2018Murat Volkan Dülger, Mustafa Temmuz OğlakcıoğluArticle

Abstract

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

With the development of technology, the ways in which people use the internet and the purposes for which they use it have both developed and changed. Today, social media networks are used as a means of receiving news, giving news and communicating. In parallel, it has become necessary for the law to keep pace with rapidly developing technology and to catch up with it over this period, and, in this context, for a legal framework to be created in which solutions to the problems are sought and the rights of individuals are defended. Germany has been one of the countries that responded to this need. This is not surprising, given that it was one of the first countries to use the internet and given how developed its legal system is.

In addition to many legal provisions on the subject, most recently the German Act on Legal Claims and Sanctions in Social Networks (Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks) was adopted on 1 September 2017 and entered into force on 1 January 2018. Although the Act mainly provides for sanctions against hate crimes, it also covers many offences in the German Criminal Code (which offences are defined as unlawful content is discussed in detail below). The new Act consists of six provisions in total; this article examines them one by one on the basis of the purpose the legislation serves.

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This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

Peer-Reviewed Article

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE GERMAN ACT TO IMPROVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW IN SOCIAL NETWORKS

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER* Akad. Rat a.Z. Dr. Mustafa Temmuz OĞLAKCIOĞLU**

Abstract: With the development of technology, the ways in which and the fields in which people use the internet have both developed and changed. Today social media networks are used as a means of obtaining news, imparting news and communicating. In parallel with this, it has become necessary for the law to keep pace with rapidly developing technology and to catch up with it over time, and for a statutory framework to be created in which, by seeking solutions to the problems arising in this context, the rights of individuals are defended. One of the countries that has responded to this need is Germany. This is not surprising, given that it was one of the first countries to use the internet and given the advanced state of its legal system. Alongside many legal provisions on the subject, most recently, on 1 September 2017, the German Act on Legal Claims and Sanctions in Social Networks (Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks)*1 was adopted, and it entered into force on 1 January 2018.*2 Although the Act provides for sanctions chiefly against hate crimes, it also covers many offences contained in the German Criminal Code (which offences are defined as illegal content will be discussed in detail below). In this article, the provisions of the new Act, which consists of six articles in total, are examined one by one on the basis of the purpose that its regulation serves.

Keywords: German Criminal Code, Social Networks, Illegal Content, Hate Crimes, Violation of Personality Rights.

AN ASSASSMENT ON THE LAW FOR THE IMROVEMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN SOCIAL NETWORKS IN GERMANY

Abstarct: With the development of technology, people’s methods and fields of using internet have both improved and changed. Today, social media networks are used as a means of getting news, notifying and communicating. Parallel to this, it was necessary to establish a legal framework in order to keep up with the rapidly developing technological laws and to find solutions to the problems in order to educate technologists during this time. One of the countries that responded to this requirement was Germany. This is not surprising given that it is one of the first countries to use the internet and the development of the legal system is taken into account. In addition to many legal regulations on the subject, the Law on Right to Claims and Sanctions (Law for the Improvement of Law Enforcement in Social Networks) was finally adopted by the German Social Network on September 1, 2017 and entered into force on 1 January 2018. Although the law foresees sanctions against hate crimes, many crimes from the German Criminal Code have been included (which crimes are defined as illegal content will be addressed in detail below). This article examines the articles one by one on the basis of the purpose served by the regulation of the new law, which consists of a total of six articles.

Keywords: German Criminal Code, Social Networks, Illegal Content, Hate Crimes, İnfringement of Personality Rights.

Introduction

It is an undeniable fact that social networks are a part of our lives. According to the internet and social media usage figures for 2017 from “We Are The Social”, 3.773 billion people were using the internet, while 2.789 billion people were using social media. According to the same data, it was stated that in Germany 33 million people out of 71.73 million use social media1. In the light of these data, Germany is one of the countries in Europe and in the world in which the proportion of internet and social network users is very high. That being so, many mechanisms of legal protection relating to the virtual sphere have been developed. With this Act, however, protection has been provided neither in respect of all internet users nor in respect of all social media networks. For with developing technology it has become virtually a necessity to create legislation of more specific content rather than laws of general content.

The Act introduces a protection mechanism in respect of certain offences that may amount to a violation of persons’ personality rights by means of social media. Today, the commission of many offences, such as insulting persons, defaming them, disseminating child pornography, making propaganda for a terrorist organisation and so on, has become easier by means of social networks. In particular, the violation of individual rights and freedoms that has recently been committed through social media by exploiting sensitive matters such as opinion, colour or origin (race), religion, sex or sexuality has the character of a hate crime, and the existence of content of this kind is not something that can be accepted in a democratic social order.

It is stated that, as of 2017, the number of persons in Germany who had lodged a complaint on account of a hate crime had reached 500,000. A failure to combat hate crimes sufficiently poses a great threat to society’s living in peace. If one starts from the information that, of the data containing hate speech and the content relating to other offences, YouTube deletes 90%, Facebook 39% and Twitter only 1%, it can be seen how very unprotected the structure is.

That being so, the adoption of a new statutory regulation had by now also become a necessity. Of course, it is not to be expected that the state should, merely in order to prevent these offences from occurring, obstruct people’s freedom of access to social media networks of this kind. A mechanism must, however, be established that is so effective that the commission of these offences is not permitted, that there is direct intervention when they are committed and that, together with all this, people’s freedom of expression and freedom of the press are also respected. The Act in question aims to have data with illegal content removed as soon as possible by way of complaint and, alongside the necessary statutory procedure, to prevent violations by applying sanctions to the owners of social networks.

1. Scope of the Act

a. Social Media Networks Falling within the Scope of the Act

In Article 1(1) of the Act,

the provision “(1) This Act applies to telemedia service providers which create profit-making platforms on the internet on which users can freely share any content with other users or access it (social networks). Platforms with journalistic-editorial activities for which the service provider itself is responsible are not regarded as social networks within the meaning of this Act. The same applies to platforms designed for individual communication or for the dissemination of specific content.” is laid down.

