1 September 2016Murat Volkan DülgerArticle

About this work

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

The article deals with the protection of personal data by criminal provisions. Together with Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), it examines the offences in Articles 135 to 138 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) (recording personal data, unlawfully giving or obtaining data, failure to destroy data) and the second paragraph of Article 17 of the KVKK.

Keywords

  • personal data
  • right to privacy
  • data protection
  • offence against private life
  • processing of data
  • data subject

Full text

This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

İstanbul Medipol Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 3 (2), Autumn 2016; 101-167

Protection of Personal Data by Criminal-Law Norms in the Context of the Law on the Protection of Personal Data and the Turkish Criminal Code*

Protection of Personal Data with Criminal Norms in the context of Protection of Personal Data Law and Turkish Criminal Code

Murat Volkan Dülger**

ABSTRACT

Protection of personal data, which can be defined as all kind of information relating to an identified or identifiable real person, is important in respect of the right to privacy and the right to respect for family life. The issue of protecting personal data is becoming more and more important nowadays; both individuals have many complaints arising from this subject in daily life and high level judicial organs take a legal attitude in this manner. In this direction, the field of the protection of personal data has been regulated by many supra-national organizations especially the Council of Europe and the European Union and states. Turkey has accepted the Law numbered 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data which regulates this area, albeit too late. Protection of personal data by criminal norms is provided by special provisions in the Turkish Criminal Code. The types of crime that should be addressed in this context are: The offense of Recording Personal Data, the offense of Illegal Delivery or Acqusition Of Personal Data and the offense of Non-Destruction of Data held in articles 135-138 of Turkish Criminal Code and the offense of Non-Destruction or Non-Anonymization of Personal Data held in article 17/2 of the Law numbered 6698.

Keywords: Personal data, right to privacy, data protection, crime against privacy, data processing, data subject.

Introduction

Personal data is a contested concept whose boundaries cannot be drawn precisely; nevertheless, it may briefly be defined as any kind of information that belongs to a human being and is capable of identifying the individual. Indeed, the fact that the human being takes his place in the universe as a human being, and his position in society, turn certain values attached to the human being into personal data; for example, a person’s name, address, illnesses, marital status and sexual preferences are all items of information regarded as personal data. However, particularly in the last century, developments in science and technology and their reflection on society and on the components that make up social life have turned a great deal of further information into personal data. In this context, the bank account number, the social security number, the citizenship number and the password of an e-mail address may be cited as examples. Accordingly, personal data may roughly be divided into two: the first group comprises information relating to the personality of the human being that stems from his existence, while the second group comprises information which is assigned to the human being because he is part of the modern information society or which is used in gaining access to various services. This distinction, however, makes no difference in terms of the value of personal data and their entitlement to protection1

I. The Emergence of the Concept of Personal Data and the Debate on Whether It Constitutes a Right in Itself

A. The Process by Which Personal Data Emerged

As stated above, personal data have existed ever since the first human beings. However, with the development of information technologies and the spread of the internet, the existence and importance of personal data have come to be better understood on account of the problems that have arisen. For this information, which had previously been filed in written form in the hands of a small number of persons or institutions, was transferred to the digital environment with the development of information technologies and, as a result of the spread of the internet, was opened up, lawfully or unlawfully, to the access of everyone, whether concerned or not2. In addition, the fact that personal data in very large quantities can be stored in very small spaces and devices, and that, as a result of the exponential increase in the processing speeds of computers, these large quantities of data can be processed comprehensively and in a very short time, has made it possible to identify individuals on the basis of fragments of information and subsequently to gain access to every kind of information about the individual concerned.

This has also been the point at which the danger relating to personal data arose. For even the concern that unconnected persons may gain access to personal data and use/disseminate them poses a real threat to individuals. Moreover, it is also possible to use these data to create profiles (virtual persons) in the virtual sphere as though one were the real owner of the data, and to carry out various unlawful acts and/or commit offences by means of these profiles, and examples of this are frequently encountered. In such a case the real owner of the data, who has no connection whatsoever with the incident, may suddenly find himself before a court as the accused and/or defendant, as the perpetrator of the offence and/or unlawful act. This shows us clearly how serious the consequences of leaving personal data unprotected are3 The importance of the protection of personal data has grown in parallel with the steady development, over the last fifty years, of the awareness of human rights and of their protection. In this context, the law of personal data protection is also examined by dividing it into various periods4. Whichever division into periods is adopted, however, a single period is identified as the beginning of the protection of personal data. Accordingly, provisions for the protection of personal data as understood today first began to be debated in the 1960s, together with the development and spread of information technologies, and began to form the subject of legal regulation in the 1970s5

B. The Debate on Whether the Concept of Personal Data Constitutes a Right in Itself

The protection of personal data is important from the standpoint of the right to respect for private and family life, which is one of the human rights. The right to respect for private and family life is guaranteed both by Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which states that everyone has the right to demand respect for his private and family life, and by Art. 20 of the Constitution, which counts it among the fundamental rights of the person6. Consequently, the protection of personal data is both a human right from the standpoint of supranational law and a fundamental right and freedom regulated by a constitutional norm from the standpoint of national law7 In legal scholarship there are two different views on whether personal data are a sub-heading of the protection of privacy (the confidentiality of private life) or an independent concept in their own right. According to the first of these, having regard to the definition of the right to privacy, which protects a natural person’s “events of life that are particular to himself or herself and that he or she would wish to remain confidential”, and to its purpose, which envisages that the person be able to live in a manner consistent with human dignity, free from the surveillance and control of third parties, it must be accepted that the concept of the protection of personal data is a sub-heading of the protection of privacy8.

According to the second view, the right to the protection of personal data could at the first stage be considered within the right to privacy; however, in the face of developing technology, the traditional approach to the right to privacy and the principles adopted in this field proved insufficient for the protection of personal data, and for this reason it began, in the course of the historical process, to separate from the right to privacy, a field of rights more deeply rooted than itself; in this sense, the protection of personal data is a particular species of the right to privacy and, owing to certain requirements peculiar to it, has begun to be perceived as a separate field, although these are fields that have an organic relationship with one another9.

I subscribe to the second of these views, because, although personal data emerged from within the concept of privacy, over time both developments in technology and the fact that these data frequently form the subject of violations of rights have led this concept to acquire a separate identity. Moreover, the word “confidentiality” in the concept of “confidentiality of private life” does not fully coincide with the protection of personal data. For the personal data that are protected need not necessarily be confidential: where a piece of information that forms part of a person’s private life and is known to the persons within that sphere, but is neither confidential nor secret, is shared with third parties, that information benefits from the scope of the protection of personal data; this, however, is not the protection of confidentiality but the protection of personal data, which is a phenomenon sui generis. Similarly, in the offences relating to the protection of personal data, too, the protected legal interest is not a “secret” but the personality rights of the person to whom the data relate10 Personal data is a very broad concept that falls within the field of interest of almost all branches of law, such as criminal law, civil law, administrative law, commercial law, the law of obligations and so on. However, since, from the standpoint of the discipline of criminal law, which is our field of interest, the matter we take as our basis is the phenomenon of the “offence”, in this study I shall examine the concept of personal data by confining it to its being the subject of an offence. In addition, because they are closely related, I shall also touch, where appropriate, on the provisions concerning administrative law and on the misdemeanours (breaches of administrative order) contained in particular in Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK)11.

The first question we encounter here is “whether, with personal data, there is a legal interest that needs to be protected”. The answer to this is clearly seen in the two paragraphs above: from the very first moment at which the importance of personal data began to be perceived to this extent, there has been no doubt that they should benefit from the protection of criminal law and of administrative law (administrative criminal law). Accordingly, it must first be determined what the personal data are that the offence seeks to protect, where their boundaries begin and end, and according to whom and to what this concept is defined and given content. Once this has been done, it will be more meaningful and comprehensible to set out the explanations relating to criminal and administrative law12

II. Definition of the Concepts of Personal Data and Processing of Personal Data

A. Personal Data

The Turkish term “kişisel veri” derives from the English concept of “personal data” and fully conveys the content and meaning of the foreign-language concept. In this field there are fundamental international instruments which are taken into account in particular in our country’s regulations and legislative work on the subject.

The first of these is the “Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data”, No. 108 of 28.1.1981, a product of the Council of Europe, of which our country is also a member. This Convention is the first international instrument in this field and has formed the basis for the production of uniform rules in this field13. In Art. 2 of the Convention, personal data are defined as “any information that identifies or is capable of identifying a person”. The second of the fundamental texts in this field is Directive 95/46/EC, the “European Community Data Protection Directive”14, a product of the European Union. In Art. 2 of this Directive, personal data are defined as “any information that may be related, directly or indirectly, to a natural person and that would render that person identifiable”15. Definitions similar to this one have been adopted by a large number of countries and transposed into their domestic law. Indeed, this definition is used for personal data in both international and national legal scholarship. On the other hand, however, this definition has been criticised for being extremely broad and vague16.

The third and fourth fundamental texts specific to this field are the directive and the regulation of 2016, No. IP/12/46, likewise issued by the European Union to replace Directive 95/46/EC. Of these instruments, the Directive, in its Art. 3 headed “Definitions”, defines first the data subject and then personal data as follows: “Data subject” means an identified or identifiable natural person by reference to an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more physical, psychological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identifying features specific to that person, which are reasonably likely to be used, directly or indirectly, by a controller or by another natural or legal person”. In the same instrument, personal data are in turn defined as “meaning any data relating to the data subject”. Indeed, in Art. 4 of the Regulation, likewise headed “Definitions”, the concepts of data subject and personal data are defined in exactly the same way17

A person being rendered identifiable denotes the characteristic whereby the person can be identified through the data being linked, directly or indirectly, to a natural person, that is, whereby it can be established that the individual is that particular individual. For example, the linking of data to an identity number, or any information relating to natural and/or legal persons who can be identified on the basis of one or more elements of their health, genetic, ethnic, religious, family and political information expressing the person’s psychic, psychological, physical, economic, cultural or social identity, indicates personal data. In other words, data bearing a specific content, such as name, telephone number, motor vehicle registration plate, social security number, passport number, curriculum vitae, picture, voice, fingerprints and genetic information, as well as data that are a combination of criteria (age, occupation, marital status, address, etc.) rendering the person indirectly identifiable, may be dealt with as personal data18. Indeed, pursuant to Art. 80 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK), the results of genetic examinations carried out on samples taken from the suspect, the accused or other persons in order to obtain evidence relating to an offence are in the nature of personal data19 Work has been carried out in our country with a view to creating basic legislation on the protection of personal data. Following three years of work by a commission set up by the Ministry of Justice (although there had also been different drafts prepared over many years previously), the “Draft Law on the Protection of Personal Data” was prepared in 2003. Taking as its basis, in general, Council of Europe Convention No. 108 and the European Community Data Protection Directive, that draft was prepared20; however, despite the strong demand in this field, it could not be enacted until 2016, for various reasons. Ultimately, because our country resumed negotiations in the process of accession to the European Union and the most recently opened negotiating chapters also included the protection of personal data, the draft was amended and submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM). Meanwhile, before the law was made, the law approving the Council of Europe’s convention on the protection of personal data was first enacted. The law submitted to the TBMM was adopted by the Assembly on 24.3.2016 under number 6698 and published in Official Gazette No. 29677 of 7.4.2016; pursuant to Art. 32 of the Law, it entered into force, as regards “Articles 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, six months after the date of its publication” and, as regards its other articles, on the date on which it was published. In Art. 3(1)(d) of Law No. 6698, personal data are defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”. In the explanatory memorandum to this article the concept is explained as follows: “Personal data means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. In this context, not only information that enables the individual to be identified with certainty, such as his or her name, surname, date of birth and place of birth, but also information on the person’s physical, family, economic, social and other characteristics is personal data. A person being identified or identifiable denotes that person being rendered identifiable through the existing data being linked in any way to a natural person. That is to say, it covers all cases in which the data enable the person to be identified as a result of bearing a concrete content expressing the person’s physical, economic, cultural, social or psychological identity or of being linked to any record such as an identity, tax or insurance number. Data such as name, telephone number, motor vehicle registration plate, social security number, passport number, curriculum vitae, picture, image and sound recordings, fingerprints and genetic information are personal data on account of their capacity to render the person identifiable, even if indirectly.”

The “Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy”, which was prepared by the Ministry of Health and entered into force upon its publication in Official Gazette No. 29863 of 20.10.2016, likewise defines personal health data, in Art. 4(1)(g), as “any health information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”. It is entirely normal and appropriate that this regulation, which also cites Law No. 6698 among its legal bases, should contain a definition parallel to that of the said Law. The “Regulation on the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector”, which entered into force upon its publication in Official Gazette No. 28363 of 24.7.2012, is another instrument in this field21. In Art. 3 of the Regulation, personal information/data are defined as “all information relating to identified or identifiable natural and legal persons”. It can be seen that the definition in this regulation, which entered into force subsequently, was also drafted in conformity with the definition of personal data in Law No. 6698 when it was still a draft.

As a result of these explanations it can be seen that the definitions contained in the international instruments, in Law No. 6698 and in the relevant regulations are in fact a correct choice. Accordingly, personal data may be defined as “all data relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”22. Consequently, in order to speak of personal data, the data must relate to a natural person and that natural person must be already identified or identifiable through the use of the data in question23. In a broader definition, personal data are any kind of information that serves to show all of the individual’s distinguishing personal, family and occupational characteristics and attributes24. Personal data are any kind of information that concerns an identified or identifiable person and identifies that person, ranging from his identity, ethnic origin, physical characteristics, state of health, genetic data, educational or employment status, residential address, credit card details, bank and insurance records, judicial archive and general information-gathering records, thoughts and beliefs, shopping habits, telephone directory, photograph, the IP address of his computer, fingerprint, the text messages sent from his mobile phone, e-mails and activities on social networking sites to the restaurant, bar or museum he last visited25. Camera recordings and sound or image recordings taken and processed in order to identify the person by indirect means, and information obtained by methods providing identification by biometric means, such as fingerprint, face, iris, handwriting and voice recognition, are also personal data26

Indeed, the General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation (YCGK), in its decision of 17.6.2014, E. 2012/12-1510, K. 2014/331, also defined personal data by referring to the above explanation and definition, which I had set out in another work of mine.

Special Categories of Personal Data and Anonymous Data

Some personal data are referred to as “sensitive data” in the legislation of countries and in international instruments. Art. 6 of Council of Europe Convention No. 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data uses the concept of “special categories of data”. The Law on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), by contrast, uses the concept of “special categories of personal data” instead of the concept of “sensitive data”. Special categories of personal data are defined in Art. 6(1) of Law No. 6698, headed “Conditions for the processing of special categories of personal data”: “Data relating to persons’ race, ethnic origin, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion, sect or other beliefs, appearance and dress, membership of associations, foundations or trade unions, health, sexual life, criminal convictions and security measures, as well as biometric and genetic data, are special categories of personal data”

Special categories of personal data are placed under special protection, in particular in order to prevent persons from being subjected to discrimination. Information relating to a person’s religious and philosophical belief, race or ethnic origin, political opinion, membership of associations, foundations and trade unions, sexual preferences, health information, private life and convictions of any kind, and so on, is classified as sensitive personal data. As a reflection of the thinking that emerged particularly after the Second World War, which opposes discrimination and aims to protect human dignity, special categories of personal data are subjected to stricter supervision than other data in order to prevent persons from being victimised should these data become known to others. The reason why data relating in particular to a person’s race or ethnic origin are made subject to rules separate from other personal data is the concern that the data of the persons in question may be misused by state institutions. The cause of this concern is that historical events such as the Jewish genocide, which took place in particular after detailed population records had been kept, have been experienced. From the standpoint of national legal systems, whether or not an item of personal data falls within the special categories depends on the interpretation of the data protection authority and, ultimately, of the courts. In its Lindqvist judgment27, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that sensitive personal data must be interpreted broadly28 Despite this judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the broad interpretation of personal data, in our country the Constitutional Court, in a decision delivered before the entry into force of the KVKK, stated that, although it is moreover a special category of personal data, “identity verification by biometric methods” was not personal data, and held that the statutory provision enacted in this field was not contrary to Art. 20 of the Constitution29. Since “biometric and genetic data” are expressly listed among the special categories of personal data in Art. 6(1) of Law No. 6698, I consider that this decision is now devoid of legal basis and has been unlawful since 7.4.2016, the date on which the Law entered into force.

The information that results from rendering data incapable of being linked to an identified or identifiable natural person, or of having their source determined, is called “anonymous data”. Such data, which are kept for purposes such as statistics, research and planning and which emerge as a mass of aggregate information rather than indicating any particular person, are not regarded as personal data because it is not possible to link them to the persons concerned30. Anonymous data is defined in Art. 3(1)(b) of Law No. 6698, headed “Definitions”, as “rendering personal data incapable of being linked in any way to an identified or identifiable natural person, even by matching them with other data”.

Processing of Personal Data

In order to be able to speak of the protection of personal data, the personal data defined above must first be subjected to a number of operations and, as a result, become usable, capable of identifying a particular person and such that meaningful conclusions can be drawn from them. Consequently, what the processing of personal data is must also be defined. The concept of processing of personal data is also defined in the convention, directive, law and regulations referred to above.

In the Council of Europe’s “Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data”, No. 108, the processing of personal data is defined as follows: “Automatic processing includes the following operations if carried out in whole or in part by automated means: storage of data, carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on those data, alteration or erasure of the data, and re-use or dissemination of the data by retrieving/recovering them from the places where they are stored.”

The processing of personal data is defined in Art. 2 of Directive 95/46/EC, the “European Community Data Protection Directive”: according to this provision, processing comprises any method, whether automatic or not. In this context, it comprises the operations carried out for the collection, obtaining, recording, organisation, storage, alteration, reading, querying, use, disclosure to others by way of transfer, dissemination or making available of personal data, as well as any operation carried out by combining or linking the data and even by blocking, erasing or destroying them.

