Abstract
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
The basic principle regarding the concurrence (içtima) of offences is the cumulation of penalties; the cumulation of penalties is the rule and the concurrence of offences the exception. This principle was expressed in the Report of the Justice Committee of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) on the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (TCK) as “there are as many offences as there are acts, and as many penalties as there are offences”. The concurrence of offences, which constitutes the exception, essentially occurs in two forms: “ideal concurrence” (fikri içtima) and the “successive offence” (zincirleme suç). The successive offence is regulated in paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 43 of the TCK, and ideal concurrence in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 43 and in Article 44.
Another matter dealt with within the subject of the concurrence of offences and treated under this heading is apparent concurrence. As the name indicates, in this case the concurrence is only apparent; in reality there is no such concurrence. Nevertheless, in the legislation too, in line with scholarly opinion, this situation is regulated in Article 42, in the section on the concurrence of offences. Article 42, however, by stating that “the provisions on concurrence shall not apply to offences of this kind”, makes it clear that these are not cases of concurrence of offences.
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
Asst. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER*
INTRODUCTION
The basic principle in the matter of the concurrence of offences (içtima) is the cumulation of penalties; the cumulation of penalties is the rule, the concurrence of offences the exception1. This principle is expressed in the Report of the Justice Committee of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) on the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (TCK) in the words “there are as many offences as there are deeds, and as many penalties as there are offences”2. The concurrence of offences, which constitutes the exception, occurs essentially in two forms: “notional concurrence” and the “continuing offence”. The continuing offence is regulated in paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 43 of the TCK, and notional concurrence in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 43 and in Article 44. A further topic that is treated within the subject of the concurrence of offences and dealt with under this heading is apparent concurrence. As its name indicates, in this situation the concurrence is only apparent; in reality there is no such concurrence. Nevertheless, in the statutory regulation too, in parallel with legal scholarship, this situation is regulated in Article 42, in the chapter on the concurrence of offences. Article 42, however, by stating that “the provisions on concurrence shall not apply to offences of this kind”, makes it expressly clear that these are not cases of concurrence of offences.
The first point to be made on the concurrence of offences in Turkish criminal law is the problem of terminology. The new TCK No. 5237, which was drafted on the basis of the modern theory of the offence and is in this sense highly innovative compared with the TCK No. 765, also undertook a renewal in the matter of language. Thus, although in the TCK, which is written in a Turkish that is considerably more up to date than the language used in the former TCK, some terms have been rendered by Turkish words in use today (for example savcı instead of müddei umumi for the public prosecutor, ilk derece instead of bidayet for first instance, Yargıtay instead of temyiz mahkemesi for the Court of Cassation), the terms içtima (concurrence) and iştirak (participation) have not been replaced by new words. Yet the words birleşme in place of içtima and katılma in place of iştirak are both used in present-day language and of Turkish origin. In our view, therefore, the terms that ought to be used in this field are suçların birleşmesi (concurrence of offences), zincirleme suç (continuing offence), düşünsel birleşme (ideal concurrence) and görünüşte içtima (apparent concurrence)3. Although we prefer the new terms, in this study we use both the new terms and, in order to remain consistent with the TCK, the terms contained in the statute. However, since “fikri içtima” (notional concurrence) in particular has become established in legal scholarship and practice, we use this expression instead of düşünsel birleşme.
As we have stated above, in criminal law the concurrence of offences is essentially divided into two, namely the cumulation of penalties and the concurrence of offences. In the matter of the concurrence of offences the TCK has, as a matter of principle, adopted the rule of “real concurrence”. According to this rule, “there are as many offences as there are deeds, and as many penalties as there are offences”4. For this reason the cumulation of penalties is also called “real concurrence”. It follows from this that the cumulation of penalties is the rule and the concurrence of offences the exception5. Accordingly, apart from the exceptional situations that fall within the concurrence of offences, every deed committed constitutes a separate offence and retains its independence, and a separate penalty must be imposed for each offence. Indeed, authors who, under the influence of the classical theory of the offence, regard the deed as the totality of act and result have expressed this in the following terms: “every result conforming to the statutory description constitutes, in principle, a separate and independent offence, and the perpetrator is deemed to have committed as many offences as the results he has brought about by his act and incurs separate and independent penalties for each of them”6.
However, a rigid application of this rule may be contrary to the principle of proportionality expressed in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the TCK, because under that rule the perpetrator’s penalty must necessarily be proportionate to the deed he has carried out. This is a consequence of the principle of equality and at the same time one of the most important principles to be borne in mind in criminal law. The penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator must therefore be proportionate to the content of wrongfulness of the deed and to the perpetrator’s culpability. In this context, if there were no rules on the concurrence of offences, or if they were not applied correctly, the perpetrator could be punished for all the offences corresponding to the type of offence he has committed, and a disproportionate penalty could thus be imposed7.
The concurrence of offences arises in situations in which there is more than one offence8. Consequently, since there is more than one offence, the perpetrator must also bear more than one criminal liability9. However, it must be explained as a whole, in terms of the theory of the offence, why, despite the existence of more than one offence, the perpetrator receives the penalty for a single offence and is held liable as if there were a single offence, and the very varied forms of concurrence that may arise in respect of different offences must likewise be explained.
In countries which, as in the criminal law of our country, have adopted different systems of concurrence for the concurrence of offences and the cumulation of penalties, the application of the principle of real concurrence, that is, of the cumulation of penalties, requires that there be more than one offence and that there be no situation falling within the scope of the concurrence of offences. Where one of the forms of the concurrence of offences is present, real concurrence is not applied and the perpetrator’s liability is determined according to whichever form of the concurrence of offences has materialised. Thus, for systems of criminal law that provide for a dual system, the most important difference between the concurrence of offences and the cumulation of penalties lies in the determination of the perpetrator’s liability10. In this context the concurrence of offences is concerned with how a person’s liability is to be determined where he has committed more than one offence, and provides solutions to this question11.
Before this is explained, however, it must briefly be explained what is to be understood by the concept of plurality of offences. In fact, what is meant here by offence is the sub-element of the deed contained in the material element of the offence. However, whereas in the classical school of criminal law this sub-element is taken to be “act, result and causal link”, in the modern theory of the offence each of these is regarded individually as a sub-element of the material element, and it is thus accepted that a result and a causal link between act and result are not required for every offence. Similarly, while some offences can be committed by a single act, other offences are committed by more than one act. It is here that the distinction between the act in the natural sense and the act in the legal sense comes into play.
The important point to be noted here is that the concepts of unity of deed and plurality of deeds do not mean the same as the concepts of unity of offence and plurality of offences. There is nevertheless a close connection between these concepts, because the unity and plurality of deeds constitute the precondition and the point of connection for the unity and plurality of offences12. Accordingly, the offence is not single in every case in which the deed is single13. For example, in both forms of notional concurrence there is a plurality of offences although the deed is single. Similarly, with regard to whether or not the continuing offence applies, the question whether certain acts performed in succession are to be regarded as a single act in the legal sense, that is, whether there is unity of the typical act, is extremely important for whether or not the penalty is to be increased under the rules on the continuing offence14.
Since the concepts of unity and plurality of deeds and of unity and plurality of offences do not mean the same, it must be determined whether, in establishing a plurality of offences, the act alone, the result alone or some other concept is to be taken as the basis15. We must state at the outset that taking the act alone or the result alone as the basis in establishing a plurality of offences may lead to misleading conclusions. For, given that in notional concurrence it is accepted by statute that more than one offence may be realised by a single act, that is, that there may be a plurality of offences, this would not be a correct choice. In our view, therefore, what must be taken as the basis here is “the violation of the norm, that is, of the statutory definition of the offence”16. For it is only by looking at the relevant type of offence (the norm) that the unity or plurality of the offence can be resolved17. When the number of times the mandatory and prohibitive norms of the statute have been violated is taken as the criterion in distinguishing between unity and plurality of offences, this distinction will have been drawn clearly18. However, as we also explain below, the criterion to be taken as the basis in distinguishing between unity and plurality of deeds is the act19. It must not be forgotten that plurality of offences and plurality of deeds are concepts that are related to one another but different.
In this context, although Arts. 43(2) and 44 TCK speak of the commission of more than one offence by a single “deed” (fiil), we consider that the concept of deed here must be understood as the “act” (hareket) and that the distinction in the articles in question must be accepted as one between “unity of the act and plurality of acts”20.
In order for the subject of the concurrence of offences to be understood and explained, and moreover because they have a direct effect on the legal consequences and on the amounts of the penalties, the concepts of offence, deed and act must be correctly interpreted and explained. For this reason, an attempt will first be made in our study to explain these concepts.
I. The Distinction between Unity and Plurality of the Act
The first point to be made on the concurrence of offences is that in some situations, although there are acts which in the natural sense appear to be more than one, the legal order treats them as if they were a single act. Thus, in some types of offence, although there are numerous acts in the natural sense, the legislature either requires more than one act for the offence to be constituted (fraud) or, even where there is more than one act, treats them as a single act (theft carried out by taking more than one item inside the same house)21.
In our view, the “act” must be taken as the basis in determining whether or not the deed is single. For this reason the “distinction between unity and plurality of the act” should be used, because it is the act that forms the essence of the wrong; the “result” and, linked to it, the “causal link that must exist between act and result” are not, in accordance with the criminal policy pursued by the legislature, elements that must necessarily be present in the statutory definition of the offence. For this reason the act must be taken as the basis in determining the unity or plurality of the deed22.
In the criminal law scholarship of our country, by contrast, since the classical theory of the offence was influential for a long time, the terms “eylem” and “fiil” (deed) were understood to mean the act, the result and the causal link connecting them. Since, according to the classical theory of the offence, the element that gives the offence its content of wrongfulness is the result, and since every offence must necessarily have a result, the deed, in the context of the concurrence of offences, is understood to mean the result. In this context, what the classical theory of the offence means by unity of the deed is unity of the result. Until recent years (in particular until 2005, when the TCK No. 5237 entered into force), the majority view in the scholarship of our country was that the result should be taken as the basis in determining the unity and plurality of the deed2324.
In our view, however, it is very difficult to explain and understand the subject of the concurrence of offences on the basis of this conception of the classical theory of the offence. In the context of the concurrence of offences, unity of the deed must be understood to mean unity of the act25. Indeed, that the concept of deed is used in the TCK to denote the act is also clearly apparent from the wording of certain articles and from their explanatory memoranda. For example, the examples given in the explanatory memorandum to Article 44 indicate that what is meant by deed is the act. Likewise, that the deed does not include the result is also expressly stated in Article 8 of the TCK26.
In order to make this subject concrete, the following example may be taken as a starting point: in the offence of laundering the proceeds of crime regulated in paragraph 1 of Article 282 of the TCK, where different acts are performed at the same time or within a very short period for the purpose of laundering a given amount of proceeds, there will be unity of deeds. For example, where the acts of first taking proceeds obtained from an offence abroad, depositing them in a bank there and taking out a loan from the bank, then, by not repaying the loan drawn from the bank, not opposing the bank’s taking of the money that was deposited with it and pledged as security, but bringing the money received from the bank as a loan back into the country, are carried out in succession, a single deed and a single offence will have been committed, even though different transactions are involved27. Similarly, acts of resistance directed at more than one police officer at the same time and for the same reason must also be regarded as a single act in the legal sense28.
Indeed, according to the theory of unity of the act, in offences with alternative acts the existence of a single typical act in the legal sense is accepted even though there are several acts in the natural sense29. Although in offences with alternative acts a single act suffices for the completion of the offence, there is also unity of the act in cases where all of the alternative acts have been carried out30.
Although the TCK No. 5237 was drawn up by taking many statutes as models and by borrowing provisions from many statutes, it is known that, both as regards the general theory of the offence and as regards many of the types of offence contained in the special part, the statute taken as the model was the German Criminal Code (Al CK) and its theory of the offence. However, the Al CK contains no provision on the continuing offence or on the compound offence. Only § 52 of the Al CK contains a provision that can be regarded as notional concurrence (Idealkonkurrenz, Tateinheit)31. Apart from this, the statute in question regulates the situation of real concurrence (Realkonkurrenz, Tatmehrheit) in §§ 53, 54 and 5532. In the German theory of the offence, the key point of the subject of plurality of offences is the theory of unity of the act (natural unity of acts). According to this theory, more than one act is accepted to be single on account of unity of time and place. Indeed, the German Federal Court of Justice has accepted the existence of a “single act” in the cases of several successive sexual assaults on a victim left defenceless, the taking of more than one item belonging to the same victim in theft or robbery, the making of more than one untrue statement in false testimony, the killing of a victim who has been beaten, and prostitution practised in the prohibited manner with the same or different persons within a very short interval of time and in the same place. Accordingly, in the German theory of the offence, once it has first been established whether the act is single or more than one, the provisions on notional concurrence can be applied if there is a single act, or if unity of the act (natural or legal unity of the act) is accepted, and none of the cases of apparent concurrence is present in the specific case. Notional concurrence, too, may be of the same kind (type) or of different kinds (types)33.
In the TCK, by contrast, the situation differs from this. The continuing offence, which does not exist at all in the German Criminal Code, is regulated in Article 43, and the compound offence, which is likewise not regulated in that statute, in Article 42. Moreover, notional concurrence of the same kind is regulated in paragraph 2 of Article 43, whereas it ought to have been regulated in Article 44. Apart from this, we consider that the concepts of “natural unity of the act” and “legal unity of the act” should also be accepted for the theory of the offence in our country. It must be borne in mind, however, that the system of the Al CK and the system of the TCK are not exactly the same and exhibit differences.
II. Notional Concurrence (Ideal Concurrence)
A. Definition and Legal Nature
The purpose of creating a criminal norm is to place various legal interests under protection and to meet attacks on them with a sanction34. As a rule, a type of offence contained in the statute encompasses the entire unlawfulness of the prohibited deed. In some situations, however, the multiplicity of the legal interests infringed by the deed committed links it to several types of offence. Assessing the deed in question from a single angle is not sufficient to cover the whole of the unlawful character of that deed35. It is precisely where several norms relate to the same deed that notional concurrence arises36.
Notional concurrence occurs where the perpetrator, by a single deed that he has carried out, commits different offences or commits the same offence more than once. Notional concurrence requires that the deed be single and that more than one offence be committed by the same deed37. Where the same offences are realised by the perpetrator’s single deed, there is notional concurrence of the same kind; where different offences are realised, there is notional concurrence of different kinds38. Of these, notional concurrence of the same kind is regulated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 43 of the TCK, and notional concurrence of different kinds in Article 44.
In both forms of notional concurrence the legislature has provided that a single penalty is to be imposed on the perpetrator. There are differing views as to the legal justification for imposing a single penalty despite the existence of more than one offence. According to one of them, the view of unity of offence, there is in fact a single offence in the case of notional concurrence, because the perpetrator has carried out a single deed, and a single penalty must be imposed. Those who hold this view take the “act”, which is one of the material elements of the offence, as the basis for the distinction between unity and plurality of offences, accept that there is unity of offence in this situation because there is a single act, and state that the offences have merged39.
According to the view of plurality of offences, by contrast, although there is a single act, the criminal norm has been violated more than once, so that the number of times the norm has been violated must be taken into account in determining the number of offences. Accordingly, since in notional concurrence the norm is violated more than once, there is a plurality of offences40.
Of these, we subscribe to the view that there is a plurality of offences. Indeed, it can be seen that the provisions in Arts. 43(2) and 44 TCK are also based on the view of plurality of offences41.
The question whether plurality of offences or unity of offence is to be taken as the basis in notional concurrence shows its most important effect in determining the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator and in explaining the legal nature of the method to be chosen. If unity of offence is accepted, there is no problem: since there is only one offence in any case, it will suffice to impose on the perpetrator the penalty for that single offence. If plurality of offences is accepted, however, the imposition of a single penalty on the perpetrator must be justified and explained, and it is from this that the difficulty of the subject arises.
There are two different views on this matter. According to the first of them, it is open to criticism that, where the perpetrator succeeds in committing more than one offence, albeit by a single deed, the provisions on notional concurrence are applied and the perpetrator is given a penalty increased by a certain amount, or it is considered sufficient to impose the heavier of the penalties for the offences he has committed. For in this situation there is no subjective connection between the offences, and the existence of a single deed is likewise insufficient to explain it. In this way skilful offenders are virtually rewarded; no distinction should therefore be made between notional concurrence and real concurrence, and the perpetrator should be punished separately for each offence he has committed. Indeed, the statutory regulation does not require the existence of a subjective element for notional concurrence either. And the fact that, in parallel with the provision for a certain increase of the penalty in the continuing offence, where the perpetrator is punished with a single penalty on account of the unity of the decision to commit the offence, the same increase is applied in notional concurrence of the same kind constitutes a contradiction, because there is no subjective element in the offences that make up notional concurrence42.
According to the second view on this matter, the reason why, in notional concurrence of different kinds, the perpetrator is punished only for the offence carrying the heaviest penalty among the offences he has committed by a single deed is the rule of “non bis in idem”43. According to this rule, an individual can be punished only once for a deed that he has carried out. Indeed, this is also stated in the explanatory memorandum to Article 44. By providing for notional concurrence in the statute and by imposing on the perpetrator in this situation the penalty for a single offence, the aim is to prevent the individual from being punished more than once for the same deed44.
The reason why the legislature contents itself with the imposition of a single penalty in notional concurrence is that the offences committed by a single deed have merged; in this situation there is one offence, and only one penalty can be imposed for one offence. This situation can be explained by the view of unity of the act45. However, it must also be explained why, although there is a single act and it is also accepted that the offences have merged, the penalty imposed is the one for the offence carrying the heavier penalty. This can be explained, though not in an entirely satisfactory manner, by criminal justice; for from the standpoint of criminal law the several results that have occurred must not be ignored. What is fair, however, is that, since the perpetrator has committed another offence or other offences, one should not be content with imposing the heaviest penalty but should increase the penalty by a certain amount; in this way notional concurrence would also cease to be a kind of reward for the perpetrator46. Moreover, the existence of a single deed constitutes an obstacle to the perpetrator’s being punished for more than one offence; what in fact merges here is the thought, for the perpetrator’s thought is to commit a single offence47.
We consider that there is a plurality of offences in notional concurrence and that, in establishing this, it is not the act but the violation of the norm that must be taken as the criterion. We consider that the justification for imposing a single penalty on the perpetrator despite the plurality of offences can be explained by the concept of criminal justice; that it is an exceptional situation for a person to act with the intent to commit more than one offence and for more than one offence to be committed by his single deed; that the second offence is generally committed negligently, so that imposing penalties for two separate offences may, in the light of the principle of proportionality, lead to harsh results; and that the imposition of a single penalty for more than one offence committed by a single deed has been provided for with the aim of reducing the severity of the punishment. However, because it regulates notional concurrence of the same kind and of different kinds in different articles and does not provide for an increase of the penalty in notional concurrence of different kinds, we do not find the regulation of notional concurrence in the TCK appropriate in this respect.
B. Conditions of Notional Concurrence
In notional concurrence of different kinds and of the same kind, which are two manifestations of the same subject, the common elements are that the deed is single and that the single deed gives rise to more than one offence. No further element is required for either form of notional concurrence. The difference between these two forms is that in notional concurrence of different kinds different offences are committed, whereas in notional concurrence of the same kind the same offence is committed more than once48.
1. A Single Deed
The first and most important condition of notional concurrence is that the perpetrator carries out a single deed. As we have also explained above, we take the act as the basis for determining the unity of the deed; we therefore regard the existence of more than one act as a plurality of deeds and the existence of a single act as the existence of only one deed. Accordingly, we consider that the concept of “deed” (fiil) used in the statute must also be understood as the “act”49. The meaning thus given to the deed is important for determining the scope of application of notional concurrence. Unity of the act may take the form of a “legal unity of acts” or of a “natural unity of acts”. Legal unity of acts is the case in which the legislature, in framing the type of offence, treats what are in fact several acts as a single act, as in offences consisting of several acts or in permanent offences. Natural unity of acts, by contrast, means that the acts carried out by the perpetrator form a unity in terms of time and place. The perpetrator’s beating the victim with numerous punches or blows with a stick, or the perpetrator’s killing the victim with numerous bullets or stab wounds, are examples of this situation50. In this case, although there are numerous acts, they are regarded as a single act.
Where, as a result of these acts, more than one norm is violated or the same norm is violated more than once, notional concurrence arises. Consequently, since they are regarded as a single act, even though there are several acts in the natural sense, they are not treated as a continuing offence or as real concurrence, and the existence of notional concurrence is accepted where the norm has been violated several times.
Some authors in legal scholarship state, under the influence of the classical theory of the offence, that they understand the deed to mean the result. According to these authors, the number of deeds is determined by the result. For example, according to these authors, a perpetrator who punches a person wearing glasses in the eye must be punished for two separate offences, since by his single deed he has caused two separate results, namely injury and damage to property51. Similarly, a person who enters an information system and obtains the personal data held there must be punished both for the offence of illegal access to an information system and for that of obtaining personal data52. Indeed, the decisions rendered by the Court of Cassation on the basis of the result in the period of the TCK No. 765 are also to this effect53.
What must be understood by the deed being single in notional concurrence is that the acts of execution of the offences making up the notional concurrence coincide. It is neither sufficient nor necessary that the offences be identical merely in respect of the mental element. In this context, just as the fact that the perpetrator performs his act in order to achieve a single aim is not in itself sufficient for the existence of notional concurrence54, so acts carried out by the perpetrator with the same motive, and situations in which the perpetrator has resolved to carry out more than one deed at the same time, are not in themselves sufficient for the existence of notional concurrence either55.
