and practical point of view. The threshold for seizure, for its part, should be read together with “strong suspicion” under Art. 128 CMK and “strong suspicion of an offence” under Art. 100. The threshold we propose is a heightened suspicion based on concrete facts, exceeding reasonable suspicion and approaching strong suspicion.

In the short term, judges' approvals must rest on concrete reasons, the threshold of suspicion must be interpreted so as to exceed reasonable suspicion, the interference must be directed only at the amount that is the subject of the offence, and individual application to the Constitutional Court must be used effectively. The compensation remedy under Art. 141 et seq. CMK should also work as a reasoned and swift mechanism. In the medium term, the time allowed for the judge's approval should be shortened, the exceptions narrowed, an effective objection procedure concluded within 48 hours established, and the non-liability regime limited by reference to gross fault and bad faith. The nine-paragraph model norm we propose covers a functional definition of the offence, the minimum content of the notification, making the transfer-tracing notification concrete, the threshold of heightened suspicion, limiting the interference to the benefit that is the subject of the offence, a bona fide owner (innocent owner) mechanism with a 48-hour time limit for the decision, narrowed non-liability, proportionality in the administrative fine, and treating decisions without reasons as falling outside effective review under Art. 36 of the Constitution.

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