Introduction
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
The Personal Data Protection Board has published decisions of principle in many different fields. Most recently, in the Official Gazette of 18 February 2019, it published as decisions of principle the “Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board of 5 December 2018, No. 2018/143, concerning a data controller that transferred health data to a third party without relying on one of the processing conditions set out in Article 6 of the Law”, the “Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board of 26 July 2018, No. 2018/91, concerning a data controller that failed to fulfil its obligation to prevent unlawful access to personal data” and the “Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board of 28 June 2018, No. 2018/69, to the effect that personal data in personnel record files must not be destroyed where the reasons requiring their processing have not ceased to exist”. What distinguishes these decisions, when they are read carefully, is that they pioneer the entry into our legal system of two concepts: “data protection by design and by default”, which does not in fact exist in our legal system but came onto the EU’s agenda with the GDPR, and “risk-based liability”, which exists in comparative law but has not been accepted in our country to date. In this article I will discuss these decisions published by the Board in the context of the concepts mentioned above, taking into account Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK) first and foremost, as well as the other legislation related to the subject.
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger*
Article 15(6) of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data, the article being entitled “Procedures and principles of examination upon complaint or ex officio”, confers on the Personal Data Protection Board, the decision-making body of the Personal Data Protection Authority, the duty and power to adopt a “resolution of principle”. Accordingly, if the Board establishes, as a result of an examination it has carried out upon complaint or ex officio, that the violation is widespread, it publishes the resolution of principle it has adopted on the matter. The adoption of resolutions of principle on matters in which the violation has been found to be widespread is not only a type of power conferred on the Board; it also falls within the scope of the Board’s duties.
Within the scope of this power and duty, the Personal Data Protection Board has published resolutions of principle in many different fields; most recently, on 18 February 2019, it published as resolutions of principle its decision “Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board of 05/12/2018, No. 2018/143, concerning the controller that transfers health data to a third party without relying on one of the processing conditions set out in Article 6 of the Law”, its decision “Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board of 26/07/2018, No. 2018/91, concerning the controller that fails to fulfil the obligation to prevent unlawful access to personal data” and its decision “Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board of 28/06/2018, No. 2018/69, on the need not to destroy personal data in personnel record files where the reasons requiring their processing have not ceased to exist”.
The distinctive feature of these decisions is that, when read carefully, they pioneer the entry into our legal system of two concepts: “data protection by design and by default”, which does not in fact exist in our legal system but came onto the EU’s agenda with the GDPR, and “risk liability”, which exists in comparative law but has not been accepted in our country to date.
In this article I shall examine the decisions in question published by the Board in the context of the concepts I have mentioned above, taking into account first and foremost Law No. 6698 and also the other legislation related to the subject.
I. Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board of 05/12/2018, No. 2018/143, “concerning the controller that transfers health data to a third party without relying on one of the processing conditions set out in Article 6 of the Law”
The decision concerns the transfer of health data to third parties without reliance on one of the processing conditions set out in Article 6 of the Law, and was rendered as a result of a complaint lodged with the Authority concerning the sharing with third parties, by the pharmacy from which the medication was obtained and without reliance on any processing condition, of the health data – a special category of personal data – of a data subject who was using medication under a doctor’s supervision.
It must be stated at the outset that the health data which are the subject of the dispute are regulated as special categories of personal data in national and supranational (sui generis)1 instruments, as is also stated in Article 6(1) of Law No. 6698 in the words “The (…) health (…) of persons constitutes personal data of a special category.” Article 6(2) of Law No. 6698 states that the processing of special categories of personal data without the explicit consent of the data subject is prohibited, and paragraph 3 of the same article provides that personal data other than those relating to health and sexual life listed in paragraph 1 may be processed without seeking the explicit consent of the data subject in the cases provided for by laws, whereas personal data relating to health and sexual life may be processed without seeking the explicit consent of the data subject only for the purposes of the protection of public health, preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of treatment and care services, and the planning and management of health services and their financing, by persons under an obligation of secrecy or by authorised institutions and organisations. At the same time, Article 8 of Law No. 6698, by referring to Article 6, makes the transfer of health data subject to the same rules.