Depending on the kind and degree of the overlap of the acts of execution of more than one offence in a single deed, notional concurrence may occur in more than one possible form and, for each possibility, in various combinations. For example, notional concurrence may occur where the acts of execution are completely identical, but it is accepted that it also occurs in the case of partial identity 56. For example, where a person beats an enforcement officer because the latter has performed his duty, both the offence of resistance to prevent a public official from performing his duty (Art. 265 TCK) and that of intentional injury (Art. 86 TCK) are at issue, and there is complete identity as regards the acts of execution of these two offences57. On the other hand, where in the offence of robbery the perpetrator first strikes the victim and then takes his money, notional concurrence will arise although, as far as the deeds are concerned, only the use of force has been realised58. A similar example in this regard is found between the offence of fraud and the offence of forgery of documents. Where the deed of fraud is committed by means of a forged private document, notional concurrence arises59. However, Article 212 of the TCK introduced a different rule on this matter and provided that in this case the provision on notional concurrence is not to be applied and that the perpetrator is to be held liable separately for both offences, the penalties being added together in accordance with the provisions on real concurrence60.
2. A Single Deed Giving Rise to More than One Offence
As regards the condition that a single deed gives rise to more than one offence, the cases of notional concurrence of the same kind and of notional concurrence of different kinds arise according to whether the offences realised are of the same type or of different types. This is an important distinction, because it is also reflected in the statutory regulation.
a. Notional Concurrence of the Same Kind (Ideal Concurrence of the Same Type)
Where the same offence is committed against more than one person by a single deed, the existence of notional concurrence of the same kind is accepted. This form of notional concurrence is regulated in paragraph 2 of Article 43 of the TCK. That paragraph contains the provision “the provision of the first paragraph shall also apply where the same offence is committed against more than one person by a single deed”61.
It was not appropriate to regulate notional concurrence of the same kind in paragraph 2 of Article 43 of the TCK when the continuing offence is regulated in paragraph 1, for the only feature common to notional concurrence of the same kind and the continuing offence is that, where they occur, the increase applied to the perpetrator’s penalty is at the same rate62. It would therefore have been more appropriate from a theoretical point of view to regulate notional concurrence of the same kind in Article 44 of the TCK, in which notional concurrence of different kinds is regulated63.
Notional concurrence of the same kind was not regulated in the TCK No. 765. In parallel with this, notional concurrence of the same kind was not accepted by the scholarship of the classical theory of the offence, which took the result as the basis for determining the number of deeds. For since, according to the classical theory of the offence, the deed was taken to be the result, there could be no question of one result violating the same provision of the statute more than once. In this situation, where the same offence was committed more than once by a single deed, it was accepted that more than one result had occurred and more than one offence had been committed. Examples are that, where more than one person was killed by one bullet or bomb, where more than one person was insulted by one utterance, or where more than one person was defrauded by one fraudulent act, as many offences arose as there were victims64. In this situation it was stated that a continuing offence would arise under Article 80 of the TCK No. 765. Indeed, this was possible because Article 80 of the former TCK (ETCK) imposed no limitation as to the number of victims, and the practice was also to this effect. Again, in the period of the TCK No. 765 there were those who stated that in such situations a single deed had been carried out but different offences had been committed, so that there was notional concurrence of different kinds, and there were also decisions of the Court of Cassation to this effect65.
In the TCK No. 5237, notional concurrence of the same kind has been accepted and regulated in the statute because it is the act and not the result that is taken as the basis for determining the number of offences66, so that there is a plurality of acts in the continuing offence but unity of the act in notional concurrence, and furthermore because Art. 43(1), in which the continuing offence is regulated, makes it a condition for this situation to arise that the victim of the deeds be the same person. Consequently, in notional concurrence of the same kind the single deed must be understood as a single deed in the legal sense67.
In notional concurrence of the same kind, the same offence is committed against different persons at the same time by the same deed68. For example, there is notional concurrence of the same kind where more than one person is killed by one bullet69, where more than one person is sexually harassed by one utterance, where calumny is committed against more than one person by one written complaint, where more than one person is insulted or threatened or deprived of liberty by one deed, where more than one person is defrauded by one newspaper advertisement70, or where, as a result of a virus being published on a website, a large number of persons download this virus onto their information systems and their systems are damaged71.
Accordingly, the element common to notional concurrence of different kinds and notional concurrence of the same kind is that the deed carried out by the perpetrator is single72. By contrast, whereas in notional concurrence of different kinds different offences are carried out by a single deed, in notional concurrence of the same kind the same offence is committed more than once by a single deed. Again, whereas in notional concurrence of different kinds it is possible for the offence to be committed against the same person by a single deed (for example, where both the offence of intentional injury and that of damage to property are committed against the victim by a punch to the face), in notional concurrence of the same kind the offences must, by virtue of the theory of the offence and of the statutory regulation, be committed against different persons.
Where the object of the offence is held in co-ownership or in joint ownership, there is no case of an offence being committed against more than one person by the perpetrator’s single deed; since the object of the offence is single, there will be a single offence. Consequently, for notional concurrence of the same kind to arise, the object of the offence must also be different. For example, where a car that has several owners in co-ownership is stolen, there is only one offence, despite the fact that there is more than one victim, because the object of the offence is one car73.
Similarly, where a bank branch is entered and money belonging to more than one person is taken, the victims of the offence are not the depositors but the natural persons who have the status of shareholders of the bank, and there is a single offence; in any case, the perpetrator’s intent is directed not at taking the money of the depositor named “x” or “y” but at taking the money held in the bank. If, however, the perpetrator robs the bank on successive days, there will be several deeds and several offences, but a continuing offence will arise on account of the unity of the decision to commit the offence74. Where individual depositors or persons whose money has been entrusted are targeted and victimised one by one, and this is done not by a single act but by different acts, neither the provisions on notional concurrence nor those on the continuing offence can be applied, since neither the condition of a single deed nor that of a single victim is fulfilled, and real concurrence will be applied75. In theft committed by using information systems, too, since the depositor’s account is targeted directly, as many offences arise as there are depositors from whose accounts money has been transferred, and where this deed is carried out by a single act of the perpetrator (which is possible thanks to computer software), notional concurrence of the same kind may arise. On the other hand, where, in the offence of theft that he commits by using an information system, the perpetrator disregards the depositors and directly targets the bank and the bank’s system, the existence of a single offence will be accepted; however, taking into account the amount of the money that is the subject of the offence and the number of depositors’ accounts entered, the court may, in its discretion, move towards the upper limit of the penalty for the offence on account of the greater wrongfulness of the offence. As regards credit cards, the Court of Cassation accepts that as many offences arise as there are cards and that, where the same card is used at different times, a continuing offence arises76.
Another matter that we wish to address in connection with notional concurrence of the same kind is the case in which, in the offence of insulting more than one person by a single deed, the victim is a public official. In our view, even if the victim is a public official, there is nothing that requires a departure from the general rule. However, the provision in paragraph 5 of Article 125 of the TCK, which contains the offence of insult, according to which “where public officials working as a board are insulted on account of their duties, the offence shall be deemed to have been committed against the members constituting the board”, was misinterpreted, and it was argued that in this situation it had to be accepted that as many offences had been committed as there were public officials. In order to prevent this misunderstanding, the following sentence was added to paragraph 5 of Article 125 of the TCK by Law No. 5377: “However, in this case the provision of the article on the continuing offence shall apply.” In our view the regulation made is correct but the manner in which it is expressed is wrong, for what exists here is not a continuing offence77 but notional concurrence of the same kind78. This incorrect wording stems from the fact that, as we have stated above, notional concurrence of the same kind is regulated not in Article 44 but in Article 43, together with the continuing offence. Even so, it would have been more correct for the legislature to use in this sentence a wording such as “the provision of paragraph 2 of Article 43 shall apply” or “the rule on notional concurrence of the same kind” shall apply. Indeed, this is expressly stated in the explanatory memorandum to the amending law.
By providing in paragraph 3 of Article 43 of the TCK that “the provisions of this article shall not apply to the offences of intentional killing, intentional injury, torture and robbery”, a special concurrence rule has been introduced for notional concurrence of the same kind as well, as in the case of the continuing offence. Accordingly, where the offences in question are committed against different persons by the same deed of the perpetrator, notional concurrence will not be applied and the penalties will be cumulated according to the number of violations of the norm (real concurrence). For example, in cases such as the killing or injuring of a large number of persons by a bomb that is thrown, likewise the killing or injuring of more than one person as a result of being hit by a car, or the taking of the property of more than one person by a single threat, there will be not notional concurrence but real concurrence79. The explanations we have given regarding this paragraph in connection with the continuing offence also apply to notional concurrence of the same kind.
b. Notional Concurrence of Different Kinds (Ideal Concurrence of Different Types)
Notional concurrence of different kinds is regulated in Article 44 of the TCK under the heading “notional concurrence”. That article contains the provision “a person who, by one deed that he or she has committed, causes more than one different offence to arise shall be punished for the offence that requires the heaviest penalty among them”. Accordingly, where different offences are realised by a single deed, there is notional concurrence of different kinds. This is the case, for example, where the perpetrator, with the stone that he throws at a shop window, both breaks the window pane and causes the sales assistant inside to be injured on the head, because the perpetrator’s single deed gives rise both to the offence of damage to property and to that of intentional or negligent injury.
Different offences do not necessarily mean the violation of different articles; notional concurrence may also arise where different types of offence are realised even though they are contained in the same article80. For example, where the perpetrator by the same deed commits the offences of bringing into the country, possessing and storing images relating to child pornography (Art. 226(3) TCK) and of bringing into the country, possessing and storing images of sexual intercourse with animals (Art. 226(4) TCK), the rule on notional concurrence of different kinds must be applied, because, although these are regulated as paragraphs of the same article, they are different types of offence. Indeed, the decisions of the Court of Cassation are also to this effect81. The same applies as between the general criminal statutes and the ancillary criminal statutes82. However, the legislature may lay down rules that prevent the application of notional concurrence in such situations; for example, under Article 212 of the TCK, where the offence of tax evasion is committed by means of a false invoice, a penalty must be imposed both for forgery of a private document (Art. 207 TCK) and for the offence of tax evasion (Art. 359 of the Tax Procedure Law, VUK)83.
On the other hand, since the basic and qualified forms of an offence are deemed to be the same offence, where both of them are violated by a single deed there will be not notional concurrence but the commission of a single offence84.
Where the perpetrator’s single deed gives rise to both an offence and a misdemeanour (administrative offence), there is no notional concurrence and a sanction is imposed only for the offence85. Similarly, since the statute speaks of an “offence”, notional concurrence does not arise where one of the deeds is a disciplinary offence86.
Accordingly, where a police officer who wishes to carry out an alcohol test is punched and pushed, both the offence of resistance to prevent a public official from performing his duty (Art. 265 TCK) and that of intentional injury (Art. 86 TCK) are at issue; in the deed of killing a person sitting in a car with closed windows by firing at him, both the offence of damage to property (Art. 151 TCK) and that of intentional killing (Art. 81 TCK); and where the death of a person is caused by driving under the influence of alcohol, both the offence of endangering traffic safety (Art. 179 TCK) and that of negligent killing (Art. 85 TCK)87. It is in these situations that the rule on notional concurrence of different kinds comes into play and the penalty for the offence carrying the heavier penalty is applied88.
Another point that we wish to address here is that the TCK distinguishes between notional concurrence of the same kind and notional concurrence of different kinds as regards the penalty to be applied. In our view, the penalties should be increased in both forms of notional concurrence, because in both of them the norm is violated more than once. Accordingly, the increase of the penalty in notional concurrence of the same kind, as in the continuing offence, is an appropriate regulation; but it is a flawed regulation that in notional concurrence of different kinds no such increase is made and only the heavier penalty is imposed on the perpetrator. What ought to be the case is that notional concurrence of the same kind and of different kinds are regulated in a single article, that the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator is increased in both cases and that, in making this increase, in notional concurrence of different kinds the norm of the offence carrying the heavier penalty is taken as the basis for the increase89.
c. Fulfilment of the Conditions for Prosecution and Punishability in Respect of Each Offence
A further condition of notional concurrence is that each of the offences included in the concurrence satisfies the conditions for prosecution and that the perpetrator is punishable for his deed. If one of these conditions is lacking, the deed in question will not be included in the concurrence. Accordingly, the deed alone is not sufficient for the application of notional concurrence. In respect of every offence whose existence is necessary for notional concurrence, the mental element and the element of unlawfulness, that is, the wrong as a whole, must be realised90. However, for the offences standing in a relationship of notional concurrence, it is not sufficient that the wrong contained in the statutory type of the offence in question be realised. In addition, where they are required, the conditions for prosecution, such as authorisation, request, decision and complaint, and punishability must be fulfilled in respect of each offence. If these conditions are not fulfilled, the offences concerned will not be taken into account in the relationship of notional concurrence91. For example, where the perpetrator by a single deed commits two offences, one prosecutable only on complaint and the other prosecutable ex officio, there will be no notional concurrence if the condition of a complaint is not fulfilled92.
In addition to the conditions for prosecution, matters which do not form part of the element of wrongfulness of the offence but are required in the statutory definition must also be present for the purposes of notional concurrence, if they are required. In this context, where there are personal grounds of impunity, personal grounds extinguishing the penalty and objective conditions of punishability, these offences will not be taken into account for the purposes of notional concurrence. Likewise, as regards grounds for discontinuance such as limitation, amnesty, withdrawal of the complaint and prepayment, each offence must be assessed separately in the specific case. Where these situations occur, the offences concerned will not be included in the notional concurrence93.
C. Special Situations in Notional Concurrence
The first question to be answered under this heading is whether notional concurrence can be applied where the offences making up the notional concurrence have remained at the stage of attempt and, similarly, where one of these offences is a completed offence while the other has remained at the stage of attempt. The rule on notional concurrence can also be applied where all of the offences realised by the perpetrator’s single deed have remained at the stage of attempt94. Similarly, it is stated that notional concurrence may also arise where one of the offences brought about by the perpetrator’s single deed has been completed and the other has remained at the stage of attempt95. Indeed, the Court of Cassation also decides to this effect96. In the second situation, however, the penalty for the completed offence will be taken into account at the stage of determining the penalty.
Another situation is whether offences committed with intent and offences committed by negligence can stand in a relationship of notional concurrence. In principle, the rule on notional concurrence can be applied between intentional and negligent offences97. This is the case in particular with aberratio ictus98. Since the TCK contains no special provision on aberratio ictus, notional concurrence must be applied in the case of aberratio ictus (both aberratio with a single result and aberratio with a double result)99. As is also stated in the explanatory memorandum to Article 44 of the TCK, the rules on mistake will not be applied in the case of aberratio ictus100. As in the example in the explanatory memorandum, where person A is aimed at but person B dies because the bullet ricochets, there is, in respect of person A, an offence of intentional killing that has remained at the stage of attempt and, in respect of person B, an offence of killing by negligence or with conditional intent (dolus eventualis) realised as a result of the aberratio ictus101. Here notional concurrence of different kinds is applied through the application of Article 44, and the penalty for the more serious offence is imposed on the perpetrator102103. Where, by contrast, the perpetrator fires at the victim’s legs with the intent to injure but the bullet ricochets and lodges in the leg of another person, thereby causing that person to be injured, the perpetrator’s
the prevailing view is that the provision on notional concurrence must be applied here as well. For this reason, the statutory regulation has abandoned the treatment of aberratio ictus together with mistake as to the person. For example, a stick thrown in order to injure a person may, after injuring the victim or without hitting the victim, strike a shop window and cause it to break. In this case, by the deed of throwing the stick, both the offence of intentional injury, completed or remaining at the stage of attempt, and the offence of damaging another’s property have been committed. Likewise, a bullet fired from a weapon in order to kill a person may, without hitting the victim, strike a wall and, by ricocheting, cause the death or injury of someone else. In this case, the offence of intentional killing has remained at the stage of attempt in respect of the person aimed at; in respect of the person whose death or injury has been caused as a result of the ricochet, however, the offence of negligent killing or negligent injury has been committed. In such situations the person causes more than one different offence to arise by one deed that he has committed, and it must suffice to punish him with the penalty of the offence among these that requires the heaviest penalty.” single deed gives rise to two offences of negligent injury, one completed and the other remaining at the stage of attempt. In this case there is notional concurrence of the same kind, regulated in paragraph 2 of Article 43, and the penalty is imposed on the perpetrator with an increase. Similarly, where the perpetrator fires a weapon or throws an object, aiming at a particular person, and considers that the bullet fired from the weapon or the object thrown may hit another person standing next to the person aimed at and cause that person’s death or injury, an offence of killing or injury committed with conditional or direct intent may be at issue in respect of that person104. However, in the combinations of negligent injury/killing, one completed and the other remaining at the stage of attempt, and attempted injury/killing with direct or conditional intent, unjust situations may arise, particularly as regards the amounts of the penalties, from the application of the rules on notional concurrence of different kinds and of the same kind. The reason for this is in particular that, in notional concurrence of different kinds as regulated in Article 44 of the statute, no increase of the penalty is provided for as it is in notional concurrence of the same kind.
In addition, it is disputed whether there can be notional concurrence between permanent offences and instantaneous offences105. Similarly, it is also disputed whether an offence of commission and an offence of omission can together constitute notional concurrence106.
It is stated that notional concurrence may also arise between the basic type of offence and offences aggravated by their result; that, however, where the aggravating result is brought about by negligence, there is apparent concurrence here by virtue of the principle of the priority of the special norm, because the aggravated offence always includes the negligent type of offence, and the perpetrator will be held liable only for the aggravating result; and that, where the aggravating result is brought about by an offence committed with intent, there is a plurality of offences and the rule on notional concurrence of different kinds comes into play, so that the perpetrator must be held liable for the offence carrying the heavier penalty107. Accordingly, if death occurs as a result of intentional injury (Art. 85 TCK) (Art. 87(4) TCK – here death has occurred as a result of the perpetrator’s negligent conduct), there is apparent concurrence and only the form of negligent injury aggravated by its result will be applied. However, it is stated that where the victim dies as a result of a sexual assault, there is notional concurrence of different kinds if the force used beyond what was necessary for the sexual assault causes death intentionally or negligently108. Indeed, what is at issue in this situation is the force and violence used by the perpetrator in order to carry out the sexual assault. Although in this deed there is more than one act in the natural sense, there is a single act in the legal sense. Where the force and violence, which are among the parts of this single act in the legal sense, cause death through the perpetrator’s negligent or intentional act, there is an offence of sexual assault, completed or remaining at the stage of attempt, and an offence of killing realised with intent or by negligence, so that more than one offence, and different offences, arise from the perpetrator’s single act in the legal sense. Consequently, Article 44 of the TCK must be applied here and the perpetrator must be punished for the offence carrying the heavier penalty109.
D. Consequences of Notional Concurrence
Whereas in the TCK, for the case of notional concurrence of the same kind, reference is made to paragraph 1 of Article 43, in which the continuing offence is regulated, and the increase provided for there, that is, an increase of the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator by one quarter to three quarters, is prescribed, Article 44, in which notional concurrence of different kinds is regulated, provides that the penalty for the most serious of the offences realised by the perpetrator’s single deed is to be imposed. The legislature has thus adopted the absorption system110 for notional concurrence of different kinds111.
In our view this is a flawed regulation. To begin with, notional concurrence of the same kind, which has no connection whatsoever with the continuing offence, ought not to have been regulated in the same article by way of a reference to the continuing offence. Its place should have been paragraph 2 of Article 44.
Moreover, the fact that the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator is increased in notional concurrence of the same kind, whereas in notional concurrence of different kinds no such increase is made and the legislature contents itself with the imposition of the heaviest penalty alone, is a contradiction that makes this difference difficult to explain. In our view, in the case of notional concurrence of different kinds too, a similar increase of the penalty ought to have been made on the basis of whichever of the different offences requires the heavier penalty112. Indeed, it can be seen that paragraph 1 of Article 81 of the Italian Criminal Code provides that in notional concurrence the penalty for the most serious violation may be increased up to threefold, and it is stated that this is a more correct solution113.
De lege lata, however, it would be a fairer solution in notional concurrence of different kinds to determine the concrete penalty by having regard to the number of offences and moving towards the upper limit of the offence carrying the heavier penalty. In determining the heavier penalty, the abstract penalty prescribed for the offence is taken into account, but where a qualified form of the offence is at issue, the penalty prescribed for the qualified form must be taken into account114. Indeed, the type of offence regulated in Article 297 of the TCK is an example of this. That article makes it an offence to bring into, or to possess in, a penal institution or detention house weapons, narcotic or stimulant substances or electronic means of communication. Where the procurement or possession of the item forming the object of this offence constitutes a separate offence, the penalty to be determined in accordance with the provisions on notional concurrence is increased by one half115. Indeed, the possession of narcotic substances, stimulant substances and weapons is in itself a separate offence (Arts. 174, 188, 191 TCK). Here the legislature has provided for an increase of the penalty specifically where there is notional concurrence – and this is notional concurrence of different kinds. In other words, the proposal we have made above is in fact already contained in the criminal code116.
III. The Continuing Offence
A. Definition and Legal Nature
The continuing offence is regulated in paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 43 of the TCK; this article reads: “(1) Where, in the course of executing a decision to commit an offence, the same offence is committed more than once against one person at different times, a single penalty shall be imposed… (3) The basic form of an offence and its qualified forms requiring a heavier or a lighter penalty shall be deemed to be the same offence. The provision of this paragraph shall also apply to offences whose victim is not a specific person”.