The processing of personal data is also defined by the regulation of 2016 and the directive No. IP/12/46, issued by the European Union to replace Directive 95/46/EC. In Art. 3 of the Directive, headed “Definitions”, and in Art. 4 of the Regulation, likewise headed “Definitions”, it is defined in exactly the same way as “processing; carrying out any operation or set of operations, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation, alteration, retrieval, consultation, use or disclosure, on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, by way of transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment, combination, restriction, erasure or destruction”. In addition, Art. 3(4) of the Directive provides the definition “restriction of processing: the marking of stored personal data with the aim of limiting their processing in the future”. In Art. 3(1)(e) of the “Law on the Protection of Personal Data”, No. 6698, the processing of personal data is defined as “any operation performed on data, such as the obtaining, recording, storage, preservation, alteration, re-organisation, disclosure, transfer, taking over, making available, classification or prevention of the use of personal data, wholly or partly by automated means or, provided that it forms part of a data filing system, by non-automated means”.

Art. 4(1)(ğ) of the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy defines the processing of personal health data as “any operation performed on health data, such as the obtaining, recording, storage, preservation, alteration, re-organisation, disclosure, transfer, taking over, making available, classification or prevention of the use of personal health data, wholly or partly by automated means or, provided that it forms part of a data filing system, by non-automated means”. As can be seen, and as ought to be the case, this provision is identical to the definition in Law No. 6698.

In the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, in turn, the processing of personal data is defined in Art. 3(1)(i) as “the operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as their obtaining, recording, storage, alteration, erasure or destruction, re-organisation, disclosure or making available in any other way, transfer to third parties, marking with the aim of restricting their use, classification or the prevention of their use, by automated or non-automated means”31 Any operation or set of operations carried out for the collection, obtaining, recording, organisation, storage, alteration, adaptation, combination, reading, querying, use, disclosure, making accessible, transfer to third parties, dissemination, making available or anonymisation of personal data, as well as by combining or linking the data and even by blocking, erasing or destroying them, is considered to fall within the definition of the processing of personal data. Processing comprises any process that may relate to personal data and is carried out by means of automated or non-automated procedures32

What is meant by automatic processing is the processing of data by methods in which automation systems are used. Automation is the name given to operations carried out by mechanical devices; within the scope of this Law, however, it must be understood so as to include digital operations as well; for example, operations of this kind carried out by means of information systems (which is what is frequently seen in practice) are also regarded as processing of personal data. In this way all the operational steps and methods covering every stage through which the data pass, starting from their collection, are placed under protection. Indeed, this is what Law No. 6698 and the relevant regulations seek to achieve33.

As is also apparent from the definition, the processing of data is not tied to an automatic/digital procedure. For example, whether the controller reads the personal data from a written document or from a computer monitor, this falls within the definition of processing. Private records which a person keeps for himself, on the other hand, are not classified as processing of personal data. For example, records kept as a result of relationships of a personal or family nature, such as the address books a person keeps on his computer, are not dealt with under this heading. Of course, this information must be assessed separately from personal data processed within the framework of professional and commercial activities and, with the exception also of the case in which such data are kept open to access by an indeterminate number of persons, must be regarded as personal data. Indeed, Art. 28(1)(a) of Law No. 6698, headed “Exceptions”, states that the provisions of the said Law shall not apply in the case of “The processing of personal data by natural persons within the scope of activities relating exclusively to themselves or to family members living in the same dwelling, provided that the data are not given to third parties and that the obligations relating to data security are complied with.” Operations carried out on anonymous data are likewise not regarded as processing of personal data. For, since the causal link between the owner of the data and the data has been severed, no operation carried out on such data results in a violation of the rights and freedoms of the person either34. The processing of anonymous data was foreseen by Law No. 6698, and Art. 28(1)(b), headed “Exceptions”, states that the provisions of the said Law shall not apply in the case of “The processing of personal data for purposes such as research, planning and statistics by anonymising them through official statistics.”

However, personal data relating to persons’ race, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion, sect or other beliefs; membership of associations, foundations and trade unions, health and private life and convictions of any kind, and so on, are termed personal data “of a special nature” or “sensitive” personal data; according to the generally accepted approach, these too are regarded as personal data, but because of their sensitive nature the processing of these data is prohibited as a rule35. Exceptionally, however, the processing of these data may be permitted in certain cases, such as where the public interest so requires or the consent of the person has been obtained36. Art. 6(2) of Law No. 6698, headed “Conditions for the processing of special categories of personal data”, clearly states that the processing of special categories of personal data without the explicit consent of the person concerned is prohibited. The exceptions under which special categories of personal data may be processed are set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 as follows: “(3) Personal data other than those relating to health and sexual life listed in the first paragraph may be processed without seeking the explicit consent of the data subject in the cases provided for by law. Personal data relating to health and sexual life, however, may be processed without seeking the explicit consent of the data subject only by persons under an obligation of secrecy or by authorised institutions and organisations, for the purposes of protecting public health, preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of treatment and care services, and the planning and management of health services and their financing. (4) In the processing of special categories of personal data, it is also mandatory that the adequate measures determined by the Board be taken”

III. The General Framework of the Provisions Introduced by Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data

The story of the drafting of Law No. 6698 in fact goes back quite a long way. As was also seen above, Türkiye is one of the first states to have signed the Council of Europe’s first convention on this subject on the day it was opened for signature in 1981. The Convention, by contrast, was ratified and became binding on the country only at the beginning of 2016. The legal reason why the Convention was ratified so late is that, beforehand, it had simply not proved possible to draft and bring into force a law containing the rights and obligations laid down in the Convention. Nevertheless, the drafting process of the Law can be traced back to 1981, the date on which the Convention was signed. In addition, as far as I have been able to follow, there have been various processes of preparing draft laws on this subject for at least ten years, but for political, legal and other reasons it has simply not been possible to enact a law on this subject.

In fact, when the text of the Law and the drafts prepared before it are examined, it can be seen that Directive 95/46/EC of the European Union was taken as the basis. Indeed, one of the fundamental aims in making this Law, and perhaps the most important one, is the need to enact this legislation within the framework of harmonisation with the EU in the process of candidacy for EU membership. However, the fact that the EU instruments grant only limited exceptions to public institutions and bodies (in particular to law enforcement and intelligence agencies) and introduce supervision in this respect, together with the requirement that the data protection board have an autonomous structure independent of political authority, was the most important factor leading to the constant postponement of the enactment of the Law as far as Türkiye was concerned, which did not wish to introduce a regulation of this kind. In the end, a Turkish-style law on the protection of personal data, not fully compatible with Directive 95/46/EC of the European Union, was drafted and entered into force.

Although the Law is open to criticism in many respects, first and foremost this difference of approach in its enactment, its positive aspects must also be pointed out. To begin with, in my view one is greater than zero. Before 7.4.2016, the date on which the Law entered into force, personal data were likewise being recorded, disseminated, destroyed, altered and so on in our country; in short, every kind of personal data was being processed and used by everyone without any limitation or regulation. With this Law a regulation, albeit a limited one, has been introduced. From now on persons and institutions will not be able to process data with the boundlessness I described above; at the very least they will shy away from doing so because of the severity of the sanctions. Indeed, many organisations in the private sector are already drawing up policies on the “Process of Compliance with the Law on the Protection of Personal Data”, trying to restructure their business processes accordingly and even obtaining consultancy services in order to be able to do so. This alone shows that what has been done is a positive step. Of course, however, these positive aspects do not lead me to disregard the shortcomings which, on the other side, are plainly visible when the matter is viewed objectively. One of the significant criticisms levelled at the Law is that it was drafted on the basis of the old directive at a time when the EU was preparing to amend its own directive. Indeed, just one week after Law No. 6698 entered into force, the new directive and regulation were put to the vote and adopted in the European Parliament. Yet that directive dates from 1995, and the EU Member States have had experience in this field ever since, that is, for a full twenty-one years. Following this experience and process of adaptation, new work was undertaken which also took into account the developments in information technologies in the intervening period and the needs in this field, and the directive was updated; in the terminology of the IT world, the existing version was upgraded to the new one. Our expectation is that, as far as our country is concerned, once compliance with the old version has been achieved, the transition to the new version will be made as soon as possible and the corresponding changes in legislation and practice will be carried out. Starting with the new version from the very outset would of course have been the best option; nevertheless, despite its shortcomings and its being outdated from birth, the fact that a regulation which did not exist at all has now been enacted is, given the realities of our country, a consoling development. Taken as a whole, Law No. 6698 is the basic regulatory statute in this field: it defines personal data and their processing and protection, sets out in broad outline, in particular, the framework for how personal data are to be processed and protected, and in addition determines what the sanction will be where the rules on processing and protection are not complied with. As I stated above, it has first of all defined what personal data are and the processing and protection of such data, and has regulated the sanction, in terms of the law of misdemeanours (breaches of administrative order), for cases in which the rules on processing/protection are not complied with.

Since the method of protecting and processing personal data introduced by the Law and the process of compliance with the regime it has established fall outside the scope of this study, I do not examine them separately and in detail. I consider it appropriate to assess them below, wherever relevant, in connection with the offences and misdemeanours.

IV. Offences Relating to the Protection of Personal Data in the Turkish Criminal Code

A. The Need to Regulate the Protection of Personal Data in the Criminal Code

Data protection law encompasses the right to know which personal data have been obtained, by whom and for whom, by whom, for what purpose and for how long they will be processed, to whom they will be transferred and when they will be destroyed. I regret to say that in the Turkish legal order the subject of the protection of personal data did not receive sufficient and necessary attention until Law No. 6698 entered into force, indeed until the election of the members of the Personal Data Protection Board began37. Because for a long time there was no adequate legislation in our country in the field of the protection of personal data, the subject was examined primarily under the heading of the protection of personality rights. In this context the protection of personal data is generally assessed under Art. 24 of the Civil Code. Where the right of personality is infringed through the unauthorised obtaining of personal data, the cessation of the infringement under private law and compensation for the damage are effected in accordance with Art. 25 of the Civil Code and Arts. 41 et seq. of the Code of Obligations38. Accordingly, the articles of the Civil Code and the Code of Obligations concerning infringement of the right of personality and its consequences are applicable irrespective of the means by which and the field in which the infringement of personality occurs; for the principle of legality of offences and penalties, which applies in criminal law, does not apply in private law39. Although it is not expressly provided for, the application of the relevant articles of these statutes in cases of misuse of personal data is possible by way of analogy and interpretation40

Because of the principle referred to above, acts such as the violation of personal data by means of information systems, their unlawful obtaining and their misuse must be separately regulated in criminal law and made into offence types41. Otherwise the protection of personal data by norms of criminal law would not be possible. In this respect it has been stated that, as with the legislation enacted in this field in Germany, there is a need for a special statute on the protection of personal data42. On the other hand, it has been stated that the “offence of obtaining data” regulated in Art. 525a(1) of the former Turkish Criminal Code No. 765 (ETCK), which contained the first regulation made in our country in the field of cybercrime, did not provide sufficient and necessary protection in this respect43

Another matter to be borne in mind with regard to acts infringing personality rights by obtaining personal data is that, apart from the official security agencies of the State, many institutions and organisations also collect private information about individuals and are in a position to infringe personality rights by means of that information. Examples include hospitals which keep highly private information about patients in information systems44, forensic medicine institutions which carry out DNA and fingerprint analyses and store the results in information systems, the data held by companies operating mobile telephone lines, and financial institutions and retail companies which hold large amounts of customer data45. Indeed, the results of genetic examinations carried out on samples taken from the suspect, the accused or other persons in order to obtain evidence relating to an offence are personal data46. For this reason, the regulation to be made for the protection of personal data should lay down not only the framework for the collection and use of such information by official bodies, but also a statutory framework for the public bodies and private organisations which have the authority and the technology to store and use the information in question47 Another major problem in this field is that, in acts of obtaining personal data on the internet, also known as identity theft, customers’ names, dates of birth, social security or citizenship numbers and credit card details are generally obtained without their knowledge48. Subsequently a great many offences are committed with these data in order to obtain unlawful gain, including aggravated fraud committed by using information systems. Credit card details, for their part, are mostly used, in addition to transferring cash from customers’ accounts, to produce a counterfeit copy of the customer’s credit card49

The protection of personal data is becoming increasingly important today; individuals voice many complaints on the subject in their daily lives, and the matter has also led the highest judicial bodies to take a legal stance. One important example is the permanent retention of personal data on Facebook and similar social networking sites. Facebook, one of the most popular social media sites, is heavily criticised on the ground that it nevertheless keeps a record of the messages, photographs and videos which users have deleted50. The criticisms have also been raised at the Constitutional Court in Germany, which is charged with protecting fundamental human rights. In an interview with the well-known news magazine Focus, Andreas Voßkuhle, President of the German Federal Constitutional Court, drew attention to the risks involved in using Facebook, stated that citizens do not know whether their data continue to be kept on record by Facebook after they have deleted them, and indicated that the matter might be brought before the Constitutional Court. Human rights organisations and IT experts state that the messages, photographs and videos deleted by users are not completely erased by Facebook and demand that this practice be brought to an end. Andreas Voßkuhle pointed out that in the coming period the need might arise for the Constitutional Court to examine whether Facebook’s practices infringe citizens’ “right to have full control over their personal data”. Indeed, the German Federal Government has for some time been holding talks with representatives of the IT and social media giants, Facebook among them. The Government wants these companies voluntarily to accept a document of “data security rules” and to give assurances to citizens. In response to the recent increase in criticism, Facebook has made changes and has offered various new facilities enabling users to act more cautiously when sharing their own information51. As a result of these developments a new type of right has emerged in the field of information technology: the right to be forgotten52. In its judgment in Google Spain SL, Google Inc v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, in which it recognised and defined the right to be forgotten, the European Court of Justice made findings on this subject that shed light on the application of the EU Data Protection Directive53 Taking into account the views and criticisms referred to above, the acts of unlawfully recording, using or disclosing personal data and of failing to destroy data have been made offences under separate articles in the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK). An important gap in the criminal law order of our country has thereby been filled54. One of the positive aspects of this regulation from the standpoint of cybercrime is that the offence types relating to personal data have been regulated not together with the other offence types in the chapter entitled “offences in the field of information technology” but, in accordance with the legal interest protected by these offences, in the chapter on “offences against private life and the secret sphere of life”, in which similar legal interests are protected55. This shows that the legislature has done the right thing in terms of legislative technique and systematics.

B. Offences Relating to the Protection of Personal Data and Their Elements

1. The Offence Types Regulated in the Turkish Criminal Code

The offence types relating to the protection of personal data are contained in Chapter Nine, entitled “offences against private life and the secret sphere of life”, of Part Two, entitled “offences against persons”, of Book Two of TCK No. 5237, in which the special provisions, that is, the offence types, are regulated. Art. 135 TCK regulates the “offence of recording personal data”, Art. 136 the “offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data”, Art. 137 the aggravated forms of these offences, Art. 138 the “offence of failure to destroy data”, and Art. 140 the security measures to be applied to legal persons in connection with these offences.

In Chapter Five of the Law on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), entitled “Offences and Misdemeanours”, Art. 17(1), headed “offences”, provides: “With regard to offences relating to personal data, the provisions of Articles 135 to 140 of the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 of 26/9/2004 shall apply.” By thus referring to the TCK in respect of wrongs relating to personal data, whether or not they fall within the framework of that Law, it has been stated that the offence types which were already in force before that Law will continue to be applied, and a direct link has thereby been established between Law No. 6698 and Arts. 135 to 140 TCK.

The second paragraph of the article provides: “Those who, in breach of Article 7 of this Law, fail to erase or anonymise personal data shall be punished in accordance with Article 138 of Law No. 5237.” In this way a point whose absence I had pointed out long before has in fact been remedied. I shall return to this subject below.

2. The Protected Legal Interest

The “offence of recording personal data” regulated in Art. 135 TCK and the “offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data” in Art. 136 protect common legal interests. As is apparent from the systematics of the Code, these offence types protect, in general, the private life and the secret sphere of life of persons and, in particular, personal data56.

By means of these offences, the “right to privacy”, which is set out both as a human right in Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights57 and as a fundamental right and freedom in Art. 20 of the 1982 Constitution58, is protected as a legal interest by the offence types in question in the face of technological developments that make it possible to interfere with the private life of persons59. A human right and a fundamental right and freedom regulated both in the ECHR and in the Constitution is thus protected by a concrete norm of criminal law60. Indeed, with paragraph 3, added to Art. 20 of the Constitution by Art. 2 of Law No. 5982 of 7.5.2010, the protection of personal data has, as a fundamental right and freedom, become a right that is expressly the subject of a constitutional norm61. Moreover, the norm regulates and protects not only personal data themselves but equally the processing of personal data. In addition, the last sentence of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution states that the principles and procedures relating to the protection of personal data must be regulated by law; the task thus entrusted to the legislature has been fulfilled by the enactment of Law No. 6698 alongside the articles of the TCK under examination here.

The question arises whether these offence types protect personal data or information falling within the scope of secrets. The chapter entitled “offences against private life and the secret sphere of life”, in which these offences are regulated, contains some offence types similar to those regulated in the ETCK No. 765 in the section entitled “felonies against the inviolability of secrets”. Proceeding from this, there are authors who state that the offences regulated in this chapter protect the inviolability of secrets, and that the offence type which was regulated in the ETCK No. 765 as disclosure of professional secrets is indeed regulated in Art. 136 of TCK No. 5237 as the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data62. However, the existence of a secret depends on the existence of a matter which its holder has an interest in not being disclosed and which was not previously known to others63. Arts. 135 and 136 TCK, by contrast, require that personal data be unlawfully recorded and that data be unlawfully given or obtained, but do not require that the data in question be data which are classified as secret and to which the holder does not allow other persons to have access or of which he does not allow them to learn. Accordingly, these offence types do not require the existence of a genuine secret, and hence it is not required that the personal information recorded be kept as a secret.

