10 October 2019Murat Volkan DülgerArticle

About this work

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

The article examines the European Union General Data Protection Regulation No. 2016/679, the most extensive and most recent instrument on personal data. The first part deals with the main international instruments on the subject. The second part deals with the scope of the Regulation, the changes it introduces, its principles, the rights and obligations it lays down and the system it establishes.

Keywords

  • GDPR
  • personal data
  • data protection law
  • KVKK

Full text

This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger161,162 SUMMARY

Awareness of personal data, which concern the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, has developed over time, and national and supranational instruments have been adopted in this context. The most comprehensive and most recent instrument adopted in this context is the European Union General Data Protection Regulation No. 2016/679 (the Regulation or GDPR). Directive 95/46/EC was adopted at a time when information technologies were not as advanced as they are today, and it also failed to achieve one of its aims, namely uniformity in the law on the protection of personal data in the EU countries. This situation gave rise to the need to recast the EU data protection rules, and in response to that need the European Union General Data Protection Regulation was adopted in May 2016. The most important difference that can be noticed at first glance throughout the Regulation, and that distinguishes it from the earlier instruments, is its endeavour to establish a highly detailed and effective system with the aim of unifying the law on the protection of personal data in the EU. Starting from this objective, the Regulation both introduces entirely new rules and regulates pre-existing rules in a more concrete and detailed manner. Accordingly, first of all, the territorial scope of the Regulation has been extended and it has been provided that in certain cases the Regulation is also applicable to countries outside the EU. The article is divided into two main parts in order to analyse the development of the law on the protection of personal data and the relevant instruments, to understand the background to the adoption of the Regulation and to examine the Regulation in detail. Accordingly, Part 1 will set out the principal international instruments in which the right to the protection of personal data is enshrined. Part 2 will examine the scope of the Regulation, the innovations it introduces, the principles, rights and obligations it lays down and the system it establishes.

Keywords: GDPR, personal data, data protection law, European Union, General Data Protection Regulation, KVKK.

ABSTRACT

The awareness on personal data which relates to basic rights and freedoms raised over time and national and international legal legislations have been adopted correspondingly. European Union General Data Protection Regulation numbered 2016/679 is the most broad in scope and most up-to-date legal text on the matter. The Directive numbered 95/46/EC, adopted in a context where information Technologies weren’t as developed as today, failed its principal mission: ensuring uniformity and consistency between data protection laws of member states of European Union. This lead to the occurrence of the need for regulating European data protection law all over again. Based on this need, European General Data Protection Regulation was adopted on May 2016. The most outstanding novelty and difference on the general overview of The Regulation is that The Regulation aims to build a circumstantial and effective system in order to harmonize data protection law in the Europe. Based on this aim, The Regulation engage both creation of entirely new rules and remodeling of existing ones with a more circumstantial and comprehensive approach. In this direction, first the territorial scope of The Regulation was extended and it is provided that The Regulation can be applicable to the countries outside European Union within certain circumstances. This article was divided into two main parts in order to first analyze the development of personal data protection law, related legislations and background of the adoption of The Regulation and then examine the provision of The Regulation in detail. Accordingly, main international texts disposing right to personal data protection are presented in the First Part. The scope of The Regulation, the novelties brought by and the principles, rights and obligations disposed in The Regulation are examined in the Second Part.

Keywords: GDPR, personal data, data protection law, European Union, General Data Protection Regulation, KVKK.

INTRODUCTION

Two of the concepts most frequently heard today are the protection of personal data and artificial intelligence technologies. In this period, in which technology is developing rapidly and adding something new to our lives with every passing day, the personal data of almost every individual are the subject of operations over which individuals have varying levels of control. Sometimes people share their data of their own volition, sometimes they do so by hastily clicking on the “I have read and understood” option, and sometimes their data reach persons other than themselves without their knowing anything about it. While this situation provides a resource for the artificial intelligence technologies that are developing at great speed through neural network systems using personal data, it also leads to the emergence of a surveillance society and to individuals being kept under constant control.

Personal data, a subject of which awareness has grown over time, also entail many risks because they are very closely connected with the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. For this reason the need arose to regulate this field at the level of legislation, and the protection of personal data has been dealt with in various instruments at national and international level. The most comprehensive and most recent instrument adopted in this context is the European Union General Data Protection Regulation No. 2016/679 (the Regulation or GDPR).

The article is divided into two main parts in order to analyse the development of the law on the protection of personal data and the relevant instruments, to understand the background to the adoption of the Regulation and to examine the Regulation in detail. Accordingly, Part 1 will set out the principal international instruments in which the right to the protection of personal data is enshrined. Part 2 will examine the scope of the Regulation, the innovations it introduces, the principles, rights and obligations it lays down and the system it establishes.

§ 1. The Right to the Protection of Personal Data

The right to the protection of personal data is in fact a right that has existed for a long time, but one which, with today’s very rapidly changing and developing technology, has become more visible, has grown in importance and has broadened in scope. Attempts have been made to protect this right, as an independent right in itself or as part of certain other rights, even by instruments drawn up half a century ago.

Part I of the article will examine how the right to the protection of personal data has been assessed by different international organisations in different periods, and then how this right has been interpreted by international courts.

I. The Development of the Right to the Protection of Personal Data

For a long time the right to the protection of personal data was considered under the headings “privacy” or “respect for private and family life”. In time it was accepted that the scope of these rights differed, and the “right to the protection of personal data” began to be treated as a separate and independent right among the fundamental rights. Indeed, these two rights, which are very closely related to each other, do not fully coincide when one considers both their content and the obligations they impose on states. For example, whereas the right to privacy in general protects the notion of prohibiting states from interfering in the private life of individuals, the right to the protection of personal data is, by comparison, more active and, where personal data are processed, entails the establishment of systems of checks and balances in order to protect the interests of the individuals concerned.163 In order fully to understand the development and scope of the right to the protection of personal data, it will be useful to examine the international instruments containing this right.

A. OECD

On 23.09.1980 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) adopted the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (OECD Guidelines) and thus became the first organisation to take a step in the international arena concerning the protection of personal data.164 These guidelines are not binding and have the character of recommendations.165 Although these rules, which are characterised as soft law, have no binding force on paper or directly, they become the basic source of reference in the relevant field where they are adopted by the majority of countries166. Indeed, the OECD Guidelines too have attained this status.

The Guidelines consist of eight basic principles: (1) the collection limitation principle, (2) the data quality principle, (3) the purpose specification principle, (4) the use limitation principle, (5) the data security principle, (6) the openness principle, (7) the individual participation principle, (8) the accountability principle.

The reason why the OECD principles are inadequate today is that they were adopted at a time when technology was not as advanced as it is now, when, for example, individuals did not share a great deal of information and images about themselves from their social media accounts in a manner accessible all over the world. Developing technology and increasing internet use have given rise to new risks that could not be foreseen at the time the principles were published.167 Moreover, the fact that the principal purpose for which the principles were drawn up stemmed from the aim of developing the member states in the economic field also meant that the protection of individuals’ personal data was not examined in all its dimensions.168

Although they are not binding, the member states have acted with the OECD Principles in mind in their legislation in the field of the law on the protection of personal data.169

B. United Nations 1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on 10 December 1948, does not regulate the right to the protection of personal data as a separate right. This does not mean, however, that the right was left unprotected. Art. 12 of the Declaration states that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation, and that everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks170. The United Nations has considered the protection of personal data within the scope of privacy.

2. United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which entered into force on 23 March 1976, the right to the protection of personal data has been considered under the “right to privacy”, which provides that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his private and family life, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or reputation, and that everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such attacks or interference.171 For example, in its General Comment No. 16, in which the right to privacy is examined, the UN Human Rights Committee stated that the gathering or holding of personal information on computers, data banks or similar devices by public authorities or by private individuals or bodies must be regulated by law.172

3. Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files

As stated above, the United Nations considers the right to the protection of personal data under privacy. Nevertheless, developing technology and the spread of computer use made it necessary to issue the Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files (UN Guidelines).173 These guidelines are of great importance because they are the first United Nations instrument relating directly to the right to the protection of personal data.174 These guidelines lay down the following principles: “the principle of lawfulness and fairness”, “the principle of accuracy”, “the principle of purpose specification”, “the principle that the data subject has a right of access to his or her data”, “the principle of the security of data”, “the principle of non-discrimination”, “the principle of supervision and sanctions”, “the principle of transborder data flows”.

By laying down these principles, the UN Guidelines aimed to determine the minimum standards that should be contained in the legislation of the member countries.175

C. Council of Europe 1. Convention No. 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data

With the emergence of information technologies in the 1960s, a need began to be felt for more detailed rules to ensure the protection of individuals’ personal data. In order to meet this need, the Convention No. 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention No. 108)176 was signed within the Council of Europe on 28 January 1981. This convention is of great importance because it is the first binding international convention in the field of the protection of personal data. In addition to protecting individuals against the harm that may arise from the processing of their personal data, the Convention aims to regulate transborder data flows.177

Convention No. 108 applies to all data processing carried out in the public sector and in the private sector. This includes data processing by the judiciary and the police178. As will be discussed below, in this respect it differs from the European Union General Data Protection Regulation. For the Regulation leaves outside its scope the data processing activities carried out by the judiciary and the police.

With this convention the following principles were laid down for personal data undergoing automatic processing: that they be “obtained and processed fairly and lawfully”, “stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible with those purposes”, “adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are stored”, “accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date” and “preserved in a form which permits identification of the data subjects for no longer than is required for the purposes for which they are stored”.179 In addition, it is expressly stated that, unless domestic law provides appropriate safeguards, special categories of data, that is, personal data revealing individuals’ racial origin, political opinions, religion or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning their health or sexual life and their criminal convictions, may not be processed automatically.180

Another matter addressed in Convention No. 108 is the right of individuals to learn of the personal data stored concerning them and, where necessary, to have them rectified and, if the data have been processed in breach of the provisions of domestic law giving effect to the principles set out in the Convention, to have them erased.181

Pursuant to Art. 9, the rights laid down in the Convention may be restricted only where the restriction (a) is provided for by the law of the State Party and (b) constitutes a necessary measure in a democratic society (i) for the protection of State security, public safety, the financial interests of the State or the prevention of criminal offences, or (ii) for the protection of the rights and freedoms of the data subject or of others.182 Furthermore, while the Convention provides for the free transfer of personal data between the States Parties, it imposes certain restrictions on the transfer of data to states whose legislation does not provide protection at the level introduced by this Convention.183

Another important point is that, although Convention No. 108 does not fall within the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, the Court, when carrying out its examination under Art. 8 ECHR (right to respect for private and family life), has taken this Convention into account and has decided whether there has been an interference with this right in the light of the principles laid down in the Convention.184

In 2001 a step was taken to remedy the shortcomings of Convention No. 108, and the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, regarding Supervisory Authorities and Transborder Data Flows, which supplements that Convention, was adopted.185 In this context the Additional Protocol regulated transborder data flows to states not party to the Convention and the obligation to establish local supervisory authorities.186

2. 108 +

With the signature of the Protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data (108+), adopted on 18 May 2018, Convention No. 108 was modernised, the aim being to adapt to the innovations brought by information technologies, to reinforce the protection of privacy in the digital sphere and to strengthen the Convention’s follow-up mechanisms.187 The Additional Protocol reaffirmed and consolidated the important principles of Convention No. 108, and also increased the responsibilities and accountability of those who process data and granted individuals new rights.188 However, 108+ has not yet been ratified by Türkiye and incorporated into our domestic law.

3. European Convention on Human Rights

After the Second World War, in order to bring the states of Europe together and to promote law, democracy, human rights and social development, the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on 4 November 1950. Art. 8 ECHR lays down the “right to respect for private and family life”189, under which “everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence”. The right to the protection of personal data is one of the concepts protected by this right. Indeed, in many of its judgments the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has stated that the State’s surveillance activities constitute an interference with individuals’ private lives.190 It must be noted, however, that the right to respect for private life is not an absolute, inviolable right. Paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned article sets out the aims capable of rendering an interference with this right legitimate.191

Furthermore, the ECtHR has stated in many of its judgments that the right to respect for private life is not merely a passive right and that, in order for the content of the right to be fulfilled, it also imposes active obligations on states in certain situations.192

D. European Union 1. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data

Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (the Directive) was published on 24 October 1995 and was the principal piece of legislation on data protection in the EU until it was repealed by the European Union General Data Protection Regulation.

The Directive emerged at a time when many Member States had already enacted legislation on data protection in their domestic law, owing to the need to provide stronger protection for personal data, to harmonise the domestic laws of the Member States and to ensure the free movement of personal data.193 However, EU directives do not apply directly in all EU countries; the rules contained in a directive must, in addition, be transposed into the national law of those states. In the course of this transposition the Member States have discretion (and hence a margin).194 For this reason the Directive was interpreted in different ways in different countries and could not be transposed uniformly into domestic law. Consequently, the Directive failed to achieve uniformity in the protection of personal data in the EU.195

In general the Directive reflects the principles contained in Convention No. 108 and in national laws, and for the most part elaborates on those principles. The principles essentially adopted in the Directive are legitimacy and fairness; the collection of personal data for explicit, specified and legitimate purposes; transparency; proportionality; security and the subjection of data processing to supervision.196 There is, moreover, an interaction between the Directive and Convention No. 108. This interaction has a positive effect on both instruments as regards the protection of personal data.197

Finally, it should be noted that the Directive served to a significant extent as a guide in the drafting of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK).

2. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter), which was signed on 7 December 2000 and became binding with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon of 1 December 2009, lays down the right to the protection of personal data as a separate and independent right. According to paragraph 1 of Art. 8 of the EU Charter, entitled “Protection of personal data”, “everyone has the right to request the protection of personal information concerning him or her.” Paragraph 2 of the same article provides that personal data must be used “fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law” and that “everyone has the right of access to the information which has been collected concerning him or her and the right to have it rectified”. In addition, the EU Charter provides for “control by an independent authority” for the application of these principles.198

By this provision the right to the protection of personal data was considered within the scope of human rights and of fundamental rights and freedoms, and was moreover separated from privacy; the importance of the right to the protection of personal data was thereby made clear.199

3. Directive 2016/680 on the Protection of Personal Data in the Judicial and Law Enforcement Authorities

Directive 95/46/EC did not apply to the activities of the judicial and law enforcement authorities. For this reason, a number of other instruments had to be drawn up in order to strike a balance between data protection and other legitimate interests. The first piece of legislation adopted within the EU concerning the processing of personal data by the police is Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, issued by the Council of the EU on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The rules of this decision applied only to the exchange of police and judicial data between Member States and left outside its scope the processing of personal data by the police at national level. Directive 2016/680 of the EU Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 “on the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to Personal Data Processed by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Conduct of Criminal Proceedings, and on the Free Movement of Such Data” repealed Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA and remedied the above-mentioned deficiency. This Directive 2016/680, which was drawn up in parallel with the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, establishes a detailed system for the protection of personal data in the police context, while also taking into account the particular features of data processing that concerns public security.200

This Directive ensures the protection of the personal data of the various categories of individuals involved in criminal proceedings. When the police and criminal justice authorities process personal data for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences and the conduct of criminal proceedings, they are under an obligation to act in accordance with the provisions of this Directive.201

In general, although this Directive is based on the principles and definitions in the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, it takes account of the nature of the fields of police and criminal justice.202

4. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector

Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (e-Privacy Directive)203, adopted on 12 July 2002, lays down the rules on the security of personal data in the field of telecommunications and communications services, on the notification of personal data breaches and on the confidentiality of those communications.204

The e-Privacy Directive refers frequently to Directive 95/46/EC and is essentially complementary to that Directive. In addition, this directive imposed on the Member States an obligation to transpose the rules in question into their domestic law.205

5. Directive 2006/24/EC on the Retention of Communications Traffic Data

On 15 March 2006, following the bomb attack of 7 July 2005 on the London Underground and under its influence, Directive 2006/24/EC on the Retention of Communications Traffic Data was adopted. This directive regulates matters relating to communications traffic data and location data. Under the directive, the information of persons using communications services, other than the content of the communications, may be retained only where there is suspicion of a serious crime.206

6. European Union Institutions Data Protection Regulations No. 45/2001 and No. 2018/1725

As Directive 95/46/EC was applicable only to the Member States, Regulation No. 45/2001, the European Union Institutions Data Protection Regulation, was adopted in response to the need for a legal instrument to regulate the data processing activities carried out by the EU institutions and bodies. Regulation No. 45/2001 by and large adopted the principles of the EU data protection regime. The scope of application of the Regulation is personal data processed by the bodies and institutions of the Union. In addition, in order to monitor the application of the provisions of this regulation, it established the European Data Protection Supervisor, an independent supervisory authority.207 The European Data Protection Supervisor is responsible for advising the Union on legislation relating to data protection law, ensuring the application of data protection law in the Union institutions, supervising the institutions and ensuring coordination.

After the entry into force of the GDPR, Regulation No. 2018/1725, which repealed Regulation No. 45/2001 and replaced it with rules consistent with the GDPR, was adopted on 23 October 2018. This new Regulation adapted the principles and rules of the GDPR to the data processed by the EU institutions, bodies and officials, taking into account the particular features of the public sector as regards data processing. Although the Regulation largely adopts the provisions of the GDPR, it lays down certain exceptions in respect of the data to be processed by the institutions and bodies within the Union. It may be said that with Regulation No. 2018/1725 a further important pillar of the EU data protection reform was completed and that Union data protection law was given a more coherent and modern structure208.

7. European Union General Data Protection Regulation No. 2016/679

As mentioned above, Directive 95/46/EC was adopted at a time when information technologies were not as advanced as they are today, and it also failed to achieve one of its aims, namely uniformity in the law on the protection of personal data in the EU countries. This situation gave rise to the need to recast the EU data protection laws, and in response to that need the European Union General Data Protection Regulation was adopted in May 2016.209

II. Restriction of the Right to the Protection of Personal Data

The right to the protection of personal data is not an absolute right, whether it is considered independently or under the right to privacy. This right may therefore be legitimately restricted where certain conditions are met. For a right to be regarded as legitimately restricted, a three-stage test is applied:

(1) The interference in question must be provided for by legal rules, and the legislation governing the interference must be such as to afford protection against arbitrariness and must be foreseeable as to its consequences.

(2) The interference in question must pursue a legitimate aim.

(3) The interference in question must be necessary in a democratic society. For this to be so, the interference (a) must be necessary and proportionate with a view to preventing the harm and (b) must not impair the essence of the right.

At this point, the aims that are accepted as legitimate for restricting the right to respect for private life under the ECHR are set out in Art. 8(2). According to that provision: “There may be interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right only where the interference is in accordance with the law and constitutes a measure necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the protection of order, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” § 2. The European General Data Protection Regulation: Emergence, Scope of Application and Basic

Principles

As explained in detail in Part 1 of the article, the innovations brought and the risks created by changing and developing technology, together with the need to unify the law on the protection of personal data in the EU countries, gave rise to the need for the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (the Regulation) to be enacted.

Part 2 of the article will examine as a whole the scope of the Regulation, which was enacted in order to remedy certain shortcomings and to regulate the law on the protection of personal data in greater detail, the innovations it introduces, the principles it lays down, the responsibilities it imposes, the system it establishes and how that system is to be put into practice.

I. The Process by which the Regulation Emerged

The Regulation emerged because the importance of the right to the protection of personal data came to be better understood over time and because the instruments on this right that existed before it proved inadequate, in the face of changing and developing technologies, to protect this right effectively210.

Taking these needs into account, the European Commission prepared a Proposal involving comprehensive amendments to Directive 95/46/EC and published it on 25 January 2012.211 The Proposal was announced to the public on the same day by Vice-President Viviane Reding on behalf of the European Commission. In her statement Reding emphasised that 17 years earlier the proportion of internet users in Europe had been only 1%, whereas today large quantities of data are transferred between continents within seconds, and that the Proposal would strengthen the protection of individuals’ personal data in the digital environment while ensuring the healthy growth of the sector.212 One of the important manifestations of the inadequacy in question, besides the fact that the protection of personal data had never before been dealt with in any instrument as comprehensively as in the Regulation, is that Directive 95/46/EC, which the Regulation repealed and which was the European Union’s principal instrument on the protection of personal data from 1995 until May 2018, was not binding.213 The first important piece of legislation in the field of personal data in the European Union was enacted in 1995 by Directive 95/46/EC.214 After this Directive had remained in force for 20 years, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), adopted in 2016, began to apply as from 25 May 2018. In the European Union acquis, the founding treaties, the accession treaties and the protocols annexed to those treaties constitute the sources of primary law, whereas regulations, directives and decisions constitute the sources of secondary law. Regulations and directives (yönergeler)215 differ from one another in their effects.216 EU directives are legal texts issued by the EU Council of Ministers and the EU Commission in order to approximate and harmonise the legislation of the EU Member States on a particular subject in line with concrete principles and objectives. The Member States to which a directive is addressed are obliged to make the necessary arrangements through their own national legislation within the time limits laid down. However, the provisions of a directive are not directly applicable in the Member States. By contrast, regulations issued by the EU Council of Ministers are of general application and apply directly in all EU Member States. After being published in the Official Journal of the Community, regulations become, on the date of their entry into force, a text binding on all Member States.217 The Member States apply these texts directly. Unlike Directive 95/46/EC, the GDPR was enacted as a “Regulation” and in this respect is a legal text that is directly binding on all Member States.

It has been stated that the new General Data Protection Regulation brought into force by the EU will, compared with Directive 95/46/EC, have an effect in the field of data protection akin to a Copernican revolution, owing to its approach, which places the individual more at the centre, its provisions, which dispense with red tape and bureaucracy and are geared directly towards application and results, and its geographically broad scope of application.218 In the new view of the universe put forward in the 16th century by the Prussian mathematician and astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus219, it is not the “earth” but the “sun” that is at the centre, and the planets revolve around the sun in a fixed orbit. This conception, known as the Copernican revolution, was carried out in the world of philosophy and thought by Immanuel Kant in the 18th century.220 Accordingly, just as the Sun came to occupy the central position in astronomy, so in the processes of knowing the subject must be at the centre, and it is not knowledge that must conform to objects but objects that must conform to knowledge. It is emphasised that in this context the new Regulation introduces a new approach which gives prominence to the rights of the individual.

221

In view of the fact that, with the technological developments that had taken place, the protection of individuals’ data was needed more than ever, the need to renew Directive 95/46/EC was already being discussed in June 2011.222 At the beginning of 2012 the EU Commission prepared a proposal for amendment on this subject. Subsequently, the Article 29 Working Party223 stated that reform was needed in the field of data protection.224 On 12 March 2014 the Draft GDPR was adopted by the EU Parliament.225 The EU Council announced its views on the Draft on 15 June 2015; negotiations continued thereafter, and at the end of the process the GDPR was adopted on 27 April 2016 and published in the Official Journal of the EU on 4 May 2016.226 As the date of entry into force of the Regulation, Art. 99(2) GDPR fixed 25 May 2018. The Regulation entered into force on that date.

The General Data Protection Regulation, announced by the EU Commission to replace Directive 95/46/EC, consists of 11 chapters, 99 articles and 173 recitals227.

