Abstract
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
The first point to be made on the concurrence of offences is that the principle in this area is the cumulation of penalties. Accordingly, the cumulation of penalties is the rule and the concurrence of offences the exception. Indeed, this is expressed in the report of the Justice Committee of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) on the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (TCK) as “there are as many offences as there are acts, and as many penalties as there are offences”. The concurrence of offences essentially occurs in two forms: “ideal concurrence” and the “successive offence”.
Full text
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Asst. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger*
INTRODUCTION
The first point to be made on the concurrence of offences is that the principle in this field is the cumulation of penalties. Accordingly, the cumulation of penalties is the rule and the concurrence of offences the exception1. Indeed, in the report of the Justice Committee of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) on the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (TCK)
the formula “there are as many offences as there are deeds, and as many penalties as there are offences”
is used to express this2. The concurrence of offences occurs essentially in two forms: “notional concurrence” and the “continuing offence”. The continuing offence is regulated in Art. 43 TCK, and notional concurrence in Art. 44 TCK. In addition, Art. 42 regulates the “compound offence”, which is the most frequently encountered type of “apparent concurrence”.
The first point to be noted on the concurrence of offences in Turkish criminal law is the problem of terminology. The TCK undertook a renewal in the matter of language. In this sense, although in the TCK, which is written in a Turkish considerably more up to date than the language used in the former TCK, some terms have been rendered by Turkish words in use today (for example savcı instead of müddei umumi for the public prosecutor, ilk derece instead of bidayet for first instance, Yargıtay instead of temyiz mahkemesi for the Court of Cassation), the terms içtima (concurrence) and iştirak (participation) have not been replaced by new words. Terms such as iştirak and içtima are in fact established, customary terms in the terminology of criminal law. However, the fact that new words are used for established terms in some parts of the criminal code while this is not done in certain other parts creates an inconsistency. Yet the words birleşme in place of içtima and katılma in place of iştirak are words that are both used in current language and of Turkish origin. Consequently, alongside the old terms, the new terms corresponding to them have now also come into use; accordingly, in the matter of the concurrence of offences, the terms zincirleme suç (continuing offence), düşünsel birleşme (notional concurrence) and görünüşte birleşme (apparent concurrence) are also used3. Indeed, in our study too the new terms are used alongside the old ones.
In our study notional concurrence, the continuing offence and apparent concurrence are examined in that order, on the basis of the articles of the TCK.
This paper was published in I. Türkiye – Azerbaycan Hukuk Sempozyumu 01 – 02 Temmuz 2011, Ed: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Yener Ünver, İstanbul, Özyeğin Üniversitesi Yayını, 2011, s.103 – 165.
II. Notional Concurrence (Ideal Concurrence)
A. Definition and Legal Nature
The purpose of creating a criminal norm is to place various legal interests under protection and to meet attacks on them with a sanction4. As a rule, an offence type contained in the Code encompasses the entire unlawfulness of the prohibited deed. In some situations, however, the multiplicity of the legal interests infringed by the deed committed links it to several offence types. Where the deed in question is assessed from a single angle only, this is not sufficient to cover the whole of the unlawful character of that deed5. Moreover, in the special part of criminal codes or in special criminal laws the offence types are regulated one by one, yet a single deed may be connected with different offence types. It is precisely where several norms relate to the same deed that notional concurrence arises6.
Notional concurrence occurs where the perpetrator, by the single deed he has carried out, commits more than one different offence. Notional concurrence requires that the deed be single and that by the same deed
more than one offence be realised7.
In notional concurrence the legislature has provided that a single penalty is to be imposed on the perpetrator. There are, however, differing views as to the legal justification for imposing a single penalty although there is more than one offence. According to one of them, the view of unity of offence, there is in fact a single offence in the case of notional concurrence, because the perpetrator has carried out a single deed, and a single penalty must be imposed. Those who hold this view take the “act”, which is one of the material elements of the offence, as the basis for the distinction between unity of offence and plurality of offences, accept that there is unity of offence in this situation because there is a single act, and state that the offences have merged8.
According to the view of plurality of offences, by contrast, although there is a single act, the criminal norm has been violated more than once, so that the number of times the norm has been violated must be taken into account in determining the number of offences. Accordingly, since in notional concurrence the norm is violated more than once, there is a plurality of offences9.
We too subscribe to the view that there is a plurality of offences in notional concurrence. Indeed, it can be seen that the provisions in Art. 44 TCK are also based on the view of plurality of offences10.
There are differing views on how the imposition of a single penalty for the several offences realised by the perpetrator is to be justified. According to the first of these, where the perpetrator has managed to realise more than one offence, albeit by a single deed, the provisions on notional concurrence are applied and it is considered sufficient to impose on the perpetrator his penalty increased by a certain amount, or to impose the penalty of whichever of the offences he has committed carries the heavier penalty. This, however, is a situation that is open to criticism. For in this situation there is no subjective link between the offences, and the existence of a single deed is likewise insufficient to explain it. In this way skilful offenders are, as it were, rewarded; consequently no difference should be made between notional concurrence and real concurrence, and the perpetrator should be given a separate penalty for each offence he has committed. Indeed, the statutory provision does not require the presence of a subjective element for notional concurrence either. And to make, in notional concurrence of the same kind, the same increase in parallel with the provision for a certain increase of the penalty in the continuing offence, where the perpetrator is punished with a single penalty on account of the unity of the decision to commit an offence, gives rise to a contradiction, since there is no subjective element in the offences forming the notional concurrence11.
In the second view on this matter, the rule “non bis in idem” is given as the reason why, in notional concurrence of different kinds, the perpetrator is punished only for the offence carrying the heaviest penalty among the offences he has realised by a single deed12. According to this rule, an individual may be punished only once for a deed he has carried out. Indeed, this is also stated in the explanatory memorandum to Art. 44. By including notional concurrence in the Code and by imposing on the perpetrator in this case the penalty of a single offence, the aim is to prevent the individual from being punished more than once for the same deed13. However, the principle in question has nothing to do with this matter. It is a principle of the law of criminal procedure and is connected with investigation, prosecution and, ultimately, the plurality of penalties. Since notional concurrence, by contrast, concerns the plurality of offences, it is in our view not appropriate to explain the matter by this principle.
In a different view on this matter it is said that the reason why the legislature contents itself with the imposition of a single penalty in notional concurrence is that the offences committed by a single deed have merged; in that case there is one offence, and only one penalty can be imposed for one offence. This, for its part, can be explained by the view of the unity of the act14. However, it must also be explained why, although there is a single act and although it is accepted that the offences have merged, the penalty relating to the offence carrying the heavier penalty is imposed. This can be explained, albeit not entirely satisfactorily, by penal justice, for from the standpoint of criminal law the several results that have come about must not be ignored. What is just, however, is that, since the perpetrator has committed another offence or other offences, one should not be content with imposing the heaviest penalty but the penalty should be increased by a certain amount; in this way notional concurrence would also lose its character of being a kind of reward for the perpetrator15. Moreover, the existence of a single deed constitutes a bar to the perpetrator’s being punished for more than one offence; what in fact concurs here is the thought, for the perpetrator’s thought is to commit a single offence16.
We consider that in notional concurrence there is a plurality of offences and that, in determining this, it is not the act but the violation of the norm that must be taken as the criterion. As for the justification for imposing a single penalty on the perpetrator although the offences are several, we consider that the concept of penal justice can explain it; that to act with the intent to commit more than one offence and to commit more than one offence by a single deed is an exceptional situation; that the second offence that comes about is generally realised through negligence, so that imposing penalties for two separate offences might, having regard to the principle of proportionality, lead to harsh results; and that the imposition of a single penalty for several offences realised by a single deed has been provided for with the aim of reducing the severity of the punishment. We consider, however, that in this case, contrary to the provision in the Code, the penalty of the more serious of the offences committed ought to be imposed with an increase of a certain amount. We consider that in this way a balance can be struck between the fact that the act carried out by the perpetrator is single and the fact that the results that have come about are several.
B. Conditions of Notional Concurrence
For notional concurrence to arise, three conditions must be present. These are that the deed be single, that the single deed give rise to more than one offence, and that each of the offences in the concurrence satisfy the conditions for prosecution and that the perpetrator be punishable for his deed.
1. The Deed Must Be Single
In Art. 44 TCK, notional concurrence is, under the heading “ideal concurrence”,
provided for. The article in question contains the provision “a person who, by a deed he has committed, causes more than one different offence to arise shall, for the offence among these that carries the heaviest penalty,
be punished”. Accordingly, notional concurrence arises where different offences are realised by a single deed. For example, where the perpetrator, with a stone he throws at a shop window, both breaks the window pane and causes the sales assistant inside to be injured on the head, this situation obtains, since by the perpetrator’s single deed both the offence of damage to property and that of intentional or negligent injury are in issue.
The first and most important condition of notional concurrence is that the perpetrator has carried out a single deed. The perpetrator’s beating his victim with numerous punches or blows of a stick, or the perpetrator’s killing the victim with numerous bullets or stab wounds, are examples of this17. Consequently, since these are regarded as a single deed, even though they comprise more than one act they will not be regarded as a continuing offence or as real concurrence, and where the norm is violated more than once the existence of notional concurrence will be accepted.
Depending on the kind and degree of the overlap, in a single deed, of the acts of execution of several offences, there is more than one possible way in which notional concurrence may come about, and for each possibility it may come about in various combinations. In this context, just as notional concurrence may come about where the acts of execution are fully identical, it is accepted that it also comes about in the case of partial identity18. For example, where a person beats an enforcement officer because he is performing his duty, both the offence of resistance to prevent a public official from performing his duty (Art. 265 TCK) and that of intentional injury (Art. 86 TCK) are in issue, and there is complete similarity as regards the acts of execution of these two offences19. On the other hand, where in the offence of robbery the perpetrator first strikes the victim and then takes his money, notional concurrence will, even though as regards the deeds only the use of force has been realised, be present20. A similar example in this regard is to be found between the offence of fraud and the offence of forgery of documents. Where the deed of fraud is committed by means of a forged document, notional concurrence is in issue21. However, Art. 212 TCK introduced a different rule on this matter, stating that in this case the provision on notional concurrence is not to be applied and that the perpetrator is to be held liable for both offences and his penalties are to be cumulated in accordance with the provisions on real concurrence22.
2. The Single Deed Must Give Rise to More than One Offence
By the expression “giving rise to more than one offence” is meant the violation of different offence types. The commission of different offences, however, is not necessarily the violation of different articles; notional concurrence may also arise where different offence types are realised although they are contained in the same article23. For example, where by the same deed of the perpetrator the offences of bringing into the country, possessing and storing images relating to child pornography (Art. 226(3) TCK) and of bringing into the country, possessing and storing images of sexual intercourse with animals (Art. 226(4) TCK) are committed, the rule on notional concurrence must be applied, because, although these are regulated as paragraphs of the same article, they are different offence types. Indeed, the decisions of the Court of Cassation are also to this effect24. The same applies as between the general criminal statutes and the ancillary criminal statutes25. However, the legislature may lay down rules that prevent the application of notional concurrence in such situations; for example, under Art. 212 TCK, where the offence of tax evasion is committed by means of a false invoice, separate penalties must be imposed both for forgery of a private document (Art. 207 TCK) and for the offence of tax evasion (Art. 359 of the Tax Procedure Law (VUK))26.
On the other hand, since the basic and the qualified forms of an offence are deemed to be the same offence, where both of them are violated by a single deed there will be not notional concurrence but the commission of a single offence27.
Where the perpetrator’s single deed realises both an offence and a misdemeanour (administrative offence), there will be no notional concurrence and a sanction will be applied only for the offence28. Similarly, since the Code says “offence”, notional concurrence will not arise where one of the deeds is a disciplinary offence29.
Accordingly, where a police officer who wishes to carry out an alcohol test is punched and pushed, both the offence of resistance to prevent a public official from performing his duty (Art. 265 TCK) and that of intentional injury (Art. 86 TCK) are in issue; in the deed of killing a person sitting inside a car with its windows closed by firing at him, both the offence of damage to property (Art. 151 TCK) and that of intentional killing (Art. 81 TCK); and where the death of a person is caused by driving under the influence of alcohol, both the offence of endangering traffic safety (Art. 179 TCK) and that of negligent killing (Art. 85 TCK)30. It is in situations such as these that the rule on notional concurrence will be applied and the penalty of the offence carrying the heavier penalty will be imposed31.
3. The Conditions for Prosecution Must Be Fulfilled and Punishability Must Exist in Respect of Each Offence
A further condition of notional concurrence is that each of the offences in the concurrence satisfy the conditions for prosecution and that the perpetrator be punishable for his deed. If one of these conditions is absent, the deed in question will not be included in the concurrence; the deed alone is therefore not sufficient for inclusion in notional concurrence. Accordingly, for every offence whose existence is necessary in notional concurrence, the mental element and the element of unlawfulness, that is to say, the elements of wrongfulness of the deed, must be realised32. However, as regards the offences standing in a relationship of notional concurrence, it is not sufficient that the elements of wrongfulness in the statutory type of the offence in question be realised. It is also necessary that, for each offence, the conditions for prosecution, such as permission, request, decision and complaint, where their existence is required, and punishability be fulfilled. If these conditions are not fulfilled, those offences will not be taken into account in the relationship of notional concurrence33. For example, where the perpetrator’s single deed realises two offences, one of which is prosecuted only on complaint and the other of which can be prosecuted ex officio, there will be no notional concurrence if the condition of complaint is not fulfilled34.
In addition to the conditions for prosecution, matters which do not form part of the element of wrongfulness of the offence but are required in the statutory definition must also be present for the purposes of notional concurrence, if they are required. In this context, where there are personal grounds for exemption from punishment, personal grounds extinguishing punishment or objective conditions of punishability, those offences will not be taken into account for the purposes of notional concurrence. Likewise, as regards grounds for discontinuance such as limitation, amnesty, withdrawal of the complaint and prepayment, each offence must be assessed separately in the specific case. Where these situations have materialised, those offences will not be included in the notional concurrence35.
C. Special Situations in Notional Concurrence
The first question to be answered under this heading is whether notional concurrence can be applied where the offences forming the notional concurrence have remained at the stage of attempt and, similarly, where one of these offences has been completed and the other has remained at the stage of attempt. It is accepted in legal scholarship that notional concurrence may arise where all of the offences realised by the perpetrator’s single deed have remained at the stage of attempt36. Similarly, it is stated that notional concurrence may also come about where one of the offences brought about by the perpetrator’s single deed has been completed and the other has remained at the stage of attempt37; indeed, the decisions of the Court of Cassation are also to this effect38. In the second situation, however, it is the penalty relating to the completed offence that is taken into account at the stage of determining the penalty.
Another situation that arises in notional concurrence is whether offences committed with intent and offences committed through negligence can stand in notional concurrence. In principle, notional concurrence between intentional and negligent offences is possible39. In addition, the question whether there can be notional concurrence between permanent offences and instantaneous offences is also disputed40. Similarly, there is also debate as to whether an offence of commission and an offence of omission can together form a notional concurrence41.
It is stated that notional concurrence may also arise between the basic offence type and offences aggravated by their result; that, however, where the aggravated result comes about through negligence, there is here apparent concurrence in accordance with the principle of the priority of the special norm, since the aggravated offence always contains the negligent offence type, and the perpetrator will be held liable only for the aggravated result; and that where, by contrast, the aggravated result is realised by an offence committed with intent, there is here a plurality of offences and the rule on notional concurrence comes into play, so that the perpetrator must be held liable for the offence carrying the higher penalty42. Accordingly, if death occurs as a result of intentional injury (Art. 86 TCK) (Art. 87(4) TCK – here the death has come about as a result of the perpetrator’s negligent conduct), there is apparent concurrence and only the form of negligent injury aggravated by its result will be applied. It is stated, however, that where the victim dies as a result of a sexual assault, there is notional concurrence if the force used beyond what is necessary for the sexual assault causes death intentionally or negligently43. Indeed, what is in issue in this case is the force and violence used by the perpetrator in order to carry out his sexual assault. Although there is more than one act in this deed, these acts form a single deed. Where the force and violence, which are among the parts of this single deed, cause death through the perpetrator’s negligent or intentional act, there is a completed or attempted offence of sexual assault and an offence of killing realised with intent or through negligence, and thus more than one, and different, offences come about through the perpetrator’s single deed.
Consequently, Art. 44 TCK should be applied here and the offence carrying the higher penalty should be applied to the perpetrator44.
D. Consequences of Notional Concurrence
Under the statutory provision, Art. 44, in which notional concurrence is regulated, provides for the imposition of the penalty of the most serious of the offences realised by the perpetrator’s single deed. The legislature has thus adopted the absorption system45 for notional concurrence46.
In our view, the fact that in notional concurrence no increase of the penalty is made and it is considered sufficient merely to impose the heaviest penalty leads to the result being wholly disregarded and to unjust outcomes47. Indeed, it is stated that Art. 81(1) of the Italian Criminal Code provides that in notional concurrence the penalty for the most serious violation may be increased up to threefold, and that this is a more correct solution48. Consequently, in our view, de lege ferenda, in notional concurrence the penalty of the more serious of the offences committed should be taken as the basis and the penalty should be imposed on the perpetrator with an increase in a certain proportion.
De lege lata, however, it would be a fairer solution in notional concurrence to determine the concrete penalty by looking at the number of offences and approaching the upper limit of the offence carrying the heavier penalty. In determining the heavier penalty, while it is the abstract penalty provided for the offence that is taken into account, where a qualified form of the offence is in issue the penalty provided for the qualified form must be taken into account49. Indeed, the offence type regulated in Art. 297 TCK is an example of this. Under that article, bringing weapons, narcotic or stimulant substances or electronic means of communication into a penal institution or detention facility, or possessing them there, is made an offence. Where the procurement or possession of the item forming the subject matter of this offence constitutes a separate offence, the penalty to be determined in accordance with the provisions on notional concurrence is to be increased by one half50. Indeed, possessing narcotic substances, stimulant substances and weapons is in itself a separate offence (Arts. 174, 188, 191 TCK). Here the legislature has specifically provided for the penalty to be increased where notional concurrence is in issue. In other words, the proposal we have made above is in fact to be found in the criminal code51.
