12 July 2018Murat Volkan DülgerCommentary

Introduction

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

The concept of personal data has been expressed in similar terms in all national and international legislation on the subject. In Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), which is regarded as the basic law specific to the field of personal data in Türkiye, it is defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”. In this context, it can be said that any information that may arise in any area of a natural person’s life, from everyday activities to professional ones, and that serves to identify that person or make that person identifiable is personal data. Personal data are therefore not confined to a particular field or activity, and their scope and limits have not been clearly and precisely drawn; they may be in issue in every environment in which a person is present.

Today, when working life takes up an important place and a large amount of time in people’s lives, the employee-employer relationship is also significant for personal data. At the formation of the employment contract and throughout its duration, the employee is economically and legally dependent on the employer, while the employer is under a duty to protect and look after the employee. This reciprocal relationship between employee and employer contains elements that may amount to interference with the employee’s personal data. In addition, the possibilities offered by developing information technologies have made it necessary to consider the connection between this relationship and personal data from a different perspective. Personal data therefore carry particular importance in the employment relationship, including its establishment, the period of work, departure from employment and even the period after departure.

Full text

This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger*

The concept of personal data has been expressed in similar terms in all national and international legal instruments on the subject; in Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data, which for our country is regarded as the basic law specific to the field of personal data, it is likewise defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person” . In this context it may be said that any information which may arise in every area of a natural person’s life, from the activities of daily life to professional activities, and which serves to identify that person or to make him identifiable, constitutes personal data. Personal data are thus not tied to a particular field or activity, and their scope and limits have not been drawn clearly and precisely; they may be at issue in every setting in which a person finds himself.

At a time when working life takes up an important place and a great deal of time in people’s lives, the employee–employer relationship is also of importance from the standpoint of personal data. At the stage of formation of the employment contract and throughout its duration, the employee is in a position of economic and legal dependence on the employer, while the employer, for its part, is under a duty to protect and look after its employee. This reciprocal relationship between employee and employer contains elements that are capable of constituting an interference with the employee’s personal data. In addition, the possibilities offered by developing information technologies have made it imperative to address the connection of this relationship with personal data from a different perspective. Personal data are therefore of particular importance in the employment relationship, including its establishment, the period of work, departure from the job and even the period after departure.

Today personal data belonging to employees are collected and processed by employers at recruitment and in the course of work, and employees are kept under surveillance in various ways while they are working. In particular, the fact that technological developments enable individuals to be placed under electronic surveillance in public and private spaces has made it easier for employers to satisfy their wish to carry out surveillance. Although surveillance of this kind is justified in some situations, because it amounts to an interference with the personal sphere of employees it must be addressed in the context of fundamental rights and freedoms, first and foremost the right to the protection of personal data, but also the privacy and protection of private life and the freedom of communication. Indeed, the following questions, which call for an answer, come to mind in connection with employers’ surveillance activities:

• What are the reasons for which employers collect personal data belonging to employees?

• Why have employers felt the need to resort to electronic monitoring and surveillance practices?

• Is the obtaining, collection and processing of employees’ personal data by means of monitoring and surveillance lawful? By reference to which features should the assessment of lawfulness be made?

• What answer do the views of legal scholarship and the decisions of the Court of Cassation give on the subject?

It is these questions that form the subject of this article. In order to be able to answer them and to establish the lawfulness of employers obtaining personal data belonging to employees by means of electronic surveillance directed at them, I shall first touch upon the reasons why electronic surveillance is felt to be needed and upon the consequences it has for employees. Subsequently, in the light of the views of legal scholarship and the decisions of the Court of Cassation, I shall make findings as to the cases in which employers’ recourse to such a course is to be regarded as lawful and the cases in which it may be concluded that the right to the protection of personal data and other fundamental rights and freedoms have been violated. In line with the view arrived at, I shall also try to offer suggestions to employers on the method that ought to be applied.

Electronic Surveillance Practices Applied in the Workplace and the Assessment of the Lawfulness of These Practices

in the Context of the Right to the Protection of Personal Data

1. Electronic Surveillance Practices within the Framework of the Employee–Employer Relationship

1.1 The Concept of Electronic Surveillance and the Electronic Surveillance Practices Applied in the Workplace

The word surveillance, which is of French origin, first began to be used towards the end of the 18th century in the sense of the close monitoring of a person’s movements. Such monitoring may relate to the person’s behaviour, actions, statements or relationships. Accordingly, surveillance is the systematic investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons.

Surveillance activities, for their part, denote any operation aimed at obtaining personal data belonging to individuals for the purpose of being able to manage the persons subjected to surveillance by gathering information about them. Surveillance activities, in whatever manner and by whatever means they are carried out, are therefore performed on individuals and derived from individuals. The outcome reached by surveillance activities thus also relates to the personal data of individuals; the essential aim is: personal data!

The fact that the wish to know, record and process the data of individuals has existed since very early times has led persons or various societies wishing to learn the data of individuals to feel the need for surveillance practices in order to gather information about persons and to monitor them, and to begin work on developing tools for that purpose. In particular, the fact that technological developments have made it easier to place individuals under electronic surveillance in every field has resulted in these practices being resorted to today in many fields on a variety of grounds. In parallel with this development, surveillance practices are also used intensively in the employee–employer relationship, in almost every workplace, although they differ in terms of tools and methods according to the nature of the workplace.

In the 2007 survey by the American Management Association of the surveillance activities used in workplaces in the USA, it was found that 66% of employers monitored and inspected employees’ internet use, 43% e-mails, 45% telephone and voicemail use, and 48% did so by camera. More dangerous still, 16% of employers record employees’ telephone conversations and 9% their voicemail messages1. Although the survey in question revealed the surveillance carried out by employers in the USA, it is known that this situation is not peculiar to the USA and that methods of this kind are used in every country of the world. It has been an inevitable consequence that surveillance practices, which are used particularly in management-oriented fields by the party holding managerial authority, are also used in the employee–employer relationship.

As can be seen, developments in technology have caused employees to be monitored in many respects, including in recruitment processes, and in particular in the course of work, during which the work is performed. Although this monitoring is carried out in particular on internet, computer and e-mail use, methods of other kinds are also resorted to. The types of electronic surveillance frequently used by employers today are as follows:

• Surveillance of employees’ telephone use,

• Surveillance of employees’ internet and computer use,

• Surveillance of employees’ e-mail use,

• Surveillance by video camera,

• Surveillance by biometric systems.

The surveillance methods mentioned vary according to the particular characteristics and needs of each workplace. Yet, however much the tool used may change, the feature common to all of them is that they rest on the employee’s personal data. This in turn has raised the question whether the methods resorted to violate individuals’ right to the protection of personal data. The essential aim of this study is precisely to establish this.