For this reason the protection of secrets does not constitute the legal interest protected by these offences. It is, however, possible that information in the nature of a secret will generally also be personal data. Where information that is at once both personal data and a secret forms the object of these offence types, the “existence of a secret” can be a legal interest that is protected only indirectly64

The legal interest protected by these offence types may vary according to the nature of the data protected. For example, where data relating to an individual’s state of health form the object of these offences, the protected legal interest is the person’s right to health. For under normal circumstances an individual goes to a physician only in the confidence that diagnosis and treatment will not give rise to personal harm, difficulties or embarrassment for him. A person who thinks that information about his health may be shared with others may avoid treatment65. Secondly, society’s right to health is also protected, since the health of society depends on healthy individuals. In the final analysis, where data relating to health form the object of these offences, the protected legal interest is the right to health of both individuals and society66. It is for this reason that paragraph 2, added to Art. 135 TCK by Art. 30 of Law No. 6698, makes the commission of the offence against health data, which are special categories of personal data, an aggravated form increasing the penalty. For in that case the wrongfulness of the offence is greater because it is committed against data of a more sensitive kind, and the offence may also give rise to side effects of this sort; a heavier penalty is therefore deserved.

Art. 138 TCK, for its part, makes it an offence for persons who are under a duty to destroy personal data within the system to fail to perform that duty even though the statutory period has expired67. Human beings are by nature free. For this reason they do not wish to live as individuals who are constantly monitored, about whom information is collected and on whom files are kept. Creating in people the feeling that they are constantly being watched may engender a sense of distrust and hatred towards the political system in which they live68; in other words, people wish to live in security and in freedom69. Thus the personal information of individuals, some of whose personal information has been entered as data into various systems at a certain point in their lives, even if lawfully, must after a time be removed from those systems. States, just as much as individuals, should want these data to be destroyed. For a State that constantly collects and records information about its citizens, in short one that keeps files on its citizens, can never be a pluralist, liberal, democratic State governed by the rule of law, nor can it turn its citizens into a society committed to these modern principles. The offence type in Art. 138 TCK is intended to prevent precisely this70.

In this context it is seen that the offence type in question protects two separate legal interests: the first is “both personal data themselves and the security desired with regard to personal data”, and the second is “the reliability and functioning of the public administration”71.

However, the concept of the protection of personal data and the legal interests protected by the related offence types lie deeper still than the explanations given above, and have philosophical foundations relating to what it is to be human. Individuals no longer have a choice as to whether or not to be members of the information society, which is an outcome of the twentieth century. The fact that personal data can be collected, processed, disseminated and evaluated efficiently and effectively by one or more centres causes individuals to feel that they are constantly being watched. The modern individual, surrounded by technology, has been left virtually stark naked and needs a protected sphere in order to be able to safeguard the intimate space that belongs to him and to carry on his social life in different guises. This is in fact the fundamental value that is intended to be protected by the concept of the protection of personal data in general and by the offence types relating to the protection of personal data in particular72

3. Conformity with the Statutory Definition of the Offence (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit)

a. Material Elements of the Offences

(1). Perpetrator and Victim

In the offence types regulated in both Art. 135 and Art. 136, the perpetrator and the victim display no special feature. Since the definitions of the offences use the expression “any person” for the one who will commit the offence and specify no further characteristic, anyone may be the perpetrator of these offences. The same applies to the victims of the offences. To be a victim of these offences it is not necessary to be the owner or possessor of the data recorded in the information system; what matters is that the personal data recorded relate to the individual73 In the offence of failure to destroy personal data regulated in Art. 138 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK), by contrast, the perpetrator is the person “who is under a duty to destroy the data within the system”. This duty is specified in the special statutes on the subject; the criminal code rightly does not state by which statutes these duties are to be determined and uses a general formulation. In each specific case that statute must be identified and it must be ascertained on whom what kind of duty to destroy data has been imposed. Moreover, although this official performs the duty on behalf of the public, he need not have the status of “public official” as defined in Art. 6 TCK. Since this offence type is “a special, sui generis offence of neglect of duty”, the perpetrator is not required to be a public official. Accordingly, a statute regulating personal data may also assign duties of this kind to persons who are not public officials, and they too may be perpetrators of the offence under examination74. Indeed, Art. 137(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 imposes such an obligation on those vested with the power and duty to investigate. The principal assignment of duty in this field, however, has been made by Art. 7 of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), entitled “Erasure, destruction or anonymisation of personal data”. It provides: “(1) Even though they have been processed in accordance with the provisions of this Law and of other relevant laws, personal data shall be erased, destroyed or anonymised by the controller, of its own motion or at the request of the data subject, where the reasons requiring their processing cease to exist. (2) The provisions of other laws concerning the erasure, destruction or anonymisation of personal data are reserved. (3) The procedures and principles relating to the erasure, destruction or anonymisation of personal data shall be laid down by regulation”. As in many matters concerning the protection of personal data, here too the Law has placed responsibility on the “controller”. Under Art. 3(1)(ı) of Law No. 6698 the controller is “the natural or legal person who determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data and is responsible for the establishment and management of the data filing system”. In other words, irrespective of whether it is a natural or a legal person, whoever records, processes, stores or transfers the data is the controller. Accordingly, it is also this natural or legal person who must erase the data when the time comes, in accordance with Art. 138 TCK. Where the controller is a legal person, the representative it designates in this regard and/or the person or persons it assigns will be the perpetrator of the offence. Consequently, in each specific case the perpetrator or perpetrators must be determined meticulously in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 6698 and of the regulation to be issued under it. In particular where the controller is a legal person, one must avoid — as is seen in practice especially in cases of occupational accidents — bringing proceedings against all the members of the board of directors and/or the senior managers of the legal person as accused without any inquiry or differentiation. In terms of the liabilities arising under private law and the law of misdemeanours the legal person itself may be liable, but under the theory of the offence adopted by the TCK it is not possible for legal persons to be perpetrators of an offence. The TCK also expressly rejects objective liability, and hence liability for the acts of third persons and liability without fault. The task falling to prosecutors and investigating authorities is therefore to conduct not a perfunctory but a detailed and realistic investigation in this regard, to find those truly responsible and to bring proceedings against them. Otherwise, as we frequently see in practice, either the innocent are punished (wholesale punishment) or the truly guilty are acquitted (wholesale acquittal). Since these offence types protect both the data of persons and the confidence that society places in the administration as regards their destruction, both the individuals to whom the data relate and every individual making up society are victims of the offence75 The explanations I have given above with regard to Art. 138 concerning the perpetrator, the victim and the object of the offence apply equally to the offence in Art. 17(2) of KVKK No. 6698.

(2). The Object of the Offence

The object of all three offences regulated in Arts. 135, 136 and 138 TCK, that is, the thing upon which the offence is committed, is “personal data”. Since I defined personal data in detail in the first part of the study, I confine myself, in order to avoid repetition, to referring to the relevant part.

It is not a requirement that this information be in the form of digital (numerical) data located, used and transmitted in an information system; for the explanatory memorandum to the article states that “no distinction is made as to whether the data are recorded in a virtual environment or on tangible paper”. That is, the concept of data in these offence types is not, in the narrow sense, “information in the form of digital code which is located in an information system or on a data carrier and on which operations are performed”, but, in the broad sense, “every kind of information” that can be recorded in any form76 In legal scholarship, however, there are authors who state that, having regard to the purpose for which this offence was introduced, not every kind of data relating to a person but only information which the person would not wish others to hear or learn of should be considered to fall within this scope, and that the concept therefore needs to be limited; that the TCK does not in fact require the data to be secret and regards it as sufficient that the data are personal; but that to accept data which are known to everyone, or which can easily be known, as falling within this scope would considerably widen the scope of the article77. In my view, however, there is no need to depart from the definition I gave at the beginning of my study and to limit this concept. For it is unclear by reference to whom and to what such a limitation would be made, and a limitation of this kind may be contrary to the principle of certainty, which is a sub-principle of the principle of legality of offences and penalties. On the other hand, since the consent of the victim is in any event a ground of justification, the victim’s consent to the recording or giving of data in the concealment or knowledge of which he sees no interest will deprive the act of its criminal character78.

In this context, for example from the standpoint of medical law, information which belongs to the patient and is communicated to the physician and other health personnel, or which the patient does not in any way wish others to learn, must be regarded as personal data. Moreover, not only the personal data communicated to health personnel but also the records arising from the person’s visit to a physician, a hospital, etc. must be regarded as falling within this scope79. The scope of this must be determined in each specific case according to the nature of the data and the conduct reflecting the will of the data subject as regards the protection of the data. Accordingly, what is called for is not an abstract general limitation but an interpretation in the light of the particular features of each case and, where necessary, a concrete limitation80

It must be examined whether personal data which have entered the public domain can constitute the object of the offence. My view was that personal data are protected and will constitute the object of the offences specific to this field in the TCK even if they have in some way entered the public domain, for example even if they have been shared within a limited group of friends on social media81. However, Art. 28 of KVKK No. 6698, which contains the exceptions, states that “provided that it is in conformity with and proportionate to the purpose and fundamental principles of this Law, Article 10, which regulates the controller’s obligation to inform, Article 11, which regulates the rights of the data subject, with the exception of the right to claim compensation for damage, and Article 16, which regulates the obligation to register with the Data Controllers’ Registry” shall not apply in the case of “the processing of personal data made public by the data subject himself”. Consequently there is no reason to change my earlier view, but a distinction needs to be drawn. Where a situation of an exceptional nature as specified in the above-mentioned provision of Law No. 6698 exists, the personal data that have been made public do not constitute the object of the offence. Where, however, personal data are processed which, even though they have been made public, do not fall within the exception, or where the processing is not in conformity with and proportionate to the purpose and fundamental principles of the Law (for example, where a picture that has been made public is used on a dating or pornography site), those data continue to constitute the object of the offences relating to the protection of personal data.

However, when data have been made public and when they are not public must be assessed separately in each specific case. For example, whereas the mobile telephone number printed on the business card of a lawyer or a physician is regarded as having been made public and does not constitute the object of the offence, for a person who has no such profession and has not had his mobile telephone number printed on a business card this information will continue to be personal data. Indeed, the Court of Cassation regards a mobile telephone number as personal data and delivers decisions in line with this view:

“On examination of the specific case: in the incident in which the accused Turgut gave the telephone number of the complainant, the girlfriend from whom he had separated, which was stored with him and which is in the nature of personal data, to the other accused Onur without the complainant’s consent, the decision to acquit them on the erroneous ground that “the act, which took the form of giving a telephone number, cannot be regarded as the obtaining and dissemination of personal data”, instead of convicting each of them separately, without regard to the fact that the act of the accused Turgut, who unlawfully disseminated the complainant’s telephone number, and of the accused Onur, who unlawfully obtained the telephone number, would constitute the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data within the meaning of Art. 136(1) TCK, has required that the judgment be (QUASHED)”82.

“According to the course of events and the findings accepted: in the incident in which the accused Ahmet, who, because he had for a time had a relationship of an emotional nature with the victim Arzu, knew the internet password of the victim’s e-mail address and of the facebook account linked to that address, logged in, after the victim had left him, to the victim’s facebook account, the password of which he knew, without her knowledge and consent, and published through that account the number of the victim’s mobile telephone; since no error has been found in the acceptance that the act of the accused, who unlawfully disseminated the number of the mobile telephone which was in the victim’s active use, which was not known to everyone and could not easily be accessed and known, and which she shared only with a limited circle, constituted the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data regulated in Art. 136(1) TCK, the grounds of appeal on points of law are dismissed”83.

(3). The Act

i. As Regards the Offence of Recording Personal Data

The offence of recording personal data regulated in Art. 135 TCK makes it an offence unlawfully to place any kind of personal data in information systems or in written records. The explanatory memorandum to the article states that no distinction is made as to whether the data are recorded in a virtual environment or physically on paper. Accordingly, the recording of data may take the form of entering data in the narrow sense, in the form of digital code, into an information system or onto a data carrier, or it may equally take the form of writing personal information by hand or with a typewriter on a sheet of file paper84. The offence of recording personal data is designed as an offence that may be committed by any form of conduct; for this reason, however the recording of the data is carried out, the outcome does not change and the offence is committed85 The act of recording may take the form of entering into the system, or putting into writing, information that does not exist in an information system or in written form; it may equally be carried out by unlawfully entering into an information system or a personal file information that in fact lawfully exists in another source.

An illustrative decision of the Court of Cassation on this subject reads as follows:

“According to the contents of the file, the accused persons’ statements containing admissions, the seizure record, the examination report of the digital forensics bureau and the photographs: in the incident in which the accused had a camera fitted to the peephole of the entrance door of the flat in which they lived, in such a way as to view the outer corridor and the entrance door of the intervening party’s flat opposite, and made sound and image recordings; although the accused argued in their defence that they had had the camera fitted for security purposes, when it is taken into account that the camera was installed from inside the flat and could not be noticed from outside, that it was able to film those entering and leaving the intervening party’s home and, when the door of the opposite flat was opened, would also be able to film the interior of the home, and that the sounds and images captured were recorded by means of a recording device inside the home and at the same time watched on a television, and when it is considered that a security camera ought to be positioned so as to view the area in front of the door of the accused persons’ own flat and not the entrance door of the opposite flat and, when that door is opened, its interior, the defence cannot be given credence; the act which they carried out by keeping the intervening party under constant tracking, monitoring and surveillance, with the aim of establishing matters such as with whom, how and when the intervening party met during the day, what the intervening party did and who came to and left the intervening party’s home, falls within the scope of activity which undoubtedly belongs to the sphere of private life and constitutes the offence of violation of privacy within the meaning of the 1st and 2nd sentences of Art. 134(1) TCK; the delivery of a judgment of acquittal on the written grounds, which are incompatible with the contents of the file, instead of their conviction, without regard to this and while also falling into error in the legal characterisation of the offence, has required that the judgment be QUASHED”86.

The offence of recording personal data is designed as an offence that may be committed by any form of conduct; for this reason, however the recording of the data is carried out, the outcome will not change and the offence will have been committed87 Today many institutions such as hospitals, the forensic medicine institution, trade unions and the like record as data and hold in their archives information which a person would particularly wish to remain confidential, such as his state of health, sexual life, DNA samples or political opinions. The unlawful recording of such information in an information system, in a manner not based on statute or on the permission given by the person, has been made an offence by this provision. Thus, whether they are individuals or institutions, all are obliged to act more carefully when entering information about persons into records, or archiving it, in a virtual or written medium88 The act of recording is likewise accomplished when the data are entered into an information system, onto a data carrier or on a piece of paper. Generally these data are first put into writing using either a computer keyboard or a typewriter; in information systems the offence is committed at the moment when this writing is completed and the save key is pressed, and in the classical method at the moment when the writing is completed. Similarly, the act is accomplished at the moment when the person’s photograph is taken or his health test results are obtained and transferred to the system. Accordingly, the moment at which the act constituting the offence is accomplished varies in each specific case according to the conduct performed. Furthermore, for the offence to be constituted it is not necessary for the personal data in question to be published or made available for use by another. The unlawful recording of the data alone is sufficient for the offence to be constituted. Since the article does not additionally require that any harm occur for the offence to be committed, the offence comes into being when the recording takes place89. It is therefore an offence of abstract endangerment90

ii. As Regards the Offence of Unlawfully Giving or Obtaining Personal Data

As the act of the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining personal data regulated in Art. 136 TCK, three different alternative forms of conduct are defined. These are giving personal data to another, disseminating personal data and obtaining personal data. Of these, giving personal data to another may be carried out by a wide variety of methods. Examples are handing over written data in person or by post, or, in a virtual environment, giving personal data by recording them on a portable memory device or by sending them over the internet in or as an attachment to an e-mail. Giving personal data to another person who is himself bound by an obligation of secrecy but who has no interest in learning the personal data in question or has no connection with the matter, for example to a physician who is not involved in the patient’s treatment, also constitutes an offence. However, the fact that health personnel, for the purpose of the patient’s treatment, pass certain data relating to the patient to one another in order to exchange information should not be regarded as giving or disseminating within the meaning of Art. 13691

The “other” referred to in the act of giving personal data to another may be natural persons or equally legal persons. The offence will have been committed where the perpetrator gives the personal data to a natural or legal person other than the victim of the offence92

Illustrative decisions delivered by the Court of Cassation on this subject read as follows:

“In the specific case; without regard to the fact that the act of the accused, in the form of creating on the internet, on the social networking site facebook, a fake member profile open to everyone in the name of the victim, a former school friend of the accused, with the victim’s forename, surname and photograph, and publishing the victim’s telephone number on the profile page, constituted the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data within the meaning of Art. 136(1) TCK, the delivery of a judgment under Art. 135(1) of the same Code, which has no application in the case, as a result of an error in the legal characterisation of the offence, has required that the judgment be (QUASHED)”93.

“In the specific case; without regard to the fact that the act of the accused — who, taking advantage of the facility afforded by his occupation, obtained the photographs stored on the laptop computer which the intervening party had left with him for repair, together with the e-mail addresses and passwords which the intervening party used to log in to the messenger program, and transferred them to a flash disk used for carrying data, added another account of his own as a friend to the intervening party’s account in the intervening party’s messenger session, which he had opened by using the e-mail address and password information, and subsequently changed the password of the intervening party’s e-mail address and thereby prevented the intervening party from logging in to the messenger program — constituted the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data regulated in Art. 136(1) TCK and the offence of system interference and of destroying or altering data regulated in Art. 244(2) TCK, and that he ought to be held separately liable and punished for each of these offences in accordance with the rules on real concurrence, the fact that, as a result of an error in the legal characterisation of the offence, judgment was delivered as written for the offence of recording personal data has required that the judgment be (QUASHED)”94.