III. The Continuing Offence
A. Definition and Legal Nature
The continuing offence is regulated in Art. 43 of TCK No. 5237; this article reads as follows: “(1)
Where, within the scope of the execution of a decision to commit an offence, the same offence is committed more than once against one person at different times, one penalty shall be imposed. However, this penalty shall be increased by from one quarter to three quarters. The basic form of an offence and its qualified forms requiring a heavier or a lesser penalty shall be deemed the same offence. In offences whose victim is not a specific person
the provision of this paragraph shall also apply. (2) Where the same offence is committed against more than one person by a single deed, the provision of the first paragraph shall also apply. (3) In the offences of intentional killing, intentional injury, torture and robbery, the provisions of this article
shall not apply.”
The continuing offence is the commission of the same offence more than once at different times within the framework of a decision to commit an offence52. In the continuing offence there is a subjective link between the offences committed, and there is not one offence but more than one53. Indeed, the definition in Art. 43 too expressly accepts that in this case there is a plurality of offences.
On the explanation of the legal basis of the continuing offence there are two different views, the single-offence view and the plural-offence view. In the first of these, the single-offence view, it is stated that in the continuing offence there is in reality a single offence, and that the existence of the same decision to commit an offence and the violation of the same statutory provision show the unity of the offence54. In countries whose statutes contain no provision on the continuing offence, the continuing offence is brought within the scope of unity of offence on various grounds. German, Austrian, Swiss and French criminal law scholarship may be cited as examples of this55. The authors who hold the single-offence view also express it in different ways. While some of the authors who adopt the view that the continuing offence consists of a single offence require unity of offence in both subjective and objective respects, there are also authors who regard objective unity alone as sufficient56.
In the second view explaining the legal basis of the continuing offence, the view of plurality of offences, it is stated that the unity of the continuing offence is a fiction; that there are in fact several offences independent of one another; that these are deemed a single offence only for the purposes of determining the penalty; that this method is resorted to in order to prevent a heavy penalty from resulting through the cumulation of penalties; and that, apart from the imposition of a single penalty on the perpetrator, the offences retain their independence as regards the other consequences too57.
It is the view of plurality of offences that prevails in Turkish criminal law scholarship. According to this view, the continuing offence in fact consists of the coming together of several offences each of which is independent in nature; this institution is, however, included in the Code on account of needs arising from practice, having regard to the fact that the cumulation of penalties would lead to very harsh results for the perpetrator. Accordingly, in the continuing offence as many offences are realised as there are violations of the norm. Consequently, the consequences of the continuing offence are limited to those indicated in the Code; in situations outside these, one must proceed according to the independent character of each offence included in the continuing offence58.
The continuing offence is a concept created in the Middle Ages by the Glossators and Post-Glossators, and is a device found by practising lawyers in favour of the perpetrator in order to reduce penalties that were very high59. Consequently, the continuing offence is a legal arrangement which reduces the amount of the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator (Art. 43(1) TCK) and to which consequences are attached as regards the commencement of the limitation period (Art. 66(6) TCK) and the determination of the competent court (Art. 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK)), but in which the offences forming the chain retain their independence60. We too subscribe to this view61.
Indeed, whereas Art. 80 of the former TCK, in which the continuing offence was regulated, used the expression “shall be deemed one offence” as the consequence of the existence of a continuing offence, Art. 43 of the new TCK uses the expression “one penalty shall be imposed”, so that the normative provision too emphasises that the will of the legislature is to the effect that a plurality of offences is accepted in the case of the continuing offence62. This, however, is not an innovation introduced by the TCK; it was a position accepted unanimously in Turkish criminal law scholarship even before this provision, and all that has been done is to transfer that view to the normative plane63.
The continuing offence differs from the permanent (uninterrupted) offence, the habitual offence and recidivism64. Whereas in the continuing offence more than one offence is committed, in the permanent offence there is a single offence whose result continues. In the habitual offence, on the other hand, the offences must be repeated for a single offence to be realised; that is to say, whereas in the habitual offence a large number of offences form one single offence, in the continuing offence the offences retain their independence but a single penalty is imposed (with an increase). In recidivism, for its part, a new offence, the same or a different one, is committed after the judgment has become final, whereas in the continuing offence the same offence is committed more than once without a judgment intervening (in any event, in temporal terms too, this cannot be regarded as the execution of a decision to commit an offence)65.
The question why the penalty of a perpetrator who persists in committing offences is reduced in the case of the continuing offence is, however, disputed. Indeed, positivist lawyers do not believe in the necessity of the continuing offence. This concept, created on the ground that penalties, being very rigid, needed to be mitigated, is in the view of positivist lawyers useless and even harmful. The perpetrator’s persistent continuation of his decision to commit an offence should be assessed not in favour of the perpetrator but against him. It is true that there is some justification in these views. Indeed, the fact that, compared with a person who commits an offence by chance, a lesser penalty is imposed for the continuing offence despite the perpetrator’s persistence in his decision is seen as an inequality. Again, does unity of decision point to the perpetrator’s weakness or to his dangerousness? The justification for creating such an institution on the basis of this element, which is extremely difficult to establish, is debatable66. Nevertheless, this institution, which exists in many foreign criminal codes, was taken first into the Italian Zanardelli Code of 1889, from there into TCK No. 765 and finally, albeit with a narrowed scope, into TCK No. 5237.
B. Conditions of Continuing Offences
The continuing offence has five conditions in all, four of them objective and one subjective67. The objective conditions are: that there be more than one deed, that each of the deeds be committed at different times, that the deeds constitute the same offence, and that the same offence be committed more than once against the same person. The subjective condition is that the several offences be committed within the scope of the carrying out of a decision to commit an offence68.
1. There Must Be More than One Deed
The first condition of the continuing offence is that there be more than one deed69. For in order that the same offence may be committed more than once against the same person, there must be more than one deed. Since it is not possible for the commission of the same offence more than once against the same victim to be realised by a single deed, plurality of deeds is the first condition for the existence of the continuing offence70. Where in the specific situation there is not more than one offence that has been committed, the existence of a continuing offence cannot be spoken of71.
Moreover, for the provision on the continuing offence to be applicable, the deeds in question must constitute an offence; that is, the deeds must contain the elements of conformity with the statutory definition of the offence (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit), unlawfulness and culpability that must be present in an offence, and the offences forming the chain must therefore have come into being with all their elements72. Where one of the deeds does not constitute an offence because it lacks a sub-element, other than the material element of the offence, that forms part of conformity with the statutory definition, or because it does not involve the elements of unlawfulness and/or culpability, it is not possible to apply the provision on the continuing offence or, as the case may be, to include that deed in the chain73.
In situations where there is unity of the act, since only the existence of a single deed is accepted there will be no plurality of offences, the norm on the continuing offence will not come into play and the perpetrator will receive the penalty of the single offence he has committed74; indeed, the Court of Cassation too, in a decision it has given concerning the offence of theft, held that the perpetrator’s taking various items in the house he had entered and, in addition, the key of the car, and stealing the car in front of the house, was not a continuing offence but a single offence of theft75; similarly, in the offence of sexual harassment the Court of Cassation regarded the perpetrator’s telephoning the complainant at short intervals and saying “I love you, you will be mine”76, or his frequently telephoning and proposing sexual intercourse77, as a single deed in the legal sense and stated that the provision on the continuing offence could not be applied78. This also holds for offences with alternative acts. Where the alternative acts are carried out one after another with the intent to commit a single offence, the existence not of a continuing offence but of a single offence will likewise be accepted79; indeed, the practice of the Court of Cassation is also to this effect80. There are, however, authors in legal scholarship who state that in offences with alternative acts there will be unity of the deed where the same act is performed, and plurality of deeds, and hence a continuing offence, where different alternative acts are performed81. We, however, do not share this view; we consider that whether there is unity of the deed or a continuing offence must be determined separately in each specific case, taking into account the particular features of the case, the temporal succession, the decision to commit an offence present in the perpetrator and also the intent to commit the offence; we do accept, however, that in offences with alternative acts, where different acts are committed against the same victim at close intervals within the scope of the same decision to commit an offence, a single offence has been committed in continuation.
The continuing offence may come about among offences carried out by acts of commission, and it may also come about in offences of omission. Likewise, it is possible for non-genuine omission offences, in other words omission offences based on a guarantor position, to be realised in continuation82. For example, where a police officer, in line with a decision he has taken beforehand, does not intervene in the theft offences to be committed during his watch, the offence of abuse of office committed by an act of omission (Art. 257(2) TCK) is committed in continuation83.
In principle it is possible for some of the acts forming the continuing offence to be acts of commission and some to be acts committed by omission; this is a view also accepted in legal scholarship84. In this case, however, the acts carried out by omission must not constitute offence types different from those constituted by the acts of commission. For example, the commission of the offence of abuse of office by an act of commission is regulated in Art. 257(1) TCK, and its commission by omission in paragraph 2 of the same article, as two separate offence types. Consequently, where the offence of abuse of office is committed first by commission and then by omission, no continuing offence will arise even though the other conditions are met. By contrast, in the offence of fraud (Arts. 157 – 158 TCK) or in the offence of torture (Arts. 94 – 95 TCK), where the acts constituting these offences are committed one after another, the existence of a chain as regards the acts can be accepted and the provision on the continuing offence can be applied85.
Where all of the several offences have remained at the stage of attempt, or where some have remained at the stage of attempt while others have been completed, a continuing offence may likewise come about. Where one of the offences forming the continuing offence has been completed and the others have remained at the stage of attempt, the continuing offence will be regarded as completed and the increase of the penalty will be made on the basis of the completed offence86.
Since Art. 43 TCK expressly speaks of a plurality of offences, it is not possible for a continuing offence to arise between offences and misdemeanours87.
2. Each of the Deeds Must Be Committed at a Different Time
The second condition required by the code for the continuing offence is that the deeds constituting the offences included in the chain be committed at different times. However, the expression “at different times” should not be understood to mean a period of time between the offences so long as to break the decision to commit an offence. One should not go to extremes as regards this period, and care should be taken that the period is reasonable having regard to the nature of the specific deeds88. The deeds forming the continuing offence must be committed at different times, but in periods that are close to one another in temporal terms, so as to reveal the existence of a decision to commit an offence. There is no unanimity as to how long or how short this time should be; it is a matter that must be assessed in each specific case89. However, the fact that the time between the offences is long may be used as a criterion indicating that the same decision to commit an offence is lacking90. Indeed, the Court of Cassation, in various decisions it has given, has regarded a period such as two to three months as long in this sense91, whereas it has not deemed a period of one month long and has stated that the provision on the continuing offence must be applied92.
In addition, it is stated in decisions of the Court of Cassation that there can be no continuing offence where the deed takes place at the same moment93. Indeed, Art. 43(1) uses the expression “at different times”. In this context it is stated that the concept of “the same time”, which also appears in the decisions of the Court of Cassation, must not be interpreted narrowly and that very short intervals of time must also be assessed within the concept of the same time. For example, it is stated that where forgery on more than one document has been carried out within a short interval of time, or where more than one forged document has been produced within a short interval of time, it must likewise be accepted that these were drawn up in the same period of time, in other words that they were not drawn up at different times94. Indeed, the Court of Cassation too states in its decisions that Art. 43 TCK is not to be applied in respect of the accused on account of forgery carried out on two cheque leaves in the same period of time95. Moreover, in such situations the Court of Cassation does not apply the provision on the continuing offence, but states that, since the same offence has been committed more than once at the same moment, a single penalty should be imposed on the perpetrator at a level departing from the lower limit, so that the several offences committed do not go unpunished and unjust results do not arise.
We do not agree with this view, nor with the decisions of the Court of Cassation which, by reading the expression “at different times” narrowly through a literal interpretation, confine the continuing offence strictly to offences committed at different times. Under TCK No. 765, the expression “even if they occur at various times” meant that the continuing offence could, as a rule, be committed within the same period of time but, exceptionally, also at different times. Since one of the conditions that give the continuing offence its distinctive character is the existence of the same decision to commit an offence, that approach was more appropriate for the purpose of establishing this. Indeed, the existence of such a decision can be established more easily in respect of offences committed within the same period of time. Under the former provision, however, the rule on the continuing offence could be applied “even if at different times”, provided that the same decision to commit an offence could be established. A literal interpretation of Art. 43(1) of TCK No. 5237, by contrast, yields the meaning that the offences forming the chain must necessarily be committed at different times. Indeed, as can be seen from its decisions on the matter, the Court of Cassation also accepts this interpretation. We consider, however, that this expression should not be understood in absolute terms and that it should be interpreted having regard to the “ratio legis” pursued by the provision on the continuing offence96. Indeed, the Court of Cassation also interprets the statutory provision in absolute terms, yet tries to reach the correct result through an incorrect application, namely by departing from the lower limit of the penalty. However, since the solution adopted by the Court of Cassation will cause the penalty to increase as the number of offences committed increases, and may thus both run counter to the purpose for which the continuing offence was regulated and lead to unfair penalties being imposed on the perpetrator, it is in our view not a correct solution97.
Accordingly, different times need not necessarily be understood as different hours or days; for example, where money is withdrawn in succession from different accounts of the same depositor at what may be called the same moment, or where purchases are made in succession over the internet, but from different places, with the same unlawfully obtained credit card, the continuing offence may be applied even though the interval of time is very short. Therefore, as we have emphasised above and as is frequently stated in legal scholarship, whether or not the continuing offence can be applied must be decided having regard to the circumstances of each specific case and also to the purpose of this article. Even in this form, however, the provision is open to debate, since different times may be understood as different days as well as different hours and minutes98.
3. The Deeds Must Constitute the Same Offence
The third condition of the continuing offence is that the deeds carried out by the perpetrator constitute the same offence. Art. 43 expresses this as “the same offence being committed more than once”. What is meant by commission of the same offence is that the protected legal interest and the material and mental elements of conformity with the statutory definition of the offence (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit) are, in broad outline, the same as between the first offence and the other offences99.
It should also be noted that, under the provision in Art. 43 TCK, “the basic form of an offence
and its qualified forms requiring a heavier or a lesser penalty shall be deemed the same
offence”. Accordingly, Art. 43 TCK will also be applied where the basic and qualified forms of any offence are committed in succession at certain intervals, provided that this falls within the scope of committing the same offence100. For example, if the perpetrator, the other conditions also being met, commits the basic form and the qualified forms of the offence of theft in succession, the provision on the continuing offence will be applied. Similarly, where first the simple and then the qualified form of the offence of sexual assault is committed, there will be a continuing offence101. However, where the perpetrator commits first theft and then robbery, no continuing offence will arise102.
On the other hand, what is taken into account for the existence of a continuing offence is the same offence type, not the protected legal interest; accordingly, offences placed in the same chapter on the basis of the legal interest protected by the offence cannot be the subject of a continuing offence, and it is therefore not possible to apply the provisions on the continuing offence as between the offences of theft and fraud103.
In legal scholarship, Özgenç states that where, in the course of the continued commission of a deed constituting an offence, the legislature enacts a provision changing its legal characterisation so that it constitutes a different offence, the change in characterisation will not affect the formation of the continuing offence. The author states, for example, that the deeds by which the resources of a bank, which is a legal person under private law, were appropriated by persons in managerial positions constituted the offence of “abuse of trust by reason of service” under TCK No. 765 (Arts. 508 and 510), but that the same deeds were defined as a special offence of embezzlement in Art. 22(3) of the Banks Law No. 4389, and that these deeds continued to be defined as embezzlement in the Banking Law No. 5411; and that the change made by this legislation in the characterisation of the deed will not constitute an obstacle to the application of the provisions on the continuing offence104.
We do not agree with this view of the author. Where the legal characterisation of the deed is changed so that it becomes a different offence, and in particular one entailing heavier consequences, treating the earlier and later deeds as a whole and applying the provisions on the continuing offence would be contrary to the fundamental principles of criminal law. First of all, such a practice would amount to a violation of the principle of legality of offences and penalties. For in that case the perpetrator’s deed would be assessed according to the legal characterisation at the moment the chain ends, and he would be held liable not for the offence carrying the lighter penalty before the legislative amendment but for the offence carrying the heavier penalty after the amendment, and would thus be punished with a heavier penalty than that provided by the law in force at the time when part of the offence was committed. Yet if the deeds are assessed separately according to the period in which they were carried out, an assessment would be made as if there were two different offences where there is in fact a continuing offence, and the perpetrator might in the end receive a heavier penalty than under the rule on the continuing offence. In our view, in this situation the law should be applied both on the basis of a continuing offence and on the basis of different offences, and once the resulting penalties have been determined the outcome more favourable to the perpetrator should be applied; no categorical statement should be made in advance.
Some authors in legal scholarship state that, where the other conditions are also met, a continuing offence may arise even where provisions contained in different laws are violated, because the TCK uses the expression “the same offence” rather than “the same provision of the law”, so that it is not a requirement that the offences be found in the same law105. We do not agree with this view of the authors. For, as we have stated above, the reason why the expression “the same offence” is used is that different offences are regulated in the same article of the law. Moreover, where the same offence type is regulated in different laws, either the implied repeal of the earlier law by the later law (tacit abrogation), or one of the principles of the priority of the special norm or the subsidiarity of the auxiliary norm, which are forms of apparent concurrence, will come into play and prevent the application of the same offence type contained in different laws. Therefore, in our view, it does not seem possible for a continuing offence to arise between the same offence types contained in different laws. Although it is not possible to object to the authors’ view in principle, for the reason explained above it is hardly possible for this to occur.
4. The Victim Must Be the Same
a. The Rule: The Same Offence Committed against the Same Victim
The third objective condition of the continuing offence is that the offences committed more than once be committed against the same person, that is, that the victim of these offences be the same person. Accordingly, even if they are committed within the scope of the same decision to commit an offence, where the victims of the offence are different persons a continuing offence will, as a rule, not arise.