1.2. Reasons for which Employers Resort to Electronic Surveillance Practices

Although the reasons for monitoring employees in the course of work while the employment contract is in force, and for recording their information by certain technological methods, are varied, the principal ones may be grouped as follows:

Being able to measure the efficiency of employees and to evaluate their performance constitutes the first and most important ground for monitoring and surveillance. When employees occupy themselves with their own personal affairs by telephone or computer, this causes their efficiency, and hence their productivity in the workplace, to fall. Sending or receiving e-mails about personal matters, spending time on social media sites, visiting other sites unrelated to work or playing games are among the non-work activities of employees most commonly encountered. Surveillance by the employer in order to prevent the decline in efficiency and productivity that may result from such causes must therefore be regarded as a justified ground.

In addition, the use, in a similar interest, of technological systems that measure the performance of employees is also a method of inspection to which employers frequently resort. By entering information through computer programs, the performance of employees can easily be measured and evaluated. An employee who knows that he is being evaluated by this method will endeavour to perform the work assigned to him more carefully and more quickly, and efficiency will thus increase. Besides increasing the efficiency of employees, the possibility of changing an employee’s position according to performance where necessary, as a result of the view arrived at, is another important reason why employers prefer this method.

While I consider that inspecting the personal use made by employees during working hours rests on a justified reason from the employers’ point of view, as I also stress in the training sessions I give on the protection of personal data, employers must abandon the outlook according to which their employees, and in particular those employees whose computer and e-mail traffic is heavy, must use the internet solely for work-related purposes throughout the entire working day. Employers may object in reply that the power to regulate this matter must lie with them and that whether or not to permit the use in question is within their own discretion. In normal circumstances, these arguments of employers might be regarded as justified in some respects. However, under present-day conditions, in which the internet has entered our lives to such a degree, an approach of this kind is neither realistic nor feasible. For this reason, instead of prohibiting personal internet use altogether on the ground of increasing the efficiency of employees, checking whether that prohibition is observed and, where personal use is detected, using this against the employee, it would be more correct and appropriate to limit internet use by laying down clear and precise rules.

Another important reason why employers feel the need to resort to surveillance methods stems from security considerations. It happens that information belonging to the workplace is transferred by employees, knowingly or unknowingly, via the internet and, generally, by e-mail. For, as a result of the development of information technology tools and their spread into every field, workplaces today generally store their own confidential information in electronic form. In order to prevent transfers of this kind, the activities of employees in the electronic environment may be monitored.

On the other hand, it can be seen that the computers in the workplace are inspected in order to eliminate the risk of employer liability that would arise if employees did not use the means of communication, and in particular the workplace’s internet network, as they should. This stems from cases of statutory obligation and statutory liability. At this point attention must be paid to copyright infringements in the material that employees download onto the computers. More importantly, and most dangerously of all, access by employees to sites containing child pornography, or the downloading of child pornography onto the computer, by means of a computer and internet network owned by the employer gives rise to the employer’s liability. Today, the downloading of images and videos relating to child pornography occupies an important place among the cybercrimes committed. At the same time, in actual cases we frequently find that such images were downloaded unknowingly by the user as a result of wrong or mistaken actions. In this situation, however, which is almost impossible to prove, an internet user who did not in fact carry out the download may turn out to be the perpetrator of the offence. In an IT environment in which such dangers exist, employers too will incur liability on account of being the owner of the internet network and the manager of the employee. The inspection of employees in order to avert these dangers is therefore also a justified and necessary ground.

The employer bears a statutory responsibility to take all necessary measures to prevent its employees from being harmed. Within the scope of this responsibility, an effort must be made to prevent acts such as insult, threat, theft and sexual harassment that may occur among the employees working in the workplace. In this context, surveillance activities may be resorted to in order to prevent situations such as the sexual harassment of an employee by another employee working in the same workplace or, as we frequently encounter, of employees by senior managers, the making of insults or threats by e-mail, or the occurrence of thefts in the workplace. Situations such as the installation on computers of software or programs capable of infecting them with viruses are also among the grounds put forward by employers for their surveillance activities.

1.3. Drawbacks of Electronic Surveillance Practices

As can be seen, employers’ recourse to monitoring and surveillance practices in respect of employees’ electronic use in the course of work rests on justified grounds and, indeed, for the most part on responsibilities arising from statute. It is nevertheless a fact which must not be ignored that these practices have drawbacks and cause adverse effects on employees. While the greatest drawback of surveillance practices over employees is, in general terms, that the fundamental rights of individuals and of employees are endangered, their specific drawback is that the psychological state of employees is adversely affected.

It is inevitable that the interests arising from the individual’s right to personal autonomy within the scope of the concept of human dignity, which is also defined in national and international instruments, from the right to protect and develop one’s physical and moral integrity, and from the right to respect for private life, the freedom of communication and the right to the protection of personal data, which are among the fundamental rights and freedoms, will be harmed by the practices in question. Along the same lines, the fact that every step taken by the employee in the workplace is monitored, from the web pages he enters and leaves to e-mail correspondence and from every kind of file on the computer to telephone conversations, and that, although this is rarely encountered, the data obtained by such monitoring are recorded, creates serious dangers for the human rights mentioned. An employer that pursues a policy of inspection and monitoring in every sense will easily be able to acquire information about the employee’s private life and will virtually have a say over, in other words will have established dominion over, the employee’s personal data. Yet practices that go this far will also amount to a violation of the individual’s right to determine the future of his own information, which is examined under the heading of the right to the protection of personal data.

Moreover, an employee whose every movement and every step is monitored, watched and recorded cannot, contrary to what is intended, work efficiently, under the effect of the stress that may arise from working with the thought of being constantly monitored. Seen from this angle, it can also be said that surveillance carried out in order to increase efficiency in fact leads, in some cases, to the opposite2.

In the light of all these explanations, there are justified grounds both for the employer to monitor and inspect the employee’s activities during work within the framework of the managerial authority3 which it has under the employment contract, and for the employee to object to such surveillance on the basis of his fundamental rights and freedoms. Although it is possible to say that employers have legitimate interests in carrying out such inspection, to expect individuals, and in particular employees, who are in a weak position, to give up their fundamental rights and freedoms for economic reasons is neither possible nor lawful. At this point, then, where both parties have justified interests and those interests at the same time collide, a middle ground must be found. In finding that middle ground, the principles and precepts of equity and justice must be taken as the basis alongside the existing interests and expectations of both parties, and there must be no departure from those principles. The course to be followed is therefore to strike a fair and reasonable balance between the employer’s wish to control and manage its employees by bringing them under its influence by means of electronic surveillance practices, and the existing expectation and demand of employees to be allowed to enjoy both the human rights and the employees’ rights conferred on them by national and international legal instruments, including at every stage of the employment relationship.

2. Surveillance by Employers of Employees’ Communications

The intensive use of means of communication in all workplaces has led employers, too, to concentrate their surveillance activities on these means. At this point it must be accepted that the employer has the power to decide on the use of means belonging to it, such as computers, telephones or the internet network. On the other hand, it is natural for the employee to object to such surveillance on the basis of fundamental human rights, first and foremost the protection of personal data, the right to respect for private life and the freedom of communication. The wish to monitor means of communication, which have entered our lives to such an extent that it would be impossible to live without using them, thus comes face to face with the fundamental rights of employees. For this reason a reasonable and fair balance must be struck with regard to the surveillance of communications as well. To that end, the nature of the activities in question carried out by employees in the workplace must first be determined, and an assessment made accordingly.