In Decision No. 2018/143, too, account is taken of these provisions and of the obligations of the controller laid down in Article 12 of Law No. 6698, such as the obligation to take all necessary technical and administrative measures to ensure the appropriate level of security for the purposes of preventing the unlawful processing of personal data, preventing unlawful access to personal data and ensuring the safekeeping of personal data; and it is stated that where the special category personal data relating to the health of the data subject – in the specific case, a person using medication under a doctor’s supervision – are shared with a third party by the pharmacy from which, in the specific case, the medication was obtained, without the conditions listed in Article 8 of Law No. 6698 being met, the controller will be held liable under Article 18 of Law No. 6698, since this constitutes a breach of Article 12(4) of the Law.
Although this decision of the Board is entirely sound from a legal point of view, the sharing of health data is something we encounter very frequently in our daily lives. Health data are included in the category of special categories of personal data for reasons such as the fact that they constitute one of a person’s points of vulnerability, that they carry the risk of the person being subjected to discrimination, that they concern public health, and that their disclosure may impede the person’s access to health services. For this reason, the unlawful processing of these data constitutes at once a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms, a criminal offence and an infringement of personality rights. Under Law No. 6698, the processing of health data without obtaining explicit consent is, as a rule, possible only for the purposes stated above and by persons under an obligation of secrecy or by authorised institutions/organisations. As can also be clearly understood from the conjunction “and” here, health data may be processed without seeking explicit consent where they are processed by persons/institutions authorised by law in line with the purposes listed in the law. In cases where one of these two elements is lacking, the data must without exception be processed after explicit consent has been obtained. Otherwise, there will be unlawful processing and transfer of personal data.
Another important point here is the content and scope of the category of data referred to as “health data”; the concept of health data was defined in an instrument whose execution has been stayed by the Council of State, the “Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Privacy”2. In Article 4 of the Regulation, entitled “definitions”, personal health data are defined as “any information relating to the physical and mental health of an identified or identifiable natural person, and information relating to the health services provided to the person”. As can be seen, the regulation brings within its scope not only data relating to physical health but also data relating to mental health.
It is noteworthy that, in this definition in the Regulation, “information relating to the health services provided to the person” is also health data. Accordingly, in addition to information relating to a person’s health, such as the person’s state of health, the medication he uses or his illness, information on the health unit from which the person receives services and on any stage of treatment applied is also regarded as health data. This point is, moreover, expressly stated in the Board’s decision as well. For example, together with the illness, the course of treatment or the medication of a patient being treated in a neurology department, even the information on the neurology ward service provided by the hospital is that person’s health data. On the other hand, the mere fact that the name of the hospital is known may at times cause irreparable harm to the person’s inner world. It is known that some health institutions specialise and provide services only in certain fields, such as maternity hospitals and children’s hospitals. Particularly in cities that are small in terms of population, it must be regarded as natural that those who wish to be treated in these hospitals want the name of the hospital not to be known.
Keeping information belonging to the patient confidential is a matter that concerns patients’ rights. This matter is seen to be expressly regulated in the Regulation on Patients’ Rights (HHY), published in Official Gazette No. 23420 of 01.08.1998. The subject of “Keeping Information Confidential” is set out in Article 23 of the HHY. The provisions of the HHY lay down certain principles concerning the keeping of information confidential. The principles relating to the obligation to keep information confidential are as follows:
Principle of confidentiality: As a general rule in the legislation, information relating to the patient that is obtained in the course of medical practice must be kept confidential. In accordance with this principle, all records and information belonging to the patient that are obtained by reason of the provision of health services may in no way be disclosed, except in the cases permitted by law (Art. 23(1) HHY).
Individuals’ most intimate information is shared, in the course of medical practice, with the actors providing health services. The actors providing health services must keep this information confidential. This confidentiality may rest on psychological, social and legal reasons such as preventing discrimination that might be directed against the person in connection with his state of health, preventing the patient from being humiliated in the eyes of society, and the like.
Principle of legal liability: Even if it is based on the person’s consent, the disclosure of information in cases where this results in the complete waiver of personality rights, the transfer of these rights to others or their excessive restriction does not remove the legal liability of the person who discloses it (Art. 23(2) HHY).