Since the provision on the continuing offence in Art. 80 of TCK No. 765 contained no such limiting wording, the article on the continuing offence could be applied even where the victims of the offence were different persons; in our view, this unnecessarily widened the scope of application of the article. Indeed, in some of its settled decisions the Court of Cassation narrowed the scope of application of the article and, particularly in the offences of homicide and intentional injury, stated that there were as many offences as there were victims and did not apply the article on the continuing offence in such cases; given the prohibition of extensive interpretation in criminal law, these decisions were in our view erroneous (in terms of the law in force at that time), although they were appropriate de lege ferenda and in terms of justice in the individual case. Indeed, this broad form of the article was also criticised in legal scholarship. Taking this de facto situation and these criticisms into account, the legislature corrected the position in the new TCK and expressly stated that a continuing offence can come into question only where the victim is the same106. The scope of application of the continuing offence has thus been considerably narrowed in the new TCK as compared with TCK No. 765107.
A further point to be made concerning the singleness of the victim in the continuing offence is that some authors in legal scholarship, starting from the theory of the unity of the act, argue that the article on the continuing offence should be applied even where there is more than one victim. The authors who hold this view state that the victim of the offence committed in the specific case must be correctly identified and that, for this reason, they do not agree with the assessment in the example given in the explanatory memorandum to Art. 43 TCK on the continuing offence,
“where the windows of cars in a car park are broken and their radio cassette players are stolen, the theft from the car belonging to each person retains its independence and the provisions on the cumulation of penalties are applied”,
because in this example the cars have been left with the car park attendant, so that the possessor of all the cars is the car park attendant; and that, since the victim of the offence is therefore the car park attendant, who is in the position of joint possessor of the cars in the car park, it must be accepted that there is a single deed in the legal sense (unity of the typical act) and hence that a single theft has been committed108.
We do not agree with this view of the authors. For in our view there are here as many offences as there are victims. In the mental element of the offence, the victim of the offence is one of the things the perpetrator must know about the offence in order for intent to exist; where the perpetrator knows the characteristics of the victim of the offence, he must be held liable for the characteristics or other attributes relating to the victim. Accordingly, a perpetrator who enters a public car park and steals the music systems of a large number of cars also knows that he is victimising a large number of persons. Similarly, where a perpetrator who enters a teachers’ room steals money and other valuables from the bags of more than one teacher, as many offences of theft are committed as there are victims. Hence a separate intent to commit an offence is formed in the perpetrator in respect of each victim. Moreover, theft is one of the offences against property. That is to say, it is primarily the legal interest of the owner of the thing in that property that is protected. In this sense the possessor is of secondary importance. Accordingly, in a theft carried out in a large number of cars by entering a car park, since the legal interests of more than one person are violated by more than one deed, it is no longer possible to apply the unity of the typical act or the provision on the continuing offence109. Here real concurrence should be applied and as many penalties imposed as there are victims. This is an approach that is also consistent with the philosophy of the TCK on this matter110.
b. The Exception: The Same Offence Committed against Different Victims
Art. 43(2) TCK, in providing that “where the same offence is committed against more than one person by a single deed, the provision of the first paragraph shall also apply”, contains a provision
that has given rise to debate. For a debate has arisen in legal scholarship as to whether this provision is notional concurrence of the same kind (homogeneous ideal concurrence) or an exceptional case of the continuing offence (because the victims are different).
Some authors state that the provision in Art. 43(2) TCK lays down an exception to the rule, which is one of the conditions of the continuing offence, that the offence be committed against the same victim, so that the provision on the continuing offence will also be applied where the same offence is committed against more than one person by a single deed, that is, against more than one victim, and that the provision in question constitutes the exception to the condition that there be a single victim; for, since the several offences committed by one deed are the same, the condition of notional concurrence that “different offences arise” from one deed is not fulfilled, and because the same offence has been committed it is not possible to apply the provisions on notional concurrence (of different kinds)111.
The authors of the opposite view, on the other hand, state that where the same offences are brought about by the perpetrator’s single deed there is notional concurrence of the same kind, and where different offences are brought about there is notional concurrence of different kinds112; and that where the same offence is committed by the perpetrator against more than one person by a single deed, the existence of notional concurrence of the same kind must be accepted113.
Notional concurrence of the same kind was not regulated in TCK No. 765 and, in line with this, legal scholarship rightly did not accept its existence. Accordingly, where more than one person was killed by one bullet or bomb, more than one person was insulted by one utterance, or more than one person was defrauded by one fraudulent manoeuvre, it was accepted that there were as many offences as there were victims114; and in such a case it was said that a continuing offence would arise under Art. 80 of TCK No. 765. Indeed, this was possible because Art. 80 imposed no limitation as to the number of victims, and this was also how the provision was applied in practice.
In TCK No. 5237, by contrast, although the Code does not expressly say “act” (hareket) but “deed” (fiil, that is, eylem), it is stated, particularly by the authors who took part in the drafting of the Code, that this is to be understood as “act”; that in notional concurrence too the act must therefore be taken as the basis and given weight; that Art. 43(2) concerns a single act of the perpetrator; and that, since there is thus a single act and a single offence, there is here notional concurrence of the same kind, although the provision has been placed in the wrong article115. In our view, however, this amounts to importing into the Code a definition and a situation that are not in it. Indeed, this is one of the most heavily criticised aspects of TCK No. 5237. Those who drafted the Code altered the former draft and made changes in line with their own views on the theory of the offence, but did not succeed in changing everything from top to bottom. As for the points that were incompatible with their own views, they placed them in the explanatory memorandum, which is not part of the text of the Code and was prepared afterwards, and there explained how the “incompatible” articles or paragraphs in question were to be understood. However, in criminal law, where the principle of legality of offences and penalties applies and which is strictly bound by form, it is not possible for a matter or characterisation that is not in the statutory norm to be explained by the norm’s explanatory memorandum as though it were in the statute, or to demand that it be applied in that way. Therefore, de lege lata, what we have here is not notional concurrence of the same kind but an exceptional form of the continuing offence. Indeed, the practice under both TCK No. 765 and TCK No. 5237 is to the same effect.
In this form of the continuing offence, the same offence is committed against different persons at the same time by the same deed116. For example, there is a continuing offence where more than one person is killed by one bullet117, where more than one person is sexually harassed by one utterance, where more than one person is calumniated by one petition of complaint, where more than one person is insulted or threatened or deprived of liberty by one deed, where more than one person is defrauded by one newspaper advertisement118, or where, as a result of a virus being published on a website, a large number of persons download this virus onto their information systems and their systems are damaged119.
Where the subject matter of the offence is held in co-ownership or joint ownership, this is not a case of an offence being committed against more than one person by the perpetrator’s single deed; rather, because the perpetrator’s deed is single, there will be a single offence. For example, where a car held by its owners in co-ownership is stolen, only one offence is committed, because the deed carried out is single even though there is more than one victim120.
Similarly, where a bank branch is entered and money belonging to more than one person is taken, the victims of the offence are the natural persons who are the shareholders of the bank, and since the perpetrator does this by a single deed there is a single offence. However, where the perpetrator acts on a single decision to commit an offence and robs the bank on successive days, there will be several deeds and several offences, but a continuing offence will arise because of the unity of the decision to commit an offence121. Where individual depositors or persons whose money has been entrusted are targeted and victimised one by one, and this is done by more than one deed, neither the provisions on notional concurrence nor those on the continuing offence can be applied, since neither the condition of a single deed nor that of a single victim is fulfilled, and real concurrence will be applied122. In theft committed by means of information systems, on the other hand, since the depositor’s account is targeted directly, there are as many offences as there are depositors from whose accounts money is transferred, and where this offence is carried out by a single deed of the perpetrator (which is possible thanks to computer software), the exceptional form of the continuing offence (Art. 43(2)) may come into question. If, however, in a theft committed by means of an information system the perpetrator pays no regard to the depositors and directly targets the bank and the bank’s system, a single offence will be accepted, but the court may, having regard to the amount of money involved in the offence and the depositors’ accounts, and thus to the greater wrongfulness of the offence, decide to move towards the upper limit of the penalty for the offence. As regards credit cards, the Court of Cassation accepts that there are as many offences as there are cards, and that a continuing offence arises where the same card is used at different times123.
Another matter we wish to address concerning the exceptional form of the continuing offence is the case in which, in the offence of insulting more than one person by one deed, the victim is a public official. Even if the victim is a public official, there is nothing that requires a departure from the general rule124. However, the provision in Art. 125(5) TCK, the article containing the offence of insult, according to which
“where public officials working as a collegiate body are insulted on account of their duties, the offence shall be deemed to have been committed against the members forming the body”, was wrongly
interpreted, and it was argued that in this case it had to be accepted that as many offences were committed as there were public officials. To prevent this misunderstanding, the following sentence was added to Art. 125(5) TCK by Law No. 5377: “However, in this case
the provision of the article on the continuing offence shall apply.” In our view the provision made is correct;
however, as we have also mentioned above, some authors in legal scholarship state that there is a continuing offence here125, while others state that there is notional concurrence of the same kind126. This wording, as we have also stated above, shows that the provision made here is, de lege lata, a continuing offence. For it to be characterised as notional concurrence of the same kind, Art. 43(2) would have had to be placed in Art. 44, and the legislature would have had to use, in this sentence of Art. 125(5), wording to the effect that “the rule on notional concurrence of the same kind” shall apply. In the explanatory memorandum to the amending law, however, the same thing was done, and the provision described in the statutory norm as a continuing offence was said to be notional concurrence of the same kind.
Art. 43(3) TCK, by stating that “in the offences of intentional killing, intentional injury, torture and robbery, the provisions of this article shall not apply”, has also introduced, in respect of this exceptional provision on the continuing
offence, a special concurrence rule. Accordingly, where the offences in question are committed against different persons by the same deed of the perpetrator, the continuing offence will not be applied and the penalties will be cumulated according to the number of violations of the norm (real concurrence). For example, in cases such as the killing or injuring of a large number of persons by a bomb that is thrown, likewise the killing or injuring of more than one person as a result of being hit by a car, or the taking of the property of more than one person by a single threat, there will be not a continuing offence but real concurrence127. The explanations we have given regarding the continuing offence in its ordinary form also hold for the exceptional case.
In our view, however, this is a flawed provision that gives rise to debate. With the continuing offence regulated in Art. 43(1) TCK, it was not appropriate to place this provision in paragraph 2. For the only difference between notional concurrence of different kinds and notional concurrence of the same kind is that the victims change. For example, whereas in notional concurrence of different kinds it is possible to commit offences against the same person by a single deed (for instance, where a punch to the face results in both the offence of intentional injury and the offence of damage to property being committed against the victim), in notional concurrence of the same kind the offences must be committed against different persons. Apart from this, in notional concurrence of different kinds as in notional concurrence of the same kind, more than one offence is committed by a single deed. De lege ferenda, this provision is notional concurrence of the same kind. It would therefore have been theoretically more appropriate for notional concurrence of the same kind to be regulated in Art. 44 TCK, where notional concurrence is regulated128.
c. The Position in Offences without a Specific Victim
The original version of Art. 43 TCK was not clear as to whether the continuing offence would be applied where offences without a specific victim were committed many times within the scope of committing the same offence, and this gave rise to doubts both in practice and in legal scholarship. In its original version prior to the amendment, Art. 43 TCK, which regulates the continuing offence, provided that
“where, within the scope of the execution of a decision to commit an offence, the same offence is committed more than once against one person at different times” a continuing offence
could arise. As can be seen, in that version the continuing offence would be applied only where the victim was specific and where the deed was carried out against the same person; consequently, in offences without a specific victim, each deed would be treated as a separate offence, even if it fell within the scope of the same decision to commit an offence, and the rules on the cumulation of penalties (real concurrence) would be applied to the perpetrator.
In order to remove this doubt and the unjust situation that had arisen, before TCK No. 5237 had even entered into force, Art. 6 of Law No. 5377 of 29.06.2005 added to Art. 43(1)
the sentence “in offences whose victim is not a specific person the provision of this paragraph shall also
apply”, and this problem was thereby resolved129,130. Accordingly, since in the offences contained in particular in the parts on offences against society and against the nation and the state, and in offences of the same nature in other parts, the victim is each and every one of the individuals who make up society131, where one of these offences is committed more than once on the same decision to commit an offence, there will be a continuing offence132. Indeed, it is also stated in legal scholarship that in offences in which everyone is the victim the provisions on the continuing offence must be applied as a matter of priority133, and the decisions of the Court of Cassation are to the same effect134. For example, where the offence of laundering the proceeds of crime regulated in Art. 282(1) TCK is committed many times within the scope of the execution of a decision to commit an offence, the provision on the continuing offence can be applied even though this offence has no specific victim135. A similar situation holds for the offence of intentional pollution of the environment or the offence of bribery.
5. The Offences Must Be Committed “within the Scope of the Execution of the Same Decision to Commit an Offence”
For a continuing offence to come into question, the offences must be committed “within the scope of the execution of a decision to commit an offence”, but the scope of this is disputed136. The subjective condition of the continuing offence is the existence of a mental link between the several offences committed. This element reflects the subjective link between several independent offences and constitutes one of the reasons why a single penalty is imposed for several offences137.
Where the same offence is committed more than once, whether or not the mental link between these offences exists must be assessed separately according to the specific circumstances in which each incident was committed138. However, the “decision to commit an offence” in question must not be confused with the intent to commit an offence. This decision is a volitional state which encompasses intent and precedes it139. For intent to exist there is knowledge and will directed at a particular deed140. In a decision to commit
an offence, however, there is not merely an element of knowledge directed at a particular act, as for example in “I shall launder money by means of transfers through the bank” or “I shall traffic in narcotic drugs by hiding them in the trailer of a lorry and taking them
across the border”; rather, as in “I shall
enter a factory on several successive days and steal various items”, there is a decision directed at
committing a particular offence.
The decision required in the continuing offence is a subjective link that must exist between the perpetrator’s acts. This subjective link may hold for deeds carried out according to a plan made in advance, and it may also be present where, without any plan, the perpetrator decides to continue his deeds141. The fact that each act appears to be a continuation of the previous one demonstrates the existence of the subjective connection and the same decision to commit an offence142. However, where the perpetrator decides in advance that he will take advantage of every opportunity to commit an offence that comes his way, it cannot be said that a continuing offence will arise143. Nevertheless, unity in the perpetrator’s decision does not mean that there is also unity in the intent to commit the offence. Each deed forming the continuing offence arises as the result of a separate intent144. Likewise, a very general unity may extend as far as a general unity of motive. For example, where a person who has made theft his occupation commits several offences of theft, there is a general unity of motive in terms of making his living by unlawful means. In this case, however, there is no continuing offence, since the law requires unity in the decision to commit the offence and is not concerned with motive145. Therefore motive, intention and purpose must not be confused with the decision146.
Whether or not there is a mental link between the same offences will be assessed in the light of the circumstances of each specific case and decided accordingly; the explanations given on this subject are therefore not definitive but serve as guidance147. For example, deeds of forgery of official documents carried out for the various stages of a car sale transaction effected with forged documents were, because they were directed at the same purpose, regarded by the Court of Cassation as having been committed “within the scope of the execution of the same decision to commit an offence”, and it was stated that the provision on the continuing offence had to be applied148. By contrast, if a fairly long period of time showing that the intent was renewed has elapsed between the deeds149, or if there are no similarities between the deeds showing the existence of the same decision to commit an offence, each deed will constitute a separate offence. Indeed, in the case of loan applications made with different forged identity documents at different branches of the same bank, it was held that the perpetrator had acted not in execution of the same decision to commit an offence but with renewed intent, and that real concurrence had to be applied150.
Accordingly, in determining, for the existence of a continuing offence, whether the several offences committed are based on the same decision to commit an offence, account will be taken of the similarity or uniformity in the manner in which the offences were committed, the exploitation of similar opportunities, the legal interest protected by the offence according to the scheme of the Code, the characteristics of and differences in the subject matter of the offence at which the act was directed, the interval of time between the offences, the fact, particularly in offences committed for economic gain, that the perpetrator has no job and/or occupation providing a regular income151, and many other similar externally manifested data and conduct152.
With regard to the subjective condition of the continuing offence, the question whether negligent offences can be committed in the form of a continuing offence is also disputed153. In our view, however, the fact that the essence of the subjective condition of the continuing offence is tied to a decision which precedes and encompasses intent places negligence outside the continuing offence. Accordingly, having regard also to the statutory provision, it does not appear possible to apply the continuing offence to negligent offences154.
C. The Consequence of Applying the Continuing Offence
In this case the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrators will be increased by from one quarter to three quarters155. The judge will increase the penalty by an amount to be determined within these proportions, having regard to the number of offences committed in continuation in the specific case. This increase will be made on the basis of the concrete penalty to be determined under Art. 61(1) TCK. Under paragraph 5 of the same article, once the concrete penalty has been determined, if one of the offences involves a qualified form increasing the penalty, the penalty will be increased accordingly, and if it involves a qualified form reducing the penalty, the amount of the penalty will be reduced; thereafter the provisions on attempt, participation and, lastly, the continuing offence will be applied in that order to the penalty thus determined. However, where at least one of the offences forming the chain did not remain at the stage of attempt but was completed, no reduction may be made on account of attempt.
Where the basic form of the offence and its qualified forms requiring a heavier penalty are committed in continuation, the penalty on which the increase is to be made must be the penalty determined according to the qualified form of the offence156. If the perpetrator is a minor, the age at the time when the last deed was carried out must be taken into account157.
Likewise, where a continuing offence arises between an offence that remained at the stage of attempt and a completed offence, the increase in penalty will, on the same principle, be made by reference to the completed offence158. Similarly, it is possible to apply the provision on the continuing offence between an offence which the perpetrator carried out alone and an offence which he committed in participation159.
In cases of continuing offence there is a plurality of offences, and the law attaches a special consequence to the continuing offence; apart from this, all the offences included in the chain retain their independence separately. Accordingly, apart from the increase in the penalty (Art. 43(1) TCK), the commencement of the limitation period for prosecution (Art. 66(6) TCK) and the determination of the court having territorial jurisdiction (Art. 12(2) CMK), in all situations not expressly specified in the law, such as the application of criminal laws in terms of place and time, and amnesty, the offences included in the chain will be assessed independently160.
