2025Murat Volkan DülgerArticle

Abstract

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

The concept of dolus generalis was first placed on the agenda of criminal law scholarship by an article written by H. B. von Weber in 1825. Since then it has been examined by all academics concerned with criminal law dogmatics and the theory of crime, various solutions have been proposed and it has also been reflected in judicial decisions. It still cannot be said that this subject, which is almost as old as the history of modern criminal law, has been fully resolved. The reason why this subject, which has become identified with the septic tank case of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), continues to be debated intensely is that this group of cases allows objective and subjective imputation, the basic components of the theory of crime, to be discussed eclectically by reference to a single case.

In this way, criminal law academics are able to test the consistency both of their own views and of the views of other authors against this case. In this study, after defining the subject in the sense in which it ought to be understood, we set out the main views on the solutions proposed for the problems that arise, together with the criticism of those views. We then explained the place of the concept in Turkish criminal law and set out our own views on the subject. Finally, after explaining the “reverse dolus generalis” cases and our view of them, we concluded the study with our final views on our approach to the theory of crime in the context of this subject.

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This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

(DOLUS GENERALIS / WEBER’S INTENT)

Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER*

Abstract

The concept of dolus generalis, first brought onto the agenda of criminal law scholarship in 1825 by an article of H. B. von Weber, has since been examined by all academics concerned with the dogmatics of criminal law and the theory of crime; various solutions have been proposed, and the concept has also been reflected in judicial decisions. It cannot be said that this issue, which is almost as old as the history of modern criminal law itself, has yet been fully resolved. The reason why this topic, which has become identified with the cesspit case of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), is still so heatedly debated is that this group of cases allows objective and subjective imputation, the basic components of the theory of crime, to be discussed eclectically on the basis of a single case. In this way, criminal law scholars can test the consistency both of their own views and of those of other authors against this case. In this study, after defining the subject in the sense in which it ought to be understood, we set out the main views on the solutions offered to the problems that arise and the criticism of these views. We then explain the place of the concept in Turkish criminal law and present our own views on the subject. Finally, after explaining the cases of “reverse dolus generalis” and our view on them, we conclude the study with our final views on our approach to the theory of crime in the context of this subject.

Keywords

Dolus Generalis, Weber’s Intent, Deviation in the Causal Link, Interruption of the Causal Chain, Linking the Perpetrator’s Will to the Second Act, Delayed Result.

THE OCCURRENCE OF THE DELAYED OUTCOME (DOLUS GENERALIS / WEBER’S INTENT)

Abstract

The concept of dolus generalis, first introduced into the agenda of criminal law doctrine through an article written by H. B. von Weber in 1825, has since been examined by all academics concerned with the dogmatics of criminal law and crime theory. Various solutions have been proposed, and the concept has also been reflected in judicial decisions. Despite being almost as old as the history of modern criminal law, it cannot be said that this issue has been fully resolved. The reason why this topic, associated with the cesspit case of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), continues to be fervently debated is that this set of incidents allows for an eclectic discussion of the fundamental components of crime theory—objective and subjective imputation—through a single case. Thus, criminal law scholars can test the consistency of both their own perspectives and those of other authors using this case as a framework. In this study, we first define the concept as it should be understood and then present and critique the main views and solutions proposed for the issues it raises. Subsequently, we explain the place of the concept in our national criminal law and present our own views on the topic. Finally, after discussing “reverse dolus generalis” cases and our position on them, we conclude our study with our final perspectives on crime theory within this context.

Keywords

Dolus Generalis, Weber’s Intent, Deviation in The Causal Link, Interruption of The Causal Chain, Linking The Perpetrator’s Intent to The Second Act, Delayed Result.

I. INTRODUCTION AND PRESENTATION OF THE SUBJECT

Although many reasonable solutions have been proposed for explaining the “dolus generalis” cases, the general name of a problem of the theory of crime that has been debated for exactly two centuries (1825–2025), no consensus has yet been reached on the matter. For this reason, although a long time has passed since the debate began, the subject is still topical for the theory of crime and continues to be reflected upon. The importance of the subject for the dogmatics of crime, and the efforts to explain this problem, stem from the fact that it contains within it the most important, core issues of the theory of crime.1

In fact, the term “dolus generalis” is used today not in the sense in which it first emerged, but to name and describe a certain type of case, a group of cases.2 In general, the term describes the situation, and the group of similar cases, in which the perpetrator believes that he brought about the result of the offence by his first act, whereas the result is in fact produced by a second act, the second act being performed solely to conceal the offence committed by the first act and to remove the evidence of the offence. In such cases, although the perpetrator anticipates the outcome of his acts within a sequence of events involving several acts, he achieves that outcome not by the act through which he directly aimed at it, but by a different act. In addition, the causal process takes considerably longer than in the commission of an ordinary offence. The subject of this debate is the situations in which the perpetrator, proceeding from the mistaken assumption that he has already brought about the result by his first, intentional act, performs another, non-intentional act, and it is this second act that leads to the result.3

The classic example of such cases is the following: A acts with the intent to kill B, but B does not die as a result of the act; A wrongly assumes that the victim, who is unconscious, is dead and tries to conceal his offence by throwing the body into the water; the autopsy subsequently reveals that death occurred by drowning, as a consequence of the perpetrator’s second act.4

Whether, from the standpoint of criminal law, a completed offence of intentional killing has been committed in this case, or only an attempted killing followed possibly by an offence of negligent killing, is a problem that has long been heatedly debated in criminal law scholarship.5 This is one of the oldest problems of criminal law dogmatics,6 and although at first sight it may look like an artificial example, such cases in fact have numerous concrete counterparts in practice. Different variations of this situation are encountered particularly frequently in German and Spanish case law.7 In Turkish judicial decisions, by contrast, we have not come across a decision in which this subject is specifically discussed. We wish to stress, however, that the absence of decisions discussing this subject does not mean that such cases do not occur.

The point to be noted in such cases is that there is no debate where the perpetrator performs the second act as a precaution, that is, in order to make the result certain, for instance by breaking the victim’s neck in order to eliminate even the slightest possibility that the victim is still alive.8 In that situation the perpetrator clearly has the intent to kill with regard to the second act: the perpetrator shoots the victim with the intent to kill and, although he thinks that the victim is dead or may be dead, shoots him in the head once more in order to eliminate entirely any chance of survival, and the victim dies of the second shot. In this situation there is an intentionally committed, completed offence.9 In this example, although the perpetrator performs two acts in the natural sense, there is in fact a single act in the legal sense, and it makes no difference whether the result occurs as a consequence of the first or of the last act, since all of them are regarded as parts of a single act.10 In the problematic group of cases, by contrast, the perpetrator believes after his first act that the result has certainly occurred, and he does not commit the second act with the intent that existed in his first act. In that situation there is not a single act in the legal sense but more than one act. Problems therefore arise, in terms of both objective and subjective imputation, between the perpetrator’s first act and the final result that ensues.

Where the perpetrator’s first act, performed with the intent to kill the victim, does not result in death, but the perpetrator, believing the victim to be dead, performs a second act in order to dispose of the body, and the victim dies as a result of this second act, legal scholarship has discussed in detail what the perpetrator’s subjective imputation will be, that is, for which mental element he will be held responsible, which act was performed with which mental element, and which of these acts was effective in bringing about death. Let us illustrate this debate, which is of practical importance, with the famous cesspit (slurry pit) example (Der Jauchegrubenfall) that was the subject of an important decision of the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof/BGH) on this issue:

The perpetrator, Ms F, in order to kill the victim, who was in a relationship with her former boyfriend, locks the victim up in her house for almost a day. During an argument between them, in order to stop the victim from screaming, the perpetrator stuffs two handfuls of earth into the victim’s mouth, (according to the finding of the court of first instance) with conditional intent to kill. Believing that the victim, who thereupon loses consciousness, is dead, the perpetrator throws her into a cesspit in order to get rid of the “body”. The autopsy subsequently reveals that the victim died not as a result of the perpetrator’s first act, the filling of her mouth with earth, but of suffocation in the cesspit into which she was thrown, that is, as a result of the second act.11

As can be seen, what is debated is whether the second act was performed intentionally, or more precisely whether the intent present in the first act also covered the second act, and whether the first and the second act should be assessed together or separately. For the first act may be treated as an intentional killing that remained at the stage of attempt and the second act as a negligent killing; or both acts together may be treated as a single completed intentional killing; or, while the existence of two different acts is accepted, the deviation in the causal link (causal process)12 in the perpetrator’s second act may be regarded as insignificant and the perpetrator held responsible only for the final result.

This is a group of cases that calls for brainstorming in the field of the theory of crime; that makes it possible to assess as a whole the elements of the theory of crime such as objective and subjective imputation, the causal link, the point in time at which intent and negligence are required, mistake, attempt, concurrence and deviation; and that is, at the same time, of the utmost importance for practice.13

We should also like to point out the following: the subject we shall examine under this heading is a mixed area in which problems relating both to the mental element of the offence and to deviation in the causal link are discussed, solutions to them are sought and various views are put forward. This subject can therefore be examined within the system of the offence both under the mental element and under the heading of mistake. Indeed, in both Turkish and German legal scholarship the subject is examined under the headings of both intent and deviation in the causal link.

II. THE CONCEPT AND ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The concept of Weber’s intent goes back to Heinrich Benedikt von Weber,14 but today it is used in a rather different sense, without any connection to its original rationale. It is therefore necessary first of all to clear up the confusion surrounding the concept of Weber’s intent. For Weber’s account of dolus generalis, the concept of dolus generalis used in Germany today and the concept of Weber’s intent used in Türkiye carry different meanings.

The idea underlying the concept of dolus generalis (general intent)15, namely that the perpetrator’s intent continues to have effect with regard to the second act as well, was first discussed in detail in Weber’s article entitled “On the Different Kinds of Intent”.16 Weber called this idea “dolus generalis”, and by using this term he deliberately departed from the distinctions between kinds of intent that had until then been common in criminal law scholarship.17

The conception of intent prevailing at the time when Weber developed this view was that the perpetrator could be punished only if he consciously caused the result brought about by his act. In that period, the notion that the death the perpetrator actually wanted could not be characterised as intentional where it was brought about by an unconscious act performed after the intentional act aimed at killing was entirely foreign to the prevailing legal understanding.

Dolus generalis as understood by Weber clearly differs from the common use of the term at that time to denote an “offence aggravated by its result” or “alternative intent”. The word “general” (generalis) in the concept means neither that the perpetrator never thought about the result attributed to him nor that he foresaw it merely as one of several possible results. Instead, Weber used the concept in the sense of “the combination and summing up of the individual acts that produce the final outcome of the offence within the unity of a criminal disposition of the will”.18 This approach of Weber’s was immediately accepted in the legal scholarship and case law of the time.19 This idea of a unifying disposition of the will clearly lies at the basis of the views of Welzel and Graf zu Dohna,20 thereby leading to the conclusion that the act forms a unity. This view, however, does not involve the assumption of a general intent extending over the whole of the act.21 Weber’s solution rests on the existence of a “continuous” or “ongoing” intent at the stage of the act of concealing the body. The acts performed at this stage are also regarded as stemming from the perpetrator’s “criminal intention”.22 In Weber’s words, “the perpetrator’s individual disposition of the will” expresses “the combination of a single whole of acts constituting the sum of the offence”.23

Weber characterises the view that the death cannot be linked to intent as “subtle calculations contrary to the sound understanding of people” and regards them as “jeopardising the prestige of the idea of justice”.24 Weber’s proposal thus found wide acceptance in scholarship, in practice and even at the legislative level until the middle of the 19th century.25

Treating the second act (for instance, disposing of the supposed body) as conduct performed with the intent to kill strained the limits of the conception of intent in the theory of crime and led to growing objections to this view. For this reason, in the middle of the 19th century some authors sought a different way of grounding the completion solution. In this context von Buri, focusing on the causal dimension of the problem, argued that the death that ultimately occurred as a consequence of the initial intentional act was, within the framework of the theory of conditions,26 a “caused” result.27 Indeed, this perspective was also adopted in the case law of the time. Maiwald summarises this by saying: “there is an act that is causal for the death, and this act was performed with the intent to kill; therefore, for the German Imperial Court (RGH), there is liability for a completed intentional killing”.28

The attempt view, which had been part of the debate on this subject from the very beginning and which Weber had expressly opposed, gained decisive momentum with an important study published one year after v. Buri’s work. The author of this contribution, Geyer, seeks to show that “dolus generalis is an untenable theoretical construct that neither can exist nor has ever existed” and that it “should be cast aside as an old relic of the history of criminal law”.29 Indeed, Mayer states that this study was the final blow dealt to Weber’s view of dolus generalis.30

In this way, at the beginning of the last quarter of the 19th century, the basic lines of the debate had been laid down and some of the main arguments put forward in support of the various proposed solutions had been developed.31

The classic solution of the completion view (the solution developed by Weber), which we shall examine below, is today based on other grounds; yet the problem is treated under the same name even by those who advocate the attempt solution, the adequacy solution and even differentiating solutions. The term is therefore used as the general name for such cases and for the solutions (views) produced in relation to them.32 The concept does not match its content, but the debates and views are still advanced under this concept.33

Today, the acceptance of a completed intentional offence in such situations is not justified by the theory of dolus generalis, because the view that there is a single act in such situations and that this act is performed with the intent to kill even at the second stage is no longer accepted. For, first of all, it is not correct to equate the perpetrator’s “desire or intention” with the concept of “intent”, which must exist contemporaneously with the act. Doing so would mean permitting a criminal law of attitude in which people’s thoughts are punished. For this reason the German Federal Court of Justice rightly states that the concept of dolus generalis has lost its validity in current law, that it belongs to legal history and that it is not correct to extend the intent present in the first act so as to cover the acts performed subsequently.34 Consequently, the term “dolus generalis”, or “Weber’s intent”, the name by which it is more commonly known in Türkiye, is used today only for historical and traditional reasons to describe such cases, but not in the legal assessment and justification of those cases.35 For this reason we have preferred to use the heading “the occurrence of the delayed result”, which we consider describes the subject better.

III. THE QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED IN DOLUS GENERALIS CASES

The construction on which the concept of dolus generalis rests is based on the following assumption, advocated in particular by Welzel:36 in such cases there is, as a whole, a “unified course of action” (concealed killing), and this course of action also encompasses the intent to kill at the second stage.37 Today, however, the view that there is a single unified act in this type of case is rejected.

In dolus generalis cases, deviations in the causal link are particularly controversial. In these cases the perpetrator performs an act with the intent to kill, but instead of killing the victim the act merely renders him unconscious. The perpetrator takes the victim to be dead and disposes of the supposed body, and the victim actually dies only as a result of this second act, for instance by being thrown into a river. The debates on the objective and subjective imputation of the offence are therefore shaped around the problem of deviation in the causal link.38

The first finding to be made in this regard is that the perpetrator, in his second act, falls into a mistake as to the elements of the statutory definition of the offence. When throwing the victim into the cesspit, the perpetrator thinks that she is already dead. In this context, under Art. 30(1) sent. 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (TCK) (§ 16(1) sent. 1 of the German Criminal Code, StGB), the perpetrator benefits from this mistake because he was mistaken as to the material elements of the statutory definition, but under Art. 30(1) sent. 2 TCK (§ 16(1) sent. 2 StGB) his liability for his negligent conduct remains. The mistake here stems from the perpetrator’s first act, since by his first act the perpetrator assumes that he has brought about the death. Although this act was not suitable and sufficient to bring about the result “desired” by the perpetrator, the question must be answered whether the final result (the death that occurred after the second act) rests on this act.

Secondly, whereas in the great majority of examples concerning the causal link in the context of mistake as to the elements of the statutory definition of the offence only one act is involved, this group of cases involves more than one act. In view of this multi-stage structure of the cases, answers must be sought to the questions whether the first act prevents the second act, which produces the final result, from being attributed to the perpetrator objectively and subjectively (the dogmatic perspective), or whether the perpetrator is to be punished for the completed offence of intentional killing (the teleological perspective, or the perspective of the sense of justice).39

The questions to which answers are sought on the basis of this case are the following:

a) Whether there is a completed intentional offence;

b) Whether the first act is to be assessed merely as an attempted intentional killing and, accordingly, whether negligently causing death has been committed by the second act;

c) If the first solution is accepted, how its theoretical foundation (its compatibility with the theory of crime, its justification) is to be secured.

In order to answer the general questions above, the following basic questions must first be answered so that liability can be determined:

a) Has the risk that the perpetrator created in accordance with his initial intent ultimately materialised?

b) Does the deviation in the causal link relate to the risk the perpetrator initially intended, or to an entirely different risk?

c) Has the perpetrator’s act created a new risk independent of the initial risk?

The answers to these questions reveal the perspective of the views in legal scholarship, particularly in the interpretation of cases of deviation in the causal link. Roxin’s approach, for example, when assessing whether deviations correspond to the perpetrator’s plan, focuses not on the perpetrator’s will but on the risks that have objectively materialised. This shows that the perpetrator’s liability is linked not only to intent or will, but also to the consequences of the concrete risk created.40

IV. THE VIEWS DEVELOPED BY LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND THE COURTS, AND THEIR CRITICISM

There are numerous views explaining dolus generalis cases. Almost every author who has written on the subject has tried to offer a solution to this problem in line with his own way of approaching the theory of crime. These views can, however, basically be divided into three: the completion view, the attempt view and the adequacy view.