Principle of the likelihood of harm: The disclosure of information that is likely to harm the patient, without a legally and morally valid and justified reason, will also give rise to both the civil and the criminal liability of staff and other persons (Art. 23(3) HHY). Principle of research/educational purpose and consent: In activities carried out for the purposes of research and education, too, the patient’s identity details may not be disclosed without his consent (Art. 23(4) HHY). Medical education is an important matter for the development of medical science. For scientific knowledge relating to medicine to be brought to light and for the shortage of the necessary technical personnel in the field of medicine to be remedied, medicine must be taught to new prospective physicians and to young physicians.
During these research and educational activities carried out for the purpose of developing medical science, too, the patient’s information must remain confidential. During the research and educational activities carried out, personal information must be kept confidential vis-à-vis the outside world and the necessary sensitivity must be shown in this regard.
Principle of taking precautions and of care: Article 5 of the HHY lists the principles to be observed in the provision of health services, and sub-paragraph (f) contains the mandatory rule that the privacy of the patient’s private life and family life may not be interfered with, except in the cases permitted by law and in cases of medical necessity; Article 21 of the Regulation, entitled “Respect for Privacy”, states that every kind of medical intervention is to be carried out with respect for the patient’s privacy and emphasises that even the event of death does not confer a right to breach privacy; and Article 23, entitled “Keeping Information Confidential”, states that information obtained by reason of the provision of health services may in no way be disclosed, except in the cases permitted by law, and that, even if it is based on the person’s consent, the disclosure of information in cases where this results in the complete waiver of personality rights, the transfer of these rights to others or their excessive restriction does not remove the legal liability of the person who discloses it, and sets out the point that in activities carried out for the purposes of research and education, too, the patient’s identity details may not be disclosed without his consent.
For the protection of patients’ rights, which form part of fundamental human rights, the actors who are involved in the course of medical practice and provide health services are obliged to act within the framework of health legislation, to show the care required for the protection of patients’ rights and, as this care requires, to take all precautions.
In the course of medical practice, physicians and health personnel are under an obligation to keep confidential the information they learn about the patient. This obligation is based on the rules of medical ethics.
Principle of the inviolability of the privacy of the patient’s private life and family life: Except in the cases permitted by law and in cases of medical necessity, the privacy of the patient’s private life and family life may not be interfered with (Art. 5(f) HHY).
The privacy of patients’ private lives must be assessed within the framework of two principles:
- The first is the principle of “respect”, that is, of non-interference.
- The second is the principle of “the confidentiality of personal data and the protection of these data”.
Institutions and organisations providing health services, and health personnel, are obliged to protect the confidentiality of the test results belonging to the patient. The scope of this protection also includes preventing unauthorised persons other than the patient from gaining access to the results and reports. According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), too, respect for the confidentiality of health data is a fundamental principle in the legal systems of the States Parties to the Convention3.
Principle of confidentiality in informing the patient: The patient must also be informed in a suitable setting and with the patient’s privacy being protected. (Art. 18(5) HHY)
Medical records are in the nature of the patient’s personal data, and the patient may not want others to know this information. For example, information that an unmarried woman is pregnant, or information concerning the patient’s sexual identity, is of this kind. This may generally hold true for situations that give rise to a danger of individuals being placed in a bad position in society. Apart from this, there may also be prohibitions imposed by the patient of his own choosing. Physicians and health personnel must comply with the principle of confidentiality in the course of medical practice and must show the necessary care so that others do not learn the patient’s personal data.
Since medical records are in the nature of the patient’s personal data, where this information is disclosed unlawfully the offences defined in Articles 136 and 137 of the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (TCK) may be constituted4.
In line with my explanations above and with the Board’s decision, it must be borne in mind that data relating to the health of all persons are regarded as falling within the category of special categories of personal data and that the processing of these data is made subject to stricter conditions than personal data which are not of a special category; and individuals’ right to the protection of personal data and their right to privacy, which are today recognised as a fundamental right and protected by both international and national instruments, must not be violated.
By resolution of principle No. 2018/143, too, the Personal Data Protection Board has once again set out the points to which attention must be paid in the processing of health data and the fact that the scope of protection of Law No. 6698 in respect of the data in question is very broad. The decision in question constitutes a precedent, in particular for the institutions and organisations that process health data.