The Act thereby states that the assessment is to be made with regard to telemedia service providers which create profit-making platforms on the internet on which internet users can freely share content or easily access content. The question that first has to be answered here is who the “Service Providers” are. Starting from a short and concise definition, service providers are natural or legal persons able to provide access to the internet. In addition, the Act has excluded from its scope journalistic-editorial activities and websites designed for individual communication or for the dissemination of specific content. In journalism, for its part, a distinction has been drawn between editorial activities and commercial activities. Editorial activity, in this case, is any operation, pursued without a commercial aim, comprising leading articles and promotional texts in newspapers, on television and in other press media which belong to the head of a particular section and generally serve an advertising purpose. Likewise, platforms which present offers within the framework of this editorial activity and which use the infrastructure of another social network are also assessed within this scope.

The areas regarded as individual communication, for their part, are platforms on which persons do not aim to inform the public but rather stand in a particular relationship and which they use for the purpose of direct communication. Examples that may be given are the websites used for electronic mail and software such as Whatsapp, Telegram and Skype. Moreover, the Act has brought within this scope only social networks that do not have a specific subject matter and user definition. On an assessment proceeding from this, online games, professional networks and thematic portals are likewise not among the platforms on which the Act imposes obligations.

In Article 1(2) of the Act, the provision “(2) If the social network has fewer than two million registered users in Germany, the social network provider is exempt from the obligations under § 2 and 3.” is laid down.

Here again we see a limitation. If the social network provider/platform has fewer than two million users in Germany, it is exempt from the obligations imposed under the Act. To make this concrete: having regard to the data on social network use in 2017 already mentioned above, obligations have been imposed under this Act on the social media networks with the most users in Germany, such as YouTube, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. It should be noted that it is not a condition for the application of the Act that the head offices or branches of the social media networks in question be located in Germany. For the obligations it lays down to apply, the Act has considered it sufficient that the number of users in Germany reaches two million persons.

b. Content Regarded by the Act as Illegal Content

The matter regulated in the last paragraph of Article 1 of the Act, for its part, concerns which data are to be assessed as falling within the scope of illegal content. Referring to the German Criminal Code, the Act states that the statutory procedure concerning illegal content will operate within the framework of the offences which it lists exhaustively. Accordingly: “(3) Illegal content: content within the scope of Article 1 which constitutes the offences under § 184d, 86, 86a, 89a, 91, 100a, 111, 126, 129 to 129b, 130, 131, 140, 166, 184b, and content comprising the offences specified in the Criminal Code in sections 185 to 187, 201a, 241 or 269, is regarded as illegal content under this Act.”

These offences, which are specified one by one in the Act, are: dissemination of propaganda material of unconstitutional organisations (86a); preparation of an offence of force and violence seriously endangering the security of the state; use of symbols of unconstitutional organisations (89a); instruction for the commission of an offence of force and violence seriously endangering the security of the state (91); disclosure of secrets relating to the external security of the state and forgery committed for the purpose of espionage (100a); public incitement to commit offences (111); disturbing the public peace by threatening to commit offences (126); forming an organisation for the purpose of committing offences (129); forming a terrorist organisation (129a); extended confiscation of proceeds and property in respect of organisations formed to commit offences abroad and terrorist organisations (129b); incitement of the public to hatred and enmity (130); violence (131); rewarding and approving of an offence committed (140); insulting religious beliefs and world views, religious communities and ideological associations (166); disseminating, procuring

or possessing writings containing child pornography (184b); making pornographic content accessible by means of broadcasting or telecommunications media; accessing content involving child and youth pornography via telecommunications media (184d); insult (185); malicious gossip (186); defamation (187); violation of the privacy of private life by taking pictures (201a); threat (241); and forgery of data of probative value (269).

Of course, the material and mental elements of the offences set out above must be fulfilled, that is, conformity with the statutory definition of the offence (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit) must be established, and, in addition, no other circumstance that could constitute a ground of justification must have arisen.

aa. Excursus: The Problem of Dealing with Hate Speech under Substantive Law, Illustrated by the Offence Types of Insult and Incitement of the Public to Hatred and Enmity

In this respect, problems arise in German criminal law too – in the first place problems which the Social Networks Act has not yet been able to eliminate but which it does not aim to eliminate either. Just like Turkish criminal law, German criminal law – as set out in the catalogue given above – contains a great many “prohibitions on speech” that rest solely on the imputation of a fact or on the voicing of a value judgment or an attitude.2 As long as these prohibitions are contained in the Criminal Code, in other words as long as they are regulated by means of criminal law, there will also be offences of opinion. It will suffice for the offence to be made out that a statement is written or voiced, whether as a “profile status”, as a “tweet” or merely as a comment or retweet. Accordingly, the mere making of a statement will bring about the general act conforming to the statutory definition of offences of this kind.3 Whether a given utterance constitutes an offence type, and which offence type it constitutes, depends on its content.

It is problematic that an ordinary remark – one that carries a relatively weak insinuation and has no concrete connection with any result, and which, as with all speech, does not carry its meaning indirectly within itself but matters more or less for what it means “in the eyes of the addressee” – acquires its meaning depending on interpretation. Expression offences – in so far as they must at the same time protect public interests – are an instrument of a robust state governed by the rule of law and of democracy. At the same time, however, they give rise to the danger of a disproportionate restriction of the freedoms and the pluralism which a democracy needs and which a state governed by the rule of law must protect.4 Where unavoidable conflicts are at issue, expression offences must be assessed and interpreted in a manner that supports, in particular, the freedoms of opinion, belief and conscience (Arts. 4 and 5 of the German Constitution).5 Some of these offences are “political in character” and, on account of the high degree of indeterminacy that goes with this, are problematic in themselves, irrespective of how unpleasant the incriminated words are and of how important the statements those words seek to convey are in social and political debate. The “limiting” conditions that arise from expressions contained in these offences, such as “capable of disturbing the public peace”, refer these provisions to the changes occurring in the spirit of the times (in other words, in the atmosphere of the period). On the other hand, the structure of speech, which changes as far as it possibly can in the context of the communication culture of social media (for example, the changes occurring in matters such as the general rules of courtesy, the syntax of sentences, grammar, etc.), must also be borne in mind when expression offences are assessed.

aaa. Insult

The principles governing the interpretation of utterances leave the criminal courts and the prosecuting authorities considerable room for interpretation in the context of the offence of insult. Unless what is at issue is an insult in the form of an abstract imputation, that is, in cases where the perpetrator has not used towards the victim words that have, in particular, the character of swearing6, whether an utterance is definitely to be regarded as “insulting” (and as intentional) depends on the words uttered by the perpetrator.