In order to remedy the shortcomings in the justification offered by the adequacy view, legal scholarship has developed numerous alternative views. These are referred to as differentiating views. Each of these views is explained below, together with the criticisms levelled at them. In addition, Roxin’s view of the realisation of the perpetrator’s plan, which is one of the differentiating views but attracts particular attention, is examined under a separate heading.

A. The Completion View

According to Weber’s original, in other words classic, doctrine of dolus generalis, it is defined as “a direction of the will that brings together all the acts constituting the offence and whose sum shows the disposition to commit the offence”.41 Accordingly, Welzel assumes that the second stage of the act falls within the scope of the intent to kill.42 On this view, the perpetrator performed his first act with the intent to kill the victim. The reason why he performed his second act also depends on his first act. In other words, had the perpetrator not performed his first act, he would not have performed his second act either. Moreover, had the perpetrator realised that the victim had not died as a result of his first act, he would still have brought about the death, either by repeating his first act or by performing the second act. The perpetrator thus began his first act and, in the course of the act, reached the result encompassed by his existing intent not by his intentional first act but by his negligent second act. In this situation the view that “the causal links merge” must be accepted, since there is now only an insignificant deviation in the causal link.43 This deviation should be disregarded, and the perpetrator should be held responsible for the death at which his initial intent was directed and punished for the completed offence of intentional killing.44 Although this view contains theoretical inconsistencies, it is a solution that satisfies the sense of justice as regards its outcome.

The completion view has been divided into various sub-views: the act solution, the causation solution and the adequacy solution.45 We shall examine the first two under this heading, and the last, which is dominant in legal scholarship and practice, under a separate heading.

1. The Act View

a. Explanation of the View

In the act view (Germ. Die Handlungslösung), the whole process from the attempted killing of the victim to the concealment of the “body” is regarded as a single act, and accordingly the existence of a single intent relating to this act is accepted. On this basis, in a case of dolus generalis there is taken to be a single act and therefore a single offence. This is understood either, as proposed by Weber, as the perpetrator’s intent extending over both individual acts, or as the acceptance of a single intentional killing on account of the connection between the acts, even if the second act is regarded as lying outside the perpetrator’s intent.46

According to Puppe, only the first act was performed with the intent to kill; therefore only this act can be taken as the basis for the punishability of the offence, since it is not possible to intend to kill someone who is thought to be dead. This first act forms a sufficient basis for punishability. It constitutes not merely the commencement of an act but a completed attempt. All the facts that make up the completed attempt, and hence the danger of intent, are fully and continuously present in the causal explanation of the result. The perpetrator threw the victim into the cesspit because she thought the victim was dead, and she was able to do so because the victim was no longer in a position to defend herself. The victim was reduced to this state because the perpetrator used a generally effective method of killing, namely suffocation with sand. The perpetrator need not foresee all the factors of the causal process in advance; consequently, even if the causal link contains factors that the perpetrator did not think of as causal, the presence of those factors (in this case, suffocation in the cesspit) is no longer significant and does not prevent the perpetrator from being held responsible for the result that occurred. The fact that these factors were brought about by the perpetrator without intent does not render negligent the result that the perpetrator achieved through his earlier intentional act. Acts performed by the perpetrator that produce a consequence are assessed as natural causes.47 Puppe is therefore of the view that the intent relating to the first act also covers the result that ensued from the second act, performed negligently. This conclusion is consistent from the author’s perspective, since Puppe holds that intent consists solely of “conditional intent”. Accordingly, all the possible results accepted by the perpetrator (as in this case) must be regarded as falling within the scope of intent.

b. Criticism of the View

The act solution proves inadequate in terms of theoretical justification. If what is meant by the perpetrator’s intention is that the perpetrator’s intent still existed at the time the body was concealed, this solution has been refuted by the arguments of the attempt solution, which will be explained later: if the perpetrator really believes that the victim is already dead, it makes no sense for him to want to kill the victim. It is contrary to logic for the perpetrator to want to kill again a person whom he believes he has already killed. If what is meant by the perpetrator’s intention is the perpetrator’s state of mind, this is not a correct solution either. For the second act performed by the perpetrator undoubtedly caused the victim’s death, and had the perpetrator known that the victim was alive, he would still have performed this act, perhaps with even greater determination. In this solution, therefore, what is taken as the basis is not the intent the perpetrator had with regard to the act, but the elements of his state of mind with regard to the whole event. For this reason it is regarded as immaterial, as far as the perpetrator is concerned, whether the result was brought about by his first act, which remained at the stage of attempt, or by his second act, probably performed negligently. This is indeed clearly seen in the proposed solutions of the authors who accept that no completed act of killing has taken place where, before the second act, the perpetrator adopted a negative attitude towards his first act, that is, underwent a change of mind.48

Maiwald, who criticises this view sharply and in depth, states that this idea could be correct if the perpetrator’s state of mind were an element in assessing as a whole an act that realises more than one statutory definition of an offence. For example, striking a person with a series of different acts such as kicks, slaps and punches is regarded as a “series of blows”, and together they constitute a single offence of intentional injury, because, although different acts of intentional injury have been performed, they appear as the expression, the outward manifestation, of a single criminal will. However, where certain acts are performed with the result being accepted or even wanted, but the perpetrator is unaware that those results were actually brought about by that act, it is questionable whether one can speak of a unity. For knowing that the protected legal interest of another is being attacked is an important element that unifies the outwardly manifested disposition of the criminal will. For example, if in a case of intentional injury the perpetrator, having beaten the victim several times, gets into his car and drives off and, in doing so, hits the victim with the car without this possibility even crossing his mind, one cannot speak of a unified intentional injury that includes hitting the victim. Since the perpetrator did not actually foresee this situation, his current (actual) will is not a decision directed at violating the legal norm (an actualised bad intention) and therefore does not constitute a criminal will of the same nature as the earlier intentional acts.49

Schroeder, for his part, in an example he gives when criticising this view, reaches the following conclusion, although in dolus generalis cases he generally assumes a completed act of intentional killing: if the perpetrator loads the victim, whom he thinks is dead, onto a lorry intending to bury him in a deserted place, and the victim dies on the way as a result of a road accident, a “significant deviation” from the foreseen causal process occurs, and in that case there is only real concurrence between attempted intentional killing and unconsciously negligent killing. For an act performed with unconscious negligence and the commission of an intentional offence cannot form a “unity of act”, since an offence is committed either intentionally or negligently.50 Developing this example, the question is asked whether, if it is assumed that the road accident did not occur and that instead the body was carried to the designated place as planned and buried there, with death occurring as a result, a unity of act should be accepted between the attempted intentional killing and the burial of the body. The answer given is that, where the second act occurs (for example the road accident), it should be assessed as standing in a relationship of real concurrence with the first act. This also clearly shows that, in the context of dolus generalis, the temporal proximity of the two stages cannot have any effect on the solution. For in the assessment the outcome does not change if it is assumed that, instead of the victim being thrown into the water immediately after the attack, the body was hidden by an act of concealment carried out the next day.51

Roxin has also criticised this perspective. In his view, these old views contain a correct core but are not sufficiently clear conceptually. For it is clear that the unity of the offence, encompassing the disposition to commit the offence and the intent to kill, and the perpetrator’s plan to kill were completed with the first act, and that the second stage of the act lies outside this scope. Treating the concept of dolus generalis as a theory linking the acts together reveals the shortcoming of certain approaches which maintain that the second stage of the act involves “will” or “intent”. In this context, attempts to reconstruct elements that are psychologically no longer present do not produce correct results.52

Roxin has also criticised the views of the authors who criticise the doctrine of dolus generalis from the standpoint of the attempt view. In this context he states that the causal deviation solution correctly grasps the dogmatic and logical structure of such cases, but that this perspective errs by detaching the problem from its teleological context and focusing solely on the causal deviation. In particular, it is misleading that they overlook the objective framework of the perpetrator’s plan and subject causal deviations to an exclusively subjective assessment. Such an assessment leads to results that are inconsistent with the perpetrator’s objective will and plan.53

Roxin has criticised, or more accurately put to the test, the view prevailing in legal scholarship and practice with regard to the scope of intent. On this view, the question whether the success of the perpetrator’s second act can be attributed to the perpetrator’s intent (subjective imputation), and therefore whether a completed offence can be accepted, depends essentially on whether, at the time of the first act, the perpetrator intended to kill the victim, or whether, without such an intention, he acted with conditional intent as to the result of death. For a result is regarded as having been brought about intentionally only where the perpetrator’s plan has been realised by him. From this perspective, where the initially intended result occurs after an inadequate causal link, that result should no longer be attributed to the perpetrator’s intent. In that case the result is the work of chance and not a work corresponding to the perpetrator’s purpose. Thus, for example, if the perpetrator loads the victim, whom he thinks is dead, into a car intending to bury him in a remote place, and the victim dies during that journey as a result of a road accident, there can at most be an attempted intentional killing.54

In our opinion, in order to assess the act view, it must first be explained what is to be understood by the singularity of the act. A twofold distinction is made with regard to the singularity and plurality of the act: (i) the concept of the natural act and (ii) the concept of the act in the legal sense. The natural act is the basic form of all acts. For example, A slapping B is a single act in the natural sense. Nevertheless, in some situations there is a single act in the legal sense even though there is more than one act in the natural sense. This situation, referred to as unity of act in the legal sense, is itself divided into two: unity of act by statutory definition and natural unity of acts. Unity of act by statutory definition exists where the legislature requires more than one act for the offence to be constituted. Robbery, a compound offence, may be cited as an example, since for this offence to be constituted both acts of intentional injury and of theft must be present together. Natural unity of acts, on the other hand, concerns several acts directed at a single aim that are carried out within the scope of a single decision of the will and a single intent. For example, stabbing a person several times is regarded as a single act by virtue of the natural unity of acts.55

We can explain dolus generalis cases by reference to the classic example given above. Where the perpetrator shoots the victim in order to kill him and buries him in the belief that he is dead, there are two acts in the natural sense. It must, however, be assessed whether there is also a single act in the legal sense. When we examine unity of act by statutory definition, the legislature has not made the performance of more than one act necessary for the offence of intentional killing. Hence there is no unity of act by statutory definition either. The last point to be assessed, and the one of real importance for the subject, is the natural unity of acts. At first sight it might be said that the perpetrator performed his act in pursuit of a single aim, within the scope of a single decision of the will and a single intent, and that there is a single act; in fact, however, where the perpetrator’s intent changes and he begins to commit a new offence, there will be a new and independent act, and it will not be regarded as a single act.

2. The Causation View

a. Explanation of the View

The second view under this heading is the “causation solution view”. Its foremost advocate is v. Buri, who maintains that in this situation there is a single intentional killing, that the occurrence of the final result of death was brought about by the causality, in the sense of the theory of conditions, of the first act, which was performed intentionally, and that the perpetrator must therefore be punished for the offence of intentional killing.56

According to this view, the solution to the problem is seen in the causal link that exists between the perpetrator’s first act and the occurrence of the result. This link is grounded in the perpetrator’s intentional conduct in his first act. This view was expressed in particular in the reasoning of the decision of the German Imperial Court (Reichsgericht/RGH) on the subject.57 Proceeding from the principle, established in the case law of the Criminal Senates of the RGH, that “the cause of a result is every act without which the result would not have occurred”, the decision accepts that the death stood in a causal link with the perpetrator’s act of attack. This view is set out in the decision in the following words:

“For the cause of the submerging (drowning in water) was the situation into which the accused had placed the woman (that is, the victim); they submerged her because they believed her to be dead and wanted to get rid of her in order to conceal the offence committed against her. However, the will that directed the earlier attack by the accused was aimed at killing the woman. It is immaterial whether the subsequent submerging of the woman caused her death; for in any event this death occurred through the will of the accused.”

Accordingly, the act having a causal link with the death was performed with the perpetrator’s intent. For this reason, according to the RGH, there is liability for an intentionally committed offence of killing.58

b. Criticism of the View

The advocates of the causation view have stated that, according to the theory of conditions, the result would not have occurred but for the perpetrator’s first act, and that there is therefore a causal link between that act and the result. According to the theory of conditions, a result occurs through the coming together of all the conditions that necessarily precede it. Each of these conditions is necessary for the occurrence of the result and has the same value as the others. However, an understanding along the lines of “had it not been for his act, this result would not have occurred” makes almost anyone responsible for the act of another. It is precisely for this reason that the theory of conditions, under which even remote and insignificant conditions are regarded as causal, has been limited by objective imputation.59 We consider that justifying the punishment of the perpetrator for the completed offence by establishing a causal link according to the theory of conditions is insufficient and contrary to modern criminal law.

The assumption advocated by the causation solution, namely that the causality between the perpetrator’s act and the result, combined with the presence of intent at any moment of the act, produces an intentional killing, does not work in such a simple way. It is not sufficient for the perpetrator to have had the will to kill once at some point in a causal link leading to the result of death. If it were, a person who bought a pistol for the purpose of murder would be punished for the offence of intentional killing if, the day before the planned murder, the weapon went off accidentally in a crowd and, without the perpetrator’s knowledge, killed the intended victim who happened to be in the crowd. The error of this view is that it disregards the fact that, for the theory of crime and accordingly for criminal law, only the intent that accompanies the commission of the offence can give rise to legal liability. Just as, with regard to the cognitive element of intent, the elements of the offence must be known at the time of its commission (Art. 21 and Art. 30(1) TCK; § 16(1) StGB), the volitional dimension of intent is likewise relevant for criminal law only if it exists at the time when the act constituting the offence is committed. It follows that, in dolus generalis cases, an intentionally performed act can be accepted only if, in accordance with the principle of contemporaneity, the perpetrator wanted the result while performing the acts that constitute the commission of the offence of intentional killing.60

Whichever completion theory is taken as the basis, it is undisputed that the first act, the attack on the victim, is an act of commission of an offence of killing. However, these theories leave unanswered the question how and why a non-intentional act subsequently performed by the perpetrator, together with the earlier act that remained at the stage of attempt, constitutes an offence of intentional killing.61

Otto, who entirely rejects the view of Weber’s intent, or, in its other name, dolus generalis, states that there is no need to resort to the doctrine of dolus generalis, which excessively increases the perpetrator’s liability in the second situation, since in that situation the perpetrator threw the victim into the water by an act involving subjective imputation on the assumption that the victim had not died, that is, he in fact completed his act, which forms a unity and which he executed intentionally; there is therefore no longer any need for an interpretation based on the doctrine known as dolus generalis, which leads to erroneous results.62

B. The Attempt (Separation) View

a. Explanation of the View

According to the attempt or separation view (Germ. Versuchslösung / Trennungstheorie), since the causal link between act and result is severed, the event must be examined by dividing it into two.63 In this context the act must be assessed separately with regard to the result intended by the perpetrator. With regard to his first act, the perpetrator should be held responsible for attempted intentional killing, since no result of death can be attributed to him although he acted with that intent; with regard to his second act, he should be held responsible for negligent killing, on the basis that he fell into a mistake as to the elements of the offence because he thought that the object of the offence at which his act was directed was a body.64

With his first act the perpetrator acted with the intent to kill the victim, but although he performed his act, the result did not occur for reasons beyond his control; with regard to the perpetrator’s first act, therefore, there is an attempted intentional killing. With his second act the perpetrator wants to get rid of the body of the victim, whom he believes to be dead. There is a causal link and objective imputation between the perpetrator’s second act and the result that occurred. However, the perpetrator does not perform the second act with the intent to kill; his intent is directed at getting rid of the body. Nevertheless, the perpetrator is expected to consider that the victim may not have died and to exercise the objective care required in this respect. The perpetrator failed to exercise this care and caused the victim’s death by his negligent second act. According to this view, although the perpetrator fell into a mistake as to the material element of the offence in his second act (Art. 30(1)), he must be held responsible for his negligent act, since the second act was negligent and the mistake excludes only intent. In this situation the perpetrator should be held responsible for attempted intentional killing on account of his first act and for negligent killing on account of his second act.65

This view takes a purely dogmatic approach as its basis. Its main argument is that there must be correspondence, that is, contemporaneity, between the objective and subjective elements of the statutory definition of the offence.66 Accordingly, the result of death is objectively attributed only to the last act, and in the last act there is no will to kill intentionally; for no one wants to kill someone whom he believes to be dead. For this reason, in such cases one cannot speak of a completed intentional killing. Although the first act was performed for the purpose of intentional killing, it does not produce the result of death and is therefore characterised merely as an attempted killing.67

In general, the advocates of the attempt solution defend their own view by opposing the arguments set out earlier.68 In particular, they reject the objective imputation of the death to the first act, because this result is not the materialisation of the risk created by the first act but the materialisation of a different risk. Owing to the risk created by the second act, the “risk connection” required for objective imputation with regard to the first act is broken.69 In other words, there is a deviation in the causal process here, but this deviation is a significant one, and the conclusions reached may be unjust. On the other hand, the advocates of the attempt view state that characterising the intentional killing as completed merely because the perpetrator initially had the will to kill and the victim’s death subsequently occurred is a moral approach expressing a criminal law of attitude. This approach rests solely on the initial intention to kill, without any further assessment of the concrete course of events.70 Accordingly, under this view, from the perspective of modern criminal law, in which a criminal law of the act rather than a criminal law of the offender applies, the punishment of intentions centred on the perpetrator is regarded as a step backwards and is criticised. On this view, the position that flatters the sense of justice carries within it the danger of a return to an approach centred on the perpetrator.