In the case of the continuing offence, the same offence is committed more than once. The continuing offence is the commission of the same offence more than once at different times within the framework of one decision to commit an offence117. In the continuing offence there is a subjective link between the offences committed, and there is not one offence but more than one offence118. Indeed, the definition in Article 43 also expressly accepts that this is a case of plurality of offences.
There are two different views on the explanation of the legal basis of the continuing offence, namely the view of unity of offence and the view of plurality of offences. According to the view of unity of offence, there is in reality a single offence in the continuing offence, and the existence of the same decision to commit the offence and the violation of the same provision of the statute show the unity of the offence119. In countries whose criminal codes contain no provision on the continuing offence, the continuing offence is brought within the scope of unity of offence on various grounds. Germany, Austria, Switzerland and France may be cited as examples of this120. The authors who hold the view of unity of offence express this in different ways. While some of the authors who adopt the view that the continuing offence consists of a single offence require unity from both the subjective and the objective point of view, there are also authors who regard objective unity alone as sufficient121.
According to the view that there is a plurality of offences, by contrast, it is stated that the unity of the continuing offence is a fiction; that there are in fact several offences independent of one another, which are deemed to be a single offence only as regards the penalty; that this method is resorted to in order to prevent the cumulation of penalties from resulting in a heavy penalty; and that, apart from the imposition of a single penalty, the offences retain their independence as regards the other consequences as well122.
The view that prevails in the scholarship of Turkish criminal law is that of plurality of offences. The continuing offence in fact consists of the coming together of several offences each of which is independent in nature, but this institution is given a place in the statute on account of requirements arising from practice and in consideration of the fact that the cumulation of penalties would lead to very severe consequences for the perpetrator. Accordingly, in the continuing offence as many offences are realised as there are violations of the norm. Consequently, the consequences of the continuing offence are limited to those indicated in the statute; in situations other than these, each offence included in the continuing offence must be dealt with according to its independent character123.
The continuing offence is a concept created in the Middle Ages by the Glossators and Post-Glossators and is a device found by legal practitioners in favour of the perpetrator in order to reduce penalties that were very high124. The continuing offence is therefore a legal institution which reduces the amount of the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator (Art. 43(1) TCK) and to which consequences are attached as regards the commencement of the limitation period (Art. 66(6) TCK) and the determination of the competent court (Art. 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, CMK), but in which each of the offences retains its independence125. We too subscribe to this view126.
Indeed, whereas Article 80 of the former TCK, which regulated the continuing offence, used the expression “shall be deemed one offence” as the consequence of the existence of a continuing offence, Article 43 of the TCK No. 5237 uses the expression “a single penalty shall be imposed”, so that the normative regulation too emphasises that the will of the legislature is likewise that a plurality of offences is accepted in the case of the continuing offence127. This is not an innovation, however, for before the TCK No. 5237 as well the consensus in Turkish legal scholarship was to this effect. By the normative regulation, the view prevailing in legal scholarship was turned into a provision of the statute128.
The continuing offence differs from the permanent offence (mütemadi suç), the habitual offence and recidivism129. Whereas in the continuing offence more than one offence is committed, in the permanent offence there is a single offence whose result continues. In the habitual offence, the offences must be repeated for a single offence to be realised; that is, in the habitual offence numerous offences constitute a single offence, whereas in the continuing offence the offences retain their independence but a single penalty is imposed (with an increase). In recidivism, a new offence, the same or a different one, is committed after the judgment has become final, whereas in the continuing offence the same offence is committed more than once without a judgment intervening (in any case, in terms of time too, it cannot otherwise be regarded as the execution of one decision to commit an offence)130.
Why the penalty of a perpetrator who persists in committing offences is reduced in the case of the continuing offence is, however, disputed. Positivist jurists do not believe in the necessity of the continuing offence. In the view of positivist jurists, this concept, which was created on the ground that penalties, being very harsh, had to be mitigated, is useless and even harmful. The fact that the perpetrator persistently maintains his decision to commit the offence ought to be assessed not in the perpetrator’s favour but to his detriment. It is true that there is some justification for these views. Indeed, the fact that, in comparison with a person who commits an offence by chance, a lesser penalty is imposed for the continuing offence despite the perpetrator’s persistence in his decision is seen as an inequality. Does the unity of the decision point to the perpetrator’s weakness or to his dangerousness? And the justification for creating such an institution on the basis of this element, which is extremely difficult to establish, is open to debate131. Nevertheless, this institution, which exists in many foreign criminal codes, was taken over first into the Italian Zanardelli Code of 1889, from there into the TCK No. 765 and finally, albeit with a narrowed scope, into the TCK No. 5237.
B. Conditions of the Continuing Offence
The continuing offence has five conditions in total, four of them objective and one subjective132. Of these, the objective conditions are that there be more than one deed, that each of the deeds be committed at a different time, that the deeds constitute the same offence, and that the same offence be committed more than once against the same person. The subjective condition is that the several offences be committed in the course of carrying out one decision to commit an offence133.
1. More than One Deed
The first condition of the continuing offence is that there be more than one deed134, because more than one deed is needed for the same offence to be committed more than once against the same person. Since it is not possible for the commission of the same offence more than once against the same victim to take place by a single deed, plurality of deeds is the first condition for the existence of a continuing offence135. Where there is not more than one offence in the specific situation, there can be no question of a continuing offence136.
Furthermore, for the provision on the continuing offence to be applicable, the deeds in question must constitute an offence; that is, the deeds must contain the elements of conformity with the statutory definition of the offence and of unlawfulness that are required for an offence to be constituted, so that the offences forming the chain must be constituted with all their elements137. Where one of the deeds does not constitute an offence because it lacks a sub-element, other than the material element of the offence, that forms part of conformity with the statutory definition, or because it does not contain the element of unlawfulness, it is not possible to apply the provision on the continuing offence or, as the case may be, to include this deed in the chain138. Similarly, where the offence is constituted but the perpetrator is not culpable in respect of the offence in question, this offence is not included in the chain either. Since Article 43 of the TCK expressly speaks of a plurality of offences, it is not possible for a continuing offence to arise between offences and misdemeanours139.
The existence of more than one deed must not be understood as meaning that there are numerous deeds in the legal sense140. Consequently, in the situations referred to above in which there is unity of the act in the legal sense, the existence of only a single offence is accepted, so that there is no plurality of offences, the norm on the continuing offence does not come into play and the perpetrator receives the penalty for the single offence he has committed141. Indeed, in a decision it rendered on the offence of theft, the Court of Cassation accepted that where the perpetrator, in the house he had entered, took various items and, in addition, the key of the car and stole the car in front of the house, this was not a continuing offence but a single offence of theft142. Similarly, in the offence of sexual harassment, the Court of Cassation accepted that the perpetrator’s telephoning the complainant at short intervals and saying “I love you, you will be mine”143, or telephoning frequently and proposing sexual intercourse144, was a single deed in the legal sense and stated that the provision on the continuing offence could not be applied145.
The same applies to offences with alternative acts. Where the alternative acts are carried out one after another with the intent to commit a single offence, the existence not of a continuing offence but of a single offence is accepted146; the practice of the Court of Cassation is also to this effect147. In legal scholarship, however, there are also authors who state that in offences with alternative acts there is unity of the act in the legal sense where the same act is performed, whereas a continuing offence arises where different acts are performed148. We do not share this view; we consider that whether there is unity of the act in the legal sense or a continuing offence must be determined separately in each specific case, having regard to the particular features of the case, the succession in time, the decision to commit the offence present in the perpetrator and also the intent to commit the offence.
The continuing offence may arise among offences of commission, and it may also arise in offences of omission. Likewise, it is possible for non-genuine (guarantor) offences of omission to be realised in continuing form149. For example, where a police officer, in accordance with a decision taken beforehand, does not intervene in the theft offences to be committed during his watch, the offence of abuse of office committed by omission (Art. 257(2) TCK) is committed in continuing form150.
It is possible for some of the acts making up the continuing offence to be acts of commission and others acts of omission; this is a view that is also accepted in legal scholarship151. In that case, however, the acts of omission must not constitute types of offence different from those constituted by the acts of commission. For example, the commission of the offence of abuse of office by an act of commission is regulated in paragraph 1 of Article 257 of the TCK and its commission by omission in paragraph 2 of the same article, as two separate types of offence. Consequently, where the offence of abuse of office is committed first by commission and then by omission, a continuing offence will not arise even though the other conditions are fulfilled. By contrast, in the offence of fraud (Arts. 157–158 TCK) or in the offence of torture (Arts. 94–95 TCK), where the acts constituting these offences are committed one after another, the existence of a chain can be accepted as regards the acts and the provision on the continuing offence can be applied152.
A continuing offence may also arise where all of the several offences have remained at the stage of attempt, or where some of them have remained at the stage of attempt while others have been completed. Where one of the offences making up the continuing offence has been completed and the others have remained at the stage of attempt, the continuing offence is accepted to be completed and the increase of the penalty is made on the basis of the completed offence153.
2. Commission of Each of the Deeds at a Different Time
The second condition required by the statute for the continuing offence is that the offences included in the chain be committed at different times. However, the expression “at different times” must not be understood to mean a period of time between the offences so long as to break the single decision to commit the offence. One must not go to extremes as regards the length of time, and care must be taken to ensure that the period is reasonable in the light of the nature of the specific deeds154. The deeds making up the continuing offence must be committed at different times but close to one another in time, in such a way as to reveal the existence of one decision to commit the offence. There is no consensus as to how long or short this time must be, and it must be assessed in each specific case155. However, the length of the time between the offences may, as regards the absence of the same decision to commit the offence, be used as a criterion156. Indeed, in various decisions it has rendered, the Court of Cassation has regarded a period such as two to three months as long in this sense157, whereas it has not considered a period of one month to be long and has stated that the provision on the continuing offence must be applied158.
In addition, the Court of Cassation states that there can be no continuing offence where the deed takes place at the same moment159. Indeed, paragraph 1 of Article 43 uses the expression “at different times”. In this context it is stated that the concept of “the same time”, which also appears in the decisions of the Court of Cassation, must not be interpreted narrowly and that very short intervals of time must also be regarded as falling within the concept of the same time. For example, it is stated that where the forgery on more than one document has been carried out within a short interval of time, or where more than one forged document has been produced within a short interval of time, it must likewise be accepted that these were drawn up within the same interval of time, in other words that they were not drawn up at different times160. Indeed, in the decisions it has rendered the Court of Cassation also states that Article 43 of the TCK is not to be applied to the accused on account of forgery carried out on two cheque leaves within the same period of time161. Furthermore, the Court of Cassation does not apply the provision on the continuing offence in such situations but states that, since the same offence is committed more than once at the same moment, a single penalty must be imposed on the perpetrator by departing from the lower limit, so that the several offences committed do not go unpunished and unjust results do not arise.
We do not share the view referred to above. Nor do we agree with the Court of Cassation’s confining the continuing offence strictly to offences committed at different times by taking the expression “at different times” in a narrow sense through a literal interpretation. In the TCK No. 765, by the expression “even if they occur at various times”, it was accepted that the continuing offence could as a rule be committed within the same period of time but, exceptionally, also at different times. Since one of the conditions that give the continuing offence its distinctive character is the existence of the same decision to commit the offence, this approach was more appropriate for the purpose of establishing that this is the case. Indeed, the existence of this decision
arise. In this case, no increase can be made by applying the provisions on the continuing offence, but this matter may be taken into consideration in determining the basic penalty under Article 61 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCY). The concepts of ‘the same time’ and ‘different time’ must also be dwelt upon here. Since the statute contains no clarity on this point and it is not possible to make definite determinations in advance, this matter must be assessed in the light of the particular features of each specific case, and it must be determined whether or not the deeds were committed ‘at different times’. In this context, the concept of ‘at the same time’ must not be interpreted narrowly, and very short intervals of time must also be accepted as the same period of time. In this respect, the short intervals of time of the forgery on more than one document must also be accepted as the same period of time. In this respect, where the forgery on more than one document has been carried out within a short interval of time, or where more than one forged document has been produced within a short interval of time, it must necessarily be accepted that these were drawn up at the same time, in other words that they were not drawn up ‘at different times’… There is no dispute that the accused altered the dates of issue of two cheques, each in the amount of one billion TL, which the accused had received from the intervening party at the same moment, initialled the alterations and, having endorsed the cheques on the back, gave them to the other accused, who was acquitted, in return for a debt owed to the latter; and, in view of the contents of the file, it must be accepted that the accused also carried out the forgery on the two cheque leaves forming the subject of the offence within the same period of time… Although it is possible to apply Article 80 of the TCY No. 765 to the accused on account of the forgery carried out on two cheque leaves within the same period of time, Art. 43(1) of the TCY No. 5237 must not be applied, on account of the phrase ‘at different times’ contained in the text of the article; nevertheless, the fact that forgery was carried out on more than one cheque leaf must be taken into consideration in determining the basic penalty under Article 61 of the Law…” YCGK, 08.06.2010, 2010/11-98, 2010/143. www. kazanci.com.tr can be established more easily in respect of offences committed within the same period of time. Under the former regulation, however, the provision on the continuing offence could be applied “even if at different times”, provided that this decision to commit the offence could be established. From the literal interpretation of paragraph 1 of Article 43 of the TCK No. 5237, by contrast, it follows that the offences forming the chain must necessarily be committed at different times. Indeed, the Court of Cassation also accepts this interpretation in the decisions it has rendered on the subject. We consider, however, that this expression must not be understood in absolute terms and that it must be interpreted in the light of the “ratio legis” pursued by the regulation of the article on the continuing offence162. Indeed, the Court of Cassation too interprets the article of the statute in absolute terms but endeavours to reach the correct result through an incorrect application, by departing from the lower limit of the penalty. However, the solution adopted by the Court of Cassation is not a correct one, because, since it causes the penalty to increase as the number of offences committed increases, it may both run counter to the purpose for which the continuing offence was regulated and lead to unfair penalties being imposed on the perpetrator163.
The reason given for the requirement in paragraph 1 of Article 43 of the TCK that the deed be committed “at different times” is that the provision on the continuing offence has to be applied to notional concurrence of the same kind, regulated in paragraph 2 of Article 43, and that this is possible only where it takes place “at the same moment”164. We do not agree with this explanation; the only reason why the regulation was made in this way is that the increase of the penalty prescribed for the continuing offence is prescribed for notional concurrence of the same kind; there is otherwise no affinity or similarity between the substantive content of this form of notional concurrence and the continuing offence. Consequently, in our view the legislature included this expression in order to distinguish legal and natural unity of the act from the continuing offence, but it has given rise to misunderstandings and to erroneous applications by the Court of Cassation. For this reason we criticise the regulation of notional concurrence of the same kind in paragraph 2 of Article 43.
The expression “different times” need not necessarily be understood as different hours or days. For example, where the money in different accounts of the same depositor is withdrawn in immediate succession, in a manner that could be called the same moment, or where purchases are made in succession over the internet, but from different places, with the same unlawfully obtained credit card, a continuing offence may be at issue despite the very close proximity in time. Consequently, as we have emphasised above and as is frequently stated in legal scholarship, whether or not the continuing offence can be applied must be decided by taking into account the circumstances of the specific case and the purpose of the regulation of this article. We must state, however, that the regulation is open to debate even in this form, since “different times” may be understood to mean different days as well as hours and minutes165.
In legal scholarship there are authors who state that the statute provides for an exception to this rule and that the provision on the continuing offence is also to be applied where the same offence is committed against more than one person by a single deed, that is, at the same time166. However, as we have also stated above, in our view this provision in paragraph 2 of Article 43 does not regulate an exception to the provision on the continuing offence but notional concurrence of the same kind, which is a separate situation in its own right. The only thing they have in common is that the increase of the penalty ultimately to be imposed on the perpetrator is made at the same rate. This interpretation by the authors, however, demonstrates the soundness of the criticism we have made of the regulation of notional concurrence of the same kind in Article 43 instead of Article 44.
3. The Deeds Constituting the Same Offence
The third condition of the continuing offence is that the deeds committed by the perpetrator constitute the same offence. This is expressed in Article 43 as “the commission of the same offence more than once”. What is meant by the commission of the same offence is that the protected legal interest and the material and mental elements of the statutory definition are, in broad outline, the same as between the first offence and the other offences167.
Furthermore, according to the provision in Article 43 of the TCK, “the basic form of an offence and its qualified forms requiring a heavier or a lighter penalty shall be deemed to be the same offence”. Accordingly, Article 43 of the TCK is also applied where the basic and qualified forms of any offence are committed one after another at certain intervals, provided that this falls within the scope of the same decision to commit the offence168. For example, where the perpetrator, the other conditions also being present, commits the basic form of the offence of theft and its qualified forms successively, the provision on the continuing offence is applied. Similarly, where first the simple and then the qualified form of the offence of sexual assault is committed, there is a continuing offence169. However, where the perpetrator commits first the offence of theft and then that of robbery, no continuing offence arises170. On the other hand, what is taken into account for the existence of a continuing offence is the same type of offence, not the protected legal interest; consequently, offences that are regulated in the same chapter on the basis of the legal interest protected by the offence cannot be the subject of a continuing offence, and it is therefore not possible to apply the provisions on the continuing offence between the offences of theft and fraud171.
In legal scholarship, Özgenç states that where, in the course of the continuing commission of a deed constituting an offence, the legislature changes its legal characterisation and enacts a provision to the effect that it constitutes a different offence, the change made in the characterisation will not affect the formation of the continuing offence. The author states, for example, that the deeds by which persons in a managerial position appropriated the resources of a bank that is a legal person under private law constituted the offence of “abuse of trust by reason of service” under the TCK No. 765 (Arts. 508 and 510); that, however, the same deeds were defined as a special offence of embezzlement in paragraph 3 of Article 22 of the Banks Law No. 4389; that the deeds in question continued to be defined as embezzlement in the Banking Law No. 5411 as well; and that the change made by this statutory regulation in the characterisation of the deed does not constitute an obstacle to the application of the provisions on the continuing offence172.
We do not share this view of the author. In our view, where the legal characterisation of the deed is changed and it is turned into an offence that is different and, in particular, entails heavier consequences, it is contrary to the fundamental principles of criminal law to accept the earlier and later deeds as a whole and to apply the provisions on the continuing offence. First of all, this practice amounts to a violation of the principle of legality of offences and penalties, because in this case the perpetrator’s deed is assessed according to the legal characterisation at the moment at which the chain ends, and the perpetrator is held liable not for the offence requiring a lighter penalty before the amendment of the statute but for the offence requiring a heavier penalty after the amendment, and such perpetrators are punished with a heavier penalty than under the statute in force in the period in which they committed a certain part of the offence. However, where the deeds are assessed separately by reference to the period of time in which they were carried out, an assessment may be made as if there were two different offences although there is in fact a continuing offence, and the perpetrator may in the end receive a heavier penalty than under the application of the continuing offence. In our view, in this situation the calculation should be made both on the basis of the continuing offence and on the basis of different offences and, once the resulting penalties have been determined, the outcome that is in the perpetrator’s favour should be applied; no view claiming certainty should be expressed in advance.
Some authors in legal scholarship state that, where the other conditions are also fulfilled, a continuing offence may arise even where provisions contained in different statutes are violated, because the TCK contains the expression “the same offence” instead of “the same provision of the law”, so that it is not a condition that the offences be found in the same statute173. We do not share this view of the authors, because, as we have also stated above, the reason for the use of the expression “the same offence” is that different offences are regulated in the same article of the statute. Moreover, where the same type of offence is regulated in different statutes, either the implied repeal (zımni ilga) of the earlier statute by the later statute, or one of the principles of the priority of the special norm or of the subsidiarity of the auxiliary norm, which are forms of apparent concurrence, comes into play and prevents the application of the same type of offence contained in different statutes. Consequently, in our view it is not possible for a continuing offence to arise between identical types of offence contained in different statutes.
4. Identity of the Victim
The third objective condition of the continuing offence is that the offences committed more than once be committed against the same person, that is, that the victim of these offences be the same person. Consequently, even if they are committed within the scope of the same decision to commit the offence, no continuing offence arises where the victims of the offence are different persons.
In the provision on the continuing offence in Article 80 of the TCK No. 765, by contrast, no such restrictive wording was used, so that the article on the continuing offence could be applied even where the victims of the offence were different persons; in our view this needlessly widened the scope of application of the article. Indeed, by some of its settled decisions – decisions which in our view were erroneous (from the standpoint of the law in force at that time), since extensive interpretation is prohibited in criminal law, (but appropriate de lege ferenda and from the standpoint of justice in the individual case) – the Court of Cassation narrowed the scope of application of the article, stating in particular that in the offences of homicide and intentional injury as many offences arose as there were victims, and did not apply the article on the continuing offence in these cases. Indeed, this broad version of the article was also the subject of criticism in legal scholarship. Taking this factual situation and these criticisms into account, the legislature corrected this in the new TCK and expressly stated that there can be a continuing offence only where the victim is the same174. In this way the scope of application of the continuing offence has been considerably narrowed in the new TCK as compared with the TCK No. 765175.
Another point that must be made concerning the singleness of the victim in the continuing offence is that some authors in legal scholarship, starting from the theory of the unity of the typical act, argue that the article on the continuing offence must be applied even in cases where there is more than one victim. The authors who hold this view state that it must be correctly determined who the victim of the offence committed in the specific case is; that for this reason they do not agree with the assessment in the example given in the explanatory memorandum to Article 43 of the TCK concerning the continuing offence, namely that “where the windows of the cars in a car park are broken and the radio-cassette players are stolen, the theft from the car belonging to each person retains its independence and the provisions on the cumulation of penalties are applied”; that, because in this example the cars have been left with the car park attendant, the possessor of all the cars is the car park attendant; and that consequently, since the victim of the offence is the car park attendant, who is in the position of joint possessor of the cars in the car park, it must be accepted that there is a single deed in the legal sense in the case (unity of the typical act) and thus that a single theft has been committed176.