Since the court cannot open up the perpetrator’s head and look inside, it must assess the traces and indications available to it. There is neither a statutory rule on the essential points of the decisive and “correct” interpretation, nor is there unanimity in the case law or in legal scholarship. In practice this normally leads to an “overall assessment” being made without any particular method.7 Indeed, even the perspective from which the meaning of the expression used is to be determined is not yet settled. As an example of the problem arising here, one may point to terms which are in fact objective according to the value judgment of our legal order but which are used by the perpetrator in a pejorative sense in the specific case (for example “you are homosexual!”, “you are disabled”).

On the basis of the vagueness of the meaning “contained in the utterance” and “to be established objectively” by way of interpretation, a notion that has become widespread in the case law and in legal scholarship, each attribution voiced would have to be characterised, in a discriminatory manner, as “worthless” in order for imputations of this kind to be accepted as insult (as a violation of Art. 3 of the German Constitution).8 On closer inspection it must also be borne in mind that the prohibition of discrimination is in fact meaningful precisely for this reason. For

“differences between the norm of sexual orientations (and similar orientations) and the inclinations of the minority in this respect are widely regarded as important in society”, and the meaning of a remark made in this connection and its assessment in law come into conflict with each other.9 In other words, if not necessarily the speaker, then the person judging the speaker comes into conflict with the principle of equality.

As soon as the utterance has a dimension of “political opinion”, art or social criticism, the difficulty of interpretation also multiplies.10 Criminal law and the law of criminal procedure are often “filtered-through constitutional law”.11 In this respect the doctrine of the insult offences has by no means been drafted in greater detail than the relevant fundamental rights. Rather, this sub-category of the constitutional guarantees must in fact find application on the basis, in particular, of Art. 5 of the German Constitution (freedom of expression and freedom of art12).13 Moreover, in borderline cases between the disparagement of a person and active political criticism, this requires that criticism going to the substance of the matter (and, as the case may be, severe criticism) or the work of art be approached in the latter sense, that is, in the sense of criticism.14

bbb. Incitement of the Public to Hatred and Enmity

However, among the offences against public security and the “hate and provocation offences in general”, the explanation of, for example, the offence of incitement of the public to hatred and enmity contained in § 130(1) of the German Criminal Code brings greater difficulties with it. In addition, the offences against public security resemble one another, within the structure of their own statutory definitions, in that the offence types close to it, such as insulting beliefs (§ 166 of the German Criminal Code) or the (public) approval of offences (§ 140 of the German Criminal Code), give rise to similar difficulties as well15.

The elements of these offences can generally be determined quite easily (sections of society,16 an individual member of such a section,17 unlawful acts, religious beliefs18 etc.). This is so, for example, with regard to the ethnic origin of Özoğuz, an expatriate Turk living in Germany. The problems, however, begin with the acts of commission: all three offence types are tied to a qualified or special form of “voicing the utterance”, such as provoking,19 calling for, approving20 or reviling. Here too, of course, problems of interpretation arise similar to those in the insult offences. Whether or not an utterance is to be interpreted as incitement of the public to hatred and enmity often varies according to the individual value judgment, political stance, world view and experience of each person in society. While for a member of a privileged section of society there may be no question of empathising with a section that is discriminated against, conversely an objective expression used by the perpetrator may, on account of a fundamental discrimination existing in society, be perceived as degrading and give rise to hypersensitivity in the addressee in the specific case. Moreover, at times the perpetrator voicing the utterance may also have directed words of a discriminatory nature against his own section, as a part of the section that practises this discrimination.

Nowadays, particularly in the political sphere and in the formation of public opinion, a less polite style is frequently resorted to in order to be able to appear close to the people. In this respect, the boundary between polemic that remains within legal limits and incitement to hatred is, to that extent, left to the practitioner.21

At the final stage, it must be determined, in respect of each of these three offence types, whether the statement voiced is capable of disturbing the public peace.22 The assessments made in the search for a

definition of the concept will not be of much use at this point. Accordingly, the act is capable of disturbing the public peace if, having regard to the manner in which the utterance relevant to the statutory definition was committed (voiced), its content and the other essential concrete features of the incident, it is such as to justify, on an overall assessment, the concern that the public peace will be disturbed.23 The case law of the highest courts can offer the practitioner (and at the same time all the addressees of the law) only criteria for the prognosis of capability.24 Criteria that may be listed here include, for example, the content and intensity of the attack (the statement),25 society’s susceptibility to the attack in question,26 the latent potential for violence27 and also the fact that the suspect utterances have a wider impact than was thought.

For each individual case, these normative considerations in the first place legitimise offences of this kind. For these ideas make it possible to deal with statements on the internet (or speeches of a political nature) in a differentiated manner and thus – in the light of the freedoms of expression and of art – in conformity with the constitution. On the other hand, by making the application of the offence types in the individual case appear complex, they also make the investigation of offences of this kind more difficult in practice. This creates a separate, special aggravating circumstance over and above the general difficulty that already exists with regard to the investigation of offences committed on the internet. It should be recalled at this point that, where offences are committed in very great numbers, criminal justice will be overburdened. To this is added the problem of the scope of application of national criminal law.28 (For example, if Kim Kardashian shares on Instagram a picture of herself with pornographic content which is accessible in Germany as it is throughout the world, but which has no particular significance for or connection with Germany, will German criminal law apply?).