The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in “Halford v. the United Kingdom”, in which the Court drew no distinction between telephone calls made by an employee in the workplace during work and calls made at home, is important in that it shows whether, once the nature of employees’ communications in the workplace has been determined, an assessment is to be made in terms of fundamental rights and freedoms. The United Kingdom police department, against which sex-discrimination proceedings had been brought, intercepted and recorded the workplace telephone calls of the applicant, Ms Halford, in order to be able to defend itself in those proceedings. The Court came to the view that the employer’s act of covertly monitoring the telephone calls constituted an unjustified interference with the right to respect for private life and the confidentiality of communications.

In activities involving the surveillance of means of communication, it is mostly a violation of the freedom of communication that arises. Likewise, since there is no doubt that communications traffic and content constitute the data of persons, a serious danger also arises for the right to the protection of personal data. It is therefore necessary to determine whether restrictions may be placed on the freedom of communication and, if so, what the extent of those restrictions is to be. In this way it will have been established what employers must pay attention to when carrying out activities of a kind that infringe employees’ freedom of communication.

The matter was examined in the case of “Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom”4, which came before the ECtHR on this subject:

“Restrictions imposed on the freedom of communication must, first of all,
be in accordance with the law. The criterion of being in accordance with the law, as expressed in the case law of the ECtHR,
comprises three basic principles. First, the act constituting the interference
must be based on a provision contained in the legislation. Likewise, the provision forming the basis
of the interference must be sufficiently accessible to the person concerned. Finally,
the provision in question must be formulated with sufficient clarity to enable those to whom it is addressed to regulate
their conduct accordingly and, under certain conditions, to foresee the consequences which
their actions may entail.”

It is clear that, by keeping employees’ communications under surveillance, employers interfere with employees’ freedom of communication and thereby with their right to respect for private life and their right to the protection of personal data. In which cases such surveillance may be possible, however, can be determined in the light of the Court’s judgment in question. Accordingly, the following conditions must be met for employers to be able to monitor employees’ communications:

• The employer must be able to base its ground for surveillance on statutory provisions: this condition is met in particular where employers are obliged to keep employees under surveillance in order to be able to fulfil the obligations imposed on them under the Labour Law, the Turkish Code of Obligations, the Income Tax Law, the Social Security and General Health Insurance Law, the Turkish Criminal Code and other legislation. In addition, the employer may also need surveillance for the requirements of the employment relationship and the employment contract. Whether grounds other than these can be based on statutory provisions must be assessed in the light of the particular features of each individual case.

• The provision on which the employer bases its surveillance of employees must be sufficiently accessible to the employee: the statutory provision on which the employer bases its ground must be objectively accessible to the employee. Since legislation is in essence accessible to everyone, I consider that what must really be understood by this condition is that the employer has to notify the employee of the surveillance activity, of the ground for the surveillance and of the statutory provisions on which that ground is based. In this way this step, which must be present for the interference to be legitimate, will acquire practical meaning. This notification may be included in the employment contract or, where the employer has a separate text or document setting out the surveillance activity

or the use of the internet, it may also be given in that form.

The provision on which the employer bases its surveillance activity must be clear enough
to enable employees to regulate their conduct accordingly and, under certain conditions,
to foresee the consequences which their actions may entail.
It has been emphasised that the provisions relied on by the employer must be clear and
must be provisions whose consequences are definite. At this point, too, I should note that it is not possible for statutory
provisions to set out every situation with sufficient clarity and, by distinguishing each individual case,
to foresee its consequences. This obligation, too, must therefore be fulfilled
by employers. Thus, as part of the notification of the employer’s surveillance activity,
it must be explained how employees are to act and how they are not to act,
and it must be clearly understandable what employees must not do using the means of communication. It is
clear that this determination is to be made in conformity with the relevant legislation and that it must not constitute
a disproportionate interference with the employee’s fundamental rights. In addition, the
consequences which the employee will face on failing to fulfil the obligations laid down by this notification
must be stated, having regard also to the nature of the work, so that the sanction
to be applied is foreseeable for the employee.

The most comprehensive and decisive statement of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the subject, however, was made in its judgment in “Copland v. the United Kingdom”. The judgment is of considerable importance because it both safeguards the employee’s fundamental rights and takes the legitimate interests of employers into account. Although the Court assessed the surveillance of all of employees’ communication activities without distinction under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), it also stated that there could be no hard and fast restriction to the effect that employers may not carry out any surveillance whatsoever. In the case, all the communication activities of the applicant, who worked at a state school, were monitored on the ground of ascertaining whether there had been any misuse. The Court stated that telephone calls made at the workplace, correspondence and the sending and receiving of e-mail are protected under Article 8 of the ECHR, but that employers may nevertheless carry out such acts of surveillance on a legitimate ground such as necessity in a democratic society. It also addressed the question whether such surveillance has to be based on the provision of information, and emphasised that, in the absence of information, employees would be left with the impression that this information would remain confidential and that the provision of information was therefore important.

3. Surveillance of Employees’ Use of E-mail

There is no doubt that sending and receiving e-mail, the use of which is also increasing very rapidly in everyday life, is an indispensable tool in working life. However, through e-mail use carried out over the employer’s internet network, many unlawful acts can be committed, whether work-related or not and whether knowingly or unknowingly. For this reason employers wish to bring e-mail use, too, under control by means of surveillance. Yet while such surveillance may be possible where there are justified grounds, it will be regarded as unlawful where it is unnecessary or where more data are obtained than necessary, since it may then be deemed an unjustified interference with fundamental rights. In order to determine this, two basic distinctions must be drawn:

3.1. Use for the Purpose of Performing the Work or Use for Personal (Individual/Private) Purposes

In determining the lawfulness of employers’ surveillance of any kind of communication use by employees, such as telephone, internet or e-mail, an important and decisive question is whether the employees’ activities placed under surveillance pertain to use for work purposes or to use for private purposes. What is sought to be distinguished here is whether, as a result of the surveillance, the employer will obtain data relating to communications which the employee has made in order to carry out the work for which he is responsible, or personal data relating to the employee’s private and personal use of the means of communication in question. This distinction will reveal both the employer’s power to carry out such inspection within the framework of its managerial authority and the limits of that inspection.

Use for the purpose of performing the work is the employee’s use of the workplace’s means of communication in order to perform the work assigned to him by the employment contract. Since a very strict understanding of this concept would give rise to various drawbacks and to great uncertainty, it should in fact be interpreted broadly. Accordingly, alongside activities which directly serve the performance of the work the employee has to carry out, activities which, though not directly doing so, will help the employee to carry it out or enable him to understand a subject must also be regarded as falling within this scope. An example is an employee’s browsing of various pages in order to learn about a subject before moving on to actually doing the work assigned in relation to it. All use by the employee other than use for the purpose of performing the assigned work, by contrast, is defined as use for private purposes.