In this situation it is clear that the perpetrator has no intent to kill with regard to his second act, since one cannot speak of an intention on the part of the perpetrator to kill a body. Consequently, it cannot be accepted that the perpetrator envisaged the elements of the offence at the moment when the act causing death was performed; hence the requirement, under the principle of contemporaneity, that intent exist at the moment the offence is committed cannot be satisfied.71 Furthermore, the argument that the event as a whole consists of a single act is opposed with the words: “However, the assumption of a unity of act here can be refuted on the ground that the successive acts stem from different decisions of the will. Nor can it be determined whether the perpetrator, on realising the failure of the first act, would still have been willing to act. Where the perpetrator did not correctly perceive the result and the result therefore did not occur through the first act, it is impossible to base that result on the perpetrator’s intent. In this situation the perpetrator’s liability will in all likelihood rest on an intentionally committed attempt together with a negligently committed full result offence.”72

This solution is based on the principle of contemporaneity, which holds that intent and act must coincide in time. Indeed, the advocates of this view agree with the criticism that, in the cesspit case, the BGH’s doctrine of dolus generalis is incompatible with the perpetrator’s intent, which was absent in the second act, and with the principle of contemporaneity.73 Accordingly, liability arising from an intent that the perpetrator had before the act (dolus antecedens)74 must be rejected, since this view opposes a covert criminal law of attitude (Gesinnungsstrafrecht) based on the perspective that he who performs the act bears its consequences (versari in re illicita). According to the advocates of the attempt view, the effort of the completion view to combine both acts into a unity, and its claim that there is a unity of offence, is neither correct nor necessary.75

Ozansü, too, states that the matter is in fact to be resolved at the level of attribution, and that the question to be answered is whether the perpetrator, when performing his act, was aware of the various possible versions of chance, since attribution may be possible for acts of which the perpetrator was aware; that is, there is a fundamental qualitative difference between acting with the suspicion that the victim is alive and directing one’s act on the assumption that the victim is dead. According to the author, in the first of these the perpetrator still performs, as the creator of a causal link, an act that is his own work. In the second case, by contrast, some natural factor external to him has an effect on the causal link. Just as one cannot intend a result that has already occurred, or a result whose occurrence lies outside all experience of life, and in that case there can only be a wish, so too the result created by an act of whose occurrence the perpetrator is unaware does not give rise to liability for intent. In this case the author reached a conclusion just as in the separation theory and stated that the first act remains within the sphere of attempt.76

Maiwald states that the correctness of the main argument of the advocates of the attempt solution, namely the claim that the “actual act of killing” was performed without intent, is no longer disputed by the opposing view, and that its theoretical correctness is accepted.77 According to this doctrine, revisited and deepened in particular by Maiwald,78 in all cases there is only an attempted killing; consequently, there can only be a relationship of real concurrence between the first act and the possible offence of negligent killing committed by the second act.79

This view has also been advocated by Maurach: “If, when performing the second act, the perpetrator proceeds from the firm assumption that the offence has already been completed, an intent relating to the second act is conceptually inconceivable, because a dead person cannot be killed. In this case, the perpetrator is attributed the intent of an (act) that has already come to an end.” The completion put forward in legal scholarship (the argument of the adequacy of the general course of events

– a differentiated version of the completion view) must not overlook the fact that the decisive condition arose after the intent had come to an end.80

Similarly, Schroeder81 also stresses that this is “not a problem of the causal process deviating from the perpetrator’s conception, but a matter of the absence of the perpetrator’s intent at the time of the act constituting the statutory definition of the offence”.82

Another justification for the attempt solution has been developed by Sancinetti:83 if the perpetrators of a murder bury, throw into the water, burn or hang the victim, who is thought to be dead, in a lethal manner, this is not the materialisation of the initial risk but the materialisation of another risk, and therefore, since the risk has not materialised, only a negligent killing is accepted. The view that the structure of the two different risks is the same is not persuasive. For, according to Sancinetti, if one speaks of a completed offence, the possible death that might occur through the second act must have been foreseeable from the outset. But if the unlawful risk of the second act is already contained in the first act, it cannot be explained why the result is not regarded as the realisation of the first risk but as the realisation of an entirely different risk. If an attempt is accepted in the case of conditional intent, this is not the non-materialisation of an unlawful risk already set up by the first act, but the absence of the realisation of a plan, because, in order for a result to be linked to a particular element of the offence, the realisation of a plan is additionally required.84

Those who advocate the attempt view in dolus generalis cases are compelled to define the second act separately and to determine its relationship with the first act. For since the result of death cannot be attributed (as intentional) to the first act, the latter can only be characterised as an attempted killing. This does not, however, automatically mean that the death occurred negligently as a result of the second act, since this depends on whether the characteristic elements of a typical form of realisation are present together. This point had already been made by Geyer;85 but, as Maiwald stresses, the person who correctly formulated the second stage, which lies at the centre of this problem, was Pfotenhauer, as early as 1839: “The command to be given to the offender acting with the thought of killing should be as follows: when you want to kill someone and think that you have killed him, but before you begin a second act for the purpose of concealment, you must find out with certainty whether death has actually occurred, in order to obtain the result through this act, which by its nature is suitable for killing; for only through this second act can you achieve your aim”.86 Consequently, if it is accepted that dolus generalis cases are realised as negligent killing, the relationship of the second act to the first act must be determined. The great majority of those who advocate this solution87 accept that there is real concurrence of offences (cumulation of penalties) here.88

b. Criticism of the View

Roxin states that the view which holds that, in a case of dolus generalis, there is in every situation only an attempted intentional killing and a possible negligent offence must be rejected. This view rests in particular on the assumption that intent “must be present at the time of the offence” (the principle of contemporaneity) and therefore maintains that intent is lacking in the actual act of killing (the second act). Consequently, in this situation the perpetrator is charged with an intent that has already come to an end. According to Roxin, however, this perspective is not correct, because intent need not be present throughout the whole process; it is necessary and sufficient that it be present at the moment when the perpetrator lets the causal process slip out of his control. In a case of dolus generalis, the victim’s death must be regarded as a result corresponding to the first act, performed by the perpetrator with the intent to kill, and this is sufficient for the result to be linked to intent, provided that the result is seen as the realisation of the perpetrator’s plan.89

Puppe states that, as a result of the decision delivered in the cesspit case of the German Federal Court of Justice mentioned above, the view put forward in legal scholarship that in that case only the offences of attempted intentional killing and negligently causing death were committed, and that a completed offence cannot be established by forming a unity of offence between the attempt and the negligent killing (the attempt view), has been refuted.

The attempt view is a solution that is theoretically correct and consistent with the dogmatics of crime but does not accord with the sense of justice. For it gives rise to the questions “is it fair to mitigate the punishment of a completed attempt? Should the legal order proceed from a moral conception that requires praise to be given to luck?”90 with regard to the death that the perpetrator ultimately brought about, and leaves them unanswered. Indeed, the attempt solution is sometimes perceived as contrary to the sense of justice even by its own advocates; one of these authors, Gropp, contents himself with accepting that “chance (good or bad luck) cannot be taken into account to the detriment of the perpetrator, but must be taken into account in his favour”;91 according to the author: “In dolus generalis cases the perpetrator is ‘lucky’, because success does not occur at the outset. This failure must be assessed in the perpetrator’s favour, as in every attempt”.92

Although it is true that in every (completed) attempt there is “luck from the standpoint of criminal law”, it is not true that this is merely an advantage, nor can it be said that this luck is justified. It should not be an advantage, because the same chance circumstance that may cause A’s attempt to fail may lead to the completion of a similar (parallel) attempt by B, the perpetrator of another offence, and in that case B may be punished because of this bad luck.93 The task of criminal law, however, is to separate wrong from bad luck.

Although the attempt view appears theoretically consistent, it nevertheless contains significant inconsistencies. There is no dispute that the perpetrator performed the first act with the intent to kill but that the result did not occur for reasons beyond his control; all views accept the case in this way as regards the first stage. The attempt view maintains that the perpetrator acted negligently with regard to his second act and that the death occurred because of this negligent act. In our view, the point that contains an inconsistency, or at least a major question mark, is whether the perpetrator really performed the second act negligently. In other words, can the death that occurred as a consequence of the perpetrator’s second act be subjectively attributed to the perpetrator on the ground that he engaged in negligent conduct? If we follow the case step by step, we see that the perpetrator performed the first act with direct or conditional intent. Now, where a perpetrator wants to kill the victim, does so with suitable means and assumes that he has achieved the outcome, but is mistaken as to the occurrence of the result and performs the second act on the basis of this mistaken belief, can this perpetrator be expected to take care to check whether the victim is really dead and to perform his second act accordingly? For since negligence means a breach of the objective duty of care, in order to say that the perpetrator performed his second act negligently, it must be shown that he acted in breach of the objective duty of care with regard to his second act. Is it then appropriate and reasonable to impose on the perpetrator an objective duty of care in this respect as an element of negligence? In our view, no. For expecting the perpetrator to check, and to take care in this respect, that death has occurred as the result of the act he performed with the intent to kill creates a major contradiction with criminal policy. Moreover, if such care were expected and the perpetrator exercised it, a perpetrator who acted with intent or conditional intent in his first act and realised that he had not achieved the result could then intentionally perform the second act needed to achieve the result. Where, on the other hand, no such care is expected of the perpetrator, the victim may still have a chance of being saved. From the standpoint of criminal policy, the most important value protected is human life. If such a duty of care were accepted, this value could not be protected. Therefore, where, in accordance with criminal policy, the exercise of such care is not required and this view is applied to the case, it is not possible to attribute subjectively to the perpetrator the result that occurred as a consequence of his second act. The attempt view thus contains a major internal contradiction in this respect. Although its solution appears theoretically consistent, it conflicts with the principles of criminal policy.

A strong argument that may be raised against this view of ours is that, if a duty to check on the victim is imposed on the perpetrator, a perpetrator who sees that the victim is alive might refrain from completing his act, voluntarily abandon it and take the steps necessary for the victim’s survival; consequently, with our criticism above we are trying to read the perpetrator’s intentions, and this may amount to covert mind-reading. This criticism is partly justified; it must be noted, however, that the same mind-reading is also present in the counter-argument: the assumption that the perpetrator might abandon what he started rather than finish it is at least as much an exercise in mind-reading as our view, and it is very difficult to regard it as a valid counter-argument. In our view, where a perpetrator who has acted with the intent to kill a person, even if only with conditional intent, and has completed his attempt checks, within the framework of a duty of care, whether the victim is dead and learns that the victim is alive, the likelihood that he will finish what he started is greater than the likelihood of voluntary abandonment. The matter thus ultimately comes down to an assessment of probabilities. Does voluntary abandonment save more lives, or does leaving the victim to his fate without checking on his condition? It is impossible to answer this with certainty. For this reason, from a teleological perspective and taking into account the doctrine of the protected legal interest, no such duty of care should be imposed on the perpetrator. If this perspective is accepted, there being no duty of care, one cannot speak of negligent conduct on the part of the perpetrator with regard to the second act.

Another aspect of the attempt view that, in our view, must be criticised is that, by separating the acts completely from one another, it overlooks the natural connection that in fact exists between the two acts and takes no account at all of the consequences in this context. While we consider that a modern criminal law system based on the act rather than on the offender ought to apply, disregarding the fact that in dolus generalis cases both acts were performed by the same perpetrator carries serious dangers, such as the perpetrator going unpunished. Even though the perpetrator did not reach the intended result with his first act, we consider that in the great majority of dolus generalis cases the first act has a significant share in bringing about the result. Perhaps, had the perpetrator not performed the first act, the second act alone would not have led to the result. In this situation, even if one wished to separate the two acts completely, it would not be possible. On the other hand, because the fact that a completed offence came about through the sum of the perpetrator’s two acts is disregarded, there arises the serious danger that the perpetrator receives a much lighter penalty than the result he brought about requires, and that an unjust practice results.

At this point it should also be noted that there may be dolus generalis cases in which the application of the attempt view would be appropriate. For this, however, there must be cases in which there is, in particular, a temporal and spatial difference between the first and the second act. In this way the natural connection between the two acts may lose its significance, and the attempt solution may be an equitable application. For if a relatively long time passes after the first act and, in addition, the second act takes place somewhere other than where the first act was performed, causal processes that cannot be regarded as insignificant may intervene. Moreover, because of the time elapsing between the two acts, the assumption that the perpetrator initially acted with the intention of killing the victim and would kill him in any event may also be weakened. It must be stressed, however, that such cases are likely to be highly exceptional.

In conclusion, since the attempt view both contains inconsistencies from the standpoint of the theory of crime and would lead to an unjust practice, it must be rejected; and since there is also a causal link between the first act and the result that occurred, an answer must be sought to the question how this result can be attributed to the perpetrator objectively and/or subjectively.

C. The Adequacy View

a. Explanation of the View

The third view developed under dolus generalis is the adequacy view (Adäquanzurteil), which proceeds from the causation solution view. According to this view, what is decisive in this type of case is that the result that occurred represents only an insignificant deviation from the foreseen causal link.94 For the actual causal link is foreseeable according to general experience of life. It is immaterial that this deviation is attributable to the perpetrator’s own act and that the influence of third persons or of natural forces is not taken into account, since it is not possible for a human being to know fully all the conditions that bring about the result.95 It is sufficient that the perpetrator foresees the causal link and that this foresight coincides with the actual causal link. In this assessment the criterion that determines what is significant and what is insignificant is the foreseeability of the result according to general experience of life. This view is based on an adequacy assessment and on a comparison of the causal link that actually occurred with the foreseen course of events. In the example of an attack on the victim followed by the submerging of the body in water, the deviation between reality and the perpetrator’s conception is neither unusual nor significant. The perpetrator must therefore be punished for a completed offence of killing.96

In the adequacy view, since the act is treated as a process, only the first stage of the act in question is regarded, from the standpoint of criminal law, as the perpetrator’s act. It is stated that the subsequent acts are to be assessed merely as a causal-mechanical link to the final result, and that this link is significant only in so far as it is the object of the adequacy assessment. It is stated that the subsequent acts, which are regarded as part of the perpetrator’s own act, have no legal significance in this context.97

In accordance with the view of an insignificant deviation in the causal link, the German Federal Court of Justice (although it does not accept the conception of dolus generalis found in legal scholarship) concluded that an insignificant causal deviation from the intentionally performed act of killing had occurred and assessed the case as intentional killing. This view, which is dominant in German legal scholarship and is also advocated by the Federal Court of Justice,98 held that the occurrence of the death through the second act is to be assessed as an insignificant deviation in the causal process and that the perpetrator must therefore be punished for the completed offence of intentional killing.99 Accordingly, departing from the basic idea of the doctrine of dolus generalis, it was not accepted that the perpetrator’s “general” intent to kill continued throughout the whole event; on the contrary, it was accepted that the cause of death did not directly form part of the perpetrator’s conception, but that this mistake was insignificant:

“For not all the details of an event can be foreseen in advance; deviations from the envisaged course of events, provided that these deviations are foreseeable within the limits of general experience of life, do not justify holding that intent is excluded or that the act is to be assessed differently.”100

In this situation it must be accepted that the offence of intentional killing is constituted in such two-stage cases.101 Although the death occurred as the result of another act, the perpetrator regarded this possibility as real and accepted it. This deviation in the causal process is insignificant and has no legal significance.102 It is immaterial that this deviation stems from the perpetrator’s own act, or that it does not stem from the acts of third persons or from natural forces.103 However, imposing a penalty for the completed offence requires that the result be objectively attributable to the perpetrator’s first act. The debate here concerns whether the risk of the first act intentionally performed by the perpetrator (for example, death by poisoning) materialised in the concrete result (for example, the drowning of an unconscious person who has been poisoned).104

According to the German Federal Court of Justice, at the moment when she stuffed earth into the victim’s mouth with conditional intent, the perpetrator caused the result of death, if not directly then indirectly. Accordingly, had it not been for the acts that indirectly paved the way for the victim’s death, the act completed with conditional intent (throwing her into the cesspit) would not have occurred either:

“The perpetrator caused the death not directly but indirectly. For the perpetrator interpreted the fact that Ms B. was lying motionless on the ground as meaning that she had died, and for that reason threw the victim into the slurry (cesspit) pit. This process, which directly brought about the victim’s death, would not have occurred without the earlier acts performed by the perpetrator with conditional intent. The perpetrator’s earlier acts are therefore also a cause of the result of death. In this context, the perpetrator brought about this result of death with conditional intent. Although the result of death occurred in a manner different from that foreseen by the perpetrator, the deviation between the actual causal link and the causal link envisaged by the perpetrator is extremely small and of such a nature as to have no legal significance.”105