In this decision, and in earlier decisions rendered along similar lines although not concerning personal health data, there is “a systemic and/or methodological error” in the processing and transfer of data. Even where there is no intentional conduct on the part of controllers, conduct of this kind can occur and can lead to pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses for data subjects. Preventing practices of this kind by means of measures taken after the event is very difficult. For this reason, the rule of “data protection by design and by default” (tasarlanmış ve önceden tanımlanmış veri koruma), laid down in Article 25 of the GDPR, should, on the basis of these decisions, be regarded as valid for our law as well and should be applied in the form it takes in the GDPR. In any future amendment of the law, this rule should also be incorporated into Law No. 6698. In practice, too, in order not to encounter similar problems, controllers should, when defining their processes at the very beginning of their data processing operations, pay attention to the principles and conditions of data processing and should, from the very outset, design their processes accordingly in advance and put them into practice. Compliance with this principle must be ensured in particular in the processing of “special categories of personal data” and, among these, of “health data”.
II. Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board of 26/07/2018, No. 2018/91, concerning the controller that was unable to fulfil the obligation of “preventing unlawful access to personal data”
Decision No. 2018/91 concerns the prevention of unlawful access to personal data. A person who shopped with membership details on the website of a ready-to-wear clothing company applied to the Company because personal information such as the delivery address, first name, surname, address and telephone number had become accessible to third parties shopping on that website belonging to the company, and requested that the personal data be erased from its systems, destroyed and rendered inaccessible and, if they had been shared with another institution in Türkiye or abroad, that they be erased and destroyed at those institutions as well; finding the reply received from the Company insufficient, the person applied to the Authority, and the decision is the finding of a violation made by the Authority as a result of the examination it carried out.
It must be stated that Article 11 of Law No. 6698 regulates the “rights of the data subject”. As is also expressly stated in that provision and in the relevant Board decision, it lays down the rights of everyone, by applying to the controller, in relation to himself, to know the third parties to whom personal data are transferred in Türkiye or abroad and to request the erasure or destruction of personal data within the framework of the conditions provided for in Article 7 of the same Law.
On the other hand, Article 12(1) of Law No. 6698 imposes on the controller obligations such as the obligation to take all administrative and technical measures to ensure the appropriate level of security for the purposes of preventing the unlawful processing of personal data, preventing unlawful access to personal data and ensuring the safekeeping of personal data.
The basic points in the Board’s decision, which is to be assessed within the framework of all these rights and obligations, are as follows:
In the Board’s decision it is stated: “When assessed together with its explanations to the effect that the complainant’s personal data were entered for shopping transactions but that the said information at the same time became visible during other customers’ shopping transactions, that, in the defence and documents submitted to the Authority by the Company, the company became aware of the situation complained of when the incident occurred, that it was established that the incident stemmed from a systemic error, that consultations were held between the relevant departments and a number of measures were taken so that other customers would not suffer harm either, and that, without delay, a version of the application was released, it has been concluded that, before the harm referred to, the Company was unable to take the necessary technical and administrative measures to ensure the appropriate level of security for the purposes of the safekeeping of personal data and of preventing unlawful access to personal data within the scope of Article 12(1) of the Law;…”, and it was decided to impose an administrative fine on the Company under Article 18 of the Law.
The point that needs to be assessed in the decision in question is that, although the company took the necessary measure as soon as it became aware of the systemic error concerned, it was held liable by the Authority on the basis of a scope almost as broad as risk liability. In our legal system in general – although it is possible to speak of the existence of contrary situations in comparative law – risk liability is not accepted even within the scope of the “right to life”. Until now we have seen risk liability accepted only in very limited areas in administrative law, under headings such as the principle of social risk. However, as is also clearly shown in Board decision No. 2018/91, risk liability has now been regarded, within the scope of the Right to the Protection of Personal Data as well, as sufficient for the controller’s liability to arise in the specific case.
In my opinion, the most important reason for the acceptance of risk liability in the field in question is that a violation of the Right to the Protection of Personal Data does not, in most cases, give rise to victimisation of the kind to which the classical legal system is accustomed. The concept of damage accepted in our law in the classical sense is in most cases unable to cover the “damage and victimisation” that arise as a result of the violation of the Right to the Protection of Personal Data. On the other hand, the controller who processes data and in some way derives a benefit from this also assumes the risks that may arise from the processing of these data. Indeed, Law No. 6698, too, provides that the controller is jointly liable for the operations carried out by the processor. Even if the controller demonstrates that it selected the best possible processor in the most meticulous manner, it is not possible for it to escape this liability. It is this provision that, in my view, constitutes the basis in positive law for the acceptance of risk liability in Personal Data Protection Law. Indeed, this and similar decisions also suggest that the Board’s interpreting the scope of liability so broadly rests on this. As can be seen, this legal discipline is influencing the established concepts and practices of the law.