D. Cases in Which the Continuing Offence Cannot Be Applied
Art. 43(3) TCK states that “in the offences of intentional killing, intentional injury, torture and robbery, the provisions of this article shall not apply”. Accordingly,
the provision on the continuing offence will not be applied even where the offences listed in the paragraph are committed more than once against the same person within the scope of the execution of a decision to commit an offence161. By this provision, the restriction placed on the application of the continuing offence by decisions of the Court of Cassation during the period of TCK No. 765, although not found in the Code, has been made the subject of a statutory rule, and consistency with practice has been achieved162. In this way this arrangement, which was aimed at satisfying the sense of justice but was contrary to the letter and spirit of TCK No. 765, has been placed on a normative footing163. The explanatory memorandum does not state the reason why these offences were selected and excluded from the application of the continuing offence, but it is highly probable that the criterion taken into account here was the legal interests protected by these offences164.
In the original version of the article, the offences of sexual assault (Art. 102 TCK) and sexual abuse of children (Art. 103 TCK) were also among the offences to which the article on the continuing offence could not be applied. However, these offences were removed from its scope by the amendment made to Art. 43(3) by Law No. 5377 of 29.06.2005. The application of the provision on the continuing offence has thus been made possible in respect of the offences of sexual assault and sexual abuse of children as well165. The reasons given for this amendment were the problem of proof and the fact that the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator would increase greatly166.
In our view this reasoning is neither explanatory nor satisfactory. Difficulty is encountered in proving sexual offences where there is no witness and/or circumstantial evidence. This difficulty of proof, however, is a difficulty that is independent of the number of times the deed, that is, the forced sexual intercourse or the abuse, took place. Likewise, where a perpetrator who has the intent and culpability to commit this offence moreover carries out his deed several times in succession and further impairs the victim’s mental and physical integrity, not imposing as many penalties as there are deeds but applying the provision on the continuing offence, and thereby virtually excusing his subsequent deeds, is in our view acceptable neither in terms of the theory of the offence nor in terms of the criminal policy adopted by modern societies. In our view the text of the Code should be restored to its former state.
Furthermore, if the repetition of the act is required by the offence type, there is not a continuing offence but a single act in the legal sense and a single offence. The provision on the continuing offence will not be applied where the same act is performed more than once in order to commit the same offence (killing or injuring by a large number of knife blows), or where more than one of the alternative acts is carried out167.
Where all or some of the offences are subject to complaint, the offences for which the condition of complaint has been fulfilled will be taken into account for the purposes of the continuing offence168. Similarly, where some of the offences are subject to victim–offender mediation, the provisions on mediation will be applied first, and if mediation cannot be achieved the existence of a continuing offence will be accepted. Therefore, for a continuing offence to arise, the offences included in the chain must be punishable169; in practice attention is paid to this point170.
A further case in which the continuing offence cannot be applied has been created by decisions of the Court of Cassation. In a specific case that came before it, the General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation (YCGK) held that in offences aggravated by their result a chain of offences, that is, continuation, cannot occur. Relying on reports of the Institute of Forensic Medicine, the YCGK held that, in the offences aggravated by their result regulated in Arts. 102(5) (the form of the offence of sexual assault aggravated by its result) and 103(6) (the form of the offence of sexual assault against a child aggravated by its result) TCK, the aggravating circumstance in question, namely the impairment of the victim’s physical and mental health, can occur only once, and that it is not possible for it to be impaired repeatedly by repeated acts; and that, accordingly, where the perpetrator’s acts are repeated in such a way as to form a continuing offence, the amount of the increase is to be found by applying Art. 43 TCK to the amount of penalty prescribed for the basic form of the offence, and the amount found by applying Art. 43 is to be added to the amount of penalty specified for the form of the offence aggravated by its result171. Since this decision of the YCGK, the same practice has come to be followed in all similar cases172.
We do not, however, agree with this view of the Court of Cassation. There are degrees of permanent impairment of mental and physical health. Where each act of the perpetrator, which is at least negligent, results in the victim’s physical or mental health deteriorating by a further degree, would it not be an unjust result to refrain from applying Art. 43 in respect of the aggravated result and to proceed on the basis of the basic form of the offence? Likewise, it may well be that such a result, which would not occur or could occur only very slightly through a single act of the perpetrator, arises or increases in degree owing to the perpetrator’s numerous deeds. Moreover, from the standpoint of medical science each sexual assault is regarded as a separate trauma, and it is stated that each trauma will have effects on the victim that differ in form and severity. It is further stated that the nature of the sexual assault suffered by the victim and the manner in which the victim was subjected to it (insertion of a finger or of the sexual organ, or commission of the deed vaginally, anally or orally) also have different effects on the victim. It is therefore clear that, where the perpetrator carries out the first of his successive deeds by inserting an object into the vagina and the second by inserting his sexual organ into the victim’s anus, the traumatic effects of these deeds on the victim will differ. Yet according to this decision of the YCGK, it will be accepted that the victim’s physical and mental health was impaired as a result of the first deed, which is relatively less serious than the second, but this will not be accepted in respect of the more serious second deed, and the provision on the continuing offence will not be applied. In our view, this produces a result that is contrary as much to the method of reasoning of legal science as to the data of medical science. Similarly, if one follows the logic of the Court of Cassation, where these offences are committed against a person whose physical or mental health was already impaired before the perpetrator’s deed, or where the degree of the mental disorder of such persons increases, would not saying “their mental or
physical health was already impaired; increasing the penalties under Art. 43 is
unnecessary” mean that these persons, on account of their mental or physical disabilities, are made “victims” in the full sense of the word and are punished, while the perpetrator, for his part, is rewarded for having found such a person? In our view, a decision given without thinking the matter through in depth, by adhering blindly to the report of the Institute of Forensic Medicine and by using pure legal technique (the application of which in the specific case is, in our view, also wrong), is contrary both to the statute and, above all, to law. This unlawfulness is, before the criminal code, the constitution and international conventions, contrary to “human rights”, which are among the unwritten universal rules of law. The YCGK must therefore change this decision. The decision is, moreover, also wrong in terms of legal technique. How penalties are to be increased and reduced, and the order in which this is to be done, are regulated in Art. 61 TCK; although there is no detailed provision on the application of the continuing offence, it is in our view erroneous, where the form of the offence aggravated by its result has occurred, to take the basic or, as the case may be, the qualified form of the offence, apply the continuing offence to it so as to find the difference, and then apply this difference to the form of the offence aggravated by its result. For Art. 61 contains no express provision to that effect.
IV. Apparent Concurrence
A. In General
Apparent concurrence arises where the application of one of several criminal laws, or of one of several criminal norms contained in the same law, renders the application of the other unnecessary173. In apparent concurrence there is in reality no plurality of offences; there is a single norm to be applied to the deed carried out by the perpetrator174. It is because there is no plurality of offences and no concurrence of offences in the true sense that this situation is called apparent concurrence175.
Where the content of wrongfulness of a deed is covered by the application of one of the several norms which that deed violates, the other norms will not be applied176. In apparent concurrence one norm will be applied to one deed, and this will come about through the relationship between the norms or through interpretation177. Consequently there is in fact no absolute necessity for apparent concurrence to be regulated in the statute178. Indeed, it is stated in legal scholarship that the situations cited as examples of apparent concurrence involve a problem of interpretation; for instance, that where there is a “special – general norm relationship”, there is no doubt, on applying the methods of interpretation, that the norm to be applied to the deed is the special norm179.
B. Principles and Types of Apparent Concurrence
Apparent concurrence is systematised in terms of, and explained in line with, the principles of the priority of the special norm, the consumption of one norm by another and the subsidiarity of the auxiliary norm180. In situations of apparent conflict of norms, all of these principles must be taken into account in order to find which norm is to be applied181.
1. The Principle of the Priority of the Special Norm (Special Norm – General Norm Relationship)
A special norm – general norm relationship exists where, in addition to the elements of one of the norms apparently applicable to the same deed carried out by the perpetrator, certain additional elements and features of the other norm are also applicable182. Thus, if one criminal norm contains the elements a+b+c while the other criminal norm contains the elements a+b+c+d, the second norm is the special norm183. These additional elements may relate to the perpetrator’s motive, the means used, the subject matter of the offence or the characteristics of the perpetrator184. In this case, in accordance with the principle of the priority of the special norm (lex specialis derogat legi generalis)185, the general norm that could be applied to the deed will not be applied, and the special norm, which fits the particular features of this deed and of similar deeds, will find application186. This is the result of logical reasoning; otherwise the general norm would have to be applied to every deed and it would be pointless to provide for the special norm187.
The first condition required for the principle of the priority of the special norm to apply is that the special norm and the general norm must protect the same legal interest188. The second condition in this regard is that the special norm must cover all the elements of the general norm and, in addition, contain certain special elements189. Hence, if it can be said that, had a given norm not existed, the matter it regulates would have fallen within the general norm, the norm in question will be regarded as a special norm190. In that case, in accordance with the principle of the priority of the special norm, it is not the norm of a general nature that will be applied to the specific case but the special norm laid down for that specific case and those like it. These elements added to the basic form of the offence in fact narrow the scope of application of the general norm relating to the offence. For this reason the general norm has a wider scope of application than the special norm. Accordingly, since the deeds regarded as falling within the special norm can be punished under the general norm, there will, as a rule, be no statutory gap if the special norm is repealed191.
As examples of the special norm – general norm relationship one may cite the relationship between the basic form of an offence and its qualified forms (the relationship between Art. 141, which regulates the offence of theft, and Arts. 142, 143 and 144), the relationship between a special offence and offences that can be committed by anyone (the relationship between the offence of embezzlement – Art. 247 TCK, Art. 168 of the Banking Law – and the offence of abuse of trust, Art. 155 TCK), and the relationship between a general law and a special law (the relationship between the offence of damage to property – Art. 151 TCK – and the offences, made criminal under Law No. 5816 on Offences Committed against Atatürk, of destroying statues, busts and monuments representing Atatürk or Atatürk’s tomb)192.
The most important difference between apparent concurrence in the form of the special norm – general norm relationship and the other forms of apparent concurrence is that in this case there is a single deed. This in fact reveals a similarity between the special norm – general norm relationship and notional concurrence. However, whereas in the special norm – general norm relationship there is a single offence, in notional concurrence there is more than one offence, but the legislature, in accordance with the criminal policy it has adopted, holds the perpetrator liable for the one of these offences that carries the heaviest penalty193.
With regard to the principle of the priority of the special norm and the special norm – general norm relationship, mention must also be made of the provision in Art. 5 of TCK No. 5237. We should first note that there is no general provision on this subject in the TCK. Art. 10 of the former TCK, however, partly regulated the relationship between special criminal laws and the TCK; thus, by stating that “the
provisions of this Code shall also apply to such matters in special criminal laws
as are not contrary thereto”, it provided that the TCK would be applied in cases where the ancillary criminal statutes contained no provision. In our view the purpose of this provision was to prevent the unnecessary repetition in ancillary criminal statutes of the provisions in the general part of the criminal code, not to regulate the relationship between norms concerning offences194. The relationships between norms containing offences should be dealt with by means of the rules on concurrence, which form the subject of this study, or the principles of interpretation195. The provision contained in Art. 5 of TCK No. 5237 as the counterpart of Art. 10 of TCK No. 765 is, by contrast, entirely different from the former one. For this article, by stating that “the general provisions of this Code shall also apply to
offences in special criminal laws and in laws containing criminal provisions”,
provides that the general provisions of the new TCK must be applied to special criminal laws even “where there is a provision to the contrary”. That is to say, whereas under the former TCK the norms of a general nature in the criminal code could be applied only where the ancillary criminal statutes contained no provision on the matter, and could thus have the character of auxiliary norms in relation to the norms of a general nature found in special laws, Art. 5 of TCK No. 5237 changed this and introduced the rule that the norms of a general nature found in the TCK shall be applied even if special laws contain a provision to the contrary. The reason given for this provision is the attempt to prevent the norms of a general nature from being circumvented by means of special provisions196.
Although the date of entry into force of Art. 5 TCK was disputed197, it ultimately entered into force on 31 December 2008. Whether it will be valid for new special criminal laws enacted after this date to contain a provision contrary to the norms of a general nature in the TCK is a separate debate; in legal scholarship, however, it is stated that the provision of Art. 5 of TCK No. 5237 is binding for ancillary criminal statutes which entered into force before 1 June 2005, that laws enacted after that date should likewise contain no norms contrary to Art. 5 of TCK No. 5237, but that if ancillary criminal statutes which have been or will be enacted after that date do contain norms contrary to the general provisions of the TCK, the norms of the ancillary criminal statute must be applied198.
In legal scholarship, however, İçel states that the entry into force of this provision, which pursues the aim of changing the whole of criminal legislation at one stroke and thus disregards the particular features of ancillary criminal statutes, was postponed once its drawbacks had been recognised; for this provision is at odds with the rules of apparent concurrence as regards the special – general norm relationship and, in addition to the significant drawbacks inherent in it, is not capable of producing a solution in terms of the principle of the priority of the special norm (lex specialis) either199.
We agree in general with this view of the author. Unlike İçel, however, we consider that Art. 5 of TCK No. 5237 is not solely a provision concerning apparent concurrence. Although different in form and scope, this article is of the same nature as the provision in Art. 10 of TCK No. 765. That is to say, it was enacted not to govern the relationship between norms containing offences but to ensure that all norms of a general nature concerning the theory of the offence and of sanctions also hold for the norms contained in ancillary criminal statutes, in particular those brought into force and applied during the period of the former TCK No. 765. The reason for this is that, TCK No. 765 having been repealed by Law No. 5237, an attempt was made to ensure that the provisions and application, as regards the theory of the offence and of sanctions, of the ancillary criminal statutes enacted under Law No. 765 in accordance with the understanding of that time would also be in harmony with the principles of the new theory of the offence which the new Code is said to have sought to introduce, and thus with the new Code. Otherwise separate provision would have to be made for each of the ancillary criminal statutes and indeed for the other laws containing criminal norms, but the impossibility of this is obvious.
We do not wish to enter into the debates as to whether a new theory of the offence has been introduced or whether it is possible to do so by statute, as this would exceed the scope of this study. We do, however, consider that attempting to resolve the relationships between special criminal laws and the general criminal code by a single article, without regard to the rules of the theory of the offence that had developed up to that time and to the specific features of the laws in question, and attempting to do so very quickly, is not an appropriate way of solving the matter.
We also agree with İçel’s view on the question of timing. Indeed, while Art. 5 of TCK No. 5237 was to enter into force on 1 June 2005 together with the other articles of the Code, the entry into force of this article was first postponed until 31.12.2006 because the necessary amendments and arrangements had not been made in the other legislation containing criminal norms, and when this period also proved insufficient the postponement was extended until 31.12.2008. Finally, a significant part of the amendments in question was made by Law No. 5728 of 23.01.2008 “on the Amendment of Various Laws and Certain Other Laws for the Purpose of Harmonisation with the Basic Criminal Laws”, which was published in the Official Gazette No. 26781 of 8 February 2008 and thereby entered into force. However, before the TCK, which was enacted in haste in the course of the process of harmonisation with the European Union, these amendments too should have been put into the form of a draft, and TCK No. 5237, the law on its entry into force and this law containing the amendments in question should have been enacted one after another as a whole and brought into force, so that these criticisms and bad practices would have been prevented.
Another matter that needs to be addressed here is that implied repeal must be distinguished from the special – general norm relationship. Where norms enacted one after the other regulate the same subject and there is a contradiction between them that prevents their being applied at the same time, the norm that entered into force later impliedly repeals the earlier norm. What must be noted here, however, is that neither of the norms contains a feature or element capable of making it special in relation to the other. In the special norm – general norm relationship, by contrast, unlike implied repeal, there is such a differentiation, as we have explained above, and both norms remain in force together but are applied to different specific cases200.
In conclusion, in the light of the provision in Art. 5 of Law No. 5237, where a norm contained in the TCK conflicts with a norm contained in an ancillary criminal statute, the problem will be resolved within the framework of the principle of the priority of the special norm, provided that the other conditions are also met. Where there is a conflict between norms relating to general provisions contained in special criminal laws that entered into force before 31 December 2008 and the norms of a general nature in the TCK, the norms of the TCK regulating the same subject will be applied in view of the express provision of Art. 5 TCK. Where there is a conflict between ancillary criminal statutes that entered into force after 31 December 2008, or that will be enacted from now on, and the general provisions of the TCK, then in view of Art. 5 TCK no such contradictory norm should, de lege ferenda, be enacted; if, however, such a provision is nevertheless made, the problem should be resolved within the framework of the principle of the priority of the special norm. Yet although this solution is formally appropriate in terms of the theory of the offence, it carries the risk of creating a contradiction with the general provisions of the TCK.
2. The Principle of the Consumption of One Norm by Another (Consuming Norm – Consumed Norm Relationship)
a. In General
Criminal norms have been laid down in order to protect certain specific legal interests. In some cases a single norm protects, within one norm and as a whole, the legal interests protected by different norms, and accordingly provides for a single penalty to be imposed for deeds that harm these interests. In such cases the norm which, by protecting all the legal interests, provides for a single penalty for the deed also encompasses the other norms and, as it were, consumes the other norms within itself; in this case it suffices to apply the norm that protects the legal interests jointly, since this norm, by providing joint protection, precludes the application of the other norms to the deeds falling within its scope201.
In one of the forms in which the principle of the consumption of one norm by another appears, a norm that protects all the legal interests protected by the other norms generally incorporates the offences contained in the other norms within itself as an element or as a qualified form increasing the penalty. The most important example of this principle, and of the first form mentioned above, is the compound offence. For example, in a theft committed by entering a building, both the offence of theft and the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling arise, but since there is a consuming norm – consumed norm relationship between these two norms, the perpetrator must be punished only for the qualified form of the offence of theft202.
In another form, the unlawfulness that arises when a deed is carried out also covers the subsequent deeds, so that the subsequent deeds, which are not punished once the norm has been applied to the earlier deed, are likewise consumed (unpunishable subsequent deed)203. However, two conditions must be met for the deeds subsequent to the first deed not to be punished. The first is that no other legal interest is violated by the subsequent deed; the second is that the existing harm is not increased204. This situation is encountered particularly in offences against property. In offences of this kind the perpetrator, by his subsequent deeds, exploits or secures the results of the first deed and/or the benefits he has unlawfully obtained by that deed205. For example, unpunished subsequent deeds fall within this category, as in the destruction of a thing taken by theft or the sale to another person of property stolen by theft206. As in this example, by his subsequent deed the perpetrator in a sense realises the benefit he has obtained from the offence of theft207. However, where the perpetrator injures the victim of the theft with a weapon obtained through the theft, the protection of different legal interests is now at stake and both deeds must be punished separately. Similarly, where goods obtained through theft are sold to a third person by means of fraud, or where the perpetrator of a laundering offence who has obtained proceeds of crime uses those proceeds as capital to engage in the illegal sale of narcotics, both different legal interests are affected and further harm arises, and different deeds that must be punished come into being. Therefore, since the conditions stated above are not fulfilled in such cases, there is no unpunished subsequent deed but real concurrence of offences.