The Directive set certain objectives within the scope of the protection of personal data, but left the methods of achieving those objectives to the countries’ own domestic legislation and, within the limits set by the Directive, to the discretion of the Member States.228 In line with the Directive, the countries adopted rules in their national law that differed from one another, and these differences in domestic law constituted an obstacle to the effective protection of personal data.229 With a view to overcoming these problems, the Regulation is binding in its entirety and aims to ensure that the rules on data protection are applied uniformly in all Member States.230

II. Basic Concepts

Before turning to detailed explanations of the Regulation, it is necessary to refer to the definitions, within the framework of the Regulation, of the basic concepts of the law on the protection of personal data, so that the Regulation’s scope of application and the meaning of the principles, rights and responsibilities it lays down can be fully grasped.

A. Personal Data

Under the Regulation, “personal data” means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.231 That is to say, it is information which clearly reveals a person’s identity or makes it capable of being revealed by means of additional information.232 In this context an “identified natural person” is a person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.233 In assessing whether a person is identifiable, account must be taken of all reasonable means that may be used, directly or indirectly, to identify that individual and that may make it possible to treat that individual differently from others.

The concept of personal data is regulated in the Regulation in general along the same lines as in Directive 95/46/EC. It should be noted, however, that the Regulation contains certain special emphases in order to guarantee that all data which make a person identifiable are regarded as personal data. In particular, the emphasis in recital 30 that online data capable of making a person identifiable, such as IP addresses and website cookies, are personal data is one of the salient features of the Regulation234.

B. Data Subject

Where the personal data of an individual are processed, the person whose personal data are processed is the “data subject”. In this sense only natural persons can have the status of data subject and thus benefit from the data protection rules.235 This does not mean that legal persons enjoy no legal protection whatsoever. As explained in Part 1 of the article, the ECHR lays down the right to respect for private and family life, and under this right persons have, in addition to the right to respect for their private and family life, the right to respect for their home and their correspondence. The ECtHR deals with the protection of data relating to legal persons in particular under the right to respect for home and correspondence.236 In this sense the concept of data subject has been narrowed in the Regulation as compared with Convention No. 108: under Convention No. 108, although the principal addressees of data protection are natural persons, the Convention provides that the States Parties may, through their national law, extend data protection so as to cover legal persons as well.237

In the Regulation, by contrast, the definition of personal data expressly emphasises the “natural person” (Art. 4), and recital 14 moreover clearly states that the Regulation does not apply to the data of legal persons. Accordingly, within the framework of the Regulation, data subjects can indisputably be natural persons only.

C. Anonymisation of Personal Data

In accordance with the storage limitation principle, personal data are kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is required by the purposes for which the personal data are processed.238 Therefore, at the point where personal data are no longer necessary for the purpose of the processing but it is considered appropriate to keep them for a further period, the data in question must be erased or anonymised.239

Anonymisation of personal data means removing from a set of personal data the elements that make a person identifiable and thereby rendering the data subject unidentifiable.240 In other words, it means rendering personal data incapable of being associated in any way with an identified or identifiable natural person, even if they are matched with other data.241 After the anonymisation operation it must no longer be possible in any way to make the person identifiable.242

D. Pseudonymisation

Pseudonymisation (the use of pseudonyms) means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that, in order to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person, such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures.243

Unlike anonymised data, pseudonymised data retain their character as personal data and therefore continue to fall within the scope of application of the Regulation.244

The definition of personal data is broader in the GDPR than in Directive 95/46/EC. Whereas in the GDPR personal data are defined as any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person, in Directive 95/46/EC personal data were defined in a manner limited to the person concerned and the characteristics of his personality (95/46/EC, Art. 2(1)(a)). The GDPR has also brought within this scope a person’s name, identification number, location data and online identifier, or one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person (GDPR, Art. 4(1)). Pseudonymised data have also been included within the scope of protectable personal data.

Art. 4(5) GDPR defines pseudonymisation as the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that, in order to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person, such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical/organisational measures. Data created by pseudonymisation are also regarded as falling within personal data for the purposes of the GDPR (GDPR, rec. 26). For these data can be re-identified by means of additional information and attributed to a person. In this respect anonymisation differs from pseudonymisation. Anonymised data are data that have been rendered such that the data subject cannot be identified. For this reason the data protection principles of the GDPR do not establish a system of protection applicable to anonymised data, including for statistical and research purposes (GDPR, rec. 26).245

E. Data Processing

Data processing is any operation or set of operations performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction. In other words, every activity carried out on and in relation to personal data is data processing.246

F. Controller and Processor

The controller is the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.

The processor, for its part, is a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller.247

Where two or more controllers jointly determine the purposes and means of processing, those controllers are “joint controllers”.248

For the purpose of determining responsibilities it is very important to establish who is the controller and who is the processor. The distinction between controller and processor is that the controller is the legal or natural person who determines the purposes and means of the data processing, whereas the processor is the person who carries out the data processing on behalf of the controller and in accordance with its instructions.249

As stated, the controller may be a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body. In this connection the Article 29 Working Party states that, in order to enable individuals to exercise their rights, where data processing is carried out by a legal person, public authority, agency or other body, it is that legal person, authority, agency or body that should be regarded as the controller, rather than a specific human being within that legal person, authority, agency or body.250

Unless it is required to do so under Union or Member State law, the processor may not carry out data processing other than on the instructions it receives from the controller.251 Indeed, a contract between the controller and the processor is a legal requirement for this relationship to be established. This contract is binding on the processor with regard to the controller and sets out the subject-matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and the categories of data subjects, and the obligations and rights of the controller.252

If the processor carries out the processing contrary to the controller’s instructions, the processor is regarded as a controller to the extent that it has departed from the instructions.253 In such a case the Article 29 Working Party presumes that there is joint controllership.254

Another point that should be mentioned is that the processor is prohibited from engaging another processor without the prior specific or general written authorisation of the controller.

255

The controller is the person/body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data (GDPR, Art. 4(7)). The processor, in turn, is described as the person/body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller (GDPR, Art. 4(8)).256 While this distinction, which was also contained in Directive 95/46/EC, is retained in the GDPR, under Directive 95/46/EC responsibility was imposed only on controllers, whereas the GDPR imposes responsibility, to a certain extent, on both. Under Art. 79 GDPR, data subjects have the right to bring proceedings against both the controller and the processor. Under Art. 82 GDPR, the data subject also has the right to bring an action for compensation against both. In addition, for example, the obligation to notify a data breach to the supervisory authority without undue delay is imposed on both controllers and processors (GDPR, Art. 33(1)-(2)). In this way an expanded liability regime has been adopted for processors as well.

f. Joint Controllership (Joint Controllers)

The term joint controllers is one of the important innovations introduced by the GDPR. Nevertheless, it can be seen that the definition of controller in Directive 95/46/EC also referred, with the words “which alone or jointly with others determines the means and purposes of the processing of personal data”, to the case in which there is more than one controller.

Art. 26 GDPR is headed “joint controllers”. According to the article, where two or more controllers have jointly determined the purposes and means of the processing of the data, they are to be characterised as joint controllers. If a company determines by what means (how) and for what purposes (why) personal data are to be processed, it is regarded as the controller. If more than one company carries out this process together, the companies are to be characterised as “joint controllers” (GDPR, Art. 26). In this sense, for example, if a company has the accounting work relating to its employees carried out by a subcontractor company connected with its field of activity, that subcontracted accounting company will be the processor, while the principal company, as controller, will be responsible for the employees’ personal data. As another example, a company offering babysitting services online may also have concluded a contract with another company for the rental of items needed for the baby, such as games and DVDs. If both companies are involved in the technical set-up of the website on which the services are offered, both companies will, as “joint controllers”, be responsible for the protection of their customers’ personal data.257

Unless the responsibilities of the controllers are determined by EU law or Member State law, the responsibilities of the joint controllers and their compliance with the obligations under the GDPR are to be determined in a transparent manner by an arrangement to be made between them. Nevertheless, the data subject may exercise his rights under the GDPR in respect of and against each of the controllers. This determination must be made in such a way as to allow a clear allocation of responsibility (GDPR, rec. 79). For this reason, although Art. 26 does not require the arrangement determining their respective responsibilities to be made in writing, it is advisable for it to be made in writing for the sake of transparency, clarity, allocation of responsibility and proof.

Processors and controllers will both be jointly liable for damage arising from the infringement of a natural person’s personal data. Each controller or processor will be liable for the entire damage arising from the same processing operations in which joint controllers are involved (GDPR, rec. 146 and Art. 82(4)). However, where joint controllers are joined to the same judicial proceedings, it may be decided that the damage be compensated according to their responsibilities under their internal arrangements (GDPR, rec. 146 and Art. 82(5)).

In a dispute decided by the CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union), both Facebook and the company administering a fan page on Facebook were held responsible for the data processing as “joint controllers”.258 In the case giving rise to the judgment, the German company Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein offered educational services by means of fan pages hosted on Facebook. By means of the Facebook Insights application, cookies were placed on the computers of the users who visited the fan page, and in this way the German company and Facebook collected personal information belonging to the users. On account of this infringement an application was made to the Data Protection Authority of the German Land of Schleswig-Holstein (Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz-ULD), and in 2011 the ULD stated that the company was to cease using the Facebook fan page because personal data were being recorded by Facebook and the company without the users’ consent being obtained. The company brought legal proceedings, asserting that in the case it was not itself but Facebook that processed the personal data, and the court brought the case before the CJEU. In its judgment of 5 June 2018 the CJEU held that both Wirtschaftsakademie and Facebook had the status of “joint controller” and were responsible. Wirtschaftsakademie became jointly responsible by defining the parameters of the fan page on Facebook and by administering this fan page and promoting it to users. The users were not informed, either by Facebook or by Wirtschaftsakademie, about the personal data collected by means of the Facebook Insights application. The personal data collected here consist of when the fan page was visited, from which country it was visited, age groups and other personal data relating to individuals. The CJEU found that Wirtschaftsakademie, even though it does not itself collect the personal data, can request the processing of personal data by means of the Facebook Insights application and can moreover make use of the data thus collected in its own activities. For this reason it was held that both Facebook Ireland and Wirtschaftsakademie were jointly responsible for the data infringement. Having regard to the time at which the act took place, the principle of joint responsibility under Directive 95/46/EC was applied and Art. 26 GDPR was not applied. It is clear, however, that the CJEU’s approach to Art. 26 GDPR may likewise be understood as one of joint responsibility in situations of this kind. The CJEU also underlined, however, that the responsibility will not be of equal degree.259

III. Scope of Application of the Regulation A. In General

The material scope of the Regulation is set out in Art. 2. According to that article, “The Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.”260

However, as expressly stated in the Regulation, the Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by competent authorities in connection with the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security.261 In such a case Directive 2016/680 on the Protection of Data in the Judicial and Law Enforcement Authorities will apply.

B. Personal Scope of Application of the Regulation

The provisions of the Regulation give rise to obligations and liability for controllers and processors, and data subjects are protected under the Regulation. It is therefore of great importance to determine who is the controller, who is the processor and who is the data subject.262

A limitation is provided for with regard to controllers and processors in the personal application of the Regulation. According to this limitation, which is intertwined with the limitation as to subject-matter, it is expressly provided that the Regulation does not apply to data processing carried out by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.263

As regards data subjects, the only limitation as to persons is the requirement of being a natural person. In the Regulation, the definition of personal data expressly emphasises the “natural person” (Art. 4), and recital 14 moreover clearly states that the Regulation does not apply to the data of legal persons. Accordingly, the Regulation applies only in respect of natural persons whose personal data are processed.

C. Territorial Scope of Application of the Regulation

Although the Regulation is an instrument based in the European Union, its geographical scope of application is wider than the borders of the European Union.264 First of all, pursuant to Art. 3(1), “The Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not.” In addition, paragraph 2 of the same article provides that the Regulation is not limited to processing within the European Union and that, where the processing activities are related to certain matters, the Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union. Accordingly, the Regulation will apply in the cases of “the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union” or “the monitoring of their behaviour as far as the behaviour of the controller or processor takes place within the Union”. Apart from these, the Regulation also “applies to the processing of personal data by a controller not established in the Union, but in a place where Member State law applies by virtue of public international law.”

One of the important innovations of the GDPR is that its territorial scope has been extended (extraterritorial scope)265.

Art. 1 of Council of Europe Convention No. 108, which entered into force on 1 October 1985, takes the territory of the member countries as the basis for the scope of application. Accordingly, “the rights of the natural person in each Party country”, whatever his nationality or residence, are secured. However, in the 2014 Draft drawn up in order to adapt Convention No. 108 to changing conditions, the jurisdiction over the subjects of data processing was taken as the basis in place of the “territorial” approach. This new wording was adopted in Convention No. 223, by which the Convention was updated on 10 October 2018.266 Although this term is not defined, it is certain that, compared with the original version of the Convention, it will broaden the scope of application according to the interpretation of each member country’s jurisdiction.267

In Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 4(a), which governs the scope of application, takes as its basis the place where the controller is established, and Art. 4(c) the place where the automated equipment used in the data processing is situated. For the application of Art. 4(a) of Directive 95/46/EC, account is taken first of whether the controller is located in the EU Member States and, at the second stage, of whether the data processing activity arises from the activities of that controller.268

Art. 3(1) GDPR, in which the matter is regulated, takes as its basis first of all the activities of a controller/processor in the territory of the EU. This provision is consistent with Art. 4(1) of Directive 95/46/EC. However, the phrase “regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not” in the provision may also have the effect of broadening the scope of application. For it will also apply where the data processing activities carried out outside the territory of the EU by a controller located in the territory of the EU are taken as the basis.269

Art. 3(2) GDPR, for its part, ensures that the GDPR also applies where controllers and processors operate outside the EU. Accordingly, even if the head office and the field of activity of the controller/processor company are outside the EU, the provisions of the GDPR may be applied to that company in the event of a possible personal data breach if it offers goods and services on EU territory. In this case there is, moreover, no requirement that any payment be made to the data subject (GDPR, Art. 3(2)(a)). In today’s world, where the internet is involved, this has the effect of extending the application of the GDPR excessively.270 This is because any website can be accessed from anywhere in the world. For example, if an EU citizen using the website of a travel company operating in the USA were to book a hotel in the USA through that site, the US company could find itself facing the application of the GDPR in respect of that person. Likewise, companies operating in Türkiye may, taking these possibilities into account, be obliged to ensure compliance with the GDPR. This broad scope of application is liable to create uncertainty both for countries and the companies operating in them and for the individuals whose rights have been infringed. For it is not clear to the individual, either, when the law of which country will come into play. In such cases, the fact that the scope of application of the GDPR has been determined will not displace other national laws, and the application of conflict-of-laws rules will be unavoidable. The GDPR states that this rule was introduced so that natural persons are not deprived of the protection to which they are entitled under the GDPR, and that, in order to determine whether such a controller/processor is offering goods/services to data subjects in the EU, it must first be ascertained whether it envisages doing so (GDPR, rec. 23). Where only the website of the controller/processor is accessible from within the EU, considerations such as the company’s e-mail address, other contact details, the language used, the currency used and the comments of customers in the EU may be taken into account. Where the company is established will not be sufficient for making these determinations (GDPR, rec. 23). It is stated, however, that this jurisdictional rule introduced by Art. 3(2)(a) GDPR for the protection of EU citizens is softened by recital 23 of the GDPR and gives internet companies a chance to stay outside the GDPR. By way of example, a company from outside the EU, say a Chinese company, displays its product catalogues on a website which it has set up on a global scale. These catalogues can be accessed from anywhere in the world. At this stage users can browse the catalogues without registering any of their personal data. Hence, if an EU citizen takes a liking to a product in these catalogues, the GDPR cannot yet be applied at this stage. The moment then comes when the user selects the product and clicks on the link in order to buy it. In that event a new website belonging to a third party opens before the user. That site does not contain any of the indicators corresponding to recital 23. The currency, for example, is not the euro but the US dollar. The user registers his personal data on this new website. This website belonging to the third party may claim that it does not fall within the scope of the GDPR, because it is not this site that offers goods and services to EU Member States, but the first website, which belongs to the company of Chinese origin. Consequently, no offering of goods and services has taken place from this site. The reduction of the event that gives rise to jurisdiction under the GDPR to the mere offering of goods and services has therefore been criticised. It has been stated that, had this wording instead been formulated as “related to marketing” or “supply of goods or services”, or more simply as “related to the data subject in the EU”, the scope of application of the GDPR would have been clearer and more certain.271

Art. 3(2)(b) GDPR contains a provision which is clearly aimed at social media companies that have their head office outside the EU. Under it, the GDPR will apply where the behaviour of consumers (data subjects) in the EU is monitored, as far as their behaviour takes place within the EU272. Consequently, all social network companies, search engine companies or other companies which have a customer base in the EU and benefit from online behavioural advertising may become subject to the GDPR by reason of this provision. The phrase “as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union” used in this provision will prevent the GDPR from being applied in loosely connected situations in which the only link between the controller and the data subject is that the data subject resides in an EU Member State.

For a processing activity to be characterised as “monitoring the behaviour of data subjects”, it must be ascertained whether natural persons are tracked on the internet, including through the use of personal data processing techniques such as profiling a natural person, particularly in order to analyse or predict the data subject’s personal preferences, behaviours and attitudes or to take decisions concerning him (GDPR, rec. 24). It is clear that, in this respect, companies such as Facebook, Google and Twitter fall within the scope of application of the GDPR.

D. Material Scope of Application of the Regulation

The Regulation does not apply where personal data are processed in the course of activities which fall outside the scope of EU law or in the course of activities carried out by the EU Member States which fall within the scope of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union273. Nor does the Regulation apply where personal data are processed by a natural person in the course of purely personal or household activities, or by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security (GDPR, Art. 2(2)).

IV. Basic Principles A. Lawfulness, Fairness and Transparency 1. Lawfulness

The principle that personal data must be processed lawfully expresses the requirement that processing be carried out on the basis of the data subject’s consent or of another ground of lawfulness provided for in the Regulation. The lawfulness of processing is governed by Art. 6(1) of the Regulation. Accordingly, for processing to be lawful even though the data subject has not consented, it is required that the processing activity,

(i) for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract,

(ii) for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject,

(iii) in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person,

(iv) for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller,

(v) for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by a controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child,

be necessary.274

2. Fairness

For processing to comply with the principles set out in the Regulation, it must be fair. In this sense, the legal norms on which the processing activity is based must have been framed in accordance with justice.275 In addition, controllers must inform data subjects and the public that they will process the data lawfully and transparently. Controllers must, moreover, be in a position to demonstrate that processing activities are carried out in compliance with the Regulation. Furthermore, controllers must, as far as possible, act in accordance with the wishes of the data subject, especially where the data subject’s consent constitutes the legal basis for the processing.276 In the light of all this, the principle of fairness goes beyond the obligation of transparency and is concerned with the processing of personal data in an ethical manner.277

The judgment of the ECtHR in K.H. and Others v. Slovakia278 may be cited as an example of this principle. In that case the applicants were women of Roma ethnic origin who had been treated in two hospitals in Slovakia during their pregnancies and deliveries. After their deliveries, none of these women had been able to become pregnant again, despite many attempts. Thereupon the domestic courts ordered the hospitals to allow the applicants and their representatives to consult the hospital and to take handwritten notes from their medical records, but dismissed the request to make photocopies of those documents on the ground of preventing abuse. Yet under Art. 8 ECHR, States are under an obligation to make a copy of data subjects’ files accessible to the data subjects. In this case, however, the domestic court dismissed the applicants’ requests to obtain effective access to information concerning their own health and, in doing so, was unable to put forward a valid reason. Although the court stated that it had dismissed the request in order to protect the information concerned from abuse, it was unable to explain how it thought that individuals who had already obtained access to the files relating to their personal data could abuse the information concerning themselves by additionally obtaining a copy of those files. In this case the ECtHR held that there had been a violation of Art. 8 ECHR.279

3. Transparency

The principle of transparency, which has been laid down in addition to the principles contained in Directive 95/46/EC, places controllers under an obligation to inform data subjects about how their data are being used.280 Any communication in this context must be provided to the data subject “in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language”. The controller is to provide the information in question in writing or, where appropriate, by other means, including electronic means. When requested by the data subject, the information may be provided orally, provided that the identity of the data subject is proven by other means.281

The principle of transparency applies to the information given to the individual before the processing activities have even begun; the information that is available for data subjects to access during the processing and the information given to data subjects following a request for access to their own data likewise fall within its scope.282 Under this principle, the risks, rules and safeguards relating to the processing of personal data and the rights of data subjects in relation to the processing must be clear and plain to the persons concerned.283 At the same time, the limited and specific purpose of the processing of personal data must be known to data subjects at the time the data are collected.284

The judgment of the ECtHR in Haralambie v. Romania285 may be examined as an example of how the principle of transparency is interpreted. In that case the applicant requested access to the information concerning him held by the secret service organisation. The applicant was given access to that information only five years after his request. The ECtHR stated that individuals have a very serious interest in being able to access their personal files held by public authorities. The ECtHR further stated that the authorities must, in this connection, provide for an effective procedure for obtaining access to such information. In this case the ECtHR stated that neither the large number of files nor the shortcomings of the archiving systems justified a delay of five years in granting the applicant’s request for access to his files. Because the authorities failed to provide the applicant with an effective and accessible means of obtaining access to his personal files, the ECtHR held that there had been a violation of Art. 8 ECHR.286

B. Processing for Specified, Explicit and Legitimate Purposes (Principle of Purpose Limitation)

Under the principle of purpose limitation, personal data are collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and may be processed only in a manner compatible with those purposes.287 This principle, which is closely related to the notions of transparency, foreseeability and individuals’ control over their data, is of considerable importance for enabling data subjects to exercise their rights.288

In other words, the legitimacy of personal data processing activities depends on the processing being carried out for a specified, explicit and legitimate purpose.289 For data to be processed for another purpose which is compatible with the initial purpose, the data subject’s consent must be obtained anew for that processing or the processing must have another legal basis.290 For example, an airline collects certain data from its passengers at the time they make their booking in order to ensure the proper operation of a flight. In this context the airline obtains information on the passengers’ seat numbers, special dietary requirements and special physical needs. If, however, the airline were to supply this information to the immigration authorities at the place of arrival, the data concerned, which were collected from the data subjects for the purpose of the proper operation of the flight, would be used for a purpose different from the purpose at the time of collection291. For this information to be transferred to an immigration authority, therefore, a different and new legal basis is required.292

The point to be emphasised here is that, for there to be processing for a purpose other than the specified purpose, a different purpose is sufficient; it need not necessarily be a purpose that is incompatible with the earlier one.293 In this context, when assessing whether the further processing that is planned is compatible with the original purpose, factors such as the relationship between the purpose for which the personal data were collected and the purposes of the further processing, the context in which the personal data were collected and the reasonable expectations of data subjects as to their further use, the nature of the personal data, the consequences of the planned further processing for data subjects, and the existence of appropriate safeguards for the original and the further processing activities must be taken into account.294 It should also be noted that the a priori compatibility with the initial purposes of processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, for scientific or historical research purposes or for statistical purposes is expressly provided for in the Regulation295. In all circumstances, appropriate safeguards, including anonymisation, encryption or pseudonymisation, must be in place when further processing is carried out.296 For example, let us assume that Company A collects and stores customer relationship management data concerning its customers. The use of these data by Company A to analyse statistically its customers’ purchasing behaviour would not be contrary to the principles laid down by the Regulation. Nevertheless, for Company A’s further processing for statistical purposes to be lawful, Company A must provide the safeguards necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of the data subject.297 Finally, where the further processing is based on the data subject’s consent or constitutes, under Union or Member State law, a necessary and proportionate measure to safeguard important objectives such as the public interest, the controller should be able to carry out that further processing irrespective of the compatibility of the purposes.298

C. Data to Be Relevant, Limited and Proportionate to the Purpose for Which They Are Processed (Data Minimisation)

Under the principle of data minimisation, personal data must be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed.299 In this respect the wording of the Regulation differs from that of Directive 95/46/EC and Convention No. 108: those instruments provided that the collection of data must be “not excessive” rather than “limited to what is necessary”.