In the Decision it was at the same time decided “that the Company be instructed to communicate to the Complainant, within 30 days of the notification of the decision pursuant to Article 15(5) of the Law and together with supporting documents, its explanations concerning the steps taken by it in relation to the request that all personal data of the complainant be erased from the Company’s systems, destroyed and rendered inaccessible and, if they were shared with another institution in Türkiye or abroad, that they be erased and destroyed at those institutions as well”. With this decision, not only was a fine imposed on controllers; at the same time the controller was instructed to act in a particular way, and the period to be allowed for carrying out the instruction in question was set at 30 days. In addition, the notification to be made to the complainant that the instruction has been complied with was not regarded as sufficient, and the controller was placed under an obligation to submit documents substantiating this notification. With the decision in question it has been made clear that, alongside fines, punitive sanctions of this kind will also be applied by the Board and that the supervision and follow-up of these sanctions will be carried out by the Authority itself.
In its decision of 24.01.2019, No. 2019/10, too, the Board gave controllers a period of 72 hours for the controller to notify the Board with a justified reason and to explain to the Board, together with the notification to be made, the reasons for the delay as well; when both decisions and the relevant legislation are assessed together, where the controller is unable, for a justified reason, to notify the Board within 72 hours, the reasons for the delay must also be explained to the Board together with the notification to be made, and, pursuant to Article 15 of Law No. 6698, the controller must comply with the Board’s decision finding a violation within 30 days of its being notified to the controller and must, again within the same period, inform the data subject of this with supporting documents.
With Decision No. 2018/91 it has been established that whether controllers comply with the sanctions imposed will be kept under the Authority’s supervision and oversight, and the system provided for in the law has been put into practice in an effective manner. The decision is important in that it imposes a number of new obligations on controllers for the elimination of the violation of the right to the protection of personal data, and it has the effect of strengthening the supervisory mechanism.
Furthermore, as I stated in my explanations on the previous decision, there is a systemic error here, and by the decision rendered by the Board the rule of “data protection by design and by default” (tasarlanmış ve önceden tanımlanmış veri koruma) has been applied here as well. Thus, even though it has no direct normative basis, the rule in question is accepted by the Board on the basis of the general principles of data processing and is applied by the Decision rendered.
III. Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board of 28/06/2018, No. 2018/69, “on the need not to destroy personal data in the personnel record file because the reasons requiring their processing have not ceased to exist”
The decision concerns the destruction of personal data in personnel record files and is a resolution of principle rendered as a result of an application made to the Authority after a request for the destruction of the documents relating to the examination and investigation files opened against civil servants during their period of service had not been complied with by the public institution acting as controller.
As is also expressly stated in the Decision, Article 7 of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data contains provisions on the destruction, erasure and anonymisation of data. In addition, a regulation has also been issued on this subject.
Article 109 of the Civil Servants Law No. 657, entitled “Civil Servant Information System, Personnel File”, contains the provision that a personnel file is to be kept for every civil servant and that this file is to contain the civil servant’s professional details and declarations of assets and, where they exist, the information and documents relating to examination, investigation and inspection reports, disciplinary penalties, and certificates of award and achievement; section “D” of the Public Personnel General Communiqué, for its part, contains the provision that the personnel files of civil servants whose duties have ended in any way are to be kept by their institutions.
In addition to all of this, the keeping of personnel files is also prescribed in the Regulation on State Archive Services and in the provisions of Law No. 3473 on the Destruction of Documents and Material No Longer Required to be Kept, and the Ministries, the General Staff, the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) and the Presidency are moreover regarded as statutorily obliged entities within the scope of Law No. 3473. In this context it is prescribed that the obliged entities are to set up unit archives for the material of archival value which they will keep for a certain period and institutional archives for the archive material or material of archival value which they will keep for a longer period, and that the material of archival value in their possession is to be kept in the unit archives for a period of 1-5 years; in addition, Article 19, entitled “Separation of Material to be Transferred to the Institutional Archive”, prescribes that material of archival value which has completed its retention period in the unit archive is to be separated out as material “to be Transferred to the Institutional Archive”.