The following example may also be given to illustrate the application of the unpunished subsequent deed in the context of the consuming – consumed norm principle. In the offence of laundering the proceeds of crime, the acts constituting the offence consist in transferring abroad proceeds of crime obtained from the predicate offence or subjecting them to various transactions with the aim of creating the impression that they were obtained by legitimate means208. In addition, Art. 282(2) separately makes the purchase, acceptance, possession or use of proceeds of crime an independent offence type. However, for the perpetrator to be held liable for the offence in Art. 282(2), he must not have participated in any way in the offence of laundering the proceeds of crime regulated in paragraph 1209. For the offence in paragraph 2 constitutes an unpunished subsequent deed in relation to the offence in paragraph 1. The legislature has thus regulated this principle in the Code, albeit not expressly.
Another form in which this principle appears is that of offences with alternative acts, since by their nature these offences can be committed by performing any one of the acts specified in the statute. If the perpetrator nevertheless does not content himself with a single act but also performs the other acts defined in the norm, he is still given the penalty for a single offence. For in this case the multiple violation of the same norm and the resulting commission of more than one offence are only apparent; in reality there is here a single violation and a single offence. Thus one of the cases of apparent concurrence is present210.
As can be seen, the existence of this principle does not require a relationship of necessity between the offences contained in the norms. Thus, as is also apparent from the examples given above, there is no relationship of necessity between the destruction of the property or its sale to another person after the theft, or the commission of the theft inside a building, and the offence of theft, nor between performing one of the alternative acts rather than another211.
b. The Compound Offence
A compound offence arises where deeds each of which in fact constitutes an independent offence are brought together and regulated as a single deed in the legal sense constituting a new offence, or where a deed which by itself constitutes an independent offence is made a qualified form requiring an increase in the penalty for another offence. In this case the plurality of offences, and of the norms regulating these offences, is only apparent. In reality, the norm in which the offences regulated by the other norms are included as an element or as a qualified form increasing the penalty consumes the other norms and causes them to lose their independence212.
Although the compound offence is not in fact a type of concurrence of offences, it is regulated in Art. 42 of TCK No. 5237 under the heading “concurrence of offences”. In that
article the compound offence is regulated as follows: “An offence which is deemed a single deed because one constitutes an element or an aggravating circumstance of the other is called a compound offence. In offences of this kind the provisions on concurrence
shall not apply”.
The point that must not be overlooked in the compound offence is that in this case there is, in the words of the Code, “an offence deemed a single deed”, that is, not several offences but a single offence213. Hence, in the case of a compound offence, even if some of the deeds constituting the offence are regulated in the Code as other independent offence types, these deeds are now regarded as a whole as a single offence and all of the deeds in question constitute the element of wrongfulness of a single offence214.
In essence, in a compound offence the acts are several in the natural sense and each act violates different legal interests. For example, in the offence of robbery regulated in Art. 148 TCK, property is taken by force or threat and the offence is carried out by more than one act, while at the same time more than one legal interest, such as the protection of a person’s bodily integrity and property, is violated215. In this case, however, the legislature treats the acts that violate several legal interests as part of a single deed and combines them within one definition of an offence. In other words, in compound offences there is a single act in the legal sense, and hence a single deed and a single offence. Accordingly, the compound offence is not one of the cases of concurrence of offences, and it is not strictly necessary for a provision on it to be included in the TCK in the chapter on concurrence of offences216. For the compound offence is a question of conformity with the statutory definition of the offence (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit) and can be brought to light by examining the offence type. Even if Art. 42 TCK did not exist, the existence of a compound offence would be accepted where one offence is regulated as an element of another or as a qualified form increasing its penalty, because this would be apparent from the way the offence type is framed217. It is stated, however, that the legislature made separate provision for the compound offence in the Code on the grounds that the compound offence is the most frequently encountered case of apparent concurrence and that differing interpretations and confusion on this subject should be avoided218.
A further point we wish to address here is that the TCK, in
Art. 42, which regulates the compound offence, states that “the offences forming the parts of the compound offence are an element or an aggravating
circumstance”. The use of the concept of “aggravating circumstance” here was a mistake, since the new TCK no longer uses the concepts of aggravating or mitigating circumstances but instead uses the concept of the qualified form of the offence219. This qualified form may, however, be of a kind that increases the penalty for the offence or of a kind that mitigates it220. The terminology used in Art. 42 is therefore inconsistent with the Code as a whole.
As stated above, in a compound offence either one offence constitutes an element of another, that is, acts constituting various offences come together as elements to form another offence, or one offence constitutes a qualified form increasing the penalty for another offence.
In the first of these, one offence constitutes an element of another, that is, acts constituting various offences come together as elements to form another offence. In this case the nature of the offences making up the compound offence changes and an offence of a different nature emerges. The offences that are elements lose their independence and there is one offence, so that only the penalty for this offence is imposed221. The point to be noted here is that it is the offence expressly designated as an element in the statute that will lose its independence222. Offences not expressly specified as an element or a qualified form in the definition of the compound offence, by contrast, will retain their independence223. When different offences lose their independence as an element of an offence and acquire the character of an element for the offence to arise, that is, when the offence into which they are incorporated cannot be committed unless this offence is realised as an element, it can be seen that there is a relationship of necessity between the offences224. Accordingly, where there is no relationship of necessity, that is, in the cases of committing one offence in order to commit another, committing one offence in order to conceal another and committing one offence on the occasion of another, each offence retains its independence, and in these situations there is not a compound offence but a cumulation of penalties225.
The best known and classic example of the first form of the compound offence is the offence of robbery. Although the offences of “force” regulated in Art. 108 TCK, “threat” regulated in Art. 106 and “theft” regulated in Art. 141 are in fact separate offence types, the legislature has combined them to create the offence of “robbery”, a new offence type entirely independent of them, which is regulated in Art. 148 of the Code. Here the offence of force – threat is an element of the offence of robbery, and these two offences have been combined within an independent offence type226. Accordingly, where theft is committed against a person by using force or threat, the provisions of these articles will no longer be applied; the offence of robbery, which is entirely independent of them, will be applied and the perpetrator will be given the penalty for that offence. Similarly, in the offence of sexual assault regulated in Art. 102 TCK or the offence of preventing the exercise of political rights regulated in Art. 114, since the use of force and threat constitutes an element of these offences, no separate penalty will be imposed for those offences, and only the penalty for the offences defined in Arts. 102 and 114 TCK will be imposed227.
However, in cases where the use of force constitutes the basic or a qualified form of an offence, if one of the forms of the offence of intentional injury aggravated by its result, regulated in Art. 87 TCK, occurs, a penalty will be imposed both for the offence of which force is an element and for the form of intentional injury aggravated by its result. Examples of these are the offence of sexual assault under Art. 102(4) TCK, sexual abuse of children under Art. 103(5), deprivation of liberty under Art. 109(6), some of the offences against liberty under Art. 119(2), qualified robbery under Art. 149(2) and the offence of resistance to prevent the performance of a duty under Art. 265(5). Hence, for force to be accepted as an element or qualified form of the offence in a compound offence, the deed carried out by way of force must be of a kind that constitutes no more than the basic form of the offence of intentional injury. In cases falling outside this, there will be both the offence of which force is an element and the qualified form of the offence of intentional injury, and the perpetrator will be given the penalty for both offences228. For the relevant articles and paragraphs referred to above expressly state that, where the form of intentional injury aggravated by its result occurs, the perpetrator shall be held separately liable for this aggravated result. An exception to the compound offence has thus been created in this respect.
In the second form of the compound offence, one offence constitutes a qualified element increasing the penalty for the other offence, and the offence that is an element loses its independence229. For example, where the offence is committed in a dwelling or workplace, which constitutes one of the qualified forms of the offence of robbery, the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling regulated in Art. 116 TCK is in fact also committed; but since this circumstance constitutes a qualified form increasing the penalty for robbery, the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling loses its independence, and the perpetrator is not punished separately for that offence but is punished for the qualified form of robbery230; indeed, the Court of Cassation expressly says so in its decisions231. Similarly, there is a compound offence where the offence of escaping from prison regulated in Art. 292(2) TCK is committed by using force and threat against persons or by breaking a door or window. For the offence of force and threat and the offence of damage to property, which are regulated in the TCK as separate offence types, have been made qualified forms of the offence of escape and have lost their independence. The point to be noted in the second form of the compound offence, however, is that, unlike in the first form of the compound offence, there is no relationship of necessity between the basic offence and the offences regulated as qualified forms. For it is possible to escape without force and threat or damage to property, for example by digging a tunnel; likewise, theft need not necessarily be committed inside a building: it is perfectly possible to steal a car parked in the street or the property inside a car whose windows or door have been left open232.
The following examples may also be given of this form of the compound offence. In paragraph 2 of the offence of deprivation of liberty regulated in Art. 109 TCK, and likewise in paragraph 4 of the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling regulated in Art. 116, the commission of the offence by using force and threat is regulated as a qualified form of these offences. The deeds of force and threat, which are in fact regulated in Arts. 106 and 108 of the Code, have been framed as a qualified form increasing the penalty for the offences in question and thus as a typical case of compound offence. In the same way, the offence of sexual harassment, regulated as an independent offence type in Art. 105 TCK, is regulated as a qualified form increasing the penalty in paragraph 3 of the offence of torture regulated in Art. 94 TCK. Accordingly, where the offence of torture is committed by subjecting the victim to sexual harassment, the perpetrator will not be punished separately for the offence of sexual harassment but will be punished for the qualified form of the offence of torture233.
However, where the deed constitutes one of the qualified forms of the offence of theft, namely where it is committed “in respect of property which, although left in a place open to
everyone, has been secured by locking or is kept in safekeeping within a building or its annexes”
(Art. 142(1)(b) TCK), then, although this at the same time constitutes the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling and is a qualified form increasing the penalty for theft, the provision on the compound offence will not be applied and, pursuant to Art. 142(4) TCK, a penalty will be imposed both for the qualified form of theft and for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling234. In our view this is a theoretically flawed provision which undermines the coherence of the Code and of practice in this area235. Indeed, since the original version of the Code did not contain Art. 142(4), no such distinction was made in this regard. However, the 6th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, despite this provision of the TCK, held that in thefts committed by entering a dwelling both the offence of theft and the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling arise236. As a result, by Art. 6 of Law No. 5560237 a paragraph 4 was added to Art. 142 of the new TCK238, which provides, in line with the decision of the Court of Cassation, that where the offence is committed in this way a penalty shall be imposed both for theft and for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling, and hence that the provision on the compound offence shall not be applied here. In legal scholarship both the said decision of the Court of Cassation and the prevention of unnecessary debate have been given as the reason for this239, while the explanatory memorandum to the law states that the fact that the investigation and prosecution of the basic form of the offences depended on complaint was causing confusion240; in our view, however, the reasoning given and the result sought to be achieved differ. Yet it is a clear contradiction that, where robbery is committed inside a dwelling, the perpetrator is punished only for the qualified form of robbery, whereas in theft he is punished both for that offence and for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling241. In our view, therefore, it is not right to explain the reasoning for the amendment in this way. This area should have been resolved either by attaching the same consequence to all similar situations (for example, robbery committed inside a dwelling) or by leaving the general principle on this subject untouched and ensuring that the Court of Cassation changed its case law so as to decide in line with the statutory provision. In our view too, this is at present the correct solution de lege ferenda.
In legal scholarship, however, Zafer states that the taking of property kept in safekeeping within a building or its annexes constitutes the aggravated form of the offence of theft; that, since a building is not regarded as a dwelling, the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling has not been expressly designated as a qualified form of theft; and that the definition in Art. 142(1)(b) TCK is not the definition of a compound offence. The author states that for this reason the legislature laid down the rule that, where the offences of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling and damage to property are committed for the purpose of committing theft, no complaint is required for investigation and prosecution in respect of those offences; that this provision also means that the rules on concurrence of offences will not be applied between theft and the offences of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling or damage to property; and that, if the building in which the property that is the subject of the theft is located falls within the concept of a dwelling, the perpetrator will be punished separately for violation of the inviolability of the dwelling and for theft242.
Although the statutory provision and the practice of the Court of Cassation are as described, in line with the views and reasons we have set out above we do not agree with this view, on the grounds that a distinction drawn in this way between the concepts of building and dwelling is incompatible with the purpose for which the norm was enacted, that this is a compound offence, that the amendment in question was indeed made subsequently, and that drawing such a distinction between the offences of robbery and theft creates a contradiction.
In this second form of the compound offence, the offence that loses its independence must be expressly designated in the statute as a qualifying element243. If the statute does not expressly indicate that a particular offence is a qualified form of another offence, no compound offence arises244. What is to be understood by this, however, is not that the name of the offence concerned must necessarily be mentioned within the other offence type. It is sufficient and necessary for the existence of a compound offence that the conduct element of one offence be set out within another offence type245. Consequently, there is no compound offence in the qualified forms of intentional killing regulated in Art. 82(1)(h) and (i) TCK, because, where the perpetrator commits intentional killing in order to conceal an offence, to destroy the evidence of it or to facilitate its commission, or in order to avoid being caught, or out of the rage felt at being unable to commit an offence, the means and end offences retain their independence246. Accordingly, there will be no compound offence where one offence is committed in order to commit another (entering a house in order to commit sexual assault, killing the victim in order to take the gold), where one offence is committed in order to conceal another (knocking unconscious with a punch the woman who is the victim of a sexual assault), or where another offence is committed by means of an offence (the perpetrator who has killed the friend with whom he was fighting taking the valuables found on the dead person)247.
The second sentence of Art. 42 TCK, in which the compound offence is regulated, states that “in offences of this kind the provisions on concurrence shall not apply”. The text of the statute does not make clear whether the concurrence that is not to be applied here is the cumulation of penalties or the concurrence of offences. Indeed, starting from this wording, some authors in legal scholarship state that what is meant by “the provisions on concurrence” is real concurrence; that, although the statute provides that the provisions on concurrence shall not apply to offences of this kind, TCK No. 5237 contains no provisions on the cumulation of penalties; and that the legislature has therefore referred to rules that do not exist in the statute248. However, both because the cumulation of penalties is not expressly regulated in the statute and because the cumulation of penalties is the rule, this provision must be understood as referring to the concurrence of offences249. Accordingly, although it is regulated in the chapter on the concurrence of offences, it is an appropriate arrangement that the statute expressly states that the compound offence is not a form of the concurrence of offences.
In conclusion, since the compound offence is in itself an independent offence, the perpetrator is not punished separately for the offences that constitute its elements or its qualified form; a penalty is imposed for the compound offence alone.
3. The Principle of the Subsidiarity of the Auxiliary Norm (Primary Norm – Auxiliary Norm Relationship)
a. In General
In some cases the legislature, so that the deeds committed do not go unpunished, enacts norms of wide scope that are to be applied where the other norms cannot be applied. In practice these are called “catch-all provisions”. The purpose of enacting them is to prevent gaps from arising in the law250. Norms of this kind, in accordance with the principle of the subsidiarity of the auxiliary norm, give way to all the norms regulating the same matter, or only to those norms that carry a heavier penalty than they do, and the other norms they encounter are applied to the specific case251. Accordingly, although it looks as if there were two norms applicable to the specific case, this is so only in appearance, because it will suffice to apply the primary norm to the deed252. In short, a norm has the character of an auxiliary (secondary, subsidiary) norm if it becomes applicable only in so far as another norm cannot be applied253.
That a norm is an auxiliary norm may be expressly laid down in the statute, and it may also be established by way of interpretation254. In this interpretation the basic idea of the statute, the relationships between the norms and the characteristics of the offence contained in the norm will be taken into account255. For example, “the offence of obtaining an unlawful benefit by means of an information system”, regulated in Art. 244(4) TCK, and, regulated in Art. 245(3), “the offence of obtaining
an undue benefit by means of a bank or credit card that has been counterfeited or
falsified” are auxiliary norms of this kind. Indeed, through the express use in these norms of the phrases “where it does not constitute
another offence” and “unless the deed constitutes another offence
requiring a heavier penalty”, it has been clearly laid down that these are auxiliary norms and that they come into play where there is no other norm to be applied256. In mixed offences or transitional offences, by contrast, the auxiliary character of these norms can be established by way of interpretation.
Auxiliary norms are also divided into absolute and relative ones257. Accordingly, subsidiarity is regarded as absolute where it holds in relation to all the norms regulating the same matter, and as relative where it holds in relation to certain specific norms. For example, if the auxiliary norm is framed with a condition such as “where it does not constitute another offence”, as in Art. 244(4), the subsidiarity of that norm is express and absolute; whereas
if, as in Art. 245(3), it is framed with a condition such as “unless the deed constitutes another offence
requiring a heavier penalty”, the subsidiarity of that norm is express and relative258.
In such cases, in which there is a relationship of primary and auxiliary norm, the primary norm will be applied to the specific case in accordance with the principle of the subsidiarity of the auxiliary norm, and the existence of a single norm will be accepted. Accordingly, provided that they arise from the same deed, the offence of concrete endangerment in relation to the offence of abstract endangerment, the offence of harm in relation to the offence of concrete endangerment, the completed offence in relation to the offence that has remained at the stage of attempt, and the more serious forms of participation in the offence in relation to the less serious ones (perpetration in relation to accessory participation)259 have the character of the primary norm260.
b. The Transitional Offence
As regards the relationship of primary and auxiliary norm, the most frequently encountered type of apparent concurrence is formed by transitional offences or, as they are also called, offences of passage. A transitional offence exists where the perpetrator, in order to commit an offence, is compelled to commit an offence that protects the same legal interest and requires a lighter sanction, and thereby commits the offence requiring the heavier penalty261. Within apparent concurrence as a whole, transitional offences are counted as unpunished prior deeds and are therefore accepted, together with all unpunished prior deeds, as a type of apparent concurrence262.