Difficulties of this kind arising from the standpoint of the rule of law lead to a vicious circle from the perspective of the legitimation of a prohibition on expression, and in particular of an incitement offence. For difficulties of this kind arising from the standpoint of the rule of law lead towards an instrumentalisation of the offences or, in other words, towards a practice guided by the opportunity principle. The fact that action is taken against only a very small proportion of the thousands of items of content on Facebook and other social media platforms that are suspected of inciting the public to hatred and enmity naturally has to do with the resources of criminal investigation; but it is at the same time also connected with the person voicing the utterance and the number of his followers. Although the offence type does not require any particular range, one may be inclined to accept a disturbance of the public peace – at least in practice – only from a certain range onwards or in some way or other (without there necessarily having to be a political dimension either). Uncertainties of this kind or, in other words, difficulties of weighing can be resolved in criminal procedure by means of a genuine opportunity principle. That is to say, where what is at issue are acts which, in terms of German criminal law, have the character of a less serious criminal offence (offences punishable by short-term imprisonment) and for which no high penalty is to be expected, these uncertainties can be removed by way of discontinuing the investigation (a decision not to prosecute based on discretion). In that case, persons with little legal knowledge, faced with the differing treatment of similar cases on the basis of the opportunity principle, are hardly able at all to reconcile, in their entirety (at least in a manner not confined to the 140-character format of Twitter), the differences in the individual case and the differing treatment of manifestly comparable cases. Lawyers will in this regard assess from a legal point of view – at a high level, of course – whether the elements of the offence type are fulfilled in a particular individual case (one which, because it has been widely shared on social media, is in some instances also reported by the media). Non-lawyers, however, may also approach this without seriousness, in a way that leads to the commands of the law losing their validity. As a result, “disappointed” citizens who believe that there is an inequality may abuse to their own advantage the uncertainties that exist because of the opportunity principle. That is, where the sanctions for the acts they have committed are applied to them, they harp on these inequalities (particularly where an inequality does exist) with a view to strengthening their position by claiming that they have suffered an injustice. The self-fulfilling prophecy29 appears at this point, in our view, as another expression that is encountered only very rarely in the context of the communication culture of social media.

bb. Should Stricter Standards of Review Be Laid Down as a Compliance Measure?

All the uncertainties described here are to be channelled into a merely superficial internal review carried out by a social media company’s own employees in line with the company’s interests. For a better understanding of the matter, the following should also be added: of course, the assessment of whether an utterance constitutes the offence types of insult or of incitement of the public to hatred and enmity can also be left to well-trained lawyers. Nevertheless, the possibility that the legal assessment may, under a different sign,

take shape should not be lost sight of. (What comes to mind in particular is the company making its employees excessively aware, in compliance training, of the possible risks of an unlawful utterance not being deleted once it has been written.)

cc. Legal Difficulties in the Investigation and Prosecution of Expression Offences

Lastly, with regard to the catalogue of offences, it must be said that the German Social Networks Act will eliminate only to a highly inadequate extent the difficulties, touched on above, that arise from the standpoint of the rule of law in the investigation and prosecution of expression offences. It may also be predicted that the difficulties touched on in this context will more or less recur in the face of the existing mechanisms offered by the German Social Networks Act. In essence, this concerns the judicial enforcement of rights, which gives the impression of necessarily lagging far behind the – at least perceived – violations of rights that occur in large numbers on the internet every day.

Finally, it must be said that, although § 185 of the German Criminal Code is violated thousands of times every day, no striking increase in convictions for insult offences can be observed statistically (at least so far). The mechanisms of criminal law practice therefore also seem to render recourse to criminal law quite superfluous in this respect. Indeed, in cases requiring interpretation there will be a built-in obstacle to a complaint, because the utterance may not have been perceived as an insult or as directed at the victim personally, or the person making the utterance may, by using sentences capable of more than one meaning, have hidden behind this or behind a supposedly jocular/arrogant tone. In that case, the person who feels that he has been verbally attacked may also think that the utterance voiced is not sufficient to be classified as an insult. In cases where merely an insult in the form of abstract abuse (that is, situations of outright swearing) has clearly been committed, a complaint may be prevented by various factors. At times the victim may, simply and ordinarily, have insulted in return the person who insulted him (and this may be enough for him by way of self-satisfaction); at times “those in whom reason prevails” may not respond at all. For some victims, in turn, the effort that criminal proceedings would entail may seem burdensome. Frequently, too, where “unidentified” or, in other words, “fake” accounts are concerned, the anonymity of the internet looms excessively large (as regards the investigation of the person who made the insult) – at least in the eyes of the user (the victim). In a case of this kind the user may also be inclined simply to want to leave his enemy in the digital world. Lastly, it may be said that, after a failed communication with certain persons in the virtual world, one may, by a simple logic, also not wish to deal with them in real life.

Despite this content and these difficulties, this Act was nevertheless prepared and entered into force as the result of a need that had come to light in German society. For that reason, an effort should be made to operate it despite the difficulties in terms of content and of investigation/prosecution. For that reason, how complaints are to be made under this Act is worth examining.

2. The Complaints Procedure for Illegal Content

Article 3 of the Act regulates the complaints procedure for illegal content. For it will be easier to understand the reporting process once it has first been explained what this complaint period should be like. For this reason we are of the opinion that it is more apt to deal first with the complaint period, on account of this connection, rather than to follow the scheme of the Act.

According to Article 3 of the Act: “(1) A social network provider must provide an effective and transparent procedure, in accordance with Articles 2 and 3, for the submission of complaints about illegal content. The provider must offer users an easily recognisable, immediately and permanently accessible process so that they can submit complaints about illegal content.

(2) The procedure is that the social network provider: 1. gives notice of the complaint without delay, checks whether the content reported in the complaint is illegal and ensures that the complaint is removed or blocked; 2. removes or blocks access to content that is manifestly contrary to the laws within 24 hours of receiving the complaint; where the social network has reached an agreement with the competent law enforcement authorities, if there is a longer period for the cancellation or blocking of the manifestly unlawful content,

3. removes or blocks access to any illegal content within seven days of receiving the complaint; the seven-day period may be renewed;

(a) the decision that content which does not contain true information is illegal may be recognised by the allegation or by other factual circumstances; in such cases, the social network may give the user an opportunity to comment on the complaint before the decision is taken,

(b) the social network, within seven days of receipt of the complaint, forwards its decision on illegality to the regulatory body recognised in accordance with paragraphs 6 to 8 of the article and submits it to the decision of the regulatory body;

4. where illegal content is removed, secures the content by storing it, within a period of ten weeks under Directives 2000/31/EC and 2010/13/EU, in view of the possibility that it may serve as evidence in any investigation/prosecution or other judicial proceedings;

5. must notify the complainant and the user without delay of the decision taken on the complaint and of the reason for its decision.