We do not share this view of the authors, for in our view as many offences arise here as there are victims. In the mental element of the offence, the victim of the offence is also one of the pieces of knowledge relating to the offence that the perpetrator must possess for the perpetrator’s intent to exist; where the perpetrator knows the characteristics of the victim of the offence, the perpetrator must be held liable for the characteristics or other attributes relating to the victim. Accordingly, a perpetrator who enters a public car park and steals the music systems of a large number of cars also knows that he is victimising a large number of persons. Similarly, where a perpetrator who enters the teachers’ room steals the money and other valuables in the bags of more than one teacher, as many offences of theft are committed as there are victims. Consequently, a separate intent to commit an offence is formed here in the perpetrator in respect of each victim. On the other hand, the offence of theft is one of the offences against property. The victim of the offence of theft is classically stated to be the possessor of the thing that forms the object of the offence; but this does not alter the fact that the owner of that thing is also a victim. Indeed, in our view the rights of the owner and of the possessor in respect of the thing forming the object of the offence are protected to an equal degree. In some situations the possessor takes second place. Accordingly, in the offence of theft committed in a large number of cars by entering a car park, since the legal interests of more than one person are violated by more than one deed, it should no longer be possible to apply here the unity of the typical act or the provision on the continuing offence177. Here real concurrence must be applied and as many penalties imposed as there are victims. This is an approach that is also consistent with the philosophy of the TCK on this matter178.
Similarly, some authors in legal scholarship state that the statute provides for an exception to this rule and that the provision on the continuing offence is also to be applied where the same offence is committed against more than one person by a single deed, that is, against more than one victim, and that the provision in question constitutes an exception to the condition that the victim be single; because, since the several offences committed by one deed are the same, the condition of notional concurrence that “different offences arise” from one deed is not fulfilled and, the same offence having been committed, it is not possible to apply the provisions on notional concurrence (of different kinds)179. As we have also stated above, this provision is not an exception to the continuing offence but a provision on notional concurrence of the same kind, which is entirely different from it. We therefore do not share the views of these authors.
In its original version, Article 43 of the TCK was not clear as to whether or not the continuing offence was to be applied where offences without a specific victim were committed numerous times within the scope of the same decision to commit the offence, and this gave rise to doubts both in practice and in legal scholarship. In its original version before the amendment, Article 43 of the TCK, in which the continuing offence is regulated, provided that a continuing offence could arise “where, in the course of executing a decision to commit an offence, the same offence is committed more than once against one person at different times”. As can be seen, in that version the continuing offence was to be applied only in situations where the victim was specific and where the deed was carried out against the same person. Accordingly, in offences without a specific victim, each act, even if it fell within the scope of the same decision to commit the offence, was to be regarded as a separate offence and the rules on the cumulation of penalties (real concurrence) were to be applied to the perpetrator. In order to remove this doubt and this unjust situation, the problem was resolved, before the TCK No. 5237 had even entered into force, by the sentence “the provision of this paragraph shall also apply to offences whose victim is not a specific person”180, added to paragraph 1 of Article 43 by Article 6 of Law No. 5377 of 29.6.2005181.
Accordingly, since in the offences contained in particular in the chapter on offences against society, the nation and the state, and in offences of the same nature in the other chapters, the victim is each and every one of the individuals making up society182, there will be a continuing offence where one of these offences is committed more than once with the same decision to commit the offence183. In offences in which everyone is the victim, the provisions on the continuing offence must be applied as a matter of priority184, and the decisions of the Court of Cassation are also to this effect185. For example, where the offence of laundering the proceeds of crime regulated in paragraph 1 of Article 282 of the TCK is committed many times in the course of executing one decision to commit an offence, the provision on the continuing offence can be applied even though this offence has no specific victim186. A similar situation applies to the offence of intentional pollution of the environment or to that of bribery.
be determined separately for each type of offence. See: Öztürk/Erdem, kn.590.
5. Commission of the Offences “in the Course of Executing the Same Decision to Commit an Offence”
For there to be a continuing offence, the offences must be committed “in the course of executing a decision to commit an offence”, but the scope of this is disputed187. The subjective condition of the continuing offence is the existence of a mental link between the several offences committed. This element indicates the subjective link between several independent offences and constitutes one of the reasons for imposing a single penalty for more than one offence188.
Where the same offence is committed more than once, whether or not a mental link exists between these offences must be assessed separately according to the specific circumstances in which each incident was committed189. The “decision to commit an offence” in question must not, however, be confused with the intent to commit the offence. This decision is a volitional state which also encompasses intent and precedes intent190. For intent to exist there must be knowledge directed at a specific deed191. In a decision to commit an offence, however, there is not merely an element of knowledge directed at a specific act, of the kind for example “I shall launder by means of a transfer through the bank” or “I shall traffic in narcotic substances by hiding them in the trailer of a lorry and taking them across the border”; rather, there is a decision directed at committing a specific offence, of the kind “I shall enter a factory on several days in succession and steal various items”.
The decision whose existence is required in the continuing offence is a subjective link that must exist between the perpetrator’s acts. This subjective decision may apply to deeds carried out within a plan made beforehand, and it may also be present where, without any plan, the perpetrator decides to continue his deeds192. The fact that each act appears to be the continuation of the preceding one reveals the existence of the subjective connection and of the same decision to commit the offence193. However, where the perpetrator decides beforehand that he will take advantage of every opportunity to commit an offence that presents itself, no continuing offence arises194. Unity in the perpetrator’s decision does not mean that there is also unity in the intent to commit the offence. Each deed making up the continuing offence comes about as the result of a separate intent195 Likewise, a very general unity may extend as far as a general unity of motive. For example, where a person who has made theft his profession commits several offences of theft, there is a general unity of motive in terms of making a living by illegal means. In that case, however, there is no continuing offence, for the statute requires unity in the decision to commit the offence and does not address motive196. Consequently, motive, intention and purpose must not be confused with the decision197.
Whether or not there is a mental link between the same offences is assessed in the light of the circumstances of each specific case and decided accordingly; the explanations given on this subject are therefore not conclusive but serve as guidance198. For example, deeds of forgery of official documents carried out for the various stages of a car sale and purchase transaction effected with forged documents were, because they were directed at the same aim, assessed by the Court of Cassation as having been committed “in the course of executing the same decision to commit the offence”, and it was stated that the provision on the continuing offence had to be applied199. By contrast, where a fairly long period of time showing that the intent has been renewed has elapsed between the deeds200, or where the existence of the same decision to commit the offence is not indicated by any similarities between the deeds, each deed constitutes a separate offence. Indeed, in the case of loan applications made with different forged identity documents at different branches of the same bank, it was decided that the perpetrator had acted not in execution of the same decision to commit the offence but with renewed intent and that real concurrence had to be applied201.
Accordingly, in determining, for the purposes of the existence of a continuing offence, whether or not the several offences committed are based on the same decision to commit the offence, account must be taken of the similarity or uniformity in the manner in which the offences were committed, the taking advantage of similar opportunities, the legal interest protected by the offence according to the system of the statute, the nature of and differences in the object of the offence at which the act is directed, the interval of time between the offences, the fact that, particularly in offences committed for economic gain, the perpetrator does not have a job and/or occupation providing a regular income202, and many other similar data and forms of conduct that are outwardly manifested203.
As regards the subjective condition of the continuing offence, it is also disputed whether or not negligent offences can be committed in the form of a continuing offence204. In our view, the fact that the essence of the subjective condition of the continuing offence is tied to a decision that precedes intent and encompasses it pushes negligence outside the continuing offence. Consequently, having regard also to the regulation in the statute, it should not be possible to apply the continuing offence to negligent offences205.
C. Consequence of the Application of the Continuing Offence
In this case the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrators is increased by one quarter to three quarters 206. The judge increases the penalty at a rate that he determines between these rates, taking into account the number of offences committed in continuing form in the specific case. This increase is made on the basis of the concrete penalty to be determined under paragraph 1 of Article 61 of the TCK. Under paragraph 5 of the same article, after the concrete penalty has been determined, if a qualified form increasing the penalty is present in one of the offences, the penalty is increased accordingly; if a qualified form reducing the penalty is present, the amount of the penalty is reduced; thereafter, attempt, participation and finally the provision on the continuing offence are applied, in that order, to the penalty thus determined. However, where at least one of the offences forming the chain has not remained at the stage of attempt but has been completed, no reduction can be made on account of attempt.
Where the basic form of an offence and its qualified forms requiring a heavier penalty are committed in continuing form, the penalty on which the increase is to be made must be the penalty determined according to the qualified form of the offence207. If the perpetrator is a minor, the age at the moment when the last deed was carried out must be taken into account208.
Likewise, where a continuing offence arises between an offence that has remained at the stage of attempt and a completed offence, the increase of the penalty is, on the same principle, made by reference to the completed offence209. Similarly, it is also possible to apply the provision on the continuing offence between an offence that the perpetrator has carried out alone and an offence that he has committed in participation with others210.
In situations in which there is a continuing offence, since there is a plurality of offences, a single consequence is attached to them only where the statute attaches a special consequence to the continuing offence; apart from this, all of the offences included in the chain individually retain their independence. Accordingly, apart from the increase of the penalty (Art. 43(1) TCK), the commencement of the limitation period for prosecution (Art. 66(6) TCK) and the determination of the court having territorial jurisdiction (Art. 12(2) CMK), in all situations that are not expressly indicated in the statute, such as the application of criminal statutes in terms of place and time, or amnesty, the offences included in the chain are subject to independent assessment211.
D. Situations in Which the Continuing Offence Does Not Apply
Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 43 of the TCK, “the provisions of this article shall not apply to the offences of intentional killing, intentional injury, torture and robbery”. Accordingly, the provision on the continuing offence is not applied even where the offences listed in the paragraph are committed more than once against the same person in the course of executing one decision to commit an offence212. By this provision, the restriction which, in the period of the TCK No. 765, was imposed on the application of the continuing offence by decisions of the Court of Cassation although it was not contained in the statute has been turned into a rule, and parallelism with practice has been achieved213. In this way this arrangement, which, although aimed at satisfying the sense of justice, was contrary to the letter and spirit of the TCK No. 765, has been placed on a normative footing214. The reason why these offences were selected and excluded from the application of the continuing offence is not to be found in the explanatory memorandum, but it is highly probable that the criterion taken into consideration here was the legal interests protected by these offences215.
In the original version of the article, the offences of sexual assault (Art. 102 TCK) and sexual abuse of children (Art. 103 TCK) were also included among the offences to which the article on the continuing offence could not be applied. However, by the amendment made to paragraph 3 of Article 43 by Law No. 5377 of 29.6.2005, these offences were removed from its scope. In this way it was ensured that the provision on the continuing offence would also be applied to the offences of sexual assault and sexual abuse of children216. The reasons given for this amendment were the problem of proof and the fact that the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator would increase greatly217. As will be seen in the footnote below, in our view this is neither an explanatory nor a satisfactory justification. Difficulty is experienced in proving sexual offences in cases where there is no witness and/or circumstantial evidence. This difficulty of proof, however, is a difficulty that is independent of the number of times the deed, that is, the forced sexual intercourse or the abuse, took place. Likewise, where a perpetrator who possesses the intent and culpability to commit this offence moreover carries out his deed several times in succession and further impairs the victim’s mental and physical integrity, not to impose as many penalties as there are deeds but to apply the provision on the continuing offence, and thus virtually to condone the subsequent deeds, is in our view acceptable neither from the standpoint of the theory of the offence nor from that of the criminal policy adopted by modern societies. In our view the text of the statute should be restored to its former version.
Furthermore, if the repetition of the act is required by the type of offence, there is not a continuing offence but a single act in the legal sense and a single offence. The provision on the continuing offence must not be applied where the same act is performed more than once in order to commit the same offence (killing or injuring by numerous stab wounds) or where more than one of the alternative acts is carried out218.
Where all or some of the offences are subject to complaint, the offences in respect of which the condition of a complaint has been fulfilled are likewise taken into account for the purposes of the continuing offence219. Similarly, where some of the offences are subject to victim–offender mediation, the provisions on mediation are applied first, and the existence of a continuing offence is accepted if mediation cannot be achieved. Consequently, for a continuing offence to arise, the offences included in the chain must be punishable220; attention is paid to this point in practice as well221.
Another situation in which the continuing offence cannot be applied has been created by decisions of the Court of Cassation. In a specific case that came before it, the General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation (YCGK) decided that a chain of offences, that is, continuity (teselsül), cannot arise in offences aggravated by their result. Relying on reports of the Institute of Forensic Medicine (Adli Tıp Kurumu), the YCGK held that in the offences aggravated by their result regulated in Arts. 102(5) (the form of the offence of sexual assault aggravated by its result) and 103(6) (the form of the offence of sexual assault against a child aggravated by its result) TCK, the aggravating circumstance in question, that is, the impairment of the victim’s physical and mental health, can occur only once and that it is not possible for it to be impaired repeatedly by repeated acts; and it therefore decided that, where the perpetrator’s acts are repeated in such a way as to constitute a continuing offence, the amount by which the penalty is to be increased is to be found by applying Article 43 of the TCK to the amount of the penalty prescribed for the basic form of the offence, and the amount found by applying Article 43 is to be added to the amount of the penalty specified for the form of the offence aggravated by its result222. After this decision of the YCGK, in all similar cases the same practice began to be followed223.
is not possible. Otherwise an excessive penalty would be imposed on the accused. Accordingly, when the penalty is being applied, in cases where the provisions on the continuing offence are to be applied, the increase under Article 43 of the TCY is to be made on the basis of the penalty found after the other grounds for increase have been applied, and the amount of the final penalty is to be determined by adding the amount of the increase to the amount of the penalty found by the increase to be made under Art. 103(6) of the TCY on account of the offence aggravated by its result. The conclusion reached by the General Criminal Assembly: In the present case, the sanction to be applied on account of the accused’s deed of abuse, committed, acting with the same decision to commit the offence, by inserting an organ into the victim’s body on more than one occasion and in such a way as to cause the impairment of the victim’s mental health, is to be determined as follows on the basis of the proposals for the application more favourable to the accused: It must be decided that the accused be sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment under Art. 103(2) of the TCY No. 5237 on account of the deed of sexual abuse by inserting an organ into the body; that, because the deed was carried out by using force, the penalty be increased by 1/2 under Art. 103(4) of the TCY and the accused be sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment; that, because the victim’s mental health has been impaired and no penalty of less than 15 years can be imposed under Art. 103(6) of the TCY, the accused be sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment; that, because the deed of abuse was carried out in continuing form, the penalty be increased by 1/4 under Article 43 of the TCY, this increase being made on the basis of 12 years’ imprisonment, which is the amount of the penalty determined by Art. 103(4), and the resulting 3 years being added to the amount of the penalty determined by Art. 103(6), so that the accused be sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment; and that, the discretionary ground for reduction being applied, a reduction of 1/6 be made under Article 62 of the TCY, so that the accused be sentenced in the end to 15 years’ imprisonment. The fact that the Local Court, in increasing the penalty on account of the offence having been committed in continuing form, applied the rate of increase in Article 43 of the TCY to the amount of the penalty found by applying Art. 103(6) and imposed an excessive penalty on the accused is contrary to the law, and there is nothing erroneous in the Special Chamber’s decision to quash the judgment for this reason.” YCGK, 20.11.2007, 2007/5-142, 2007/240. www.kazancı.com.tr
We do not share this view of the Court of Cassation. There are degrees of permanent impairment of mental and physical health. Where, as a result of each of the perpetrator’s acts, which are at least negligent, the victim’s physical or mental health deteriorates by a further degree, would it not be an unjust result for Article 43 not to be applied in respect of the aggravating result and for the basic form of the offence to be taken as the starting point? Likewise, it may also be possible for such a result, which would not occur or could occur only in a very slight form through a single act of the perpetrator, to arise, or for its degree to increase, as a consequence of the perpetrator’s numerous deeds. Similarly, “if one proceeds on the logic of the Court of Cassation”, where these offences are committed against a person whose physical or mental health was already impaired before the perpetrator’s deed, or where the degree of such persons’ impairment increases, would saying “their mental or physical health was already impaired; it is unnecessary to increase the penalties under Article 43” not mean that these persons are, on account of their mental or physical disabilities, regarded as victims in the full sense of the word and punished, and, on the other hand, that the perpetrator is rewarded for having found such a person? In our view, a decision given without thinking the matter through in depth, by adhering blindly to the report of the Institute of Forensic Medicine and by using pure legal technique (which in our view is also wrong) is contrary both to the statute and, in particular, to law. This unlawfulness is, before the criminal code, the constitution and international conventions, contrary to “human rights”, which are among the unwritten universal rules of law. The YCGK must therefore change this decision. Moreover, the decision is also wrong from the standpoint of legal technique. How penalties are to be increased and reduced, and the order in which this is done, are regulated in Article 61 of the TCK. Although there is no detailed provision as regards the application of the continuing offence, it is in our view erroneous, when the form of the offence aggravated by its result has been realised, to take the basic or, as the case may be, the qualified form of the offence into account, to find the difference by applying the continuing offence to it, and to apply this difference to the form of the offence aggravated by its result. The Court of Cassation should abandon this error as soon as possible.
IV. Apparent Concurrence (Birleşme)
A. In General
Where the application of one of several criminal statutes, or of one of several criminal norms contained in the same statute, renders the application of the other unnecessary, there is apparent concurrence224. In the case of apparent concurrence there is in fact no plurality of offences, and there is a single norm to be applied to the deed carried out by the perpetrator225. It is because there is no plurality of offences and no concurrence of offences in the true sense that this situation is called apparent concurrence226.
Where the content of wrongfulness of a deed is covered by the application of one of the several norms violated by that deed, the application of the other norms does not come into question227. In the case of apparent concurrence, one norm is applied to one deed, and this comes about either through the relationship between the norms or by way of interpretation228. Consequently, there is no need for apparent concurrence to be regulated in the statute229. Indeed, it is stated in legal scholarship that in the situations cited as examples of apparent concurrence there is a problem of interpretation and that, for example, in cases where there is a “special
– general norm relationship”, there is no doubt, once recourse is had to the methods of interpretation, that the norm to be applied to the deed is the special norm230.
B. Principles and Forms of Apparent Concurrence
Apparent concurrence is systematised in the context of the principles of the priority of the special norm, the consumption of one norm by another and the subsidiarity of the auxiliary norm, and is explained in accordance with these principles231. In situations in which there is an apparent conflict of norms, all of these principles must be used in order to find which norm is to be applied232.
1. The Principle of the Priority of the Special Norm (Special Norm – General Norm Relationship)
Where, among the norms that are apparently applicable to the same deed carried out by the perpetrator, one contains, alongside the elements of the other norm, certain additional elements and features, there is a special norm – general norm relationship233. Accordingly, if one criminal norm contains the elements a+b+c while the other criminal norm contains the elements a+b+c+d, the second norm is the special norm234. These additional elements may relate to the perpetrator’s motive, the means used, the object of the offence or the characteristics of the perpetrator235. In this case, in accordance with the principle of the priority of the special norm (lex specialis derogat legi generalis)236, the general norm that could be applied to the deed is not applied, and the special norm, which fits the particular features of this deed and of similar deeds, finds application237. This is the result of logical reasoning; otherwise the general norm would have to be applied to every deed and it would be unnecessary to provide for the special norm238.
The first condition required for the principle of the priority of the special norm to apply is that the special norm and the general norm protect the same legal interest239. The second condition in this regard is that the special norm must encompass all the elements of the general norm and must in addition contain certain special elements240. Consequently, if it can be said that, had a given norm not existed, the matter regulated by that norm would have remained within the general norm, the norm in question is accepted as a special norm241. In this case, in accordance with the principle of the priority of the special norm, it is not the norm of a general nature that is applied to the specific case but the special norm laid down for that specific case and similar ones. These elements added to the basic form of the offence in fact narrow the scope of application of the general norm relating to the offence. For this reason the general norm has a wider scope of application than the special norm. Consequently, since it is possible for deeds regarded as falling within the special norm to be punished under the general norm, as a rule, if the special norm is repealed, there will be no statutory gap242.
Examples of the special norm – general norm relationship are the relationship between the basic form of an offence and its qualified forms (the relationship between Article 141, in which the offence of theft is regulated, and Articles 142, 143 and 144), the relationship between a special offence and offences that can be committed by anyone (the relationship between the offence of embezzlement – Art. 247 TCK, Art. 168 of the Banking Law – and the offence of abuse of trust, Art. 155 TCK) and the relationship between a general statute and a special statute (the relationship between the offence of damage to property – Art. 151 TCK – and the offences of destroying statues, busts and monuments representing Atatürk or the tomb of Atatürk, which are made offences by Law No. 5816 on Offences Committed against Atatürk)243.
The most important difference between the form of apparent concurrence represented by the “special norm – general norm relationship” and the other cases of apparent concurrence is that in this case there is a single deed. In fact this reveals a similarity between the special norm – general norm relationship and notional concurrence. However, whereas in the special norm – general norm relationship there is a single offence, in notional concurrence there is more than one offence, but the legislature, in accordance with the criminal policy it has adopted, holds the perpetrator liable for the one of these offences that requires the heaviest penalty244.