“The divorce proceedings between the accused and the intervening party were brought on 01.09.2010; in view of the facts that it has been established that the facebook account forming the subject of the complaint was accessed on 18.10.2010-19.10.2010 and 23.11.2010- 01.12.2010 from the shared home in Istanbul by means of the internet connection attached to the telephone of which the accused was the subscriber, on 25.10.2010-26.10.2010 from an internet café in Ankara, and on 19.02.2011-20.02.2011 from the hotel owned by the accused’s friend; that the accused also admits that the account in question was logged into by the accused on the said dates; that on the same dates the intervening party was on duty in Malatya; that the witnesses gave statements corroborating the intervening party’s allegations; and that, having regard to common experience of life and the contents of the file, it cannot be accepted as conduct to be expected of the intervening party, who had a facebook account of the intervening party’s own, to open a new facebook account and to continue to use that account, the password of which was known to the intervening party, together with the accused, against whom the intervening party had brought divorce proceedings and from whom the intervening party was in fact living apart; the abstract defence of the accused, which is far from credible and is aimed at escaping punishment, to the effect that the accused and the intervening party had created the account in question and its password together, cannot be given credence; whereas, giving precedence to the intervening party’s allegations, which have not changed in substance and are also corroborated by physical evidence and by the witnesses’ statements, and having regard to the fact that the existing evidence clearly and unequivocally shows that the person who carried out the act alleged was the accused, it ought to have been accepted that the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data under Art. 136(1) TCK with which the accused was charged had been proved against the accused, who unlawfully disseminated the intervening party’s personal information and photographs on the social networking site called facebook, where they could be perceived by an indeterminate number of persons, more than one, the delivery of a judgment of acquittal in respect of the accused on the written grounds, which do not accord with the course of events and the contents of the file, as a result of an error in the assessment of the evidence, has required that the judgment be (QUASHED)”95.

The dissemination of personal data may likewise be carried out in a wide variety of ways. It may be carried out by sending the personal data in writing, in the form of a letter, to more than one person, or equally by making the personal data accessible to others on a website on the internet or by disclosing them in a forum. Giving or disclosing the personal data to a single person is sufficient for the offence to be constituted; it is not necessary for everyone to learn of them96. The act of disseminating personal data may also be carried out through the written, visual or online press97. What is meant by disseminating data is making the content of the data available to others in such a way that many persons can learn of it; the publication of personal data in a publication with an indication of identity may also be cited as an example of dissemination98.

Obtaining personal data, the third alternative form of conduct of this offence type, may be brought about by taking the documents on which the personal data are written from the place where they are kept, or it may equally be done by accessing the information system in which the data are stored, recording the data on a storage device and taking that device99

As is also stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article, whether or not the data given to another, disseminated or obtained were lawfully recorded has no bearing on the constitution of the offence. Irrespective of how the data were recorded, the act element is fulfilled once the forms of conduct listed above are carried out. This offence type is an offence with alternative forms of conduct; where one or several of the forms of conduct specified in the statute as the material element of the offence, namely giving personal data to another, disseminating them or obtaining them, are carried out at the same time, a single offence is committed and the perpetrator receives the penalty for a single offence.

For this offence to be constituted it is not necessary that any harm should result from the perpetrator’s conduct. It is apparent from the clear wording of the statute that this is an offence of abstract endangerment, because Art. 136 TCK describes the forms of conduct as “gives, disseminates or obtains” but does not require that any harm arise as a result of them. The point that particularly needs to be addressed here is whether, as regards the conduct of “obtaining personal data”, merely “learning” amounts to obtaining. In my view the act of merely learning cannot be regarded as obtaining and therefore does not satisfy the definition of the conduct contained in this offence type. For example, where a doctor who is a professor of medicine leaves records containing the diagnosis and treatment of his patient among the documents from which he lectures to his students, and the professor’s assistant, while examining the documents, sees the papers belonging to the patient and learns of the situation, there is no obtaining100

iii. As Regards the Offence of Failure to Destroy Personal Data

For the offence of failure to destroy personal data regulated in Art. 138 of the Code to be capable of being committed, there must first of all be data that have been lawfully recorded. For in order for the offence of failure to destroy data to be committed it is first necessary that “the periods determined by the laws have expired”. This expression, which appears at the beginning of the article regulating the offence type, is liable to cause confusion. Is it to be understood as meaning the period for which the personal data are permitted to remain recorded in the system, or the period prescribed for the official to perform the duty of erasing the data? As can be seen, this is an important question that must be answered for the determination of the period and hence for the constitution of the offence. The explanatory memorandum to this article contains no statement indicating the legislature’s intention; however, proceeding from the idea that the legislature would not enact a superfluous provision, the answer to be given to this question is that the period in question means the period for which the personal data are permitted to remain recorded in the system. For the period prescribed for the official to destroy the personal data, in other words to perform his duty, may be laid down by statute or equally by a regulation on the subject; indeed, no express period may be specified at all and it may be expected that a reasonable time elapse after the superior’s order in this regard. Accordingly, the period specified in the statute is the period for which the personal data are permitted to remain recorded in the system. If the data are not erased after this period has expired, that omission constitutes the act element of the offence101. For example, Art. 9(3), headed erasure of personal health data, of the “Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy” issued by the Ministry of Health expressly specifies this period by providing: “Data transferred to the central health data system may be erased from the local database 10 years after the date on which the transfer was made.” Accordingly, where the health data are not erased even though the said period has elapsed, the officials who are authorised to erase personal health data will have committed this offence by omission.

Another question that must be answered in this connection is what is to be understood by the word “law” appearing in the definition of the offence. If it is interpreted narrowly and understood to mean only legal norms in the nature of a “statute” in the technical sense, enacted by the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM), the field of application of the offence type will be narrowed considerably and unnecessarily. Accordingly, this word must also be understood to cover written legal norms in the nature of general regulatory acts, such as by-laws, regulations and directives102. However, in order not to be exposed to the criticisms that may be raised by virtue of the principle of legality of offences and the prohibition of extensive interpretation, it would be a more appropriate solution to amend the article so that it refers to written rules of law103 The offence of failure to destroy data regulated in Art. 138 TCK may be committed by the perpetrator’s failing to carry out the operation required by his duty, that is, the operation of destroying the data from the system. How the destruction of the data is to be carried out should be indicated in the statute or regulation by which the duty in question is assigned. For the destruction of data from the system may take a wide variety of forms. For example, the duty of destroying the data may be performed by burning them if the data exist in written form, or, if the data exist as virtual data in an information system, by erasing them or by breaking the portable memory device, CD or hard disk on which the data are held104. Indeed, Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK) also contains a provision in line with these explanations of mine. Art. 7 of the Law, entitled “Erasure, destruction or anonymisation of personal data”, after defining the erasure of personal data in general terms, leaves it to regulations to determine how the data are to be erased. It provides: “(1) Even though they have been processed in accordance with the provisions of this Law and of other relevant laws, personal data shall be erased, destroyed or anonymised by the controller, of its own motion or at the request of the data subject, where the reasons requiring their processing cease to exist. (2) The provisions of other laws concerning the erasure, destruction or anonymisation of personal data are reserved. (3) The procedures and principles relating to the erasure, destruction or anonymisation of personal data shall be laid down by regulation”

The offence of failure to destroy data is committed by omission. The act of destroying the data must be carried out at the end of the period determined by the laws: within the period, if those laws prescribe a specific period for the destruction of the data, or, if no such period is prescribed, within a reasonable time according to the nature of the matter. If the data have still not been destroyed even though these periods have elapsed, the offence is committed. Apart from this, where the person under a duty to destroy the data expressly says that he will not carry out this operation, or, although it has been communicated to him by an order, states that he will not comply with his superior’s order, the offence will likewise have been committed without any need for these periods to elapse105 However, for the offence to be committed it is essential that a legal norm regulate clearly and intelligibly the periods for which the data are to be kept on record and the requirement that the data be destroyed at the end of that period. It is sufficient and necessary that the written legal norm state that the data will be kept on record for a limited period and that the end of the period be clearly identifiable. In the absence of such a period and of a provision ordering the destruction of the personal data, it is not possible for the offence in Art. 138 TCK to become operative. For example, the provision in Art. 137(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271, “If, during the implementation of a decision given under Article 135, a decision not to prosecute is given in respect of the suspect or the judge’s approval under the first paragraph of the same article cannot be obtained, its implementation shall be terminated immediately by the public prosecutor. In that case the recordings relating to the detection or interception carried out shall be destroyed within ten days at the latest under the supervision of the public prosecutor, and the fact shall be recorded in a report”, prescribes a specific period for the destruction of the information obtained. Where personal data are contained in the information thus obtained and, the other conditions being fulfilled, those data are not destroyed at the end of the prescribed period, the offence defined in Art. 138 will have been committed106 No further result is required for the offence of failure to destroy data. The offence is committed when the omission in question occurs. Hence this offence is not an offence of harm; it is an offence of abstract endangerment.

iv. As Regards the Offence, Regulated in Art. 17(2) of KVKK No. 6698, of Failure to Erase

or Anonymise Personal Data

Under Art. 17(2) of KVKK No. 6698, “Those who, in breach of Article 7 of this Law, fail to erase or anonymise personal data shall be punished in accordance with Article 138 of Law No. 5237”. Art. 7 of the Law, as we also stated above, provides that the controller is under the obligation to erase, destroy or anonymise personal data. The nature of the controller, for its part, is regulated in Art. 3(1)(ı) of the Law. Accordingly, when the said articles and cross-references are read together, the offence type should read as follows:

“Where personal data which, although processed in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 6698 and of other relevant laws, are no longer covered by the reasons requiring their processing are not erased, destroyed or anonymised by the controller, of its own motion or at the request of the data subject, a penalty of imprisonment from one year to two years shall be imposed on the controller if it is a natural person and, if it is a legal person, on its authorised and responsible organs and/or representatives.”

I must state at the outset that this offence is an offence type which is similar to, but different from, the offence regulated in Art. 138 TCK. Had the legislature wished Art. 138 to apply together with all the elements of the offence in the event of a breach of Art. 7 of Law No. 6698, it would have used the expression “Article 138 of Law No. 5237 shall apply”. The legislature, however, did not do so; it created a different offence type through the combined application of Arts. 17(2), 7 and 3 of KVKK No. 6698 and, by using the expression “shall be punished in accordance with Article 138 of Law No. 5237”, indicated that Art. 138 TCK is to apply only as regards the sanction. I am therefore of the opinion that the provision in question must be understood in this way and interpreted accordingly.

As regards the act element, this offence is committed by omission and has alternative forms of conduct. The alternative forms of conduct are failing to destroy, failing to erase and failing to anonymise. Of these, Law No. 6698 does not define how failing to destroy and failing to erase are to be carried out. Since the conduct of failing to destroy is also defined in Art. 138 TCK as the conduct constituting the offence and is used in the same sense as in that offence, I refer to the explanations I have given concerning that article.

The word erase is defined, as an IT term, as “bringing one or more memory locations into a specific state, usually represented by the zero or blank character”. That is, the act of erasure takes place where the link to the data concerned is removed from the index / active directory showing where the data are held, or where other data are written over the data; in short, where the possibility of accessing the data sought is eliminated (the removal of accessibility without recourse to data recovery methods). Where the perpetrator fails to perform this act even though he is under an obligation to do so, the conduct of failing to erase occurs.

Anonymisation, for its part, is defined in Art. 3(1)(b) of KVKK No. 6698. According to that provision, anonymisation is “rendering personal data incapable of being linked in any way to an identified or identifiable natural person, even by matching them with other data”. Accordingly, this conduct occurs where the person under an obligation to carry out this operation fails to render the personal data incapable of being linked to a natural person. What remains in the event of anonymisation is statistical information; this information may be used in medical, financial or criminological studies and its use does not constitute an offence, since it does not point to a specific person.

The obligation to erase, destroy or anonymise personal data has been imposed in general terms by Art. 7 of KVKK No. 6698 on the natural and legal persons who are controllers. Since, under the theory of the offence adopted by our Code, legal persons cannot be perpetrators of an offence, it must be clearly determined, in the case of controllers that are legal persons, who is or are responsible for this operation. The explanations I have given with regard to Art. 138 TCK also apply to this article. Under Art. 7(1) KVKK, personal data which have been processed in accordance with the provisions of the law but in respect of which the reasons requiring their processing have ceased to exist must be erased, destroyed or anonymised by the controller, of its own motion or at the request of the data subject. Paragraph 2 of the same article provides that the provisions of other laws on these matters are reserved. Paragraph 3, for its part, states that the method of erasing, destroying or anonymising personal data will be regulated by the regulations to be issued. Accordingly, the obligation that must be breached for this offence to be constituted will be determined by Art. 7 KVKK and the relevant regulations.

(4). Aggravated Forms of the Offences

Art. 135(2) of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) makes the commission of the offence in respect of “qualified personal data” an aggravated form increasing the penalty. I had made this subject a matter of criticism in all the editions of my book entitled Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku that were published before Law No. 6698 entered into force107. Finally, on the basis of a text prepared by a commission which was set up by the Directorate General for Legislation of the Ministry of Justice for the amendments that needed to be made to the TCK and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) for compliance with the European Convention on Cybercrime, and in which I too took part and shared my thoughts on this article and on various other articles, a number of amendments were made to the TCK by Art. 30 of Law No. 6698, whereby this and similar flawed provisions were amended and certain provisions that ought to exist were added. By the amendment made to Art. 135(2) TCK by Art. 30 of Law No. 6698, the paragraph in question was reworded to read: “where the personal data relate to the political, philosophical or religious opinions of persons or to their racial origins, or, unlawfully, to their moral tendencies, sexual lives, state of health or trade-union affiliations, the penalty to be imposed under the first paragraph shall be increased by one half”. The provision has thus been brought into the form it ought to have, and the commission of the offence of unlawful recording against the personal data defined in Art. 3 of Law No. 6698 as special categories of personal data has been made an aggravated form increasing the penalty. Because, by their very nature, the wrongfulness of an offence committed against the said personal data is greater, the legislature has opted to increase the penalty for the offence.

If, of the matters contained in this paragraph, information on state of health, for example, has been recorded not in relation to a person but as anonymous data in the form “disease … is widespread in region x”, that is, if it is in the nature of statistical information, no offence arises under this paragraph. For in that case the information has not been recorded as personal data108

Art. 137 TCK, under the heading “aggravated forms”, provides for aggravated forms increasing the penalty, deriving from the status of the perpetrator, for the offences contained in the chapter on offences against private life and the secret sphere of life. Under sub-paragraph “a” of Art. 137, where the offences regulated in Arts. 135 and 136 are committed by a public official and through abuse of the authority conferred by his office, the penalty imposed on the perpetrator will be increased. For the purposes of the TCK the definition of public official is given in sub-paragraph “c” of Art. 6. According to that provision, “the term public official means a person who participates in the performance of a public activity by appointment or election or in any other way, on a permanent, fixed-term or temporary basis”. In this context, in the case of health personnel, for example, this aggravated form may be present in almost every case109. Similarly, where a lawyer, who by the nature of the function he performs is in certain situations deemed a public official for the purposes of criminal law, discloses or gives to a third person personal data which he holds and/or processes by virtue of his function, without the explicit consent of the data subject or outside the authority conferred on him by the laws, the aggravated form of the offence arises.

Under sub-paragraph “b” of Art. 137, where this offence is committed by taking advantage of the facility afforded by a particular profession or trade, the penalty imposed on the perpetrator is likewise increased. The concept of “a particular profession or trade” used here may be understood to cover every line of business that records, processes and transfers personal data; it may include in particular the health/medical, finance, insurance and retail sectors, the human resources of every sector and the IT sector. Accordingly, where any one of the aggravated forms in question is present, the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator is increased by one half. To continue with the example above, where a lawyer, at a time when he is not acting in the capacity of public official, for example while writing a book or an article on a legal subject, includes in that work, with the facility afforded by his being a lawyer, the personal data of the persons involved in the cases in which he has acted, this aggravated form arises.

Paragraph 2, added to Art. 138 TCK by Art. 5 of Law No. 6526 of 21.2.2014, introduced the provision: “Where the object of the offence is data that must be removed or destroyed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the penalty to be imposed shall be doubled”. An aggravated form increasing the penalty has thus been provided for the offence of failure to destroy data. For example, the provision in Art. 137(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271, “If, during the implementation of a decision given under Article 135, a decision not to prosecute is given in respect of the suspect or the judge’s approval under the first paragraph of the same article cannot be obtained, its implementation shall be terminated immediately by the public prosecutor. In that case, the recordings relating to the detection or interception carried out shall be destroyed within ten days at the latest under the supervision of the public prosecutor, and the fact shall be recorded in a report”, prescribes a specific period for the destruction of the information obtained. Where personal data are contained in the information thus obtained and, the other conditions being fulfilled, those data are not destroyed at the end of the prescribed period, the offence defined in Art. 138 will have been committed110 and, by virtue of the aggravated form in question, the penalty for the offence is increased. I must say that I regard this provision as a positive one and think that it will be effective in inducing the investigating authorities to act with care so as not to neglect and/or abuse their duties.