Referring to its earlier case law, the Court stated that there is no difference between direct intent and conditional intent as regards causation and ultimately held that the deviation in the causal link, which developed differently from what was envisaged, was “legally insignificant”.106 This is a mixed solution that is partly consistent in theory while appealing to the sense of justice. The BGH rejects the attempt view, which had been dominant until the date of this decision, concluding that drawing such a distinction between the first act and the result that ensued from the second act would mean arbitrarily departing from the realities of life.107

Accordingly, since by his act performed with the initial intent to kill the perpetrator caused (created the risk of) the result of death that occurred later and is attributable to him, he must be punished for the completed offence of intentional killing.108 It makes no difference whether the perpetrator performed his first act with conditional intent or with direct intent.109 The negligent offence committed by the second act recedes into the background behind the offence stemming from the intent with which the first act was committed.110

This view, expressed in the Court’s decision, changed the perception of the attempt view that had been dominant until then. During the period when the attempt view was dominant, the BGH had also decided in line with that view.111 Following this decision, with the views put forward to revise and develop the position taken in it,112 the attempt solution was pushed into the background, and efforts were made to close the dogmatic gaps in the BGH’s decision.113

b. Criticism of the View

With its consistent decisions delivered in line with this view, the BGH once again confirmed the solution to the problem that is in harmony with judicial decisions based on old legal traditions and with relatively recent decisions of the supreme courts; however, the doubts regarding the solution adopted in this decision have not been fully dispelled, nor have the debates in legal scholarship come to an end.114 The assessment of such cases as a single completed intentional killing within the framework of the adequacy view has been criticised in various respects.115

This decision of the BGH is criticised by some authors in German legal scholarship on the ground that in this case the result occurred not as a consequence of the risk created by the act of intentional killing, but as a consequence of another act and the will connected with it.116 It should be noted, however, that certain other authors consider the Federal Court’s decision to be correct; according to them, intent must be accepted even where the result intended by the first act occurs, within the causal link, in the subsequent act.117

Maiwald states that, in order to ground its view, the BGH essentially put forward the same arguments that have been known since v. Buri’s article of 1864 and have constantly given rise to objections in the course of the debate.118 The author stresses that the advocates of the adequacy view disregard the fact that the act that actually caused the death was performed without the aim of intentional killing.119 According to Maiwald, the special feature of dolus generalis cases is that what takes effect after the perpetrator has “let go” of his act is not the blind forces of nature but the perpetrator’s own conduct, that is, human will. In this context, if the adequacy view is accepted, the following question must be answered: can this conduct be controlled, and therefore foreseen, by the perpetrator? The advocates of the adequacy view do not take this question as their basis. For them, the foreseeability of the causal chain alone is sufficient. In dolus generalis cases, the result that occurred can be attributed to the perpetrator only if it is assumed that he could foresee the actual course (the causal link) of his act. Such an assessment, however, made solely in terms of foreseeability while disregarding whether the outcome could be willed, is structurally unworkable.120 The author examined the subject from every angle and concluded that only the attempt view can fully explain the subject, and that real concurrence should therefore be applied between the two offences arising in such a situation.121

One of the authors who criticise this view, Hettinger, states that the advocates of the adequacy view have no real argumentation, that these authors reject the old construction of dolus generalis and instead try to reach the same result through a specially constructed theory of deviation, and that this is a kind of “labelling fraud”. According to the author, the doctrines of versari in re illicita, dolus indirectus and dolus generalis have been set aside in the adequacy view only for the purpose of justifying that view.122

Another criticism frequently levelled at the adequacy theory is that it embodies a moral approach, which is characteristic of a criminal law based on “attitude” (Gesinnung), taking into account only the perpetrator’s inner attitude rather than the intent in the commission of the offence. Accordingly, according to Köhler, instead of an appropriate legal attribution, what takes place is an assessment of a morally wrongful attitude, such as wanting the death of others.123 In addition to this view, Maiwald states that, if one looks only at the perpetrator’s intention, it is of no importance whether the victim’s death was brought about by the initial act of attack or only by the subsequent throwing of the body into the water.124

Sancinetti, another author who advocates the attempt view, states that only the first act is attributable; that, even if a deviation in the causal link is accepted, it is argued that this deviation is insignificant because the result occurred within foreseeable limits; that this argument is usually constructed on the ground that the event forms a whole; but that this is not a real argument, because the fact that the event forms a whole does not prevent it from being assessed as partly intentional and partly negligent.125

Roxin, for his part, takes a more moderate path. According to Roxin, the BGH arrives at the acceptance of a completed killing by accepting that there is an insignificant causal deviation between the perpetrator’s first act and the death that occurred. Roxin states that this view is widely accepted in legal scholarship. Accordingly, the Court’s perspective of treating dolus generalis, like earlier similar cases, merely as a special form of causal deviation is to be welcomed. However, concluding that this deviation is always insignificant would be a “hasty approach”. For it is overlooked that in such situations the concrete causal process may sometimes lie outside the bounds of foreseeability; in that case it may be said that the objective element of the offence is not fulfilled. For example, if a person loads the victim, whom he thinks is dead, into his vehicle and takes him away in order to bury him in a remote place, but the victim, who is in fact merely unconscious, dies in a road accident while being taken to the burial place, it must be accepted that, owing to the uncertainty of the causal process, there is only an attempt to commit the offence.126

Roxin, after stating that the case law accepts an insignificant causal deviation in dolus generalis situations and that this applies only where the perpetrator’s act carried the intent to kill, stated that a small limitation must be made here. According to Roxin, the intent must be an unrevised intent to kill (one that has not been taken back, a decision that has not been abandoned). If A intended to kill B but, on seeing the victim motionless, felt remorse and abandoned his intention, tried to restore the victim to consciousness (voluntary abandonment), but wrongly assumed that his efforts had failed and then buried the victim in despair, thereby causing his death, A abandoned his plan of murder at the stage of attempt. In that case the death that subsequently occurred cannot be regarded as the realisation of the plan to kill that existed at the outset and therefore cannot be linked to intent. However, in the great majority of judicial decisions the court ruled on an unrevised intent to kill; the outcome reached is therefore consistent with this view. Yet in the cesspit decision127 the BGH accepts, for dolus generalis situations, that a completed offence of killing is constituted even where the perpetrator had only conditional intent, because, according to the BGH, the difference between the two kinds of intent, that is, the deviation of the causal process from the perpetrator’s conception, is small and legally insignificant. It is precisely this that Roxin argues must be opposed, maintaining that this difference is the starting point of the legal assessment.128 Proceeding from this criticism, Roxin formed his own view, which we shall examine below.

A similar view has also been put forward by Walter. According to the author, a situation to be distinguished from dolus generalis cases is where the perpetrator abandons his decision to commit the offence before his second act but, through carelessness or a mistake, causes the offence to be fully realised. Such cases may be called “failed abandonment” (verstolperter Rücktritt). This situation can arise in cases of both completed and incomplete attempt. An example of a completed attempt is where the perpetrator, having injected poison into the victim, wants to save the victim with an antidote but mistakenly administers more of the effective poison, thereby hastening the victim’s death. After the attempt has been completed, the decision to commit the offence has been abandoned, and in the course of his efforts to withdraw the perpetrator negligently brings about completion.129 Indeed, as we stated above, Roxin speaks for such cases of the concept of a “revised intention of completion” (revidierte Vollendungsabsicht), maintains that there is no intentional completion, and thus concludes that there is a plurality of offences between the attempt and the negligent completion.130 Walter states that the German Federal Court of Justice has also indirectly adopted this solution,131 but that this applies to an incomplete attempt. In the decision in question, a dentist wanted to set fire to his surgery as an act of revenge against his landlord; he poured petrol in his surgery and struck a match, but changed his mind and wanted to put the match back into the matchbox. At that moment the match accidentally flared up and, although he immediately put it out, a small flame ignited the petrol vapour and thus the whole surgery. The Federal Court assessed this situation merely as negligent arson; according to the Court, at the moment the match was struck the perpetrator no longer had a decision to commit the offence, and therefore had no intent. It was established that the perpetrator had definitively abandoned his earlier decision to commit the offence at the stage of incomplete attempt, that is, at a moment when he thought he had not yet done everything necessary for the offence to be completed.132 For the Federal Court, the fact that there was only a short interval between that moment and the act that subsequently started the fire is immaterial. According to Walter, this approach is consistent, since at the moment the perpetrator tried to put the match back into the box he was deemed to have voluntarily abandoned the attempt under § 24(1) StGB, because he had given up the will to continue committing the offence. The ignition of the match, on the other hand, is a new offence committed merely negligently.133

D. The View of the Realisation of the Perpetrator’s Plan

a. Explanation of the View

Under the view of the realisation of the perpetrator’s plan, Roxin states that in such cases, even if the objective element of the offence of killing has been fulfilled, in order to determine the perpetrator’s intent it must be established whether the perpetrator intended the victim’s death, and a distinction must be drawn as to whether he merely accepted it as a side effect. If A intended to kill B, buried B, who was unconscious and whom he thought was dead, and B died as a result of the perpetrator’s second act, then, on an objective assessment, this situation must be regarded as the realisation of the perpetrator’s plan despite the deviation in the causal link. Within this plan A wanted to kill B and succeeded in doing so. Although the process of realisation differs in a certain way, this is as insignificant for the realisation of the plan to kill as other causal deviations are.134 As can be seen, Roxin has tried, by developing his own theory, to reach the result arrived at by the BGH in a way that is theoretically more consistent, or at least more “honest”, without bending the theory of crime.

Roxin first points out that, in deciding between two different solutions to such unresolved problems, “we should not conclude that one of them is wrong”. For various solutions that are internally correct can be developed by proceeding from different premises. According to Roxin, in the group of cases described by the term dolus generalis, the foreseeability of the deviation in the causal process says nothing conclusive; it merely indicates that the result of the perpetrator’s second act is connected with the realisation of the perpetrator’s plan and can therefore be attributed to the perpetrator’s intent. For if, when committing the first act, the perpetrator did not aim at the victim’s death but merely accepted the possibility of death, that is, acted with conditional intent, this situation must be resolved differently.135 For example, if a thief or a rapist wants merely to render his victim unconscious and at most accepts as a risk his victim’s death, which he does not really want, and perhaps even makes attempts to resuscitate the victim, but after a while abandons these efforts in the mistaken belief that they are futile and buries the supposed body, and death thereby occurs,136 he is not regarded as having realised his plan by his second act, because what he did entirely contradicts his own intention. In that case the perpetrator does not say, with regard to the death, as he would if he had pursued the aim of killing, “I have achieved my goal in any event”; on the contrary, he laments that, as a result of his mistake, everything has gone wrong. Not only from the perpetrator’s perspective but also from a normative standpoint, this situation must be regarded not as the realisation of the criminal plan but as an unfortunate accident, since the criminal plan includes the occurrence of death only for the success of the rape, and for the rest is aimed at avoiding death.137 An illustration of this assumption is the situation in which the perpetrator realises after the first act that the victim is still alive; in that case the perpetrator who has performed his act directed at intentional killing will carry out the second act causing death without any hesitation, whereas the perpetrator acting with conditional intent will not do so, because this does not correspond to his aims. It is precisely for this reason that in dolus generalis cases a completed offence is to be assumed in the former situation, whereas otherwise only an attempted offence must be accepted.138 According to Roxin, therefore, in concrete terms every act suitable for bringing about the result sets the causal process in motion; in that case what is decisive is whether there is still a foreseeable causal link within the perpetrator’s plan.139

This solution is largely in harmony with the prevailing theory on causal deviations. For, with regard to intentional offences, two conditions are put forward for deviations to be insignificant: a) the deviation must remain within the limits of foreseeability; b) the deviation must not justify a different assessment of the act. In a case of dolus generalis, the principle of the realisation of the plan is a decisive feature for attribution. On the basis of this principle, if the condition of foreseeability is met, the result of the second act must be regarded as the realisation of the perpetrator’s plan and assessed as a completed offence.140

Roxin explains this view with the following example: where a footballer aims at the lower left corner of the goal, but the shot deviates, strikes the upper corner of the frame one metre higher and crosses the goal line, this is regarded by everyone as an intentional goal (not an attempt), because the foreseeable causal deviation within the context of the realisation of the plan changes nothing.141

According to Roxin, the problem in such cases is whether the course of events is objectively determined, in accordance with the criteria of legal assessment, as corresponding to the perpetrator’s will. This assessment of correspondence is not cognitive but normative in nature; it includes in the assessment all the causal and psychological findings brought about by the course of events, but subjects these findings to a legal assessment and examines whether the result obtained is equivalent to what the perpetrator aimed at. At this point he states that a teleological interpretation is unavoidable in criminal law, since otherwise one would be left without clear and unambiguous solutions. The analytical question “How would the perpetrator have acted had he recognised his mistake in time?” produces very clear results. It must thus be established whether, where the perpetrator set out to act with the intention to kill irrespective of causal deviations, this plan, so long as it was not altered by an effort at voluntary abandonment, was actually realised in the objective sense. The aim in doing so is to make visible, in the objective sense, the act that the perpetrator actually carried out.142

With this view, Roxin on the one hand supports the completion solution, arguing that the second act, and therefore the final result, was a foreseeable process at the time the first act was carried out, and that the final result can therefore be attributed to the first act as an insignificant causal deviation.143 However, taking into account that foreseeability is in general a feature common to intent and negligence,144 and that the prevailing view supplements this concept with a test according to which “individual circumstances that could not be foreseen in advance do not justify a different assessment of the act”,145 he develops the concept of “the realisation of the perpetrator’s plan” in order to resolve the question whether the deviation from the envisaged course of events is attributable. This approach maintains that the realisation of the intentionally created risk must also be accompanied by a finding that “the plan has been realised”.146 In a case of dolus generalis, the plan is realised only if the perpetrator initially acted with the intent to kill and did not revise this intent before his second act; otherwise (for instance, if the perpetrator acted with conditional intent, or acted with direct intent or even with purpose but later abandoned his aim through counter-acts) “the perpetrator’s plan” is not realised. In that case the perpetrator’s first act remains at the stage of attempted intentional killing, and the occurrence of the result is attributed to the perpetrator’s possibly negligent second act.147

An approach closer to the solution of the theory of the realisation of the perpetrator’s plan is the assumption that whether the result is to be assessed as completion or as attempt depends on whether the decision concerning the second act was taken from the outset or after the first act. According to this theory, where the will to dispose of the victim takes shape only after the supposed killing, there is an attempted killing and a negligent killing in real concurrence. This generally leads to the results advocated here, since a perpetrator who acts with the intent to kill in the first act will usually plan the second act from the very beginning, as he will have to dispose of the body. By contrast, a perpetrator who acts in the first act with merely conditional intent as to a killing and hopes that the victim will survive will usually not have made any prior plan as to what to do with the body in the event of the victim’s death. However, both assumptions can be refuted in the concrete case, and relying on the time at which the decision to dispose of the body was taken would be misleading; for the foreseeability of the second act does not in general depend on whether it was planned at the time of the first act, nor can the second act be regarded as the materialisation of the danger created by the first act solely because it was planned from the outset.148

b. Criticism of the View

This view of Roxin’s has been criticised from every angle by the Argentine criminal law scholar Sancinetti, who advocates the attempt solution, in his article in the Festschrift published in 2001 on the occasion of Roxin’s 70th birthday. According to Sancinetti, this distinction rests on a premise of the traditional understanding: conditional intent (Eventualvorsatz) is legally of lesser weight than direct intent committed with a particular purpose (Absicht). Sancinetti states that the doctrine of objective imputation (objektive Zurechnung) shows that this cannot be correct, because what is decisive in establishing whether an act reduces an existing risk (the act not fulfilling an element of the offence) or replaces it with a lesser risk (justification) is not the kind of intent that creates the risk but the objective dimension of the risk.149 For example, a perpetrator who aims at a target with the intent to kill but uses a defective weapon, and therefore has little chance of hitting from a long distance, has a lower chance of success; this perpetrator creates less risk and realises a lesser wrong. By contrast, a perpetrator who acts with conditional intent but shoots a person at close range with a large-calibre weapon creates a greater chance of success and realises a graver wrong.150 Attributing a structural significance to the “volitional” element of intent requires intent to be understood as “bad intention”, which “must be rejected as a relic of a criminal law of attitude”; what matters is solely knowledge of the relevant risk.151 Moreover, it is also possible for a perpetrator who initially acted with a particular purpose to abandon that purpose in his subsequent acts. For example, if the perpetrator has made a wager that he can succeed with a single shot, he may lack the motivation for a new attempt. On the other hand, a perpetrator who initially acted with conditional intent may later find a new motivation; for instance, having injured the victim, he may want to kill him in order to eliminate him as a witness.152

According to Sancinetti, these two objections can be overcome by a small modification of Roxin’s view: what is decisive is not the intent with which the perpetrator initially acted, but whether the perpetrator, had he recognised the real situation, would have had the motivation for a new (intentional) act. The author states that at various points in Roxin’s explanations it is clear that this distinction turns into a question about the perpetrator’s hypothetical conduct,153 but that this means departing from a criminal law of the act (Tatstrafrecht).154 On the other hand, it is not comprehensible why the form of intent should matter where the perpetrator acts without intent at the second stage, but should not matter where the process continues without the perpetrator’s intervention or with a deviation. The explanation underlying the argument that in a case of dolus generalis the perpetrator “acts anew”155 conceals the fact that Roxin, too, regards the second stage as the “actual act of killing”. For Roxin considers the attempt solution troubling where he claims that the perpetrator initially acted intentionally and would have acted in the same way even had he recognised the real situation. This, however, cannot justify the claim that the final result is the materialisation of the first risk.156 What must materialise is the danger encompassed by the perpetrator’s intent; if this risk materialises, there is intentional completion. An additional concept such as “the realisation of the plan” is therefore misleading.157

According to Sancinetti, the “correct solution” runs counter to intuition, and the more the conditions of the “differentiating solutions” are met, the more intensely it runs counter to intuition: the perpetrator foresaw the second act in his initial plan and created a risk; had this risk not been altered by the perpetrator, success would have been achieved, and it would have been accepted that the perpetrator acted with an unaltered intent to kill. Nevertheless, there is no intentionally completed offence. If there is no other argument supporting this understanding, this intuitive solution must yield to dogmatic argumentation. This is the critical point for “reflective equilibrium”, and it also explains why dogmatic analysis and the dogmatic system must ultimately stand above criminal policy.158 In other words, according to the author, the solutions produced by the dogmatics of crime take precedence over criminal policy. Solutions found appropriate from the standpoint of criminal policy in spite of the dogmatics of crime should find no application in criminal law. Liberation from a criminal law based on subjective views and from its application, and the objective application of criminal law, can be achieved only in this way.