Under the principle of data minimisation, the controller’s obligation is not so much to keep data processing to a minimum as to limit the collection of data to the extent that is adequate having regard to the purposes of the processing.300 That is to say, the categories of data chosen by the controller for processing must be necessary to achieve the explicitly specified purpose of the processing, and the controller must limit the collection of data to information that is directly relevant to the specific purpose pursued by the processing.301

For example, in the Digital Rights Ireland case302 the CJEU examined the validity of the Data Retention Directive, which aimed to harmonise the provisions of national laws concerning the retention of personal data generated or processed by publicly available electronic communications services and networks with a view to the possible transmission of the data concerned to the competent authorities for the purpose of fighting serious crime such as organised crime and terrorism. Although the fight against serious crime is in general regarded as a legitimate interest, the fact that this directive covered “all individuals and every kind of electronic communication and traffic data, without any differentiation, limitation or exception” was found to be problematic.303

By reason of the principle that data are to be processed to the minimum extent, laid down in Art. 5(1)(c) GDPR, personal data may be collected only in a manner limited to what is necessary. This principle therefore represents an important step with regard to social media companies such as Facebook, which collect a great many personal data about their users, such as date of birth, place of residence, place of work, occupation, friends, interests and distance from their family. Social media companies, which have the status of controller, are obliged, in order to enable the data subject to exercise his rights, to inform the user transparently about the data they collect and to make available the database relating to the data processed (GDPR, Art. 12). There is no doubt that these data which Facebook is understood to hold about its users, the dates on which events took place, the countless photographs stored and the data relating to users’ contact lists are personal data within the meaning of Art. 4(1) GDPR. Facebook users will therefore be able to request the erasure of these data under Art. 17, which governs the right to be forgotten, by stating, within the framework of the principles laid down in Art. 5(1)(c) and Art. 5(1)(e) GDPR, that their processing and storage by Facebook is “no longer necessary”. In the case of such requests it can be said that Facebook, as a controller, is responsible for applying Art. 17 GDPR without delay and may otherwise face the sanctions provided for in Art. 83.

D. Data to Be Accurate and, Where Necessary, Kept Up to Date

Under the principle of accuracy and currency, personal data are to be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay.304 Under this principle, a controller holding an item of personal information must not, without first making an effort to attain reasonable certainty that the data reflect reality and are up to date, use that information.305 Moreover, at the stage when the data are first obtained, if the data are collected directly from the person concerned and with his knowledge, the data in question must be supplied accurately by that person.306

As is apparent from the wording of the Regulation, personal data are to be kept up to date “where necessary”, whereas no such qualification has been made with regard to the accuracy of personal data. Accordingly, while some data must necessarily be checked regularly and updated, the updating of certain recorded data is prohibited by law. For example, the findings in a medical record must not be updated and altered even if they later turn out to be wrong. In such cases new findings may be recorded only by clearly indicating that an addition was made at a later stage. Another example concerns situations in which continuous updating is necessary: when a person applies to a bank for a loan, the bank examines, from databases created for this purpose, whether the person is creditworthy. If such a database contains data that are out of date, the person concerned may face adverse consequences. Those who control such databases must therefore keep the data up to date.307

The principle that data must be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date is very closely connected with individuals’ right of access to their personal data and their rights to request the rectification or erasure of their data.308

Indeed, in the Rijkeboer309 case the CJEU stated that the right to privacy also entails that data subjects can be certain that their personal data are processed accurately and lawfully.310

E. Retention of Data for the Period Necessary for the Purpose (Principle of Storage Limitation)

The principle of storage limitation means that personal data must be kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects only for as long as is required by the purposes for which the personal data are processed.311 Put more simply and clearly, personal data must be processed only for the period required by the relevant purpose; at the end of that period the processing of the data must cease, and the data must either be destroyed or anonymised in such a way that the person concerned can no longer be identified. Under this principle, therefore, once the processing purpose has been achieved, the personal data concerned must be erased, destroyed or anonymised. A point to be noted in this context is that the principle of storage limitation applies only to data kept in a form which permits the identification of individuals.312

Under this principle, in order to ensure that personal data are not kept longer than necessary, the controller must establish certain time limits for the erasure or periodic review of the data.313 The requirement that data be retained for the period necessary for the purpose of the processing is directly connected with the right to be forgotten.314

Another point to be addressed is that, where personal data are archived in the public interest, for scientific or historical research purposes or for statistical purposes, these archived data may be stored for longer periods, provided that the data concerned are used solely for the purposes mentioned above and that the appropriate technical and organisational measures required by the Regulation are implemented.315

For example, in the S. and Marper316 case, the ECtHR held that the retention for an unlimited period of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA samples of the applicants, the criminal proceedings against whom had ended in an acquittal and in a discontinuance of the case, was disproportionate and could not be regarded as necessary in a democratic society.317 Another example is the Digital Rights Ireland318 case. In that case the CJEU, as explained above, examined the validity of the Data Retention Directive. That directive provided for the retention of data, without any distinction being made, for a minimum of six months and a maximum of twenty-four months; in this connection the CJEU identified as a problem the fact that the Data Retention Directive did not lay down objective criteria for determining the period of retention, which could vary between six months and twenty-four months.319

At the end of the period necessary for the purpose, the data must, as a rule, be permanently destroyed. Where permanent destruction is not immediately possible, the data concerned must be erased with the means available, that is, removed from the controller’s ordinary spheres of access and use. In addition, it is also possible to store the data after subjecting them to processes such as anonymisation, so that they can no longer identify the persons concerned320.

F. Principle of Data Security

Under the principle of data security, the controller must, taking into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons posed by the processing, both at the time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the processing itself, with a view to implementing data-protection principles in an effective manner and meeting the requirements of this Regulation, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures designed to integrate the necessary safeguards, and protect the rights of data subjects.321 The Regulation expressly recognises pseudonymisation as one of the appropriate measures for data security.

For example, the sentence “Melodi Ertekin was born on 9 January 1992 and is the only daughter of a family with three children, together with her two brothers” can be pseudonymised in the following ways:

(i) “M.E. 1992 is the only daughter of a family with three children, together with her two brothers”; or

(ii) “1701 is the only daughter of a family with three children, together with her two brothers”. Pseudonymisation carried out in form (i) is less secure than that carried out in form (ii).322 What should be understood from this is that the method of pseudonymisation may affect the effectiveness of data protection.323

G. Obligation of Accountability

The controller is responsible for compliance with the principles laid down in the Regulation and is under an obligation to be able to demonstrate such compliance.324 To that end, the controller must take appropriate technical and organisational measures. Although the wording of the Regulation refers to the accountability of the controller, the processor, who is subject to certain obligations, must also be in a position to account for its compliance with these principles.325

The procedures to be followed and the systems to be set up in this context will vary depending on the risk created by the processing and the nature of the data326. In order to act in accordance with this principle, controllers and processors may, for example, keep records of processing activities and make those records available to the supervisory authority where necessary327, designate, in certain cases, a data protection officer to perform tasks in matters relating to the protection of personal data328, carry out a data protection impact assessment prior to the processing where a type of processing is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons329, ensure data protection by design and by default330, put in place methods and procedures enabling data subjects to exercise their rights331, and adhere to approved codes of conduct or certification mechanisms332.

The Article 29 Working Party summarised the obligation of accountability as the controller’s obligation to take measures which will, in the context of processing operations and under normal circumstances, ensure adherence to the data protection rules, and to have ready the necessary documentation demonstrating to data subjects and supervisory authorities that the data protection rules are being complied with.333

§ 3. Rules of Data Processing

I. General Obligations of the Controller

A. Obligation to Designate a Representative

As explained above, the scope of application of the Regulation has been drawn more widely than the EU Member States. In parallel with the Regulation providing that it applies where the data of persons in the EU are processed even if the controller or processor is not established in the EU, it is laid down that the controller or processor must designate in writing a representative in the Union.334 The representative to be designated must be established in one of the Member States where the data subjects are whose personal data are processed in relation to the offering of goods or services to them, or whose behaviour is monitored.335

Where a controller outside the EU processes the data of data subjects located in more than one EU country, the choice as to which of those countries the representative should be established in, and consequently with which country’s data protection authority the representative should be registered, is left to the controller.336 The controller may designate a representative in whichever of the countries concerned is most suitable for it. Whichever country the representative is in, however, the identity and contact details of the representative must be included in the information notices addressed to all EU citizens.337

A representative need not be designated where the processing is occasional and does not involve the large-scale processing of special categories of personal data, if, taking into account the nature, context, scope and purposes of the processing, it is concluded that the processing is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.338 Furthermore, if the processing in question is carried out by a public authority or body, that authority or body is not required to designate a representative in the Union.339

Under Art. 4(2) of Directive 95/46/EC, where the controller was not established on EU territory and automated equipment situated on EU territory was used for the purposes of processing, the controller was obliged to designate a representative established in the territory of that Member State, without prejudice to legal actions that might be brought against the controller itself.

Under Art. 4(17) GDPR, a representative is defined as a natural or legal person established in the EU who, designated by the controller or processor in writing pursuant to Art. 27, represents the controller or processor with regard to their obligations under the GDPR. The designation of a representative must therefore be made in writing. Moreover, legal persons as well as natural persons may be designated as representatives (GDPR, rec. 80).

Controllers/processors operating in the Member States where the data subjects are whose personal data are processed in relation to the offering of goods or services to them, or whose behaviour is monitored (GDPR, Art. 3(2)), are obliged to designate a representative (GDPR, rec. 80, Art. 27(3)).

The representative is mandated to be addressed, in addition to or instead of the controller or the processor, by supervisory authorities and data subjects in particular, on all issues related to the processing, for the purposes of ensuring compliance with the GDPR (GDPR, Art. 27(4)).

B. Obligation of Joint Controllers to Conclude an Arrangement on the Division of Tasks

As explained above, where two or more controllers jointly determine the purposes and means of processing, those controllers are joint controllers. Unless determined by Union or Member State law, joint controllers must determine their obligations under the Regulation in a transparent manner by means of an arrangement to be concluded between them.340

Joint controllers are jointly responsible for the lawfulness of the processing activities carried out on the side of both controllers, and they are likewise jointly and severally liable in the event of any infringement.341 A controller that does not wish to be liable for infringements occurring on the side of the other joint controller must expressly stipulate which obligations are to be performed by which controller342. In this context the parties’ areas of responsibility and non-responsibility must be determined concretely and in detail.343 It is obvious at this point that the parties’ responsibilities cannot be arranged in such a way as to create areas of non-responsibility that would be to the detriment of data subjects. Such an arrangement would be void, and each controller would continue to be individually and jointly and severally liable. The obligations relating to enabling data subjects to exercise their rights, moreover, cannot be delegated to one of the joint controllers344. Each controller must set up, in conformity with the GDPR, the application and response mechanisms necessary for data subjects to be able to exercise their rights.

In conclusion, the areas of responsibility and non-responsibility of each controller must be determined by a clear and unambiguous arrangement. Otherwise each controller will be jointly and severally liable for each obligation, irrespective of which controller’s side the matter arose on345.

C. Obligations Relating to the Selection of Processors

Pursuant to Art. 28 of the Regulation, the controller must use processors that provide sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in such a manner that, in the course of the processing, the requirements of the Regulation are met and the protection of the rights of the data subject is ensured.346

D. Obligations Relating to Records (Documentation Requirements) i. Establishing Data Protection Policies

The controller must adopt and implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure, and to be able to demonstrate, that processing is performed in accordance with the provisions of the GDPR (GDPR, Art. 24(1)). To that end it is to implement appropriate data protection policies (GDPR, Art. 24(2)). Companies’ appropriate data protection policy rules should contain the objectives, the definitions of key terms, the basic principles and the purposes of personal data processing, the responsibilities and the lead supervisory authority in these matters.347

ii. Privacy Notice

The controller must be able to provide the data subject with any communication relating to the processing of personal data in a brief, concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, in writing/by electronic means/orally (GDPR, Art. 12(1)). Likewise, where the data subject’s personal data are collected, the controller must provide the data subject with its own identity and contact details, the contact details of the data protection officer, the legal basis for the processing, the legitimate interests relating thereto, if any, the recipients of the personal data, and whether the personal data will be transferred to a third country/international organisation together with the safeguards relating thereto (GDPR, Art. 13(1), 14(1)). In addition, matters such as the period for which the personal data will be stored, the criteria used in that regard if that period is not clear, explanations concerning the portability, rectification, restriction and erasure of the data, the right to withdraw consent to the processing and the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority must also be provided to the data subject (GDPR, Art. 13(2)). This information must in general be explanatory and intelligible with regard to the customers whose data the controller companies process. Companies may also provide these explanations on their websites.

iii. Data Retention and Records of Processing Activities

The controller is obliged to maintain a written record (including in electronic form) of the personal data processed (GDPR, Art. 30(1)). These records are to contain information such as the controller, the data protection officer, the purposes of the processing, the categories of data subjects and of personal data, the recipients, the data transfers and the time limits for erasure of the data (GDPR, Art. 30(1)–(2)).

iv. Data Subject Consent Form

Where processing is based on consent, the request for consent must be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language (GDPR, Art. 7(2)). Consent may be given not only in written form but also electronically or orally (GDPR, rec. 32). Consent may take the form of ticking a box when visiting a website, whereas silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity cannot be construed as consent. Separate consent is required for each item of data processed. Where consent has been given, the controller must be able to prove that the data subject has consented (GDPR, rec. 42).

Where the data subject is a child, the child must be at least 16 years old for the consent to be valid (GDPR, Art. 8(1)). Where the data subject is below the age of 16 years, the consent must be given by the holder of parental responsibility, or be given by the child and authorised by the holder of parental responsibility (GDPR, Art. 8(1)).

A dispute is pending before the CJEU as to whether pre-ticked boxes constitute valid consent. In that case the website “dein-macbook.de” holds promotional lotteries online and distributes gifts to users who make purchases. For this purpose users’ personal data, such as their name and address details, are recorded. Users also agree to give these details to the sponsoring organisations by means of the checkbox presented to them (pre-ticked boxes). Participation in the lottery is made possible by a ticked checkbox permitting cookies so that the company named Planet49 can track consumers’ behaviour and use its targeted advertising. Since the events took place before the period in which the GDPR entered into force, the Advocate General in the case also carried out an assessment under Directive 95/46/EC. According to the Advocate General, since under Art. 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC consent must be given “freely and after being informed” and under Art. 7(a) consent must be given in a “clear, unambiguous and definite” manner, consent to the processing of personal data given by means of such pre-ticked boxes is invalid. The opinion of the Article 29 Working Party on consent is to the same effect. Moreover, the GDPR regulates the matter of consent in a much clearer manner that demands certainty. In the dispute, the user was compelled to tick the box in order to take part in the lottery. By ticking it, the user also permits the use of cookies. Art. 7(4) GDPR prohibits such ways of obtaining consent which rush the user in order to benefit from the main service (bundling). According to the Advocate General, therefore, users were not sufficiently informed about the consequences of these pre-ticked boxes, and consent obtained in this way should not be regarded as valid consent.348 We believe that the judgment of the CJEU will be to the same effect. For ticked boxes, in particular those ticked simultaneously with use of the service and without adequate information having been provided, cannot be construed as valid consent under either Directive 95/46/EC or Art. 7 and recital 42 of the GDPR.

v. Data Processing Agreement

Where the controller wishes processing to be carried out on its behalf, it must give the processor specific and written authorisation. Where such authorisation is given, the controller will expect processors to provide sufficient guarantees in terms of matters such as the expert knowledge, reliability and resources needed to implement the technical and organisational measures required by the GDPR. In such cases the controller and the processor will be obliged to comply with the contract and with EU legislation/the national legislation of the EU Member States on matters such as the subject-matter, duration and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data processed and the categories of data subjects. After the completion of the processing on behalf of the controller, the processor will be obliged to erase the data processed or to return them to the place from which they were obtained, unless they are required to be stored under EU legislation or the legislation of a Member State (GDPR, rec. 81).349

vi. Communication and Notification of a Data Breach

Where a personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller is obliged to communicate the personal data breach to the data subject without undue delay (GDPR, Art. 34(1)). In the event of a personal data breach, the controller is obliged to notify the personal data breach to the supervisory authority within 72 hours at the latest of becoming aware of the breach (GDPR, Art. 33(1)). The following points must be observed in the data breach notification (GDPR, Art. 33(3)):

- The nature of the data breach must be described, including explanations as to the categories and number of data subjects and data records concerned.

- The name and the necessary details of the data protection officer or other contact point where more information can be obtained must be provided.

- The likely consequences of the personal data breach must be described.

- The measures taken/proposed to mitigate the possible adverse effects of the data breach must be described.

Where it is not possible to provide this information at the same time, the information may also be provided in phases without undue further delay (GDPR, Art. 33(4)).

II. Grounds of Lawfulness in Data Processing A. Grounds of Lawfulness in the Processing of Personal Data

As explained above, the lawful, fair and transparent processing of personal data is one of the principles contained in the Regulation. Under this principle the processing of personal data must be lawful, and processing is lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies:

(a) The data subject has given consent to the processing of his personal data for one or more specific purposes,

(b) Processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract,

(c) Processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject,

(d) Processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person,

(e) Processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller,

(f) Processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by a controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.

1. Consent a. Definitions of Consent

Under the Regulation, the consent of the data subject “is a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication by which the data subject, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her.”350 Turning to other instruments, consent is defined in Directive 95/46/EC as “consent which is obtained freely and after information has been provided and which signifies the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her”. Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), for its part, does not use the concept of consent on its own but employs the expression “explicit consent”. According to the KVKK, explicit consent is “consent that relates to a specific matter, is based on information and is expressed with free will”.351 On the basis of these definitions it may be concluded that the Regulation has strengthened the conditions laid down for the consent that must be obtained from the data subject for the processing of his personal data.352 Accordingly, although the Regulation does not use the term “explicit consent” as such, a comparison with the KVKK shows that, since “consent based on information” is obtained, this too is explicit consent.

In Art. 7(1) of Directive 95/46/EC, the consent required for the processing of personal data was regulated as having to be given unambiguously and to be given explicitly (explicit consent) (95/46/EC, Rec.

33). In the GDPR, by contrast, the matter of consent is regulated in much greater detail and in a manner that takes the will as its basis.353 Under Art. 7(2) GDPR, where the data subject gives consent by a written declaration, the request for consent must be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. The existence of consent must be proved by the controller (GDPR, Art. 7(1)). When assessing whether consent has been freely given, account must be taken, first and foremost, of whether the consent was given in connection with the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service (GDPR, Art. 7(4)). Recital 32 of the GDPR likewise provides that consent may be given in writing, by electronic means or orally, by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication.354 The case in which the data subject is a child is also specifically regulated in Art. 8 of the Regulation. First of all, where the data subject is a child, the data subject’s interests or fundamental rights and freedoms which require protection of personal data must not override the legitimate interests pursued by a controller or by a third party, and the processing must be necessary for the purposes of those interests (GDPR, Art. 6(1)(f)). For the consent of a data subject who is a child to be valid, the child must be at least 16 years old. Where the child is below the age of 16 years, the processing in question will be lawful only if the consent is given and authorised by the person who, in respect of the child, holds parental responsibility, and for as long as that authorisation continues (GDPR, Art. 8(1)).

b. The Element of Being Informed

As is apparent from the definition in the Regulation, consent must be “informed”; that is, the data subject must have knowledge of the matter before making the declaration of consent. The Article 29 Working Party has stated that the information to be given must be provided in a clear and intelligible manner and must contain full and complete information on matters such as the data processed, the purposes of the processing, the likely recipients of the data and the rights of the data subject.355 It is, moreover, of great importance that consent to the processing of personal data be specific to the matter in question. In this sense consent must be “specific”, and it must be clearly discernible which processing activities the consent has been given for.356 A general consent expressed with regard to the processing of data will therefore not constitute a ground of lawfulness satisfying the conditions within the meaning of the Regulation.357

c. The Element of Distinguishability, Intelligibility and Accessibility

Where the data subject’s consent is given in the context of a written declaration which also concerns other matters, that is, where the declaration also covers matters other than consent, the request for consent must be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. It is also expressly provided that any part of such a declaration which constitutes an infringement of the Regulation shall not be binding.358

Where processing is based on consent, the request for consent must be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language (GDPR, Art. 7(2)). Consent may be given not only in written form but also electronically or orally (GDPR, rec. 32). Consent may take the form of ticking a box when visiting a website, whereas silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity cannot be construed as consent. Separate consent is required for each item of data processed. Where consent has been given, the controller must be able to prove that the data subject has consented (GDPR, rec. 42).

At this point I would also recall my explanations above concerning the consent form and, in order to avoid repetition, confine myself to referring the reader to the relevant heading.

d. Revocability of Consent

Another important point is that the data subject has the right to withdraw his consent at any time. The data subject must be informed of this before giving consent. Moreover, it must be as easy to withdraw consent as to give it.359 The withdrawal of consent is a right that operates for the future and has no effect on past operations.360

e. The Element of Consent Being Freely Given

Furthermore, for consent to be valid it must be freely given. In this sense, when assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account must be taken, above all, of whether the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract.361 The Regulation has thus expressly treated as invalid consent given in situations where there is an imbalance of power between the parties.362 For example, the Article 29 Working Party has stated that, because of the subordination resulting from the employee/employer relationship, employees are almost never in a position to give consent freely, to refuse consent or to withdraw their consent. Accordingly, on account of the imbalance of power, employees can give consent of their own free will only in the rare cases where no negative consequence attaches to their refusal to consent.363 As another example, one may consider an agreement concluded between passengers and an airline concerning the transfer of passenger name records to the immigration authority of a country. Since the passengers have no other option if they are to be able to visit the country concerned, it cannot be said that such an agreement is based on freely given consent within the meaning of data protection law. For the transfer of these data to the immigration authority to be regarded as lawful, the transfer must have a legal basis other than consent.364

f. Consent of Children

Another matter to be mentioned in connection with consent is the processing of a child’s personal data in relation to the offer of information society services365 directly to a child. Under the Regulation, for the processing of a child’s personal data when an information society service is offered to the child to be validly based on the child’s consent, the child must be at least 16 years old.366 Where the child is below the age of 16 years, such processing is lawful only if and to the extent that consent is given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child.367 Member States may lower this age to as low as 13 years.368 The Regulation also states that these rules on the processing of children’s data do not affect the rules of the Member States, in terms of contract law, on the validity, formation and effect of a contract.369

Where the data subject is a child, the child must be at least 16 years old for the consent to be valid (GDPR, Art. 8(1)). Where the data subject is below the age of 16 years, the consent must be given by the holder of parental responsibility, or be given by the child and authorised by the holder of parental responsibility (GDPR, Art. 8(1)).