Another question that arises with regard to the aggravated forms of the offence is whether the provision in Art. 17(2) of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), “Those who, in breach of Article 7 of this Law, fail to erase or anonymise personal data shall be punished in accordance with Article 138 of Law No. 5237”, covers the aggravated form of the offence contained in Art. 138(2). Since the provision states that Art. 138 is to apply for the purposes of punishment without distinguishing between its paragraphs, and since the aggravated form of the offence is likewise a provision relating to punishment, I think that in theory Art. 138(2) may be applied in respect of the offence contained in Art. 17(2) KVKK. In practice, however, the public prosecutor’s office, which is the investigating authority, and the law enforcement forces which assist it, as well as the courts and judgeships, which are the trial authorities, carry out operations such as the recording of personal data in particular by virtue of the authority they derive from the CMK and other statutes. The recording or processing of personal data in this way for the purposes of investigation or prosecution is, under Art. 28(1)(d) of Law No. 6698, excluded from the scope of application of Law No. 6698. Consequently, the personal data referred to in Art. 138(2) TCK constitute an exception to Law No. 6698. Hence, where authorities which lawfully record or process personal data for an investigation or prosecution fail to destroy them even though the period prescribed for their destruction has elapsed, what should be applied to them is not Art. 138(2) TCK by virtue of the reference in Art. 17(2) of Law No. 6698; rather, since the omission they have committed breaches only Art. 138(1) TCK, Art. 138(2), which is its aggravated form, should be applied directly. Although this does not affect the final penalty, it is necessary for the correct identification of the applicable provisions and for ensuring lawfulness; accordingly, where such a situation arises, the proceedings must be brought under this article and, if proof is established, the judgment must also be based on this article.

b. Mental Elements of the Offences

The mental element of all four offences under examination is intent. Neither the TCK nor the KVKK requires any further particular feature as regards the mental element. Since intent is required for the commission of the offences and no other feature is specified in this regard, it is not possible for these offences to be committed negligently111

4. Elements of Unlawfulness

a. The Legal Nature of the Expression “Unlawfully” in Arts. 135 and 136(1) TCK

According to the minority view in legal scholarship, to which I also subscribe, concepts of this and similar kinds are sometimes used superfluously in the offence type in order to point to the absence of a ground of justification; here the legislature is alerting the judge to dwell with particular care on the question of the existence of grounds of justification, but it is not necessary for unlawfulness of this kind to be covered by the perpetrator’s intent, and it therefore does not belong to the definition of the offence. Indeed, in the offences in Arts. 135 and 136(1) TCK the expression “unlawfully” is used in this sense112. Accordingly, on the view I accept, this expression in the definition of the offence has no special meaning and does not form part of the offence type. Indeed, in practice, in any trial concerning an offence type containing such an expression, to impose on the prosecution and the judge, in addition to the many difficulties of proof, the further burden of specifically proving that the perpetrator acted unlawfully would bring the trials in question to a standstill. In fact, in trials concerning offences of this kind no effort is ever made to prove specifically that the perpetrator acted unlawfully; as in the other offences, which do not contain an expression of this kind, unlawfulness is accepted as a presumption, and where the existence of a ground of justification is at issue, that is investigated. For conformity with the statutory definition of the offence gives rise to a presumption of unlawfulness: if the act conforming to the statutory definition has been carried out, unlawfulness is deemed to have been realised as well, and there is no need for it to be proved separately. If, on the contrary, there is a ground of justification (which is also included in intent), the specific conditions of that ground of justification and the fact that the perpetrator carried out his act with knowledge of it must be proved.

In paragraph 2 of Art. 135, which regulates the offence of recording personal data, where qualified personal data are separately regulated, it is not additionally required, as regards the act of recording data relating to “the political, philosophical or religious opinions and racial origins of persons”, that the perpetrator know that the act he is committing is unlawful. Even this form of the provision shows that the phrase “unlawfully” used in paragraph 1 is used superfluously. However, the authors who defend the other view state that in paragraph 2 the legislature considered it unnecessary to investigate whether the perpetrator acted with awareness of unlawfulness and accepted that the perpetrator in this case acts unlawfully; that accordingly the offence will be committed upon completion of the perpetrator’s conduct, and that during the trial it is no longer necessary to prove separately that the perpetrator acted knowing that he was committing an unlawful act113. As I also stated above, I do not share this view.

b. As Regards the Offence of Recording Personal Data

In the offence of recording personal data, the consent of the victim or authority conferred by statute renders the act lawful. No offence arises where a person records the data on the basis of permission given by the owner of the data or the person to whom the data relate, or where a person charged with recording data performs the same act on the basis of the authority he derives from statute.

(1). Consent of the Victim

i. The Moment at Which Consent Must Exist and Its Form

In the ground of justification based on the consent of the victim, the consent must exist at the moment the offence is committed; moreover, whether this consent is given explicitly or impliedly is of no particular significance, and consent given in either form is valid. Where a person fills in the “customer information form” handed to him by a bank employee, permission must be deemed to have been given. However, since Law No. 6698 requires, apart from the exceptions, the explicit consent of the data subject for personal data processed within the scope of that Law, and since Art. 17 of the Law states that Arts. 135-140 TCK shall apply with regard to offences relating to personal data, the processing (recording, copying, transfer, etc.) of personal data falling within the application of Law No. 6698 requires the explicit consent of the data subject, save in the exceptional cases in which, again under that Law, explicit consent need not be sought. Accordingly, for the purpose of establishing the existence of a ground of justification under Arts. 135 and 136, whether explicit consent exists within these limits must be assessed in each specific case. For personal data which are not subject to Law No. 6698 or which are subject to the exceptions, on the other hand, implied consent will be valid.

ii. Where the Personal Data Have Been Made Public by the Data Subject

Personal data are among the rights of which a person may dispose absolutely114. In my book entitled Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku, I had stated that, where a person places personal data concerning himself on the internet, on a web page from which anyone can copy the data without needing to obtain separate permission, it must be discussed whether the taking and recording of those data by others will constitute an offence; that, as a different view in legal scholarship, Karagülmez states that a person who shares personal data on the internet in a medium of this kind has also consented to their being recorded by others115; that I do not share this view, because the fact that personal data have been shared on social media does not mean that they may be used by everyone; that, although public figures constitute an exception to this, even for such persons the exception does not hold for data concerning the secret sphere of their private life; and that accordingly, even if they have been published on social media, the use of personal data by a third person without the explicit consent of the data subject will constitute an offence; and I had set out my views on this subject, also quoting the report which I submitted upon being appointed as an expert in a case brought on the allegation that this offence had been committed116. Indeed, the Court of Cassation also has decisions to similar effect:

“According to the course of events and the contents of the file; in the incident forming the subject of the allegation and finding that the intervening party Senem, who is known to the public because she practises the profession of model and came second in a beauty contest held in 2009 and who is from time to time the subject of reports in the tabloid press in particular, and the witness Ebru, who practises the same profession as her, had added each other as friends on the social networking site called facebook; and that in June 2009, when the witness Ebru was sharing the same home with the accused Serap, a university student, the accused Serap, taking advantage of the witness Ebru’s having left her facebook session open, entered, without the knowledge of the witness Ebru, the page of the intervening party Senem, who was on Ebru’s friends list, sent 20 photographs belonging to the intervening party to her own e-mail account, and then committed the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data by placing the photographs of the intervening party which she had obtained on a fake profile which she had created on the same site in the name of the intervening party and without the latter’s knowledge; since no error has been found in the acceptance that the act of the accused, who unlawfully disseminated the photographs of the intervening party, which she had obtained against the intervening party’s consent, together with the latter’s forename and surname, on the social networking site called facebook, where they could be perceived by an indeterminate number of persons, more than one, constituted the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data, the grounds of appeal on points of law are dismissed”117.

Above, on the question whether personal data which have entered the public domain can constitute the object of the offence, I set out my views on the matter. Art. 28 of KVKK No. 6698, which contains the exceptions, states that “provided that it is in conformity with and proportionate to the purpose and fundamental principles of this Law, Article 10, which regulates the controller’s obligation to inform, Article 11, which regulates the rights of the data subject, with the exception of the right to claim compensation for damage, and Article 16, which regulates the obligation to register with the Data Controllers’ Registry” shall not apply in the case of “the processing of personal data made public by the data subject himself”. Indeed, even before KVKK No. 6698 entered into force, the view and practice of the Court of Cassation were to this effect:

“In the incident in which the accused copied the intervening party’s profile picture, open to everyone, from the intervening party’s facebook account on the internet and placed it on the accused’s own facebook account without consent; considering that the picture could not be obtained and its content could not be determined, there is no image which was obtained by the accused as a result of keeping the intervening party under constant tracking, monitoring and surveillance and which would lead to a violation of privacy; moreover, since the intervening party’s profile picture on facebook cannot be regarded as an image relating to the sphere of private life which the intervening party does not wish to be seen and known by others and the confidentiality and protection of which is recognised by the law as a fundamental personality right, the offence charged is not constituted in terms of its statutory elements; when an assessment is made from the standpoint of the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data in Art. 136 TCK, although the intervening party’s picture on the facebook account may be accepted as falling within the scope of personal data, since the accused obtained the picture from the intervening party’s profile picture, open to everyone, on the facebook account on the internet and placed it on the accused’s own facebook account without including any other personal information belonging to the intervening party, it is likewise not possible to speak of unlawful obtaining and dissemination, and it is therefore understood that the elements of this offence are not constituted either; the decision to convict on the written grounds instead of acquitting has required that the judgment be (QUASHED)”118. “According to the course of events and the contents of the file, in the incident in which the accused, who worked as a case-tracking clerk in a law office, procured the picture of the intervening party, a lawyer, appearing on the social networking site called facebook from the intervening party’s page, opened on the same site a fake account bearing the intervening party’s forename and surname together with a first name, and published through that account the picture of the intervening party thus obtained, without the intervening party’s knowledge and consent; since no error has been found in the acceptance that the act of the accused, who unlawfully disseminated the intervening party’s picture on the social networking site called facebook, where it could be perceived by an indeterminate number of persons, more than one, constituted the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data; having regard to the trial conducted, to the evidence gathered and set out in the decision, to the court’s conviction and discretion formed in accordance with the results of the prosecution, and to the contents of the file examined, the other grounds of appeal on points of law of the accused, which are not based on any reason, are dismissed”119.

Accordingly, a distinction must be drawn with regard to personal data shared in the public sphere. Where one of the exceptional situations set out in the above-mentioned provision of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK) exists, the personal data that have been made public do not constitute the object of the offence. However, where personal data which, even though they have been made public, do not fall within the exception, or whose processing is not in conformity with the purpose and fundamental principles of the Law and is not proportionate120, are processed (for example, where a picture that has been made public is used on a dating or pornography site), such data continue to constitute the object of the offences relating to the protection of personal data. Consequently, it must be accepted that the offence is committed where, although the person shared the data himself, the personal data are processed in a manner contrary to the purpose for which they were shared, in circumstances where the person’s consent is clearly absent or it is apparent that there is no consent. Indeed, in a similar case, pictures that a young girl had published on her own site were published in a publicly accessible manner on another site by her friends, who were minors, after speech bubbles containing words written as though spoken by the girl had been added to the pictures. In that case the Court of Cassation gave an exemplary decision showing that the personal data were still under protection:

“According to the contents of the file examined: in the case brought on the allegation that the juveniles pushed to crime, using the photographs found in the account of the intervening victim Seren on the social networking site called “facebook”, created another page on the same site under the name “Serenözipek_efkandemirbolatsekskardeşliği”, published on that page photographs of the victim taken in various places and committed insult by placing speech bubbles inside the photographs and writing, as though the victim herself were speaking, words of obscene content of a nature to harm the victim’s honour and reputation, the offence of insult was found to be established at the end of the trial and it was decided to defer the pronouncement of the judgment in respect of the juveniles pushed to crime; in the case brought under Arts. 135 and 136 TCK, the acquittal of the juveniles pushed to crime was ordered; however, the decision to acquit the juveniles pushed to crime on grounds that are not lawful and do not accord with the contents of the file, without regard to the fact that the act of the juveniles pushed to crime, who made the pictures contained in the intervening victim’s own account available for everyone to share in such a way that her name and surname could be understood, would constitute the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data regulated in Art. 136(1) TCK, is contrary to law and has required that the judgment be (QUASHED)”121.

iii. Cases under KVKK No. 6698 in Which the Processing of Personal Data Does Not Require Explicit Consent

The act of recording personal data in Art. 135 TCK and the acts of giving them to another, disseminating or obtaining them in Art. 136 are defined as “processing of personal data” in Art. 3(1)(e) of KVKK No. 6698122. After stating in Art. 4 of the same Law, headed “general principles”, that “Personal data may be processed only in accordance with the procedures and principles laid down in this Law and in other laws.”, the Law provides in Art. 5(1), headed “conditions for the processing of personal data”, that personal data may not be processed without the explicit consent of the data subject. Where at least one of the following conditions is present, however, it will be possible to process personal data without seeking the explicit consent of the data subject: a) It is expressly provided for by the laws. b) It is necessary for the protection of the life or physical integrity of the person himself or of another person, where that person is unable to express his consent owing to actual impossibility or his consent is not recognised as legally valid. c) It is necessary to process personal data belonging to the parties to a contract, provided that this is directly related to the conclusion or performance of the contract. ç) It is necessary in order for the controller to be able to fulfil its legal obligation. d) The data have been made public by the data subject himself. e) Data processing is necessary for the establishment, exercise or protection of a right. f) Data processing is necessary for the legitimate interests of the controller, provided that it does not harm the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. Each of these situations also constitutes a ground of justification for the purposes of Arts. 135 and 136 TCK.

iv. Cases under KVKK No. 6698 in Which the Processing of Special Categories of Personal Data

Does Not Require Explicit Consent

After Art. 6(1) of KVKK No. 6698 specifies what the special categories of personal data are123, the conditions for processing them are laid down in Art. 6(2). Accordingly, it is prohibited to process special categories of personal data without the explicit consent of the data subject. Under Art. 6(3), the personal data listed in the first paragraph, other than those relating to health and sexual life, may be processed without seeking the explicit consent of the data subject in the cases provided for by the laws. Personal data relating to health and sexual life, by contrast, may be processed without seeking the explicit consent of the data subject only for the purposes of the protection of public health, preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of treatment and care services, and the planning and management of health services and their financing, by persons under an obligation of secrecy or by authorised institutions and organisations. Pursuant to Art. 6(4), it is stated that, in the processing of special categories of personal data, it is in addition a requirement that the adequate measures determined by the Personal Data Protection Board be taken. At the time this article was being written, the members of this Board had only just been appointed and the Board had not begun its activities. Consequently, there is as yet no decision taken by the Board either. However, once the Board has begun its activities and takes decisions on the protection of personal data, it will also be necessary to comply with those decisions of the Board in order for the data processing acts carried out to be lawful. Otherwise the processing of personal data will be unlawful and will constitute an offence.

(2). Reliance on an Authority Conferred by Law

The recording of personal data in reliance on an authority conferred by law is another ground of justification. This is stated in the explanatory memorandum to Art. 135 TCK and in Art. 5 of Law No. 6698.

i. Application of the Measure of Search and Seizure in Information Systems under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK)

In this context, by virtue of the provision in paragraph 3 of Art. 134 of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271, which bears the marginal heading “Search, copying and seizure in computers, computer programs and computer files”, that “during the seizure of computers or computer files, a backup of all the data in the system shall be made”, personal data may also be among these data. However, since in this case an authority deriving from the law is being exercised, the offences in Arts. 135 and 136 do not arise124. Indeed, as I have also stated above, the processing of personal data by the investigation and prosecution authorities (in private-law terms, the adjudicating authorities) and by the authorities for the execution of sentences constitutes an exception to the Law pursuant to Art. 28(1)(d) KVKK. That is to say, the processing of personal data by the said authorities in the course of their duties and within the limits of the relevant legislation is a ground of justification.

ii. Processing of Personal Data within the Scope of the State’s Intelligence Activities Another situation that needs to be discussed with regard to the application of this article is whether the recording of personal data by the National Intelligence Organisation (MİT), which carries out its activities within the framework of Law No. 2937 on State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence Organisation, in the course of the duties it performs under Art. 4 of that law constitutes a ground of justification. The processing of personal data may be counted among the duties of MİT listed in Art. 4 of its founding law. The recording of personal data by MİT, an institution charged with gathering intelligence on behalf of the State and evaluating it, within the framework of its duties specified in the said Art. 4 and for the purpose of performing those duties indisputably constitutes a ground of justification with regard to the offence of recording personal data regulated in Art. 135 TCK, and the acts carried out by members of MİT on account of their work in this respect are not regarded as offences125. Indeed, Art. 28(1)(ç) of Law No. 6698 lays down as an exception “the processing of personal data within the scope of preventive, protective and intelligence activities carried out by public institutions and organisations given duties and powers by law to ensure national defence, national security, public security, public order or economic security”, and a ground of justification has thus been created with regard to intelligence activities. However, where these data relate to the secret sphere of a person’s life, which may not be touched, or where, even if the secret sphere is not involved, the information gathered is handed over for publication in the press, as was frequently seen in our country during a certain period, this will not be lawful and the offence will have been committed.

In principle, this does not hold for the other law enforcement forces such as the General Directorate of Security, the Gendarmerie General Command, the Coast Guard Command and the like. For the information gathered by MİT is submitted to the State officials specified in its own law and is used for the purpose of giving direction to the policies of the State. The intelligence information gathered by law enforcement forces, by contrast, is collected for operational purposes, with a view to conducting an investigation into suspected persons and to its being used later as evidence in court proceedings. Consequently, it should not be possible for these institutions to process information in the nature of personal data without a judge’s decision and without complying with the provisions of the CMK; doing so should constitute an offence on the part of those concerned; and, since such data are unlawfully obtained evidence, they should be treated as falling under the exclusionary rule and should not be used in the investigation and prosecution.

In practice, however, interception of communications in the nature of intelligence gathering was carried out, and personal data were recorded, solely on the basis of the provision “shall engage in intelligence activities” contained in Additional Article 7 of the Law on the Duties and Powers of the Police. Nevertheless, despite this, all of the institutions in question were carrying out interception for intelligence purposes and recording this information, which is in the nature of personal data.

The legal basis in this field was first created by Law No. 5397 of 3.7.2005. By this law, additions were made to Additional Article 7 of the Law on the Duties and Powers of the Police and to Law No. 2803 of 10.3.1983 on the Organisation, Duties and Powers of the Gendarmerie, and paragraph 1 of Art. 6 of Law No. 2937 of 1.11.1983 on State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence Organisation was amended and certain paragraphs were added to that article. In this way it was made possible to intercept communications and to record the personal data in question even before an investigation has begun. By Art. 28(1)(ç) – (d) of Law No. 6698, which I have cited above, these operations carried out by law enforcement forces have, on condition that they comply with the general principles, been placed on an entirely statutory footing.