As regards the principle of the priority of the special norm and the special norm – general norm relationship, the provision in Article 5 of the TCK No. 5237 must also be addressed. We must state first of all that the TCK contains no general provision on this subject. Article 10 of the former TCK, however, partly regulated the relationship between the special criminal statutes and the TCK; by stating that “the provisions of this Code shall also apply to those matters of the special criminal laws that are not contrary thereto”, it provided that the TCK was to be applied in cases where the ancillary criminal statutes contained no provision. In our view the purpose of this provision is to prevent the provisions in the general part of the criminal code from being needlessly repeated in the ancillary criminal statutes, not to regulate the relationship between the norms relating to offences245. The relationships between the norms that contain offences must be dealt with by the rules on concurrence that form the subject of this study or by the principles of interpretation246. The provision in Article 5 of the TCK No. 5237, which corresponds to Article 10 of the TCK No. 765, is by contrast entirely different from the former one. By stating that “the general provisions of this Code shall also apply to the offences in special criminal laws and in laws containing penal provisions”, this article provides that the general provisions of the new TCK are to be applied to the special criminal statutes even “in cases where there is a provision to the contrary”. That is to say, whereas in the period of the former TCK the norms of a general nature of the criminal code could be applied only if the ancillary criminal statutes contained no provision in that respect, that is, could have the character of auxiliary norms in relation to the norms of a general nature found in the special statutes, this was changed by Article 5 of the TCK No. 5237, which introduced the rule that the norms of a general nature found in the TCK are to be applied even if the special statutes contain a provision to the contrary. The reason given for this provision is the attempt to prevent the norms of a general nature from being circumvented by means of special provisions247.
Although the date of entry into force of Article 5 of the TCK was disputed248, it ultimately entered into force on 31 December 2008. Whether it would be valid for new special criminal statutes enacted after this date to contain a provision contrary to the norms of a general nature of the TCK is a separate debate; it is stated in legal scholarship, however, that the provision of Article 5 of the TCK No. 5237 is binding for the ancillary criminal statutes that entered into force before 1 June 2005, that statutes to be enacted after that date must likewise not contain norms contrary to Article 5 of the TCK No. 5237, but that, where ancillary criminal statutes that have been or will be enacted after that date do contain norms contrary to the general provisions of the TCK, the norms of the ancillary criminal statute must be applied 249.
In legal scholarship, İçel states that the entry into force of this provision, which pursues the aim of changing the whole of criminal legislation at a stroke and thus disregards the particular features of the ancillary criminal statutes, was postponed once its drawbacks were recognised; for this provision is a regulation contrary to the rules on apparent concurrence as regards the special – general norm relationship and, in addition to the significant drawbacks inherent in it, is not capable of producing a solution as regards the principle of the priority of the special norm (lex specialis) either250.
We do not share this view of the author. For while we adopt the author’s view that there need not be a provision on apparent concurrence in the criminal code either, we consider that Article 5 of the TCK No. 5237 is not a provision relating solely to apparent concurrence. Although it differs in form and scope, this article is of the same nature as the provision in Article 10 of the TCK No. 765. That is to say, it was enacted not in order to regulate the relationship between norms containing offences but in order to ensure that all norms of a general nature relating to the theory of the offence and of sanctions also apply to the norms contained in the ancillary criminal statutes, in particular those brought into force and applied in the period of the former TCK No. 765. The reason for this is that, with the repeal by Law No. 5237 of the TCK No. 765, which was under the influence of the classical school of criminal law, an attempt was made to ensure that the regulation and application, as regards the theory of the offence and of sanctions, of the ancillary criminal statutes enacted in the period of Law No. 765 according to the understanding of that time would also be in harmony with the new statute and with the principles of the modern theory of the offence that the new statute sought to introduce. Otherwise a separate regulation would have to be made for every ancillary criminal statute and indeed for the other statutes containing criminal norms, but the impossibility of this is evident.
On the other hand, we agree with İçel’s view on the question of timing. Indeed, whereas Article 5 of the TCK No. 5237 was to enter into force on 1 June 2005 together with the other articles of the statute, the entry into force of this article was first postponed to 31.12.2006 because the necessary amendments and adjustments had not been made in the other legislation containing criminal norms, and when this period too proved insufficient, the period of postponement was extended until 31.12.2008. Finally, a significant part of the amendments in question was made by the “Law on the Amendment of Various Laws for the Purpose of Harmonisation with the Basic Criminal Laws and on the Amendment of Certain Other Laws” No. 5728 of 23.1.2008, which entered into force upon publication in the Official Gazette No. 26781 of 8 February 2008. However, before the TCK, which was enacted in haste in the course of the process of harmonisation with the European Union, these amendments too ought to have been put into the form of a bill, and the TCK No. 5237, the law on its entry into force and this law containing the amendments in question ought to have been enacted one after the other as a whole and brought into force, so that these criticisms and bad practices would have been prevented.
A further point that needs to be addressed in this connection is that implied repeal must be distinguished from the special – general norm relationship. Where norms enacted one after the other regulate the same subject matter and there is a contradiction that prevents them from being applied at the same time, the norm that entered into force later impliedly repeals the earlier norm. The point to be noted here, however, is that neither of the norms contains a feature or element capable of making it special in relation to the other. In the special norm – general norm relationship, by contrast, and unlike implied repeal, there is such a differentiation, in the manner we have explained above, and both norms remain in force together but are applied to different specific cases251.
In conclusion, in the light of the provision in Article 5 of Law No. 5237, where a norm relating to an offence contained in the TCK conflicts with a norm contained in an ancillary criminal statute, the problem must be resolved within the framework of the principle of the priority of the special norm, provided that the other conditions are also present. Where there is a conflict between norms relating to general provisions contained in special criminal statutes that entered into force before 31 December 2008 and the norms of a general nature of the TCK, the norms of the TCK regulating the same subject matter will be applied, in view of the express provision of Article 5 of the TCK. Where, on the other hand, there is a conflict between ancillary criminal statutes that entered into force after 31 December 2008, or that will be enacted from now on, and the general provisions of the TCK, then, in view of Article 5 of the TCK, no such contradictory norm ought, de lege ferenda, to be enacted; if such a provision is nevertheless enacted, the problem must be resolved within the framework of the principle of the priority of the special norm. However, although this manner of resolving the problem is appropriate in terms of the theory of the offence, it carries the risk of creating a contradiction with the general provisions of the TCK and with the modern theory of the offence which, through these provisions, it is sought to apply in our country.
2. The Principle of the Consumption of One Norm by Another (Consuming – Consumed Norm Relationship)
a. In General
Criminal norms are enacted in order to protect certain specific legal interests. In some situations a single norm protects, within one norm and as a whole, the legal interests protected by different norms, and accordingly provides for a single penalty to be imposed for deeds that harm these interests. In such situations the norm which, by protecting all of the legal interests, provides for a single penalty for the deed also encompasses the other norms and, as it were, consumes the other norms within itself; in this case one is content with applying the norm that protects the legal interests jointly, for by providing joint protection this norm prevents the other norms from being applied to the deeds falling within its scope252.
In one of the manifestations of the principle of the consumption of one norm by another, a norm that protects all of the legal interests protected by the other norms generally contains within itself the offences covered by the other norms, as an element or as a qualified form increasing the penalty. The most important example of this principle, and the example of the first case described above, is the compound offence. For example, in the offence of theft committed by entering a building, both the offence of theft and the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling are constituted, but since there is a consuming – consumed norm relationship between these two norms, the perpetrator is punished only for the qualified form of the offence of theft253.
In another manifestation, the unlawfulness arising from the performance of a deed also covers the subsequent deeds, and thus, through the application of the norm to the earlier deed, the subsequent norms, which are not punished, are consumed as well (the subsequent norm that cannot be punished)254. However, two conditions must be present for the deeds that follow the first deed not to be punished: the first of these is that no other legal interest is violated by the subsequent deed, and the second is that the existing harm is not increased255. This situation is encountered in particular in offences against property. In offences of this kind the perpetrator generally exploits or secures the results of the first deed (the benefits he has unlawfully obtained) by his subsequent deeds256. Unpunished subsequent deeds fall within this scope, as in the cases of destroying an item taken by committing theft or of selling to another person property stolen by committing theft257. As in this example, the perpetrator, by his subsequent deed, engages in a kind of exploitation of the gain obtained from the offence of theft258. However, where the perpetrator injures the victim of the offence of theft with a weapon obtained as a result of the theft, what is now at issue is the protection of different legal interests, and both deeds must be punished separately. Similarly, where property obtained as a result of theft is sold to a third person by way of fraud, or where the perpetrator of the laundering offence who has obtained proceeds of crime uses these proceeds as capital and sells illegal drugs, different legal interests are likewise protected, a further harm arises and different deeds that must be punished emerge. Consequently, since in such cases the conditions we have indicated above are not fulfilled, there is no unpunished subsequent norm, and what arises is real concurrence of offences. As regards the unpunished subsequent norm, in the context of the consuming
– consumed norm principle, the following example may also be given in order to show that it is a matter of principle in terms of the theory of the offence: in the offence of laundering the proceeds of crime, the acts constituting this offence consist in taking the proceeds obtained from the predicate offence abroad or subjecting them to various transactions for the purpose of creating the impression that they were obtained by legitimate means259. In addition, in paragraph 2 of Article 282 the purchase, acceptance, possession or use of the proceeds of crime is regulated as an independent type of offence. For the perpetrator to be held liable for the offence in paragraph 2 of Article 282, he must not have participated in any way in the offence of laundering the proceeds of crime regulated in paragraph 1260. For the offence contained in paragraph 2 is an unpunished subsequent norm in relation to the offence contained in paragraph 1. The legislature has thus regulated this principle in the statute, albeit not in an express manner.
The other manifestation of this principle is formed by offences with alternative acts, for by their nature these offences can be committed by performing one of the acts indicated in the statute. If the perpetrator nevertheless does not content himself with a single act and also carries out the other acts in the norm, he is again given the penalty for a single offence. For in this situation the multiple violation of the same norm and, as a result of this, the commission of more than one offence are only apparent; in reality there is, in this situation, a single violation and a single offence. What is at issue is therefore one of the cases of apparent concurrence261.
As can be seen, the existence of a relationship of necessity between the offences contained in the norms is not required here for this principle to exist. Consequently, as is also seen in the examples given above, there is no relationship of necessity between the destruction of the property or its sale to another person after the theft has been committed, or the commission of the offence of theft inside a building, and the offence of theft, nor in the performance of one of the alternative acts rather than another262.
b. The Compound Offence
A compound offence exists where deeds each of which in fact constitutes an independent offence are brought together and regulated as a single deed in the legal sense that constitutes a new offence, or where a deed which on its own constitutes an independent offence can be made into a qualified form of another offence requiring the penalty for that offence to be increased. In this situation, too, the plurality of the offences and of the norms regulating these offences is only apparent. In reality, the norm that is included within another type of offence as an element or as a qualified form increasing the penalty consumes the other norms and causes them to lose their independence263.
Although the compound offence is in fact not a form of the concurrence of offences, it is regulated in the TCK No. 5237 in Article 42 under the heading “concurrence of offences”. According to that article: “An offence which is deemed a single deed because one offence constitutes an element or an aggravating circumstance of the other is called a compound offence. The provisions on concurrence shall not apply to offences of this kind.”
The point that must not be overlooked in the compound offence is that in this situation there is, in the words of the statute, an “offence deemed a single deed”, that is, there are not several offences and, in this context, several acts, but a single act in the legal sense and a single offence264. Consequently, in determining the unity of the deed in the case of a compound offence, it is not the unity of the act in the natural sense but the unity of the act in the legal, that is, typical, sense that must be taken into account. Even if some of these acts are regulated in the statute as other, independent types of offence, these acts are now regarded, as a whole, as a single offence, and all of the acts in question constitute the element of wrongfulness of the single offence265.
In essence, in the compound offence the acts are several in the natural sense and each act violates different legal interests. For example, in the offence of robbery regulated in Article 148 of the TCK, property is taken by force or threat and the offence is realised by more than one act; at the same time more than one legal interest, such as the protection of the person’s bodily integrity and property, is violated266. In this situation, however, the legislature, by deeming the acts that violate more than one legal interest a single deed, combines them within one definition of an offence. In other words, in compound offences there is a single act in the legal sense and therefore a single offence. Accordingly, the compound offence is not one of the cases of the concurrence of offences, and it is in fact not necessary for a provision on it to be included in the TCK in the chapter on the concurrence of offences267. For the compound offence is a problem relating to conformity with the statutory definition of the offence and can be identified by examining the type of offence. Even if Article 42 of the TCK did not exist, the existence of a compound offence would be accepted where one offence has been regulated as an element of another or as a qualified form of it increasing the penalty, because this is apparent from the way in which the type of offence is framed268. It is stated, however, that the legislature gave the compound offence a separate place in the statute on the ground that the compound offence is the most frequently encountered of the cases of apparent concurrence and that it should not give rise to differing interpretations and confusion in this regard269.
A further point that we wish to address here is that Article 42, in which the compound offence is regulated in the TCK, states that “the offences forming the parts of the compound offence are an element or an aggravating circumstance”. The use of the concept of “aggravating circumstance” here is mistaken, for the TCK does not use the concepts of aggravating or mitigating circumstances but uses in their place the concept of the qualified form of the offence270. This qualified form may be of a kind that increases the penalty for the offence, just as it may be of a mitigating kind271. The terminology used in Article 42 is therefore out of keeping with the statute as a whole.
As we have stated above, in the compound offence either one offence constitutes an element of the other, that is, acts constituting various offences come together as elements and form another offence, or one offence constitutes a qualified form of another offence increasing the penalty.
In the first of these, one offence constitutes an element of the other, that is, acts constituting various offences come together as elements and form another offence. In this case the nature of the offences that make up the compound offence changes, and an offence of a different nature emerges. The offences that are elements lose their independence and there is one offence; consequently only the penalty for this offence is imposed272. The point to be noted here is that it is the offence expressly indicated in the statute as an element that will lose its independence273. Offences that are not expressly specified as an element or a qualified form in the definition of the compound offence, by contrast, retain their independence274. Where different offences lose their independence as an element of an offence and acquire the character of an element for the constitution of the offence, that is, where the offence in which they are included cannot be realised unless this offence is realised as an element, a relationship of necessity is seen to exist between the offences275. Consequently, in the cases of committing another offence in order to commit an offence, committing another offence in order to conceal an offence and committing another offence on the occasion of an offence, in which there is no relationship of necessity, each offence retains its independence, and in these situations what is at issue is not a compound offence but the cumulation of penalties276.
The best-known and classic example of the first manifestation of the compound offence is the offence of robbery. Although the offences of “force”, regulated in Article 108 of the TCK, “threat”, regulated in Article 106, and “theft”, regulated in Article 141, are in fact types of offence separate from one another, they have been combined by the legislature so as to create the offence of “robbery”, a new type of offence entirely independent of them, which is regulated in Article 148 of the statute. Here the offence of force
– threat is an element of the offence of theft, and these two offences have been combined within an independent type of offence277. Accordingly, where the offence of theft is committed by using force or threat against a person, the provisions of these articles are no longer applied; the offence of robbery, which is entirely independent of them, is applied and the perpetrator is given the penalty for that offence. Similarly, in the offence of sexual assault regulated in Article 102 of the TCK or in the offence of preventing the exercise of political rights regulated in Article 114, since the use of force and threat constitutes an element of these offences, no separate penalty is imposed for those offences; only the penalty for the offences defined in Articles 102 and 114 of the TCK is imposed278.
However, in cases where the use of force constitutes the basic or a qualified form of an offence, if one of the forms of the offence of intentional injury aggravated by its result, regulated in Article 87 of the TCK, is realised, a penalty is imposed both for the offence of which force is an element and for the form of the offence of intentional injury aggravated by its result. Examples of this are the offence of sexual assault in Art. 102(4) TCK, the sexual abuse of children in Art. 103(5), deprivation of liberty in Art. 109(6), some of the offences against liberty in Art. 119(2), qualified robbery in Art. 149(2) and the offence of resistance to prevent the performance of a duty in Art. 265(5). Consequently, for force to be accepted as an element or a qualified form of the offence, the deed carried out must be of such a nature as to constitute the basic form of the offence of intentional injury. In the cases falling outside this, both the offence of which force is an element and the qualified form of the offence of intentional injury are at issue, and the perpetrator is given the penalty for both offences279. For it is expressly stated that, where the form of the offence of intentional injury aggravated by its result is realised, the perpetrator is to be held separately liable for this aggravating result. These are the exceptions to the compound offence.
In the second manifestation of the compound offence, by contrast, one offence constitutes a qualified element of the other offence increasing the penalty, and the offence that is the element loses its independence280. For example, where the offence is committed in a dwelling or workplace, which constitutes one of the qualified forms of the offence of robbery, the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling regulated in Article 116 of the TCK is in fact committed as well; however, since this circumstance constitutes a qualified form of the offence of robbery increasing the penalty, the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling now loses its independence, and the perpetrator is not punished separately for that offence but is punished for the qualified form of the offence of robbery281. The Court of Cassation also states this expressly in its decisions282. Similarly, the case in which the offence of escaping from prison regulated in paragraph 2 of Article 292 of the TCK is committed by using force and threat against persons or by breaking a door or window is also an example of the compound offence. For the offences of force and threat and of damage to property, which are regulated separately in the TCK, have been regulated as qualified forms of the offence of escape and have lost their independence. However, the point to be noted in the second manifestation of the compound offence is that, unlike the first manifestation of the compound offence, there is no relationship of necessity between the basic offence and the offences regulated as a qualified form.
For it is also possible to escape without force and threat or damage to property, for example by digging a tunnel; in the same way, theft need not necessarily be committed inside a building. It is perfectly possible for a car parked in the street, or for property inside a car whose windows or door have been left open, to be stolen283.
The following examples may also be given in connection with this manifestation of the compound offence: in paragraph 2 of the offence of deprivation of liberty regulated in Article 109 of the TCK, and likewise in paragraph 4 of the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling regulated in Article 116, the commission of the offence by using force and threat is regulated as a qualified form of these offences. The deeds of force and threat, which are in fact regulated in Articles 106 and 108 of the statute, have been regulated in the form of a qualified form of the offences in question increasing the penalty and thus as a typical case of the compound offence. In the same way, the offence of sexual harassment, which is regulated as an independent type of offence in Article 105 of the TCK, is regulated in paragraph 3 of the offence of torture regulated in Article 94 of the TCK as a qualified form of that offence increasing the penalty. Accordingly, where the offence of torture is committed by subjecting the victim to sexual harassment, the perpetrator is not punished separately for the offence of sexual harassment but is punished for the qualified form of the offence of torture284.
Where, by contrast, the deed is committed “in respect of property which, although left in a place that anyone can enter, has been secured by locking, or which has been placed in safekeeping within a building or its annexes”, which is one of the qualified forms of the offence of theft (Art. 142(1)(b) TCK), the provision on the compound offence is not applied, even though this at the same time constitutes the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling and is a qualified form of the offence of theft increasing the penalty, and pursuant to Art. 142(4) TCK a penalty is imposed both for the qualified form of the offence of theft and for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling285. In our view this is a provision that is mistaken from a theoretical point of view and that disrupts the coherence of the statute and of the practice in this field286. Indeed, since paragraph 4 of Article 142 did not exist in the original version of the statute, no distinction was made in this regard. However, the 6th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation decided, notwithstanding this provision of the TCK, that in offences of theft committed by entering a dwelling both the offence of theft and the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling are constituted287. As a result, Article 6 of Law No. 5560288 added to Article 142 of the TCK a paragraph 4289, which provides, in line with the decision of the Court of Cassation, that where the offence is committed in this way a penalty is to be imposed both for theft and for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling, and that the provision on the compound offence is therefore not to be applied here. In legal scholarship both the said decision of the Court of Cassation and the prevention of unnecessary debate have been given as the reason for this290. In the explanatory memorandum to the Law, for its part, it is indicated that the fact that the investigation and prosecution of the basic form of the offences is subject to a complaint was causing confusion291. In our view, however, the reasoning given and the result sought to be achieved are different. It constitutes an obvious contradiction that, where the offence of robbery is committed inside a dwelling, the perpetrator is punished only for the qualified form of the offence of robbery, whereas in the offence of theft a penalty is imposed both for that offence and for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling292. In our view, therefore, it is not correct for the reason for the amendment to be explained in this way. This area must be resolved either by attaching similar consequences to all similar situations (such as, for example, the commission of the offence of robbery inside a dwelling) or by leaving the general principle on this matter untouched and ensuring that the Court of Cassation changes its case law so as to decide in accordance with the statutory provision. In our view this is the correct solution de lege ferenda.
In legal scholarship, however, Zafer states that the taking of property kept in safekeeping within a building and its annexes constitutes the aggravated form of the offence of theft; that, since a building is not regarded as a dwelling, the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling is not expressly indicated as a qualified form of the offence of theft; and that the definition in Art. 142(1)(b) TCK is not a definition of a compound offence. The author states that for this reason the legislature laid down the rule that, where the offences of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling and damage to property are committed for the purpose of committing the offence of theft, no complaint is to be required for an investigation and prosecution to be conducted in respect of these offences; that this provision also means that the rules on the concurrence of offences are not to be applied between theft and the offences of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling or damage to property; and that, if the building in which the property that is the object of the theft is located falls within the scope of a dwelling, the perpetrator is to be punished separately for violation of the inviolability of the dwelling and for theft293.