2. Processing Necessary for the Conclusion or Performance of a Contract

Processing that is carried out where it is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract is lawful.370

3. Processing Necessary for the Controller to Be Able to Comply with Its Legal Obligation

Processing that is carried out where it is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject is lawful.371 This ground of lawfulness applies to controllers in both the private and the public sector.372 The legal obligation in question may derive from the domestic law of the State concerned or from EU law. The legislation forming the basis for the processing of personal data must comply with the ECHR provision on the “right to respect for private and family life” and with the EU Charter provisions on “respect for private and family life” and “protection of personal data”.373

4. Processing Necessary to Protect the Vital Interests of the Data Subject or of Another Natural Person

Processing that is carried out where it is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person is lawful.374 As a rule, processing on the basis of this provision should take place only where the processing is not based on another ground. The power to process data under this provision is therefore subsidiary in nature.375

This provision has no exact counterpart in the KVKK.

5. Processing Necessary for the Performance of a Task Carried Out in the Public Interest or for the Exercise of the Controller’s Official Authority

Processing that is carried out where it is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller is lawful.376 In this context it is not a requirement that the official authority be exercised by the controller. Acting in accordance with the requests, falling within the scope of its authority, of a third party vested with such authority is also covered by this ground of lawfulness.377 For processing to be carried out under this heading, the processing in question must have a legal basis in EU law or in the domestic law of the country concerned. That legal basis must be clear and precise, and also foreseeable.378 It is, moreover, expressly provided that EU Member States may maintain or introduce more specific provisions for the application of the rules of the Regulation concerning the power to process data.379

The KVKK, by contrast, uses a broader formulation than the Regulation and provides that processing is to be regarded as lawful where the possibility of processing data is expressly provided for by the laws, without any public interest requirement.380

6. Processing Necessary for the Purposes of Legitimate Interests

Processing that is carried out where it is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by a controller or by a third party is lawful, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of his personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.381

The existence of a legitimate interest must be carefully examined in each individual case.382 If it is established that the controller has a legitimate interest in the processing, a balance must be struck between that legitimate interest and the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects.383 The reasonable expectations of the data subject must also be taken into account in such an assessment. Where the rights of the data subject override the legitimate interests of the controller, the controller may adopt measures and introduce safeguards with the aim of minimising the impact of the processing on the rights of the data subject, and may thereby reverse the balance and rely on this ground of lawfulness.384

The CJEU has examined the “balancing test” in detail in its case law. For example, in the Valsts policijas Rīgas reģiona pārvaldes Kārtības policijas pārvalde385 case the CJEU stated that, for personal data to be processed on the basis of legitimate interests, all three of the following conditions must be fulfilled386:

(1) The third party to whom the personal data are to be disclosed must have a legitimate interest,

(2) The processing of the personal data concerned must be necessary in order to achieve that legitimate interest,

(3) The fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject must not take precedence over the legitimate interests of the controller or of third parties.

The CJEU further stated that the balance of interests must be assessed case by case and that factors such as the seriousness of the harm that the data subject’s rights would suffer must be taken into account in each case.387

Where personal data are processed on the basis of “legitimate interests”, the data subject has the right to object at any time, on grounds relating to his particular situation, to the processing of personal data concerning him.388 The controller must stop the processing unless it puts forward compelling legitimate grounds for continuing the processing.389

B. Grounds of Lawfulness in the Processing of Special Categories of Personal Data

Data relating to a person’s race, ethnic origin, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion, sect or other beliefs, appearance and dress, membership of an association, foundation or trade union, health, sex life, criminal convictions and security measures, together with biometric and genetic data, are special categories of personal data, and the processing of such data is prohibited as a rule.390 Where the exceptions set out in Art. 9(2) of the Regulation are present, however, special categories of personal data may be processed:

(a) The data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for one or more specified purposes;

(b) Processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and exercising the specific rights of the controller or of the data subject in the field of employment and social security and social protection law, in so far as it is authorised by Union or Member State law or by a collective agreement concluded pursuant to Member State law which provides for appropriate safeguards for the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject;

(c) Processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving consent;

(d) Processing is carried out, in the course of its legitimate activities with appropriate safeguards, by a foundation, association or any other not-for-profit body with a political, philosophical, religious or trade union aim, on condition that the processing relates solely to the members or former members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in connection with its purposes and that the personal data are not disclosed outside that body without the consent of the data subjects;

(e) Processing relates to personal data which are manifestly made public by the data subject;

(f) Processing is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or whenever courts are acting in their judicial capacity;

(g) Processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of Union or Member State law which is proportionate to the aim pursued, respects the essence of the right to data protection and provides for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject;

(h) Processing is necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for the assessment of the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social care or treatment or the management of health or social care systems and services, on the basis of Union or Member State law or pursuant to a contract with a health professional;

(i) Processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, on the basis of Union or Member State law which provides for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particular professional secrecy;

(j) Processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes.

In addition, the Regulation provides that Member States may maintain or introduce further conditions, including limitations, with regard to genetic data, biometric data or data concerning health.391

III. Rules on the Security of Processing A. Principal Provisions on Data Security

The rules on the security of processing place the controller and the processor under an obligation to take appropriate technical and organisational measures in order to prevent any unauthorised interference with processing operations.392 In this context, taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller and the processor implement, where appropriate, appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk.393

Some of the measures that may be taken are specified in the Regulation. Accordingly, measures such as (a) the pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data; (b) the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing systems and services; (c) the ability to restore the availability of and access to personal data in a timely manner in the event of a physical or technical incident; (d) a process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of technical and organisational measures for ensuring the security of the processing,394 may be applied in order to ensure the security of processing. It should also be borne in mind that the most general measure to be taken to ensure data security is to use personal data only where this is really necessary and to the extent necessary.395

It should be noted that possessing the right equipment – hardware and software – is not sufficient to ensure data security. Achieving this objective requires internal organisational rules. Such rules may include, for example, informing employees about data security and explaining their responsibilities under data protection law, ensuring that personal data are used only in accordance with the instructions of the competent person or with general rules, and clearly defining the limits of authority and the responsibilities in relation to the processing of personal data.396

Furthermore, for the sake of the security of processing, the Regulation imposes on the controller, in the event of a personal data breach, an obligation to notify the breach to the supervisory authority where the personal data breach is likely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.397

The measures which a controller or processor may take to improve data security include the designation of personal data protection officers, the training of employees in data security, and the regular conduct of audits, penetration tests and quality tests.398

B. Confidentiality

In the Regulation, confidentiality is recognised as a general principle.399 Art. 5(1)(f) of the Regulation lays down, under the name “integrity and confidentiality”, the principle that personal data “must be processed in a manner that ensures the security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures”. In addition, as stated above, Art. 32 provides that the controller and the processor must take appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a high level of data security; in this context, measures such as the pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data and the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing systems and services are cited as examples. Furthermore, Art. 28 states that the details of the processing must be governed, as between the controller and the processor, by a contract or other legal act, and that in that contract or other legal act the processor must ensure that persons authorised to process the personal data have committed themselves to confidentiality or are under an appropriate statutory obligation of confidentiality.

The obligation of confidentiality does not arise in cases where information relating to personal data is known to an individual solely by reason of that individual’s own private situation. In such cases the above-mentioned Art. 28 and Art. 32 are not taken into account, because the use of personal data by such persons does not fall within the scope of application of the Regulation.400 In Art. 2(2)

(c) of the Regulation it is expressly stated that this Regulation “shall not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity”. The point to be noted here is that, in the Bodil Lindqvist401 case, the CJEU stated that this exception must be interpreted narrowly.402

Another aspect of the obligation of confidentiality is the “confidentiality of communications”, and this obligation is subject to the e-Privacy Directive. The rules of that directive on ensuring the confidentiality of electronic communications provide that Member States must ensure that the surveillance of or listening to communications and the related metadata is prevented, other than where carried out by the persons using them or with the consent of the persons using them.403 The e-Privacy Directive also states that countries may, by provisions of their national law, introduce exceptions to this principle for the purposes of national security, defence and the prevention and detection of crime, and only if necessary and proportionate for those purposes.404

C. Personal Data Breach Notification

In the event of a breach of the security of personal data, the breach must be notified to the supervisory authority and to the data subject, having regard to the risk it poses to the data subject.405 In this context, a personal data breach is a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or processed.406 Data breaches can have very dangerous consequences for individuals’ rights to privacy and data protection. This is because a data breach means that the data subject loses control over his data.407 In this connection the Article 29 Working Party has stated that breaches may have three effects on personal data: disclosure, loss and/or alteration.408

Having regard to the wording of the Regulation, the existence of intent or negligence is irrelevant for there to be a personal data breach; how and why the breach occurred is of no significance in this respect.409 The notification obligation, however, will not arise with every breach.410

Under the Regulation, in the event of a personal data breach, the controller must notify the personal data breach to the competent supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours at the latest of becoming aware of the breach, unless the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. In the event of delay, the notification must also state the reasons for the delay.411 As is apparent from the relevant provision of the Regulation, the notification obligation will arise only where the data breach is likely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.

The personal data breach notification to be made to the supervisory authorities must contain, at least, the nature of the personal data breach, including the categories and approximate number of data subjects concerned and the categories and approximate number of personal data records concerned; the name and contact details of the data protection officer or other contact point where more information can be obtained; the likely consequences of the personal data breach; and, including those taken to mitigate the possible adverse effects of the personal data breach, the measures taken or proposed to be taken by the controller to address the personal data breach.412

The Regulation’s rules on data breach notification differ in certain respects from Convention No. 108 and from Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK). Under Convention No. 108, controllers must notify the breach to the competent supervisory authority “without delay” where the data breach is likely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.413 The KVKK, moreover, provides that where the personal data processed are obtained by others through unlawful means, the controller must notify this to the data subject and to the Board “as soon as possible”.414 Another point to be addressed here is that the Law has defined a personal data breach as personal data being “obtained by others through unlawful means”. It is therefore possible to say that the rules introduced by the Regulation are more comprehensive and detailed.

Whereas the Regulation provides that the data breach notification to the supervisory authority is to be made “within 72 hours at the latest”, data breaches which are likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons must be communicated by the controller to the data subject “without undue delay”.415 In this communication the nature of the personal data breach must be described in clear and plain language;416 the communication must also contain information similar to that in the notification made to the supervisory authority.417 In some cases, however, the controller is under no obligation to notify the data subject. For example, the controller is not under a notification obligation if it has implemented appropriate technical and organisational protection measures and has applied those measures to the personal data affected by the personal data breach.418 Nor will notification be required where the controller has, after the breach, taken measures to reduce the likelihood of the high risk in question materialising.419 Finally, if the notification would involve disproportionate effort, the controller cannot be expected to make it; in such a case the data subject may be informed of the breach by other means, for example by a public communication.420

The obligation to inform the supervisory authority and the data subject of personal data breaches is laid down essentially with regard to controllers. However, breaches that are subject to notification may also occur on the side of the processor.421 For that reason, the processor must, after becoming aware of a personal data breach, notify the controller “without any delay”.422

IV. Rules on Accountability and Compliance

The principle of accountability is of considerable importance for the effective application of the rules on data protection. In this connection the controller is required to demonstrate that it acts in compliance with the data protection rules and must therefore be in a position to do so. Moreover, accountability should not be thought of as arising only after a breach has occurred. Controllers must, at every stage of the processing, operate in accordance with a processing policy that is appropriate and conducive to the protection of data. The Regulation states that controllers must take appropriate technical and organisational measures in order to be able, and to be in a position, to demonstrate that they carry out processing in compliance with the rules.423

A. Data Protection Officers

The Regulation provides, in certain cases, for the designation of “data protection officers”, who are to inform and advise controllers with regard to operating in conformity with the data protection rules. Data protection officers also act as an intermediary between the supervisory authorities, data subjects and the organisation by which they are designated.424

Under Convention No. 108, designating a data protection officer was regarded as one of the methods that could be chosen in order to demonstrate compliance with the data protection rules. Under the Regulation, by contrast, the designation of a data protection officer is not always at the discretion of controllers and processors but is mandatory in certain cases.425 The Regulation provides that the designation of a data protection officer is mandatory where (i) the processing is carried out by a public authority or body, (ii) the core activities of the controller or the processor consist of processing operations which, by virtue of their nature, their scope and/or their purposes, require regular and systematic monitoring of data subjects on a large scale, or (iii) the core activities of the controller or the processor consist of the large-scale processing of special categories of data or of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences.426 Although terms used in this provision such as “systematic monitoring on a large scale” and “core activities” are not defined in the Regulation, the Article 29 Working Party has published guidelines on how they are to be interpreted.427 For example, a hospital and a health insurance company are controllers most of whose activities consist of the large-scale processing of special categories of personal data.428

The Regulation provides that, in cases other than those explained above in which the designation of a data protection officer is mandatory, the controller or processor, or associations and other bodies representing controllers or processors, may also designate a data protection officer. In addition, Union or Member State law may introduce an obligation to designate a data protection officer for other organisations as well, beyond the cases listed, and in such cases those persons, associations or bodies must designate a data protection officer.429

Where a data protection officer has been designated, the controller and the processor ensure that he is involved, properly and in a timely manner, in all issues relating to the protection of personal data.430 For example, the data protection officer must be involved in the giving of advice on carrying out a data protection impact assessment.431 For the data protection officer to be able to perform his tasks effectively, controllers and processors must provide him with the necessary resources.432 For example, data protection officers must be provided with financial resources, infrastructure and equipment in connection with the performance of their tasks, and must receive continuous training so that they can develop their expertise and stay up to date.433

In addition, the Regulation lays down certain guarantees to ensure that data protection officers are able to act independently. In this connection the controller and the processor ensure that the data protection officer does not receive any instructions regarding the performance of his tasks. Moreover, the data protection officer may not be dismissed or penalised by the controller or the processor for performing his tasks.434

The tasks of the data protection officer include, at least, informing and advising controllers and processors and the employees who carry out processing of their obligations under the data protection provisions; monitoring compliance with the policies of the controller and the processor in relation to the protection of personal data, including the awareness-raising and training of staff involved in processing operations and the related audits; providing advice, where requested, as regards the data protection impact assessment; cooperating with the supervisory authority; acting as a contact point for the supervisory authority on issues relating to processing, including prior consultation; and, where appropriate, providing advice with regard to any other matter.435

Regulation 45/2001 on personal data held by EU institutions and bodies provides that each Union institution and body must designate a data protection officer.436 In this context, the data protection officer is tasked with ensuring that the provisions of that Regulation are applied correctly within the EU institutions and bodies and that data subjects and controllers have been informed of their rights and obligations.437 In line with the Regulation, Regulation 45/2001 also states that data protection officers must be independent in the performance of their tasks and that they must be provided with the staff and resources necessary for those tasks.438 One of the important innovations introduced by the GDPR is that it obliges controller/processor companies of a certain scale to have, as data protection officer, a person who can be involved in issues relating to the protection of personal data (GDPR, Art. 38(1)) and who is an expert in data protection law and practice (GDPR, rec. 97). The data protection officer provides the link between the supervisory authorities, the data subjects and the controller/processor and, because he facilitates compliance with the GDPR, is regarded as a cornerstone of the responsibility of controller/processor companies.439 Controller/processor companies must provide the data protection officer with the necessary resources. The data protection officer should be seen as an important supporter of, and contributor to, the persons/groups/organisations engaged in data processing. The tasks of the data protection officer are laid down as follows (GDPR, Art. 39(1)):

- To inform and advise the controller/processor and the employees who carry out processing activities of their obligations under the GDPR and other national data protection legislation,

- To monitor compliance with the policies of the controller/processor in relation to the protection of personal data, including the audits relating to the awareness-raising and training of staff involved in processing activities,

- To provide advice, where requested, as regards the data protection impact assessment,

- To cooperate with the supervisory authority

- To act as a contact point for the supervisory authority on issues relating to processing (including prior consultation) and, where appropriate, to be consulted on the matter.

The data protection officer must perform his tasks having regard to the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing and to the risks of the processing operations (GDPR, Art. 39(2)). The data protection officer may be an employee of the controller/processor and may fulfil the tasks on the basis of a service contract (GDPR, Art. 37(6)). The controller is obliged to publish the contact details of the data protection officer and to communicate them to the supervisory authority (GDPR, Art. 37(7)).

B. Records of Activities

In order to be able to demonstrate that the rules on data processing have been complied with, and thus to be held accountable for data processing activities, persons are generally required to document and record their activities.440 Moreover, the recording of processing activities also enables the supervisory authorities to review the lawfulness of data processing.441 The Regulation provides that each controller and, where applicable, the controller’s representative must maintain a record of the processing activities under its responsibility.442 That record must contain all of the following information:

(a) The name and contact details of the controller and, where applicable, the joint controller, the controller’s representative and the data protection officer;

(b) The purposes of the processing;

(c) A description of the categories of data subjects and of the categories of personal data relating to the processing;

(d) The categories of recipients to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed, including recipients in third countries or international organisations;

(e) Where applicable, transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organisation, including the documentation of suitable safeguards;

(f) Where possible, the envisaged time limits for erasure of the different categories of data;

(g) Where possible, a general description of the technical and organisational security measures.443

Apart from controllers, the Regulation also provides that processors and, where applicable, processors’ representatives are under an obligation to maintain a record of all categories of processing activities carried out on behalf of a controller.444 Since, before the adoption of the Regulation, only the obligations of the controller were regulated in the contract between the controller and the processor, the express imposition on processors of an obligation to keep a record of their activities is regarded as a major development.445

In addition, the Regulation has introduced an exception to the obligation to record processing activities. Accordingly, no such obligation arises for the controller or the processor in the case of an enterprise or an organisation employing fewer than 250 persons. However, for exemption from the obligation to record processing activities it is further required that the processing carried out by the controller or processor is not likely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects, that the processing is carried out only occasionally, or that the processing does not include special categories of data or personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences.446

C. Data Protection Impact Assessment and Prior Consultation

Data processing activities entail certain risks, at levels that vary according to the nature and scope of the processing. In this framework, before commencing data processing activities, controllers must examine and assess the consequences which the risks of the planned processing may have for the rights of individuals. This assessment will enable controllers to identify, address and mitigate possible risks in advance and, consequently, to limit the negative impact of those risks on the rights of individuals as a result of the data processing.447 In this respect, the data protection impact assessment is a preventive data protection tool.448

The Regulation imposes on the controller the obligation, where a data processing operation is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, to carry out, prior to the processing, an assessment of the impact of that processing operation on the protection of personal data.449 The Regulation has also specified the processing operations which present a high risk and for which a data protection impact assessment is therefore most needed. Accordingly, where the data processing involves (i) a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons which is based on automated processing, including profiling, and on which decisions are based that produce legal effects concerning the natural person or significantly affect the natural person; (ii) the processing on a large scale of special categories of personal data or of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences; or (iii) the systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale, that data processing is deemed to carry a high risk and a data protection impact assessment is deemed to be necessary.450

With regard to the obligation to carry out a data protection impact assessment, the supervisory authority must establish a list of the kinds of processing operations which are subject to this obligation and a list of those which are exempt from it, and must make those lists public.451

Where a data protection impact assessment has to be carried out, controllers must assess the purposes, the necessity and the proportionality of the data processing, as well as the possible risks which it creates for the rights of individuals.452 The impact assessment must also contain the measures envisaged to address the risks, including safeguards, security measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data and to demonstrate compliance with the Regulation.453

The Article 29 Working Party has laid down principles concerning data protection impact assessments and the determination of whether a processing operation will result in a high risk. Accordingly, it has developed nine criteria for determining whether a data protection impact assessment is required for a given processing operation; what has to be examined in this framework is whether the data processing activity involves the following:

(1) Evaluation and scoring,

(2) Automated decision-making with legal or other significant effect,

(3) Systematic monitoring,

(4) Special categories of data,

(5) Data processing on a large scale,

(6) Matched or combined datasets,

(7) Data concerning vulnerable data subjects,

(8) Innovative use or the application of technological or organisational solutions,

(9) The data processing itself preventing data subjects from exercising a right or from benefiting from a contract or a service.454

The Article 29 Working Party has stated that, where fewer than two of the nine situations listed are present, the data processing activity will not constitute a high risk and that there is therefore no need to carry out a data protection impact assessment.455 In addition, the Article 29 Working Party recommends that, in cases where it is uncertain whether a data protection impact assessment is required, the assessment be carried out, because it helps controllers to comply with data protection rules.456 Finally, the Article 29 Working Party considers it important that a data protection impact assessment be carried out where a new data processing technology is introduced.457

If the data protection impact assessment shows that the data processing would constitute a high risk to the rights of individuals in the absence of measures taken by the controller to mitigate the risk, the controller must consult the supervisory authority prior to the processing.458

Controller companies began to make the preparations necessary for GDPR compliance even before the GDPR entered into force. In this context, the controller must first of all, taking into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation, the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing as well as the risks which the processing entails for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures (such as pseudonymisation) both at the time of the determination of the means for processing the data and at the time of the processing itself, ensure that data protection principles are implemented effectively (such as the principle of data minimisation) and in this way safeguard the rights of data subjects (GDPR, Art. 25(1)).

Within the framework of these principles, where the processing of personal data is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of the person concerned, the controller is obliged, before the data are processed, to carry out a “data protection impact assessment (DPIA)”, that is, an assessment of the impact of that processing operation on the protection of personal data (GDPR, Art. 35(1)). This assessment must contain at least the following (GDPR, Art. 35(7)):

- A systematic description of the envisaged processing operation and the purposes of the processing

-An assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processing operation in relation to the purpose,

-An assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of the data subject,

- The measures and mechanisms for the protection of the data subject’s personal data.

Accordingly, the controller company is obliged to satisfy the minimum requirements for the protection of personal data and, where necessary, to carry out a data protection impact assessment. Processors, too, have been placed under an obligation to assist the controller with the data protection impact assessment where they are requested to do so or where this is necessary (GDPR, rec. 95).