Roxin’s view is also criticised for overlooking that this is a problem of deviation. It makes no difference whether the supposed body was thrown into the water by a third party or by the perpetrator himself; what is decisive is solely the adequacy assessment (Adäquanzurteil) and the realisation of the risk created by the first act. For this reason, where the perpetrator was determined from the outset to carry out the second act (the disposal of the supposed body), there is as a rule a completed intentional offence.159 Where, however, the perpetrator decides to dispose of the body only after having completed the act he performed with the initial intent to kill, it may be said that this conclusion is not compelling and depends on the particular features of the specific case; here too, only the adequacy assessment is decisive.160 A significant deviation of the causal process is conceivable even at the first stage.161 For example, if the perpetrator loads the victim, whom he believes to be dead, into a vehicle in order to bury him in a deserted place, and the victim’s death occurs on the way as a result of a traffic accident, there may be an attempted killing and possibly a negligent killing, owing to the lack of objective imputation, since the result can then be seen merely as the realisation of the general risk of life.162

E. Other Intermediate (Differentiating) Views

The first of the differentiating views that attempt to build an intermediate solution between the two opposite poles of the completion view and the attempt view is that of Welzel. It defends the completion solution in general, but in cases where the will to dispose of the victim is formed only after the supposed death, it accepts real concurrence between attempted intentional killing and negligent killing. According to the author, what matters is whether or not the perpetrator foresaw from the very beginning that he would carry out the second act.163

An intermediate view based on the perpetrator’s plan for committing the offence has been put forward by Stratenwerth164 and Rudolphi.165 The authors justify their view by reference to the effect of the result having been foreseen in the initial plan for the perpetrator’s second act. Accordingly, the focus must be on whether or not the subsequently occurring death is the realisation of the risk created by the perpetrator’s first act. This reasoning holds where the perpetrator foresaw the second act from the very beginning; otherwise it is doubtful. The authors leave unanswered the question why the second act having been foreseen at the outset should ensure the realisation of the risk created by the first act. This understanding presupposes a situation in which the perpetrator intentionally uses himself as an instrument for the negligent act to be carried out later, and it resembles the alic (actiones libera in causa) cases. In any event, in the initial plan the second act serves the purpose of concealing an offence that has already been completed, and it is not regarded as an alternative act of completion. Consequently, the fact that the second stage was foreseen in the initial plan is of no help in solving the problem.166

Another intermediate solution, proposed by Schroeder,167 holds that if the first act was concretely capable of bringing about the result, that is, if the victim had already been fatally wounded, a burial or submersion that accelerates death does not exclude intent; but if the first act was not concretely capable of bringing about the result, intent cannot be said to exist.168 According to this view, intent rests not on the causal link but on the idea that the act is concretely capable of bringing about the result.169 For Schroeder, what matters is not the degree of divergence between the actual course of events and the course of events envisaged by the perpetrator, but the adequacy of the act known to the perpetrator for bringing about the result. This is because the object of intent and negligence is not the essential features of the causal process but the concrete adequacy of the act to lead to the result.170 Applying this approach to the dolus generalis problem, Schroeder concludes that if the first act was concretely adequate for bringing about the result, that is, if the victim had already been fatally wounded, the acceleration of death through subsequent submersion does not exclude intent; but if, conversely, the first act was not concretely adequate for bringing about the result, there is no intent.171

Walter states that, in dolus generalis cases, appropriate results regarding the deviation in the causal course can be obtained by means of the following test question: “Would the perpetrator, when carrying out the first act, still have carried out that act had he known in advance how the subsequent events would unfold?” The author states that this criterion is consistent with the basic principle that, as regards the perpetrator’s intent, only his mental representations are decisive, while objective assessments of what the perpetrator should or could have envisaged are irrelevant; he adds that this approach can be applied in a dogmatically clear and reliable manner. He nevertheless makes the reservation that, as always, problems of proof may arise in the course of proceedings. Walter states that the approach he proposes is close to the view that distinguishes between purpose (absicht) and conditional intent (bedingter Vorsatz), but does not coincide with it entirely, because there may be certain unusual situations (atypical cases) in which the perpetrator wants to harm (kill) the victim, but not in just any manner; he wants to do so only in a particular manner, or specifically avoids doing so in a certain other manner.172

Another differentiating view on this subject that attracts attention and deserves closer examination is the natural unity of acts solution put forward by the Spanish criminal lawyer Sanz Morán. Sanz Morán first states clearly that in such cases there is a single completed intentional offence and, referring to the view of Karl Peters,173 states that “the process from the beginning of the act to the result forms a unity of meaning (Sinneinheit)”. The problem here therefore lies in the distinction between unity and plurality of offences. Since there is no dispute that a single completed offence of intentional killing exists where the second act is performed with conditional intent, he states that it makes no sense to speak of two different offences where the second act is possibly a negligent killing. The author states that the problem arises at the point of distinguishing between a single violation and the commission of several offences; that the existence of a single violation can be established in different ways, all of which can be reduced to a common idea, namely that the application of one criminal provision and of the sanction laid down in that provision suffices to cover the total wrongfulness of the conduct; and that an approach to the contrary would violate the “non bis in idem” principle. He states that, in order to speak of a single offence, one may proceed from the doctrines of “apparent concurrence” and “natural unity of acts”; that the concept of natural unity of acts174 means treating several formally homogeneous offences as a single violation by way of a value-based synthesis; and that the existence of natural unity of acts cannot be disregarded entirely in dolus generalis cases either. Nevertheless, according to the author, the point that really needs to be emphasised, beyond the applicability of the category of natural unity of acts to these cases, is that the distinction between a single offence and several offences is a value-based question rather than a logical-formal problem. This is clearly seen in certain situations in which it must be decided whether several offences exist, for example natural unity of acts and continuing offences, or in “prior or subsequent connected acts”. It is precisely here, according to the author, that the application of the non bis in idem principle in its substantive sense (the prohibition of taking an incriminating element into account twice) plays a decisive role. In this context, he expresses serious reservations about solutions to the dolus generalis problem that lead to a single death being taken into account more than once.175

V. TREATMENT OF THE SUBJECT IN TURKISH LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

The view of the “occurrence of the delayed result”, which some authors in German legal scholarship treat within the dolus generalis doctrine, is called Weber’s intent in Turkish legal scholarship and is explained under this heading.176 Although it is not referred to as Weber’s intent, this subject is, as we have explained in detail above, treated in German legal scholarship as one of the problem areas of intent, within the dolus generalis doctrine and as a variety of it.177

We must point out that the subject has not been explained in Turkish criminal law scholarship in this detail or with this degree of importance. Although dealing with the subject under the heading of Weber’s intent creates the impression that the classical dolus generalis solution is being adopted, the problem is in fact, as explained in detail above, solved within the framework of the adequacy view of the German Federal Court of Justice. Turkish legal scholarship states that in dolus generalis cases it is not necessary, for the causal link, to determine all the details and the precise moment at which the result occurred, for example to know the moment of death with one hundred per cent certainty; that it is necessary and sufficient for the course of events to correspond in general to the perpetrator’s long-term or short-term plan and thinking; and that, accordingly, an insignificant deviation between act and result does not affect intent. According to these explanations, an assessment based on general experience of life may be used to determine whether a deviation in the causal link is significant, and deviations that are foreseeable according to general experience of life and do not call for a different assessment of the perpetrator’s act are regarded as insignificant. For example, where the perpetrator strikes the victim on the head with a hammer, believes him to be dead and throws him off a bridge to get rid of the body, but the victim dies by striking the pier of the bridge or by drowning in the water, Weber’s intent is accepted; the deviation is described as insignificant, and it is stated that the perpetrator must be punished for the completed offence of intentional killing.178 Accordingly, in cases where the intent to kill and the deviation do not occur simultaneously, for example where the perpetrator shoots the person he wants to kill and then, believing him to be dead, buries him, the perpetrator has aimed at, or accepted as possible, a specific result, even if the person was in fact not yet dead and dies of asphyxia as a result of being buried alive. In this case, after the victim has been shot, the delayed result occurs through the second act, and it must be accepted that the statutory definition of the offence has been fulfilled.179

In Turkish criminal law scholarship, Önder, Artuk/Gökçen et al. and Demirbaş180 examine this subject under the heading of Weber’s intent and, stating that the deviation is insignificant, hold the perpetrator liable for the completed offence of intentional killing. Hakeri, without using a particular name, sets out the solution of the case according to the attempt and completion views and states that he defends the completion view.181 Apaydın, in his monograph on intent, mentions the subject with reference to Önder, presents the two basic distinctions in this area in the same way, and states that the “mistake” in the causal link is not significant.182 Dönmezer/Erman, for their part, state that the initial intent is sufficient for the offence to be regarded as intentional, and that the perpetrator bears criminal liability based on intent even if he regrets his conduct at the moment the result occurs.183 Öztürk/Erdem,184 Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız,185 Koca/Üzülmez186 and Özen187 deal with the subject under the heading of deviation in the causal link and, stating that this deviation is insignificant, hold that the perpetrator must be punished for the completed offence of intentional killing. At this point, İçel emphasises that a mistake or deviation in causation does not convert liability based on intent into liability based on negligence, since intent need not also cover the causal link.188 In other words, the prevailing view in Turkish legal scholarship is likewise parallel to the solution and reasoning of the BGH.

As can be seen, although in Türkiye the impression is created, through the name Weber’s intent, that the dolus generalis doctrine is being accepted, what is in fact accepted is the adequacy solution of the BGH. However, as we have pointed out at the appropriate places in this study, the view advanced by Weber has today lost its validity as a result of the decisions of the BGH. In particular, the authors who examine the subject under the heading of Weber’s intent create the mistaken impression that Weber advanced this view (even though what they describe is the view currently prevailing), and they do not mention, even in summary, the historical development and process of change in between.

This view, which is mentioned only briefly in Turkish criminal law scholarship, has never been the subject of judicial decisions. It is not surprising that a subject that has not been discussed in detail in legal scholarship has not reached the courts.

VI. OUR VIEW

First of all, it should be stated that, in our opinion, all the views set out above contain internal inconsistencies but also highly consistent elements. We see that each view, besides having aspects open to criticism, also rests on reasons that can be accepted as reasonable. Indeed, in our view there is in essence no single solution that can be applied to all dolus generalis cases. Rather, the prevailing method of solution varies according to the angle from which the case is viewed. For example, if the emphasis is placed on the fact that the perpetrator would not have performed the second act had he not performed the first, and that the process must therefore be considered as a whole in order to reach a just result, the completion view is adopted; if the correspondence, that is, the contemporaneity, between the objective and subjective elements of the offence is required, the attempt view is adopted; and if the occurrence of death through the second act is regarded as an insignificant deviation in the causal process, the adequacy view is adopted.

The conclusion we draw from our study and the view we have formed are as follows: we consider that the doctrine of Weber’s intent or dolus generalis established in Turkish legal scholarship, although it produces a just result, contains inconsistencies that must be regarded as significant in theoretical terms. For even though the perpetrator’s general desire is directed at killing the victim, the two acts, the results of these acts, the deviation in the causal link and the mental elements of the acts differ from one another to a large extent. This solution treats the desire preceding intent as equivalent to intent and carries the danger, albeit implicitly, of a slide into a criminal law of attitude. Moreover, treating intent in this way may also lead to conditional intent being accepted as the only form of intent.

On the other hand, if the attempt view is accepted, the result will be theoretically more correct and consistent, but it will not satisfy the sense of justice.189 In that case, since there are two different acts of the perpetrator and two different offences resulting from them, the perpetrator must be punished separately for each offence (attempted intentional killing and negligently causing death). This, however, means that the perpetrator’s bad luck in the causal link is rewarded even though he ultimately achieved what he intended. One of the important tasks of criminal law is to ensure that a distinction is drawn between bad luck and wrong. In our view, this solution fails to draw that distinction soundly.

The solution of the BGH, although more rational and an attempt to find a middle way, does not allow it to be said in every case that the deviation is insignificant. For a deviation in the causal link is not always insignificant. In the case of significant deviations, the causal process cannot be said to be adequate to lead to the result. Consequently, this solution cannot hold good in every case.

The differentiating views, although they add dogmatic richness in theoretical terms, do not offer simple solutions that can be applied in every case.

As regards the view put forward by Roxin that the perpetrator realises his plan, it appears reasonable to say that the acts carried out by the perpetrator are parts of his plan, that by carrying out his acts within this plan the perpetrator brought about the result he intended, and that the perpetrator should therefore be held liable for the offence of intentional killing he committed through two separate acts. It must be said, however, that this view also carries various dangers, owing to the requirement that all the results brought about be part of the plan. According to Roxin, the perpetrator should not be held liable for the result in respect of acts and results that were not in his plan. However, it is not possible for the perpetrator to have conditional intent in respect of a matter that is not part of his plan either; in that case, too, there is no dolus generalis case. Dolus generalis covers cases in which the intended result did not occur through the first act; if the result is not part of the perpetrator’s initial plan, this already means that he had no conditional intent. Looking at the theft and rape examples given by Roxin to justify his view and at the explanations that follow them, one understands in fact an approach according to which the perpetrator, through his second act, brought about a result he virtually did not foresee and therefore cannot be held liable for the result that occurred. In that case, however, there is no dolus generalis problem, since conditional intent on the part of the perpetrator cannot be spoken of in the first place. Moreover, in the examples given by Roxin, the perpetrator’s main goal (theft) differs from the side result that occurred (death); indeed, the result that occurred (death) is described as a result that the perpetrator never foresaw, never took into account and did not include in his plan, while on the other hand it is stated that the perpetrator had conditional intent as to the side result that occurred. It is also very difficult to say that the perpetrator had conditional intent in respect of results he did not foresee, did not take into account and did not include in his plan. Consequently, while we fully agree with Roxin’s approach that exceptional situations may exist, we consider that the examples given in this connection and the explanations offered also contain internal inconsistencies and do not fully reflect dolus generalis cases.

After the criticisms of each view set out above, it must be stated that applying the decisions and explanations of the BGH appears to be the most reasonable method of solving the overwhelming majority of the problems raised by dolus generalis cases. At the same time, the fact must not be overlooked that the BGH, because it aims at a practical solution, virtually brushes aside the theoretical debates on this subject by calling every deviation insignificant. For although in the great majority of dolus generalis cases the deviation may be insignificant, in some cases that are left out of account the deviation may genuinely deserve consideration. In such situations the deviation is so great that the natural connection between the two acts carried out by the perpetrator is broken, and we consider that the attempt view can then be applied. For example, there is a significant deviation where the perpetrator strikes the victim with intent to kill, lays the supposed body on the back seat of his car in order to get rid of it, and, while he is driving to the seaside to dispose of it, the victim dies as a result of a traffic accident on the way. In this case, although a completed offence exists, the disconnection between the acts carried out by the perpetrator weakens the view that the perpetrator ought to receive a very severe penalty, so that the problem of injustice arising from the application of the attempt view may be regarded as resolved, at least in part.

In conclusion, we wish to state that none of the views put forward to resolve dolus generalis problems constitutes on its own a complete and final answer, that as many examples can be constructed to falsify each view as to confirm it, and that this subject will therefore continue to remain one of the controversial topics of the theory of crime.

VII. REVERSE DOLUS GENERALIS CASES

Another matter we wish to address in this study is the situation in which the exact opposite of the above examples occurs, that is, “reverse dolus generalis”. In this situation the perpetrator plans to carry out his act in order to achieve a particular result, such as killing, but achieves that result with one of his first acts or directly with his very first act; in other words, there is a case of “premature completion”.190 For example, what conclusion should be reached where a person who wants to kill his wife by slapping her unconscious and then throwing her out of their apartment on a high floor slaps her before the act of throwing her from the height, and his wife dies?191 In this case, when carrying out his first act, the perpetrator did not foresee that the result would occur and did not manifest any will directed at it; yet with his first act he achieved the result that he wanted to achieve with the second act planned for later.