Although the statutory provision and the practice of the Court of Cassation are as described, we consider, in line with the views and reasons we have explained above, that a distinction drawn in this way between the concepts of building and dwelling is incompatible with the purpose for which the norm was enacted, that this is a compound offence, that indeed the amendment in question was made subsequently and that the drawing of such a distinction between the offences of robbery and theft constitutes a contradiction, and we do not share this view.
In the said second manifestation of the compound offence, the offence that loses its independence must be expressly indicated in the statute as a qualified element294. If it is not expressly indicated in the statute that one offence is a qualified form of the other, no compound offence arises295. What is to be understood from this, however, is not that the name of the offence concerned must necessarily be stated in the definition of the other offence. It is sufficient and necessary for the existence of a compound offence that the deed element of one offence be stated within another type of offence296. Consequently, there is no compound offence in the qualified forms of the offence of intentional killing regulated in sub-paragraphs (h) and (i) of paragraph 1 of Article 82 of the TCK, for where the perpetrator commits the offence of intentional killing in order to conceal an offence, to destroy the evidence of it or to facilitate its commission, or in order to avoid being caught, or out of the rage felt at being unable to commit an offence, the offences that are the means and the end retain their independence297. Accordingly, there is no compound offence in the cases of committing another offence in order to commit an offence (entering a house in order to commit the offence of sexual assault, killing the victim for the purpose of taking the gold), committing another offence in order to conceal an offence (knocking unconscious with a punch the woman who is the victim of a sexual assault) or committing another offence by means of an offence (a drunken perpetrator insulting the head of state, a perpetrator who has killed the friend with whom he was fighting taking the valuables on the dead person)298.
According to the second sentence of Article 42, in which the compound offence is regulated in the TCK, “the provisions on concurrence shall not apply to offences of this kind.” It is not expressly stated in the statute whether what is not to be applied here is the cumulation of penalties or the concurrence of offences. Indeed, some authors in legal scholarship, taking this wording as their starting point, state that what is meant by “the provisions on concurrence” is real concurrence; that, although it is stated in the statute that the provisions on concurrence are not to be applied to offences of this kind, the TCK contains no provisions on the cumulation of penalties; and that the legislature has therefore referred to rules that are not to be found in the statute299. However, both because the cumulation of penalties is not expressly regulated in the statute and because the cumulation of penalties is the rule, this provision must be understood as referring to the concurrence of offences300. Accordingly, even though it is regulated in the chapter on the concurrence of offences, it was an appropriate provision for the statute to state expressly that the compound offence is not a form of the concurrence of offences. However, as we have also stated above, there is no need for this to be regulated separately in the part of the criminal code on the theory of the offence301.
In conclusion, since the compound offence is an independent offence in its own right, the perpetrator is not punished separately for the offences that constitute its elements or its qualified form but is punished only for the compound offence.
3. The Principle of the Subsidiarity of the Auxiliary Norm (Primary – Auxiliary Norm Relationship)
a. In General
In some cases the legislature, so that the deeds committed do not go unpunished, enacts norms of broad scope that are to be applied in cases where the others cannot be applied. In practice these are called “catch-all provisions”. Their purpose is to prevent a gap from arising in the statute302. In accordance with the principle of the subsidiarity of the auxiliary norm, these give way to all of the norms regulating the same subject matter, or only to those norms that carry a heavier penalty than they do, and the other norms with which they collide are applied to the specific case303. Accordingly, although it looks as if there were two norms applicable to the specific case, this is only apparent, because one is content with applying the primary norm to the deed304. In short, a norm has the character of an auxiliary (secondary, subsidiary) norm if it becomes applicable only in so far as another norm cannot be applied305.
While the auxiliary norm is sometimes expressly regulated in the statute, at other times it has to be identified by way of interpretation306. In the course of this interpretation the basic idea of the statute, the relationships between the norms and the characteristics of the offence contained in the norm are taken into account307. For example, the “offence of obtaining an unlawful benefit by means of an information system” regulated in paragraph 4 of Article 244 of the TCK and the “offence of obtaining an unjust benefit by means of a counterfeit or falsified bank or credit card” regulated in paragraph 3 of Article 245 are auxiliary norms. Indeed, by expressly including in these norms the expressions “where it does not constitute another offence” and “provided that the deed does not constitute another offence requiring a heavier penalty”, it has been clearly laid down that these are auxiliary norms and that they will come into play where there is no other norm to be applied308. By contrast, in mixed offences or in transitional offences the auxiliary character of these norms can be identified by way of interpretation.
Auxiliary norms are also distinguished according to whether they are “absolute” or “relative”.309 Subsidiarity is regarded as absolute when it applies in relation to all norms regulating the same subject matter, and as relative when it applies in relation to certain specific norms. For example, if the auxiliary norm is framed with a condition in the form “where it does not constitute another offence”, as in paragraph 4 of Article 244, the subsidiarity of this norm is express and absolute; if it is framed with a condition in the form “provided that the deed does not constitute another offence requiring a heavier penalty”, as in paragraph 3 of Article 245, the subsidiarity of this norm is express and relative310.
In such cases, in which there is a primary norm – auxiliary norm relationship, the primary norm is applied to the specific case in accordance with the principle of the subsidiarity of the auxiliary norm, and in such cases the existence of a single norm is accepted. Accordingly, provided that they arise from the same deed, the following have the character of a primary norm: the offence of concrete endangerment in relation to the offence of abstract endangerment, the offence of harm in relation to the offence of concrete endangerment, the completed offence in relation to the offence that has remained at the stage of attempt, and the more serious forms of participation in the offence in relation to its less serious forms (perpetration in relation to accessoryship)311312.
b. The Transitional Offence
As regards the primary – auxiliary norm relationship, the most frequently encountered form of apparent concurrence is that of transitional offences or, in other words, offences of passage. A transitional offence exists where the perpetrator, in order to commit an offence, is obliged to commit an offence that protects the same legal interest and requires a lighter sanction, and in this way commits the offence requiring the heavier penalty313. Within apparent concurrence as a whole, transitional offences are counted as unpunished prior deeds and for this reason are accepted, together with all unpunished prior deeds, as a form of apparent concurrence314.
Certain conditions must be present for transitional offences to exist. The first of these is that the legal interests protected by the offence requiring the heavy sanction and by the offence that must be passed through, that is, committed first, in order to commit that offence and that requires a lighter sanction than the other are the same315. Accordingly, the offence of intentional injury (Art. 87 TCK) is a transitional offence in relation to the offences of sexual assault (Art. 102(2) TCK), indecent assault (Art. 102(1) TCK) and intentional killing (Art. 81 TCK)316.
The other condition is that, for the offence to be committed, it must be unavoidable to pass through an offence requiring a lighter sanction. Indeed, as in the examples above, the offences of sexual assault or intentional killing cannot be realised without intentional injury being realised317.
The condition common to all unpunished prior deeds, namely that the perpetrator and the victim of the prior deed be the same, also applies to transitional offences. Where the same deed is carried out against the same victim by different perpetrators, or where the same deed is carried out against different victims by the same perpetrator, these are accepted as different offences. Accordingly, where the same deed is committed by the perpetrator against different victims, it is no longer apparent concurrence but the cumulation of penalties, which is real concurrence, that is applied, and the perpetrator is punished separately for both his prior and his subsequent deed. For example, where the perpetrator commits the offences of intentional injury and sexual assault against different victims, there is no transitional offence even if the other conditions are present, and it is accepted that there are as many offences and penalties as there are victims318.
A further condition of the transitional offence is that the aggravating results be linked to the perpetrator’s act by a single causality319. In situations in which there is no causal link between the serious result that has occurred and the perpetrator’s act, the perpetrator cannot be held liable for the result that has occurred and is therefore not liable for the offence with the serious result, and the transitional offence does not arise either320.
One of the most important conditions of the transitional offence, and the last, is that the perpetrator’s intent be directed, from the beginning of his deed, at bringing about the aggravating results, that he want these results. Consequently, where the perpetrator begins his act negligently and then continues with intent, or where the perpetrator, having initially willed the commission of the offence requiring a penalty of a lighter nature, subsequently directs his intent at the serious result, no transitional offence arises321. In other words, there is no transitional offence in the case of supervening intent. Here the reason for imposing a single penalty on the perpetrator is not the transitional offence, which is one of the forms of apparent concurrence, but “supervening intent”, which is one of the types of intent contained in the mental element of the offence; in this situation the problems that arise must also be resolved within the framework of the consequences attached to supervening intent322.
Where the perpetrator’s intent is directed at bringing about the most serious result (that is, where there is no supervening intent) but, after the transitional offence has been committed, the offence requiring the heavier penalty cannot be completed for reasons beyond the perpetrator’s control, the perpetrator is held liable for attempt to commit the offence with the serious result. For example, where the perpetrator aims his weapon at the victim’s head and fires, and the victim, despite the bullet entering his head, does not die but is injured and subsequently recovers, the perpetrator is here punished no longer for intentional injury but for attempted intentional killing and, even though the perpetrator’s deed has remained at the stage of attempt, he is held liable for the offence with the serious result. Consequently, the offence of intentional injury is accepted as a transitional offence and regarded as an unpunished prior deed323.
The point that must be noted here is that in transitional offences the perpetrator’s intent must be directed from the outset at the offence requiring the heavier sanction. In addition, the transitional offence must not be in the position of a preparatory act, punished independently, for the heavier offence324.
c. The Mixed Offence
The mixed offence is the situation in which norms that arise from the primary – auxiliary norm relationship but cannot be classified under the other manifestations of apparent concurrence, that regulate offences between which there is no relationship of element or of qualified form increasing the penalty, and that protect different legal interests are apparently applicable to the same event325.
In a manner similar to the examples given above for the transitional offence, it is possible to think that the offence of illegal access to, and remaining in, an information system (Art. 243 TCK) has the character of a transitional offence in relation to the offence of hindering and disrupting the functioning of an information system and the offence of destroying or altering data (Art. 244(1)-(2) TCK). Indeed, in the first edition of our book entitled “Bilişim Suçları” the relationship between the two offences was characterised in this way326. We now consider, however, that the offence of illegal access to, and remaining in, an information system does not have the character of a transitional offence in relation to the offence of damaging an information system327. For although the other conditions for being a transitional offence are present between these two types of offence, the two conditions we have indicated above are not. It is not necessarily required, in order for an information system to be damaged, that the system be entered unlawfully; it is perfectly possible for damage to be done to the system by someone who has entered the system lawfully, for example a company officer or a service technician, after the system has been lawfully entered and that person has continued to remain in it. Moreover, it is also possible to commit this offence without entering the system, by damaging the physical structure of the system. Consequently, there is no absolute necessity to enter the system unlawfully in order to damage it. On the other hand, while the legal interest protected by the offence of illegal access to, and remaining in, an information system is “the security of the information system”328, the legal interests protected by the offence of hindering or disrupting the functioning of an information system and the offences of destroying or altering data consist in “the interest of the person who has the power of disposal over the information system and/or the data contained in the information system in reaching and using, without any hindrance, malfunction or delay, values created with the data such as software, economic information, scientific work, information and the like”329. As can be seen, the legal interests protected by these two offence norms differ. Consequently, the offence regulated in Article 243 of the TCK does not constitute a transitional offence in relation to the offences regulated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 244. However, since there is also no relationship of necessity between them and no feature of element or qualified form, the mixed offence, which is yet another form of apparent concurrence, may be at issue. In this way it is possible to explain why, although there is no necessity, where the system is damaged after it has been unlawfully entered and remained in, only a single penalty is imposed on the perpetrator under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 244.
CONCLUSION
In the concluding part of our study we wish to set out the matters which stand out in our explanations above, which fall outside the general explanations on the subject, and which we do not find appropriate in theoretical and normative terms and/or on which we take a different view.
We must state at the outset that, in the distinction between unity of offence and plurality of offences, which is of particular importance in the matter of the concurrence of offences, we subscribe to the view that there is a plurality of offences. In this context, the “act” must be taken as the basis in determining whether or not the deed is single. For this reason the “distinction between unity and plurality of the act” should be used, because it is the act that forms the essence of the wrong. The “result” and, linked to it, the “causal link that must exist between act and result” are not, in accordance with the criminal policy pursued by the legislature, elements that must necessarily be present in the statutory definition of the offence. For this reason the act must be taken as the basis in determining the unity or plurality of the deed.
Notional concurrence occurs where the perpetrator, by a single deed that he has carried out, commits different offences or commits the same offence more than once. Notional concurrence requires that the deed be single and that more than one offence be committed by the same deed. Where the same offences are realised by the perpetrator’s single deed, there is notional concurrence of the same kind; where different offences are realised, there is notional concurrence of different kinds. Of these, notional concurrence of the same kind is regulated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 43 of the TCK, and notional concurrence of different kinds in Article 44.
It was not appropriate to regulate notional concurrence of the same kind in paragraph 2 of Article 43 of the TCK when the continuing offence is regulated in paragraph 1, for the only feature common to notional concurrence of the same kind and the continuing offence is that, where they occur, the increase applied to the perpetrator’s penalty is at the same rate. We therefore consider that it would be more appropriate to regulate notional concurrence of the same kind in Article 44 of the TCK, in which notional concurrence of different kinds is regulated.
In the TCK No. 5237, notional concurrence of the same kind has been accepted and regulated in the statute because it is the act and not the result that is taken as the basis for determining the number of offences, so that there is a plurality of acts in the continuing offence but unity of the act in notional concurrence, and furthermore because Art. 43(1), in which the continuing offence is regulated, requires, for this situation to arise, that the victim be the same person. Consequently, in notional concurrence of the same kind the single deed must be understood as a single deed in the legal sense.
Another matter that we wish to address in connection with notional concurrence of the same kind is the case in which, in the offence of insulting more than one person by a single deed, the victim is a public official. Even if the victim is a public official, there is nothing that requires a departure from the general rule. However, the provision in paragraph 5 of Article 125 of the TCK, which contains the offence of insult, according to which “where public officials working as a board are insulted on account of their duties, the offence shall be deemed to have been committed against the members constituting the board”, was misinterpreted, and it was argued that in this situation it had to be accepted that as many offences had been committed as there were public officials. In order to prevent this misunderstanding, the following sentence was added to paragraph 5 of Article 125 of the TCK by Law No. 5377: “However, in this case the provision of the article on the continuing offence shall apply.” In our view the regulation made is correct but the manner in which it is expressed is wrong, for what exists here is not a continuing offence but notional concurrence of the same kind. This incorrect wording stems from the fact that, as we have stated above, notional concurrence of the same kind is regulated in Article 43 together with the continuing offence. Even so, it would have been more correct for the legislature to use in this sentence a wording such as “the provision of paragraph 2 of Article 43 shall apply” or “notional concurrence of the same kind” shall apply. Indeed, this is expressly stated in the explanatory memorandum to the amending law.
The TCK draws a distinction, as regards the penalty to be applied, between notional concurrence of the same kind and notional concurrence of different kinds. In our view the penalties should be increased in both types of notional concurrence. For in both types more than one violation of a norm takes place. Accordingly, it was an appropriate provision to increase the penalty in notional concurrence of the same kind, as in the continuing offence; however, it is mistaken not to provide for such an increase in notional concurrence of different kinds and to impose on the perpetrator only the heavier penalty. What ought to be the case is that notional concurrence of the same kind and of different kinds be regulated in the same article and that in both cases the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator be increased. In making this increase, the offence carrying the heavier penalty should, in notional concurrence of different kinds, be taken as the basis for the increase.
In the combinations of negligent injury/killing and attempted injury/killing with direct or conditional intent, one of which is completed and the other of which has remained at the stage of attempt, situations may arise that result from the application of the rules on notional concurrence of different kinds and of the same kind and that are unjust, particularly as regards the amounts of the penalties. The reason for this is that, in particular in notional concurrence of different kinds regulated in Article 44 of the statute, no increase of the penalty has been provided for as it has in notional concurrence of the same kind.
Where there is a single act in the legal sense, the existence of a single offence is accepted, so that there will be no plurality of offences, the continuing offence will not come into play and the perpetrator will be given only the penalty for the offence he has committed. In a decision that it rendered concerning the offence of theft, the Court of Cassation likewise accepted that where the perpetrator, in the house he had entered, took various items and, in addition, the key of the car and stole the car in front of the house, this was not a continuing offence but a single offence of theft. Similarly, in the offence of sexual harassment the Court of Cassation accepted that the perpetrator’s telephoning the complainant at short intervals and saying “I love you, you will be mine”, or telephoning frequently and proposing sexual intercourse, was a single deed in the legal sense and stated that the provision on the continuing offence could not be applied.
In the TCK No. 765 it was accepted, by means of the expression “even if they occur at various times”, that the continuing offence could arise as a rule within the same period of time but, exceptionally, at different times as well. Since one of the conditions that give the continuing offence its distinctive character is the existence of the same decision to commit an offence, this expression was appropriate for the purpose of bringing that out. From a literal interpretation of paragraph 1 of Article 43 of the TCK No. 5237, by contrast, the meaning emerges that the offences forming the chain must necessarily be committed at different times. The Court of Cassation also accepts this interpretation in the decisions it has rendered on the matter. We, however, consider that this expression must not be understood in absolute terms and that it must be interpreted having regard to the “ratio legis” pursued by the provision of the article on the continuing offence. The Court of Cassation, too, interprets the article of the statute in absolute terms, but tries to reach the correct result through a wrong practice, by departing from the lower limit of the penalty. However, the solution accepted by the Court of Cassation is not a correct one, since it will lead to the penalty increasing as the number of offences committed increases and may therefore both run counter to the purpose for which the continuing offence was regulated and lead to unfair penalties being imposed on the perpetrator.
Some authors in legal scholarship state that an exception to the rule on the continuing offence regulated in paragraph 1 of Article 43 of the TCK has been introduced by paragraph 2 of Article 43, and that it is provided that the provision on the continuing offence is also to be applied where the same offence is committed against more than one person by a single deed and at the same time. However, as we have also stated above, this provision contained in paragraph 2 of Article 43 regulates not an exception to the continuing offence but notional concurrence of the same kind. The only point they have in common is that the increase of the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator is made at the same rate. This interpretation by the authors, however, demonstrates that the criticism we have made of the regulation of notional concurrence of the same kind in Article 43 instead of Article 44 is justified.
According to paragraph 3 of Article 43 of the TCK, “the provisions of this article shall not apply to the offences of intentional killing, intentional injury, torture and robbery”. Accordingly, even where these offences are committed more than once against the same person in the course of executing one decision to commit an offence, the provision on the continuing offence is not applied. By this provision, the restriction which, in the period of the TCK No. 765, had been placed on the application of the continuing offence by decisions of the Court of Cassation, although it was not in the statute, was made the subject of a normative provision, and consistency with practice was achieved. In this way this rule, which, while aimed at satisfying the sense of justice, was contrary to the letter and the spirit of the TCK No. 765, was placed on a normative footing. The reason why these offences were selected and kept outside the application of the continuing offence is not to be found in the explanatory memorandum, but it is highly probable that the criterion taken into consideration here was the legal interests protected by these offences.
In the original version of Article 43 of the TCK, the offences of sexual assault (Art. 102 TCK) and sexual abuse of children (Art. 103 TCK) were also included among the offences to which the article on the continuing offence could not be applied. However, by the amendment made to paragraph 3 of Article 43 by Law No. 5377 of 29.6.2005, these offences were removed from its scope. It was thus ensured that the provision on the continuing offence would also be applied in respect of the offences of sexual assault and sexual abuse of children. The problem of proof and the fact that the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator would increase greatly were given as the reasons for this amendment. In our view, however, this is a reason that is neither explanatory nor satisfactory. Difficulty is experienced in proving sexual offences in cases where there is no witness and/or circumstantial evidence. This difficulty of proof, however, is a difficulty that is independent of the number of times the deed, that is, the forced sexual intercourse or the abuse, took place. Likewise, where a perpetrator who has the intent and the culpability to commit this offence carries out his deed several times in succession and does further damage to the mental and physical integrity of his victim, it is in our view acceptable neither in terms of the theory of the offence nor in terms of the criminal policy adopted by modern societies that he should not be held liable for as many offences as there are deeds and that, through the application of the provision on the continuing offence, his subsequent deeds should, as it were, be excused. In our view the text of the statute should be restored to its former state.
In the light of the provision in Article 5 of the TCK, where an offence contained in the TCK conflicts with an offence contained in an ancillary criminal statute, the problem is resolved within the framework of the principle of the priority of the special norm, provided that the other conditions are also present. Where there is a conflict between norms relating to general provisions contained in special criminal statutes that entered into force before 31.12.2008 and the norms of a general nature of the TCK, the norms of the TCK regulating the same subject matter will be applied, in view of the express provision of Article 5 of the TCK. Where, on the other hand, there is a conflict between ancillary criminal statutes that entered into force after 31.12.2008, or that will be enacted from now on, and the general provisions of the TCK, then, in view of Article 5 of the TCK, no such contradictory norm ought, de lege ferenda, to be enacted. If a different provision is nevertheless enacted, the problem must be resolved within the framework of the principle of the priority of the special norm. Although this solution is appropriate in terms of the theory of the offence, it carries the risk of creating a contradiction with the general provisions of the TCK and with the modern theory of the offence which, through these provisions, it is sought to apply in our country.
