Introduction
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
The subject of this article is the Board’s “Facebook decision” of 11 April 2019, No. 2019/104, which was published on 10 May 2019. The data breach at issue in the Board’s decision rests on the allegation, which was reported publicly and is referred to as the “Photo API” incident, that between 13 September and 25 September 2018 some third-party applications may have had access to photos on Facebook, for twelve days, beyond the scope of their authorisation. Facebook’s Engineering Director Tomer Bar confirmed this allegation in a statement published on 14 December 2018 at https://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/2018/12/14/notifying-our-developer-ecosystem-about-a-photo-api-bug/ under the title “Notifying our developer ecosystem about a photo API bug”.
The statement said that a photo API bug had been discovered which allowed third-party applications to access Facebook users’ photos and that the problem had been fixed, but that because of this flaw some third-party applications may have had access to photos beyond the scope of their authorisation for 12 days between 13 September and 25 September 2018. In addition, it emerged that, whereas a third-party application given permission by a Facebook user through the Facebook platform to access his or her photos should have had access only to the photos the user had shared on the timeline, during those 12 days third-party applications also gained access, as a result of the flaw described, to other photos shared on Marketplace or Facebook Stories.
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
I. Introduction
The Personal Data Protection Board (the Board), which is charged with performing and exercising the duties and powers conferred on it by Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (the Law) and by the other legislation on the subject, is accordingly also competent to decide on the complaints of those who claim that their rights relating to personal data have been infringed. In addition, upon complaint or, where it learns of an alleged infringement, of its own motion, the Board will examine whether personal data are being processed lawfully in matters falling within its remit and, where necessary, will take measures in this regard.
Now that a general framework for data protection law has been drawn with the entry into force of the Law and the creation of the other legal rules on the subject, the Board, relying on these duties and powers, decides concrete cases on the subject and shares with the public, in summary form, those of them which it considers necessary. The subject of this article is the “Facebook decision” No. 2019/104 of 11.04.2019, which the Board published most recently, on 10 May 2019.
II. The Facebook Decision A. The Data Breach
The data breach that is the subject of the Board’s decision is based on the allegation, which became public and is referred to as the “Photo API”, that between 13 September and 25 September 2018 some third-party applications may, for twelve days, have accessed photographs via Facebook to an extent exceeding their authorisation. Facebook Engineering Director Tomer Bar confirmed this vulnerability, and this allegation, in a statement which he published on 14 December 2018 at https://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/2018/12/14/notifying-our-developer-ecosystem-about-a-photo-api-bug/ under the title “Notifying our developer ecosystem about a photo API bug” .
The statement said that a photo API bug had been discovered which allowed third-party applications to access Facebook users’ photographs, that the problem had been resolved, but that because of this flaw some third-party applications may, for 12 days between 13 September and 25 September 2018, have accessed photographs to an extent exceeding their authorisation. In addition, it emerged that, whereas during those 12 days a third-party application which had been granted permission by a Facebook user, via the Facebook platform, to access his photographs ought to have had access only to the photographs which the user had shared on his timeline, owing to the flaw described the third-party applications also gained access to other photographs shared on Marketplace or Facebook Stories. In other words, developers were also able to access photographs which users had uploaded to Facebook but had not shared. It was stated that the flaw described affected applications which had obtained permission to access Facebook’s photo API and were able to access people’s photographs, and that it may have affected a total of 6.8 million users and 1,500 applications created by 876 developers. Lastly, Facebook states that tools will be developed to enable application developers to identify the persons who use their applications and have been affected by this flaw.
B. The Board’s View
The Board first examines whether Facebook fulfilled its notification obligation in the data breach. The Board finds that, under the provision in paragraph 5 of Article 12 of the Law, “Where the personal data processed are obtained by others by unlawful means, the controller shall notify the data subject and the Board of this situation as soon as possible.”, the data breach ought to have been notified to the Board by Facebook, but that no notification was made. Accordingly, under the first paragraph of Article 15 of the Law, “The Board shall carry out the necessary examination in matters falling within its remit, upon complaint or, where it learns of an alleged infringement, of its own motion.” Pursuant to this provision the Board decided to carry out an examination of its own motion.