(3) The procedure must provide for the measures that have to be applied so that every complaint is documented and dealt with under Directives 2000/31/EC and 2010/13/EU.

(4) The management of social networks must be supervised by the management of the social network by means of monthly checks. Organisational deficiencies in the resolution of complaints received must be remedied immediately. For the persons responsible for complaints, German-language training and technical training in this field must be provided regularly, at least every six months, by the management of the social network.

(5) The procedures referred to in paragraph 1 may be supervised by a body appointed by the administrative authority referred to in Article 4.

(6) A body shall be recognised as a regulated self-regulatory body within the meaning of this Act in the following cases: 1. the independence and expertise of its officers responsible for complaints are ensured; 2. it ensures that appropriate equipment and rapid tests are in place within seven days; 3. appropriate equipment and rapid examination within seven days are ensured and a complaints office is set up; and 4. the institution must be run by several social networks or institution providers that supply the appropriate equipment. In addition, it must be open to the participation of other providers, in particular social networks.

(7) The decision on the recognition of a regulated self-regulatory body is taken by the administrative authority referred to in Article 4.

(8) If the conditions for recognition cease to exist entirely, the classification may be revoked in whole or in part, or a solution may be provided together with ancillary provisions.

(9) The administrative authority under Article 4, a social network provider, pursuant to sub-paragraph 3-b of paragraph 3 of Article 2, the outcomes of the decisions within a specified period; it is not guaranteed that these officers will fulfil their obligations under paragraph 3 of Article 2 by following the Regulation’s Own Statute.”

a. Persons Who May Lodge a Complaint

The Act does not lay down any restriction as regards the persons who may lodge a complaint. However, on an assessment proceeding from the purpose of the Act, complaints may be lodged by citizens, civil society organisations and complaints bodies.

b. Deletion or Blocking of Unlawful Content

First of all, it should be noted that the legislature deliberately drew the distinction between the deletion and the blocking of illegal content. Deletion of content means that the content in question can no longer be accessed, not within the borders of Germany alone but worldwide. Blocking of content, by contrast, means that access to those data can no longer be obtained only within the borders of Germany. Whether the content was deleted or blocked must be clearly stated in the report. Social network providers need a body to conduct the procedure for deleting/blocking content following a complaint. This body, which they establish within their own structure, must delete content that is manifestly unlawful within 24 hours of receiving the complaint. In some cases, however, there may be doubts as to whether or not the content is lawful. For that situation the Act, under Article 3(3), provides for a review period of 7 days. Thus, if a firm view still cannot be formed within the 7-day period, the 7-day period may be exceeded and a further period of 7 days is granted in addition. As can be seen, the 7-day period granted initially is not a strict time limit.

So that it can be determined how content whose unlawfulness is in doubt is to be classified, the user who published the content is given the right to comment before a decision is taken. In this respect an apt approach has been adopted in the context of freedom of expression and freedom of the press.

It should be noted that social network providers cannot be expected to monitor for illegal content of their own motion. They can initiate the necessary procedure only upon a complaint.

A user who has had recourse to the complaints procedure may apply to the Federal Office of Justice if his complaint is disregarded and the necessary process is not initiated. It is provided that this application is to be made by accessing the forms section of the website of the Federal Office of Justice. In the course of the application, the ground of complaint, an image of the content in question or other supporting evidence may be submitted.

Together with a complaint about illegal content, individuals may in addition turn to the law enforcement authorities (public prosecutor/police) in respect of the same content in order to pursue criminal-law and civil-law remedies.

c. Storage of Illegal Content

In sub-paragraph 3 of Article 3(2), the Act has accepted the storage of the content for a maximum period of ten weeks. This was done in view of the possibility that, as a result of individuals resorting to other legal remedies together with the complaint, the content may be used as evidence in the investigation/prosecution stages relating to the offence. Indeed, the period was fixed in a manner appropriate to its purpose, having regard to Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on Electronic Commerce and the Audiovisual Media Directive 2010/13/EU of 10 March 2010.

d. The Supervisory Body of Social Network Service Providers

Social network service providers are obliged to establish within their own structure a supervisory body to conduct the complaints procedure. It is a basic requirement that the persons who are to serve on this supervisory body be independent and that it be made up of persons who are experts in their field.

The authorised persons in the body are obliged to carry out their own internal checks once a month. The legislature has also provided that, if organisational problems are found to exist, they must be resolved without delay, and that language proficiency and technical knowledge must also be checked regularly and deficiencies remedied. It has further been emphasised that there must also be an administrative authority supervising these bodies. As to the duties of the administrative authority, obligations have been imposed, where a 7-day period has been set in cases in which there is doubt concerning illegal content as part of the complaints procedure, such as providing appropriate equipment geared to the needs of the supervisory body and setting up a complaints office.

e. The Problem of the Conflict of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the Removal of Content

Another matter that has been debated in German legal scholarship with this Act is whether the removal of content classified as illegal content constitutes a violation of freedom of expression or of freedom of the press.

In reply to the authors who claim that this amounts to a violation, it is argued that social network providers, which become aware of the situation when a complaint about unlawful content is received, are obliged to delete the content, and that this obligation, deriving from Article 10 of the Teleservices Act, falls within the sphere of responsibility of content providers. If the staff of these platforms establish that there are concrete indications that the posts made – the unlawful content – involve an abuse of rights, they must delete the content. For it is stated that it is not the supervisory bodies of the social network provider that determine whether the content is contrary to the law; rather, Article 1(3) of the Act expressly specifies which content is to be regarded as criminal. At this point it is argued that the deletion or blocking of content consists merely in the application of the existing laws and that, if further legal action is sought in respect of that content, it is possible to submit views to that effect to the competent judicial authorities.