In the compound offence the acts are several in the natural sense and each act violates different legal interests. For example, in the offence of robbery regulated in Article 148 of the TCK, property is taken by force or threat and the offence is realised by more than one act; at the same time more than one legal interest, such as the protection of the person’s bodily integrity and property, is violated. In this situation, however, the legislature, by deeming the acts that violate more than one legal interest a single deed, combines them within one definition of an offence. In other words, in compound offences there is a single act in the legal sense and therefore a single offence. Accordingly, the compound offence is not one of the cases of the concurrence of offences, and it is in fact not necessary for a provision on it to be included in the TCK in the chapter on the concurrence of offences. For the compound offence is a problem relating to conformity with the statutory definition of the offence and can be identified by examining the type of offence. Even if Article 42 of the TCK did not exist, the existence of a compound offence would be accepted where one offence has been regulated as an element of another or as a qualified form of it increasing the penalty, because this is apparent from the way in which the offence is framed. However, the legislature gave the compound offence a separate place in the statute on the ground that the compound offence is the most frequently encountered of the cases of apparent concurrence and that it should not give rise to differing interpretations and confusion in this regard.
Article 42, in which the compound offence is regulated in the TCK, states that “the offences forming the parts of the compound offence are an element or an aggravating circumstance”. The use of the concept of “aggravating circumstance” here is mistaken, for the TCK no longer uses the concepts of aggravating or mitigating circumstances but uses in their place the concept of the qualified form of the offence. This qualified form, however, may be of a kind that increases the penalty for the offence, just as it may be of a mitigating kind. The terminology used in Article 42 is therefore out of keeping with the statute as a whole.
Where the deed is committed “in respect of property which, although left in a place that anyone can enter, has been secured by locking, or which has been placed in safekeeping within a building or its annexes”, which is one of the qualified forms of the offence of theft (Art. 142(1)(b) TCK), the provision on the compound offence is not applied, even though this at the same time constitutes the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling and is a qualified form of the offence of theft increasing the penalty, and pursuant to Art. 142(4) TCK a penalty is imposed both for the qualified form of the offence of theft and for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling. In our view this is a mistaken provision that disrupts the coherence of the statute and of the practice in this field. Yet it constitutes an obvious contradiction that, where the offence of robbery is committed inside a dwelling, the perpetrator is punished only for the qualified form of the offence of robbery, whereas in the offence of theft a penalty is imposed both for that offence and for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling.
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Footnotes
- Faculty Member in Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, Istanbul Medipol University Faculty of Law.
- Bahri Öztürk/Mustafa Ruhan Erdem, Uygulamalı Ceza Hukuku ve Güvenlik Tedbirleri Hukuku, 11. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2011, kn.580. ↑
- TBMM Adalet Komisyonu’nun Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarasına ilişkin 3.8.2004 tarih ve Esas:1/593, Karar: 60 sayılı Raporu, TBMM, Dönem 22, Yasama Yılı 2, Sıra Sayısı 664, s.229. ↑
- To the same effect see: Veli Özer Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi Türk Ceza Kanununun Anlamı, 4. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2010, s.702. ↑
- İzzet Özgenç, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 4. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2009, s.498. ↑
- Mahmut Koca/İlhan Üzülmez, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 3. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2010, s.449; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.580. ↑
- Sulhi Dönmezer/Sahir Erman, Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku, C.II, 12. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1999, kn.1116. ↑
- Veli Özer Özbek/M. Nihat Kanbur/Koray Doğan/Pınar Bacaksız/İlker Tepe, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 2. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2011, s.515. ↑
- Kayıhan İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1972, s.40; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.580. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.15. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.11. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.9. ↑
- Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Band II, München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 2003, §33, kn.13. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.18. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.450. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.34. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, kn.580. ↑
- Türkan Yalçın Sancar, “Yeni Türk Ceza Kanunu’nda Zincirleme Suç”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, Y.20, S.70, Mayıs – Haziran 2007, s.244. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.41; Koca/Üzülmez, s.450, 451. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.10; Koca/Üzülmez, s.451. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.452. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.29; Özgenç, s.171, 172. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.10, 17-69; Koca/Üzülmez, s.435. ↑
- Nur Centel/Hamide Zafer/Özlem Çakmut, Türk Ceza Hukukuna Giriş, 6. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2010, s.504; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.34; Dönmezer/Erman, II, kn.1130. ↑
- For the views on this matter see: Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.502-504. ↑
- Turhan Tufan Yüce, Ceza Hukuku Dersleri, Manisa, Şafak Yayınevi, 1982, s.379, 380; Özgenç, s.523; Özbek/Kanbur/Bacaksız/Doğan/Tepe, s.532; Koca/ Üzülmez, s.452. ↑
- Mehmet Emin Artuk/Ahmet Gökcen/A. Caner Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 4. Bası, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 2009, s.687-691; Koca/Üzülmez, s.652. ↑
- Murat Volkan Dülger, Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasına İlişkin Suçlar ve Yaptı-rımlar, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2011, s.610, 611. ↑
- “…Since the determination of excessive penalties by way of an increase of ¼ (pursuant to) Article 43 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCY), without regard to the fact that resisting more than one police officer at the same time and for the same reason constitutes a single offence, … has been found … contrary to the law…, the judgment is to be quashed…” 4. CD. 28.01.2008, 2007/10292, 2008/737. Cited in: Erdener Yurtcan, Türk Ceza Kanunu Genel Hükümler, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 2010, s.445. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.30. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.455. ↑
- See: Roxin, §33, kn.70–118. ↑
- See: Roxin, §33, kn.119–169. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.515, 516; Roxin, §33, kn.1–5. See also: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.32; Koca/Üzülmez, s.457. ↑
- Yener Ünver, Ceza Hukukuyla Korunması Amaçlanan Hukuksal Değer, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004, s.668-678. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.57. ↑
- Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, s.684; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.57. ↑
- Mahmut Koca, “Fikri İçtima”, Ceza Hukuku Dergisi, Y.2, S.4, Ağustos 2007, s.199; Roxin, §33, kn.70; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.63; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.597; ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.2. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.531, 532. ↑
- Tahir Taner, Ceza Hukuku Umumi Kısım, 3. Bası, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1953, s.481; Roxin, §33, kn.71; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.58, 59. ↑
- To the same effect see: Koca, s.200. ↑
- Kayıhan İçel/Füsun Sokullu Akıncı/İzzet Özgenç/Adem Sözüer/Fatih M. Mahmutoğlu/Yener Ünver, Suç Teorisi, 2. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2000, s.418; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.60. ↑
- “A person may, by a single deed that he or she commits, cause more than one different offence to arise; however, in accordance with the rule of non bis in idem, he or she can be punished only once for that deed. Where the deed carried out causes more than one different offence to arise, the perpetrator should be punished for the offence that requires the heaviest penalty among these offences. The aim has thus been to prevent a person from being punished more than once for one deed.” ↑
- Koca, s.201; Koca/Üzülmez, s.468; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.530; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.732. ↑
- On the same subject Koca, for his part, states that the strongest basis for contenting oneself with imposing a single penalty on the perpetrator, although a plurality of offences is accepted in notional concurrence, is to be sought in the fact that the deed is single; that notional concurrence must be understood as an institution that makes it possible to grasp the content of wrongfulness of a deed from different legal points of view; and that notional concurrence is the assessment of a deed from various aspects, its essence being a plurality of assessments made on the basis of unity of the deed. See: Koca, s.201. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.733, 734; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.532. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.530. ↑
- Koca, s.201; Koca/Üzülmez, s.468. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.734; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/ Bacaksız/Tepe, s.534; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.597; Koca, s.202. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.535. ↑
- Yet here there are two different offences which the perpetrator has realised by his single deed, and under the rule on notional concurrence of different kinds only the penalty for the offence carrying the heavier penalty is applied to the perpetrator. To the same effect see: Özgenç, s.529. ↑
- Hakan Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 10. Bası, Ankara, Adalet Yayınevi, 2011, s.551. ↑
- For these decisions see: Özgenç, s.519, dn.1048. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.63. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.468, 469; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.534. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.70; For the contrary view see: Ayhan Önder, Ceza Hukuku Dersleri, İstanbul, Filiz Kitanevi, 1992, .462; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.67; Koca, s.210, 211. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.80. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.82. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.70. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.469, 470. ↑
- However, Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe argue that, although this provision is called “notional concurrence of the same kind” in legal scholarship, it is a new case of the continuing offence. On this matter see: Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.528. To the same effect: Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.513. ↑
- Özgenç, s.523; Koca/Üzülmez, s.472; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.529. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.719; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/ Bacaksız/Tepe, s.529; Koca/Üzülmez, s.472; Koca, s.199. Indeed Özgenç, who is the drafter of the statute, also explains the reason for this provision in the following words: “The only thing that the continuing offence and notional concurrence of the same kind have in common is that the rates of the increase that may be made in the penalty are the same. It would in fact have been more appropriate for two separate concurrence provisions relating to situations that differ from one another to be regulated in separate articles. However, because of the difficulty we encountered in explaining this during our work in the Justice Committee of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) on the new Turkish Criminal Code (TCK), we found ourselves obliged to regulate both cases of concurrence under the same article”. Özgenç, s.523. ↑
- In legal scholarship Öztürk/Erdem state that in this situation there is still a continuing offence, but that, in view of the provision in Art. 43(2) TCK, it is not possible in practice to apply the continuing offence; and that it is nevertheless not comprehensible that a deed’s violating the same provision of the statute should be deemed a continuing offence and the penalty therefore be aggravated, whereas its violating different provisions of the statute is accepted as notional concurrence and one is therefore content with punishing the perpetrator only for the offence requiring the heaviest penalty. See: Öztürk/Erdem, kn.587. While we share the authors’ criticism of the differentiation made as regards the increase of the penalty, we do not share the reasoning behind it. For in the continuing offence there is more than one offence and therefore more than one act, whereas in notional concurrence there is a single act but more than one offence. In our opinion, however, because the authors attach importance not to the act but to the result, they assess the two situations in the same way and, proceeding from this way of thinking, are unable to make sense of a distinction being drawn between them. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.472; Özgenç, s.518–522; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.507. ↑
- Özgenç, s.523. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.719; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.529. ↑
- Koca, s.473. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.79. ↑
- Roxin, § 33, kn.81; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.529; Artuk/ Gökcen/Yenidünya, s.691; Özgenç, s.523; Koca/Üzülmez, s.473. ↑
- In legal scholarship Özbek states that notional concurrence of the same type is at issue “also where mobile telephones belonging to two separate persons turn out to be in the bag that is the object of the theft”. See: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.719. We, however, do not share this view of the author, for we consider that, just as there is a single deed and a single offence under the theory of the unity of the typical act even where the belongings of different persons present in a house are stolen inside that same house, so too, where a single bag is stolen, there is a single offence under the same theory even though two different mobile telephones belonging to two different persons turn out to be in it. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.719. ↑
- Özgenç, s.523, 524. ↑
- Özgenç, s.524. ↑
- “…in the delivery of judgment as written without regard to the fact that, in the deed of the accused, who was an ancillary staff member and paying officer of a primary school, consisting in obtaining a benefit in the amount of … by making unjustified deductions from the lesson fees and salaries of the teachers working at the school, without their knowledge, when transferring money to their bank accounts, as many offences arose as there were victims and that the provisions on the continuing offence contained in Article 43 of Law No. 5237 could not be applied…” 11. CD., 25.05.2006, 2006/1859, 2006/4708. Cited in: Yurtcan, s.453. ↑
- “Regard must be had to the fact that the offence of misuse of bank and credit cards regulated in Article 245 of the TCK No. 5237 arises as many times as there are cards and that the provision on the continuing offence is to be applied where the same card is used more than once at different times.” 11. CD., 12.11.2007, 2007/7255, 2007/7837. Cited in: Yurtcan, s.452. ↑
- Indeed, in legal scholarship Zafer argues that this is a case of the continuing offence. See: Hamide Zafer, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2010, s.339. ↑
- Özgenç, s.525, 526. ↑
- “…whereas it should have been accepted that, in his deeds directed at these victims, the accused acted with intent to injure, and it should have been decided to punish him separately, 4 times according to the number of victims, for the offence of injury with a weapon, the giving of the decision as written by applying Article 44 of the TCK No. 5237, which has no place in the case, … is contrary to the law.” 1. CD., 14.11.2007, 2006/5195, 2007/8413. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.742. To the same effect see: Özgenç, s.530. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.75. ↑
- “The deed of obtaining, by means of a computer system, a large number of images and video recordings relating to child pornography and to sexual acts performed with animals and of systematically storing and keeping them on the computer constitutes, even if it is for personal purposes, the offence in Art. 226(3) of the TCK No. 5237 by virtue of the reference in Article 44 thereof.” 5. CD., 01.10.2007, 2007/9856, 2007/6957, online: www.kazanci.com.tr. ↑
- “… that these proven deeds of the accused remained at the stage of an attempt to enable the migrants to leave the country and that, if Article 79 of the TCK No. 5237 is applied, the penalty to be imposed must be reduced by one quarter to three quarters pursuant to Article 35 of the said Law, and that, in accordance with the rule on notional concurrence, no penalty can additionally be determined for violation of the Passport Law No. 5682 …” Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.736, dn.733. To the same effect: Öztürk/Erdem, kn.597. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.736; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.537. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.736; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.536; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.506; Özgenç, s.529. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.471; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.736; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/ Bacaksız/Tepe, s.537. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.76; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.506; Zafer, s.346. ↑
- “It is contrary to the law that the accused, who, as is understood from the content of the file, caused more than one different offence to arise by a single deed, was additionally convicted of the offence of endangering traffic safety as well, without regard to the fact that, in view of the provision of Article 44 of the TCK No. 5237, he had to be held liable for the offence of causing death and injury by negligence defined in Art. 85(2) of the TCK No. 5237, which requires the heaviest penalty among them.” 9. CD., 13.11.2007, 9982/8317. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.741. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.737; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.537. ↑
- To the same effect see: Koca/Üzülmez, s.472; Koca, s.215; Zafer, s.344. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.116. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.72. ↑
- Önder, s.463; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, s.696; Dönmezer/Erman, II, kn.1134; Koca/Üzülmez, s.475; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.737. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.73, 74; Koca/Üzülmez, s.475; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/ Bacaksız/Tepe, s.537, 538; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.737. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.70; Koca/Üzülmez, as.476. ↑
- Koca, Fikri İçtima, s.212; Koca/Üzülmez, s.476. For the contrary view see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.70; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.507. ↑
- “It being understood from the documents and information in the file that the accused’s deed constitutes two separate offences, one being attempted export and the other completed transport; whereas, pursuant to Article 44 of the TCK, the result determined by applying the provisions on the offence of attempted export should have been compared with the result to be determined by applying those on the completed offence of transport and judgment should have been given on the basis of the offence producing the heavier result, the giving of a decision as written without carrying out a concretisation and comparison of the kind indicated…” 10. CD., 04.03.2008, 872/3594. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.743. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.70; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.738. ↑
- In the case of aberratio ictus there is no error (mistake); rather, the result of the act carried out by the perpetrator materialises not on the object aimed at (intended) but, as a result of the deviation, on another object. ↑
- Özgençs.530; Koca, s.211. ↑
- “Both in legal scholarship and in our practice, in the case of aberratio ictus ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.70. ↑
- To the same effect see: Veli Özer Özbek, “Suç Genel Teorisi Bakımından Ortaya Çıkan Bazı Sorunlar ve Görüşlerimiz”, Ceza Hukuku Dergisi, Y.6, S.15, Nisan 2011, s.24. ↑
- “According to the evidence gathered, in the incident, which took place in such a way that the accused, while advancing with a knife in his hand on the victim O… A…, with whom he had been arguing, wounded in the hand the victim A… Ş…, who had stepped in between, a penalty should have been determined for the completed offence, which is the most serious deed, by applying the concurrence provisions regulated in Article 44 of the TCK; the determination of an excessive penalty by giving separate judgments, as written, for the offences of intentional injury and attempted intentional injury has necessitated the quashing…” 2. CD., 18.04.2007, 1063/5590. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.739. “…In the incident in which the bullet that had struck the victim A… left his body and struck the victim M…, who was near the scene and had no connection with the incident, causing him to be injured, the failure to have regard to the fact that the accused’s deed directed at this victim constitutes the offence of negligent injury and that the accused’s legal position had to be assessed under Article 44 of the TCK No. 5237…” 1. CD., 13.11.2007, 2006/5592, 2007/8365. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.741. ↑
- Özgenç, s.534. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.93 – 100. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.476; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.507. For the contrary view see: Roxin, §33, kn.88. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.477. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.477. ↑
- For the contrary view see: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.702. ↑
- For the absorption system see: Sulhi Dönmezer/Sahir Erman, Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku, C.III, 11. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1994, kn.1771, 1772. ↑
- Özgenç, s.529. ↑
- To the same effect see: Koca/Üzülmez, s.477. ↑
- Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.259. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.81. ↑
- Özgençs.529. ↑
- Indeed, Özgenç also states that during the work on the drafting of the statute he worked towards having discretion conferred on the judge in this matter but was not successful. See: Özgenç, s.529. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.248; Koca/Üzülmez, s.441; Özgenç, s.506; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.709. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.256; Özgenç, s.506, 507; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.710. ↑
- Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.509; Koca/Üzülmez, s.458. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.89–93. ↑
- For these views see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.89–93. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.93; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.509, 510; Koca/Üzülmez, s.458. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.96. ↑
- Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.248; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.581. ↑
- Sulhi Dönmezer/Sahir Erman, Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku, C.I, 12. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1997, kn.527; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.95, 96; Koca/ Üzülmez, s.458, 459; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.710; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.510; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.520. ↑
- There are also authors who state that, in the case of the continuing offence, the question whether there is a single offence or several offences must be dealt with according to the single-offence view as regards punishment and according to the several-offences view as regards the other institutions of criminal law. See: Zafer, s.337. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.459; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.581. ↑
- However, Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, by including in their work the statement “where the existence of a continuing offence is accepted, the several offences that have been committed will be deemed a single offence…”, have used wording that could be taken to mean that, where there is a continuing offence, the numerous offences lose their independence and become a single offence. See: Artuk/ Gökcen/Yenidünya, s.682. ↑
- For a detailed explanation of these differences see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.97–104. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepes.519. ↑
- Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.258. ↑
- To the same effect see: Zafer, s.337. In legal scholarship Öztürk/Erdem, for their part, state that the continuing offence has six conditions, namely that there be more than one offence, that the several offences be committed at different times, that the offences be the same, that the offence be committed against the same person, that the several offences committed not be among the offences listed in Art. 43(3) TCK, and that the several offences be based on a single decision to commit an offence. See: Öztürk/ Erdem, kn.585-592. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.459. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.110. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.111. ↑
- “…For this reason, since, apart from the cannabis seized from the accused, the narcotic substances which they had sold before being apprehended and which they had acquired in order to sell could not be seized, and since there is also no possibility of investigating whether or not these were parts of the same whole as the narcotic substances seized, the determination of an excessive penalty for the accused by applying Article 43 of the TCK without regard to the fact that its conditions were not fulfilled…” 10. CD., 17.04.2008, 2007/27117, 2008/6310. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.711. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.95; Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.528; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.710; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.585; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.510, 511. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.111; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.585. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.460. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.460. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, kn.586; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.511. ↑
- “In the deed of the accused, who entered through its window the home of the complainant living on the third floor of an apartment building, left the home with the car key that he had taken together with money and a number of items, and immediately stole the vehicle that was in the car park in front of the home, there is no room for applying the provisions on the continuing offence, having regard to the fact that no interval of time intervened and that the deed was continued without interruption. The accused’s deed as a whole constitutes a single offence of theft, and in characterising the offence the most serious characteristic within the deed as a whole must be relied on. The determination of the basic penalty under Article 61 of the Law by the local court, having regard to the unity of the occurrence, when giving a new judgment following the quashing, is appropriate.” YCGK, 02.10.2007, 2007/6-195; 2007/197, YKD Eylül 2008. Cited in: Yurtcan, 2010, s.442, 443. ↑
- “…The increase, under Article 80, of the penalty imposed under Art. 421(2) of the TCY, without regard to the fact that the accused’s deed, which consisted in telephoning the intervening party Vildan at short intervals that do not indicate a renewal of intent and saying ‘I love you, you will be mine’, constitutes in its entirety the offence of molestation and, as such, already encompasses continuity, is contrary to the law…” 4. CD., 26.01.1995, 9211/324. YKD, C.21, S.6, Haziran 1995, s.973– 975. ↑
- “…However, the accused’s frequently telephoning the intervening party İmren and proposing ‘sexual intercourse’ is importunate conduct; the increase of the penalty under Article 80 of the said Law, without considering that these acts in their entirety constitute the offence of molestation defined in Art. 421(2) of the (former) TCY, without showing and explaining after which deed of verbal harassment the offence would turn from a single offence into several offences and the accused would be deemed to have infringed the same provision of the law more than once with the same decision to commit the offence, and, moreover, without regard to the fact that no proceedings were brought in the indictment in respect of the deed of ‘embracing’ accepted by the court, is contrary to the Law…” 4. CD., 11.05.1994, 2239/4306. YKD, C.21, S.2, Şubat 1995, s.315–317. ↑
- Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.511. ↑
- Dönmezer/Erman, I, kn.529; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.111; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.711. ↑
- “Since it is understood that the offence of qualified sexual assault, which is one of the offences with alternative acts, was committed by inserting first the finger and then the penis into the victim’s sexual organ, the provisions on the continuing offence do not apply, because the condition of commission more than once at different times is not met.” 5. CD., 02.12.2008, 2008/11972, 2008/10675. Cited in: Yurtcan, s.450. ↑
- Türkan Yalçın Sancar, Müteselsil Suç, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 1995, s.68. ↑
- Hakan Hakeri, İhmal Kavramı ve İhmali Suçların Çeşitleri, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2003, s.303; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.113. ↑
- Hakeri, İhmali Suçlar, s.303; Koca/Üzülmez, s.461. ↑
- Hakeri, İhmali Suçlar, s.304; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.114; Sancar, Müteselsil Suç, 70; Koca/Üzülmez, s.461; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.710; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.511; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.520. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.461. ↑
- Dönmezer/Erman, I, kn.530; Koca/Üzülmez, s.461; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.114; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.710; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.520. ↑
- Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, s.681. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, kn.587; Zafer, s.338. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.142; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.713; Özbek/Kanbur/ Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.523; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.517. ↑
- “…Although it is generally accepted that it would not be consistent with justice and equity to deny continuity where there is a shorter or longer interval of time between the dates on which the offences were committed or where there is more than one victim of the offence, it must be accepted that there is no unity in the decision to commit the offence where there is an interval of time, such as 2 – 3 months, which may be regarded as long and cannot be accepted as reasonable…” YCGK, 08.07.2003, 2003/5-189, 2003/207. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.713. ↑