D. Codes of Conduct

The Regulation has called on the Member States, the supervisory authorities, the Board and the Commission to encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct intended to contribute to the proper application of the Regulation, taking account of the specific features of the various processing sectors and the specific needs of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.459 In this framework, the purpose of codes of conduct is to give abstract and technical legal rules an application-oriented and practical interpretation.460 For this reason, codes of conduct are aimed at providing solutions relating to a particular sector or to the technologies used in data processing activities.461

Codes of conduct may be drawn up in respect of any aspect of the Regulation. Art. 40(2) of the Regulation lists, by way of example, some of the matters on which codes of conduct may be drawn up in order to specify its application. These are:

(a) Fair and transparent data processing,

(b) The legitimate interests pursued by controllers in specific contexts,

(c) The collection of personal data,

(d) The pseudonymisation of personal data,

(e) The information provided to the public and to data subjects,

(f) The exercise of the rights of data subjects,

(g) The information provided to children and the protection of children, and the manner in which the consent of the holders of parental responsibility over children is to be obtained,

(h) The measures to ensure the security of processing,

(i) The notification of personal data breaches to supervisory authorities and to data subjects,

(j) The transfer of personal data to third countries or international organisations, or

(k) out-of-court proceedings and other dispute resolution procedures for resolving disputes between controllers and data subjects.

Art. 40(2) further provides that codes of conduct may be prepared, amended or extended by associations and other bodies representing categories of controllers or processors. When preparing codes of conduct, these organisations/bodies must consult stakeholders and take their views and suggestions into account.462

In addition, apart from the substantive interpretation of the Regulation, codes of conduct must also contain rules of procedure which enable a body that has an appropriate level of expertise in relation to the subject-matter of the code and is accredited for that purpose by the competent supervisory authority463 to carry out the task of monitoring compliance with the code.464

Once the code of conduct has been prepared, the organisation/body concerned submits the draft code, amendment or extension to the competent supervisory authority. The supervisory authority gives an opinion on whether that draft complies with the Regulation. If the supervisory authority finds that the draft provides sufficient safeguards, it approves it.465

Where the code of conduct does not relate to processing activities in several Member States and is approved by the supervisory authority, the competent supervisory authority registers and publishes the code.466 Controllers may adhere to such registered and published codes of conduct in order to demonstrate their compliance with particular aspects of the Regulation. However, demonstrating compliance by adhering to a code of conduct is possible only if the supervisory authority of the Member State concerned has registered and published the code of conduct in question.467 Where, on the other hand, the code of conduct relates to processing activities in several Member States, the competent national supervisory authority must first obtain the opinion of the Board on the draft.468 If the Board confirms that the draft complies with the Regulation, the Board submits the draft to the Commission.469 If the Commission also confirms that the draft complies with the Regulation, the Commission decides, by way of implementing acts, that the draft has general validity within the EU470 and ensures appropriate publicity for the approved codes which have been decided as having general validity.471

In addition, as stated above, for the monitoring of compliance with codes of conduct the competent supervisory authority will accredit an independent body which has an appropriate level of expertise in relation to the subject-matter of the code.472 That body will monitor the compliance of the controller and the processor with the code of conduct and, where the code is infringed, will take appropriate action, including the suspension or exclusion of the controller or processor from the code.473 That body must also inform the competent supervisory authority of such actions and of the reasons for taking them.474

Although the criteria required for accreditation are to be determined in detail by the competent supervisory authorities,475 under Art. 41(2) of the Regulation the body concerned may be accredited for the purpose of monitoring compliance with codes of conduct if it has the following characteristics:

(a) It has independence and expertise in relation to the subject-matter of the code,

(b) It has established procedures which allow it to assess the eligibility of the controllers and processors concerned to apply the code of conduct, to monitor their compliance with the provisions of the code and to review the operation of the code periodically,

(c) It has established procedures and structures to handle complaints about infringements of the code or about the manner in which the code has been, or is being, implemented by a controller or processor, and has made those procedures and structures transparent to data subjects and the public, and

(d) Its tasks and duties do not result in a conflict of interests.

Finally, where the conditions for accreditation are not, or are no longer, met or where actions taken by the body infringe the Regulation, the competent supervisory authority may revoke the accreditation of that body.476

E. Certification

Data protection certification mechanisms and data protection seals and marks (“certification”) are further methods by which controllers and processors can demonstrate their compliance with the Regulation.477 In this context, the Regulation requires the Member States, the supervisory authorities, the Board and the Commission to encourage controllers and processors to obtain certification.478 It is expressly provided that the specific needs of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises must be taken into account in certification mechanisms.479 The Regulation also states that certification is voluntary and is made available via a transparent process.480

Since certification mechanisms make it possible for a controller or processor to prove that its processing operations comply with the data protection standards under the Regulation, they will increase the trust placed in that controller or processor and strengthen its competitive advantage.481 Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that a certification which has been granted does not reduce the responsibility of the controller or processor for compliance with the Regulation and is without prejudice to the tasks and powers of the competent supervisory authorities.482

The Regulation does not contain detailed rules on how certification is to be carried out; it provides only basic information.483 Accordingly, a certification may be issued by the competent supervisory authority or by certification bodies.484 Those certification bodies must be accredited by the competent supervisory authority or by the national accreditation body.485 In this framework, in order to be accredited, certification bodies must:

(a) Have independence and expertise in relation to the subject-matter of the certification,

(b) Have undertaken to respect the criteria approved by the competent supervisory authority or by the Board,

(c) Have established procedures for the issuing, periodic review and withdrawal of data protection certification, seals and marks,

(d) Have established procedures and structures to handle complaints about infringements of the certification or about the manner in which the certification has been, or is being, implemented by a controller or processor, and have made those procedures and structures transparent to data subjects and the public, and

(e) Have tasks and duties that do not result in a conflict of interests.486 Accreditation may be issued for a maximum period of five years and may be renewed on the same conditions, provided that the certification body meets the requirements listed.487 Moreover, where the conditions for accreditation are not, or are no longer, met or where actions taken by a certification body infringe the Regulation, the competent supervisory authority or the national accreditation body may revoke the accreditation of the certification body concerned.488

In order to obtain certification, the controller or processor must provide the certification body or the competent supervisory authority with all the information and the access to its processing activities which are necessary to conduct the certification procedure.489 Certification may be issued for a maximum of three years and may be renewed, provided that the controller or processor continues to meet the relevant criteria.490

V. Data Protection by Design and by Default

A. Data Protection by Design

The controller must ensure that the rights of data subjects are protected by taking appropriate technical and organisational measures for the purpose of implementing data protection principles effectively and of integrating the safeguards necessary to meet the requirements of the Regulation.491 These measures must be implemented both at the time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the processing itself.492 Furthermore, when deciding on the relevant measures and when implementing them, the controller must take into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity which the processing poses for the rights and freedoms of natural persons.493

B. Data Protection by Default

The controller must take appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for the purpose of the processing are processed.494 That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility.495 For example, a measure taken in accordance with this obligation should ensure that not all of an employer’s employees are able to access the data subject’s personal data.496

d. Adoption of Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (Privacy by default / by design)

While new information technologies increase the privacy and data protection risks that we face, they also develop the methods devised to eliminate those risks. By means of these methods, which are called privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs), the tools that ensure that the personal information of individuals who use technology is kept confidential are diversified and made more effective. In doing so, the aim is that the tools should be lawful and that the functionality of technological systems should be maintained. In this context, preference is given to methods such as reducing the personal data collected to a minimum, using pseudonyms or anonymous data in order to ensure anonymity, and obtaining the informed consent of the user.

Art. 25 GDPR regulates “data protection by design (privacy by design)” and “data protection by default (privacy by default – data protection through default settings)”, which are two methods of privacy-enhancing technologies. Accordingly, taking into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation and the nature, scope and purposes of the processing of the data, as well as the risks, appropriate technical and organisational measures (TOM), such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data protection principles effectively, will be implemented by the controller, and in this way the rights of data subjects will be safeguarded (GDPR, Art. 25(1)). Protection by default will in particular ensure that personal data are not made accessible to an indefinite number of persons without the intervention of the data subject (GDPR, Art. 25(2)). In fulfilling the requirements of this article, an approved certification mechanism pursuant to Art. 42 GDPR may be adopted in order to establish the adequacy of controllers’ standards.

Taking into account the state of the art (the latest technology), the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing as well as the risks for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller and the processor will implement the following technical and organisational measures in order to ensure an appropriate level of security (GDPR, Art. 32(1)):

- The pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data,

- The ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing systems and services,

- The ability to restore the availability of and access to personal data in a timely manner in the event of a physical or technical incident,

- A process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of technical and organisational measures for ensuring the security of the processing.

The concept of the state of the art, which has to be taken into account in ensuring data security, is not defined in the GDPR. In patent law, the state of the art comprises everything made available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of the patent application.497 In the Cambridge Dictionary, state of the art is defined as “very modern and using the most recent ideas and methods”.498 In Wikipedia, by contrast, the state of the art is described as “the highest level of general development achieved at a particular time in a device, technique or scientific field”.499 The most important feature of the state of the art is that it changes over time and is a dynamic concept. In the field of data protection, the state of the art is associated rather with cybersecurity and is understood as denoting the innovation that drives the continuous development of effective security methods and technologies.500 When these innovations are taken into account, the costs of implementation must also be taken into account (GDPR, Art. 25(1), 32(1)). Consequently, controllers and processors will also have to work with competent security companies that implement these new possibilities.

VI. Cross-Border Data Transfers

While the Regulation provides for the free flow of data within the borders of the EU, it lays down that, for personal data to be transferred abroad, certain conditions must be fulfilled and the rules set out in Chapter 5 of the Regulation must be complied with.501 In this context, because the EU is a political union and the free movement of data within the Union is the aim, “transfer abroad” has a special meaning and denotes the transfer of data to third countries outside the EU or to international organisations.502 As the Regulation expressly states, the free movement of personal data within the Union may be neither restricted nor prohibited for reasons connected with the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data.503 It should also be noted that the area of free data flow has been extended by the Agreement on the European Economic Area.504

Another point to be borne in mind before the rules are examined in detail is that the free movement, within the Member States and the European Economic Area, of personal data processed for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the conduct of criminal proceedings is subject not to the Regulation but to Directive 2016/680.505

For data to be transferred to a third country or an international organisation under the Regulation, the personal data must first of all have been obtained in accordance with the Regulation and must be processed in accordance with the Regulation.506 Personal data which have been obtained in accordance with the Regulation and whose processing is carried out in accordance with it may be transferred to a third country or an international organisation in two ways: on the basis of an adequacy decision of the European Commission or, in the absence of an adequacy decision of the Commission, where certain conditions are met.507

A. Transfers on the Basis of an Adequacy Decision of the European Commission

The Regulation provides that a transfer of personal data to a third country or an international organisation may take place without any specific authorisation being required where, in respect of a third country, a territory or one or more sectors within that third country, or an international organisation, the Commission has decided that it ensures an adequate level of protection.508 The expression “ensuring an adequate level of protection” in this article has been interpreted by the CJEU as meaning that “the protection afforded by the third country in respect of fundamental rights and freedoms must be essentially equivalent to the guarantees afforded by EU law”.509

The Commission decides whether foreign countries ensure an adequate level of protection by examining their domestic law, the international commitments to which they are subject and the independent supervisory mechanisms which they have.510 If the Commission is satisfied that the third country or international organisation concerned ensures an adequate level of protection, it may adopt a binding “adequacy decision”.511 Instead of adopting this decision only for the country as a whole and with effect in every field, the Commission may also adopt it in respect of a territory or one or more sectors within the country in question.512 Even where such a decision exists, if a person claims, in relation to the transfer of his data to a third country, that an adequate level of protection is not ensured by the country concerned, the local supervisory authorities are competent to examine that claim.513

An important point to be made regarding the adequacy decision is that, whereas Directive 95/46/EC provided for the possibility of this decision being taken both by the Member States and by the European Commission, the Regulation provides that it may be taken only by the Commission.514

The Commission monitors on an ongoing basis the developments in third countries and international organisations in respect of which an adequacy decision has been adopted.515 The adequacy decisions adopted must be reviewed at least every four years, taking into account all developments.516 In addition, in the light of the information obtained, it is always possible for the adequacy decision to be repealed, amended or suspended.517 Where such a situation exists, consultations may also be held between the Commission and the third country or international organisation concerned with a view to remedying the situation.518 The Regulation expressly states that decisions adopted by the Commission on the basis of Directive 95/46/EC are to remain in force until amended, replaced or repealed by a Commission Decision adopted in accordance with the Regulation.519

Finally, the Regulation provides that the third countries, the territories and sectors within a third country and the international organisations for which the Commission has decided that an adequate level of protection is or is no longer ensured are to be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and on its website.520

B. Transfers in the Absence of an Adequacy Decision of the European Commission

In the absence of a decision adopted by the European Commission, a controller or processor may transfer personal data to a third country or an international organisation only if that controller or processor has provided appropriate safeguards, and on condition that enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects are available.521 The Regulation lists how appropriate safeguards may be provided in this context without any specific authorisation from a supervisory authority being required. Accordingly, appropriate safeguards may be provided by the following means:

(a) A legally binding and enforceable instrument between public authorities or bodies,

(b) Binding corporate rules,

(c) Standard data protection clauses adopted by the Commission,

(d) Standard data protection clauses adopted by a supervisory authority and approved by the Commission,

(e) An approved code of conduct,

(f) An approved certification mechanism.522 In addition to these methods, tailored contractual clauses between the controller or processor and the controller, processor or recipient of the personal data in the third country or international organisation may also constitute an appropriate safeguard for the transfer of data abroad, provided that they are authorised by the competent supervisory authority.523 Likewise, subject to authorisation by the competent supervisory authority, provisions to be inserted into administrative arrangements between public authorities or bodies which include enforceable and effective data subject rights may also be regarded as an appropriate safeguard.524

C. Derogations for Specific Situations

The Regulation provides that, even in the absence of an adequacy decision or of appropriate safeguards, a transfer of personal data to a third country or an international organisation may take place where certain situations exist. These situations are listed exhaustively in the Regulation and are as follows:

(a) The data subject has explicitly consented to the proposed transfer, after having been informed of the risks of such transfers for the data subject due to the absence of an adequacy decision and appropriate safeguards,

(b) The transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and the controller or for the implementation of pre-contractual measures taken at the data subject’s request,

(c) The transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and another natural or legal person,

(d) The transfer is necessary for important reasons of public interest,

(e) The transfer is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims,

(f) The transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of other persons,

(g) The transfer is made from a register which is open to consultation.525 Where a transfer is not based on an adequacy decision, on the provision of appropriate safeguards or on the derogations explained above, a transfer to a third country or an international organisation may take place only if the transfer is not repetitive, concerns only a limited number of data subjects, is necessary for the purposes of compelling legitimate interests pursued by the controller which are not overridden by the interests or rights and freedoms of the data subject, and the controller has assessed all the circumstances surrounding the data transfer and has, on the basis of that assessment, provided suitable safeguards with regard to the protection of personal data.526

According to the Article 29 Working Party, transfers of data abroad that are based on a derogation for specific situations must be exceptional in nature and must be assessed separately for the situation of each individual; moreover, this method must not be repetitive and must not be used for large-scale transfers.527

D. Transfers Based on International Agreements

The European Union and the Member States may conclude international agreements with third countries which regulate the transfer of personal data to third countries for specific purposes.528 The agreements to be concluded must contain appropriate safeguards ensuring the protection of the personal data of the individual concerned.529 The Regulation is without prejudice to such international agreements.530

§ 4. Independent Supervision

Independent supervision is one of the indispensable elements of European data protection law. Indeed, Art. 8(3) of the EU Charter provides that compliance with the rules on the protection of personal information is to be subject to control by an independent authority.531 The Regulation provides that each Member State must ensure that one or more independent public authorities (supervisory authority) are responsible for monitoring the application of the Regulation, in order to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons in relation to processing and to facilitate the free flow of personal data within the Union.532 The importance of independent supervision for the protection of personal data is also reflected in the case law of the courts. For example, in Schrems533 the CJEU stated that, even where there is an adequacy decision adopted by the Commission for transfers abroad, if a complaint on the matter is lodged with the national supervisory authority, the national supervisory authority must examine that complaint with due diligence.534

I. Independence

The Regulation expressly provides that each supervisory authority must act with complete independence in performing its tasks and exercising its powers in accordance with the Regulation.535 The ability of the supervisory authority, its members and its staff to remain independent of direct or indirect external influence is a very important requirement for ensuring objectivity when decisions are taken on matters relating to data protection.536 For example, in European Commission v. Austria the CJEU stated that the fact that the workforce of the Austrian Data Protection Authority was provided by the Federal Administration and that the Authority was under an obligation to keep the Administration informed at all times infringed the requirement of independence of the supervisory authority laid down in EU data protection law.537

Under the rules in the Regulation, in order for supervisory authorities to be completely independent in performing their tasks and exercising their powers:

(i) The members of each supervisory authority must, in performing their tasks and exercising their powers in accordance with the Regulation, act free from direct or indirect external influence and must neither seek nor take instructions from anybody.538

(ii) The members of each supervisory authority must refrain from any action incompatible with their duties and must not, during their term of office, engage in any occupation incompatible with that office, whether gainful or not.539

(iii) Each Member State must ensure that each supervisory authority is provided with the human, technical and financial resources, premises and infrastructure necessary for the effective performance of its tasks and the effective exercise of its powers.540

(iv) Each Member State must ensure that each supervisory authority chooses its own staff itself and has its own staff.541

(v) Each Member State must ensure that the financial control to which each supervisory authority is subject does not affect the independence of the supervisory authority and that it has separate annual public budgets, which may be part of the overall state budget or national budget.542

II. Powers and Tasks

The supervisory authority is the principal body ensuring compliance with the Regulation in national law. Proceeding from this aim, supervisory authorities have wide tasks and powers which go beyond monitoring and also include proactive and preventive supervisory activities. In order to be able to perform their tasks, supervisory authorities must have investigative, advisory and corrective powers. The powers of the supervisory authorities are listed in Art. 58 of the Regulation:

(a) To advise controllers and data subjects on all matters relating to data protection,

(b) To approve standard contractual clauses, binding corporate rules or administrative arrangements,

(c) To investigate processing operations and to intervene accordingly,

(d) To request the provision of certain relevant information for the supervision of the activities of controllers,

(e) To issue warnings or reprimands to controllers and to order that personal data breach notifications be sent to data subjects,

(f) To order the rectification, blocking, erasure or destruction of data,

(g) To impose a temporary or definitive limitation on processing operations,

(h) To refer a matter to the courts.543 In order for the supervisory authority to be able to perform its tasks and exercise its powers, it must have access to all the personal data and information necessary for an investigation, as well as to the premises in which the controller keeps the relevant information.544 The CJEU has stated that the powers of the supervisory authority must be interpreted broadly so that data protection can be ensured effectively for data subjects.545

Each supervisory authority is competent to exercise its powers on its own territory.546 In addition, the Regulation establishes a “one-stop-shop” mechanism and requires cooperation between the different supervisory authorities. Accordingly, in order that effective cooperation can be ensured in cases involving cross-border data processing, the Regulation provides for the supervisory authority of the controller’s main or single establishment to be established as lead supervisory authority.547

Independent supervisory authorities are also empowered to deal with requests and complaints, to raise public awareness of data protection and to advise those involved in national decision-making on legislative and administrative measures relating to the processing of personal data.548

Under the “one-stop-shop” mechanism of the Regulation, where more than one supervisory authority is established in a Member State, that Member State designates the supervisory authority which is to represent those authorities in the Board and sets out the mechanism to ensure compliance by the other authorities with the rules relating to the consistency mechanism referred to in Art. 63.

III. Cooperation

While the Regulation draws a general framework for cooperation between supervisory authorities, it lays down more specific rules for the cooperation of supervisory authorities in connection with cross-border data processing.549

Under the Regulation, supervisory authorities must provide each other with relevant information and mutual assistance in order to implement and apply the Regulation in a consistent manner, and must put in place measures for effective cooperation with one another.550 In this context, mutual assistance covers, in particular, information requests and supervisory measures, such as requests to carry out prior authorisations and consultations, inspections and investigations.551

Under the “one-stop-shop” mechanism of the Regulation, if a controller or processor has establishments in more than one Member State or if, although it has a single establishment, its processing activities substantially affect data subjects in more than one Member State, the supervisory authority of the main (or single) establishment is the lead authority for the cross-border activities of the controller or processor.552

In order that a high level of data protection can be ensured, the lead supervisory authority must not act alone but must cooperate with the other supervisory authorities concerned in the adoption of decisions on the processing of personal data carried out by controllers or processors.553 Cooperation between the supervisory authorities concerned may include the mutual exchange of information, mutual assistance, and the conduct of joint investigations and monitoring.554 This cooperation is an endeavour that must be made in order to ensure consistency and to reach consensus.555

Each supervisory authority must reply to a request for mutual assistance from another supervisory authority without delay and no later than one month after receiving the request.556 Where the controller has establishments in more than one Member State, the supervisory authorities may conduct joint operations, including joint investigations and joint enforcement measures, in which members or staff of the supervisory authorities of other Member States are involved.557

IV. European Data Protection Board

Another institution of importance in ensuring that data protection rules are applied effectively and consistently within the EU is the European Data Protection Board (the Board).558 The Regulation established the Board as an EU body with legal personality.559 The Board is the successor to the Article 29 Working Party, which Directive 95/46/EC had set up in order to advise the Commission on EU activities affecting the rights of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and to privacy, to promote the uniform application of the directive and to provide the Commission with expert opinion on matters relating to data protection.560

The Board is composed of the head of one supervisory authority of each Member State and of the European Data Protection Supervisor, or their respective representatives.561

The tasks of the Board are set out in detail in Arts. 64, 65 and 70 of the Regulation and may be grouped under three main headings:

• Consistency: The Board may adopt a legally binding decision in three cases:

(i) Where a supervisory authority has raised a relevant and reasoned objection in one of the “one-stop-shop” cases,

(ii) Where there are conflicting views on which supervisory authority is the “lead supervisory authority”,

(iii) Where the competent supervisory authority has not requested the opinion of the Board or does not follow the opinion of the Board.562 The fundamental task of the Board in this context is to ensure that the Regulation is applied consistently throughout the EU.563

• Advice: The tasks of the Board also include advising the Commission on any issue related to data protection in the EU.564

• Guidance: The Board also issues guidelines, recommendations and best practices in order to ensure the consistent application of the Regulation and to ensure cooperation and the exchange of information between supervisory authorities. In addition, the Board must encourage associations of controllers and processors to draw up codes of conduct and to establish data protection certification mechanisms and seals.565 A final point to be mentioned is that an action may be brought before the CJEU against the decisions of the Board.566

V. Consistency Mechanism

A consistency mechanism has been provided for in order to ensure that the Regulation is applied uniformly in all Member States. Accordingly, in order to contribute to the consistent application of the Regulation within the EU, the supervisory authorities must cooperate with each other and, where relevant, with the Commission through the consistency mechanism set out in the Regulation.