In a decision of the German Imperial Court (Reichsgericht),192 the perpetrator, who wanted to kill his wife, tried to disguise his conduct as suicide by creating the impression that she had jumped from the train; to that end he struck his wife hard on the head with a spanner and then rolled her onto the rails. The Court was unable to establish with certainty whether death had been caused by the impact received when falling onto the rails or by the concussion caused by the spanner. In this situation, the Court stated that it was irrelevant whether the perpetrator had struck the victim on the head in order to impair her cognitive functions or in order to kill her at that moment, and that even if the blow had been struck merely with the aim of injuring her and the result had occurred at that moment, this would be irrelevant as regards intent.

The Court used the following example in resolving this case: where a person wants to kill another with a hammer he is holding, does not strike the first blow with intent to kill, his aim being ultimately to kill the other only after striking him many times with the hammer until his rage is satisfied, but death occurs with the first blow, he nonetheless carries out the act of killing intentionally. What distinguishes this case from classical dolus generalis intent is that, unlike in classical dolus generalis, the first act is not directed at killing someone; on the contrary, the wish to kill relates to the second or subsequent acts, and the subsequent acts are meant to be carried out precisely on the plan that the first act will not suffice.193 Indeed, in the hammer example given by the Court, the perpetrator who planned to kill the victim after perhaps twenty blows, and who stops his act when death occurs after the first blow, will not be held liable for the aggravated form of killing committed with monstrous feeling. It is clear that the pre-legal motive or drive in the perpetrator’s inner world has no effect on the performance of the act or the occurrence of the result; this intention remains in an area that is not punished.

More recently, the German courts have dealt with two further situations that have been examined specifically by current legal scholarship.194 In the first, the perpetrator aims to render the victim incapable of resistance and plans then to take him to a place about 100 kilometres away and kill him there, but the victim dies while being immobilised by the initial acts (tying him up, gagging him and administering drugs). In the second, the perpetrators aim to render the victim unconscious by squeezing his neck and plan then to bring about his death by injecting air intravenously into his arm, but the victim has already died from the initial blows.

These cases share the following feature with dolus generalis cases: the perpetrator aims to bring about a particular result falling within the statutory definition of the offence (death, in the cases mentioned), and this result occurs through a course of events that does not correspond to the causal process envisaged by the perpetrator. In dolus generalis cases, however, the first act, which is aimed at killing, does not result in death; death is brought about by a second act. In premature completion cases, by contrast, the first act, which is not aimed at causing the result, brings about the result.

In this situation, it must be accepted that the death caused by the first act is objectively attributable, that is, foreseeable for the perpetrator. On this assumption, the question arises whether the prematurely occurring result, that is, the fact that the perpetrator’s first act brought death forward to an earlier point in time, can be regarded as a legally insignificant causal deviation and accepted as a completed killing.195

The prevailing view in legal scholarship is that this is one of the cases of deviation from the causal process envisaged by the perpetrator. Such deviations are regarded as insignificant, and the existence of a completed intentional offence is accepted here.196

Puppe, in line with the Court and proceeding from the view that the blow the husband struck to the head with the spanner was a typical method of killing, argues that every act that renders the victim unconscious must be assessed within the concept of “danger of intent”197 and that punishment for the completed offence must be imposed. For by rendering the victim defenceless, the perpetrator has already put into effect a method capable of bringing about the result of killing. Moreover, since the perpetrator cannot be expected to foresee every point of the causal development, there is no circumstance affecting causation either.198

Schroeder argues that in such situations the perpetrator has no intent directed at completing the offence. According to Schroeder, if the result occurs during an attempt that is not yet completed (incomplete attempt), it must be accepted that the perpetrator did not know that his conduct would produce a concrete result. In this situation there is a mistake about the perpetrator’s principal act and an incomplete attempt; the perpetrator could easily have stepped back by voluntarily abandoning the offence, and in this situation an offence committed by negligence may possibly arise.199

Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, on the other hand, state that it is not possible to agree with this view, because an act of incomplete attempt also stems from the perpetrator’s will to realise the elements of the offence, and the German legislature treats incomplete (unfinished) attempt and completed (finished) attempt in the same way, without drawing any distinction between them in terms of wrongfulness and culpability.200 For example, where the perpetrator thinks that he must administer ten separate doses of a particular poison in order to cause a person’s death, the perpetrator’s intent to complete the offence, that is, the idea that he has done everything necessary for the result to occur, has according to Schroeder not yet been formed. Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, however, state that a prematurely occurring result must also be regarded as the perpetrator’s intentional act. Consequently, where there is an insignificant deviation from the envisaged causal link, the perpetrator must be punished for a completed intentional offence. Voluntary abandonment of the offence can come into consideration only in exceptional situations in which the result cannot be attributed to the perpetrator’s act.201

However, the occurrence of the result at the preparatory stage, contrary to the perpetrator’s expectation, is regarded as a significant deviation. In this case the perpetrator’s liability for a negligent offence may come into question.202 For where a preparatory act triggers the occurrence of the result, the existence of a completed intentional offence cannot be accepted. This applies, for example, where a rifle goes off by itself while being cleaned, and likewise in the abduction case in which the victim was planned to be killed elsewhere and after several intervening acts. The BGH likewise does not accept the existence of a “legally relevant” intent at the preparatory stage and states that the first act must be assessed merely as negligent killing (or, in the abduction case, as bodily injury aggravated by its result). The reason why the perpetrator’s firm decision, at the stage of preparatory acts, to commit a particular offence does not constitute “intent” is that the result must be based on an act committed intentionally that is an element of an offence, and such an act does not yet exist at the preparatory stage.203

In resolving this problem, it could be argued that the perpetrator created a danger in accordance with his decision, that this danger must be regarded as covered by intent also at the preparatory stage or during a trial run, since it does not matter in which version the act led to the result, because these versions can be attributed to the same act of creating the risk of killing; this, however, should not be accepted in accordance with the view of a criminal law of the act, since it would extend punishment too far into the area of preparatory acts.

Although there is a tendency to resolve dolus generalis and reverse dolus generalis situations in the same way, the legal justification can be the same for both situations only when they are considered from the perspective of the completion solution. In this way, the deviation in the causal link is regarded as insignificant in both situations. In the attempt solution, by contrast, the reason for rejecting completion is that the initial risk is not realised in the result caused by the second act, whereas in the case of premature completion it is that the perpetrator has “not yet” developed a perfect intent (to complete the attempt).204

On the other hand, some authors who defend the attempt solution for dolus generalis do not consider the same solution appropriate for “premature completion”.205 In fact, it is easier to arrive at the attempt solution in the case of premature completion than in dolus generalis, since in dolus generalis the perpetrator foresaw that what he was doing could already bring about the result; consequently, intentional completion can be accepted where the initial risk has not really been replaced by a second risk and there has merely been a change in the accompanying circumstances. In reverse dolus generalis, by contrast, the perpetrator has not yet contemplated the possibility of completion.206 In our view, it is an interesting approach that authors who consider the attempt solution appropriate in dolus generalis cases do not consider this view appropriate in reverse dolus generalis.

We consider that approaching the matter from the perspective of the attempt view in the case of premature completion will very probably lead us to an erroneous conclusion. In this situation the perpetrator has begun his act with suitable means and methods in order to achieve the result that he envisaged (intended) would occur a few acts later. Since the perpetrator has also begun his act directed at the result, it is clear that he has intent here. It is only that the perpetrator did not think that his act or his means could take effect through the first acts. Consequently, in this situation there is no problem with the perpetrator’s act or with his intent. There is merely an insignificant deviation in the causal process. To regard this deviation as significant and to say that voluntary abandonment by the perpetrator was possible, that perhaps he would have abandoned voluntarily, and that the perpetrator must therefore be punished for an offence that remained at the attempt stage, would mean rewarding a perpetrator who has clearly manifested his intent to commit the offence. This is contrary to the concept of justice (not to intuitions) that is sought through a teleological interpretation of the law. Regarding the deviation as insignificant, by contrast, is dogmatically consistent, since it rests on the foundations of the theory of crime.

Consequently, in the case of reverse dolus generalis, dogmatic problems and debate do not arise with the same intensity as in the basic dolus generalis situations. Indeed, whether premature completion cases are examined on the basis of the adequacy theory or of the theory that the perpetrator realised his plan, the same conclusion is reached. This conclusion also shows us that the attempt solution does not yield a theoretically correct result here. When the differentiating solutions are applied to premature completion cases, they too reach the conclusion we have reached.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The importance of dolus generalis cases lies in the fact that, for fully two centuries, the most important dogmatic questions of the theory of crime have been debated around this subject, and will continue to be debated in the future. In this way, many components of the theory of crime are positioned eclectically around one subject, harmonised and justified in a logical and consistent manner with regard to their practical consequences; the components of the theory of crime are thereby virtually subjected to a consistency test. The cesspit case and similar cases are extremely important in providing a basis for this kind of debate.

The debates conducted on this subject and on this type of case show us this richness and diversity. In this context, the first question debated is whether the final result (death) can be objectively attributed to the perpetrator’s first act, that is, the objective elements of the statutory definition of the offence. This debate may take place within the framework of views that are in fact theories of attribution, such as the adequate causation view (whether or not the perpetrator’s act was adequate to bring about the result of death), or it may be addressed in the context of the theory of conditions, which explains the causal link, and the theory of objective imputation, which limits it (whether or not death is regarded as the concretisation of the risk created by the first act). As regards the subjective element of the statutory definition, the problems of the correspondence that must exist between intent and the objective elements of the statutory definition must be resolved. For this reason, problems of correspondence arise that are assessed as “significant” or “insignificant” in terms of the causal link between the events.207

Most of the proposals for resolving this problem focus on the basic aspects of the theory of crime mentioned above. The proposals are not, however, confined to these, and attempts have been made to explain the subject by reference to other elements of the theory of crime as well. For example, recourse has often been had to considerations of justice holding that the completed-offence solution ensures fairer punishment, or to a moral criticism of the solution’s implicit proximity to a criminal law of attitude. In addition, attempts have at times been made (although less so today) to explain the concept of dolus generalis by reference to its structural similarity to other dogmatic categories such as indirect perpetration or actiones libera in causa. Some proposals referred to as differentiating solutions attempt to construct a solution by adding differentiating elements to the adequacy view, such as a special assessment of the subjective element of the first act (for instance, the difference between direct intent and conditional intent, or whether there was an intention to initiate the second act). Finally, some approaches bring complex problems such as the unity and plurality of acts or offences into the debate.208

Two analyses must be distinguished here: a) whether the result that ultimately occurred can be objectively attributed to the first act; b) if it can be attributed, whether this attribution also holds good as regards intent. In this context, it is clear that the first act is causal for the final result that occurred. For according to the “conditio sine qua non” formula of the theory of conditions, had the perpetrator not performed this first act, which he performed intentionally, there would have been no need at all for the second act; consequently, if this first act is mentally eliminated, the final result also disappears.209 Hence, as regards the objective elements of the statutory definition, there is no problem in terms of the causal link between the first act and the final result that occurred.

The more controversial examination, however, and the one that must be carried out in order to determine the perpetrator’s liability, is to determine whether, although the first act caused this result, the result can also be objectively attributed to that act. There is no doubt that the first act created a legally impermissible risk. The debate concerns whether the result of death can be regarded as the realisation of the risk created by this first act.210 Sowada states in this regard, within the framework of general foreseeability, that it is in keeping with ordinary experience of life that a person without special medical knowledge, in the specific situation, should confuse the victim’s state of mere unconsciousness with death and kill the victim through the act of disposing of the (supposed) body. On this basis, the occurrence of the result of death must be regarded as the wrongfulness of the result in the context of the first act and must not be treated as a mere accident.211

In parallel with this view, those who refer to the plan of the perpetrator who carried out the first act, or to his intention, at the time of the first act, to carry out the second, also put forward similar arguments. In this context, Roxin responds to the thesis defended by Sancinetti that “death is the realisation not of the initial risk but of another risk”: Roxin argues that the view of “the creation of two different risks” is not persuasive and, in this context, states that for a completed intentional offence to be attributed to the perpetrator, the death occurring through the second act must in any event have been foreseeable in advance; but if the prohibited risk of the second act was already present in the first act, it cannot really be understood why the result should be regarded as the realisation not of the initial risk but of an entirely different risk.212

On this basis, as regards the subjective dimension of the statutory definition of the offence, the question to be answered is: “Can the victim’s death be attributed to the perpetrator in the subjective sense as a result he brought about intentionally?”213 German case law and part of legal scholarship see no problem in such situations. In their view, there is here an insignificant deviation from the causal process envisaged by the perpetrator. Accordingly, the perpetrator’s intent must cover the causal process, but it is sufficient for him to envisage the connection between his act and the result in its essential features. This is because it is impossible to know the actual causal relationship exactly, and the perpetrator therefore cannot be expected to know it.214 The argument against this view states that it is contrary to the principle of contemporaneity, which requires intent to be present “at the time of the act”. In this situation, the act that caused the victim’s death was carried out without intent to kill. In response to this objection, Roxin argues that intent need not be present throughout the entire process; it is necessary and sufficient for it to be present at the moment when the perpetrator relinquishes control over the causal link. According to Roxin, in dolus generalis cases the victim’s death is attributed to the perpetrator as an adequate consequence of the first act covered by his intent. This inference is sufficient for attributing the result to the perpetrator’s intent, since the result is regarded as the realisation of the perpetrator’s plan.215

In a context in which the debate is delimited in this way, the disagreement essentially stems from the fact that the supporters of the completed-offence theory focus on the “volitional dimension” of the intent present in the first act. This view considers it unnecessary to know with certainty the risk that led to the victim’s death. The supporters of the attempt solution, by contrast, place stronger emphasis on the cognitive dimension of intent and argue that the perpetrator’s representation must also include certain knowledge of the risk that caused the victim’s death.216 Consequently, which view is to be adopted depends on the answer given to the question whether greater weight is to be attached to the cognitive or to the volitional dimension of intent.217 In the theory of crime we attach importance to the perpetrator’s cognitive dimension, that is, to the element of knowledge in intent, and we even consider it to carry more weight than willing or, in other words, than the element of wanting in intent. We consider, however, that knowledge alone is not sufficient, particularly for resolving the borderline cases that form the subject of this article (just as in the distinction between conditional intent and conscious negligence). For we consider that a person cannot be expected to be aware of all the processes in which he is involved or to have near-certain knowledge of those processes.218

In our view, there is in essence no single solution that can be applied to all dolus generalis cases. Rather, the prevailing method of solution varies according to the angle from which the case is viewed. For example, if the emphasis is placed on the fact that the perpetrator would not have performed the second act had he not performed the first, and that the process must therefore be considered as a whole in order to reach a just result, the completion view may be adopted; if the correspondence, that is, the contemporaneity, between the objective and subjective elements of the offence is required, the attempt view may be adopted; and if the occurrence of death through the second act is regarded as an insignificant deviation in the causal process, the adequacy view may be adopted.

Those who defend the completed-offence view, in criticising the defenders of the attempt solution, argue that “the treatment of causal deviations is not a matter of logic but a matter of political or some other kind of evaluation”. The supporters of the attempt view, for their part, state that their opponents practise a kind of “decisionism”. It must be said, however, that the resolution of such situations always involves a degree of decisionism.219

This debate, in turn, leads us to the question of which domain law essentially belongs to. Without answering this question, it is not possible to find a solution to the concrete problem. In other words, is law purely a field of science, or is it a field concerned with values? To answer this question, the following question must first be answered: what is right, which is the foundation of law? Can the concept of “right” be defined and shown concretely, like an apple, a book, a strand of hair or a computer? It is not possible to show and define the concept of right concretely in this way. The concept of right is therefore in fact an evaluation. That a person has a right to something, or that his right has been infringed, depends solely on a right having been recognised for that person by the legal order. This act of recognition involves making a value judgement about something. Someone, or some persons (the legislature), has made a value judgement on recognising something as a right of a particular person or persons. For example, when we say that “the intellectual property right in this article belongs to its author”, we are in fact speaking not of the concrete existence of this article, printed on paper or displayed digitally, but of a value judgement recognised as a right, since in the eyes of the legislature an intellectual creation is of a value that must and can be protected as a property right. Hence the foundation of law concerns right and, consequently, value judgement.

On this basis, it may be said that law, formally, that is, as regards its external elements such as the hierarchy of norms, the entry into force of laws, the principle that there is no crime and no punishment without law, the principle that laws cannot apply retroactively, and the rule that whoever kills a human being is to be sentenced to life imprisonment, is a natural science. As regards its dimension of content, however, consisting of prohibitions such as “you shall not kill”, “you shall not steal” and “you shall not commit sexual assault”, and of commands such as “you shall look after your ascendants and descendants” and “you shall perform your duty on time and properly”, it may be said that law always involves a value judgement and may in this respect be a cultural science. For these prohibitions and commands are framed according to a particular value judgement. Hence it is possible and normal for law, which in terms of its content is a value, to make value judgements as a “decision-maker” on certain matters. Dolus generalis cases are precisely one of the situations in which such value judgements manifest themselves and in which an evaluation must be made and a decision reached as a result.