For it is also stated that, when the balance of common interests is taken into account, this situation can be legitimised, and that the time limits laid down in the complaints procedure (24 hours – 7 days) are necessary and proportionate for achieving the aim.

In our opinion, the necessary legislation must of course be enacted, in one way or another, in order to prevent offences that are steadily multiplying on social media, such as hate crimes. However, the conflict of interests between a person’s fundamental rights and freedoms, such as freedom of expression and freedom of the press, will be resolved only if it is assessed as sensitively as possible and if the persons sitting on these supervisory bodies genuinely adopt an impartial approach. Otherwise the “Chilling Effect” will make itself felt, and people will maintain only a limited presence on a platform on which they have given up exercising their most natural rights.

3. Reporting Obligation

a. Social Network Providers Subject to the Obligation

Another point on which the Act differs from other legal regulations is the reporting obligation. That is to say, the Act, which provides for any social media user to lodge a complaint about illegal content, has tied the outcome of the complaint to a reporting process. According to Article 2 of the Act: “(1) Social network providers that receive more than one hundred complaints about illegal content within one year are obliged, pursuant to Article 2 on the handling of complaints about illegal content on their platforms, to prepare the report every six months and after publishing it in the German Federal Gazette; and on their own homepage within one month at the latest. The report published on their own homepage must be easily recognisable and must be immediately and at all times accessible.”

This reporting will produce consequences from several angles. The complaining user, seeing that his complaint has been dealt with and that the necessary sanctions have been applied, will feel that his legal security has been ensured. For a person who has not lodged a complaint but uses the social media network, it will also have an awareness-raising function with regard to possible violations. Finally, since the reputation of social media providers will be damaged where the reporting makes it public that the number of complaints against them has reached one hundred and that they have consequently been subjected to a sanction, it will perform a preventive task by inducing providers to act more carefully.

Social network providers must draw up the report in question on the handling of complaints about illegal content and on their provision of an effective complaints procedure. In order for the report to deliver the benefit intended by the Act, it must be easily comprehensible and accessible on the social networks’ websites. It is moreover stipulated that this access must not be a one-off but must be such that persons can reach the report whenever they wish, in line with their requests.

b. Content of the Report

Article 2(2) of the Act explains what the content of the report must include. According to the Act:

“(2) The report must cover at least the following matters: 1. general remarks on the efforts made by social network providers to prevent criminal acts on the platforms,

2. a description of the mechanisms for submitting complaints about illegal content and of the decision-making criteria for deleting and blocking illegal content, 3. the number of complaints about illegal content received in the reporting period and, after the complaint, its breakdown into complaints from complaints officers and complaints about illegal content received from users,

4. the organisation, staffing, technical and linguistic competence of the work units responsible for processing complaints. The efforts made for the training and development of the persons responsible for handling complaints,

5. membership of inter-regional organisations, with reference to whether there is a complaints centre in these inter-branch organisations,

6. the number of complaints in respect of which an external body was consulted in order to prepare the decision, 7. whether, by reason of the objection, there was a case within the scope of sub-paragraph 3-a of Article 3(2); the number of complaints in the reporting period which, broken down into those directed to complaints bodies and

users’ complaints, led to the cancellation or blocking of the content in question, and whether in that case it was sent to the user and whether it was referred to a recognised regulated regulatory institution pursuant to sub-paragraph 3-b of Article 3(2); 8. the time stage after the complaint (in the form "within 24 hours" / "within 48 hours" /within one week/at some later time"), the information that access was blocked or the content deleted within the one-week period elapsing between receipt of the complaint on the social network and the cancellation or blocking of the illegal content, or at a later date, broken down into those directed to complaints bodies and users’ complaints, 9. it must contain the information for informing the complainant and the user that the decision on the complaint concerning the content in question has been stored.”

As can be seen, the Act has laid down detailed rules on the content of the report. In particular, the report must state the criminal content, whether the illegal content was removed by deletion or by blocking and what criteria were applied in reaching that decision, and the number of and reasons for the complaints, broken down into complaints from complaints officers and complaints from users.

4. Administrative Sanctions

In order to achieve its intended aim, the Act has made social network providers subject to sanctions should they fail to operate the complaints procedure effectively. It is expressly stated that a sanction will be imposed in the event of any shortcoming in the complaints process, in the reporting period or in the relevant supervisory body of the social network. The infringements have not been classified as criminal offences; they have been treated as misdemeanours (administrative offences). While 500 thousand euros has been set as the lower limit of the administrative fine, in certain cases indicated below a limit of 5 thousand euros has been set for the administrative fine, according to the degree of the infringement. The amounts so specified may be increased up to tenfold. This matter, regulated in Article 4 of the Act, has been laid down in the following terms: “(1) Offences committed intentionally or by negligence,

1) contrary to (1) of paragraph 2, first sentence, cannot publish a report that is inaccurate, incomplete or not prepared in the prescribed manner or on time, or that contains an incorrect, incomplete or deficient report;

2) acts contrary to § 3 (1-1), the complainant or the natural or legal person who does not fully or completely carry out the procedure specified for lodging complaints,

3) acts contrary to § 3 (1-2), if it does not provide a procedure specified therein,

4) acts contrary to § 3 (4-1), if the handling of complaints is not monitored in an appropriate manner,

5) acts contrary to § 3 (4-2), if it does not remedy the organisational deficiency or does not eliminate it in time,

6) contrary to § 3 (4-3), if it does not offer training or support in time,

7) contrary to § 5, does not designate a domestic service representative or a domestic recipient, or

8) contrary to § 5 (2-2), if requests for information to which a reply is requested are not answered,

(2) In the cases referred to in (7) and (8) of paragraph 1 of this Article, a fine of up to five hundred thousand euros may be imposed as an administrative penalty, and in the remaining cases the fine of up to five million euros in the first paragraph. Sub-paragraph 3 of Article 30(2) of the Act on Regulatory Offences shall apply.

(3) Misdemeanours committed abroad shall also be punished.