By virtue of the power conferred on it above all by Article 3995 of the Turkish Code of Obligations (TBK), entitled “Duty to comply with arrangements and instructions”, and also by the Labour Law and the relevant regulations, the employer may decide whether the electronic means of communication at the workplace are to be dedicated solely to use for work purposes or, alongside work, to personal use as well, and may check whether the rules it lays down under that decision are complied with. For example, the employer may permit personal use only at certain hours or approve access only to certain sites, and it may also check this in various ways. Within the framework of its managerial authority, the employer will be able to regulate the conduct of employees for the purposes of the performance of the work.

The scope and limits of the surveillance which the employer may carry out within the framework of its managerial authority, and whether the employment contract may be terminated on the basis of the data obtained through such surveillance, have frequently been the subject of decisions of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court:

a. Remarks on whether the employee may use the means of communication

for private purposes

In one of its decisions the Court of Cassation explained as follows whether the employee may use the means of communication at the workplace for private and personal matters:

“Private use of the internet at the workplace without the employer’s express or tacit permission is prohibited. In other words, if there is no permission, given tacitly or expressly in the employment contract, to the effect that the internet may be used privately, the employee may not use the internet at the workplace for private purposes. This prohibition may, however, exceptionally be legitimately breached in urgent situations and for reasons relating to the employee’s work. Even where permission for private use has been granted, the employee

is not entitled to unlimited use of the internet or the e-mail communication system. It is not a requirement that permission for the employee to use the internet for private purposes be given solely by an express declaration of intent. Such permission may also be given tacitly. The fact that the employer, despite having noticed private use at the workplace for at least six months, has raised no objection must be regarded as tacit permission. Only in that way, however, can one speak of the employee’s legitimate reliance that the employer will not object in the future either. Likewise, the employer’s allocating computers with an internet connection in the rest room for the employees’ use must also be regarded as tacit permission.”6

Although it is not, as a rule, possible for the employer to introduce practices and rules restricting employees’ freedom of communication, it has been accepted that personal internet use at the workplace may be prohibited and that checks and inspections may be carried out, particularly on e-mails, in matters relating to the company. It is therefore possible for the employer to lay down rules on personal internet use. The decision cited above sought to clarify how such rules may be introduced as well as their scope and limits. It is particularly important that the decision underlined that, even where the rule is that personal use is permitted, there can be no question of unlimited personal use. It is obvious that, where an employer has provided that the means of communication may freely be used for personal purposes, this cannot be understood as expressing an intention that the employee may use a large and significant part of his working hours for personal purposes. A contrary view would be an inequitable approach from the employer’s standpoint. Moreover, even where the employer has expressly or tacitly permitted personal use, the employee’s obligation under Article 3967 of the TBK, entitled “Duty of care and loyalty”, to perform the work undertaken with care and to act loyally must not be forgotten.

Even where there is no rule as to whether employees may use the computers and the internet at the workplace for private purposes, doing personal business on computers allocated for work at the workplace and accessing the internet for non-work purposes are, save in urgent situations, not considered acceptable by legal scholarship and the Court of Cassation. The reason for this is the employer’s legitimate expectation that the employee will carry out work-related tasks on the computer allocated to him.

The Court of Cassation has stated that, where the employment contract lays down no express rule on personal use, the rules on private use may be determined in particular by other legal provisions applicable to the sector to which the workplace belongs. It has further held that personal use makes no difference according to whether or not the employee completes on time the work assigned to him, and that the rules on personal use must be complied with even if the work has been completed on time or finished:

“Article 20 of the bank’s code of ethics, which was submitted by the respondent and with which employees are obliged to comply, lays down the rules that employees shall not engage in conduct contrary to the principles of justice, integrity, honesty… reliability and social responsibility and may not use the bank’s assets and resources inefficiently or for purposes other than those intended. This code of ethics has the character of an annex to the employment contract. It is understood that the claimant used the work computer for purposes other than its intended purpose by accessing internet shopping and gaming sites on more than one occasion during working hours and, during that time, did not devote the time to the performance of work. The fact that the work undertaken was completed on time or that the employer suffered no loss does not eliminate this negative conduct. The claimant has breached an ancillary obligation.”8

That being so, in order to avoid uncertainty on the matter, the most correct and practical solution, on which there is also consensus in legal scholarship, is to establish a workplace policy and procedure governing the use of the means of communication that is systematic, whose rules are laid down clearly, precisely and in detail, and that is manageable and sustainable. Under such a policy it can be determined how, to what extent, within what limits or during which periods of time employees may make personal use of the electronic means of communication belonging to the workplace. In this way the existing uncertainties will be removed and it will also become easier for the employer to check compliance with the rules it has laid down. Moreover, to expect the employee to be able to know his limits in this respect without any rule having been laid down by the employer may in some cases be unjustified. For this reason it would be more appropriate for the employee to know clearly the workplace rules to which he is subject before any inspection and before the sanction he may face as a result of that inspection.

At this point it must be noted that there should be no differing practices as between employees. The workplace policy to be laid down in respect of these surveillance and inspection activities must regulate a general practice, and the principle of equality between employees must not be infringed. Prohibiting some employees from using the internet while leaving other employees free to use it would not be a lawful procedure. Nevertheless, the internet and e-mail needs of employees working in different departments of the same workplace may differ. For example, an employee working in the sales and marketing unit, who is in direct contact with customers, may be allowed to exchange personal messages via the workplace e-mail address in the context of e-mails sent in order to strengthen the relationship with the customer. There is, however, no need to create such an area of free use for an employee of the production unit who has no dealings whatsoever with customers. It should be regarded as justified for the employer to adopt different practices within the same workplace on the basis of justified grounds such as these. The principle of equality must therefore not be understood as absolute; regard must be had to the nature of the work performed by the employee, to what is required for the performance of the work and to the unit to which the employee belongs. In all other situations, however, the employer is under an obligation to apply the principle of equality among its employees. The sole exception to this obligation is that, where a report or a complaint has been made about an employee, surveillance may be carried out in respect of that employee alone. It may also be said that, where there is a concrete and justified suspicion concerning an employee, surveillance directed solely at that employee may be carried out.

The determination of e-mail use is also important in this respect. Employees generally have corporate e-mail addresses dedicated to professional use as well as e-mail addresses for their private use, and the difference between these accounts must also be set out in the policy to be established. It is useful for the management of this matter that the scope within which the e-mail address provided by the employer is to be used should be foreseeable in advance. In addition, matters such as whether one employee may access another employee’s corporate e-mail address and, if so, in which cases this may be possible must also be clarified.

The first thing to be determined with regard to e-mail use is whether employees may use their personal e-mail addresses and engage in personal e-mail traffic by means of the workplace’s computers or telephones or via the workplace internet network. Apart from this, whether employees may exchange personal messages via their corporate e-mail addresses is also of considerable importance. A twofold distinction must therefore be drawn in this respect: once the use of personal and corporate e-mail addresses has been dealt with, the limits of the use of corporate addresses for work purposes and for personal purposes must be determined.