Following the examination carried out by Facebook, the API bug was reported as a potential software defect. In that case, according to the Board, the fact that the API bug persisted for twelve days between 13 September and 25 September 2018 and that Facebook did not intervene in the API bug in question in good time is an indication of shortcomings in the taking of technical and administrative measures in this respect.
In its decision the Board takes into consideration that, whereas a third-party application which has been granted permission by a Facebook user, via the Facebook platform, to access his photographs ought to have had access only to the photographs which the user had shared on his timeline, owing to the breach described the third-party applications also gained access to other photographs shared on Marketplace or Facebook Stories, and that the third-party applications in question also gained access to photographs which Facebook users had uploaded to Facebook as drafts and had not yet made available for sharing. The Board is of the view that the fact that access was thus provided to a far greater number of photographs than the extent to which Facebook’s users had generally given permission is contrary to the principles of “being in conformity with the law and the rules of good faith”, contained in Art. 12(1) and Art. 4(2)(a) of the Law, and of “being relevant, limited and proportionate to the purpose for which they are processed” , laid down in sub-paragraph (ç) of Art. 4(2).
The Board goes on to state that Facebook was unable to determine whether the third-party applications had actually been able to access more specific photographs than the number to which access had normally been permitted, and that this shows that Facebook is experiencing difficulties in controlling the data flow on its own platform. The fact that the data flow cannot be controlled by Facebook is contrary to its obligations concerning “Data Security”, which are set out in Art. 12(1) of the Law.
At the very first stage, Facebook platform applications, by using the statement “Your friends, your connections and the other people you play with will be able to see your game activity. The game has access to your public profile and to the people you know who play this game”, obtain permission to operate in such a way that they can reach the user’s friends’ information or other information even if the person does not wish it. Since no choices are made possible as to which of their personal data the data subjects are to permit to be shared in the application, or as to the privacy settings at the installation stage, the processing of personal data in this manner is based on explicit consent. In the face of this situation the Board states that, since explicit consent must be declared of one’s own free will, the obtaining of the data subject’s explicit consent must not be put forward as a precondition for the provision of a product or service or for benefiting from a product or service.
It should be noted that the breach described may have affected 6.8 million users and 1,500 applications created by 876 developers and that approximately 300 thousand users in Türkiye may have been affected by the data breach, and that the announcement, by Facebook Engineering Director Tomer Bar, of the data breach that is the subject of the decision amounts to the existence of such a breach and to its acknowledgement by Facebook.
In conclusion, the Board decided unanimously, on the ground that the concrete event which occurred as set out in my account above constitutes a data breach and that Facebook did not take the technical and administrative measures necessary to prevent this breach from occurring, to impose an administrative fine of 1,100,000 TL under Article 18 of the Law and, on the ground that no notification was made to the Authority although the data breach in question had been detected on 19 September 2018, to impose an administrative fine of 550,000 TL.
III. Legal Assessment of the Decision
Almost all national rules governing the protection of personal data have established data protection authorities to supervise whether the requirements of those laws are being met. One of the most important innovations introduced by Law No. 6698 is likewise that a regulatory and supervisory body has been provided for in order to perform the duties conferred by the Law. To this end the Personal Data Protection Authority was established, and the Personal Data Protection Board took up its duties as the Authority’s principal decision-making body.
The Board’s “Facebook Decision” in question, which forms the subject of this article and of which I am sharing a brief assessment, is likewise a historic decision for Turkish data protection law, not only because it establishes a significant breach and imposes a fine at the highest level provided for by the Law, but also because it is a “first”.
The data security obligation, which forms the reasoning of the decision, places on controllers the responsibility of taking appropriate technical and administrative measures, by providing the necessary time, resources and expertise, in order to ensure the safekeeping of personal data by preventing the unlawful processing of personal data and unlawful access to personal data, and to secure the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. For data security to be ensured, it must be possible to determine correctly all the existing risks and threats that may arise in relation to data protection, the probability of the risks materialising and the losses they will cause if they do materialise. The controller must also train its employees and carry out awareness-raising activities in this area, develop a data security policy and determine its procedures1.