However, the fact that a matter has a statutory basis and that action is taken in accordance with that basis does not in every case mean that it is lawful. This provision is contrary to the international instruments in the field of personal data and to the universal principles accepted in this field, and is therefore also contrary to law. Particularly in a system such as that of our country, in which law enforcement forces are not in the habit of rendering account and in which internal and external oversight mechanisms either have not been established as they should be or, where established, are not operated as they should be, this provision is extremely open to abuse. Although I have no expectation whatsoever that this will happen – for this is not a situation that changes with the government of the day but the product of a general mentality seen in our country in every era and under every government – I consider and propose that this provision should either be repealed or that the activities of law enforcement forces in this field should be subjected to oversight. Indeed, in the United Kingdom (England) special procedural measures or operations of this kind conducted by the police are supervised and reported on by independent commissions established specifically for this field. In some cases the police cannot even take such measures without the prior authorisation of these commissions. Evidence obtained by methods not approved by the commission is not used in the investigation and prosecution126. In a democratic country and in political systems that have embraced the rule of law, the need for structures of this kind is inescapable.

iii. Evaluation of Signal Data under Art. 135 CMK A further matter I wish to address here is the evaluation of signal data regulated in Art. 135 CMK. The confidentiality of private communication and the protection of personal data are two concepts closely bound up with each other. As a result of developing information technologies, the monitoring, collection and storage of data have become easier and the costs of these operations have fallen. The fact that these operations have accordingly become easier has given rise, alongside the listening to and recording of the content of communications, to new possibilities and points of debate, such as the evaluation of the signal data of those communications, in particular retrospectively, or the determination of the location of suspects by using signal data. Besides the content of private communication, the recording of various data relating to private communication is also a significant problem. In this context it is seen that it is not the direct content of the communication, that is, “what” was said, but the records of telephone calls or of items sent by post, in other words the information as to “with whom”, “how often”, “for how long” and “from where” a person communicated, that is of the utmost importance, particularly at the investigation stage, and that in many criminal cases these are put before the accused as evidence and used as a means of proof. Something similar occurs, particularly in cybercrime or in offences committed by using information systems, with regard to the e-mails sent and the websites visited127 In this context it is seen that, in many investigations and prosecutions, the decisions given by the courts on the detection of communications request the signal data recorded by telephone operators “relating to the period before the date on which the decision was given”, and indeed that in some investigations and prosecutions such data are placed in the file as evidence by law enforcement even without any such court decision. I must state at the outset that the signal data in question (of mobile telephones and every kind of electronic and digital device and the like) are also in the nature of personal data, and that they may be recorded only where a provision made by law and by the relevant legislation permits this. Under Art. 19(1)(f)128 of the “Regulation on Authorisation for the Electronic Communications Sector”, drawn up on the basis of Arts. 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 60 of the Electronic Communications Law No. 5809 of 5.11.2008, traffic data may be retained in the following manner and for the following period: “An operator that is an access provider or that provides telephone services is obliged to retain for a period of two years the IP address, port range, start and end time of the service provided, type of service used, amount of data transferred, number of users and subscriber identity information relating to the parties, as well as the traffic data relating to the calls made over its infrastructure; and to retain user information for the duration of the limitation period specified in the relevant legislation”. Accordingly, the recording of signal data and their retention for a period of two years is laid down as an obligation for access providers and operators providing telephone services. I must state, however, that this provision is in itself unlawful. The regulation in question was drawn up in conformity with the European Union Directive in this field129. However, many Member States of the European Union did not transpose the Data Retention Directive into their domestic law, out of concern that the domestic legislation to be enacted under it would require processed personal data to be kept in the system for longer than necessary and that this would violate the right to privacy. Acting on similar concerns, the European Court of Justice, by its judgment of 8.4.2014, rendered the Data Retention Directive invalid. In its judgment the Court stated that the Data Retention Directive seriously violated two fundamental rights, namely the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data; that the retention of the personal data in question was necessary for public security and the fight against serious crime, but that the Data Retention Directive had not laid down sufficient limits for that purpose and that its scope had not been properly defined; and it ruled that the directive was disproportionate. It further stated that making the retention of data and the transfer of information to national authorities mandatory constituted a serious violation of rights130. Consequently, the directive on which the regulation of the retention of personal data in the electronic communications sector in our country is based has been annulled on the grounds set out above, with which I also agree. In our country, however, the regulation is still in force and, as I shall explain below, the signal data, that is, the personal data, obtained on the basis of this regulation are used as evidence at the investigation and prosecution stages, and even, for the purposes of proof, in the reasoning of the judgment131

Proceeding from this, we arrive at the conclusion that the processing of persons’ data of this kind, which are in the nature of personal data, outside this legislation will constitute the offences defined in Arts. 135 and 136 TCK and that, in addition, where these data are not destroyed or anonymised although the period has expired, either Art. 17(2) KVKK or Art. 138 TCK will, depending on the circumstances, be made out.

On the other hand, in my opinion, the fact that these data are requested retrospectively by a court decision does not render the acts of the telephone operators lawful either, for there is no statutory basis for public prosecutors’ offices or courts to make such a retrospective request. Art. 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) contains no provision to the effect that signal data relating to the past may be requested and evaluated. In practice, however, on the basis of the expression “signal data may be evaluated” in Art. 135(1) CMK, the authorities proceed as though such a retrospective power existed, and the signal data (which at the same time constitute personal data for the data subject) that telephone operators are obliged to keep under the authority contained in the regulation referred to above (and which they use in charging for their services) are requested from them and are used in the investigation and prosecution, and even as a means of establishing the facts in the process of proof. Yet the “principle of limited legality” applies in criminal procedure law as well. Provisions that restrict fundamental rights and freedoms – and all coercive measures are of this nature – may be enacted, amended and repealed only by law. Moreover, another important principle of criminal procedure law is that coercive measures can be applied not to the past but prospectively. Yet Art. 135 CMK contains no provision, with regard to the measure of evaluating signal data, to the effect that this measure may extend to the past. The investigation and prosecution authorities are therefore carrying out an operation that has no statutory basis and is consequently unlawful. Signal data recorded before the decision of the public prosecutor’s office, in cases where delay would be prejudicial, or of the judge, in ordinary circumstances, cannot be used as evidence or taken as a basis for the judgment, even if they enter the file by a decision of the prosecutor’s office or of the court, by virtue of Arts. 206(2), 217(2) and 230 CMK, which govern unlawfully obtained evidence and the exclusionary rules, and of the settled case law of the Court of Cassation on this matter. Consequently, the evidence obtained in this way and also the derivative evidence obtained on the basis of it are unlawful (in accordance with the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine) and cannot be used at any stage of the criminal proceedings132 Practice, however, does not follow this course, and these signal data, known as HTS reports, are used as evidence in both criminal and private-law proceedings. What is interesting is that the Court of Cassation, which finds it lawful for these reports to be brought into the file, accepts that they are personal data and treats their removal from the file and delivery to third persons as an offence:

“In the specific case: the accused and the intervening party are married by civil marriage and divorce proceedings are pending between them; during the proceedings, at the request of the accused, the HTS reports containing the detailed call records for the last 2 years of the mobile telephone line used by the intervening party were obtained and placed in the case file; in the incident in which the accused took the HTS reports from the case file and sent them to the intervening party’s father, Ali, and elder brother, Mehmet: the HTS reports containing the call records showing with whom, when, how often and for how long the intervening party communicated fall within the scope of personal data; although the accused obtained the HTS reports, which are in the nature of personal data, in a lawful manner, the accused unlawfully disseminated them in their recorded form; this act constitutes the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data within the meaning of Art. 136(1) TCK; and the rendering of judgment as written, through an error in the legal characterisation of the offence and without regard to the fact that the accused should have been held liable for this offence and sentenced, has required that the judgment be (QUASHED)”133.

However, in the investigation of offences, particularly for the identification of the perpetrators, and during the prosecution, in order to establish the perpetrator’s connection with the act, with his accomplices and/or with the victim and to achieve proof, obtaining and evaluating these signal data is extremely necessary and important. Art. 135 CMK should therefore be amended in accordance with the law as it ought to be and brought into line with the system currently in operation. Yet I must state once again that the law as it stands and the operations currently carried out are unlawful.

In this situation, in view of Art. 135 CMK as currently in force and from the standpoint of the law as it stands, telephone operators, by handing over these signal data to the court, additionally commit the offence of unlawfully giving data defined in Art. 136 TCK. On the other hand, with regard to public prosecutors’ offices and courts, the offence of unlawfully obtaining data defined in the same article likewise comes into question. Consequently, legislation must be enacted on this matter as soon as possible and the unlawfulness removed.

Consequently, neither public authorities nor private persons have the right or the power, on the ground that they do not look at the content, to monitor data traffic without any statutory basis, arbitrarily and in breach of the Constitution, to draw certain conclusions from it and, most importantly, to use these in criminal proceedings as though they were lawful evidence134. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) also has judgments to a similar effect135

iv. Processing of Special-Category Health Data

Another matter that needs to be discussed with regard to the protection of personal data and the offences committed against them is that, where a physician has been charged with a duty to disclose certain matters, compliance with the provision of the law constitutes a ground of justification, whereas failure to comply gives rise to an offence on account of the non-performance of the duty. For example, the giving of personal data pursuant to Arts. 279 and 280 TCK and certain provisions of the Law on Public Hygiene (Umumi Hıfzıssıhha Kanunu) concerning notification will not constitute an offence136

After health data are defined as special categories of personal data in Art. 6(1) of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), paragraph 2 states that they may be processed only with the explicit consent of the data subject. Accordingly, for the processing of such data to be lawful, explicit consent must exist. However, sentence 1 of paragraph 3 of the same article provides that the personal data listed in the first paragraph, other than those relating to health and sexual life, may be processed without seeking the explicit consent of the data subject in the cases provided for by the laws. Sentence 2 of paragraph 3, for its part, states that personal data relating to health and sexual life may be processed without seeking the explicit consent of the data subject only for the purposes of the protection of public health, preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of treatment and care services, and the planning and management of health services and their financing, by persons under an obligation of secrecy or by authorised institutions and organisations. After this clear provision there is no need to resort to the theory of presumed consent for the recording of patient information137; the Law has already placed this among the exceptions and included it among the cases in which consent need not be sought. In addition, paragraph 4 of the same article also provides that, for the processing of special categories of personal data, it is further a requirement that the adequate measures determined by the Personal Data Protection Board be taken. Art. 7 of the “Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy”, issued by the Ministry of Health on the basis of Law No. 6698, governs the processing of personal health data, and paragraphs 1 and 4 of that article are identical to Art. 6 of the parent law explained above. Paragraph 2 of Art. 7 of the Regulation, by stating that “For personal health data to be processed without being anonymised for purposes other than those listed in the first paragraph, the data subject must be informed in detail about the reason for the processing of his or her data, his or her written consent must be obtained and that consent must be kept”, governs the anonymisation of personal health data, and paragraph 3, by stating that “The data subject may at any time withdraw the consent he or she has given for the processing and transfer of his or her data, unless there is a legal provision or judicial decision to the contrary”, governs the withdrawal of the consent given for the processing of personal health data. Withdrawal of consent has no effect with regard to operations carried out up to that date. Accordingly, where the processing of personal health data is at issue, whether a ground of justification exists for the purposes of Arts. 135 and 136 TCK must be decided by assessing all these provisions together.

In this context we must state that physicians, dentists, pharmacists, midwives and their assistants, and all other members of the medical professions or arts, have the right to refrain from testifying pursuant to Art. 46(1)(b) CMK in respect of the information they have learned about their patients and their patients’ relatives by virtue of that capacity. However, where a physician testifies although a ground for refraining exists and the patient has not consented to the testimony, the physician commits the offence of disclosing personal data138. Indeed, members of the medical profession have also been granted the right to refrain from acting as an expert in criminal investigations and prosecutions concerning the patients with whom they have dealings by virtue of their capacity and those patients’ relatives (Art. 70(1) CMK). Art. 9(4) of the Turkish Medical Association Rules of Professional Ethics for Physicians likewise provides that a physician summoned to court as a witness or expert may withdraw from these duties by asserting that the matter is a professional secret139

v. The Problem of Recording Information on Persons’ Political, Philosophical or Religious Opinions and Racial Origins

The explanatory memorandum to Art. 135(2) TCK states that the recording of information on persons’ moral tendencies, sexual lives, state of health or trade-union affiliations may be provided for by law as a ground of justification, particularly in the context of combating crime140. Accordingly, the recording of information on persons’ political, philosophical or religious opinions and racial origins should not be accepted as a ground of justification in any manner whatsoever. In that case, however, it is seen that there is a contradiction between Art. 135(2) TCK and KVKK No. 6698. Whereas it follows from the interpretation of the explanatory memorandum that the processing of certain personal data, which I have mentioned above, should in no way be accepted as a ground of justification, the KVKK has accepted all of these as personal data and, moreover, by bringing areas such as criminal investigation and prosecution and intelligence activities within the scope of the exceptions, has provided that explicit consent is not needed for the processing of such data. Undoubtedly, from the standpoint of the law as it ought to be, what is correct is the conclusion reached by interpreting the explanatory memorandum to Art. 135(2) TCK. What is in force and what we are living with, however, are the provisions of KVKK No. 6698 and the operations that have in any event been carried out in this way up to now.

vi. The Problem of the Fate of Personal Data in the Information Systems Provided to Employees in the Public and Private Sectors

Another possibility I wish to address under this heading is the situation in which the computers or e-mail accounts given to public officials and workers by the institutions for which they work or by their employers are seized by the authorised superior of the institution/workplace or by the persons charged with supervision, and the data in them are examined and recorded. There are two different views on this matter. According to the first of these views, the computers and/or e-mails in question are given for work and may be examined even if they contain personal data141. The other view on this matter is that, even though the purpose for which the computers and/or e-mail accounts in question are given is work-related, it is not possible to confine their use to work alone; that personal communications or transactions are inevitably carried out with them; and that personal data cannot be seized or obtained without consent or a court decision. While I also take into account the arguments put forward in the second view, I essentially agree with the first view. For this computer and/or e-mail address is given to the public official or worker not so that he may attend to private affairs but so that he may carry out the tasks connected with his duties. The person may of course also attend to personal affairs with these tools if he so wishes and provided that work is not disrupted. But he must know that these tools, which have been given to him for use, may be inspected at any time and that he cannot raise the objection that they contain his personal data. In my view, this is a situation that must be accepted, and that is also applied in this way in practice, both for public officials in the public sector and within the framework of worker – employer relations in the private sector.

c. As Regards the Offence of Unlawfully Giving or Obtaining Personal Data

The grounds of justification in question also apply to the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining personal data regulated in Art. 136. In the definition of the offences in Arts. 135 and 136 TCK it is additionally stated that the perpetrator must carry out his acts “unlawfully”. Differing views and reasons have been advanced in legal scholarship as to the use of this and similar expressions in the definition of an offence142. Some authors state that in offence types containing such expressions a situation of “special unlawfulness” is at issue; that here the legislature requires that it be specifically investigated and proved whether the perpetrator acted unlawfully; that otherwise, that is, if it cannot be proved that the perpetrator acted unlawfully, he cannot be punished; and that this is the purpose of specifically stating in the offence type that the perpetrator carries out the acts “unlawfully”143. Other authors, by contrast, state that direct intent is thereby indicated; that offences containing expressions of this kind can be committed only with the direct intent of the perpetrator; and that, consequently, in trials concerning offences of this kind it must be investigated whether the perpetrator carried out the act knowing that it was unlawful144

d. As Regards the Offence of Failure to Destroy Personal Data and the Offence, Regulated in Art. 17(2) of KVKK No. 6698, of Failure to Erase or Anonymise Personal Data

In the offence of failure to destroy personal data regulated in Art. 138 of the Code, two different legal interests are protected and, accordingly, both the individual to whom the personal data relate and every individual making up society are victims of the offence; for this reason the consent of the person harmed by the offence alone, even though he is the person to whom the undestroyed data relate, does not render the act lawful145. Apart from this, there is no other ground of justification deriving from the law with regard to this offence type either. However, in a case of force majeure, since there is no voluntary act on the part of the perpetrator that can be accepted as an act within the meaning of criminal law, no offence arises owing to the absence of the act element, which is one of the material elements of the offence. Indeed, the Court of Cassation expressed a view to the same effect in the decisions it gave concerning Art. 230 of the former criminal code, which contained a similar offence type146. These explanations also apply to the offence of failure to erase or anonymise personal data regulated in Art. 17(2) of KVKK No. 6698.