Accordingly, the consistency mechanism is used in two situations. The first concerns the opinions to be issued under Art. 64 of the Regulation where a competent supervisory authority intends to adopt one of certain measures, or for the determination of standard contractual clauses. The second comprises the binding decisions which the Board issues for supervisory authorities in “one-stop-shop” cases and the cases in which the supervisory authority has not requested the opinion of the Board or has not followed its opinion.567

VI. Urgency Procedure

In exceptional circumstances, where a supervisory authority concerned needs to act urgently in order to protect the rights and freedoms of data subjects, that supervisory authority may, by way of derogation from the consistency mechanism or the cooperation procedure, immediately adopt provisional measures which are valid for a specified period not exceeding three months and are intended to produce legal effects within the territory of the State concerned.568 The supervisory authority which has adopted the provisional measure communicates without delay the reasons for adopting those measures to the other supervisory authorities concerned, to the Board and to the Commission.569 The same supervisory authority may, giving its reasons, request the Board to issue an urgent opinion or a final decision. Such a request may be made by any supervisory authority, stating its reasons, where no appropriate measure has been taken in a situation in which there is an urgent need to act in order to protect the rights and freedoms of the persons concerned.570 In this context, an urgent opinion or an urgent final decision is adopted within two weeks by a simple majority of the members of the Board.571

§ 5. Rights of Data Subjects and Restrictions I. Rights of Data Subjects A. Right to Be Informed

It is of very great importance that data subjects know whether personal data concerning them are being processed and which of their personal data are being processed, so that they can maintain control over their data and exercise their rights arising from the law on the protection of personal data. For this reason, the Regulation imposes on controllers an obligation to inform data subjects when they collect personal data for a planned data processing operation. For this obligation to arise, it is not required that the data subject request information from the controller; it is sufficient that the controller collects personal data in order to process them.572 This is because data subjects have the right to know which of their data are collected, used or processed and how, the risks which the data processing activities involve, the safeguards put in place against those risks, and their rights in relation to the processing.573 Otherwise it would not be possible for individuals to exercise control over their own data and to be protected from the adverse consequences that may arise from the processing. It is precisely these dangers that the “principle of transparency”, explained in detail above, seeks to prevent.

Under Art. 12 of the Regulation, the controller is under an obligation to provide the data subject with all the information relating to the processing, which will be described in detail below, in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language.574 This information may be provided to the data subject in writing or, where appropriate, by other means, including electronic means, and, where requested by the data subject, orally, provided that the identity of the data subject is proven by other means.575 The Regulation further provides that the information to be provided to data subjects may be provided in combination with standardised icons in order to give, in an easily visible, intelligible and clearly legible manner, a meaningful overview of the intended processing.576

One of the illustrative decisions on the right to be informed concerns the case of Smaranda Bara and Others v. Casa Naţională de Asigurări de Sănătate and Others577. In that case, the national administration had transferred the applicants’ information to the National Health Insurance Fund without informing them beforehand. The CJEU stated that informing data subjects that their data are being processed is of great importance, since it substantially affects the exercise of their rights of access to the data being processed, of rectification of those data and of objection to the processing of those data. Although the Court noted that provision is made for the right to be informed to be restricted under certain conditions, it held that, since those conditions were not met in the case at hand, the applicants should have been informed before their data were transferred to the National Health Insurance Fund.578

The Regulation lays down different rules for cases in which personal data are collected from the data subject and cases in which they are not obtained from the data subject. Accordingly, where personal data are collected from the data subject, data subjects must be informed of the following:

(i) the identity and the contact details of the controller and, where applicable, of the controller’s representative,

(ii) the contact details of the data protection officer, where applicable,

(iii) the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing,

(iv) where the processing is based on the interest of the controller or of a 3rd party, the legitimate interests pursued by those persons;

(v) the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data, if any;

(vi) whether it is intended to transfer the personal data to a third country or international organisation, whether or not the transfer decision is based on an adequacy decision by the Commission, or a reference to the appropriate or suitable safeguards relating to the transfer decision and the means by which to obtain a copy of them or where they have been made available,

(vii) the period for which the personal data will be stored or, if that is not possible, the criteria used to determine that period,

(viii) the rights which he has in relation to the data processing and how they are to be exercised,

(ix) whether the provision of personal data is a statutory or contractual requirement, or a requirement necessary to enter into a contract, as well as whether the data subject is obliged to provide the personal data and the possible consequences of failure to provide such data,

(x) the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling,

(xi) the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority,

(xii) the existence of the right to withdraw consent.579

Where, on the other hand, personal data are not obtained from the data subject, the controller must inform the data subject from where and how the personal data were obtained.580 In any event, the controller must provide the data subject with information similar to that listed for the case in which the data are obtained from the data subject.

Furthermore, in accordance with the principles of purpose limitation and transparency, where the controller intends to carry out processing for a purpose other than that which it initially indicated to the data subject, the controller must inform the data subject of that new purpose. It is not possible for the controller to carry out further processing without providing this information and obtaining the data subject’s consent to the new purpose.581

The time at which the information is to be provided will vary according to the source from which the personal data are obtained. Accordingly, where personal data are obtained directly from the data subject, the controller must provide the information at the time when the data are collected.582 Where personal data are not obtained from the data subject, the controller must provide the information within a reasonable period, but at the latest within one month.583 In addition, if a disclosure of the data to another recipient is envisaged, the information must be provided at the latest when the personal data are first disclosed.584

The information must be provided free of charge. However, where it is manifestly apparent that the requests of a data subject are unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character, the controller may charge a reasonable fee or refuse to act on the request.585 The Regulation expressly provides that this obligation does not arise where and insofar as the data subject already has the information.586 Furthermore, where personal data have not been obtained from the data subject, the obligation to inform does not arise if the provision of the relevant information is impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort, in particular in the case of processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes.587

B. Right of Access

The Regulation expressly provides for the right of individuals to access their own personal data. Accordingly, the data subject has the right to obtain from the controller confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him are being processed and, where processing is taking place, the right of access to the personal data concerned and to certain information.588

Under the rules in the Regulation, data subjects have the right to request and to obtain information on the following with regard to personal data:

(i) the purposes of the processing,

(ii) the categories of personal data concerned,

(iii) the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed,

(iv) where applicable, the envisaged period for which the personal data will be stored or, if no period has been determined, the criteria used to determine that period,

(v) the existence of the rights to request rectification and erasure of personal data and restriction of the data processing,

(vi) the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority,

(vii) where the personal data are not obtained from the data subject, the available information as to their sources;

(viii) the existence of automated decision-making and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.589

Under the right of access, the controller must provide the data subject with a copy of the personal data undergoing processing.590 All information provided to the data subject must be intelligible.591 For example, information containing technical abbreviations will not be regarded as sufficient unless the abbreviations are explained.592

According to the case law of the CJEU, the right of access to personal data must not be subject to excessive time limits. For example, in Rijkeboer the CJEU stated that, if data subjects are not granted a right of access to their data relating to the past, it will not be possible for them to exercise rights such as the rectification and erasure of their data, or to have recourse to legal remedies and obtain compensation.593 Consequently, data subjects must have a reasonable opportunity to obtain information on data processing operations that took place in the past.594

C. Right to Request Rectification

The accuracy of data is a quality which must be ensured if data protection is to be provided effectively, and it is directly related to the principle of accuracy explained above.595 Proceeding from this requirement, the Regulation provides that data subjects have the right to obtain from the controller, without undue delay, the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning them.596 At the same time, taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject may request that his incomplete personal data be completed.

Since the right to request rectification makes it possible for data to be processed lawfully, data subjects are under no obligation to state any reason for such requests.597 However, the burden of proof in showing that the data are inaccurate or incomplete lies with the data subject.598 On this point there is the judgment of the ECtHR in Ciubotaru v. Moldova599. In that case the applicant, who had been entered in the official records with Moldovan ethnic identity, applied to have this changed to Romanian, but the request was refused because the applicant was unable to prove his claim. On this point, although the ECtHR found it acceptable for States to require the existence of objective evidence when recording an individual’s ethnic origin, in the case at hand the applicant had in fact already submitted, going beyond a subjective perception of his own ethnic identity, verifiable links between himself and persons of Romanian ethnic origin. National law, however, requires in such a situation the submission of evidence that the applicant’s parents belonged to the Romanian ethnic group. Having regard to the history of Moldova, such a requirement constitutes a major obstacle to the registration of an ethnic identity other than that recorded by the Soviet authorities. In this case the ECtHR concluded that Moldova, by failing to act in accordance with its positive obligations, had violated the applicant’s right to respect for private life.600

Another point concerning the right to rectification is that this right is granted only to “data subjects” and only in respect of “their own personal data”. Accordingly, a person cannot request the rectification of the personal data of a third party.601

D. Right to Request Erasure (Right to Be Forgotten)

The right to erasure, which did not feature as an express and distinct right in the instruments preceding the Regulation, first attracted great attention with the judgment of the CJEU in Google Spain602 and was subsequently strengthened by being included in the Regulation.603 In the Google Spain judgment, the CJEU examined whether Google was under an obligation to erase information relating to the applicant that was no longer up to date. In that case the applicant, a lawyer, claimed that the listing, in the results of a search made by his name on Google, of newspaper reports containing information to the effect that he had been forced to sell his property in order to restructure his social security debts was contrary to Directive 95/46/EC. On this point the CJEU held that, once personal data published under a person’s name have become invalid or irrelevant and where the processing of those data is no longer necessary for the purpose, the personal data concerned must be erased.604

Within the framework of this right, the data subject has the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him without delay. Accordingly, where one of the following situations applies, there is an obligation to erase the data subject’s personal data without delay:

(a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or processed,

(b) the data subject withdraws the consent on which the processing is based and there is no other legal ground for the processing,

(c) the data subject objects to the processing and there is no overriding legitimate ground for the processing,

(d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed,

(e) the erasure of the personal data is mandatory for compliance with a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject,

(f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society services referred to in Art. 8(1) of the Regulation.605

In the context of the right to erasure, the burden of proving that the data processing is lawful lies with the controller, who is responsible for the lawfulness of the processing activities.606 In addition, in accordance with the principle of accountability, the controller must at all times be in a position to demonstrate that the data processing rests on a legal basis.607

The Regulation has placed certain limitations on the right to request erasure. Accordingly, erasure may not be requested where the data processing activity is necessary:

(i) for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information,

(ii) for compliance with a legal obligation which requires processing under Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject, or for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or the exercise of official authority vested in the controller,

(iii) for reasons of public interest in the area of public health,

(iv) for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, in so far as the right to erasure is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the objectives of that processing, or

(v) for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.608

Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged to erase the personal data, the controller must, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform the other controllers which are processing the personal data whose erasure the data subject has requested about the request for erasure.609

The last point to be made concerning this right is that there is a debate as to whether the “right to be forgotten” and the “right to erasure” are one and the same concept. In this context, there are views to the effect that the right to erasure exists only where certain situations are present, such as unlawful processing or the data no longer being necessary for the purpose of the processing, whereas the right to be forgotten exists without any such limitation610.

Since in this article I address the subject from the perspective of the GDPR, I have, in parallel with the Regulation’s approach to the matter, examined the right to request erasure and the right to be forgotten as one and the same right. Art. 17 of the Regulation governs this right and calls it the “right to request erasure (right to be forgotten)”. For this reason, although I essentially subscribe to the view that the right to be forgotten is a separate right that is broader than the right to erasure, in this GDPR-centred article of mine I have likewise used the name and classification right to request erasure (right to be forgotten) to denote both rights.

E. Right to Restriction of Processing

The Regulation provides that, where certain situations exist, data subjects have the right to restrict the processing activities of controllers temporarily.611 The situations in which restriction may be requested in this context are as follows:

(a) where the accuracy of the personal data is contested by the data subject, for a period enabling the controller to verify the accuracy of the personal data,

(b) the processing is unlawful and the data subject opposes the erasure of the personal data and requests the restriction of the use of the data instead,

(c) the controller no longer needs the personal data for the purposes of the processing, but the data subject needs those data for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims,

(d) the data subject has objected to the processing, pending verification of whether the legitimate grounds of the controllers override the legitimate grounds of the data subject.612

Where restriction of data processing is requested, this right may be exercised, for example, by temporarily moving the selected data to another processing system and thus preventing users from accessing those data.613

Finally, the controller must inform the data subject before the restriction on a data processing operation is lifted.614

F. Right to Data Portability

The right to data portability is a right granted to data subjects with the Regulation which had not previously been provided for in any instrument. Under this right, where the processing is based on consent or on a contract or where the processing is carried out by automated means, the data subject has the right to receive the personal data concerning him which he has provided to a controller in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format.615 Data subjects have the right to transmit those personal data to another controller without any hindrance from the controller to which the data were provided.616

Where the right to data portability exists, the data subject has the right to have his personal data transmitted directly from one controller to another, provided that this is technically feasible.617 In order to facilitate this transmission, controllers should develop interoperable formats and thereby enable the right to data portability to be exercised.618

According to the guidelines of the Article 29 Working Party, the right to data portability supports the choice, control and empowerment of the data subject; it gives the data subject the possibility of controlling his own personal data.619 Accordingly, the right to data portability consists principally of the following elements:

(a) the right of data subjects to receive the personal data concerning them which are processed by a controller in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format,

(b) the right to transmit personal data from one controller to another without any hindrance, where this is technically possible,

(c) a regime under which, upon the data subject’s request for data portability, the controller acts on the instructions of the data subject,

(d) the exercise of the right to data portability not adversely affecting any other right.620

G. Right to Object to Processing

The data subject has the right to object to the processing of the personal data in question on grounds relating to his particular situation or where his personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes.621 In this respect, the data subject does not have a general right to object to data processing.

As regards the first situation above, the data subject may object at any time, on grounds relating to his particular situation, to the processing of personal data concerning him where the legal basis of the processing is the purpose of performing a task carried out in the public interest or the legitimate interests of the controller.622 The purpose of providing for a right to object on grounds relating to the data subject’s particular situation is to strike a balance between the data protection rights of the data subject and the legitimate interests of others in the data processing.623 On this point the CJEU has stated that the rights of the data subject, as a rule, override the economic interests of the controller.624 In addition, the Regulation expressly provides that the burden of proving the existence of grounds requiring the data processing to be continued lies with the controller.625 If the controller is unable to prove that it is necessary for the processing activities to continue, it may not continue to process the data.626

Furthermore, where personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes, the data subject has the right to object at any time and free of charge to the processing of personal data concerning him for such direct marketing purposes, to the extent that the processing is related to direct marketing.627

H. Right Not to Be Subject to a Decision Based Solely on Automated Processing

Under the Regulation, the data subject has the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or similarly significantly affects him.628 However, where the processing in question:

(i) is necessary for entering into, or the performance of, a contract between the data subject and a controller, or

(ii) is authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, or

(iii) takes place with the explicit consent of the data subject, a decision taken under these conditions is not unlawful even if it is based solely on automated processing.629

The Article 29 Working Party states that the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing is a general prohibition and that the data subject is not required to object proactively to such a decision.630

Another point to be mentioned is that, as explained above, the information which the controller must provide to the data subject under the right to be informed includes the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling.631 In addition, under the right of access, the data subject has the right to request information on the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, and, in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.632

Under this right, the controller must implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, in particular the rights of the data subject to express his point of view and to contest the decision and, first and foremost, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller.633 As mentioned earlier, it is very important that persons are able to exercise control over their data, and this is a matter which the Regulation has also taken into account. For this reason, the inclusion of human intervention in decision-making mechanisms is important for preventing the adverse consequences that might otherwise arise.634

II. Restrictions

Union or Member State law to which the controller or processor is subject may, by way of a legislative measure, restrict the scope of the rights and obligations provided for, where such a restriction respects the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms and constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard the matters set out below:

(a) national security,

(b) defence,

(c) public security,

(d) the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security,

(e) other important objectives of general public interest of the Union or of a Member State, in particular an important economic or financial interest of the Union or of a Member State, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters, public health and social security,

(f) the protection of judicial independence and judicial proceedings,

(g) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of breaches of ethics for regulated professions,

(h) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, to the exercise of official authority in the cases referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e) and (g),

(i) the protection of the rights and freedoms of the data subject or of others,

(j) the enforcement of decisions on claims arising from civil law.635 The legislative measure introduced in relation to restrictions must specify the purposes of the processing or categories of processing concerned, the categories of personal data, the scope of the restrictions introduced, the safeguards to prevent abuse or unlawful access or transfer, the specification of the controller or categories of controllers, the storage periods and the applicable safeguards taking into account the nature, scope and purposes of the processing or categories of processing, the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects, and the right of data subjects to be informed about the restriction, unless this is prejudicial to the purpose of the restriction.636

III. Legal Remedies, Liability, Penalties and Compensation A. Right to Lodge a Complaint with a Supervisory Authority

Every data subject has the right, without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, to lodge a complaint with the competent supervisory authority if he considers that the processing of personal data relating to him has been carried out unlawfully.637 Under this right, the competent supervisory authority must handle complaints lodged by a data subject or by a body, organisation or association, must investigate, to the extent appropriate, the subject matter of the complaint and must inform the complainant of the progress and the outcome of the investigation within a reasonable period, in particular if further investigation or coordination with another supervisory authority is necessary.638 The Regulation further provides that supervisory authorities must facilitate the submission of complaints by taking certain measures.639

When the supervisory authority adopts a decision on the complaint, every natural or legal person has the right to an effective legal remedy against legally binding decisions of that supervisory authority concerning them.640 Just as this right exists for data subjects, it also applies to controllers and processors.641 B. Right to an Effective Legal Remedy

1. In General

The right to an effective legal remedy is recognised as one of the fundamental rights under both the ECHR and the EU Charter, and great importance is attached to it. For example, in Schrems the CJEU held that legislation which does not provide for any legal remedy enabling data subjects to have access to their personal data or to rectify or erase their personal data would compromise the essence of the fundamental right “to an effective legal remedy” enshrined in Art. 47 of the EU Charter.642

As mentioned above, the persons concerned have the right to a legal remedy against the binding decisions of supervisory authorities. The point to be noted here is that this right arises only against “binding” decisions of the supervisory authority.643 The persons concerned will not be able to seek a legal remedy against non-binding decisions of the supervisory authority, such as the issuing of opinions.644

Under the Regulation, every data subject has the right to an effective legal remedy where he considers that his rights under the Regulation have been infringed as a result of the processing of his personal data in breach of the Regulation.645 For that remedy to be “effective”, the competent courts before which data subjects can bring the relevant proceedings are of considerable importance, because limiting the courts before which proceedings may be brought against controllers or data subjects could cause data subjects to encounter various difficulties.646 Accordingly, the Regulation provides that such proceedings may be brought before the courts of the Member State where the controller or processor has an establishment or where the data subject has his habitual residence.647 Where, however, the controller or processor is a public authority acting in the exercise of the public powers of a Member State, a limit has been placed on the courts before which proceedings may be brought, and it is provided that proceedings concerning such persons are to be brought before the courts of the Member State in which the authority in question is located.648

In addition, (i) a data subject, controller, processor or supervisory authority has the right to bring an action before the CJEU for the annulment of a decision of the European Data Protection Board which is of direct and individual concern to them, or (ii) a data subject has the right to bring an action before the CJEU on the basis of a claim that any EU institution or body has infringed data protection law. In the second case, the action is to be brought before the General Court of the EU (the General Court, EGC), which is the court of first instance of the CJEU.649

2. Right to Be Represented by a Not-for-Profit Body, Organisation or Association

Under Art. 80 of the Regulation, data subjects have the right to mandate a not-for-profit body, organisation or association which has been properly constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State, has statutory objectives which are in the public interest and is active in the field of the protection of data subjects’ rights and freedoms with regard to the protection of their personal data, to lodge the complaint on their behalf, to exercise on their behalf the rights referred to in Arts. 77, 78 and 79 and, provided that Member State law so provides, to exercise on their behalf the right to receive compensation.650 The right to be represented by such a body, organisation or association enables individuals to benefit from its expertise and from its organisational and financial capacities, and thus to exercise their rights effectively.651

C. Liability and Compensation

The right to an effective legal remedy encompasses the right of individuals whose personal data have been processed unlawfully to claim compensation for the damage they have suffered as a result of such processing.652 The Regulation expressly provides that any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of the Regulation has the right to receive compensation from the controller or processor for the damage suffered.653 The concept of “damage” in this article must be interpreted broadly, in the light of the case law of the CJEU and in a manner consistent with the objectives of the Regulation.654

Under the Regulation, any controller involved in the processing is liable for the damage caused by processing which infringes the Regulation.655 A processor, by contrast, is liable for the damage caused by the processing only where it has not complied with the obligations of the Regulation specifically directed to processors or where it has acted outside or contrary to the lawful instructions of the controller.656

Where more than one controller or processor, or both a controller and a processor, are involved in the same processing and are responsible for any damage caused by the processing, the Regulation provides that each controller or processor is to be held liable for the entire damage, in order to ensure effective compensation of the data subject.657 In such a case, however, if a single controller or processor has paid compensation for the whole of the damage, that controller or processor will be able to claim back from the other controllers or processors involved in the same processing that part of the compensation which corresponds to their share of responsibility for the damage.658 The reason for introducing such a rule is that it is a matter of considerable importance that “full and complete” compensation be provided for the damage suffered.659

The Regulation further provides that a controller or processor may be exempted from this liability if it proves that it is not in any way responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.660

D. Penalties

The Regulation has empowered the supervisory authorities of the Member States to impose administrative penalties where the Regulation is infringed. Exposure to the administrative fines introduced by the Regulation is a new and highly significant development. Matters such as the levels of the fines, the circumstances to which the local authorities must have regard in deciding whether or not to impose a fine, and the maximum fine that may be imposed are expressly regulated in the Regulation; the aim has thus been to create a uniform system of penalties within the EU.661

According to the rules introduced by the Regulation, in the event of non-compliance with the basic principles of processing and the conditions for consent, infringement of the data subjects’ rights and failure to comply with the Regulation’s rules on the transfer of data abroad, the supervisory authorities have the power to impose an administrative fine of up to EUR 20,000,000 or, where the controller or processor is an undertaking, of up to 4% of its total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year (whichever amount is higher).662 As regards other infringements, the supervisory authority may impose an administrative fine of up to EUR 10,000,000 or, where the controller or processor is an undertaking, of up to 2% of its total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year (whichever amount is higher).663

In each individual case, the supervisory authority takes the following matters into account when deciding whether to impose an administrative fine and when deciding on the amount of the administrative fine:

(a) the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement, as well as the number of data subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by them,

(b) whether the infringement was intentional or resulted from negligence,

(c) whether any action has been taken by the controller or processor to mitigate the damage suffered by data subjects,

(d) the degree of responsibility of the controller or processor, having regard to the technical and organisational measures implemented by them,

(e) any relevant previous infringements by the controller or processor,

(f) the degree of cooperation with the supervisory authority in order to remedy the infringement and mitigate the possible adverse effects of the infringement,

(g) the categories of personal data affected by the infringement,

(h) the manner in which the infringement became known to the supervisory authority, in particular whether, and if so to what extent, the controller or processor notified the infringement,

(i) compliance with measures previously ordered against the controller or processor with regard to the same subject matter,

(j) whether approved codes of conduct or approved certification mechanisms have been adhered to,

(k) any other aggravating or mitigating factor applicable to the circumstances of the case, such as financial benefits gained, or losses avoided, directly or indirectly, from the infringement.664

Furthermore, apart from their power to impose administrative fines, the supervisory authorities have various “corrective” powers.665 For example, the supervisory authorities may issue warnings, issue reprimands, and impose a temporary or definitive limitation, including a ban on processing.