As a result of the assessment it made in the light of all these points, the Board decided “that, in the context of the application made to the Authority after the request for the destruction of the documents relating to the examination and investigation files opened against civil servants during their period of service had not been complied with by the public institution acting as controller, and proceeding from the facts that the personal information whose destruction is requested consists of documents relating to the examination and investigation files opened against the data subject during the period in which he or she was a civil servant and that the documents in question must therefore be kept in personnel files pursuant to Law No. 657, that under the Public Personnel General Communiqué they are to be placed in the fourth section of personnel files and the personnel files of civil servants whose duties have ended in any way are to be kept by their institutions, and that under the Regulation on State Archive Services they are contained in civil service record files in respect of which one hundred and one years have not elapsed since the date of the last entry, it was appropriate for the complainant’s request not to be met by the controller, since, as stated in Article 7 of Law No. 6698, the reasons requiring the processing of the personal data have not yet ceased to exist either”.
I am of the opinion that it would be appropriate to assess Board decision No. 2018/69 within the scope of the Right to Erasure.
With the advance of technology, access to information and preventing the information that can be accessed from disappearing have become very easy. With this advance, a very rapid change is taking place in the political, social and economic fields. The change in question also directly affects the rights and freedoms of persons. While technological advances and the easier access to information have positive effects on the lives of individuals, they have just as many negative effects. The negative effect on individuals of technological progress and of the greater ease of accessing information and of preventing information from disappearing frequently arises at the stage where the developments in question constitute an interference with the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual.
In this context, among the fundamental rights and freedoms, the right that is most exposed to interference and perhaps most often violated is the individual’s right to the protection of personal data and to privacy. The developments in question cause the individual’s right to privacy to become subject to constant violation. With the development of communication technologies, the boundaries between individuals themselves and between the individual and the world are disappearing, and the individual’s personal data and sphere of privacy are becoming ever more visible and accessible. It was first the right to be forgotten that came onto the agenda as a result of this whole conjuncture. This right later evolved, within the scope of Personal Data Protection Law, into the “right to request erasure”.
The right to erasure, which did not feature as an explicit and exclusive right in the instruments preceding the GDPR, was first articulated in the Google Spain judgment of the CJEU, and at a later stage the right in question was included in the GDPR. In that judgment the CJEU held that, once personal data published under a person’s name had become out of date or irrelevant, the processing of this information was no longer necessary for a legitimate purpose and that the personal data therefore had to be erased.
In this context, where one of the following cases applies, the controller is under an obligation to erase the personal data without any delay:
• the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purpose for which they were collected or processed,
• the data subject withdraws the consent on which the processing is based and there is no other legal ground for the processing,
• the data subject objects to the processing and there is no overriding legitimate ground for the processing,
• the personal data have been processed unlawfully,
• the erasure of the personal data is mandatory for the purpose of compliance with a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject,
• the personal data have been collected in relation to the provision of information society services referred to in Article 8(1) of the GDPR.
Likewise, the GDPR has also introduced certain limitations on the right to request erasure:
• for the exercise of the right of expression and information,
• for compliance with a legal obligation which requires processing under Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject, or for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or the exercise of official authority vested in the controller,
• for reasons of public interest in the area of public health,
• for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, in so far as the right to erasure is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the objectives of the processing concerned, or
• where it is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims,
erasure cannot be requested.
It must be borne in mind that, unlike the right to be forgotten, the right to erasure comes into play only where certain situations exist, such as unlawful processing or the purpose of the processing no longer being necessary.
Articles 7 and 11 of Law No. 6698 regulate the data subject’s right to request the erasure of his personal data where, despite their having been processed in accordance with the provisions of this Law and of other relevant laws, the reasons requiring their processing have ceased to exist, and also the obligation of the controller to erase the data where the reason requiring the processing of the personal data has ceased to exist, the conditions being observed by the controller of its own motion even in the absence of a request from the data subject.