5. Special Forms of Appearance of the Offences

a. Attempt

It is possible for both offence types regulated in Arts. 135 and 136 TCK to remain at the stage of attempt147. Attempt may take the form that, after the perpetrator has embarked on the acts of execution, these acts remain unfinished; for, since the occurrence of a separate result is not required for the offence to arise, the offence will arise upon the completion of the acts148. The offences regulated in Art. 138 TCK and in Art. 17(2) of KVKK No. 6698, by contrast, being offences that can be committed by omission, are not capable of attempt149

b. Participation

It is possible for the offences regulated in Arts. 135, 136 and 138 TCK and in Art. 17(2) of KVKK No. 6698 to be committed by way of participation, and they present no special features with regard to participation. However, in the offences regulated in Arts. 134, 135 and 136 TCK, where those who participate in the offence have the status of public official or practise a particular profession or trade connected with this matter, the penalty imposed on these persons is increased pursuant to Art. 137 TCK150.

c. Concurrence of Offences

The offence with which a problem of concurrence is most likely to arise in relation to the offence of recording personal data in Art. 135 TCK is the “Offence of Hindering or Disrupting the Functioning of an Information System and the Offence of Destroying or Altering Data” regulated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Art. 244. In particular, the act defined in paragraph 2 of Art. 244 by the expression “places data in the system” and “the recording of data”, which is the act element of Art. 135, have the same meaning. However, when the two offence types are examined together, it is seen that in Art. 135 it is personal data, and in Art. 244(2) data of every kind, that constitute the object of the offence; and that, on the other hand, while Art. 244(2) concerns only the placing of data in an information system, in Art. 135 a recording made on any kind of medium suitable for making a record, whether or not it is an information system, constitutes the act element of the offence. Accordingly, Art. 135, because it covers only personal data as regards the object of the offence, and Art. 244, because it covers only recording in information systems as regards the act element, are each in the nature of a “special norm” in relation to the other. As between these two offence types, an attempt should first be made to reach a conclusion according to the distinction between special norm and general norm and, if this is not possible, the rule of notional concurrence should be applied151 Another possibility concerns whether Art. 135 or Art. 134 is to be applied, particularly where data relating to persons’ private lives are recorded or given. Beyond information that makes a person identifiable, images and sounds that reveal his private life – although these too in fact constitute personal data – will, in my opinion, when the protected legal interests are also taken into consideration, no longer constitute the offence of recording personal data but the offence of violation of privacy. In the decision it gave on this matter the Court of Cassation, emphasising the same point, stated that Art. 134 must be applied:

“A) As to the examination of the appeals on points of law against the judgment of acquittal rendered in respect of the accused for the offence of recording personal data: for the offence of “Recording of personal data” regulated in Art. 135 of TCK No. 5237 to arise, any kind of information belonging to an identified or identifiable person must be recorded unlawfully; the concept of “personal data”, which forms the material object of the offence, must be understood as any kind of information belonging to a natural person which the person has not made available to unauthorised third persons, which he or she shares only with a limited circle by disclosing it to other persons when he or she so wishes, which is not known to everyone and/or cannot easily be accessed and known, which identifies the person or makes him or her identifiable, which distinguishes the person from the other individuals in society and is capable of revealing his or her characteristics; although there is no doubt that an image or sound of private life is “personal data”, the act of fixing an image or sound relating to a person’s private life, without his or her knowledge, on a particular electronic, digital or magnetic medium by means of a device capable of taking pictures or recording must be assessed within the scope of the offence of violation of privacy defined in sentence 2 of Art. 134(1) of TCK No. 5237; an image, photograph or sound relating to a person’s private life cannot be accepted as personal data within the scope of Art. 135 of TCK No. 5237; in the incident forming the subject of the allegation, the act consisting of recording images and photographs of the victim in a naked state will not constitute the offence of “Recording of personal data”; and, since the filming took place within the knowledge and consent of the victim, the offence of violation of privacy has not arisen either; this being understood, and the court having, at the end of the trial, so accepted and assessed the matter by setting out the reasons why the statutory elements of the offence imputed to the accused were not made out, it is decided, dismissing all the grounds of appeal on points of law of the intervening party’s counsel and of the public prosecutor to the effect that the offence charged against the accused was established, which are not considered well-founded, and having regard also to Art. 223(9) of CMK No. 5271, that the judgment be UPHELD in accordance with the request,…”152.

In another case, by contrast, the Court of Cassation did not regard the publication of pictures which the person had had taken in his everyday clothes as a violation of privacy, but held that the offence of unlawfully disseminating personal data had been committed:

“Given that the picture of the intervening party found on the internet, which the intervening party had had taken while posing in everyday clothes, does not relate to the sphere of private life and is not of a nature to violate the privacy of his or her private life, the rendering of a judgment of acquittal in respect of the accused for the offence of recording personal data on account of the same act and of a conviction for the offence of violation of privacy regulated in Art. 134(2) TCK on the basis of reasons that are not lawful and sufficient, without regard to the fact that the statutory elements of the offence of violation of privacy imputed to the accused were not made out in the specific case and that the act of the accused, who unlawfully published the intervening party’s picture, which is in the nature of personal data, would constitute the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data defined in Art. 136 TCK, has required that the judgment be (QUASHED)”153.

In one case, at the end of the trial held after images of the victim in a naked state had been recorded and disseminated, the court of first instance, correctly, acquitted the accused on the ground that Art. 136 was not made out because the images had been recorded with the victim’s consent; the Court of Cassation, however, rightly quashed the decision of the court of first instance in this respect, on the ground that, once the images had been recorded, whether with or without consent, their dissemination would constitute the offence defined in Art. 134(1), sentence 2:

“C) As to the examination of the appeals on points of law against the judgment of acquittal rendered in respect of the accused for the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data: for the offence of “Unlawfully giving or obtaining data” regulated in Art. 136(1) of TCK No. 5237 to arise, any kind of information belonging to an identified or identifiable person must be given to another, disseminated or obtained; the recording of an image or sound of private life is made an offence in sentence 2 of Art. 134(1) of TCK No. 5237, while the disclosure of an image or sound relating to private life without the knowledge and consent of the person concerned, even if it was obtained through negligence or entirely lawfully – that is, its dissemination, revelation, exposure, announcement, communication to the public, being made public, in short its being brought to the knowledge of a person or persons not entitled to learn its content – is made an offence in Art. 134(2) of TCK No. 5237. According to the contents of the file, the rendering of a judgment of acquittal in respect of the accused on grounds that are not lawful and sufficient, instead of assessing within the scope of Art. 134(2) of TCK No. 5237 the act of the accused, who recorded images and photographs of the victim in a naked state with her knowledge and, without the victim’s consent, sent the CDs made from the recordings thus obtained to different institutions at various times, … has required that the judgment be quashed,…”154

The most important relationship of concurrence among these offences is that between Art. 138 TCK and Art. 17(2) of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK). As I have also stated above, the offences regulated in Art. 17(2) KVKK and in Art. 138 TCK are similar but distinct offence types. Had the legislature wished Art. 138 to be applied together with all the elements of the offence in the event of a breach of Art. 17(2) of Law No. 6698, it would have used the expression “Article 138 of Law No. 5237 shall apply”. The legislature did not do so, however; it created a different offence type through the combined application of Arts. 17(2), 7 and 3 of KVKK No. 6698 and, by using the expression “shall be punished in accordance with Article 138 of Law No. 5237”, indicated that Art. 138 TCK is to be applied solely with regard to the sanction. Moreover, unlike Art. 138, it also included in the provision the act of “failing to anonymise”, which is not found in that article. The provision in question must therefore be understood in this way and interpreted accordingly. The possibilities that will confront us are, accordingly, as follows:

If the perpetrator has failed to anonymise personal data that he was required to anonymise, there is no room for debate; since this act is regulated only in Art. 17(2) KVKK, that article applies.

If the perpetrator has failed to erase data that he was required to erase, then regard is had to the object of the offence. If the data or the data processing activity forming the object of the offence falls within the exceptions of KVKK No. 6698 and an offence nevertheless arises, there is in any event again only one applicable norm, and Art. 138 TCK applies.

If the personal data that were not erased although they should have been are data to which KVKK No. 6698 applies, then both Art. 17(2) KVKK and Art. 138 TCK may be applicable at the same time, and although it may appear that the rule of notional concurrence could be applied in this case, this is a solution that is both theoretically mistaken and leads us to no result. It offers no solution, for Art. 17(2) KVKK refers to Art. 138 TCK as regards the penalty, so that it is not possible in this respect to determine which offence carries the heavier penalty. It is, moreover, theoretically mistaken, for both the TCK and the KVKK take the form of general laws and regulate the same matter in a very similar manner, the one referring to the other as regards the penalty. The problem here must therefore be resolved on the basis of the rule of earlier general law – later general law. Accordingly, where personal data falling within the scope of both Art. 138 TCK and Art. 17(2) KVKK are not erased although they should have been, Art. 17(2) KVKK, being the later general law, must be applied.

It is possible for all four offences to be committed in the form of a continuing offence (successive offence). In addition, the offences contained in Art. 138 TCK and Art. 17(2) KVKK are in the nature of permanent offences (mütemadi); consequently, the moment at which this offence is completed and the moment at which it ends are different, and the features pertaining to permanent offences apply to these offences. On the other hand, it is also possible for the offences regulated in Arts. 135 and 136 to be committed in the form of a permanent offence155 Where the disclosure of personal data at the same time also constitutes the offence of insult, there is notional concurrence between this offence and the offence of insult, since more than one offence has been brought about by a single act. The perpetrator is liable for the offence carrying the heaviest penalty156. In this case, since the penalty for the offence of disclosing personal data is greater, the perpetrator must be punished for that offence. Indeed, the Court of Cassation is also of this view:

“According to the contents of the file: the act of the accused, who, in the names of the victims with whom the accused’s girlfriend was on hostile terms, carried out membership registrations on a dating site on the internet under the user names “Atesli_Dizdar” and “Afet-i Derya” and, on the profile pages thus created, recorded on the site in question and published the victims’ photographs and telephone numbers, which are in the nature of personal data, together with expressions of a nature to injure the victims’ honour, dignity and reputation, constitutes the offences of recording personal data, unlawfully giving or obtaining data and insult within the meaning of Arts. 135(1), 136(1) and 125(2)-(1)-(4) TCK; since the single act of the accused constitutes more than one offence under the law, the accused should have been punished, in accordance with the rule of notional concurrence regulated in Art. 44 TCK, for the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining data defined in Art. 136(1) TCK, which carries the heaviest penalty; and the rendering of judgment under Art. 135(1) TCK, which carries a lighter penalty, without regard to the rule of notional concurrence, has required that the judgment be (QUASHED)”157.

6. Sanction

For all four offences under examination the laws provide solely for a custodial penalty. The penalty for the offence of recording personal data is imprisonment for a term of one to three years. The penalty for the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining personal data is imprisonment for a term of two to four years. The penalty for the offence of failure to destroy personal data is imprisonment for a term of one to two years. Since Art. 17(2) KVKK refers to Art. 138 TCK as regards the penalty, the penalty for this offence is likewise imprisonment for a term of one to two years.

In addition, aggravated forms increasing the penalty are provided for in Art. 135(2) TCK with regard to the offence of recording personal data (the penalty is increased by one half), in Art. 137 TCK with regard to the offence of recording personal data and the offence of unlawfully giving or obtaining personal data (the penalty is increased by one half), and in Art. 138(2) TCK with regard to the offence of failure to destroy personal data and the offences of failure to erase and to anonymise personal data (the penalty is doubled).

Pursuant to Art. 140 TCK, where any legal person obtains an unlawful benefit as a result of the commission of the offences contained in Arts. 135, 136 and 138, the security measures specific to legal persons set out in Art. 60 TCK will be applied to them. As regards Art. 17(2) KVKK, since a reference is made only with regard to penalties and no provision is made with regard to security measures, so that no rule directed at legal persons has been laid down, it is not possible to apply Art. 60 TCK to this offence.

The court having jurisdiction to hear these offences is the Criminal Court of First Instance.

V. In Lieu of a Conclusion: Problems in the Field of the Protection of Personal Data

The entry into force of KVKK No. 6698 as of 7.4.2016, and the establishment of the Personal Data Protection Authority and Board, with all the members of the Board having been elected as of 1.1.2017, mark the beginning of a new era in the protection of personal data in our country. Thus personal data, which until 7.4.2016 were specifically protected only by the TCK, are now protected by criminal law and administrative law together, and this concept and its components, whose content had been filled only by international instruments to which we were not a party and by legal scholarship, are now regulated by a law. In this way the requirement of the principle of certainty, which is important for criminal law, has also been met. Furthermore, our approval, before the enactment of Law No. 6698, of the Council of Europe’s Convention No. 108 on the Protection of Personal Data is also an important development that should be noted to our country’s credit.

While I regard the entry into force of KVKK No. 6698 as positive in principle, I must also state that it contains many deficient and flawed provisions. The large number of exceptions to the Law’s scope of application, and in particular the fact that public institutions and organisations, and among these the law enforcement forces and intelligence activities, have been taken entirely outside the scope of the Law, are arrangements contrary to the spirit of personal data protection law. The absence, in the law enforcement and intelligence agencies that collect and process these personal data, of internal and external oversight specific to this field, and the fact that a culture of accountability has not taken root in most public institutions and organisations in our country, further aggravate these problems in practice. Another important point of criticism is that the majority of the members of the Personal Data Protection Board are appointed by the political power and by the parliamentary group representing the majority, and that it has not been structured as an autonomous institution. This casts a shadow, even if only in appearance, over the impartiality of the Authority and the Board. What is to be desired is that this Authority and this Board be completely independent in terms of legislation, structure and practice alike. However, this criticism will become clear, in a positive or a negative sense, through the decisions the Board will give and the practices of the Authority. My wish is that this criticism of mine will prove to be entirely unfounded!

An important point to be made under this heading is that, as can be seen from my explanations of the offence types above, in the framing of the offence types only the obtaining and dissemination of personal data by unlawful means, or the failure to destroy recorded personal data, have been placed under the protection of criminal law, whereas the processing of personal data has not been brought under that protection. Yet it is also possible for personal data that have been lawfully obtained or distributed and that are not yet required to be destroyed to be misused by being processed unlawfully. The fact that this situation was not contemplated and that the necessary offence type was not included in the TCK is regarded as a significant deficiency. In our view, the processing of personal data unlawfully and by unauthorised persons should also be made a separate offence type158. For in Art. 3(1)(e) of KVKK No. 6698 the processing of personal data is defined in such a way as to encompass the acts contained in Arts. 135 and 136 TCK, but more broadly than them. To apply the offence types by extending them and interpreting them broadly, as though acts that are not there were present, is, however, prohibited by the principle of legality of offences and penalties and by Art. 2(3) TCK, which lays down the prohibition of extensive interpretation amounting to analogy. The offences in question therefore need to be redrafted so as to cover the processing of personal data.

With regard to the protection of personal data, the laws and regulations to be enacted, the authorities and boards to be established, and the severe administrative fines and even prison sentences to be imposed in the event of a breach will never be a complete solution or a means of preventing breaches. Individuals and institutions must first of all ensure the security of the information systems they use. What is meant by this is ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the data in the system and of the system itself, and their security against every kind of danger relating to use. To that end, institutional policies must be established, the institution must be brought into compliance with its personal data protection (KVK) policy and with the relevant legislation, and compliance must be audited regularly. For example, everyone, from the chairman of the board of directors and the CEO of a company to the reception officer who takes and processes the identity details of those entering at the door, must be trained in and willing to implement this policy. Both the public sector and the private sector must require all the solution partners, customers, employees and others with whom they do business to comply with the legislation and policies in this field, and must even require proof that they are in compliance. As long as end-to-end compliance within the institution and, on a sector-by-sector basis, the compliance of all parties and stakeholders are not ensured, no one will be able to feel at ease in this matter

The security measures to be taken must not aim solely at protecting data. These security measures must ensure the security envisaged for information systems, the confidentiality of the data in the system and the prevention of unauthorised access, and also the uninterrupted operation of the system159. Today many public services, both those in the public sector and those transferred to the private sector, operate entirely under the control of information systems, and the interruption of the operation of these systems may cause great harm to society.

However, despite these measures taken by individuals and/or institutions, complete security cannot be achieved in the field of information technology. Every system developed for the security of information systems has a vulnerability, and it is possible to enter the system by finding that weak point. For this reason, what is sought in the field of information technology is not absolute security but “the best security”. In order to prevent cybercrime and the unlawful obtaining of personal data, and to ensure that these acts are combated effectively, users operating on an individual or institutional basis need to be made aware of the need to create and use a good security barrier that is suited to their own systems and is designed to protect both the data and the continuity of the system. In this way a certain decrease in the number of unlawful acts occurring in the field of information technology may come about. Since the security measures to be used will also bring to light the unlawful acts committed, they will be instrumental in the development of new and more effective measures160 At the level of countries, in States that have turned interfering in individuals’ private lives and surveilling, keeping files on and constantly tracking the people in their country into a mode of government, the protection of personal data has either never been the subject of legal regulation or such regulations are not applied in practice. In some countries, while certain safeguards exist with regard to the processing of personal data held by the State, similar practices by private enterprises are, for economic reasons, largely treated leniently or tolerated. Even in the European Union, which takes a serious approach to the protection of personal data and has significant legislation, many problems relating to the subject persist. The workability of systems for the protection of personal data, including Europe’s, is an important subject of debate. The points on which these debates centre are the effectiveness of the protection of personal data and its compatibility with human rights and individual freedoms and, on the other hand, the fact that the collection and processing of such data are extremely necessary for commerce and for the detection of crime and offenders.

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• Walden, Ian, Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.

• Yılmaz, Sabire Sabem, Tıp Alanında Kişisel Verilerin Açıklanması Suçu, Seçkin, Ankara, 2014.

• Yokuş Sevük, Handan, “Tıp Ceza Hukukunda Kişisel Verilerin Açıklanması”, Tıp Ceza Hukukunun Güncel Sorunları, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, Ankara, 2008, s.782- 811.

ABSTRACT

The protection of personal data, which may be defined as all data relating to an identified or identifiable natural person, is of importance for the right to respect for private and family life, which is one of the human rights. The subject of the protection of personal data is steadily gaining importance today; individuals voice many complaints on this subject in their daily lives, and the subject also leads the highest judicial bodies to take a legal stance. Accordingly, the field of the protection of personal data has been regulated by many supranational organisations, first and foremost the Council of Europe and the European Union, and by States. Türkiye, albeit belatedly, has adopted Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data, which regulates this field. The protection of personal data by criminal-law norms, for its part, is ensured by the offence types in the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK). The offence types to be addressed in this context are the offence of Recording Personal Data, the offence of Unlawfully Giving or Obtaining Data and the offence of Failure to Destroy Data regulated in Arts. 135-138 TCK, and the offence of Failure to Erase or Anonymise Personal Data regulated in Art. 17(2) of Law No. 6698. Keywords: Personal data, Privacy, Data protection, Offence against private life, Processing of data, Data subject.