Another important point is that the Regulation states that the Member States may lay down rules on other penalties applicable to infringements of the Regulation.666 Accordingly, the Member States may lay down rules on the imposition of penalties for cases in which the Regulation and the national provisions adopted pursuant to the Regulation are infringed.667 What must be borne in mind at this point is that the provisions introduced in national laws must not breach the principle that no one may be tried twice for the same offence (ne bis in idem).668 For example, Germany’s Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) provides that the intentional infringement of certain data protection rules constitutes a criminal offence.669 To give an example, a fine or imprisonment of up to three years is prescribed where non-public personal data of a large number of data subjects are transferred unlawfully.

e. Stronger Enforcement of Infringements

One of the most important innovations introduced by the GDPR is that, together with the broadening of the scope of liability, the fines that may be imposed have also been increased to a remarkable degree. Companies that infringe the provisions of the GDPR run the risk of being subject to an administrative fine of up to EUR 20 million annually or up to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the infringing company in the preceding financial year (GDPR, Art. 83(5)). This sanction may be applied against both controller companies and processor companies. Where a controller or processor intentionally or negligently infringes the provisions of the GDPR in respect of the same or linked processing operations, the total amount of the administrative fine may not exceed the EUR 20 million specified for the gravest infringement (GDPR, Art. 83(3) and 83(5)).

The following matters will be taken into account when deciding whether to impose an administrative fine and when determining the amount of the fine:

i. The nature, gravity and duration of the infringement, having regard to the nature, scope and purpose of the processing concerned, as well as the number of data subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by them, ii. Whether the infringement was committed intentionally or negligently, iii. The action taken by the controller or processor to mitigate the damage suffered by data subjects,

iv. The degree of responsibility of the controller or processor, having regard to the technical and organisational measures implemented pursuant to Arts. 25 and 32 GDPR,

v. Any other relevant previous infringements by the controller or processor, vi. The degree of cooperation with the supervisory authority in order to remedy the infringement and mitigate the possible adverse effects of the infringement,

vii. The categories of personal data affected by the infringement, viii. Whether the controller or processor notified the infringement, and the manner in which the infringement became known to the supervisory authority,

ix. Compliance with the other measures taken in accordance with Art. 58(2) GDPR, x. Any other aggravating and mitigating factors applicable to the circumstances of the case, such as financial benefits gained, or losses avoided, directly or indirectly, from the infringement,

xi. Whether the controller / processor has adhered to the approved certification mechanisms provided for in Arts. 40 and 42 GDPR.

Each supervisory authority has been placed under an obligation to ensure that the imposition of the administrative fines listed in Art. 83 is, in each individual case, effective, proportionate and dissuasive (GDPR, Art. 83(1)).

A further matter that makes the position of companies more onerous under the GDPR is that, where processing is based on consent, controller companies/processors are obliged to prove the existence of the consent (GDPR, Art. 7(1), rec. 42). The controller is, moreover, obliged to demonstrate that it has acted in compliance with the principles laid down in Art. 5(1) GDPR (GDPR, Art. 5(2), rec. 24). These matters too may be said to complement the strong enforcement tools introduced by the GDPR.

The first fines for infringement of the GDPR have also begun to be imposed. In Austria, a betting company was fined EUR 4800 because the field of view of the camera it had installed for security reasons was wide and it recorded the public area, which is protected under the GDPR; in Portugal, a hospital was fined EUR 150,000 twice and EUR 100,000 once for acting contrary to the principles of the reliability and integrity of information and of data minimisation, because it held active data belonging to 985 physiotherapy doctors although they were not its own employees. Lastly, in Germany, the social network company Knuddels.de was fined EUR 20,000 on account of the leak of the e-mail addresses, user names and passwords of 1.8 million of its registered users.670

§ 6. Implementation of the European Union General Data Protection Regulation

As explained in detail above, the Regulation has a very broad scope of application, and it has conferred very broad and detailed rights and imposed very broad and detailed responsibilities. It is of great importance that the system established by the Regulation be reflected effectively in practice.

In this context, it is considered that following a four-stage approach would be a useful course of action for putting the rules introduced by the Regulation into practice. These four stages are:

(1) gap analysis,

(2) risk analysis,

(3) project steering and resource/budget planning, and

(4) implementation.671 This approach is based in part on the Waterfall Model, which divides the implementation stages into different phases limited according to their time and scope.672 Where a processing activity affects several Member States, however, a fifth stage may be necessary in order to adapt the data protection system to local particularities.673

I. Step One: Gap Analysis

As a first step, the organisation concerned should analyse its currently existing data protection standards and compare them with what is needed in order to meet the obligations required under the Regulation. To this end, the persons responsible for data processing in the different departments of the organisation should be involved in the assessment stage. The analysis in question may be carried out in different ways, such as workshops, interviews and self-assessment; what matters at this point is to focus on what kinds of processing activities are carried out and for what purposes, what types of data are processed, how responsibilities are allocated within the organisation and what safeguards have been put in place.674

When the gap analysis is carried out, account should be taken of the data processing activities specifically carried out by the organisation concerned and of the obligations imposed by the Regulation for processing of that kind. To complete this stage, the organisation will compare its own data protection standards with what they ought to be and will identify the gaps in data protection.675 An attempt will be made to close this gap in the other stages.

II. Step Two: Risk Analysis

As has been mentioned many times above, the degree of risk that the data processing activity poses to the rights and freedoms of data subjects is a variable on which considerable emphasis has been placed for the purpose of determining responsibilities. In this context, organisations should examine their different departments, and the degrees of risk of the data processing activities in those departments should be established. At this point, particular attention should be paid to those data processing activities that carry the greatest risk for the rights and freedoms of data subjects and are most likely to give rise to high fines.676

To complete this stage, the organisation concerned should, also taking into account the risks posed by its various processing activities, prepare a draft strategic project for putting new data protection standards into practice in line with the data protection gap that has been identified.677

III. Step Three: Project Steering and Resource/Budget Planning

On the basis of the project plan in question, a data protection organisation should be set up throughout the organisation with a view to putting the provisions of the Regulation into practice. Within this framework, the organisation in question should take into account the budget and resources needed for the restructuring, including legal costs, IT costs and staffing needs. At this point, the fact that a data protection officer is already in place may be of considerable benefit.678

The organisation should allocate responsibilities relating to the project to staff in key positions in the areas most affected. Where appropriate, a “head” project manager will be appointed by the organisation's senior management. The head project manager may be an independent consultant with expert knowledge of data protection.679

To complete this stage, the data protection concept must be finalised.680

IV. Step Four: Implementation

In the final stage, the new data protection standards that are in conformity with the Regulation will be put into practice in accordance with the data protection concept finalised in the previous stage. The organisation’s management will assist the project managers in ensuring that the processing activities of the different departments conform to the new standards.681 Organising workshops in order to raise awareness within the organisation and to train employees to carry out their data processing activities lawfully is regarded as a useful method.682

For this stage to be completed, the new data processing standards must have been successfully put into practice and must have become part of the organisation’s ordinary operations.683 In order to ensure compliance with the Regulation, data processing activities must be continuously monitored, and these standards maintained, after this stage as well.684

V. Step Five: Additional National Requirements

The Regulation leaves the States a considerable margin of appreciation in laying down the rules on data protection. The Member States will therefore be able to lay down additional data protection requirements.685 At this point, organisations that carry out data processing activities in more than one EU Member State, or that affect more than one EU Member State, should establish whether they will be affected by different national legislation.686

CONCLUSION

The GDPR is an overhaul and modernisation of the EU data protection regime. This new instrument, which introduces new protection and safeguard mechanisms for individuals, at the same time imposes new obligations on companies that process, store and make available to users countless data every day. Moreover, owing to the expanding scope of application of the GDPR, adapting to this new situation has become mandatory not only for companies established in the EU but also for companies outside the EU.

In Part I of the article, an attempt was made to assess the development of the “right to the protection of personal data” by examining how it features in international instruments. In this context, it may be said that this right is not a new right, but that its being understood and regulated as a distinct right emerged with technological developments and the demands of the digital age. The most recent and most detailed instrument on the protection of personal data is the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, which entered into force on 25 May 2018. The aim of this Regulation is to unify the law on the protection of personal data in the EU, and the Regulation has been examined in detail in Part II of the article.

In Part II of this article, the European Union General Data Protection Regulation No. 2016/679 has been examined in detail and as a whole: the definition of the concepts relating to the protection of personal data, the scope of application of the Regulation, the innovations it introduces, the principles it embodies, the safeguards it provides, the responsibilities it imposes, the system it establishes and the way in which that system can be put into practice. The most important difference that can be noticed at first glance throughout the Regulation, and that distinguishes it from the earlier instruments, is its endeavour to establish a highly detailed and effective system with the aim of unifying the law on the protection of personal data in the EU.

Starting from this objective, the Regulation both introduces entirely new rules and regulates pre-existing rules in a more concrete and detailed manner. Accordingly, first of all, the territorial scope of the Regulation has been extended and it has been provided that in certain cases the Regulation is also applicable to countries outside the EU. Alongside the extension of the scope, the conditions required in order for there to be, in general, a lawful processing activity have been made more stringent, data subjects have been granted new rights and their pre-existing rights have been broadened. Accordingly, with the Regulation, the “right to be forgotten” and the “right to data portability” have been regulated on a statutory basis for the first time. Furthermore, in general terms, the obligations of controllers and processors have been increased and made more concrete. In this connection, the requirement that, in certain situations, data protection officers be designated to inform and advise controllers with regard to operating in compliance with the data protection rules has been expressly laid down for the first time. In addition, the fact that controllers and processors have been placed under an obligation, where a personal data breach occurs, to notify that breach to the supervisory authority and to the persons concerned is an important innovation introduced by the Regulation. A final innovation that needs to be mentioned is that the supervisory authorities of the Member States have been empowered to impose administrative penalties where the Regulation is infringed. A further striking point here is that the fines that may be imposed in the event of an infringement have been set at a very high level.

When the heavy administrative fines adopted by Art. 83 GDPR are also taken into account, the importance of ensuring the GDPR compliance of all those who process data, and of companies in particular, becomes all the more evident.

In conclusion, the Regulation has, in general terms, established a more comprehensive and detailed system than those already in existence, with the aim of creating a uniform law on the protection of personal data in the EU, and has prescribed very heavy penalties for breaches of its provisions. In view of the aims described, it would be highly beneficial for Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), which was designed on the basis of Directive 95/46/EC and entered into force shortly before the Regulation was approved, to be developed on the basis of the Regulation.