In line with all these explanations, in the Board’s Decision No. 2018/69 it was assessed that the data subject’s right to request the erasure of his personal data has limits, and whether in the specific case the data had been processed lawfully and whether there were still valid reasons for their processing; and, having regard to the particular features of the specific case, it was established that the reasons requiring the processing of the personal data in personnel record files had not ceased to exist and it was decided that the data subject’s right to request the erasure of his personal data would not be applicable in respect of the incident complained of.
In line with all these explanations, it must be borne in mind that persons’ right to request the erasure of their data is fundamental but that the right in question has certain limitations, and the balance between rights and obligations must be struck by means of an assessment to be made in respect of each case. It is at this point that the period of “one hundred and one years” in the relevant legislation which we have mentioned above needs to be reviewed. Is there a balance and proportion between the aim pursued and the benefit obtained by the state in keeping personnel records, and the harm suffered by the persons whose personal data are kept and processed for such a long time? The answer to this question can be given only if it is stated correctly and transparently for what purpose and in what cases the record archive in question is used. The decision rendered by the Board is in conformity with the law as far as the normative regulation is concerned, but from the standpoint of the law as it ought to be the position is open to debate.
Conclusion
Above I have tried to assess in detail the following decisions rendered by the Personal Data Protection Board: the Decision “concerning the controller that transfers health data to a third party without relying on one of the processing conditions set out in Article 6 of the law”, dated 05/12/2018 and numbered 2018/143; the Decision “concerning the controller that fails to fulfil the obligation to prevent unlawful access to personal data”, dated 26/07/2018 and numbered 2018/91; and the Decision “on the need not to destroy personal data in personnel record files, because the reasons requiring their processing have not ceased to exist”, dated 28/06/2018 and numbered 2018/69. The conclusions I have reached within the framework of that assessment are as follows:
• By resolution of principle No. 2018/143, the Personal Data Protection Board has once again set out the points to which attention must be paid in the processing of health data and the fact that the scope of protection of Law No. 6698 in respect of the data in question is very broad. The decision in question has the character of a precedent, in particular for the institutions and organisations that process health data.
• In this decision, and in earlier decisions rendered along similar lines although not concerning personal health data, there is “a systemic and/or methodological error” in the processing and transfer of data. Even where there is no intentional conduct on the part of controllers, conduct of this kind can occur and can lead to pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses for data subjects. Preventing practices of this kind by means of measures taken after the event is very difficult. For this reason, the rule of “data protection by design and by default” (tasarlanmış ve önceden tanımlanmış veri koruma), laid down in Article 25 of the GDPR, should, on the basis of these decisions, be regarded as valid for our law as well and should be applied in the form it takes in the GDPR. In any future amendment of the law, this rule should also be incorporated into Law No. 6698.
• In practice, too, in order not to encounter similar problems, controllers should, when defining their processes at the very beginning of their data processing operations, pay attention to the principles and conditions of data processing and should, from the very outset, design their processes accordingly in advance and put them into practice. Compliance with this principle must be ensured in particular in the processing of “special categories of personal data” and, among these, of “health data”.
• By Decision No. 2018/91 rendered by the Board, the obligations and responsibilities of the controller are interpreted very broadly.
• It is understood from the Decision in question that whether controllers comply with the sanctions imposed will be kept under the Authority’s supervision and oversight and that the system provided for in the law has begun to be applied effectively by the Board.
• The concept of damage accepted in our law in the classical sense is in most cases unable to cover the “damage and victimisation” that arise as a result of the violation of the Right to the Protection of Personal Data. On the other hand, the controller who processes data and in some way derives a benefit from this also assumes the risks that may arise from the processing of these data. Indeed, Law No. 6698, too, provides that the controller is jointly liable for the operations carried out by the processor. Even if the controller demonstrates that it selected the best possible processor in the most meticulous manner, it is not possible for it to escape this liability. It is this provision that, in my view, constitutes the basis in positive law for the acceptance of risk liability in Personal Data Protection Law. Indeed, this and similar decisions also suggest that the Board’s interpreting the scope of liability so broadly rests on this. As can be seen, this legal discipline is influencing the established concepts and practices of the law.
• It is seen that Decision No. 2018/91 is important in that it introduces a number of new obligations for controllers, such as making a notification with supporting documents, for the elimination of the violation of the right to the protection of personal data, and that it has the effect of strengthening the supervisory mechanism.