In the event which unfolded in such a way that, whereas Facebook ought to have given a third-party application access, via the Facebook platform, only to the photographs which users had shared on their timeline, owing to the flaw described third-party applications were also given access to other photographs shared on Marketplace or Facebook Stories, and that Facebook was unable to determine whether the third-party applications had actually been able to access more specific photographs than the number to which access had normally been permitted, it can be seen that Facebook was unable to control the data flow on its own platform, and in this sense Facebook clearly fails to fulfil the data security obligation which I explained above. Having regard to the scale reached by the Facebook “Photo API” data breach, the imposition of an amount very close to the administrative fine of 1,200,000 TL, which is the updated upper limit under Art. 18(1)(b) of the Law, is necessary, proportionate and appropriate.
Apart from this, the Board pointed to an extremely important matter and also addressed the fact that Facebook’s applications process personal data on the basis of “explicit consent” by means of the permission which they obtain at the first stage merely by including a statement of indeterminate scope and without giving persons any possibility of choice. The Board underlined, entirely correctly, that, since explicit consent must be declared of one’s own free will, the obtaining of the data subject’s explicit consent must not be put forward as a precondition for the provision of a product or service or for benefiting from a product or service.
The second part of the ruling concerns the failure to fulfil the “Data Breach Notification Obligation”, which is one of the data security obligations. Paragraph 5 of Article 12 of the Law lays down the provision “Where the personal data processed are obtained by others by unlawful means, the controller shall notify the data subject and the Board of this situation as soon as possible. Where necessary, the Board may announce this situation on its own website or by another method which it deems appropriate.” and imposes on the controller an obligation to notify. In view of the fact that Facebook announced this vulnerability by the statement it made but did not submit a breach notification to the Board, an administrative fine of 550,000 TL was imposed under Article 18 of the Law.
Lastly, I must address the fact that the Board acted of its own motion without there being a breach notification, solely on the basis of the statement made by the Facebook official and treating that statement as an admission. This situation is, above all, an extremely positive development for the application of the KVKK and, at the same time, an indication of the Board’s efforts to have every controller comply with its obligations and make a notification where required.
If controllers and processors do not take the necessary steps towards compliance with the KVKK, the Board will not delay in doing what is required. Indeed, the fact that Microsoft, too, submitted a data breach notification on 8 May 2019 and that this was announced to the public by the Authority on 10 May shows that large companies are now, given the threats of sanction which the KVKK carries, taking serious steps towards ensuring compliance.
Footnotes
- Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurumu, Kişisel Veri Güvenliği Rehberi (Teknik ve İdari Tedbirler), s. 2-11. ↑
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Right to Be Forgotten” (Unutulma Hakkı), Essays in Honour of Prof. Dr. Yadigar İzmirli (Prof. Dr. Yadigar İzmirli’ye Armağan), Savaş Publishing, Ankara, 2024, pp. 1019–1141.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Assessment of the Amendments to the KVK Law on the Processing of Special Categories of Personal Data and the Transfer of Data Abroad” (KVK Kanunu’nda Özel Nitelikli Kişisel Verilerin İşlenmesi ve Yurt Dışına Veri Aktarımı Kapsamında Yapılan Değişikliklere İlişkin Değerlendirmeler), Academia.edu, 25 March 2024.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Our Assessment of the Decision Summaries Published by the Personal Data Protection Board on 18 July 2022” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulunun 18 Temmuz 2022 Tarihinde Yayınlanan Karar Özetlerine İlişkin Değerlendirmelerimiz), Dülger Law Office, 1 September 2022.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Use of Personal Health Data as Evidence in Divorce Proceedings” (Kişisel Sağlık Verilerinin Boşanma Davasında Delil Olarak Kullanılması), Hukuk ve Daha Fazlası Dergisi (Law and More), No. 9, June 2022, pp. 76–84.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “A Very Important Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board on Lawyers' Access to Enforcement Files Without a Power of Attorney” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulu’ndan Avukatların İcra Takip Dosyalarına Vekaletname Olmaksızın Erişebilmesine İlişkin Çok Önemli Bir Karar), Dülger Law Office, 15 August 2021.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, Personal Data Protection Law (Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku), 4th ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2026.