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Footnotes

  1. Member of the teaching staff in Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and IT Law, Faculty of Law, Istanbul Aydın University. ↑
  2. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4034-5436 ↑
  3. Christos Giakoumopoulos/Giovanni Buttarelli/Michael O’Flaherty, Handbook on European Data Protection Law, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2018, s. 19. ↑
  4. Murat Volkan Dülger, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku, Hukuk Akademisi, İstanbul, 2019, s. 30. ↑
  5. Hüseyin Murat Develioğlu, 6698 sayılı Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Kanunu ile Karşılaştırmalı Olarak Avrupa Birliği Genel Veri Koruma Tüzüğü Uyarınca Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku, On İki Levha Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2017, s. 7. ↑
  6. For details on soft law rules see: Andrew T. Guzman/Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, Journal of Legal Analysis, Volume 2, Issue 1, Spring 2010, s. 171–225. ↑
  7. Develioğlu, s. 7. ↑
  8. Dülger, s. 50. ↑
  9. Dülger, s. 51. ↑
  10. UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 Aralık 1948, 217 A (III), Art. 12. ↑
  11. UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Aralık 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, Art. 17. ↑
  12. UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, 8 Nisan 1988, s. 10. ↑
  13. Dülger, s. 53. ↑
  14. Dülger, s. 53. ↑
  15. Develioğlu, s. 10. ↑
  16. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Automatic Processing of Individual Data, 28 Ocak 1981, ETS 108 (Convention 108). ↑
  17. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 24. ↑
  18. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 24. ↑
  19. Convention 108, Art. 5. ↑
  20. Convention 108, Art. 6. ↑
  21. Convention 108, Art. 8. ↑
  22. Convention 108, Art. 9. ↑
  23. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 25. ↑
  24. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 25. ↑
  25. Dülger, s. 56. ↑
  26. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 26; ↑
  27. Dülger, s. 55; Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 26. ↑
  28. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 26. ↑
  29. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 22. ↑
  30. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 23; AİHM, Klass ve Diğerleri v. Almanya, No. 5029/71, 6 Eylül 1978; AİHM, Rotaru v. Romanya [GC], No. 28341/95, 4 Mayıs 2000; AİHM, Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, No. 37138/14, 12 Ocak 2016. ↑
  31. ECHR Art. 8(2): “There may be interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right only where the interference is in accordance with the law and constitutes a measure necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the protection of order, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” ↑
  32. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 23. For example: AİHM, I v. Finlandiya, No. 20511/03, 17 Temmuz 2008; AİHM, K.U. v. Finlandiya, No. 2872/02, 2 Aralık 2008. ↑
  33. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 29. ↑
  34. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 50. ↑
  35. Dülger, s. 59. ↑
  36. Dülger, s. 58. ↑
  37. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 29. ↑
  38. European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 Ekim 2012, 2012/C 326/02, Art. 8. ↑
  39. Dülger, s. 63. ↑
  40. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 31, 32. ↑
  41. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 282. ↑
  42. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, 283. ↑
  43. European Parliament and Council of Europe, Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 12 Temmuz 2002 (E-Privacy Regulation). ↑
  44. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 33; E-Privacy Regulation, Art. 4. ↑
  45. Dülger, s. 63. ↑
  46. Dülger, s. 63. ↑
  47. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 34, 35. ↑
  48. Recital 17 of the GDPR, which was adopted before Regulation No. 2018/1725 was adopted, expressly states that Regulation No. 45/2001 needed to be updated and brought into line with the GDPR. ↑
  49. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 30. ↑
  50. Jan Philipp Albrecht, “How The GDPR Will Change The World”, Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 287, 2016, s. 289. ↑
  51. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), Sec (2012), Brussels, 25 January 2012, C-7-0025/12, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2012/0011/CO M_COM(2012)0011_EN.pdf ↑
  52. Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of data protection rules to increase users' control of their data and to cut costs for businesses, 25 January 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.htm ↑
  53. Albrecht, s. 289. ↑
  54. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protectionof individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, Official Journal, L 281, 23/11/1995, p. 31-50. (Data Protection Directive) ↑
  55. The term 'directives', which may be translated into Turkish as 'yönerge', will be rendered as 'Direktif', on account of its intelligibility and because it is now also used in this form in Turkish. ↑
  56. Mehmet Nuri Tapan, “Avrupa Birliği (AB) Hukukunun Kaynakları ve Ulusal Hukuka Etkileri: Avrupa Adalet Divanı”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, S. 3, Y. 1998 (s. 971-1020), s. 993 vd. ↑
  57. Tapan, s. 994. ↑
  58. Christopher Kuner, The European Commission's Proposed Data Protection Regulation: A Copernican Revolution in European Data Protection Law, Privacy and Security Law Report, June 2012, http://robertgrzeszczak.bio.wpia.uw.edu.pl/files/2012/12/Kuner_A-Copernican-Revolution-in-European-Data- Protection-Law.pdf (Son Erişim Tarihi: 10.02.2019) ↑
  59. Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543). Copernicus’s work "De revolutionibus orbium caelestium (On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres)", in which he set out his theorem, was printed in 1543. However, that the new conception of the universe put forward by Copernicus had been put forward 200 years before him by the work of the Maragha School, founded by Nasir al-Din Tusi (1201-1274) in the city of Maragheh in Iran, has by now gone beyond a mere claim and become an established fact. Nasir al-Din Tusi criticised Ptolemy’s conception of the universe, stated that the Milky Way consists of stars and, using new mathematical methods, formulated the “double-linkage theory”. That this theorem was used unchanged by Copernicus was disclosed by J.L.E. Dreyer in 1906. After Tusi, Ibn al-Shatir (Ibn al-Shatiral) (1304-1375), of the same school, set out the system of the sun and the planets. That Copernicus used the views and calculations in Ibn al-Shatir’s works “Nihâyat el-Sûl and Ta’lîk el-Ersâd (Nihayat alsul of c Ala’ al-Din)” was first disclosed in 1950 by E.S. Kennedy of the American University of Beirut. Copernicus used Ibn al-Shatir’s “Mercury model” and “lunar model” calculations exactly as they stood. Given that Copernicus did not cite the works of these scholars and made no mention of them whatsoever, and moreover transferred even the calculations unchanged into his own work, the thought suggests itself that Copernicus’s work goes beyond borrowing and amounts to plagiarism. See F. Jamil Ragep, “Copernicus and His Islamic Predecessors: Some Historical Remarks”, Mc. Gill University, History of Science Journal, N. XLV, 2007 s. 65-81. ↑
  60. What is the Copernican Revolution in Kant, https://www.the-philosophy.com/copernican-revolution-kant (Son Erişim Tarihi: 10.03.2019) ↑
  61. Dave Elliman, GDPR: It is time to rethink your approach to privacy, August 11, 2017, https://www.thoughtworks.com/insights/blog/gdpr-it-s-time-rethink-your-approach-privacy
  62. Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, June 2011, https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-work/publications/opinions/comprehensive-approach-personal-data-protection_en ↑
  63. Article 29 Working Group (WP 29). It denotes the working group which, pursuant to Art. 29 of Directive 95/46/EC, which entered into force in 1998, is composed of representatives of the data protection authorities of the EU Member States, of the European Data Protection Supervisor and of the European Commission. Although this Working Group is not a decision-making body, it is independent in its work and has a guiding influence, for instance in resolving problems arising in the field of data protection and preparing opinions on topical issues. With the entry into force of the GDPR, the Article 29 Working Party came to an end and the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) was established in its place. The new Board, set up by Art. 68 GDPR, is composed of the heads and representatives of the data protection authorities of the EU Member States and of representatives of the European Data Protection Supervisor. See European Data Protection Board, https://edpb.europa.eu/about-edpb/about-edpb_en ↑
  64. EDPS, The History of the General Data Protection Regulation, https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection/legislation/history-general-data-protection-regulation_en (Son Erişim Tarihi: 10.03.2019) ↑
  65. Progress on EU Data protection reform now irreversible following European Parliament vote, Strasbourg, 12 March 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-186_en.htm ↑
  66. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), Official Journal of the European Union, L 119/1, 4 May, 2016, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.119.01.0001.01.ENG (Son Erişim Tarihi: 10.03.2019) ↑
  67. Recitals may contain statements, explanations and reasons relating to a legal text. In the EU acquis, 'recitals' denote the part which contains the reasons for the legal text, without political considerations or normative language. They generally begin with 'Whereas' (which conveys the meaning “while”, “since”). See Tadas Klimas; Jurate Vaiciukaite, The Law of Recitals in European Community Legislation, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, V. 15, 2008, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228152770_The_Law_of_Recitals_in_European_Community_Legisla tion ↑
  68. Dülger, s. 66. ↑
  69. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 29. ↑
  70. Dülger, s. 66. ↑
  71. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Art. 4(1). ↑
  72. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 83. ↑
  73. GDPR, Art. 4(1). ↑
  74. Mário Fernandes/Alberto Rodrigues da Silva/António Gonçalves, “Specification of Personal Data Protection Requirements: Analysis of Legal Requirements based on the GDPR Regulation”, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mario_Fernandes14/publication/324054218_Specification_of_Personal_D ata_Protection_Requirements_- _Analysis_of_Legal_Requirements_from_the_GDPR_Regulation/links/5ad7b07baca272fdaf8029d1/Specificati on-of-Personal-Data-Protection-Requirements-Analysis-of-Legal-Requirements-from-the-GDPR- Regulation.pdf (Son erişim tarihi: 19.07.2019). ↑
  75. GDPR, Art. 4(1). ↑
  76. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 84. ↑
  77. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 85. ↑
  78. GDPR, Art. 5(1)(e). ↑
  79. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 93. ↑
  80. GDPR, Recital 26; Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 93. ↑
  81. Regulation No. 30224 on the Erasure, Destruction or Anonymisation of Personal Data, Art. 10(1). ↑
  82. GDPR, Recital 26; ↑
  83. GDPR, Art. 4(5). ↑
  84. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 94. ↑
  85. Handbook on European Data Protection, s. 94. ↑
  86. GDPR, Art. 4(2). ↑
  87. GDPR, Art. 4(7), 4(8). ↑
  88. GDPR, Art. 26(1). ↑
  89. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 101. ↑
  90. Article 29 Working Party (2010), Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and “processor”, WP 169, Brussels, 16 Şubat 2010. ↑
  91. GDPR, Art. 29. ↑
  92. GDPR, Art. 28(3). ↑
  93. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 108, 109. ↑
  94. Article 29 Working Party (2010), Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and “processor”, WP 169, Brussels, 16 Şubat 2010), s. 25. ↑
  95. GDPR, Art. 28(2).
  96. These definitions are similar to the definitions in Art. 2 of Directive 95/46/EC. The definition of controller in Directive 95/46/EC was itself taken from the definition of “controller of the file” in Art. 2(d) of the Council of Europe’s Convention No. 108, which is regarded as the first major convention in the field of data protection. See European Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 28 January 1981, ETS No. 108, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/108 In the version of the Convention as updated by Convention No. 223, the controller is defined as the natural or legal person, public authority, service, agency or any other body which, alone or jointly with others, has the power to take decisions with respect to data processing. See the updated Convention No. 108, https://rm.coe.int/16808ade9d, Art. 2(d)). ↑
  97. For examples see What is a Data Controller or a Data Processor, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rules-business-and-organisations/obligations/controller-processor/what-data-controller-or-data-processor_en#references ↑
  98. Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), C-210/16, 5 June 2018, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v. Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH, Interveners: Facebook Ireland Ltd., Vertreter des Bundesinteresses beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht. ↑
  99. ABAD, C-210/16, paragraf 43. ↑
  100. GDPR, Art. 2. ↑
  101. GDPR, Art. 2(2)(d). ↑
  102. Paul Voigt/Axel von dem Bussche, The EU GDPR: A Practi cal Guide, Springer, Heidelberg, 2017, s. 17. ↑
  103. GDPR, Art. 2(2)(c). ↑
  104. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 22. ↑
  105. Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3) - Version for public consultation Adopted on 16 November 2018, s. 3. https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/consultation/edpb_guidelines_3_2018_territorial_scope_en.pdf (Son erişim: 19.07.2019) ↑
  106. Protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, ETS No. 223, Strasbourg, 10.X. 2018, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/ ↑
  107. Paul de Hert/Michal Czerniawski, “Expanding the European Data Protection Scope beyond Territory: Article 3 of the General Data Protection Regulation in its Wider Context”, International Data Privacy Law, V. 6, No. 3, 2016 (s. 230-243), s. 232. ↑
  108. Hert/Czerniawski, s. 233. ↑
  109. Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3) - Version for public consultation Adopted on 16 November 2018, s. 12. ↑
  110. Hert/Czerniawski, s. 237. ↑
  111. Robert Madge, Five Loopholes in the GDPR, August 27, 2017, https://medium.com/mydata/five-loopholes-in-the-gdpr-367443c4248b (Son Erişim Tarihi: 20.03.2019). ↑
  112. Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3) - Version for public consultation Adopted on 16 November 2018, s. 12. ↑
  113. Title V, Chapter 2 of the Treaty on European Union contains the specific provisions on the EU’s common foreign and security policy. See Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, C 326/13, 26.10.2012. ↑
  114. GDPR, Art. 6(1); Develioğlu, s. 58. ↑
  115. Dülger, s. 116. ↑
  116. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 118. ↑
  117. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 119. ↑
  118. AİHM, K.H. ve Diğerleri v. Slovakya, No. 32881/04, 28 Nisan 2009. ↑
  119. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 118, 199. ↑
  120. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 120. ↑
  121. GDPR, Art. 12(1). ↑
  122. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 120. ↑
  123. GDPR, Recital 39. ↑
  124. GDPR, Recital 39. ↑
  125. AİHM, Haralambie v. Romanya, No. 21737/03, 27 Ekim 2009. ↑
  126. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 120. ↑
  127. GDPR, Art. 5(1)(b). ↑
  128. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 122. ↑
  129. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 122. ↑
  130. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 123. ↑
  131. Guide to General Data Protection Regulatin. ↑
  132. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 123. ↑
  133. Dülger, s. 121. ↑
  134. GDPR, Art. 6(4); Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 124. ↑
  135. GDPR, Art. 5(1)(b). ↑
  136. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 124. ↑
  137. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 125. ↑
  138. GDPR, Recital 50. ↑
  139. GDPR, Art. 5(1)(c). ↑
  140. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 90. ↑
  141. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 125. ↑
  142. For the full text of the judgment see: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=150642& pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=612496. ↑
  143. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 126. ↑
  144. GDPR, Art. 5(1)(d). ↑
  145. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 127. ↑
  146. Dülger, s. 133. ↑
  147. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 128. ↑
  148. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 91, 92. ↑
  149. ABAD, C-553/07, College van burgemeester en wethouders van Rotterdam v. M. E. E. Rijkeboer, 7 Mayıs 2009. ↑
  150. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 128. ↑
  151. GDPR, Art. 5(1)(e). ↑
  152. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 129. ↑
  153. GDPR, Recital 39. ↑
  154. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 92. ↑
  155. GDPR, Art. 5(1)(e); Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 129, 130. ↑
  156. AİHM, S. and Marper v. Birleşik Kırallık [GC], Nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 4 Aralık 2008. ↑
  157. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 129. ↑
  158. ABAD, Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources ve Diğerleri and Kärntner Landesregierung ve Diğerleri [GC], 8 Nisan 2014. ↑
  159. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 130. ↑
  160. For the requirements, the advantages and a comparison of anonymisation and similar techniques under the GDPR see Mike Hintze/Khaled El Emam, “Comparing the benefits of pseudonymisation and anonymisation under the GDPR”, Journal of Data Protection & Privacy, Volume 2, Number 2, Autumn 2018, s. 145-158. ↑
  161. GDPR, Art. 5(1)(f). ↑
  162. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 131, 132. ↑
  163. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 132. ↑
  164. GDPR, Art. 5(2), 25. ↑
  165. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 134, 135. ↑
  166. Guide to General Data Protection Regulatin. ↑
  167. GDPR, Art. 30. ↑
  168. GDPR, Art. 37-39. ↑
  169. GDPR, Art. 35. ↑
  170. GDPR, Art. 25. ↑
  171. GDPR, Art. 12, 24. ↑
  172. GDPR, Art. 40, 42. ↑
  173. Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 3/2010 on the principle of accountability, WP 173, Brussels, 13 July 2010. ↑
  174. GDPR Art. 27(1); Develioğlu, s. 98, 99. ↑
  175. GDPR Art. 27(3). ↑
  176. Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3) - Version for public consultation Adopted on 16 November 2018, s. 21. ↑
  177. Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3) - Version for public consultation Adopted on 16 November 2018, s. 12. ↑
  178. GDPR Art. 27(2)(a). ↑
  179. GDPR Art. 27(2)(b). ↑
  180. GDPR Art. 26(1); Develioğlu, s. 102. ↑
  181. Guide to General Data Protection Regulatin- Information Commissioner’s Office, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/controllers-and-processors/what-does-it-mean-if-you-are-joint-controllers/ (Son erişim: 19.07.2019) ↑
  182. Guide to General Data Protection Regulatin. ↑
  183. Gernot Fritz/Nadja Paulus, “CJEU rules on joint controllership – what does this mean for companies?”, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, https://digital.freshfields.com/post/102f0aw/cjeu-rules-on-joint-controllership-what-does-this-mean-for-companies, (Son erişim: 19.07.2019). ↑
  184. Fritz/Paulus. ↑
  185. Guide to General Data Protection Regulatin. ↑
  186. GDPR Art. 28(1). ↑
  187. Punit Bhatia, Contents of Data Protection Policy according to GDPR, https://advisera.com/eugdpracademy/knowledgebase/contents-of-the-data-protection-policy-according-to-gdpr/ (Son Erişim Tarihi: 18.03.2019). ↑
  188. Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, delivered on 21 March 2019 (1), Case C-673/17, Planet 49 GmbH v. Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbande-Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V., http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=212023&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode= lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5537788 (Son Erişim Tarihi: 22.03.2019) ↑
  189. For a sample Data Processing Agreement which the controller may conclude with the processor under Art. 28(2) GDPR see http://www.fastviewer.com/demo/FV-ADV_Kunden_EN.pdf (Son Erişim Tarihi: 19.03.2019) ↑
  190. The conditions required under civil law in order for there to be valid consent are also necessary from the standpoint of the law on the protection of personal data; for example, the capacity to have rights, etc. ↑
  191. Dülger, s. 22, 23. ↑
  192. Dülger, s. 67. ↑
  193. Eugenia Politou/Efthimios Alepis/Constantinos Patsakis, “Forgetting Personal Data and Revoking Consent under the GDPR: Challenges and Proposed Solutions”, Journal of Cybersecurity, V. 4, I. 1, January 2018. ↑
  194. Handbook on European Data Protection, s.112 vd. ↑
  195. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 146; Article 29 Working Party (2007), Working Document on the processing of personal data relating to health in electronic health records (EHR), WP 131, Brüksel, 15 Şubat 2007. ↑
  196. Develioğlu, s. 52, 53. ↑
  197. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 112. ↑
  198. GDPR, Art. 7(2). ↑
  199. GDPR, Art. 7(3). ↑
  200. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 150. ↑
  201. GDPR, Art. 7(4). ↑
  202. Develioğlu, s. 54. ↑
  203. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 144. ↑
  204. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 146. ↑
  205. Under Art. 1(1)(b) of Directive 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council, information society services are services provided, as a rule, for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services. ↑
  206. Develioğlu, s. 54. ↑
  207. GDPR, Art. 8(1). ↑
  208. GDPR, Art. 8(1), last sentence. ↑
  209. GDPR, Art. 8(3); Develioğlu, s. 55. ↑
  210. GDPR, Art. 6(1)(b). ↑
  211. GDPR, Art. 6(1)(c). ↑
  212. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 151. ↑
  213. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 152. ↑
  214. GDPR, Art. 6(1)(d). ↑
  215. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 108. ↑
  216. GDPR, Art. 6(1)(e). ↑
  217. Develioğlu, s. 64. ↑
  218. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 107, 108. ↑
  219. GDPR, Art. 6(2). ↑
  220. Develioğlu, s. 65. ↑
  221. GDPR, Art. 6(1)(f). ↑
  222. GDPR, Preamble, Recital 47. ↑
  223. Article 29 Working Party (2014), Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC, 4 Nisan 2014. ↑
  224. Article 29 Working Party (2014), Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC, 4 Nisan 2014. ↑
  225. ABAD, C-13/16, Valsts policijas Rīgas reģiona pārvaldes Kārtības policijas pārvalde v. Rīgas pašvaldības SIA‘Rīgas satiksme’, 4 Mayıs 2017. ↑
  226. Rīgas satiksme, p. 28-34. ↑
  227. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 156, 157. ↑
  228. GDPR, Art. 21(1). ↑
  229. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 158. ↑
  230. GDPR, Art. 9(1). ↑
  231. GDPR, Art. 9(4). ↑
  232. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 165. ↑
  233. GDPR, Art. 32. ↑
  234. GDPR, Art. 32(1). ↑
  235. Dülger, s. 177. ↑
  236. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 165. ↑
  237. GDPR, Art. 33. ↑
  238. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 168. ↑
  239. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 169. ↑
  240. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 170. ↑
  241. ABAD, C-101/01, Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist, 6 Kasım 2003. ↑
  242. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 170. ↑
  243. e-Privacy Directive, Art. 5(1); Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 171. ↑
  244. e-Privacy Directive, Art. 15(1); Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 171. ↑
  245. Develioğlu, s. 108. ↑
  246. GDPR, Art. 4(12). ↑
  247. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 172. ↑
  248. Article 29 Working Party (2017), Guidelines on Personal data breach notification under Regulation 2016/679, WP250, 3 Ekim 2017, s. 6. ↑
  249. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 68. ↑
  250. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 68. ↑
  251. GDPR, Art. 33(1). ↑
  252. GDPR, Art. 33(3). ↑
  253. Convention 108, Art. 7(2). ↑
  254. Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), Art. 12(5). ↑
  255. GDPR, Art. 34(1). ↑
  256. GDPR, Art. 34(2). ↑
  257. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 173. ↑
  258. GDPR, Art. 34(3)(a). ↑
  259. GDPR, Art. 34(3)(b). ↑
  260. GDPR, Art. 34(3)(c). ↑
  261. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 173. ↑
  262. GDPR, Art. 33(2). ↑
  263. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 174. ↑
  264. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 175. ↑
  265. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 175. ↑
  266. GDPR, Art. 37(1). ↑
  267. Article 29 Working Party (2017), Guidelines on Data Protection Officers (DPOs), WP 243 rev.01, last revised and adopted 5 April 2017. ↑
  268. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 175, 176. ↑
  269. GDPR, Art. 37(4). ↑
  270. GDPR, Art. 38(1). ↑
  271. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 175, 176. ↑
  272. GDPR, Art. 38(2). ↑
  273. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 177. ↑
  274. GDPR, Art. 38(3). ↑
  275. GDPR, Art. 39(1). ↑
  276. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 177. ↑
  277. For all the tasks of data protection officers see Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001. ↑
  278. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 177. ↑
  279. Handbook on European Data Protection Law, s. 175. ↑
  280. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 178. ↑
  281. GDPR, Art. 30(5); Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 179. ↑
  282. GDPR, Art. 30(1). ↑
  283. GDPR, Art. 30(1). ↑
  284. GDPR, Art. 30(2). ↑
  285. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 179. ↑
  286. GDPR, Art. 30(5); Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 179. ↑
  287. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 179. ↑
  288. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 47. ↑
  289. GDPR, Art. 35(1). ↑
  290. GDPR, Art. 35(3). ↑
  291. GDPR, Art. 35(4), 35(5). ↑
  292. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 180; GDPR, Art. 35(7)(a)-35(7)(c). ↑
  293. GDPR, Art. 35(7)(d). ↑
  294. Article 29 Working Party (2017), Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is “likely to result in high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP 248 rev.01, Brussels, 4 Ekim 2017. ↑
  295. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 181. ↑
  296. Article 29 Working Party (2017), Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) andcdetermining whether processing is “likely to result in high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP 248 rev.01, Brussels, 4 Ekim 2017, s. 9. ↑
  297. Article 29 Working Party (2017), Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is “likely to result in high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP 248 rev.01, Brussels, 4 Ekim 2017, s. 9. ↑
  298. GDPR, Art. 36 ↑
  299. GDPR, Art. 40. ↑
  300. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 73. ↑
  301. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 73. ↑
  302. GDPR, Recital 99; Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 73. ↑
  303. GDPR, Art. 41(1). ↑
  304. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 74. ↑
  305. GDPR, Art. 40(5). ↑
  306. GDPR, Art. 40(6). ↑
  307. GDPR, Art. 40(7). ↑
  308. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 74. ↑
  309. GDPR, Art. 40(8). ↑
  310. GDPR, Art. 40(9). ↑
  311. GDPR, Art. 40(10). ↑
  312. GDPR, Art. 41(1). ↑
  313. GDPR, Art. 41(4). ↑
  314. GDPR, Art. 41(4). ↑
  315. GDPR, Art. 41(3). ↑
  316. GDPR, Art. 41(5). ↑
  317. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 183. ↑
  318. GDPR, Art. 42(1). ↑
  319. GDPR, Art. 42(1). ↑
  320. GDPR, Art. 42(3). ↑
  321. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 77. ↑
  322. GDPR, Art. 42(4). ↑
  323. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 77. ↑
  324. GDPR, Art. 42(5). ↑
  325. GDPR, Art. 43(1). ↑
  326. GDPR, Art. 43(2). ↑
  327. GDPR, Art. 43(4). ↑
  328. GDPR, Art. 43(7). ↑
  329. GDPR, Art. 42(6). ↑
  330. GDPR, Art. 42(7). ↑
  331. GDPR, Art. 25(1). ↑
  332. GDPR, Art. 25(1). ↑
  333. GDPR, Art. 25(1). ↑
  334. GDPR, Art. 25(2). ↑
  335. GDPR, Art. 25(2). ↑
  336. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 184. ↑
  337. On this subject see Tamer Soysal, Tarımda Biyoteknoloji Uygulamaları ve Patent Hakları (Agricultural Biotech Patent Law), Adalet Yayınevi, 2019. ↑
  338. Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/state-of-the-art (Son Erişim Tarihi: 19.03.2019) ↑
  339. Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_the_art (Son Erişim Tarihi: 19.03.2019) ↑
  340. Solving the GDPR Puzzle, Data Protection with State of the Art Cybersecurity, https://www.softcat.com/assets/uploads/pdfs/gdpr/Solving-the-GDPR-puzzle.pdf, s. 16 (Son Erişim Tarihi: 19.03.2019) ↑
  341. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 250; GDPR, Art. 44(1). ↑
  342. Develioğlu, s. 73. ↑
  343. GDPR, Art. 1(3). ↑
  344. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 252. ↑
  345. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 252. ↑
  346. Develioğlu, s. 73. ↑
  347. Develioğlu, s. 74. ↑
  348. GDPR, Art. 45(1). ↑
  349. ABAD, C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner [GC], 6 Ekim 2015, para. 96. ↑
  350. See: Hakan Üzeltürk, Avrupa Birliği Genel Veri Koruma Düzenlemesi, Yeditepe Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, C. XV, S. 2, İstanbul, 2018, s. 168; Develioğlu, s. 75. ↑
  351. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 254. ↑
  352. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 255; GDPR, Art. 45(3). ↑
  353. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 254, 255. ↑
  354. Develioğlu, s. 74. ↑
  355. GDPR, Art. 45(4). ↑
  356. GDPR, Art. 45(3). ↑
  357. Develioğlu, s. 75. ↑
  358. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 255. ↑
  359. GDPR, Art. 45(9). ↑
  360. GDPR, Art. 45(8). ↑
  361. GDPR, Art. 46(1). ↑
  362. GDPR, Art. 46(2). ↑
  363. GDPR, Art. 46(3). ↑
  364. GDPR, Art. 46(3). ↑
  365. GDPR, Art. 49(1). ↑
  366. GDPR, Art. 49(1). ↑
  367. Article 29 Working Party (2005), Working document on a common interpretation of Article 26 (1) of Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, WP 114, Brussels, 25 Kasım 2005. ↑
  368. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 265, 266. ↑
  369. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 265, 266. ↑
  370. GDPR, Recital 102. ↑
  371. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 189. ↑
  372. See: Üzeltürk, s. 170-172, GDPR, Art. 51(1). ↑
  373. ABAD, C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner [GC], 6 Ekim 2015, para. 41. ↑
  374. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 190. ↑
  375. GDPR, Art. 52(1). ↑
  376. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 191. ↑
  377. ABAD, C-614/10, European Commission v. Republic of Austria [GC], 16 Ekim 2012, para. 59, 63. ↑
  378. GDPR, Art. 52(2). ↑
  379. GDPR, Art. 52(3). ↑
  380. GDPR, Art. 52(4). ↑
  381. GDPR, Art. 52(5). ↑
  382. GDPR, Art. 52(6). ↑
  383. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 194, 195; GDPR, Art. 58. ↑
  384. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 195. ↑
  385. Guide to General Data Protection Regulatin. ↑
  386. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 195. ↑
  387. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 197; GDPR, Art. 56(1). ↑
  388. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 197. ↑
  389. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 197. ↑
  390. GDPR, Art. 61(1). ↑
  391. GDPR, Art. 61(1). ↑
  392. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 198. ↑
  393. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 198. ↑
  394. GDPR, Art. 60(1)-60(3). ↑
  395. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 198. ↑
  396. GDPR, Art. 61(2). ↑
  397. GDPR, Art. 62(1). ↑
  398. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 199. ↑
  399. GDPR, Art. 68(1). ↑
  400. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 199, 200. ↑
  401. GDPR, Art. 68(3). ↑
  402. GDPR, Art. 65(1). ↑
  403. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 200. ↑
  404. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 200. ↑
  405. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 201. ↑
  406. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 201. ↑
  407. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 201. ↑
  408. GDPR, Art. 66(1); Develioğlu, s.143. ↑
  409. GDPR, Art. 66(1). ↑
  410. GDPR, Art. 66(3). ↑
  411. GDPR, Art. 66(4). ↑
  412. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 207. ↑
  413. GDPR, Recital 39. ↑
  414. GDPR, Art. 12(1). ↑
  415. GDPR, Art. 12(1). ↑
  416. GDPR, Art. 12(1). ↑
  417. ABAD, C-201/14, Smaranda Bara ve Diğerleri v. Casa Naţională de Asigurări de Sănătate ve Diğerleri, 1 Ekim 2015. ↑
  418. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 209. ↑
  419. GDPR, Art. 13(1), 13(2). ↑
  420. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 211. ↑
  421. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 211. ↑
  422. GDPR, Art. 13(1). ↑
  423. GDPR, Art. 14(3). ↑
  424. GDPR, Art. 14(3)(c). ↑
  425. GDPR, Art. 12(5). ↑
  426. GDPR, Art. 13(4), 14(5)(a). ↑
  427. GDPR, Art. 14(5)(b). ↑
  428. GDPR, Art. 15(1). ↑
  429. GDPR, Art. 15(1). ↑
  430. GDPR, Art. 15(3). ↑
  431. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 218. ↑
  432. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 218. ↑
  433. ABAD, C-553/07, College van burgemeester en wethouders van Rotterdam v. M. E. E. Rijkeboer, 7 Mayıs 2009 ↑
  434. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 218. ↑
  435. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 219. ↑
  436. GDPR, Art. 16. ↑
  437. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 154, 155. ↑
  438. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 154. ↑
  439. AİHM, Ciubotaru v. Moldova, No. 27138/04, 27 April 2010, para. 51, 59. ↑
  440. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 219, 220. ↑
  441. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 155. ↑
  442. ABAD, C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [GC] (“Google Spain”), 13 Mayıs 2014. ↑
  443. Google Spain, s. 156. ↑
  444. Dülger, s. 167, 168. ↑
  445. GDPR, Art. 17. ↑
  446. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 223. ↑
  447. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 223. ↑
  448. GDPR, Art. 17(3). ↑
  449. GDPR, Art. 17(2). ↑
  450. For details on the right to be forgotten see Christina Markou, “The Right to Be Forgotten: Ten Reasons Why It Should Be Forgotten”, Law, Governence and Technology Series 20: Reforming Data Protection Law, Springer, 2015, ss. 203-226. ↑
  451. GDPR, Art. 18. ↑
  452. GDPR, Art. 18(1). ↑
  453. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 227. ↑
  454. GDPR, Art. 18(3). ↑
  455. GDPR, Art. 20(1). ↑
  456. GDPR, Art. 20(1). ↑
  457. GDPR, Art. 20(2). ↑
  458. GDPR, Recital 68. ↑
  459. Article 29 Working Party (2016), Guidelines on the right to data portability, WP 242, 13 Aralık 2016, 5 April 2017 (revize), s. 13. ↑
  460. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 229. ↑
  461. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 229. ↑
  462. GDPR, Art. 21(1). ↑
  463. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 230. ↑
  464. Google Spain, para. 81. ↑
  465. GDPR, Art. 21(1). ↑
  466. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 231; GDPR, Art. 21(1). ↑
  467. GDPR, Art. 21(2); Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 231. ↑
  468. GDPR, Art. 22(1). ↑
  469. GDPR, Art. 22(2). ↑
  470. Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP 251, 3 Ekim 2017, s. 15. ↑
  471. GDPR, Art. 13(2)(f). ↑
  472. GDPR, Art. 15(1)(h). ↑
  473. GDPR, Art. 22(3). ↑
  474. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 235. ↑
  475. GDPR, Art. 23(1). ↑
  476. GDPR, Art. 23(2). ↑
  477. GDPR, Art. 77(1). ↑
  478. GDPR, Art. 57(1)(f). ↑
  479. GDPR, Art. 57(2). ↑
  480. GDPR, Art. 78(1). ↑
  481. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 238. ↑
  482. ABAD, C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner [GC], 6 Ekim 2015. ↑
  483. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 239. ↑
  484. GDPR, Recital 143. ↑
  485. GDPR, Art. 79(1). ↑
  486. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 240. ↑
  487. GDPR, Art. 79(2). ↑
  488. GDPR, Art. 79(2). ↑
  489. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 240. ↑
  490. GDPR, Art. 80(1). ↑
  491. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 245. ↑
  492. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 246. ↑
  493. GDPR, Art. 82(1). ↑
  494. GDPR, Recital 146. ↑
  495. GDPR, Art. 82(2). ↑
  496. GDPR, Art. 82(2). ↑
  497. GDPR, Art. 82(4). ↑
  498. GDPR, Art. 82(5). ↑
  499. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 246. ↑
  500. GDPR, Art. 82(3). ↑
  501. Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 247. ↑
  502. GDPR, Art. 83(5); Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 248. ↑
  503. GDPR, Art. 83(4); Giakoumopoulos/Buttarelli/O’Flaherty, s. 248. ↑
  504. GDPR, Art. 83(2). ↑
  505. GDPR, Art. 58. ↑
  506. GDPR, Art. 84(1). ↑
  507. GDPR, Recital 149. ↑
  508. GDPR, Recital 149. ↑
  509. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, Section 42. ↑
  510. How much are the first fines for GDPR infringement, December 12, 2018, https://www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/news/first-sanctions-gdpr-infractions/ (Son Erişim Tarihi: 15.03.2019) ↑
  511. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 245. ↑
  512. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 246. ↑
  513. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 246. ↑
  514. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 246. ↑
  515. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 246. ↑
  516. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 247. ↑
  517. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 247. ↑
  518. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 247. ↑
  519. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 247. ↑
  520. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 247. ↑
  521. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 247. ↑
  522. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 247. ↑
  523. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 248. ↑
  524. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 248. ↑
  525. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 249. ↑
  526. Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 249. ↑

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