(4) The administrative authority within the meaning of sub-paragraph 1 of Article 36(1) of the Act on Regulatory Offences is the Federal Office of Justice. The Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, in agreement with the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy and the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure, shall issue general administrative principles on the exercise of discretion by the administrative authorities in the assessment of misdemeanour proceedings and sanctions.

(5) If the administrative authority wishes to obtain a judicial decision in order to base its decision on the fact that content which has not been removed or blocked is unlawful within the meaning of Article 1(3), it must give information on the illegality beforehand. The court that decides on the objection to the fine is responsible. The request for a preliminary ruling must be forwarded to the court together with the opinion of the social network. The application may be decided without a hearing. The decision is final and binding on the Administration/Authority board.”

5. Service of Documents on the Social Network Provider

Provision has been made for the designation of an authorised service centre for the purpose of serving complaints and other documents in court or other judicial proceedings concerning content, and for the creation of a contact person through the appointment of a natural person by social network providers.

According to Article 5 of the Act: “(1) Social network providers must designate a service centre in the domestic market, and this service centre must be indicated on their own platforms in an easily comprehensible and directly accessible manner. Service in proceedings under Article 4 or in proceedings before German courts for preventing the dissemination of illegal content may be effected on this service centre. The address of this centre shall likewise be taken as the basis for the service of documents instituting proceedings.”

6. Failure of the Social Network Provider to Supply Information Requested by Law Enforcement or Judicial Authorities

This matter, regulated in Article 5(2) of the Act, has been laid down in the following terms:

“(2) Where information is requested by domestic law enforcement authorities, an authorised person resident in the country must be designated. The recipient is obliged to reply to requests for information within 48 hours of receiving the notification. Where the request for information is not answered in a manner covering the full content of the request, the reasons for this must be stated in the reply.”

As can be seen from the provision of the Act, when law enforcement authorities request information, social network providers are under a duty to transmit the information within a short time. Failure to provide information to law enforcement authorities has in turn been made subject to a sanction in sub-paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 4(1) of the Act, the heaviest administrative fine under the Act being provided for.

7. Transitional Provisions

Article 6 of the Act regulates transitional provisions and thereby clarifies the process of the Act’s application. The first paragraph lays down the provision “The report pursuant to Article 2 shall be expected for the first time for the first half of 2018”. By its transitional provisions the Act specifies when the report is first to be submitted; the work relating to the complaints procedure regulated in Article 3 of the Act must be completed within 3 months, taking as the starting point 1 January 2018, the date on which the Act entered into force. Paragraph 2, for its part, introduces the provision “The procedures in Article 3 must be put in place within three months of the date on which this Act enters into force. If a social network provider fulfils the requirements of § 1 at a later date, the procedures in § 3 must be presented three months after that date.” Accordingly, service providers that subsequently acquire the characteristics, set out in Article 1 of the Act, of the social networks recognised under this Act must, within 3 months starting from the date on which they meet the qualities required by the Act, present their arrangements showing that they have put in place the procedures relating to complaints.

Conclusion

On the basis of the articles, examined in detail above, of the Act adopted in Germany on 1 September 2017 and in force as of 1 January 2018, it may be accepted that an attempt has been made to introduce legislation geared to the needs of society, particularly as a result of the day-by-day increase in violations relating to hate crime. Nevertheless, the fact that, in defining illegal content under the Act, the yardstick used is an assessment relating to situations regarded as offences under a limited number of provisions of the German Criminal Code also gives rise to certain doubts as to adequacy. For assessing illegal content solely in terms of the particular provisions of the German Criminal Code specified in Article 1(3) of the Act has failed to provide a protection mechanism for the parts left uncovered. As regards the concept of illegal content, it would be appropriate to adopt rules that are broader but require no interpretation.

It should also be noted that major tasks have been imposed on the state and on social network providers in preventing infringements of fundamental rights and freedoms. In this vein, legislation that is necessary but not sufficient has been created. It is, for its part, a text that Türkiye may take as a reference in any statutory regulation it may draw up on social networks. Of course, since countries’ socio-cultural and political approaches do not coincide exactly, it would be appropriate for there to be legislation that takes the conditions of the country into account.