Certain conditions must be met for transitional offences to exist. The first of these is that the legal interest protected by the offence requiring the heavy sanction and by the offence that has to be passed through, that is, committed first, in order to commit it, and that requires a lighter sanction than the other, must be the same263. Accordingly, in the offences of sexual assault (Art. 102(2) TCK), indecent assault (Art. 102(1) TCK) and intentional killing (Art. 81 TCK), bodily harm may have the character of a transitional offence264.
The other condition is that, for the offence to be committed, it must be unavoidable to pass through an offence requiring a lighter sanction. Indeed, as in the examples above, it is not possible for the offences of sexual assault or intentional killing to be committed without bodily harm occurring265.
The condition common to all unpunished prior deeds, namely that the perpetrator and the victim of the prior deed be the same, also applies to transitional offences. Where the same deed is carried out against the same victim by different perpetrators, or against different victims by the same perpetrator, these deeds will be regarded as different offences. Accordingly, where the same deed is carried out by the perpetrator against different victims, it is no longer apparent concurrence but the cumulation of penalties, which is real concurrence, that will be applied, and the perpetrator will be punished separately for both the prior and the subsequent deed. For example, where the perpetrator commits the offences of bodily harm and sexual assault against different victims, there will be no transitional offence even if the other conditions are met, and it will be accepted that there are as many offences and penalties as there are victims266.
A further condition of the transitional offence is that the aggravated results must be causally linked to the perpetrator’s deed267. Where there is no causal link between the serious result that has occurred and the perpetrator’s act, the perpetrator cannot be held liable for the result that has occurred; he will therefore not be liable for the offence with the more serious result, and no transitional offence will arise either268.
One of the most important conditions of the transitional offence, and the last, is that the perpetrator’s intent must be directed from the outset of the deed at bringing about the aggravated results. Consequently, no transitional offence will arise where the perpetrator begins the act negligently and then continues it with intent, or where the perpetrator, having initially willed to commit the offence requiring the lighter penalty, subsequently directs his intent towards the serious result269. In other words, in the case of supervening intent there can be no question of a transitional offence. Here the reason why a single penalty is imposed on the perpetrator is not the transitional offence, which is one of the forms of apparent concurrence, but “supervening intent”, which is one of the kinds of intent belonging to the mental element of the offence; the problems arising in this situation will likewise be resolved within the framework of the consequences attached to supervening intent270.
Where the perpetrator’s intent is directed at bringing about the most serious result (that is, where there is no supervening intent) but, for reasons beyond the perpetrator’s control, the offence requiring the heavier penalty cannot be completed after the transitional offence has been committed, the perpetrator will be held liable for attempt to commit the offence with the more serious result. For example, where the perpetrator aims his weapon at the victim’s head and fires, and the victim, despite the bullet entering the head, does not die but is injured and subsequently recovers, the perpetrator will be punished here not for intentional injury but for the offence of attempted intentional killing; even though the perpetrator’s deed has remained at the stage of attempt, he will be held liable for the offence with the more serious result, and the offence of intentional injury, being regarded as a transitional offence, will have the character of an unpunished prior deed271.
The point to be noted here is that in transitional offences the perpetrator’s intent must be directed from the outset at the offence requiring the heavier sanction. Moreover, the transitional offence must not be in the position of an independently punished preparatory act of the more serious offence272.
c. The Mixed Offence
The mixed offence is the situation in which norms that arise from the relationship of primary and auxiliary norm but cannot be classified among the other forms of apparent concurrence, that regulate offences between which there is no relationship of element or of qualified form increasing the penalty, and that protect different legal interests, are apparently applicable to the same case273.
In a manner similar to the examples given above for the transitional offence, it is possible to think that the offence of illegal access to and remaining in an information system (Art. 243 TCK) has the character of a transitional offence in relation to the offence of hindering or disrupting the functioning of an information system and of destroying or altering data (Art. 244(1)-(2) TCK). Indeed, in the first edition of our book entitled “Bilişim Suçları” the relationship between the two offences was characterised in this way274. At the stage we have now reached, however, we think that the offence of illegal access to and remaining in an information system does not have the character of a transitional offence in relation to what may be called, in short, the offence of damaging an information system. For although the other conditions of a transitional offence are met between these two offence types, the two conditions we have set out above are not. This is because it is not indispensable, in order to damage an information system, to have entered the system unlawfully; the system may perfectly well be damaged by someone who has entered it lawfully, for example a company officer or a service technician, after entering the system lawfully and continuing to remain in it; moreover, this offence can also be committed without entering the system, by damaging the physical structure of the system. There is therefore no absolute necessity to enter the system unlawfully in order to damage it. On the other hand, whereas the legal interest protected by the offence of illegal access to and remaining in an information system is “the security of the information system”275, the legal interest protected by the offence of hindering or disrupting the functioning of an information system and of destroying or altering data is “the interest of the person who has the power of disposal over the information system and/or the data contained in the information system in accessing and using, without any hindrance, malfunction or delay, assets created with data such as software, economic information, scientific work, information and the like”276. As can be seen, the legal interests protected by these two criminal norms also differ. It is therefore not possible for the criminal norm regulated in Art. 243 TCK to be a transitional offence in relation to the criminal norm regulated in Art. 244(1) and (2). However, since there is neither a relationship of necessity between them nor the feature of element or qualified form, they can be characterised as a mixed offence, which is yet another type of apparent concurrence. In this way it becomes possible to explain why, where the system is damaged after it has been entered unlawfully and remained in, although there is no necessity to do so, the perpetrator receives only a single penalty under Art. 244(1) and (2).
CONCLUSION
In the concluding part of our study we have thought it appropriate to set out those matters which stand out in our explanations above and which, apart from the general explanations on the subject, we do not find appropriate in theoretical and normative terms and/or on which we take a different view, and thus to touch on these matters once more.
We must state first of all that, in the distinction between unity of offence and plurality of offences, which is of particular importance in the matter of the concurrence of offences, we subscribe to the view of plurality of offences.
Notional concurrence occurs where the perpetrator, by the single deed he has carried out, commits more than one different offence. Notional concurrence requires that the deed be single and that by the same deed
more than one offence be realised.
We think that in notional concurrence there is a plurality of offences and that, in determining this, it is not the act but the violation of the norm that must be taken as the criterion. We think that the reason why a single penalty is imposed on the perpetrator although the offences are several can be explained by the concept of penal justice; that it is an exceptional situation for someone to act with the intent to commit more than one offence and to commit more than one offence by a single deed; that the second offence realised is generally committed negligently, so that imposing a penalty for two separate offences could, having regard to the principle of proportionality, lead to harsh results; and that, in order to reduce the severity of the penalty, the course taken has been to impose a single penalty for several offences realised by a single deed. In that case, however, we think that, contrary to the provision in the statute, the penalty for the more serious of the offences committed should be imposed with an increase of a certain amount, and that in this way a balance can be struck between the fact that the act carried out by the perpetrator is single and the fact that the results that have occurred are several.
In the case under Art. 43(2), which regulates the exceptional form of the continuing offence, there is nothing that requires a departure from the general rule even where the victim is a public official. However, the provision in Art. 125(5) TCK, the article containing the offence of insult, according to which
“where public officials working as a collegiate body are insulted on account of their duties, the offence shall be deemed to have been committed against the members forming the body”, was wrongly
interpreted, and it was argued that in this situation it had to be accepted that as many offences had been committed as there were public officials. In order to prevent this misunderstanding, the following sentence was added to Art. 125(5) TCK by Law No. 5377: “However, in this case
the provision of the article on the continuing offence shall apply.” In our view the provision made is correct;
however, as we have also noted above, some authors in legal scholarship state that there is a continuing offence here, while others state that there is notional concurrence of the same kind. This wording, as we have likewise stated above, shows that de lege lata the provision made here is a continuing offence. For it to be capable of being characterised as notional concurrence of the same kind, Art. 43(2) would have had to be placed in Art. 44 and the legislature would have had to use in this sentence wording to the effect that “the rule on notional concurrence of the same kind” shall apply.
The existence of more than one deed in the continuing offence must be understood as the existence of a multiplicity of deeds in the legal sense. Consequently, since in the situations we have briefly touched on above only a single offence is accepted to exist, there will be no plurality of offences, the norm on the continuing offence will not come into play and the perpetrator will receive the penalty for the single offence he has committed; indeed, in a decision on the offence of theft the Court of Cassation likewise accepted as a single offence of theft, and not as a continuing offence, the perpetrator’s taking various items in the house he had entered and, together with these, the car key, and stealing the car in front of the house; similarly, in the offence of sexual harassment the Court of Cassation accepted as a single deed in the legal sense the perpetrator’s telephoning the complainant at short intervals and saying “I love you, you will be mine”, or telephoning frequently and proposing sexual intercourse, and stated that the provision on the continuing offence could not be applied.
In TCK No. 765 it was accepted, by means of the expression “even if they occur at various times”, that the continuing offence could as a rule be committed within the same period of time but, exceptionally, also at different times. Since one of the conditions that gives the continuing offence its character is the existence of the same decision to commit an offence, this approach was more appropriate from the point of view of establishing that circumstance. Indeed, the existence of that decision can be established more easily in respect of offences committed within the same period of time. Under the former provision, however, on condition that this decision to commit an offence could be established, the provision on the continuing offence could be applied “even if at different times”. From the literal interpretation of Art. 43(1) of TCK No. 5237, by contrast, it follows that the offences forming the chain must necessarily be committed at different times. Indeed, the Court of Cassation too accepts this interpretation in the decisions it has given on the matter. We think, however, that this expression must not be understood in absolute terms and that it must be interpreted having regard to the “ratio legis” pursued by the provision of the article on the continuing offence. Indeed, the Court of Cassation too interprets the article of the statute in absolute terms but tries, through an incorrect application, to reach the right result by moving away from the lower limit of the penalty. However, since the solution accepted by the Court of Cassation will lead to the penalty increasing as the number of offences committed increases, it is not a correct solution, because it both runs counter to the purpose for which the continuing offence is regulated and may lead to unjust penalties being imposed on the perpetrator.
Art. 43(2) TCK regulates the exceptional form of the continuing offence, that is, the case in which the perpetrator, by a single deed, commits an offence against more than one victim at the same time. In legal scholarship there are those who state that this is the exceptional form of the continuing offence, and there are also authors who state that it is notional concurrence of the same kind. De lege lata this provision is the exceptional form of the continuing offence, because that is how the norm has been framed. De lege ferenda, however, this provision should be made in Art. 44, as a type of notional concurrence.
Art. 43(3) TCK states that “in the offences of intentional killing, intentional injury, torture and robbery, the provisions of this article shall not apply”. Accordingly,
even where the offences listed in the paragraph are committed more than once against the same person within the scope of the execution of a decision to commit an offence, the provision on the continuing offence will not be applied. By this provision the restriction which, in the period of TCK No. 765, had been imposed on the application of the continuing offence by decisions of the Court of Cassation although it was not contained in the statute has been made the subject of a normative provision, and consistency with practice has been achieved. In this way this arrangement, which, although aimed at satisfying the sense of justice, was contrary to the letter and the spirit of TCK No. 765, has been placed on a normative footing. The reason why these offences were selected and kept outside the application of the continuing offence is not to be found in the explanatory memorandum; it is, however, highly probable that the criterion taken into consideration here was the legal interests protected by these offences.
In the original version of Art. 43 TCK, the offences of sexual assault (Art. 102 TCK) and sexual abuse of children (Art. 103 TCK) were also placed among the offences to which the article on the continuing offence could not be applied. However, by the amendment made to Art. 43(3) by Law No. 5377 of 29.06.2005 these offences were removed from its scope. The application of the provision on the continuing offence was thus secured for the offences of sexual assault and sexual abuse of children as well. The reasons given for this amendment were the problem of proof and the very great increase in the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator. In our view, however, this is neither an explanatory nor a satisfactory justification. In proving sexual offences, difficulty is experienced where there is no witness and/or circumstantial evidence. This difficulty of proof, however, is a difficulty that is independent of the number of times the deed, that is, the forced sexual intercourse or the abuse, has taken place. Likewise, where a perpetrator who has the mental element and the culpability to commit this offence moreover carries out the deed several times in succession and impairs the victim’s mental and physical integrity still further, not to impose as many penalties as there are deeds but to apply the provision on the continuing offence and thereby, as it were, to excuse the subsequent deeds is, in our view, acceptable neither in terms of the theory of the offence nor in terms of the criminal policy adopted by modern societies. In our view the text of the statute should be restored to its former wording.
In the light of the provision in Art. 5 TCK, where a norm concerning an offence contained in the TCK conflicts with a norm concerning an offence contained in an ancillary criminal statute, the problem will, provided the other conditions are also met, be resolved within the framework of the principle of the priority of the special norm. Where there is a conflict between norms relating to general provisions contained in special criminal laws that entered into force before 31 December 2008 and the norms of a general nature of the TCK, the norms of the TCK regulating the same matter will be applied, in view of the express provision of Art. 5 TCK. Where, on the other hand, there is a conflict between the general provisions of the TCK and ancillary criminal statutes that have entered into force after 31 December 2008 or that will be enacted from now on, then, in view of Art. 5 TCK, de lege ferenda no such contradictory norm ought to be enacted; if such a provision exists nonetheless, the problem should be resolved within the framework of the principle of the priority of the special norm. Yet although this solution is formally appropriate in terms of the theory of the offence, it carries the risk of creating a contradiction with the general provisions of the TCK.
In the compound offence there are several deeds, and each deed violates different legal interests. For example, in the offence of robbery regulated in Art. 148 TCK, property is taken by force or threat and the offence is realised by several deeds; at the same time more than one legal interest, such as the protection of the person’s bodily integrity and property, is violated. In this situation, however, the legislature treats the deeds that violate several legal interests as a single deed and combines them within one definition of an offence. In other words, in compound offences there is a single deed and therefore a single offence. Accordingly, the compound offence is not one of the cases of concurrence of offences, and it is not necessary for a provision on it to be included in the chapter of the TCK on the concurrence of offences. This is because the compound offence can be identified by examining the offence type. Even if Art. 42 TCK did not exist, the existence of a compound offence would be accepted wherever one offence has been framed as an element of another or as a qualified form increasing its penalty, because this would be apparent from the way the offence type is framed. It can be seen, however, that the legislature has given the compound offence a separate place in the statute on the grounds that the compound offence is the most common of the cases of apparent concurrence and that differing interpretations and confusion on this matter should be avoided.
Art. 42 TCK, in which the compound offence is regulated, states that “the offences forming
the parts of the compound offence are an element or an aggravating circumstance”. Here
the use of the concept of “aggravating circumstance” was a mistake, because the new TCK no longer uses the concepts of aggravating or mitigating circumstance; in their place the concept of the qualified form of the offence is used. This qualified form, however, may be of a kind that increases the penalty for the offence, just as it may be of a kind that reduces it. The terminology used in Art. 42 is therefore out of keeping with the statute as a whole.
Where the deed is committed, as one of the qualified forms of the offence of theft, “in respect of property which, although left in a place
open to everyone, has been secured by locking or is kept in safekeeping within a building or its annexes” (Art. 142(1)(b) TCK), then, although this
at the same time constitutes the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling and is a qualified form of the offence of theft that increases the penalty, the provision on the compound offence will not be applied and, pursuant to Art. 142(4) TCK, a penalty will be imposed both for the qualified form of the offence of theft and for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling. In our view this is a provision that is flawed in theoretical terms, and it disrupts the coherence of the statute and of practice in this field. Yet it constitutes a manifest contradiction that, where the offence of robbery is committed inside a dwelling, the perpetrator is punished only for the qualified form of the offence of robbery, whereas in the offence of theft a penalty is imposed both for that offence and for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling.