- “Although it is understood that the accused committed the offence of deprivation of liberty for a sexual purpose, which he carried out against the victim at a short interval of about one month, in the course of executing one decision to commit an offence, and although the provisions on the continuing offence ought to have been applied to him, the decision to convict him twice of the said offence on the grounds stated…” 5. CD., 08.04.2008, 668/3345. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.713. ↑
- “In view of the words ‘at different times’ in Art. 43(1) of the TCK No. 5237, the provisions on the continuing offence cannot be applied to deeds committed at the same moment.” 11. CD., 03.12.2007, 2005/12264, 2007/8780. Cited in: Yurtcan, s.462. ↑
- Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.538. ↑
- “…On account of the expression ‘at different times’ in Art. 43(1) of the TCY No. 5237, the offences must necessarily be committed at different times for the provisions on the continuing offence to be applicable, and it has consequently been accepted that, where the same offence is committed more than once against the same victim at the same time, a single offence will ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.522. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek, Suç Genel Teorisi, s.23; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/ Bacaksız/Tepe, s.523. ↑
- Özbek, Suç Genel Teorisi, s.22. ↑
- Özbek, Suç Genel Teorisi, s.23. ↑
- Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.513; Zafer, s.338; Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.251. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.462. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.711; Özgenç, s.514; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.589; Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.529; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.521. ↑
- “Although the accused first committed the offence of simple sexual abuse by rubbing his sexual organ between the victim’s legs and then committed the offence of qualified sexual abuse by inserting his sexual organ into the victim’s mouth, the failure to apply the provisions on the continuing offence… 5. CD., 10.03.2008, 653/1714. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.711. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, kn.589. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.127; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.521. ↑
- Özgenç, s.515. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.129; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.520; Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.253. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.717. ↑
- Özgenç, s.507; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.525; Zafer, s.339. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.463. ↑
- For the contrary view see: Roxin, §33, kn.36 – 37. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özgenç, s.512, 513; Zafer, s.339. ↑
- Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.514; Zafer, s.339. ↑
- The explanatory memorandum to this amendment reads as follows: “In the case of the continuing offence, the same offence has been committed more than once. These offences, however, are committed in the course of executing one decision to commit an offence; that is to say, there is a subjective link between these offences. The basic form of an offence and its qualified forms requiring a heavier or a lighter penalty shall be deemed to be the same offence. In the case of the continuing offence there is not one offence but more than one offence. In order to be able to speak of a continuing offence, the same offence must be committed repeatedly against the same person. The victim of the offences committed must be the same person. Where the victims of the offence are different persons, the provisions on the continuing offence cannot be applied. In offences such as bribery and pollution of the environment, in which everyone making up society is the victim, the provisions on the continuing offence must be applied first and foremost, since no specific person is the victim. However, in order to remove the hesitation that has arisen among those who apply the law with regard to this last situation, a sentence reading ‘The provision of this paragraph shall also apply to offences whose victim is not a specific person’ has been added to the first paragraph of Article 43”. TBMM, Dönem 22, Yasama Yılı 3, Sıra Sayısı 901, s.2. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, for their part, state that an attempt was made to remove this hesitation by including this provision, but that the expression “offence whose victim is not a specific person” is inadequate to explain the purpose fully; that in offences committed against the state and society, too, the victim may be a specific person, the victim of the offence of extortion by a public official, for example, being the natural person whose will is coerced by the public official so that a benefit may be procured for the latter; that what is meant by this expression is therefore that the legal interest primarily protected by the offence belongs not to the individual but to society, the nation and the state; and that, accordingly, whether or not the victim is a specific person must, having regard to the legal interest sought to be protected, ↑
- In legal scholarship Sancar states that the “offence whose victim is not a specific person” must be understood in particular as an offence committed not against “society” but “against a community”, because in some situations, although the persons at whom the act is directed are more than one, these persons may form a community and the perpetrator may carry out a deed directed at that community; that he may, for example, insult at one and the same time everyone in a very large group; and that in such situations the victim is not a specific person and the application of the provisions on the continuing offence would be reasonable. Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.257. What is meant here is all offences whose victim cannot be distinguished as a person. Moreover, in a deed of insult directed at a community consisting of a large number of persons, everyone who is a member of that community is a victim of the offence of insult, and the example given is an example not of the continuing offence but of notional concurrence of the same kind. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.463; Özgenç, s.513. ↑
- Özgenç, s.513. ↑
- “The deeds of the accused, who worked as an ophthalmologist at the Ankara O… Training and Research Hospital, consisted in examining patients entitled to health benefits from the Retirement Fund at the private clinic named “O… Medical Centre”, giving the impression that he was making matters easier for them by stating that he would have the official registration formalities carried out without their presence, taking the private prescriptions he had written and the patients’ health booklets, entering the patients in the hospital protocol register at the O… Hospital where he was employed although they had not come to the hospital, and writing the private prescriptions into the health booklets on the basis of the results of the private examinations; the delivery of an acquittal on the grounds stated, without regard to the fact that these deeds constitute the continuing offence of abuse of office… ” 11. CD., 14.11.2007, 2006/8473, 2007/7935. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.717. ↑
- Dülger, Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanması, s.612. ↑
- On this subject see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.130-138. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.463; Özgenç, s.513. ↑
- Özgenç, s.513. ↑
- Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.515; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.523. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.135 ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.136, 137. Some authors in legal scholarship, however, understand this to mean that the perpetrator draws up a plan for committing the same offence. See: Öztürk/Erdem, kn.592; Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.533. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.714; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.523, 524. ↑
- Sancar, Müteselsil Suç, s.97, 98; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.136, 137; Dönmezer/ Erman, I, kn.532; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.516; Koca/Üzülmez, s.464; Özbek/Kanbur/ Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.524. Indeed, the Court of Cassation has also held that there is no continuing offence in this situation: “…by taking advantage, committed the offence of indecent assault twice against the same victim in different places … the rather long period of 7–8 months that elapsed between the first deed and the second deed, which cannot be regarded as reasonable, shows that they were committed by the accused not with the same decision to commit the offence but by taking advantage of the opportunities that arose.” YCGK, 8.7.2003, 5-189/207. For the contrary view see: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.714. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.714; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.524. ↑
- Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.254. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.524. ↑
- Özgenç, s.513. ↑
- “In the case in which the accused attempted to obtain an unjust gain by transferring to the victim before a notary, with a forged driving licence and on the basis of the contract for the sale and transfer of the car drawn up between them, the car he had rented with a forged identity document, it must be borne in mind that, since the forged identity document and driving licence and the car sale contract were all drawn up and used for the same purpose, they will as a whole constitute the continuing offence of forgery of an official document.” Cited in: Yurtcan, s.452. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem,.586. ↑
- “Given that it is alleged that the accused committed the offences of fraud by applying with two different forged identity documents to the Kızıltoprak and Kazasker branches of the same bank and obtaining loans, the decision given as written, accepting that he committed them under the same decision to commit an offence, without regard to the fact that the deed will constitute two separate offences because he acted with different identity documents falsely drawn up in different names and with a renewed criminal intent, required the judgment to be quashed.” 11. CD., 5.5.2009, 2009/1845, 2009/5216. Cited in: Yurtcan, s.462. ↑
- Zafer, s.340. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, kn.592; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.516; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/ Bacaksız/Tepe, s.523, 524; Zafer, s.340. ↑
- For these discussions see: Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.517. ↑
- To the same effect see: Dönmezer/Erman, I, kn.530; Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.534; Koca/Üzülmez, s.464. For the contrary view see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.146, 147; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.715; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.592; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.518; Özbek/ Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.525; Sancar, Zincirleme Suç, s.250. ↑
- Taşkın, s.181. ↑
- Özgenç, s.514; Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.539; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/ Tepe, s.527; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.717; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.593. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.153; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.527; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.519; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.717. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.153; Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.539; Özbek/Kanbur/ Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.527; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.717. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, kn.589. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, kn.593; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.512. ↑
- “…In the killing, on 27.02.2004, by F., acting in the same unity of decision and action with the accused İ, of the deceased, who was under treatment in hospital because the accused F., acting in unity of decision and action with the accused İ., had attempted to kill her on 25.02.2004, … without considering that, pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 43 of Law No. 5237, which was applied, the provisions of that article cannot be applied to offences of this kind … the classification of the offences as a continuing offence, whereas a separate penalty ought to have been determined for the accused in respect of each of the two offences…” 1. CD., 15.11.2006, 2398/4942. “…In the offence of robbery, the rendering of judgment on the basis of the file and of a single deed, without separate application being made for each deed in view of the fact that, under Art. 43(3) of the TCY No. 5237, the provision on the continuing offence cannot be applied…” 6. CD., 13.6.2006, 2005/15401, 2006/6002. Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.718, dn.715, 716. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.717. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.527. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.528. ↑
- Özgenç, s.518. ↑
- The explanatory memorandum to this amendment reads as follows: “In the case of the continuing offence, the person is given not a separate penalty for each of these offences but one penalty, which is, however, increased. Yet the provision to the effect that the rules on real concurrence must be applied where the offences of sexual assault and sexual abuse of children are committed repeatedly against the same person has caused serious concern among judges and prosecutors, first and foremost the Court of Cassation, on account of the problem of proof and the emergence of disproportionate amounts of punishment. In order to dispel these concerns, the words ‘sexual assault, sexual abuse of children’ in the third paragraph of the article have been removed from the text”. TBMM, Dönem: 22, Yasama Yılı: 3, Sıra Sayısı:901, s.2, 3. Cited in: Özgenç, s.518. ↑
- Sancar, Müteselsil Suç, s.67; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.512; Özbek/Kanbur/ Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.521. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.711; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.521. ↑
- Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, s.531, 532; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.586. ↑
- “For the provision on the continuing offence regulated in Article 43 of the TCK No. 5237 to be applicable, first of all more than one offence must have been committed and each of these offences must be punishable.” 10. CD., 17.4.2008, 2007/27117, 2008/6310. Cited in: Yurtcan, s.451. ↑
- “…In the case in which it was decided that the accused be sentenced to 15 years, 7 months and 15 days’ imprisonment for the offence of sexual abuse under Arts. 103(2) and (6), 43(1) and 62 of the TCY No. 5237 and that Article 53 be applied to him, there is no dispute that the accused’s deed of sexual abuse by inserting an organ into the body on more than one occasion is established and that the deed was carried out by the use of force. The legal dispute between the Special Chamber and the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Cassation centres on determining how the penalty is to be calculated in cases in which Art. 103(6) of the TCY No. 5237 must be applied because the victim’s mental health has been impaired and, in connection with this, how the penalty is to be applied where the conditions of the continuing offence are met… For the impairment of the victim’s mental or physical health to be a ground for increasing the penalty, there must be permanent damage. The existence of permanent damage will be determined by a medical report. This permanent damage to the victim, however, will occur only once. For example, the permanent impairment of the victim’s mental health occurs once; there is no question of mental health being impaired anew with each deed carried out. For this reason, in cases in which the basic form of the offence has been carried out in continuing form, where the victim’s mental health has been impaired, taking into account that this impairment occurred once, the application of the provisions on the continuing offence to the form of the offence aggravated by its result ↑
- “As stated in the decision of the General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation of 20/11/2007, 2007/5- 142 Esas, No. 2007/240, which our Chamber has also adopted, the aggravated form of the offence in paragraph 5 of Article 102 of the TCK, which arises as a result of the offences of qualified sexual assault that the accused intentionally committed in continuing form and for liability for which he must be culpable at least to the degree of negligence, cannot be continuing; since the deeds carried out in continuing form are those preceding Art. 102(5), the increase under Article 43 of the TCK must be made not on the penalty determined under Art. 102(5) but on the amount of the penalty found before the application of that article, and must be added to the penalty determined under Art. 102(5); the imposition of an excessive penalty without regard to this … is contrary to the law and … it was decided that the judgment be quashed.” 5. CD., 31.3.2008, 2008/329, 2008/2957. Cited in: Yurtcan, s.446. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.702. ↑
- Kayıhan İçel, “Görünüşte Birleşme (İçtima) İlkeleri ve Yeni Türk Ceza Kanunu”, İstanbul Ticaret Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Yıl 7, Sayı 14, Güz 2008, s.36; Özgenç, s.538; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.539. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.172. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, kn.599; Koca/Üzülmez, s.479. ↑
- Zafer, s.329; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.702; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.11, 172; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.48; Koca/Üzülmez, s.479.; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.599. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.11; 172; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.48; Koca/ Üzülmez, s.479. ↑
- Özgenç, s.538. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.175. ↑
- Zafer, s.329. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.173. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.702, 703; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.539; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.600; Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku, 556. ↑
- Zafer, s.329. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, kn.600. For details on this subject see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.173. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.173. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.37. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.702; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.37, 38, 40; Önder, s.452; Koca/Üzülmez, s.480; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.539. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.177; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.173, 174; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.41. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.703; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.540. ↑
- Zafer, s.329. ↑
- Önder, s.452; Koca/Üzülmez, s.480; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.41, 42; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.703; Özgenç, s.538; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.601; Özbek/ Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.540. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.40. ↑
- To the same effect see: İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.184. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.39. ↑
- Explanatory memorandum to Article 5 of the TCK No. 5237: “In special criminal laws and in laws containing penal provisions … the way is opened to practices contrary to the general rules adopted in the criminal code, and the fundamental principles are circumvented. In order to prevent all these drawbacks, and also to ensure unity in the application of the law and to ensure legal certainty, other laws should confine themselves to laying down special definitions of offences and determining the sanctions relating to those offences. On the other hand, it must be ensured that the general principles laid down in this Code with regard to offences and sanctions are also applied to the offences defined in special laws.” ↑
- For these discussions see: Hüsamettin Uğur, “5237 Sayılı TCK’nın 5. Maddesi ve 5728 Sayılı Kanunun Getirdikleri”, Terazi Hukuk Dergisi, Yıl 3, Sayı 19, Mart 2008, s.95, 96. ↑
- For detailed views on this subject see: Fatih Selami Mahmutoğlu, “TBMM Adalet Komisyonu’nda Kabul Edilen Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı Hakkında Görüş”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Reformu İkinci Kitap: Makaleler, Görüşler, Raporlar, Ed: Teoman Ergül, Ankara,Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, 2004, s.361. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.39, 40. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.213; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.42; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.601. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.38, 42; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.603. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.174. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.219; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.33. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.43; Roxin, §33, kn.220. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.220; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.603. ↑
- For the contrary view see: Roxin, §33, kn.222, 224. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.43. ↑
- Dülger, Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanması, 528, 561. ↑
- Dülger, Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanması, 661. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.44. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.38, 43. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.204; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.44; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.705, 706; Özgenç, s.503; Öztürk/Erdem,kn.594. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.481. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.481. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.706. ↑
- To the same effect see: Koca/Üzülmez,.481; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.706; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.519; Koca, s.198. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.706; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.519. ↑
- Özgenç, one of those who drafted the statute, also points out that the presence of such a provision in the statute is unnecessary, and explains the reason why the provision nevertheless appears in the statute as follows: “In our opinion, it is unnecessary to make a regulation concerning the compound offence within the general provisions of the Code. Although we voiced this opinion during our work in the Justice Committee of the TBMM on the new TCK, the provision in the Government Bill (Art. 54) was retained unchanged together with its explanatory memorandum. In fact, although the concepts of ‘aggravating circumstance’ or ‘mitigating circumstance’ are not used in the theory of the offence taken as the basis in the work of the Justice Committee of the TBMM on the new TCK, this provision, taken over verbatim from the Government Bill, contains the distinction between ‘element’ and ‘aggravating circumstance’” Özgenç, s.503. ↑
- See: the last sentence of the footnote above. To the same effect see: Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/ Bacaksız/Tepe, s.516. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.706, dn.694; Koca/Üzülmez, s.481. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.45. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.207. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, kn.595; İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.206, 207; Özbek/Kanbur/ Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.516. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.45. ↑
- Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, s.520; Koca/Üzülmez, s.482. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.517. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.482; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.45; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.706. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.482; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.706. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.207. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.482. ↑
- “Given that it is understood that the accused committed the offence of qualified robbery, which is one of the compound offences, with a weapon, against more than one person, in a dwelling and at night, in a manner falling under Art. 149(1)(a), (c), (d), (h) of the TCY No. 5237, the infringement of Art. 42(1) of the same Law by applying the law as written, without regard to the fact that it is not possible to give a separate judgment for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling, which is an aggravating circumstance of the offence of qualified robbery set out in the said article” 6. CD., 10.12.2007, 97/13859. “Given that the commission of the offence of robbery inside a dwelling is regulated as a qualified form in Art. 149(1)(d) of the TCK No. 5237 and that this sub-paragraph was also applied to the accused in respect of the offence of attempted qualified robbery, the failure to consider that, in accordance with the provisions on the compound offence laid down in Article 42, no separate penalty may be imposed for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling” 1. CD., 28.4.2008, 2007/2819, 2008/3405. Cited in: Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.707. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.45. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.483. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.483. ↑
- For the contrary view see: Özgenç, s.504. ↑
- “The deed, which took the form of taking small livestock at night from the complainant’s stable, a structure in the nature of a building adjoining the house within his garden surrounded by a wall, constitutes the offence of theft falling under sub-paragraph (b) of the first paragraph of Article 142 and under Article 143 of the TCK No. 5237 and the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling falling under the first and fourth paragraphs of Article 116 of the same Law.” 6. Ceza Dairesi, 19.9.2006, E. 1087 K. 8255. Cited in: Ali Parlar/Muzaffer Hatipoğlu, Türk Ceza Kanunu Yorumu, C.II, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2007, s.1085. ↑
- Law No. 5560, adopted on 6.12.2006. Date of the Official Gazette: 19.12.2006. ↑
- “Where the offences of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling and damage to property are committed for the purpose of committing the offence of theft, no complaint is required for an investigation and prosecution to be conducted in respect of these offences.” ↑
- Özgenç, s.505. ↑
- “In accordance with the rule that there are as many offences as there are deeds, and as many penalties as there are offences, where another person’s dwelling is entered or damage is done to property in order to commit the offence of theft, a penalty must also be imposed separately for these offences. However, since the basic form of both offences is an offence whose investigation and prosecution depend on a complaint, where, for example, the offence of theft is committed by violating the inviolability of the dwelling, the basic form of the violation of the inviolability of the dwelling falls within the scope of victim–offender mediation, whereas the offence of theft remains outside the scope of mediation, and in these situations problems such as the suspension of the investigation for the offence of theft or its being conducted separately are encountered in practice. It has been added to Article 142 of Law No. 5237 in order to remove the drawback referred to.” TBMM, Dönem 22, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 1255, s.18. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.518. Indeed, Özgenç states that, with regard to the offence of robbery too, where the offence in its qualified form is “committed in a dwelling or workplace”, separate penalties ought to be imposed both for the offence of robbery and for the offence of violation of the inviolability of the dwelling, but that in view of the existing statutory regulation this is not possible and only an increased penalty for the offence can be imposed. See: Özgenç, s.506. ↑
- Zafer, s.334, 335. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.208; Koca/Üzülmez, s.483; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.595. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.208. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.518. For the contrary view see: Zafer, s.335, 336. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem, kn.595; Koca/Üzülmez, s.483. ↑
- Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.519. ↑
- Zafer, s.333. ↑
- Koca/Üzülmez, s.483, 484. ↑
- Özgenç, s.503. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.703; Özgenç, s.538; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/ Bacaksız/Tepe, s.541. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.190; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.38. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.45; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.704. ↑
- Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.703. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.191; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.38; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.703; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.603; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.541. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.45, 46; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.704. ↑
- Murat Volkan Dülger, Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku, 3. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2013, s.423; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.704; Özgenç, s.538; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.541. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.192. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.38, 39. ↑
- Özgenç, s.539, 540. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.201, 203, 207-210; Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi, s.704; Koca/ Üzülmez, s.484; Öztürk/Erdem, kn.603; Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, s.541. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.46. ↑
- Roxin, §33, kn.200; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.46, 47. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s234. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.47. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.234, 235. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.47. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.236. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.47. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.48. For the contrary view see: Roxin, §33, kn.211. ↑
- For details on supervening intent see: Murat Volkan Dülger, “5237 Sayılı YTCK’da Kastın Unsurları ve Türleri – Özellikle Olası Kastın Değerlendirilmesi”, Hukuk ve Adalet Eleştirel Hukuk Dergisi, Y.2, S.5, Nisan 2005, s.104-106; Önder, s.312; Zafer, s.183. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.237, 238; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.48. For the contrary view see: Roxin, §33, kn.205. ↑
- İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.47. ↑
- İçel, Suçların İçtimaı, s.216; İçel, Görünüşte Birleşme, s.46. ↑
- Murat Volkan Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004, s.242. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku, s.380-383. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku, s.326. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku, s.388-390. ↑
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