A further benefit of the policy to be established is that it will resolve the problem of notifying employees of the inspection and surveillance to be carried out. For these practices to be regarded as transparent and lawful, the scope, conditions and limits of the surveillance must be notified to employees before the surveillance begins. However, even where the employee has been notified and his approval has been obtained, these do not in themselves establish the lawfulness of the surveillance. Moreover, making the notification subject to approval may give rise to problematic situations for the employer in the future. For this reason, reliance should not be placed solely on the approval to be obtained from employees upon notification, and as far as possible a justified ground in which the employer has a legitimate interest should be relied on. In particular, where one of the exceptions under which personal data may be processed without the consent of the data subject applies, such as necessity for the performance of a contract or the establishment of a right, it will not be necessary to obtain the employees’ approval either, but the obligation to notify will continue to apply.

Where the policy, drawn up in accordance with the nature of the workplace and the requirements of the work and also on the basis of employees’ fundamental rights and freedoms, is breached, the policy may also specify how that breach is to be established and notified to employees and what sanctions employees will face as a result of the breach. For example: where such a breach occurs, can one speak of the employer having a ground for termination for just cause? This problem, which is frequently encountered in practice, has also come before the Court of Cassation, and attempts have been made to resolve it through concrete examples.

b. Remarks on the employer’s power to inspect the employee’s communications

It is apparent from our explanations above that the employer may, within the framework of its managerial authority, lay down rules on the private use of the means of communication at the workplace and may also determine the scope and limits of those rules. The next question to be answered is whether employers may check the extent to which the rules they have laid down are observed. It must be stated that employers have the right to set up an effective inspection mechanism in respect of the workplace rules.

The most illuminating decision to the effect that employers have the power to carry out electronic inspection reads as follows:

“The employer has the power to inspect at any time the computers and electronic mail addresses belonging to it and the electronic mail received at those addresses. Moreover, it is unacceptable for the claimant employee to use the computer for private business without the employer’s permission.”9

It is significant that the decision accepted that the employer has the power to inspect computers and electronic mail addresses at any time, without in any way setting out the limits of inspection and without going into detail as to how such inspection may be carried out. Accordingly, there is no doubt as to the employer’s power of inspection. This must not, however, be understood as an absolute and unlimited power of inspection. The decision should be approached only from the standpoint that it dispelled the hesitations as to whether the employer may carry out inspections, emphasised the existence of such a power and established the employer’s power of inspection in definite and unequivocal terms. While the power of inspection exists, attention must be paid to the recommendations set out in this study as regards the lawful exercise of that power.

In a judgment delivered following its examination of a case that came before it concerning an employer’s examination of the corporate e-mail accounts, containing correspondence of an intimate nature, of applicants working in a private company, the Constitutional Court set out criteria as to how inspection will be regarded as lawful:

“When the courts of instance balance the interests of the parties and examine the proportionality of the interference, they must address, in the light of the circumstances of the particular case, how the restrictive and compelling provisions in the employment contracts were laid down, whether the parties were informed of those provisions, whether the legitimate aim giving rise to the interference with the employees’ fundamental rights was proportionate to the interference, and whether, as in the case forming the subject of the application, the termination of the contract was a reasonable and proportionate measure in response to the employees’ acts or omissions. In addition, the courts of instance must exercise the requisite care to ensure that the steps taken in the course of the proceedings and the reasoning of the judgment ultimately delivered do not in themselves constitute an interference with the sphere of private life.”10

Although in its judgment the Court made an abstract assessment of the criteria of lawfulness, in its assessment of the merits of the specific case it regarded the notification given by the employer to the employee of the existence of its power of inspection over electronic communications as sufficient for a finding of lawfulness. Yet neither the limits and manner of that inspection nor the form in which the information was given were examined. Important though the judgment is in terms of its abstract assessments, its adjudication of the case itself is incomplete and open to criticism.

At this point a twofold distinction must be drawn, as regards the employer’s inspection of e-mail use, between corporate and private e-mail addresses. A further point of debate is whether inspection is confined to corporate e-mail addresses or whether personal e-mails accessed from work computers may also be subjected to inspection. It should be accepted that corporate e-mail addresses may be subjected to inspection by the employer on the same approach as the workplace’s means of communication. There are, however, also situations in which the employee makes private use of corporate e-mail addresses. In that case, where the employer has prohibited private use, the employer also has the power to inspect these e-mails, provided that it complies with the rules of inspection.

By contrast, what is to happen where employees use personal e-mail from their work computers, making use of the workplace’s facilities, raises greater question marks. Although it may be accepted that inspection can be carried out because the workplace’s facilities are being used, the existence of a serious danger to the employee’s right to the protection of personal data as a result of such inspection cannot be disregarded altogether either. Here the most reasonable solution appears to be that, while the traffic of private e-mails may be inspected, their content should not be viewed. Nevertheless, it should be accepted that, where there is a report, a complaint or a serious suspicion, the content of the employee’s personal e-mails may also be inspected.

The judgment in “Bărbulescu v. Romania” delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2016 on the inspection of corporate e-mail addresses is of considerable importance and is one of the leading judgments on the subject. In the case giving rise to the judgment, the applicant, who worked in a private company, had both a Yahoo Messenger account which he used for work purposes and, separately, one of his own. Under the internal regulations of the workplace where the applicant worked, it was prohibited to use for personal purposes equipment allocated for office use, such as computers, telephones, photocopiers and fax machines. The regulations did not, however, contain any provision to the effect that the employer could monitor the operations and acts carried out on that equipment. The applicant’s communications via Yahoo Messenger were recorded for nine days and he was dismissed for having used the internet for personal purposes during working hours. Having been unsuccessful before the courts of first instance and of appeal, the applicant took the matter to the ECtHR.

The first conclusion reached by the Court following its examination is that the monitoring to be carried out by the employer must be notified to the employee, in its full scope and extent, before the monitoring takes place. The Court regarded this requirement as the most important condition of monitoring and stated that complete notification is a precondition of lawfulness. It was thus concluded that covert monitoring and surveillance are prohibited and may not be carried out.

The case giving rise to the judgment was also examined in the light of the relationship between the monitoring of communications and the protection of personal data. An assessment was also made from this angle, on the basis that the tracking of communications will result in personal data being obtained on a large scale and that the principles of data protection law must therefore be taken as the basis. Referring to the European Union’s Directive 95/46/EC and the Working Document11 of the Working Party, the Court stated that the tracking and reading of employees’ e-mails and internet activities are subject to the principles of the law on the protection of personal data and that, in every monitoring activity, the principles of:

• Transparency; the purpose of collection being specified and explicit,

• Necessity, the purpose of collection being legitimate,

• Fairness, the purposes for which the data are subsequently processed being compatible with the purpose of collection,

• Proportionality, the processing not being excessive and the data not being kept for longer than the purpose requires,

must be complied with. Reference was made to the provisions of the Working Document according to which the monitoring of an employee’s internet activity is acceptable in limited circumstances, whereas the reading of e-mails can come into question only where there are grounds weightier than those put forward for monitoring. In this context the Court drew attention to the distinction between tracking the flow of communications and monitoring their content, and to the question whether all or only part of the communications were tracked. In addition, how long the monitoring is to last, who is authorised to access the data obtained as a result of the monitoring, and spatial limits are further criteria to be taken into account for the purposes of lawfulness. It is also noteworthy that the Court referred to the provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which entered into force on 24 May 2016 in place of Directive 95/46/EC and which raises the principles of data protection law to a higher level and provides more comprehensive protection for personal data.