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Footnotes
- Faculty member in Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, Özyeğin University Faculty of Law. ↑
- Bahri Öztürk/Mustafa Ruhan Erdem, Uygulamalı Ceza Hukuku ve Güvenlik Tedbirleri Hukuku, 11. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2011, kn.580. ↑
- TBMM Adalet Komisyonu’nun Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarasına ilişkin 03.08.2004 tarih ve Esas:1/593, Karar: 60 sayılı Raporu, TBMM, Dönem: 22, Yasama Yılı:2, Sıra Sayısı:664, s.229. ↑
- To the same effect see: Veli Özer Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi Türk Ceza Kanununun Anlamı, 4. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2010, s.702. ↑
- Yener Ünver, Ceza Hukukuyla Korunması Amaçlanan Hukuksal Değer, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004, s.668 - 678. ↑
- Kayıhan İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1972, s.57. ↑
- Mehmet Emin Artuk/Ahmet Gökcen/A. Caner Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 4. Bası, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 2009, s.684; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.57. ↑
- Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Band II, München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 2003, kn.70; Mahmut Koca, “Fikri İçtima”, Ceza Hukuku Dergisi, Y.2, S.4, Ağustos 2007, s.199; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.63; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.597; ↑
- Veli Özer Özbek/M. Nihat Kanbur/Koray Doğan/Pınar Bacaksız/İlker Tepe, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 2. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2011,s.531, 532. ↑
- Tahir Taner, Ceza Hukuku Umumi Kısım, 3. Bası, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1953, s.481; Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.71; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.58, 59. ↑
- To the same effect see: Koca, a.g.y., s.200. ↑
- Kayıhan İçel/Füsun Sokullu Akıncı/İzzet Özgenç/Adem Sözüer/Fatih M. Mahmutoğlu/Yener Ünver, Suç Teorisi, 2. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2000, s.418; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.60. ↑
- “A person may, by one deed that he commits, bring about more than one different offence; under the non bis in idem rule, however, he may be punished only once for that deed. Where the deed carried out brings about more than one different offence, the perpetrator should be punished for the offence among these that requires the heaviest penalty. The aim is thus to prevent a person from being punished more than once for one deed.” ↑
- Mahmut Koca/İlhan Üzülmez, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 3. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2010, s.468; Koca, a.g.y., s.201; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.530. ↑
- On the same point Koca, for his part, states that the strongest basis for contenting oneself with imposing a single penalty on the perpetrator although a plurality of offences is accepted in notional concurrence is to be sought in the singleness of the deed; that notional concurrence must be understood as an institution which makes it possible to grasp the content of wrongfulness of a deed from different legal points of view; and that notional concurrence is the assessment of a deed from various aspects, its essence being a plurality of assessments made upon the unity of the deed. See: Koca, a.g.y., s.201. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.733, 734; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.532. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.530. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.535. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.70; For the contrary view see: Ayhan Önder, Ceza Hukuku Dersleri, İstanbul, Filiz Kitanevi, 1992, .462; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.67; Koca, a.g.y., s.210, 211. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.80. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.82. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.70. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.469, 470. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.75. ↑
- “The deed of obtaining by means of a computer system a large number of pictures and video recordings relating to child pornography and to sexual acts performed with animals, and of systematically storing and keeping them on the computer, constitutes, even if done for personal purposes, the offence in Art. 226(3) by reference of Art. 44 of TCK No. 5237.” 5. CD., 01.10.2007, 2007/9856, 2007/6957, online: www.kazanci.com.tr. ↑
- “… that these proven deeds of the accused remained at the stage of an attempt to enable the migrants to leave the country, that, if Art. 79 of TCK No. 5237 is applied, the penalty to be imposed must be reduced by one quarter to three quarters pursuant to Art. 35 of the said Law, and that, in accordance with the rule on notional concurrence, no penalty may additionally be fixed for contravention of the Passport Law No. 5682 …” Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.736, dn.733. To the same effect: Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.597. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.736; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.537. ↑
- İzzet Özgenç, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 4. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2009, s.529; Nur Centel/Hamide Zafer/Özlem Çakmut, Türk Ceza Hukukuna Giriş, 6. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2010; s.506; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.736; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.536. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.471; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.736; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.537. ↑
- Hamide Zafer, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2010, s.346; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.76; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.506. ↑
- “It is contrary to law that the accused, who is understood from the content of the file to have brought about more than one different offence by one deed, was additionally convicted of the offence of endangering traffic safety, without regard to the fact that, in view of the provision of Art. 44 of TCK No. 5237, he ought to have been held liable for the offence among these requiring the heaviest penalty, namely the offence of causing death and injury by negligence defined in Art. 85(2) of TCK No. 5237.” 9. CD., 13.11.2007, 9982/8317. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.741. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.737; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.537. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.116. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.72. ↑
- Sulhi Dönmezer/Sahir Erman, Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku, C.II, 12. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1999, kn.1134; Önder, a.g.e., s.463; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.696; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.475; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.737.. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.73, 74; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.475; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.537, 538; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.737. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.70; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.476. ↑
- Koca, Fikri İçtima, s.212; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.476. For the contrary view see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.70; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.507. ↑
- “Since it is understood from the documents and information in the file that the accused’s deed constitutes two separate offences, one being attempted export and the other completed transport, the judgment ought, pursuant to Art. 44 TCK, to have been based on the offence producing the heavier outcome, after comparing the outcome determined by applying the provisions on the offence of attempted export with the outcome to be determined by applying the provisions on the offence of completed transport; the giving of the decision in the manner written, without a concretisation and comparison of the kind indicated having been carried out…” 10. CD., 04.03.2008, 872/3594. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.743. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.70; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.738. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.93 – 100. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.476; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.507. For the contrary view see: Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.88. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.477. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.477. ↑
- For the contrary view see: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.702. ↑
- On the absorption system see: Sulhi Dönmezer/Sahir Erman, Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku, C.III, 11. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1994, kn.1771, 1772. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.529. ↑
- To the same effect see: Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.477. ↑
- Türkan Yalçın Sancar, “Yeni Türk Ceza Kanunu’nda Zincirleme Suç”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, Y.20, S.70, Mayıs – Haziran 2007, s.259. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.81. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.529. ↑
- Indeed, Özgenç too states that during the work on the drafting of the statute he worked towards having the judge granted a discretion on this point but did not succeed. See: Özgenç, a.g.e., s.529. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.248; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.441; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.506; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.709. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.256; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.506, 507; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.710. ↑
- Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.509; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.458. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.89 – 93. ↑
- For these views see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.89 – 93. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.93; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.509, 510; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.458. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.96. ↑
- Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.248; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.581. ↑
- Sulhi Dönmezer/Sahir Erman, Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku, C.I, 12. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1997, kn.527; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.95, 96; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.458, 459; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.710; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.510; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.520. ↑
- There are also authors who state that, in the case of the continuing offence, the question whether there is a single offence or several offences must be approached according to the single-offence view as far as punishment is concerned, and according to the plural-offence view as far as the other institutions of criminal law are concerned. See: Zafer, a.g.e., s.337. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.459; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.581. ↑
- However, Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, in our opinion under the influence of the provision in Art. 80 of TCK No. 765, include in their work the statement “where the existence of a continuing offence is accepted, the several offences committed will be deemed a single offence…” and have thus used wording to the effect that, where there is a continuing offence, the numerous offences will lose their independence and become a single offence. See: Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.682. ↑
- For a detailed explanation of these differences see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.97 – 104. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.519. ↑
- Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.258. ↑
- To the same effect see: Zafer, a.g.e., s.337. In legal scholarship Öztürk/Erdem, for their part, state that the continuing offence has six conditions, namely that there be more than one offence, that the several offences be committed at different times, that the offences be the same, that the offence be committed against the same person, that the several offences committed not be among the offences listed in Art. 43(3) TCK, and that the several offences be based on a single decision to commit an offence. See: Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.585 - 592. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.459. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.110. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.111. ↑
- “…For this reason, since, apart from the cannabis seized on the accused, the narcotic substances which they had sold before their arrest and had acquired in order to sell could not be seized, and since there is also no possibility of investigating whether or not these were parts of the same whole as the narcotic substances seized, the fixing of an excessive penalty for the accused by applying Art. 43 TCK without regard to the fact that its conditions were not met…” 10. CD., 17.04.2008, 2007/27117, 2008/6310. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.711. ↑
- Hakan Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 10. Bası, Ankara, Adalet Yayınevi, 2011, s.528; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.95; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.710; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.585; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.510, 511. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.111; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.585. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.586; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.511. ↑
- “In the deed of the accused, who entered through the window the home of the complainant living on the third floor of an apartment building, left the home with money and some items together with the car key he had taken, and immediately stole the vehicle standing in the car park in front of the home, there is no room for applying the provisions on the continuing offence, considering that no interval of time intervened and that the deed was continued without interruption. The accused’s deed as a whole constitutes a single offence of theft, and in characterising the offence the most serious qualification within the deed as a whole must be relied upon. When the local court renders a new judgment following the reversal, it is appropriate that the basic penalty be determined under Art. 61 of the Law with regard to the occurrence as a whole.” YCGK, 02.10.2007, 2007/6-195; 2007/197, YKD Eylül 2008. Cited in: Erdener Yurtcan, Türk Ceza Kanunu Genel Hükümler, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 2010, s.442, 443. ↑
- “…The increase under Art. 80 of the penalty imposed under Art. 421(2) of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCY), without regard to the fact that the accused’s deed, which consisted in telephoning the intervening party Vildan at short intervals that do not indicate a renewal of intent and saying ‘I love you, you will be mine’, constitutes in its entirety the offence of molestation and as such already includes the continuation within itself, is contrary to law…” 4. CD., 26.01.1995, 9211/324. YKD, C.21, S.6, Haziran 1995, s.973 – 975. ↑
- “…However, the increase of the penalty under Art. 80 of the said Law is contrary to law, in that it was not considered that the accused’s frequently telephoning the intervening party İmren and proposing ‘sexual intercourse’ is importunate behaviour which in its entirety constitutes the offence of molestation defined in Art. 421(2) of the (former) TCY; in that it was not shown and explained after which deed of verbal harassment the offence would turn from a single offence into several offences and the accused would be deemed to have violated the same provision of the law more than once with the same decision to commit an offence; and in that, furthermore, no regard was had to the fact that no charge had been brought in the indictment in respect of the deed of ‘embracing’ accepted by the court…” 4. CD., 11.05.1994, 2239/4306. YKD, C.21, S.2, Şubat 1995, s.315 – 317. ↑
- Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.511. ↑
- Dönmezer/Erman, I, kn.529; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.111; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.711. ↑
- “Since it is understood that the offence of qualified sexual assault, which is one of the offences with alternative acts, was committed by inserting first the finger and then the penis into the victim’s sexual organ, the provisions on the continuing offence do not apply, as the condition of being committed more than once at different times is not met.” 5. CD., 02.12.2008, 2008/11972, 2008/10675. Cited in: Yurtcan, a.g.e., s.450. ↑
- Türkan Yalçın Sancar, Müteselsil Suç, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 1995, s.68. ↑
- Hakan Hakeri, İhmal Kavramı ve İhmali Suçların Çeşitleri, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2003, s.303; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.113. ↑
- Hakeri, İhmali Suçlar, s.303; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.461. ↑
- Hakeri, İhmali Suçlar, s.304; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.114; Sancar, Müteselsil Suç, 70; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.461; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.710; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.511; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.520. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.461. ↑
- Dönmezer/Erman, I, kn.530; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.461; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.114; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.710; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.520. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.460. ↑
- Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.681. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.587; Zafer, a.g.e., s.338. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.142; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.713; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.523; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.517. ↑
- “…Although it is generally accepted that it would not be in keeping with justice and equity to reject continuation where there is a shorter or longer interval of time between the dates on which the offences were committed or where there is more than one victim of the offence, it must be accepted that there is no unity in the decision to commit an offence where there is an interval of time that can be regarded as long and cannot be accepted as reasonable, such as 2 – 3 months…” YCGK, 08.07.2003, 2003/5-189, 2003/207. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.713. ↑
- “The conviction of the accused twice for the said offence on the grounds written, although it is understood that he committed the offence of deprivation of liberty for a sexual purpose, which he carried out against the victim at an interval as short as one month, within the scope of the execution of a decision to commit an offence, and the provisions on the continuing offence ought to have been applied to him…” 5. CD., 08.04.2008, 668/3345. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.713. ↑
- “In view of the words ‘at different times’ in Art. 43(1) of TCK No. 5237, the provisions on the continuing offence cannot be applied to deeds committed at the same moment.” 11. CD., 03.12.2007, 2005/12264, 2007/8780. Cited in: Yurtcan, a.g.e., s.462. ↑
- Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.538. ↑
- “…Because of the expression ‘at different times” in Art. 43(1) of TCY No. 5237, the offences must necessarily be committed at different times for the provisions on the continuing offence to be applicable, and as a consequence of this it has been accepted that a single offence arises where the same offence is committed more than once against the same victim at the same time. In this case no increase can be made by applying the provisions on the continuing offence, but this circumstance may be taken into account in determining the basic penalty under Art. 61 TCY. The concepts of ‘the same time’ and ‘different times’ must also be dwelt upon here. Since the Law contains no clarification on this point and it is not possible to make definite determinations in advance, this matter must be assessed having regard to the particular features of each specific case, and it must be determined whether or not the deeds were committed ‘at different times’. In this context the concept of ‘at the same time’ should not be interpreted narrowly, and very short intervals of time should also be accepted as the same period of time. In this respect, where the forgery on more than one document has been carried out within a short interval of time, or where more than one forged document has been produced within a short interval of time, it must likewise be accepted that these were drawn up at the same time, in other words that they were not drawn up ‘at different times’… There is no dispute that the accused altered the dates of issue of two cheques, each in the amount of one billion TL, which he had received from the intervening party at the same moment, initialled them, endorsed them on the back and gave them to the other accused, who was acquitted, in return for his debt to him; in view of the content of the file it must also be accepted that the accused carried out the forgery on the two cheque leaves forming the subject of the offence within the same period of time… Although it is possible to apply Art. 80 of TCY No. 765 to the accused on account of the forgery carried out on two cheque leaves within the same period of time, Art. 43(1) of TCY No. 5237 should not be applied because of the phrase ‘at different times’ contained in the text of the article; nevertheless, the fact that forgery was carried out on more than one cheque leaf should be taken into account when the basic penalty is determined under Art. 61 of the Law…” YCGK, 08.06.2010, 2010/11-98, 2010/143. www.kazanci.com.tr ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.522. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek, Suç Genel Teorisi, s.23; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.523. ↑
- Özbek, Suç Genel Teorisi, s.23. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.462. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.711; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.514; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.589; Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.529; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.521. ↑
- “The failure to apply the provisions on the continuing offence although the accused first committed the offence of simple sexual abuse by rubbing his sexual organ between the victim’s legs and then committed the offence of qualified sexual abuse by inserting his sexual organ into the victim’s mouth… 5. CD., 10.03.2008, 653/1714. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.711. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.589. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.127; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.521. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.515. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.129; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.520; Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.253. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.717. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.507; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.525; Zafer, a.g.e., s.339. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.463. ↑
- For the contrary view see: Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.36 – 37. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özgenç, a.g.e., s.512, 513; Zafer, a.g.e., s.339. ↑
- Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.513, 514; Zafer, a.g.e., s.339; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.528. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.2. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.523; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.472; Koca, a.g.y., s.199. ↑
- In legal scholarship Öztürk/Erdem state that in this situation there is still a continuing offence but that, in view of the provision in Art. 43(2) TCK, it is not possible in practice to apply the continuing offence; that, however, it is not comprehensible that the violation of the same provision of the law by one deed should be deemed a continuing offence and the penalty therefore aggravated, whereas the violation of different provisions of the law should be accepted as notional concurrence and one should therefore content oneself with punishing the perpetrator only for the offence requiring the heaviest penalty. See: Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.587. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.523. ↑
- Koca, a.g.y., s.473. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.79. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., § 33, kn.81; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.529; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.691; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.523; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.473. ↑
- In legal scholarship Özbek states that this situation exists “also where mobile telephones belonging to two different persons turn out to be in the bag that is the object of the theft”. See: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.719. We do not, however, agree with this view of the author, because, just as there is a single deed and a single offence under the theory of the unity of the typical act even where the belongings of different persons present in a house are stolen from within the same house, we think that, where a single bag is stolen, a single offence likewise exists under the same theory, even though two different mobile telephones belonging to two different persons turn out to be in it. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.523, 524. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.524. ↑
- “…in the deed of the accused, a caretaker and paying agent at a primary school, which took the form of obtaining a benefit in the amount of … by making unjustified deductions, without the knowledge of the teachers serving at the school, from their lesson fees and salaries when transferring money to their bank accounts, as many offences arose as there are victims; the rendering of the judgment in the manner written without regard to the fact that the provisions on the continuing offence contained in Art. 43 of Law No. 5237 could not be applied…” 11. CD., 25.05.2006, 2006/1859, 2006/4708. Cited in: Yurtcan, a.g.e., s.453. ↑
- “It must be borne in mind that the offence of misuse of bank or credit cards regulated in Art. 245 of TCK No. 5237 arises as many times as there are cards and that the provision on the continuing offence is to be applied where the same card is used more than once at different times.” 11. CD., 12.11.2007, 2007/7255, 2007/7837. Cited in: Yurtcan, a.g.e., s.452. ↑
- “…Since the fixing of excessive penalties by way of an increase at the rate of ¼ (pursuant to) Art. 43 TCY, without regard to the fact that resisting more than one police officer at the same time and for the same reason constitutes a single offence, … was found to be contrary to law… the judgment is reversed…” 4. CD. 28.01.2008, 2007/10292, 2008/737. Cited in: Yurtcan, a.g.e., s.445. ↑
- Zafer, a.g.e., s.339. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.525, 526. ↑
- “…whereas it ought to have been accepted that, in his deeds directed at these victims, the accused acted with intent to injure, and it ought to have been decided that he be punished separately 4 times, according to the number of victims, for the offence of injury with a weapon, the giving of the decision in the manner written by applying Art. 44 of TCK No. 5237, which has no place in the case, … is contrary to law.” 1. CD., 14.11.2007, 2006/5195, 2007/8413. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.742. To the same effect see: Özgenç, a.g.e., s.530. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.719; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.529; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.472; Koca, a.g.y., s.199. Indeed, Özgenç, the drafter of the statute, also explains the reason for this arrangement in the following words: “The only thing the continuing offence and notional concurrence of the same kind have in common is that the rates of the increase that may be made in the penalty are the same. It would in fact have been more appropriate for two separate provisions on concurrence, which relate to situations that differ from one another, to be regulated in separate articles. However, because of the difficulty we encountered in explaining this during our work in the Justice Committee of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) on the new TCK, we found ourselves obliged to regulate both situations of concurrence under the same article”. Özgenç, a.g.e., s.523. ↑
- The explanatory memorandum to this amendment reads as follows: “In the case of the continuing offence, what is at issue is that the same offence has been committed more than once. These offences, however, are committed within the scope of the execution of a decision to commit an offence; that is, there is a subjective link between these offences. The basic form of an offence and its qualified forms requiring a heavier or a lesser penalty shall be deemed the same offence. In the case of the continuing offence there is not one offence but more than one offence. In order to be able to speak of a continuing offence, the same offence must be committed repeatedly against the same person. The victim of the offences committed must be the same person. Where the victims of the offence are different persons, the provisions on the continuing offence cannot be applied. In offences in which everyone making up society is the victim, such as bribery and pollution of the environment, since no particular person is the victim, the provisions on the continuing offence must be applied first and foremost. However, in order to remove the hesitation that has arisen among those applying the law with regard to this last situation, a sentence reading ‘In offences whose victim is not a specific person the provision of this paragraph shall also apply’ has been added to Art. 43(1)”. TBMM, Dönem 22, Yasama Yılı 3, Sıra Sayısı 901, s.2. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, for their part, state that an attempt was made to remove this hesitation by including this provision, but that the expression “offence whose victim is not a specific person” falls short of explaining the purpose fully; that in offences committed against the state and society too the victim may be a specific person, for example that in the offence of extortion by a public official the victim is the natural person whose will is coerced by the public official so that a benefit is provided to the latter; that what is meant by this expression is therefore that the primary legal interest protected by the offence belongs not to the individual but to society, the nation and the state; and that, accordingly, whether or not the victim is a specific person must be determined separately for each offence type, having regard to the legal interest sought to be protected. See: Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.590. ↑