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Footnotes

  1. Yeditepe University Faculty of Law, Department of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law (E-mail: volkan.dulger@dulger.av.tr). ↑
  2. Friedrich-Alexander University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Faculty of Law and Economics, Chair of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and Philosophy of Law (Prof. Dr. Hans Kudlich) (E-mail: mustafa.oglakcioglu@fau.de) Date of Submission of the Article: 21.05.2018 Dates of Acceptance of the Article: 13.08.2018/17.08.2018 *1 Hereinafter referred to as the “Act”. *2 See Guggenberger, NJW 2017, 2577; Koreng, GRUR-Prax 2017, 203; Nolte, ZUM 2017, 552; Liesching, ZUM 2017, 809. ↑
  3. For the full text of the report published by We Are The Social see https://www.slideshare.net/ wearesocialsg/digital-in-2017-western-europe ↑
  4. In summary Oğlakcıoğlu/Schuhr, in: Felder/Vogel (Hrsg.), Handbuch Sprache und Recht, 2017, S. 527 ff. ↑
  5. Offences of this kind are referred to as expression offences (Äußerungsdelikte), see: Hilgendorf, Computerund Internetstrafrecht, 2012, S. 79 ff.; Römer, Verbreitungs- und Äußerungsdelikte im Internet, 2000, S. 1 ff.; Zaczyk, in: Nomos Kommentar, StGB, 5. Aufl. 2017, Vorb §§ 185 ff. Rn. 18 ff.; Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, 29. Aufl. 2014, § 130 Rn. 17. ↑
  6. See Ostendorf, NK-StGB/ (footnote 6) § 130 Rn. 8; Poscher, NJW 2005, 1316 ff; Bertram, NJW 2005, 1476 ff. From the perspective of political science Sirsch, in: Meibauer (Hrsg.), Hassrede, 2016, S. 167. ↑
  7. Lackner/Kühl, 28. Aufl. 2014, § 193 Rn. 14; Zaczyk, NK-StGB, § 193 Rn. 41. ↑
  8. See BVerfG NStZ-RR 2016, 308; OLG München StV 2015, 570; AG Rostock NZV 2013, 251. ↑
  9. BVerfGE 93, 266 (295); Sinn, in Satzger/Schluckebier/Widmaier, 3. Aufl. 2017, § 185 Rn. 10 mwN. ↑
  10. LG Tübingen NStZ-RR 2013, 10. ↑
  11. Kudlich, Prüfe dein Wissen BT I, 3. Aufl. 2013, Fall 96. ↑
  12. Kudlich, Erwägen - Wissen - Ethik, 2008, S. 433 f. ↑
  13. Kudlich, Erwägen - Wissen - Ethik, 2008, S. 433 (434), Jahn, JuS 2005, 1057; Reiter, in: FS Zeidler, 1987 Bd. 1, S. 597 (613). ↑
  14. Freedom of art has played a role in Germany in rap music containing swear words and slang, whose popularity has risen in recent years, and in proceedings brought against artists who push the limits to the extreme; on this see Oğlakcıoğlu/Rückert, ZUM 2015, 876. ↑
  15. See BVerfG NJW 1994, 2943; BVerfGE 93, 266. ↑
  16. BVerfG NStZ 1988, 21; BGH NJW 2004, 596 (597); BayObLG NJW 1957, 1607; OLG Hamm NJW 1982, 659; Otto, NJW 1986, 1206 (1207); Würtenberger, NJW 1982, 610 (612); Regge/ Pege, MüKo StGB/ § 185 Rn 18. ↑
  17. In abbreviated form, these three offence types read as follows: § 130(1) of the German Criminal Code: Whoever, in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace, (1) incites hatred against a group defined by its national, racial, religious or ethnic origin, against a section of the population or against individuals in the population on account of their belonging to the said groups or to a section of the population, or directs towards violent or arbitrary acts (…) shall be punished with imprisonment from three months to five years. § 140, sub-paragraph 2, of the German Criminal Code: Whoever approves of one of the unlawful acts referred to in § 138(1) (2-4, 5) and in the last alternative act of § 126(1) of the German Criminal Code, or of an unlawful act under § 176(3), under § 176a and 176b, under § 177(4-8) or under § 178, after it has been committed or after it has been attempted in a punishable manner; (…) in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace; publicly, at a meeting or through the dissemination of written material (§ 11(3)), shall be punished with imprisonment of up to three years or a fine. § 166(1) of the German Criminal Code: (1) Whoever, publicly or through the dissemination of written material (§ 11(3)), insults the religious or ideological views of others in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace shall be punished with imprisonment of up to three years or a fine. ↑
  18. See BGHSt 16, 56; 21, 371; 29, 26; Ostendorf, NK § 130 Rn. 18; Lackner/Kühl/Heger, § 130 Rn. 2. ↑
  19. Rackow, in: BeckOK-StGB, 37. Edition, § 130 Rn. 16; BGHSt 21, 371; OLG Stuttgart 19.5.2009 - 2 S. 1014/09, NStZ 2010, 453 (454). ↑
  20. Stübinger, NK § 166 Rn. 8; wohl auch Lackner/Kühl/Heger § 166 Rn 2; Fischer, 65. Aufl. 2018, § 166 Rn 4 b; Hörnle, aA MüKoStGB/ § 166 Rn 18; Lenckner/Bosc, Sch/Sch, h § 166 Rn 4. ↑
  21. See BGHSt 21, 371 (372) = NJW 1968, 309 (310); BGH NStZ 1981, 258; BGHSt 40, 97 (102) = NJW 1994, 1421 (1422); BGHSt 46, 212 (217) = NJW 2001, 624 (626); OLG Köln NJW 1981, 1280; BayObLG NJW 1990, 2479 (2480); OLG Frankfurt a. M. NJW 1995, 143 (144). ↑
  22. BGH NJW 1978, 58; OLG Braunschweig NJW 1978, 2046; Rudolphi, ZRP 1979, 220; Fischer, § 140 Rn 7. ↑
  23. See Kudlich, Hukuk Köprüsü 2013, 41. ↑
  24. BGH NStZ 2007, 216 (217); Satzger/Schluckebier/Widmaier/Lohse, Rn. 9. Fischer, NStZ 1988, 159 (164): The element is contrary to the principle of legality (Art. 103 Abs. 2 GG). On whether the statement is “capable”, see in detail Hörnle, Grob anstößiges Verhalten, 2006, S. 303 ff. ↑
  25. Vgl. BGHSt 16, 49 (56) = NJW 1961, 1364 (1365); BGHSt 29, 26 = NJW 1979, 1992; OLG Celle NJW 1970, 2257; OLG Hamburg NJW 1975, 1088 (1089); OLG Koblenz MDR 1977, 334; OLG Schleswig MDR 1978, 333; OLG Koblenz StV 1985, 15 (16); OLG Düsseldorf NJW 1986, 2518 (2519); Sternberg-Lieben, Sch/Sch, § 130 Rn. 11. ↑
  26. Schäfer, in: Münchner Kommentar StGB, 3. Aufl. 2017, § 130 Rn. 24 ff. ↑
  27. Sternberg-Lieben, Schö/Sch, § 130 Rn. 11; Satzger/Schluckebier/Widmaier/Lohse, § 130 Rn. 9; Giehring, StV 1985, 30 (35). ↑
  28. Rackow, BeckOK, § 130 Rn. 22. ↑
  29. OVG Greifswald 19.9.2009 - 3 M 155/09 Rn. 1 f. ↑
  30. Hilgendorf, Vgl. NJW 1997, 1873 (1874); Sieber, NJW 1999, 2065 (2068); Heghmanns, JA 2001, 276; Lagodny, JZ 2001, 1198; Koch, JuS 2002, 123; Valerius, NStZ 2003, 341 (342); Hörnle, NStZ 2001, 309; Jeßberger, JR 2001, 432; Sieber, ZRP 2001, 97. ↑
  31. See Schnepper, Robert K. Mertons Theorie der self-fulfilling prophecy, 2004. ↑

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