A further point particularly emphasised by the Court is that the employer must give legitimate reasons for monitoring the communications and accessing their content. Accordingly, the employer must rely on justified grounds for monitoring, and priority must be given to considering whether it is possible to establish a lighter monitoring system based on methods and measures that interfere less with the employee’s private life than measures involving access to the content of the employee’s communications. Monitoring and surveillance must therefore be applied only to the extent needed to obtain the data necessary for the aim which the employer seeks to achieve. The extent to which monitoring and surveillance are to be carried out for the aim pursued will be determined separately according to the particular features of each individual case.

By its Bărbulescu judgment the Court made it clear that employees undoubtedly enjoy their fundamental rights at the workplace too, above all respect for private life and the confidentiality of communications, but that this does not prevent the employer from laying down rules on the use for private matters of the means of communication which are used at the workplace and are its property. Stating that the fact that employees’ right to private life continues at the workplace does not mean that employers may not carry out any inspection at all, the Court established clearly and unequivocally that employers have a right of inspection over the means of communication. It was, however, strongly emphasised that such inspection will be regarded as lawful only if it is carried out in accordance with the rules and forms indicated. An inspection carried out in conformity with fundamental rights and the principles of data protection law will therefore be regarded as a lawful inspection and will not amount to a violation of the right to respect for private life. The Court’s judgment provides guidance for employers in that it introduces criteria that help to determine the scope and limits of employers’ inspection and surveillance activities and of their practices of accessing the content of communications, and in that it deals extensively with the principles of data protection law.

The ECtHR’s most recent judgment on whether employees’ computers may be examined is “Libert v. France”. The case concerned the removal from his post of an employee of SNCF (the French national railway company) after the seizure of his work computer had revealed that he had stored on it pornographic files and forged certificates drawn up for a third party. Relying on Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), the applicant complained that his employer had opened, in his absence, personal files stored on the hard drive of his work computer, and, after the Court of Cassation, took the matter to the ECtHR. At the time when Libert’s computer was seized, French law provided that employers could open the files on employees’ work computers unless they were identified as personal. The interference in question therefore essentially had a basis.

The Court stated that the interference had been carried out in order to guarantee the protection of “the rights of others” and that, in such a situation, these were the rights of employers, who may legitimately wish to ensure that their employees use the computer facilities which they place at their disposal in line with their contractual obligations and the applicable regulations. French law contained a mechanism for protecting private life: although the employer could open the professional files stored on the hard disks of the computers which it had given to its employees for the performance of their duties, it could not secretly open files identified as personal unless there was a serious risk or an exceptional situation; it could open such files only in the presence of the employee concerned or after the latter had been duly informed. It was found that the domestic courts had applied this principle and had considered that, in the case in question, the principle did not prevent the employer from opening the files concerned, because the files had not been duly identified as private.

The Court assessed the situation to the effect that an employee could not use for private purposes an entire hard drive intended for the recording of professional data, that the generic term "personal data" could refer to work files being handled personally by the employee, and that there could therefore be no clearly identified items relating to private life. The Court accordingly observed that the domestic courts had properly assessed the applicant’s allegation that his right to respect for his private life had been violated and that the decisions of those courts were based on relevant and sufficient grounds. It was therefore concluded that, in the case in which the employee’s computer was examined and the employee was dismissed on the basis of the data obtained through that examination, the employer’s interference was justified and legitimate and that the right to respect for private life had not been violated.

c. Remarks on whether the data obtained by the employer as a result of inspecting the employee’s communications

may constitute a valid ground for termination

It is frequently encountered in practice that employers dismiss employees and proceed to terminate the contract by citing as grounds the data they have obtained through the inspection and surveillance of communications. Employees are dismissed on account of such data, and in the reinstatement actions they bring, employers rely on those data. Yet when even the limits and scope of the power of inspection are disputed and uncertain, the validity of terminating the contract on the basis of that activity also raises question marks. This situation, too, has come before the Court of Cassation:

“It is understood from the e-mail records produced by the respondent, which the claimant also admitted having sent personally, that the claimant, using the workplace computer during working hours, sent messages containing indecent words and pictures to a female colleague working at the same place. In these circumstances it must be accepted that the termination of the claimant’s employment contract was based on a valid reason.”12

“According to the information and documents in the file, the claimant employee has since 2003, using the employer’s computer at the workplace, been going online several times a day

to place bets. It is apparent from the written documents and from the content of the defence statement which the claimant gave to the inspector that the claimant had previously been warned about this matter and on account of excessive indebtedness. It is also seen that, because of this conduct, the claimant became excessively indebted and was subjected to enforcement proceedings on account of a loan debt owed to another bank. Having regard also to the fact that the claimant’s internet use during working hours for the purpose of accessing betting sites amounted on some days to several hours, it is clear that the conduct in question gave rise to adverse effects at the workplace. That being so, it must be accepted that the termination of the claimant’s employment contract was based on a valid reason.”13

“From the content of the electronic correspondence of various dates submitted to the case file in order to prove the ground for termination in question, it must be accepted that there was no concrete act on the part of the claimant and that the statements in that correspondence therefore cannot be regarded as falling within the scope of making unfounded reports and imputations damaging to honour and dignity. On the other hand, if the employee’s words and correspondence, though not of such gravity, are of a nature to disrupt the order of work, the ground for termination must be deemed valid. Given that the electronic correspondence produced in the file does not relate to a single day but displays a certain continuity, and that feedback messages in which company employees expressed their discomfort at the tone of that correspondence have been submitted to the file, electronic correspondence which is by its nature liable to disrupt peace and order at work must be deemed a valid ground for termination.”14

As can be seen, although the use of the internet, computers and e-mail for personal purposes at the workplace has not been prohibited in definite and unequivocal terms by legislation, and this situation has not expressly been classified as a ground for termination for just cause or for valid reason, the use by employees of the communication facilities at the workplace for their personal affairs has been treated by the Court of Cassation as a ground for termination. A further point to be noted here is that the communication carried out by the employee in this way need not necessarily infringe a norm laid down as an offence in criminal law. The Court of Cassation considers it sufficient that acts of this kind on the part of employees may give rise to adverse effects at the workplace. Many of the acts regarded by the Court of Cassation as valid grounds for termination consist of the acts defined in the following sub-paragraphs of Article 25(2) of the Labour Law, entitled “The employer’s right of immediate termination for just cause”:

b) The employee’s uttering words or engaging in conduct offending the honour and good name
of the employer or of a member of the employer’s family, or the employee’s making
unfounded reports and imputations about the employer that are damaging to honour and dignity.
e) The employee’s engaging in conduct incompatible with honesty and loyalty, such as
abusing the employer’s trust, committing theft or disclosing the employer’s
professional secrets.
h) The employee’s persisting in not performing the duties he is required to perform,
despite having been reminded of them.