In our view, applying the decisions and explanations of the BGH appears to be the most reasonable method of solving the overwhelming majority of the problems raised by dolus generalis cases. At the same time, the fact must not be overlooked that the BGH, because it aims at a practical solution, virtually brushes aside the theoretical debates on this subject by calling every deviation insignificant. For although in the great majority of dolus generalis cases the deviation may be insignificant, in some cases that are left out of account the deviation may genuinely deserve consideration. In such situations, since the deviation is very great, the natural connection between the two acts carried out by the perpetrator may be broken, and the attempt view may then come into consideration.

In conclusion, we consider that none of the views put forward to resolve dolus generalis problems constitutes on its own a complete and final answer, that as many examples can be constructed to falsify each view as to confirm it, and that this subject will therefore continue to remain one of the controversial topics of the theory of crime.

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Footnotes

  1. Istanbul Aydın University, Faculty of Law, Department of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and IT Law, İstanbul/Türkiye, E-mail: muratdulger@aydin.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0002- 1574-1755. The author undertakes that his work complies with the principles of scientific ethics. ↑
  2. Morán Ángel José Sanz, “Aproximación al problema del denominado ‘dolus generalis’”, InDret: Revista para el Análiss del Derecho, No. 3, 2016, s. 2. ↑
  3. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 2. ↑
  4. Sternberg-Lieben Detlev / Schuster Frank, “Vorsätzliches und fahrlässiges Handeln”, Schönke/Schröder Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar, 30. Auflage, C.H. Beck, München, 2019, § 15, kn. 58; Jescheck Hans Heinrich / Weigend Thomas, Lehrbuch des Allgemeiner Teil, 5. Auflage, Duncker & Humbold, Berlin, 1996, s. 314. ↑
  5. Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB K, § 15, kn. 58. ↑
  6. Maiwald Manfred, “Der ‘Dolus Generalis’ Ein Beitrung zur Lehre von der Zeruchnung”, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (ZStW), Vol. 78, Issue 1-2, 1966, s. 31 (30-58). ↑
  7. Roxin Claus, Gedanken zum “Dolus Generalis”, Kultur, Kriminalität, Strafrecht: Festschrift für Thomas Würtenberger zum 70. Geburtstag, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1977, s. 109. ↑
  8. “Such situations are not as artificial as they appear at first sight. They are encountered frequently, in different variations, in the case law. For example, there have been cases in which the supposedly dead body was buried in the ground with fatal effect (DRiZ 1932, No. 285), thrown into a river (RGSt 70, 257), thrown into a latrine pit (BGH MDR 1952, 16) or into a cesspit (BGHSt 14, 193), hanged in order to simulate suicide (OGHSt 1, 75) or exposed to the effect of poisonous gases (OGHSt 2, 285).” See Roxin Claus / Greco Luís, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Band I, 5. Auflage, C.H.Beck, München, 2020, § 12 kn. 174; Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 109. To the same effect, see Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 2; Oğlakçıoğlu Mustafa Temmuz, “Gübre Çukuru Olayının (BGHST 14, 193) 50 Yılı ‘Daha Da Eski Testideki Eski Şarap’”, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Prof. Dr. Durmuş Tezcan’a Armağan, C. 21, Özel S., 2019, s. 3299. For the original of this article, see Oğlakçıoğlu Mustafa Temmuz, “50 Jahre Jauchegrubenfall (BGHSt 14, 193) – Alter Wein in noch älteren Schläuchen?”, Juristische Rundschau (JR), Vol. 2011, No. 3, 2011. ↑
  9. Sancinetti Marcelo A., “Dolus Generalis” und “strafrechtliches Glück”, Festcshrift für Claus Roxin zum 70. Geburtsatg, (Hrsg) Bernd Schünemann / Hans Achenbach / Wilfried Bottke / Bernhard Haffke / Hans-Joachim Rudolphi, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin / New York, 2001, s. 350 (349-364); Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 7. ↑
  10. Jakobs Günther, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil: Die Grundlagen und die Zurechnungslehre Lehrbuch, 2. Auflage, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin - New York, 1991, § 8, kn. 77. ↑
  11. “In some cases, although there are acts that naturally appear to be several, the legal order treats them as if they were a single act. In natural unity of acts, several acts of the same kind directed at a single goal are carried out within the scope of a single volitional decision and a single intent. These acts display a close temporal and spatial connection. This natural unity between the acts is also perceived as a unit by an objective outside observer.” Dülger Murat Volkan, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 2. Baskı, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2023, s. 810. ↑
  12. BGH Urteil vom 26.04.1960 (5 StR 77/60). Jauchegruben case, BGH 14, 193. Similar decisions are also found in Spanish case law; the decisions of the Spanish Supreme Court on the subject are as follows: “Decision of 14 November 1980: the accused renders the victim unconscious by squeezing his neck tightly; believing him to be dead, the accused tries to simulate suicide by tying a television cable around the victim’s neck and in doing so causes the victim to suffocate. The decision of 20 January 1982 deals with a situation in which the accused, believing that his son, whom he intended to kill, had drowned, took him out of the bathtub and dropped the child, who was still alive, onto the floor, thereby causing the child’s death. More recently, the decision of 18 November 2008 deals with a case in which the perpetrator strangled the victim with a rope and, after placing a plastic bag over the head of the body they believed to be dead, threw it down a cliff, so that the exact cause and time of death could not be established with certainty.” Cited in Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 3. ↑
  13. Although we consider the terms “causal process” or “causal course” to be a more accurate expression than causal link, the term causal link has been used throughout the study in order to avoid conceptual confusion. Where, however, causal link is not appropriate and a process is meant, the term causal process has been preferred. ↑
  14. Academics working in Germany state that the cesspit case has become increasingly important in German legal education with regard to the question “how should the conflict between different views be presented in a legal paper?”; see Oğlakçıoğlu, s. 3300. ↑
  15. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, 32; Sanz Morán also states expressly that this concept was first used by Weber; see Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 4. ↑
  16. It should be noted that the general intent referred to here is not used in the sense of the distinction between general intent and specific intent found in older criminal law textbooks. Weber used the word general in the sense of an intent extending to the general, that is, to the second act. ↑
  17. Benedikt von Weber Heinrich, “Ueber die verschiedenen Arten des Dolus”, Neues Archiv des Criminalrechts, No. 7, 1825, 576 vd. ↑
  18. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 31; Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 4. ↑
  19. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 31, 32. ↑
  20. Michael Hettinger, “Der sog. dolus generalis: Sonderfall eines „Irrtums über den Kausalverlauf”?”, Festschrift für Günter Spendel zum 70. Geburtstag, Walter de Gruyter, (Hrsg) Manfred Seebode, Berlin New York, 1992, s. 239 (238-255). This article may also be consulted on the significance of Weber’s contribution and the debate it gave rise to. ↑
  21. Welzel Hans, Das Deutsche Strafrecht, 11. Auflage, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1969, s. 74; Graf zu Dohna Alexander, Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre, 4. Auflage, Ludwig Röhrscheid, Bonn, 1950, s. 27. ↑
  22. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 32. ↑
  23. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 35. ↑
  24. Weber, s. 576. ↑
  25. Weber, s. 577. ↑
  26. Mayer Hellmut, “Das Problem des sogenannten dolus generalis”, Juristen Zeitung (JZ), Vol. 11, No. 4, 1956, s. 110 (109-112); Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 5. ↑
  27. For details on the theory of conditions, see Dülger, Genel Hükümler, (2), s. 360 vd. ↑
  28. von Buri Maximilian, “Zur Lehre von der Tödtung”, Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht (GA), Band 11, 1863, s. 753-765. See also Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 32 vd. ↑
  29. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 33; Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 5. ↑
  30. Geyer August, “Zur Lehre vom dolus generalis und vom Kausalzusammenhang”, Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht (GA), Band 13, 1865, s. 239, 243 (239-246). ↑
  31. Mayer, Dolus Generalis, s. 110; Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 6. ↑
  32. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 6. ↑
  33. Sancinetti, s. 352. ↑
  34. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 2. On the problem of terminology, see Sowada Christoph, “Der umgekehrte ‘dolus generalis’: Die vorzeitige Erfolgsherbeiführung als Problem der subjektiven Zurechnung”, Juristische Ausbildung (JURA), Vol. 26, Issue 12, 2004, s. 815 (814-821). ↑
  35. BGHSt 14, 193. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 110. ↑
  36. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 175; Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 110. ↑
  37. Welzel, (11), s. 74. ↑
  38. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 109. ↑
  39. Walter Tonio, “Irrtümer auf Tatbestandsebene”, Handbuch des Strafrechts, Band 2: Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, (Hrsg.) Hilgendorf/Kühl/Valerius, C.F. Müller, Heidelberg, 2019, § 46 kn. 56. ↑
  40. Oğlakçıoğlu, s. 3301. ↑
  41. Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB K, § 15, kn. 57. ↑
  42. Weber, s. 577. ↑
  43. Welzel, (11), s. 74. ↑
  44. İçel Kayıhan / Sokullu-Akıncı Füsun / Özgenç İzzet / Sözüer Adem / Mahmutoğlu Fatih S. / Ünver Yener, İçel Suç Teorisi, 3. Baskı, Beta Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2004, s. 232. ↑
  45. To this effect, see Puppe Ingeborg, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil im Spiegel der Rechtsprechung 4. Auflage, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2019, § 10, kn. 26. ↑
  46. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 31 vd.; Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 7. ↑
  47. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 7. ↑
  48. Puppe, AT, (4), § 10, kn. 26. ↑
  49. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 35. ↑
  50. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 36. ↑
  51. Schroeder Friedrich-Christian, Leibziger Kommentar StGB, 11. Auflage, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, 1994, § 59 kn. 26. ↑
  52. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 36, 37. ↑
  53. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 127. ↑
  54. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 127. ↑
  55. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 120. ↑
  56. Dülger, Genel Hükümler, (2), s. 809 vd. ↑
  57. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 7. ↑
  58. RGSt. 67, 258 (2259). ↑
  59. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 32, 33. ↑
  60. Dülger, Genel Hükümler, (2), s. 360. ↑
  61. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 37. ↑
  62. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 37, 38. ↑
  63. Otto Harro, Grundkurs Strafrecht Die einzelnen Delikte, 7. Auflage, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2005, s. 73. ↑
  64. Heinrich Bernd, Ceza Hukuku Genel Kısım, C. II, Adalet Yayınevi, Ankara, 2015, § 30, kn. 1094. ↑
  65. Kühl, who holds this view, states that the example case must be resolved in this way, although he does not declare himself a supporter of the separation theory; see Kühl Kristian, Strafrecht Allgemenier Teil, 8. Auflage, Verlag Franz Vahlen, München, 2017, § 13, kn. 48. To the same effect, see Gropp Walter, Strafrecht Allgemenier Teil, 4. Auflage, Heidelberg, Springer, 2015, § 4, kn. 135; Ozansü Mehmet Cemil, Ceza Hukukunda Kasttan Doğan Sübjektif Sorumluluk, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2007, s. 97. ↑
  66. To this effect, see Ozansü, Kast, s. 149. Partly to this effect, see Otto, Grundkurs Strafrecht, (7), s. 81. For Otto states that, where the perpetrator has no firm belief as to whether or not the victim is dead, the result must be reached by applying dolus generalis. Otto, Grundkurs Strafrecht, (7), s. 81, 96, 97. While Otto does not accept the application of dolus generalis in the first version of the example, he accepts this form of intent in the second version he himself developed. ↑
  67. On the principle of contemporaneity, see Hruschka Joachim, “Die Herbeiführung eines Erfolges durch einen von zwei Akten bei eindeutigen und bei mehrdeutigen Tatsachenfeststellung”, Juristische Schulung (JuS), 1982, s. 317-324. Hruschka Joachim, Strafrecht nach logisch-analytischer Methode: Systematisch entwickelte Fälle mit Lösungen zum Allgemeinen Teil, 2. Auflage, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin New York, 1988, s. 25 vd.; Jerouscheck Günter / Kölbel Ralf, “Zur Bedeutung des so genannten Koinzidenzprinzips im Strafrecht”, Juristische Schulung (JuS), 2001, s. 422 vd. (417-424). ↑
  68. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 9. ↑
  69. Hettinger, Dolus Generalis, s. 238 vd.; Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 30 vd.; Sancinetti, s. 349 vd. ↑
  70. Freund Georg, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil: Personale Straftatlehre, 2. Auflage, Springer, Berlin Heidelberg, 2009, § 7, kn. 143; Frisch Wolfgang, Tatbestandsmässiges Verhalten und Zurechnung des Erfolgs, C.F. Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, 1988, s. 620 vd. ↑
  71. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 10. ↑
  72. Engisch Karl, Untersuchungen über Vorsatz und Fahrlässigkeit im Strafrecht, Scientia Verlag, Aalen, 1964, s. 72; Frank Reinhard, Das Strafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich nebst dem Einführungsgesetz, J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1931, § 59, kn. 9; Maurach Reinhart / Zipf Heinz, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil: Teilband 1 Grundlehren des Strafrechts und Aufbau der Straftat, 2. Auflage, C.F. Müller, Heidelberg, 1992, § 23 kn. 35; Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 30 vd. ↑
  73. Finger August, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Strafrechts, Carl Heymans Verlag, Berlin, 1904, s. 263. To the same effect earlier, see Binding Karl, Handbuch des Strafrechts, Band I, Duncker & Humbold, Leipzig, 1885, s. 539. To the same effect, see Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 34. ↑
  74. Oğlakçıoğlu, s. 3302. ↑
  75. Dolus antecedens is a Latin term meaning “pre-existing intent”; in criminal law it denotes a person’s having a particular intent (the will to commit an offence) before carrying out an act. The concept relates in particular to questions such as whether this intent continues during the person’s act and how this intent affects criminal liability. Dolus antecedens is distinguished from the intent present at the time of the act (dolus simultaneus). If the will to commit the offence (intent) was formed before the act but does not actually continue during the act, the legal consequences differ. Such situations play an important role in determining the perpetrator’s criminal liability. ↑
  76. Sancinetti, s. 354; 356, 357; Jakobs, AT, (2) §8, kn. 65. ↑
  77. Ozansü, Kast, s. 99, 100. ↑
  78. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 34. ↑
  79. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, 30 vd. ↑
  80. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 111. ↑
  81. Maurach Reinhart, Deutsches Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 4. Auflage, Müller, 1971, s. 282; in particular Engisch, Vorsatz und Fahrlässigkeit, 72; Frank, § 59, kn. 9; Schmidhaüser Eberhard, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 2. Auflage, J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1975, § 10, kn. 46. ↑
  82. Schroeder, LK StGB, (11), § 59, kn. 130. ↑
  83. In this sense, see also Backmann Leonhard E., “Grundfälle zum strafrechtlichen Irrtum”, Juristische Schulung (JuS), 1972, s. 196 vd. The author proposes an “assessment of intent” and bases this assessment on the perpetrator’s actual will at the stage of the second act, and for this reason accepts only the existence of an attempt. ↑
  84. Sancinetti, s. 349. ↑
  85. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 179. ↑
  86. Geyer, Dolus Generalis, s. 314. The author explains here that death may be a matter of mere chance and that, for negligence to exist, the results to be produced by the perpetrator’s act must not lie outside the realm of probability. ↑
  87. Pfotenhauer Carl Eduard, Der Einfluß des factischen Irrthums und der sogenannten Verirrung auf die Strafbarkeit vorsätzlich verübter Verbrechen, Gebrúder Reichenbach, Band II, Leipzig, 1839, s. 132. ↑
  88. Hruschka, Die Herbeiführung, s. 319; Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 58. ↑
  89. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s.11. ↑
  90. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 179. ↑
  91. Sancinetti, s. 350. ↑
  92. Gropp, AT, (4), § 5 kn. 76. ↑
  93. Gropp, AT, (4), § 5 kn. 77. ↑
  94. Sancinetti, s. 362, 363. ↑
  95. Stratenwerth Günther / Kuhlen Lothar, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil: Die Straftat, Verlag Franz Mahlen, München, 2011, §8, kn. 93; Wessels Johannes / Beulke Werner / Satzger Helmut, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil; Die Straftat und ihr Aufbau, 47. Auflage, C.F. Müller, Heidelberg, 2017, § 378 vd.; von Hippel Robert, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Springer Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, 1932, s. 139; von Liszt Franz / Schmidt Eberhard, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Strafrechts: Band I Einleitung und Allgemeiner Teil, 26. Auflage, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin Leipzig, 1932, s. 268; Mayer, Dolus Generalis, s. 109 vd. That there is merely an insignificant deviation is also emphasised in the decisions BGH MDR 1952, s. 16; BGHSt. 7, 325; 14, 193. Cited in Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 33, dn. 17; Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 7. ↑