- In legal scholarship Sancar states that “an offence whose victim is not a specific person” must be understood in particular as an offence committed not against “society” but “against a group”; that in some situations, although the persons at whom the act is directed are several, these persons may form a group and the perpetrator may carry out a deed directed at that group, for example may insult at once everyone present in a very large crowd; and that in such situations the victim is not a specific person and it would be reasonable to apply the provisions on the continuing offence. Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.257. What is meant here is all offences whose victim cannot be identified as a person. Moreover, in a deed of insult directed at a group in which a large number of persons are present, everyone who is a member of that group is a victim of the offence of insult, and the example given is an example not of the continuing offence but of notional concurrence of the same kind. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.463; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.513. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.513. ↑
- “The acquittal on the grounds written, without regard to the fact that the deeds of the accused, who works as an ophthalmologist at the Ankara O… Training and Research Hospital, constitute the offence of continuing abuse of office, those deeds consisting in examining patients entitled to health benefits from the Retirement Fund at the private clinic named “O… Medical Centre”, giving the impression of providing a convenience by stating that he would have the official registration formalities carried out without their being present, taking the private prescriptions he had written and the patients’ health booklets, entering the patients in the hospital protocol register at the O… Hospital where he was employed although they had not come to the hospital, and writing the private prescriptions into the health booklets according to the results of the private examination… “ 11. CD., 14.11.2007, 2006/8473, 2007/7935. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.717. ↑
- Murat Volkan Dülger, Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasına İlişkin Suçlar ve Yaptırımlar, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2011, s.612. ↑
- On this point see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.130 - 138. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.463; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.513. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.513. ↑
- Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.515; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.523. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.135 ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.136, 137. In legal scholarship, however, there are also authors who understand by this that the perpetrator draws up a plan for committing the same offence. See: Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.592; Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.533. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.714; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.523, 524. ↑
- Sancar, Müteselsil Suç, s.97, 98; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.136, 137; Dönmezer/Erman, I, kn.532; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.516; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.464; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.524. Indeed, the Court of Cassation too has decided that there is no continuing offence in this situation: “…by taking advantage, he twice committed the offence of indecent assault against the same victim at different places … the rather long period of 7 – 8 months that elapsed between the first deed and the second deed, which cannot be regarded as reasonable, shows that it was committed by the accused not with the same decision to commit an offence but by taking advantage of the opportunities that arose.” YCGK, 08.07.2003, 5-189/207. For the contrary view see: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.714. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.714; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.524. ↑
- Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.254. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.524. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.513. ↑
- “In the case in which the accused attempted to obtain an unjust gain by transferring to the victim at the notary’s office, with a forged driving licence and on the basis of a contract for the sale and transfer of a car drawn up between them, the car he had rented with a forged identity card, it must be borne in mind that, since the forged identity card and driving licence and the car sale contract were all drawn up and used for the same purpose, they constitute as a whole the offence of continuing forgery of official documents.” Cited in: Yurtcan, a.g.e., s.452. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.586. ↑
- “In view of the allegation that the accused committed the offences of fraud by applying to the Kızıltoprak and Kazasker branches of the same bank with two different forged identity cards and obtaining loans, the giving of the decision in the manner written, on the assumption that he committed them under the same decision to commit an offence and without regard to the fact that, since he acted with different identity cards made out untruthfully in different names and with a renewed criminal intent, the deed constitutes two separate offences, has necessitated reversal.” 11. CD., 05.05.2009, 2009/1845, 2009/5216. Cited in: Yurtcan, a.g.e., s.462. ↑
- Zafer, a.g.e., s.340. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.592; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.516; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.523, 524; Zafer, a.g.e., s.340. ↑
- For these debates see: Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.517. ↑
- To the same effect see: Dönmezer/Erman, I, kn.530; Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.534; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.464. For the contrary view see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.146, 147; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.715; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.592; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.518; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.525; Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.250. ↑
- Taşkın, a.g.e., s.181. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.514; Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.539; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.527; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.717; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.593. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.153; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.717; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.527; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.519. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.153; Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.539; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.717; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.527. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.589. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.593; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.512. ↑
- “…In the killing … on 27.02.2004 of the deceased, who was under treatment in hospital because of the attempt to kill her made on 25.02.2004 by the accused F., who was acting in unity of decision and deed with the accused İ., by F., acting in the same unity of decision and deed with the accused İ, … the characterisation of the offences as a continuing offence, whereas separate penalties ought to have been fixed for the accused for each of the two offences, without it being considered that under the last paragraph of Art. 43 of Law No. 5237, which was applied, the provisions of this article cannot be applied to offences of this kind …” 1. CD., 15.11.2006, 2398/4942. “…The rendering of a judgment on the basis of the file and for a single deed, without a separate application being made for each deed, having regard to the fact that under Art. 43(3) of TCY No. 5237 the provision on the continuing offence cannot be applied to the offence of robbery…” 6. CD., 13.06.2006, 2005/15401, 2006/6002. Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.718, dn.715, 716. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.717. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.527. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.528. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.518. ↑
- The explanatory memorandum to this amendment reads as follows: “In the case of the continuing offence, the person is given not a separate penalty for each of these offences but one penalty, which is however increased. Yet the provision to the effect that the rules on real concurrence must be applied where the offences of sexual assault and sexual abuse of children are committed repeatedly against the same person has given rise to serious concerns among judges and prosecutors, above all the Court of Cassation, as regards the problem of proof and the emergence of disproportionate amounts of penalty. In order to remove these concerns, the phrase ‘sexual assault, sexual abuse of children’ contained in the third paragraph of the article has been removed from the text”. TBMM, Dönem: 22, Yasama Yılı: 3, Sıra Sayısı:901, s.2, 3. Cited in: Özgenç, a.g.e., s.518. ↑
- Sancar, Müteselsil Suç, s.67; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.512; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.521. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.711; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.521. ↑
- Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.531, 532; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.586. ↑
- “For the provision on the continuing offence regulated in Art. 43 of TCK No. 5237 to be applicable, more than one offence must first of all have been committed and each of these offences must be punishable.” 10. CD., 17.04.2008, 2007/27117, 2008/6310. Cited in: Yurtcan, a.g.e., s.451. ↑
- “… In the case in which it was decided that the accused be sentenced to 15 years 7 months 15 days’ imprisonment for the offence of sexual abuse pursuant to Art. 103(2) and (6), Art. 43(1) and Art. 62 of TCY No. 5237 and that Art. 53 be applied to him, there is no dispute that the accused’s deed of sexual abuse by inserting an organ into the body more than once is established and that the deed was carried out by using force. The legal dispute between the Special Chamber and the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation centres on how the penalty is to be calculated in cases in which Art. 103(6) of TCY No. 5237 has to be applied because the victim’s mental health has been impaired and, in connection with this, on determining how the sentence is to be calculated where the conditions of the continuing offence are met… For the impairment of the victim’s mental or physical health to be a ground for increase, there must be permanent damage. The existence of permanent damage will be established by a medical report. This permanent damage caused to the victim, however, will occur only once. For example, the permanent impairment of the victim’s mental health occurs once; there is no question of mental health being impaired anew with each deed that takes place. For this reason, in cases in which the basic form of the offence has been carried out in continuation, where the victim’s mental health has been impaired it is not possible, having regard to the fact that this impairment occurred once, to apply the provisions on the continuing offence to the form of the offence aggravated by its result. Otherwise an excessive penalty would be fixed for the accused. Accordingly, when the sentence is calculated in cases in which the provisions on the continuing offence are to be applied, the increase under Art. 43 TCY will be made on the penalty arrived at by applying the other grounds for increase, and the amount of the final penalty will be determined by adding the amount of the increase to the amount of the penalty arrived at by the increase to be made under Art. 103(6) TCY on account of the offence aggravated by its result. The conclusion reached by the General Criminal Assembly: In the specific case, the sanction to be applied to the accused on account of the deed of abuse committed, acting with the same decision to commit an offence, by inserting an organ into the victim’s body more than once and in such a way as to cause the impairment of mental health will be determined as follows, on the basis of the proposals for the application in the accused’s favour: that he be sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment pursuant to Art. 103(2) of TCY No. 5237 on account of the deed of sexual abuse by inserting an organ into the body; that, because the deed was carried out by using force, his penalty be increased at the rate of 1/2 pursuant to Art. 103(4) TCY and he be sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment; that, because the victim’s mental health has been impaired, he be sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, since under Art. 103(6) TCY a penalty of less than 15 years cannot be fixed; that, because the deed of abuse was carried out in continuation, his penalty be increased at the rate of 1/4 pursuant to Art. 43 TCY and, this increase being made on 12 years’ imprisonment, the amount of the penalty determined under Art. 103(4), the resulting figure of 3 years be added to the amount of the penalty determined under Art. 103(6), so that he be sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment; and that, a discretionary ground for reduction being applied, a reduction at the rate of 1/6 be made pursuant to Art. 62 TCY, so that the accused be sentenced in the end to 15 years’ imprisonment. The local court’s application, in increasing the penalty because the offence was committed in continuation, of the rate of increase in Art. 43 TCY to the amount of the penalty arrived at by applying Art. 103(6), and the fixing of an excessive penalty for the accused, are contrary to law, and there is no error in the Special Chamber’s decision to reverse the judgment on this ground.” YCGK, 20.11.2007, 2007/5-142, 2007/240. www.kazancı.com.tr ↑
- “As stated in the decision of the General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation of 20/11/2007, No. 2007/5-142 Esas, 2007/240, which our Chamber has also adopted, the aggravated form of the offence in Art. 102(5) TCK, which occurs as a result of the offences of qualified sexual assault committed intentionally by the accused in continuation and for liability for which there must be fault at least in the degree of negligence, cannot be continued; since the deeds that took place in continuation are those preceding Art. 102(5), the increase under Art. 43 TCK had to be made not on the penalty fixed under Art. 102(5) but on the amount of the penalty arrived at before the application of that article, and added to the penalty determined under Art. 102(5); the fixing of an excessive penalty without regard to this … is contrary to law and … it was decided that it be reversed.” 5. CD., 31.03.2008, 2008/329, 2008/2957. Cited in: Yurtcan, a.g.e., s.446. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.702. ↑
- Kayıhan İçel, “Görünüşte Birleşme (İçtima) İlkeleri ve Yeni Türk Ceza Kanunu”, İstanbul Ticaret Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Yıl.7, Sayı.14, Güz 2008, s.36; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.538; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.539. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.172. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.599; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.479. ↑
- Zafer, a.g.e., s.329; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.702; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.11, 172; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.48; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.479.; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.599. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.11; 172; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.48; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.479. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.538. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.175. ↑
- Zafer, a.g.e., s.329. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.173. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.702, 703; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.539; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.600; Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, 556. ↑
- Zafer, a.g.e., s.329. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.600. For details on this point see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.173. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.173. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.37. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.702; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.37, 38, 40; Önder, a.g.e., s.452; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.480; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.539. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.177; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.173, 174; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.41. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.703; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.540. ↑
- Zafer, a.g.e., s.329. ↑
- Önder, a.g.e., s.452; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.480; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.41, 42; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.703; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.538; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.601; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.540. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.40. ↑
- To the same effect see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.184. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.39. ↑
- Explanatory memorandum to Art. 5 of TCK No. 5237: “In special criminal laws and in laws containing criminal provisions … the way is opened to applications contrary to the general rules adopted in the criminal code, and the basic principles are circumvented. In order to be able to prevent all these drawbacks, and also to ensure uniformity in the application of the law and to ensure legal certainty, other laws should confine themselves to containing only special definitions of offences and to determining the sanctions relating to those offences. On the other hand, it must be ensured that the general principles laid down in this law with regard to offences and sanctions are also applied in respect of the offences defined in special laws.” ↑
- For these debates see: Hüsamettin Uğur, “5237 Sayılı TCK’nın 5. Maddesi ve 5728 Sayılı Kanunun Getirdikleri”, Terazi Hukuk Dergisi, Yıl:3, Sayı:19, Mart 2008, s.95, 96. ↑
- For detailed views on this point see: Fatih Selami Mahmutoğlu, “TBMM Adalet Komisyonu’nda Kabul Edilen Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı Hakkında Görüş”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Reformu İkinci Kitap: Makaleler, Görüşler, Raporlar, Ed: Teoman Ergül, Ankara,Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, 2004, s.361. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.39, 40. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.213; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.42; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.601. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.38, 42; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.603. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.174. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.219; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.33. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.43; Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.220. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.220; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.603. ↑
- For the contrary view see: Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.222, 224. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.43. ↑
- Dülger, Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanması, 528, 561. ↑
- Dülger, Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanması, 661. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.44. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.38, 43. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.204; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.44; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.705, 706; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.503; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.594. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.481. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.481. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.706. ↑
- To the same effect see: Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.481; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.706; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.519; Koca, a.g.y., s.198. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.706; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.519. ↑
- Özgenç, one of those who drafted the statute, also points out that it is unnecessary for the statute to contain such a provision, and explains the reason why the provision has nonetheless been included in the statute as follows: “In our opinion, it is unnecessary to make a provision on the compound offence within the general provisions of the Code. Although we voiced this opinion during our work in the Justice Committee of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) on the new TCK, the provision in the Government Bill (Art. 54) was retained unchanged together with its explanatory memorandum. In fact, although the concepts of ‘aggravating circumstance” or ‘mitigating circumstance’ are not used in the theory of the offence taken as the basis in the work in the Justice Committee of the TBMM on the new TCK, this provision, taken over unchanged from the Government Bill, contains the distinction between ‘element’ and ‘aggravating circumstance’” Özgenç, a.g.e., s.503. ↑
- See: the last sentence of the footnote above. To the same effect see: Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.516. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.706, dn.694; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.481. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.45. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.207. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.595; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.206, 207; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.516. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.45. ↑
- Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.520; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.482. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.517. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.482; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.45; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.706. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.482; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.706. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.207. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.482. ↑
- “Since it is understood that the accused committed the offence of qualified robbery, which is one of the compound offences, with a weapon, against more than one person, in a dwelling and at night, in a manner corresponding to Art. 149(1)(a), (c), (d), (h) of TCY No. 5237, the contravention of Art. 42(1) of the same Law by an application made in the manner written, without regard to the fact that it is not possible to render a separate judgment for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling, which is an aggravating circumstance of the offence of qualified robbery set out in the said article” 6. CD., 10.12.2007, 97/13859. “The failure to consider that, since the commission of the offence of robbery inside a dwelling is regulated as a qualified form in Art. 149(1)(d) of TCK No. 5237 and this sub-paragraph was also applied to the accused in the offence of attempted qualified robbery, no penalty may additionally be imposed for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling, in accordance with the provisions on the compound offence laid down in Art. 42” 1. CD., 28.04.2008, 2007/2819, 2008/3405. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.707. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.45. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.483. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.483. ↑
- For the contrary view see: Özgenç, a.g.e., s.504. ↑
- “The deed, which took the form of taking small livestock at night from the complainant’s barn, a building adjoining the house within the garden enclosed by a wall, constitutes the offence of theft corresponding to Art. 142(1)(b) and Art. 143 of TCK No. 5237 together with the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling corresponding to Art. 116(1) and (4) of the same Law.” 6. Ceza Dairesi, 19.9.2006, E. 1087 K. 8255. Cited in: Ali Parlar/Muzaffer Hatipoğlu, Türk Ceza Kanunu Yorumu, C.II, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2007, s.1085. ↑
- Law No. 5560, adopted on 6.12.2006. Date of the Official Gazette: 19.12.2006. ↑
- “Where the offences of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling and of damage to property are committed for the purpose of committing the offence of theft, no complaint is required for an investigation and prosecution to be conducted in respect of these offences.” ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.505. ↑
- “In accordance with the rule that there are as many offences as there are deeds, and as many penalties as there are offences, where another person’s dwelling is entered or damage is caused to another person’s property in order to commit the offence of theft, a penalty must additionally be imposed for these offences as well. However, since the basic form of both offences is an offence whose investigation and prosecution depend on a complaint, where, for example, the offence of theft is committed by violating the inviolability of the dwelling, the basic form of the violation of the inviolability of the dwelling falls within the scope of victim–offender mediation whereas the offence of theft remains outside the scope of victim–offender mediation, and in these situations problems are encountered in practice such as the investigation for the offence of theft being held in abeyance or being conducted separately. It has been added to Art. 142 of Law No. 5237 in order to remove the drawback indicated.” TBMM, Dönem:22, Yasama Yılı: 5, Sıra Sayısı: 1255, s.18. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.518. Indeed, Özgenç states, with regard to the offence of robbery too, that where the offence is committed “in a dwelling or workplace”, which is a qualified form of this offence, separate penalties ought to be imposed both for the offence of robbery and for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling, but that this is not possible in view of the existing statutory provision and that the penalty for the offence can only be imposed with an increase. See: Özgenç, a.g.e., s.506. ↑
- Zafer, a.g.e., s.334, 335. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.208; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.483; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.595. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.208. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.518. For the contrary view see: Zafer, a.g.e., s.335, 336. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.595; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.483. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.519. ↑
- Zafer, a.g.e., s.333. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.483, 484. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.703; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.538; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.541. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.190; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.38. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.45; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.704. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.703. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.191; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.38; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.703; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.603; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.541. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.45, 46; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.704. ↑
- Murat Volkan Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004, s.249, 250, 264; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.704; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.538; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.541. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.192. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.38, 39. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.539, 540. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.201, 203, 207 - 210; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.704; Koca/Üzülmez, a.g.e., s.484; Öztürk/Erdem, a.g.e., kn.603; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, a.g.e., s.541. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.46. ↑
- Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.200; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.46, 47. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s234. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.47. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.234, 235. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.47. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.236. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.47. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.48. For the contrary view see: Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.211. ↑
- For details on supervening intent see: Murat Volkan Dülger, “5237 Sayılı YTCK’da Kastın Unsurları ve Türleri – Özellikle Olası Kastın Değerlendirilmesi”, Hukuk ve Adalet Eleştirel Hukuk Dergisi, Y.2, S.5, Nisan 2005, s.104 - 106; Önder, a.g.e., s.312; Zafer, a.g.e., s.183. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.237, 238; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.48. For the contrary view see: Roxin, a.g.e., §33, kn.205. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.47. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.216; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.46. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.242. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.214. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.231. ↑
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