Also noteworthy are the Court of Cassation’s decisions to the effect that, where termination is effected on account of the cases listed in Article 25 of the Labour Law, there is no need to give the employee a prior warning:

“It must be accepted that, as a rule, there is no need to give the employee a prior warning in the cases under Art. 25 of the Labour Law (İK), which confer on the employer a right of termination without notice, and that, on that basis, where the employee uses the internet for private purposes despite the employer’s express prohibition, the employment contract may be terminated without the need for a prior warning.”15

In the light of the decisions cited, it is apparent that settled case law of the Court of Cassation has formed to the effect that the employment contract may be terminated for valid reason or for just cause on the basis of data obtained through the inspection and surveillance of employees’ private use of the workplace’s means of communication. In particular, employees’ personal use despite the employer’s prohibition of private use has been deemed a valid ground for termination even where that use does not in addition constitute an offence or an unlawful act. In legal scholarship there are also views to the effect that the sanction of termination for just cause is a severe consequence where the employee’s private use does not seriously impair the performance of the work.

It is to be observed, however, that in many of the decisions delivered the assessment of the lawfulness of the computer and internet inspection carried out by the employer is deficient. Although I share the Court of Cassation’s view that employees’ use of computers and the internet for their personal affairs should be regarded as a valid ground for termination, particularly where private use has been prohibited by the employer, I consider that, in the specific case before it, the Court of Cassation should also review the lawfulness of the inspection carried out by the employer. For since data and documents obtained through an unlawful inspection will themselves be regarded as unlawful, the problem of unlawfully obtained evidence may also arise.

d. Remarks on the employer’s use of evidence obtained unlawfully as a result of inspecting

the employee’s communications

While it is accepted that employers may use the evidence they obtain through inspection carried out on the basis of the rules and recommendations explained in detail above and of employees’ fundamental rights, it is a major open question whether findings obtained through inspection that is not carried out in accordance with those rules, and is therefore deemed unlawful, can be admitted as evidence in the course of disputes.

It can be seen that, in the decisions delivered in the concrete cases that have come before the Court of Cassation on the subject, an assessment in terms of unlawfully obtained evidence has been made and that in some decisions such evidence was not accepted as a basis for the judgment. By contrast, in a decision delivered in 2012, the General Civil Assembly of the Court of Cassation concluded that evidence obtained irregularly may be assessed according to the particular features of the case. I should state at the outset that I do not share this view. There is no doubt that, as a result of the inspection and surveillance of employees, first and foremost the confidentiality of communications and, since personal data are obtained on a large scale, the right to the protection of personal data are violated, as is, where those data also include data relating to private life, the right to respect for private life. While inspection activities, which concern the individual’s most fundamental rights, rest on justified grounds, such inspection also has a scope and limits. Since an inspection carried out without observing those limits will constitute a violation of employees’ fundamental rights, such an inspection cannot be accepted; nor should it be possible for data obtained through an unlawful inspection to be admitted as evidence at any stage of a dispute.

Conclusion

The fact that technological developments have made it easier to keep individuals under electronic surveillance in public and private spheres has led to these practices being resorted to today in many fields and on a variety of grounds. In parallel with this development, surveillance practices are used intensively in the employee–employer relationship too, in almost every workplace, although the tools and methods differ according to the nature of the workplace. While this monitoring is carried out, with the help of technological devices or programs, in particular on internet, computer and e-mail use, other kinds of methods are also resorted to. Although employers have many different grounds for subjecting employees to surveillance practices, the foremost grounds on which surveillance is based are the measurement of employees’ efficiency and the assessment of their performance, security reasons, and statutory liability and obligation.

Although the employer is justified in the grounds on which it bases its surveillance practices, it is inevitable that those practices will harm the interests arising from the individual’s right to personal autonomy within the concept of human dignity, which is also defined in national and international instruments, from the right to protect and develop one’s physical and moral integrity, and from the right to respect for private life, freedom of communication and the right to the protection of personal data, which are among the fundamental rights and freedoms. It can thus be said that the employer has justified grounds for monitoring and inspecting the employee’s activities during work within the framework of the managerial authority which it has under the employment contract, and that the employee likewise has justified grounds for objecting to such surveillance on the basis of his fundamental rights and freedoms. Here the problem should be resolved by striking a reasonable and fair balance between the two interests.

The basic conclusions reached as a result of the explanations concerning the lawfulness of the employer’s practices of inspecting and keeping under surveillance the employee’s communications are as follows:

• Although it is not, as a rule, possible for the employer to introduce practices and rules restricting employees’ freedom of communication, the employer may, relying on its managerial authority, lay down rules on whether all the means of communication belonging to the workplace, above all the internet, computers and e-mail, may be used for private purposes. The employer may prohibit the private use of the means of communication altogether, or may decide that they may be used in certain cases, specifying the scope and limits of such use.

• In addition to being able to lay down rules on the use of the workplace’s means of communication, the employer also has the power to inspect the activities which employees carry out on the means of communication, in particular in order to check whether those rules are complied with. However, an unlimited and absolute power of inspection has not been accepted in either national or international judicial disputes. Criteria of lawfulness, such as that the inspection must be based on notification, must be carried out in conformity with the principles of data protection law and must rest on legitimate grounds, and that access to content must be regarded as a last resort, have been laid down by legal scholarship and by the decisions of the Court of Cassation, the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

• Although the use of the internet, computers and e-mail for personal purposes at the workplace has not been prohibited in definite and unequivocal terms, and this situation has not expressly been classified as a ground for termination for just cause or for valid reason, the use by employees of the communication facilities at the workplace for their personal affairs has been treated by the Court of Cassation as a ground for termination.

• Although there is a decision of the General Civil Assembly of the Court of Cassation (YHGK) to the effect that whether findings obtained through an inspection deemed unlawful can be admitted as evidence in the course of disputes is to be determined according to the particular features of the case, I am of the opinion that data obtained in this way fall within the scope of unlawfully obtained evidence and, by reason of the Constitution, the Code of Civil Procedure (HMK) and the principles of the rule of law, must not form the basis of the judgment in proceedings.

In the light of the explanations and judicial decisions given above, we see that many different problems and points of debate arise concerning employers’ practices of inspecting, monitoring and keeping under surveillance employees’ communications. In practice in particular, further and different concrete situations are encountered and difficulty is experienced in resolving the issue.

It is generally accepted that employers may lay down rules on the private use of the means of communication, may inspect the activities carried out on the means of communication and may terminate the employment contract on the basis of the data obtained through that inspection. Nevertheless, in order to remove problems and uncertainties on the subject, especially at the stage of judicial proceedings, the most correct solution is to establish a workplace policy and procedure on the use of the means of communication, in particular the internet, computers and e-mail, that is systematic, whose rules are laid down clearly, precisely and in detail, and that is manageable and sustainable. The policy so established should, taking into account the international treaties to which Türkiye is a party, above all the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as well as the Constitution, the Labour Law, the Law on the Protection of Personal Data and other legislation, be capable of answering the following questions in particular:

• Is it possible for employees to use the means of communication at the workplace for private purposes? If so, what are the scope and limits of such use? (For example, only at certain hours, only for certain sites or only on certain days.)