  96. Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB K, § 15, kn. 58. ↑
  97. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 33, 34. ↑
  98. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 38; Mayer, Dolus Generalis, s. 109 vd. ↑
  99. Most recently BGHSt 7, 329; 14, 194; 23, 135. It is stated that only the meaning of the decision RGSt 70, 257 on this subject is unclear; see Welzel, (11), s. 74; Jakobs, AT, (2), § 8 kn. 65; Sancinetti, s. 352, 352; Oğlakçıoğlu, s. 3302; Thomas Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch: StGB, 72. Auflage, C.H. Beck, München, 2025, § 16 kn. 7; von Rengier Rudolf, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 11. Auflage, C.H. Beck, München, 2019, § 15 kn. 5; Wessels/Beulke/Satzger, AT, (47), kn. 262 vd. ↑
  100. Vogel Joachim / Bülte Jens, “Irrtum über Tatumstände”, Strafgesetzbuch Leipziger Kommentar (LK), 13. Auflage, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2020, § 16, kn. 58; Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58; Stratenwerth/Kuhlen, AT, § 8 kn. 93; Wessels/Beulke/Satzger, AT, (47), kn. 262 vd; Mayer, Dolus Generalis, s. 109 vd.; Jescheck/Weigend, AT, (5), s. 311 vd. ↑
  101. BGHSt 14, 193. ↑
  102. BGHSt 7, 329. See also Sancinetti, s. 352, 353. ↑
  103. BGHSt 14, 193. See also Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 110, 111. ↑
  104. Mayer, Dolus Generalis, s. 110; Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58. ↑
  105. Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58. ↑
  106. BGHSt 14, 193. ↑
  107. Cited in Puppe, AT, (4), § 10, kn. 25; Ozansü, Kast, s. 98. ↑
  108. Oğlakçıoğlu, s. 3302. ↑
  109. RG 67, 258; OGH 1, 75; BGH 7, 329; MDR/D 52, 16. Fischer, StGB, (72), § 16 kn. 9; Jescheck/Weigend, AT, (5), s. 314; Welzel, (11), s. 74; Wessels/Beulke/Satzger, AT, (47), kn. 381; Triffterer, Puppe, Roxin, Schroeder, Rudolphi and Stratenwerth/Kuhlen also hold this view. ↑
  110. BGH 14, 193. ↑
  111. Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58; Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12 kn. 179; for the contrary view, see Hruschka, Die Herbeiführung, s. 320. ↑
  112. Hettinger, Dolus Generalis, s. 238 vd. ↑
  113. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12 kn. 177; Jerouscheck/Kölbel, s. 422; Schroeder, LK StGB, (11), § 16 kn. 31; Kühl, AT, (8), § 13 kn. 47. ↑
  114. Oğlakçıoğlu, s. 3302, 3303. ↑
  115. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 30. ↑
  116. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 9. ↑
  117. Freund, AT, (2), s. 306. ↑
  118. Heinrich, C. II, § 30, kn. 1098; Jescheck/Weigend, AT, (5), s. 314. ↑
  119. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 30. ↑
  120. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 34, 35. ↑
  121. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 38. ↑
  122. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 57, 58. ↑
  123. Hettinger, Dolus Generalis, s. 251. ↑
  124. Köhler Michael, “Der Begriff der Zurechnung”, Festschrift für Hans Joachim Hirsch zum 70. Geburtstag, (Hrsg.) Thomas Weigend/Georg Küpper, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1999, s. 80. ↑
  125. Maiwald, Dolus Generalis, s. 35. ↑
  126. Sancinetti, s. 353. ↑
  127. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 176. ↑
  128. BGHSt 14, 193. ↑
  129. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 178. ↑
  130. Walter, Handbuch des Strafrechts, § 46, kn. 58. ↑
  131. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 178. ↑
  132. Walter, Handbuch des Strafrechts, § 46, kn. 58. ↑
  133. BGH NSIZ 2010, 503. ↑
  134. Walter, Handbuch des Strafrechts, § 46, kn. 58. ↑
  135. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 177. ↑
  136. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 121. ↑
  137. BGHSt 7, 363 vd. ↑
  138. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 177. ↑
  139. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 121, 122. ↑
  140. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 180. ↑
  141. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 122. ↑
  142. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 123, 124. ↑
  143. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 126. ↑
  144. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 114, 118. ↑
  145. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 121. ↑
  146. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 116. ↑
  147. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 116, 121; see also Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12 kn. 167. ↑
  148. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 121-127; see also Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12 kn. 165; Sancinetti, s. 356. ↑
  149. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 180. ↑
  150. Roxin Claus, “Gedanken zur Problematik der Zurechnung im Strafrecht”, Festschrift für Richard M. Honig zum 80. Geburtstag, O. Schwartz, Göttingen, 1970, s. 136 (133-150); Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 11 kn. 47. ↑
  151. Sancinetti, s. 356. ↑
  152. Jakobs, AT, (2), § 8, kn. 65. ↑
  153. Sancinetti, s. 356. 357. ↑
  154. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 122. Nor does this contradict the assertion that "the perpetrator’s plan [was in fact realised despite the causal deviation]" (aaO, 126); for the assumption that the perpetrator’s plan "was in fact realised" depends on an assessment of the perpetrator’s hypothetical conduct. ↑
  155. Sancinetti, s. 357. ↑
  156. Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 123. ↑
  157. Sancinetti, s. 357. ↑
  158. Sancinetti, s. 358. ↑
  159. Sancinetti, s. 363, 364. ↑
  160. Stratenwerth/Kuhlen, AT, § 8, kn. 93. ↑
  161. Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58. ↑
  162. To the same effect, see Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 120. ↑
  163. Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58. ↑
  164. Welzel, (11), s. 74. A similar approach is also adopted by the following authors: Sternberg- Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58. ↑
  165. Stratenwerth/Kuhlen, AT, § 8, kn. 93. Stratenwerth dealt with this subject under the heading of intent in the 3rd edition of his general part textbook, and under the heading of objective imputation from the 4th edition onwards. Although the author dealt with the subject under different headings, and thus from different perspectives, in different editions of his book, he explained it within the framework of the same view. For this comparison, see Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 12, dn. 46. ↑
  166. Rudolphi Hans Joachim, Systematischer Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (SK - StGB), Band I, (Hrsg.) Jürgen Wolter, 9. Auflage, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln, 2016, § 16, kn. 34. ↑
  167. Sancinetti, s. 355. ↑
  168. Schroeder, LK StGB, (11), § 16, kn. 31. To the same effect, see Eser Albin / Burkhardt Björn, Strafrecht Bd.I, Schwerpunkt Allgemeine Verbrechenselemente, 4. Auflage, C.H.Beck, München, 1992, kn. 45. ↑
  169. Schroeder, LK StGB, (11), § 16, kn. 29. ↑
  170. Sancinetti, s. 355; Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 12. ↑
  171. Schroeder, LK StGB, (11), § 16, kn. 29. ↑
  172. Schroeder, LK StGB, (11), § 16, kn. 31. ↑
  173. Walter, Handbuch des Strafrechts, § 46, kn. 57. ↑
  174. Peters Karl, “Mehrere Schüsse bei einer Tötung”, Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht (GA), 1958, s. 101 (97-107). ↑
  175. According to the author, natural unity of acts requires the combined presence of a. spatial and temporal proximity between the different acts, b. a concentration of typical wrongfulness and culpability, and c. a similar or identical motivational situation. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 18, 19. For the author’s detailed views on this subject, see also Sanz Morán Ángel José, El Concurso de Delitos: Aspectos de Política Legislativa, Ediciones Universidad de Valladolid, Valladolid, 1986, s. 130, 131. ↑
  176. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 18, 19. ↑
  177. Introduced into Turkish legal scholarship as Weber’s intent by Önder Ayhan, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, C. II- III, 2. Baskı, Beta Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1992, s. 293; Artuk Mehmet Emin / Gökcen Ahmet / Alşahin Mehmet Emin / Çakır Kerim, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 13. Baskı, Adalet Yayınevi, Ankara, 2019, s. 419; Demirbaş Timur, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 15. Baskı, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2020, s. 393. Ozansü has also stated that the subject of dolus generalis is referred to in Turkish legal scholarship as “Weber’s intent”; see Ozansü, Kast, s. 97. Indeed, until writing this article we too dealt with and explained the subject in the same way; see Dülger, Genel Hükümler, (2), s. 472-474. The reason why it bears this name in Turkish legal scholarship is that this form of intent was written about by von Weber; see Weber, s. 549 vd. ↑
  178. Gropp, AT, (4), § 4, kn. 134; Freund, AT, (2), s. 305; Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 174 vd.; Kühl, AT, (8), § 13, kn. 46. Heinrich, C. II, § 30, kn. 1088; Jescheck/Weigend, AT, (5), s. 314. ↑
  179. Önder Ayhan, C. II-III, (2), s. 293; Artuk/Gökcen/ Alşahin/Çakır, Genel Hükümler, (13), s. 419; Demirbaş, Genel Hükümler, (15), s. 393. ↑
  180. Önder, C. II-III, (2), s. 293; Artuk/Gökcen/Alşahin/Çakır, Genel Hükümler, (13), s. 420. ↑
  181. Önder, C. II-III, (2), s. 293; Artuk/Gökcen/Alşahin/Çakır, Genel Hükümler, (13), s. 419; Demirbaş, Genel Hükümler, (15) s. 393. ↑
  182. Hakeri Hakan, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 24. Baskı, Adalet Yayınevi, Ankara, 2021, s. 218, 219. ↑
  183. Apaydın Cengiz, Ceza Hukukunda Doğrudan Kast, Olası Kast, Basit Taksir ve Bilinçli Taksir Kavramları, no place, date or publisher of publication given. ↑
  184. Dönmezer Sulhi / Erman Sahir, Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku Genel Kısım, C. II, 12. Baskı, Beta Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1999, s. 229. ↑
  185. Öztürk Bahri / Erdem Mustafa Ruhan, Uygulamalı Ceza Hukuku ve Güvenlik Tedbirleri Hukuku, 21. Baskı, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2021, kn. 847. ↑
  186. Özbek Veli Özer / Doğan Koray / Bacaksız Pınar, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 13. Baskı, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2022, s. 442. ↑
  187. Koca Mahmut / Üzülmez İlhan, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 13. Baskı, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2020, s. 259. ↑
  188. Özen Mustafa, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, Adalet Yayınevi, Ankara, 2017, s. 598. ↑
  189. İçel Kayıhan, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 6. Baskı, Beta Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2021, s. 498. ↑
  190. For the result of death arises from the perpetrator’s acts, and the perpetrator knows and wants it; in other words, he acts intentionally. Under Art. 81 TCK, the penalty for intentional killing is life imprisonment. If, however, we adopt the attempt view and accept that attempted intentional killing and negligent killing have occurred, the perpetrator will be punished, under Art. 35 TCK, with imprisonment of nine to fifteen years for attempted intentional killing and, under Art. 85 TCK, with imprisonment of two to six years for negligent killing, that is, with imprisonment of eleven to twenty-one years in total. In other words, a person who ought to receive a sentence of life imprisonment can be sentenced to at most twenty-one years’ imprisonment. Moreover, where this person acted with conditional intent, since there is no attempt in respect of conditional intent, the perpetrator’s first act can be classified only as intentional bodily injury, and the penalty that can then be imposed on the perpetrator will be at most nine years. ↑
  191. Sancinetti, s. 351; Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58. ↑
  192. In the 1955 decision BGH GA 55, 123, the victim died in the struggle that ensued because he resisted while trying to prevent his execution. In the abduction case (BGH NStZ 2002, 309), the perpetrator overpowered his wife violently at home and then wanted to take her, using two different cars, to a place 100 km away in order to obtain her signature there and kill her. The victim, however, had already died from the violence used to overpower her. In the ‘air injection case’ (BGH NStZ 2002, 475), the perpetrator wanted first to beat the resisting victim and then to kill him by injecting air into his vein. The victim, however, died as a result of the blows he had suffered, and the perpetrators, believing that the victim was still alive, did not realise that the air injection they administered could not cause his death. For the examples, see Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 182. For decisions to similar effect, see RG DStR 39, 177; NJW 02, 1057; NStZ 02, 475. Cited in Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58. ↑
  193. RG DStR 1939, 177. On the decision, see also Sowada, Dolus Generalis, s. 816. ↑
  194. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), §12, kn. 189. ↑
  195. The decisions referred to are BGH NStZ 2002, 309 and BGH NStZ 2002, 475. For details, see Roxin Claus, “Zur Erfolgszurechnung bei vorzeitig ausgelöstem Kausalverlauf”, Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht (GA), 2003, s. 257-268; Wolter Jürgen, “Zum umgekehrten dolus generalis. Subjektive Zurechnung eines beendeten (tauglichen) Versuchs bei objektiver Zurechnung der Vollendung”, Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht (GA), 2006, s. 406- 411. ↑
  196. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), §12, kn. 183. ↑
  197. Fischer, StGB, (72), § 16 kn. 9; Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), §12, kn. 182; Sowada, Dolus Generalis, 817 vd.; Stratenwerth/Kuhlen, AT, § 8, kn. 94; Welzel, (11), s. 75; Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58. See also Puppe Ingeborg, Vorsatz und Zurechnung, Heidelberger Forum, Decker & Müller, Heidelberg, 1992, 56 vd.; Puppe Ingeborg, Nomos Kommentar (NK), Band I, (Hrsg.) Urs Kindhäuser / Ulfrid Neumann / Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen / Frank Saliger, Nomos Verlag, Baden – Baden, 2023, § 16, kn. 86 vd. ↑
  198. According to the theory of the danger of intent, an attempt begins only when the perpetrator knowingly begins to set in motion his causal acts that create an intentional danger. These acts must bring about the result intentionally, so that the acts in question can be linked to the perpetrator’s intent. Puppe, AT, (4), § 10, kn. 11. ↑
  199. Puppe, AT, (4), § 10, kn. 11. ↑
  200. Schroeder, LK StGB, (11), § 16, kn. 34. Similarly, see Herzberg Rolf Dietrich, “Aberratio ictus und abweichender Tatverlauf”, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (ZStW), Vol. 85, Issue 4, 1973, s. 867 (867-892). These views are likewise cited in Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58. ↑
  201. Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58. The situation is indeed the same in Türkiye: owing to similar debates on attempt, the distinction between incomplete (unfinished) and completed attempt contained in the former Turkish Criminal Code No. 765 was not included in the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (TCK). ↑
  202. Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58; Roxin/Greco, AT/ I, (5), § 12 kn. 185; Stratenwerth/Kuhlen, AT, § 8, kn. 93. ↑
  203. BGH NJW 02, 1057. Fischer, StGB, (72), § 16 kn. 8; Puppe, NK, § 16, kn. 90; Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 184, Roxin, Dolus Generalis, s. 261; Sowada, Dolus Generalis, s. 817; Stratenwerth/Kuhlen, AT, § 8, kn. 94; Vogel/Bülte, LK, (13), § 16, kn. 73; Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, S/S StGB, § 15, kn. 58. ↑
  204. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn. 184. ↑
  205. Sancinetti, s. 351. ↑
  206. Maurach/Zipf, AT, (2), § 23 kn. 36. ↑
  207. Sancinetti, s. 351, dn. 10. ↑
  208. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 14, 15. ↑
  209. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 15. ↑
  210. Sowada, Dolus Generalis, s. 814 vd. ↑
  211. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 15, 16. ↑
  212. Sowada, Dolus Generalis, s. 815. The additional argument offered by this author appears more problematic: “If the act of disposing of the body is carried out by a third person who mistakenly assumes that the victim is dead, the punishment of the first perpetrator for a negligent offence in connection with the second act is excluded; however, in the case of the intervention of a third person, it is doubtful whether the first perpetrator can be held entirely not responsible for the victim’s death. But punishing the first perpetrator for negligence requires the acceptance of objective imputation, and this will be accepted all the more if the first perpetrator, unaware of the situation he himself has created, brings this situation about on his own” see Sowada, Dolus Generalis, s. 815, 816. ↑
  213. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12 kn. 180. Roxin says: “I am sceptical as to whether Sancinetti’s distinction between the realisation of the ‘first risk’ and the realisation of the ‘second risk’ is practicable and teleologically justifiable.” Cited in Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 16. ↑
  214. Sowada, Dolus Generalis, s. 816; Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 16. ↑
  215. See also Sowada, Dolus Generalis, 2004, s. 816. ↑
  216. Roxin/Greco, AT/I, (5), § 12, kn., 178, 179. ↑
  217. Sowada, Dolus Generalis, s. 816. ↑
  218. Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 18. ↑
  219. For our views on this subject, see Dülger, Genel Hükümler, (2), s. 445 vd. ↑
  220. Baldó Lavilla, ADPCP, (48), 1995, s. 344, 345, cited in Sanz Morán, Dolus Generalis, s. 17. 1-2, 1966. Maurach Reinhart, Deutsches Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 4. Auflage, Karlsruhe, Müller, 1971. Maurach Reinhart /Heinz Zipf, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil: Teilband 1 Grundlehren des Strafrechts und Aufbau der Straftat, 2. Auflage, C.F. Müller, Heidelberg, 1992. Mayer Hellmut, “Das Problem des sogenannten dolus generalis”, Juristen Zeitung (JZ), Vol. 11, No. 4, 1956. Oğlakçıoğlu Mustafa Temmuz, “Gübre Çukuru Olayının (BGHST 14, 193) 50 Yılı ‘Daha Da Eski Testideki Eski Şarap’”, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Prof. Dr. Durmuş Tezcan’a Armağan, C. 21, Özel S., 2019. ↑

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