• Within the framework of Decision No. 2018/69, it is understood that persons’ right to request the erasure of their data is fundamental but that the right in question has certain limitations, and that, in cases where the data have been processed lawfully and the reason requiring their processing continues to exist, the data subject’s request for the erasure of his personal data may not be carried out.
• It must be borne in mind that persons’ right to request the erasure of their data is fundamental but that the right in question has certain limitations, and the balance between rights and obligations must be struck by means of an assessment to be made in respect of each case. It is at this point that the period of “one hundred and one years” in the relevant legislation which we have mentioned above needs to be reviewed. Is there a balance and proportion between the aim pursued and the benefit obtained by the state in keeping personnel records, and the harm suffered by the persons whose personal data are kept and processed for such a long time? The answer to this question can be given only if it is stated correctly and transparently for what purpose and in what cases the record archive in question is used. However, the decision rendered by the Board is in conformity with the law as far as the normative regulation is concerned, whereas from the standpoint of the law as it ought to be the position is open to debate.
Footnotes
- Academic / Lawyer. ↑
- See: Art. 9 GDPR. ↑
- The regulation in question, the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Privacy, entered into force upon its publication in Official Gazette No. 29863 on 20 October 2016. On 6 July 2017 a stay of execution was ordered in respect of the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Privacy (Danıştay 15. D. 2016/10488, 2016/10500 YD. T. 06.07.2017). On 24 November 2017, with the said stay of execution also being taken into account, the Regulation Amending the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Privacy entered into force upon its publication in Official Gazette No. 30250. On 9 October 2018 a stay of execution was ordered in respect of the Regulation Amending the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Privacy (Danıştay 15. D. 2018/1490 YD. T. 09.10.2018). For details of the process concerning the Regulation and the stay of execution decisions see: Murat Volkan Dülger, “Kişisel Sağlık Verileri Yönetmeliğinin Yürütmesinin Durdurulmasına İlişkin Danıştay’ın 9.10.2018 Tarihli Kararına İlişkin Değerlendirme”; www.academia.edu.tr. ↑
- See: Z. v. Finlandiya, Başvuru No. 22009/93, 25 Şubat, 1997; S. ve Marper v. Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru No. 30562/04 ve 30566/04; M.S. v. İsveç, Başvuru No. 74/1996/693/885, 27 Ağustos 1997; Uslu v. Türkiye (No. 2), 23815/04, 20 Ocak 2009; ↑
- Hasta Bilgilerinin Gizli Tutulmasına Dair İlkeler, Hukuki Haber, 10 Temmuz 2018 https://www.hukukihaber.net/hasta-bilgilerinin-gizli-tutulmasina-dair-ilkeler-makale,5960.html , son erişim tarihi 22 Ocak 2019. ↑
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Right to Be Forgotten” (Unutulma Hakkı), Essays in Honour of Prof. Dr. Yadigar İzmirli (Prof. Dr. Yadigar İzmirli’ye Armağan), Savaş Publishing, Ankara, 2024, pp. 1019–1141.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Assessment of the Amendments to the KVK Law on the Processing of Special Categories of Personal Data and the Transfer of Data Abroad” (KVK Kanunu’nda Özel Nitelikli Kişisel Verilerin İşlenmesi ve Yurt Dışına Veri Aktarımı Kapsamında Yapılan Değişikliklere İlişkin Değerlendirmeler), Academia.edu, 25 March 2024.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Our Assessment of the Decision Summaries Published by the Personal Data Protection Board on 18 July 2022” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulunun 18 Temmuz 2022 Tarihinde Yayınlanan Karar Özetlerine İlişkin Değerlendirmelerimiz), Dülger Law Office, 1 September 2022.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Use of Personal Health Data as Evidence in Divorce Proceedings” (Kişisel Sağlık Verilerinin Boşanma Davasında Delil Olarak Kullanılması), Hukuk ve Daha Fazlası Dergisi (Law and More), No. 9, June 2022, pp. 76–84.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “A Very Important Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board on Lawyers' Access to Enforcement Files Without a Power of Attorney” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulu’ndan Avukatların İcra Takip Dosyalarına Vekaletname Olmaksızın Erişebilmesine İlişkin Çok Önemli Bir Karar), Dülger Law Office, 15 August 2021.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, Personal Data Protection Law (Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku), 4th ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2026.