• May private communications be conducted via corporate e-mail addresses? In which cases may private use of corporate e-mail addresses be possible? (For example, should e-mail traffic conducted in order to strengthen the company’s relationship with customers be regarded as private use?)

• Is access to personal e-mail accounts, other than corporate e-mail, possible from workplace computers?

• Does private use of the means of communication give rise to the employer’s right of termination for valid reason? Is there a threshold that gives rise to this right? (For example, where private use exceeds a certain number of hours.)

• Is every kind of activity that employees carry out on the means of communication inspected by the employer? If so, what are the scope and limits of that inspection?

• What are the grounds for the inspection of communications carried out by the employer? From which legal provisions do those grounds derive their basis?

• Are the data obtained as a result of the inspection recorded? If the rule is that they are not, are there nevertheless cases in which they are recorded?

• Who is authorised to access the data obtained as a result of the inspection?

• Are the data obtained as a result of the inspection processed? Are they transferred to third parties? If so, to whom and to what extent are they transferred?

• Will the inspection of the means of communication entail sanctions for employees? May the employer terminate the contract on the basis of the data obtained as a result of the inspection? In which cases does it have a right of termination? (For example, can the mere fact that private use has been prohibited be regarded as a ground for termination even if the data obtained as a result of the inspection do not constitute an offence or an unlawful act?)

The procedure, which must give clear and unequivocal answers to the questions set out above, should be given to employees to read, employees should be informed about the procedure and, indeed, such information should be repeated at regular intervals. In this way employees, having detailed and up-to-date knowledge of the workplace rules on the use and inspection of the means of communication, will both take care to comply with those rules and be aware of their rights and obligations.

Where judicial disputes arise concerning the use and inspection of the means of communication, a lawful workplace policy drawn up with regard to the interests of both employee and employer will provide guidance by pointing to the solution of the problem encountered in the specific case. At the same time, as explained in detail above, a lawful inspection mechanism and the scope and limits of that inspection must be determined.

The basic starting point for employers when establishing a workplace policy and an inspection mechanism, and for the judicial authorities when examining and assessing concrete cases on the subject, should be as follows: “the striking of a fair and reasonable balance between the employer’s wish to control and manage its employees by bringing them under its influence by means of electronic surveillance practices, and the existing expectation and demand of employees to be allowed to enjoy both the human rights and the employees’ rights conferred on them by national and international legal instruments, including at every stage of the employment relationship.”

Footnotes

  1. Academic/Attorney-at-law. ↑
  2. https://www.amanet.org/news/1473.aspx. ↑
  3. As regards the negative consequences of surveillance for individuals, one may recall the “Panopticon Prison”, which Jeremy Bentham designed as a new model of prison and which Foucault drew on in order to explain his views on the phenomenon of surveillance in modern society, laying bare the way in which the mechanism of surveillance and control is operated by modern power. The architecture and lighting of the prison are designed in such a way that the prisoner can be watched at any moment, and even his shadow can be seen; yet the prisoner is not in a position to know when he is being watched. In time it has no longer even been necessary to place a guard in the tower; the prisoner in any case behaves of his own accord as though a guard were there. According to Foucault, the Panopticon is a machine that keeps every moment of the prisoners under control, from their movements and their ways and forms of behaviour to their thoughts. And this great effect of it derives from creating in the prisoner a state of conscious and permanent visibility that ensures the automatic functioning of power. ↑
  4. The employer’s managerial authority derives from the nature of the employment contract. This was explained as follows in a judgment of the Constitutional Court dated 26.9.1967, E. 1963/336 and K. 1967/29, published in Official Gazette No. 13031: “The contract of service comprises three elements: 1. the element of work, 2. the element of remuneration, 3. the element of subordination. It is this element of subordination that distinguishes this contract from other contracts for the performance of work. In the contract of service the employee is, to a greater or lesser extent, subordinate to the employer. That is to say, “he (the employee) performs his work under the supervision and control of the employer.” This view has also been maintained in the decisions delivered by the Court of Cassation. Indeed, in the decision of the 9th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation dated 3.10.2017, E. 2015/28321, K. 2017/14781, this point was set out as follows: “The criterion that defines the employment contract is legal and personal dependence. Legal dependence in the true sense comprises the employee’s obligation to comply with the conduct of the work and with the instructions at the workplace. The employee performs his or her obligation within the framework of the employer’s decisions and instructions. The employee’s personal dependence on the employer comes to the fore. The content of the element of dependence in the employment contract consists in the employee acting in accordance with the employer’s instructions and in the work process and its results being supervised by the employer.” ↑
  5. For judgments to similar effect see: “Klass ve diğerleri v. Almanya”, B. No:5029/71, 6/10/1978;“Campbell v. Birleşik Krallık”, B. No:13590/88, 25/3/1992. ↑
  6. Article 399- “The employer may make general arrangements concerning the performance of the work and the conduct of employees at the workplace and may give them specific instructions. Employees must comply with these to the extent required by the rules of good faith.” ↑
  7. 9.HD. 17.03.2008, E. 2006/30107, K. 2007/2011. ↑
  8. Article 396- “The employee is obliged to perform the work undertaken with care and to act loyally in protecting the employer’s legitimate interests. The employee is obliged to use the employer’s machinery, tools and equipment, technical systems, installations and vehicles properly and to take care of these as well as of the materials handed over to him or her for the performance of the work. For as long as the service relationship continues, the employee may not, in breach of the duty of loyalty, render services to a third party in return for remuneration and, in particular, may not compete with his or her own employer. The employee may not, during the service relationship, use for his or her own benefit or disclose to others information learned in the course of the work, in particular production and business secrets. To the extent necessary for the protection of the employer’s legitimate interests, the employee is obliged to maintain confidentiality even after the service relationship has ended.” ↑
  9. 9. HD. 4.05.2009, E. 2008/36305, K. 2009/12393. ↑
  10. 22. HD. 1.9.2016, E. 2016/6321, K. 2016/13143. To the same effect see: 9. HD. 13.12.2010, E. 2009/447, K. 2010/37516 ↑
  11. Anayasa Mahkemesi, 24.03.2016, Başvuru No: 2013/4825 (Para. 51), ↑
  12. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on The Surveillance of Electronic Communications in The Workplace, 29 Mayıs 2002, 5401/01/EN/Final WP 55. ↑
  13. 9. HD. 16.12.2014, E. 2004/18435, K. 2004/28069. ↑
  14. 9. HD. 10.10.2006, E. 2006/19150, K. 2006/26792. ↑
  15. 9. HD. 13.3.2014, E. 2013/13973, K. 2014/8256. ↑
  16. 9. HD. 17.03.2008, E. 2007/27583, K. 2008/5294. ↑

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