Footnotes

  1. Date of submission of the article: 30.11.2016. Date of acceptance of the article: 15.12.2016.
  2. Assoc. Prof. Dr., member of the academic staff in Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and IT Law at the Faculty of Law of Istanbul Medipol University. Contact: İstanbul Medipol Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi - Kavacık Mah. Ekinciler Cad. No.19 Kavacık Kavşağı – Beykoz.
  3. Murat Volkan Dülger, Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku, 6. Bası, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2015, s. 631, 632. ↑
  4. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 632. ↑
  5. Dülger, s. Bilişim Suçları, 632. ↑
  6. For a detailed account of these periods see: Elif Küzeci, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması, Turhan Kitapevi, Ankara, 2010, s. 106 – 116. ↑
  7. Küzeci, s. 106; Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 632. ↑
  8. Handan Yokuş Sevük, “Tıp Ceza Hukukunda Kişisel Verilerin Açıklanması”, Tıp Ceza Hukukunun Güncel Sorunları, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, Ankara, 2008, s. 782. ↑
  9. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, 633. For detailed explanations of the definition and nature of the protection of personal data as a right see: Küzeci, s. 60 – 103. ↑
  10. Güçlü Akyürek, “Kişisel Veriler ve Özel Hayatın Gizliliği Hakkı”, Suç ve Ceza – Ceza Hukuku Dergisi, Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği yayını, S.3, Temmuz – Ağustos – Eylül 2011, s. 44. ↑
  11. Küzeci, s. 70. ↑
  12. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 633, 634. ↑
  13. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 634. ↑
  14. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 634. ↑
  15. The convention in question was signed by Türkiye on 28.01.1981 and, having been duly approved by Law No. 6669 of 30.1.2016 (the approving law was published in the Official Gazette No. 29628 of 18.2.2016), was deposited with the Secretariat General of the Council of Europe and entered into force in respect of Türkiye as of 1.9.2016. For the original text of the convention and the table of ratifications see: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig. asp?NT=108&CM =8&DF=11/08/2011& CL=ENG ↑
  16. In the creation of a uniform legal order in the European Union, the principal source is the directives enacted by the European Community. Accordingly, the efforts to create a uniform data protection law yielded their first gains in the 1990s. The first draft of the Data Protection Directive dates back to 1990. This draft constitutes the starting point for the regulation of data protection at Community level. For detailed information on the subject see: Nilgün Başalp, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması ve Saklanması, Yetkin Yayınları, Ankara, 2004, s. 25 – 32. ↑
  17. Başalp, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması ve Saklanması, s. 33. ↑
  18. Ian J. Lloyd, Information Technology Law, 6th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, s. 39. ↑
  19. For the original and full texts of the European Union’s Regulation (Tüzük) and Directive of 2016 on the protection of personal data see: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/ reform/index_en.htm; 3.11.2016. ↑
  20. Başalp, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması ve Saklanması, s. 33, 34. ↑
  21. Yokuş Sevük, s. 797; Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 635. ↑
  22. Başalp, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması ve Saklanması, s. 108. ↑
  23. The “Regulation on the Processing of Personal Information and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications Sector”, which was previously in force and was published in the Official Gazette No. 25356 of 6.2.2004, was repealed by Art. 23 of the above-mentioned regulation of 24.7.2012. In Art. 3 of the repealed regulation personal data were defined as follows: “any information relating to natural and/or legal persons who are identified or who can be identified, directly or indirectly, on the basis of an identification number or of one or more elements of their physical, psychological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity or of their health, genetic, ethnic, religious, family and political information” ↑
  24. For a similar definition see: Lütfü Cihan Gülmez, “Kişisel Verilerimiz Korunuyor mu?”, Terazi Hukuk Dergisi, Y.6, S.59, Temmuz 2011, s58; Küzeci, s. 9. ↑
  25. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 647. ↑
  26. A. Çiğdem Ayözger, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması: Elektronik Haberleşme Sektörüne İlişkin Özel Düzenlemeler Dahil, Beta, İstanbul, 2016, s. 6. ↑
  27. Aydın Akgül, Danıştay ve Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Kararları Işığında Kişisel Verilerin Korunması, Beta, İstanbul, 2014, s.8, 9; Ayözger, s. 6; Küzeci, s. 1, Llyod, s.42. ↑
  28. Lloyd, s. 41; Ayözger, s. 7; Akgül, s. 8, 9. ↑
  29. Avrupa Adalet Divanı, Bodil Lindqvist v. İsveç, Dava No. C-101/01, 6.11.2003; for the judgment see: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ liste.jsf?num=C-101/01; 3.11.2016. ↑
  30. Akgül, s. 17-20. ↑
  31. AYM, 19.3.2015, E. 2014/180, K. 2015/30, R.G. 3.4.2015-29315. ↑
  32. Başalp, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması ve Saklanması, s. 34. ↑
  33. In Art. 3 of the previous regulation the processing of personal data was defined as “any operation or set of operations carried out on personal information, whether or not by automatic means, by such methods as collection, recording, preparation, loading, adaptation, alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making accessible, arrangement, combination, blocking and erasure”. ↑
  34. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 669. ↑
  35. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 669. ↑
  36. Uğur Ersoy, “Bir İnsan Hakları Kavramı Olarak Kişisel Verilerin Korunması”, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Kamu Yönetimi Anabilim Dalı Siyaset ve Sosyal Bilimler Bilim Dalı, Ankara, 2009, s. 16. ↑
  37. For a detailed account of sensitive personal data and the situations in which they may be processed see: Cemil Kaya, “Avrupa Birliği Veri Koruma Direktifi Ekseninde Hassas (Kişisel) Veriler ve İşlenmesi”, İÜHFM, C.LXIX, S.1 - 2, 2001, s. 317 - 334. ↑
  38. Ersoy, s. 16. ↑
  39. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 265. ↑
  40. Nilgün Başalp, “Kişisel Verilerin Korunması ve İnternet”, İnternet ve Hukuk, Der: Yeşim M. Atamer, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayını, İstanbul, 2004, s. 6; Başalp, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması ve Saklanması, s. 100 – 103. ↑
  41. Sibel Özel, Uluslararası Alanda Medya ve İnternette Kişilik Hakkının Korunması, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2004, s.168. ↑
  42. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 670, 671. ↑
  43. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 671. ↑
  44. Yener Ünver, “Türk Ceza Kanunu’nun ve Ceza Kanunu Tasarısının İnternet Açısından Değerlendirilmesi”, İÜHFM, C.LIX, S.1 – 2, İstanbul, 2001, s. 93, 94. ↑
  45. Yener Ünver, “Federal Almanya’da Terör ve Organize Suçluluk ile İlgili Düzenlemeler”, Prof. Dr. Nurullah Kunter’e Armağan, İstanbul, İÜHF Eğitim Öğretim ve Yardımlaşma Vakfı Yayını, 1998, s. 437. ↑
  46. “From the standpoint of medical science, personal data are data relating to a person’s state of health. These data, which are also called medical data, relate to the state of health of natural persons and are information that will be acquired by members of the medical profession. According to Art. 1 of Recommendation No. (97) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Medical Data, medical data means personal information relating to the individual’s state of health. The concept of medical data also covers genetic data. Personal data relating to health are data of a special nature and require more special protection than other personal data. Indeed, when account is also taken of the harm that the misuse of data relating to a person’s state of health, in other words of medical data, would cause to the person, it will be appropriate for the recording of such data to be made subject to a special procedure and limited to specific purposes. In Art. 3 of Recommendation No. (97) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe this point is emphasised in the following terms: ‘During the collection and processing of medical data, fundamental rights and freedoms, in particular the right to respect for privacy, must be ensured. Medical data may be collected and processed only in accordance with the safeguards provided by domestic law.’ Art. 7(2)(f) of the Draft Law on the Protection of Personal Data provides that, on condition that adequate measures are taken to ensure the protection of the privacy of private life and family life, personal data relating to health may be processed ‘for the purposes of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, treatment, care or the provision of health services, by health institutions, employers obliged to set up a workplace health unit, schools and universities in accordance with the relevant laws, by health personnel who are under an obligation of secrecy by law or according to professional rules’. It is possible for medical data to be recorded and stored by automatic or non-automatic means. Operations such as obtaining these data, transferring them to third persons, altering, erasing or destroying them may be carried out only within the framework permitted by the laws and to the extent that this is lawful.” Yokuş Sevük, s. 786, 787. ↑
  47. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 671, 672. ↑
  48. Yokuş Sevük, s. 797. ↑
  49. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 672. ↑
  50. Ian Walden, Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pn. 3.73 – 3.76; Jonathan Clough, Principles of Cybercrime, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, s.238 – 254. ↑
  51. Ali Karagülmez, Bilişim Suçları ve Soruşturma – Kovuşturma Evreleri, 5. Bası, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2014, s. 451. ↑
  52. Wouter Martinus Petrus Steijn, “The Coast of Using Facebook: Assigning Value to Privacy Protection on Social Network Sites Against Data Mining, Identity Theft, and Social Conflict”, Data Protection on the Move: Current Developments in ICT and Privacy/Data Protection, Eds: Serge Gutwirth/Ronald Leenes/Paul De Hert, Springer, Heidelberg, 2016, s. 327. ↑
  53. “Kişisel Bilgiler Facebook’a Ne Lazım”, Esas, Aylık Hukuk Dergisi, S. 2, Kasım 2011, s. 34. ↑
  54. On this concept see: Meg Leta Jones, Ctrl + Z: The Right to Be Forgotten, New York University Press, New York, 2016, s. 1 vd.; Amitai Etzioni, Privacy in a Cyber Age, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2015, s.113-122; Cécile de Terwangne, “The Right to be Forgotten and Informational Autonomy in the igital Environment”, The Ethics of Memory in a Digital Age Interrogating the Right to be Forgotten, Edited by Alessia Ghezzi, Ângela Guimarães Pereira, Lucia Vesnić- Alujević, European Commisson, Joint Research Centre, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, s. 82 – 101; Yod-Samuel Martin, Jose M. Del Alamo, “Forget About Being Forgetten”, Data Protection on the Move: Current Developments in ICT and Privacy/Data Protection, Eds: Serge Gutwirth/ Ronald Leenes/Paul De Hert, Springer, Heidelberg, 2016, s. 249 – 276. ↑
  55. For the judgment and an assessment of it see: Armağan Ebru Bozkurt Yüksel, Bulut Bilişimde Kişisel Verilerin Korunması, Yetkin, Ankara, 2016, s. 132 – 136. ↑
  56. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 673. ↑
  57. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 673. ↑
  58. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 675, 704. ↑
  59. Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life: 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. Interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right may occur only where the interference is provided for by law and is a measure necessary in a democratic society for national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the country, the protection of order, the prevention of crime, the protection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. ↑
  60. Article 20 - Everyone has the right to demand respect for his private life and family life. The privacy of private life and family life is inviolable. The exceptions required by judicial investigation and prosecution are reserved. Unless there is a judge’s decision duly given in the cases expressly indicated by law, or, in cases where delay would be prejudicial, an order of the authority empowered by law, no one’s person, private papers or belongings may be searched and these may not be seized. Unless there is a judge’s decision duly given on one or more of the grounds of national security, public order, the prevention of crime, the protection of public health and public morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; or, again on these grounds, in cases where delay would be prejudicial, a written order of the authority empowered by law; no one’s person, private papers or belongings may be searched and these may not be seized. The decision of the competent authority shall be submitted for the approval of the judge having jurisdiction within twenty-four hours. The judge shall announce his decision within forty-eight hours of the seizure; otherwise the seizure shall be lifted automatically. (Additional paragraph: 5982 - 7.5.2010 / Art. 2) Everyone has the right to demand the protection of the personal data concerning him. This right also includes being informed about the personal data concerning oneself, having access to these data, requesting their rectification or erasure, and learning whether they are being used in accordance with their purposes. Personal data may be processed only in the cases provided for by law or with the explicit consent of the person. The principles and procedures relating to the protection of personal data shall be regulated by law. ↑
  61. Durmuş Tezcan, Mustafa Ruhan Erdem, R. Murat Önok, Teorik ve Pratik Ceza Özel Hukuku, 13. Bası, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2016, s.622. ↑
  62. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.675. To the same effect see: Karagülmez, s.446. ↑
  63. For detailed information on this subject see: Küzeci, s. 267 – 270. ↑
  64. Hakan Hakeri, “Verileri Hukuka Aykırı Olarak Verme (Sır Saklama Yükümlülüğünün İhlali) Suçu”, Tıbbi Müdahaleden Kaynaklanan Hukuki Sorumluluk Sempozyumu, 16 – 17 Ocak 2009, Mersin Barosu Yayını, Mersin, 2009, s. 127. ↑
  65. Süheyl Donay, Meslek Sırrının Açıklanması Suçu, Sulhi Garan Matbaası, İstanbul, 1978, s.5; Murat Volkan Dülger, “Bankacılık Sırrı ve Sırrın Açıklanmasına İlişkin Suçlar”, Banka ve Finans Hukuku, Panel ve Seminer Notları, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 2009, s. 176. ↑
  66. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 675, 676. ↑
  67. Küzeci, s. 56. ↑
  68. Hakeri, Verileri Hukuka Aykırı Olarak Verme, s. 127; Yokuş Sevük, s. 794, 795. ↑
  69. Olgun Değirmenci, “Bilişim Suçları”, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Hukuk Anabilim Dalı Kamu Hukuku Bilim Dalı, İstanbul, 2002, s. 157. ↑
  70. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 718, 719. ↑
  71. For a depiction of a utopian world in which people are constantly monitored and have files kept on them, and of human behaviour in that world, see: George Orwell, Bin Dokuz Yüz Seksen Dört, Çev: Nuran Akgören, Can Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999. ↑
  72. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 719. ↑
  73. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 719, 720. To the same effect see: Karagülmez, s. 468. ↑
  74. Küzeci, s. 59; Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 677. ↑
  75. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 677, 704. ↑
  76. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 720. ↑
  77. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 720. ↑
  78. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 678; Karagülmez, s. 448. ↑
  79. Hakeri, Verileri Hukuka Aykırı Olarak Verme, s. 128; Yokuş Sevük, s. 796. ↑
  80. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 678. ↑
  81. Hakeri, Verileri Hukuka Aykırı Olarak Verme, s. 128. ↑
  82. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 678. ↑
  83. See: Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 678. ↑
  84. 12. CD. 7.7.2014, E. 2014/607, K. 2014/16665. ↑
  85. 12. CD. 17.11.2014, E. 2014/6748, K. 2014/22909. ↑
  86. To the same effect see: Karagülmez, s. 448. ↑
  87. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 679. ↑
  88. 12. CD. 22.12.2014, E. 2014/3486, K. 2014/26247. ↑
  89. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 680. ↑
  90. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 680. ↑
  91. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 680, 681; Karagülmez, s. 448. ↑
  92. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 681. ↑
  93. Indeed, with regard to this offence, the obligation not to give data in the nature of a secret to persons who are not concerned also applies vis-à-vis the physician’s superiors, the chief physician and so on. However, if these physicians too gain access to these secrets, or find themselves having to gain access to them, by carrying out a medical intervention on the patient, then of course no such obligation will exist vis-à-vis these persons. The obligation of secrecy also applies vis-à-vis the hospital administration and the administrative staff. Consequently, instructions of the hospital administration to the effect that the whole of the patient’s file be handed over to the administration are unlawful, for it cannot be accepted that the patient’s implied consent extends to this as well. All correspondence conducted by physicians in the hospital must, as a rule, be kept from the hospital administration. Information may be passed on to the administration only for reasons of planning, control or security, and only in so far as that purpose requires. The matters entered in the patient protocol register may also fall within the scope of personal data. Hakeri, Verileri Hukuka Aykırı Olarak Verme, s. 129. ↑
  94. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 706; Karagülmez, s. 451. ↑
  95. 12. CD. 23.6.2014, E. 2013/26654, K. 2014/15414. ↑
  96. 12. CD. 7.4.2014, E. 2013/15899, K. 2014/8411. ↑
  97. 12. CD. 22.9.2014, E. 2014/883, K. 2014/18388. ↑
  98. Hakeri, Verileri Hukuka Aykırı Olarak Verme, s. 129. ↑
  99. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 713. ↑
  100. Hakeri, Verileri Hukuka Aykırı Olarak Verme, s. 129. ↑
  101. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 713. ↑
  102. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 714. ↑
  103. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 721, 722. ↑
  104. Karagülmez, s. 469. ↑
  105. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 722. ↑
  106. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 722. ↑
  107. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 722. ↑
  108. Karagülmez, s. 469, 470. ↑
  109. “In the draft criminal code adopted by the parliamentary sub-committee, the case in which these qualified personal data constitute the object of the offence was provided for as an aggravated form leading to an increase in the penalty. However, in the text sent by the Justice Committee to the plenary assembly and enacted upon its adoption in the plenary assembly, the case in which qualified personal data constitute the object of the offence is not provided for as an aggravated form increasing the penalty. In that case there is no longer any point, from the standpoint of legislative technique, in mentioning the data in question separately either. Yet it would have been a more appropriate arrangement for the case in which these data constitute the object of the offence to be provided for as an aggravated form increasing the penalty, as in the text adopted in the sub-committee”. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 681, 682. ↑
  110. Karagülmez, s. 447. ↑
  111. Hakeri, Verileri Hukuka Aykırı Olarak Verme, s. 131. ↑
  112. Karagülmez, s. 470. ↑
  113. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 681; Hakeri, Verileri Hukuka Aykırı Olarak Verme, s. 129; Yokuş Sevük, s. 801. ↑
  114. Hakan Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 19. Bası, Adalet Yayınevi, Ankara, 2016, s.241. ↑
  115. For a similar view: Karagülmez, s. 448. ↑
  116. Karagülmez, s. 448. ↑
  117. Karagülmez, s. 449. ↑
  118. See: Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 684-695. ↑
  119. 12. CD. 17.2.2014, E. 2013/7765, K. 2014/3758. ↑
  120. 12. CD. 13.10.2014, E. 2014/4081, K. 2014/19490. ↑
  121. 12. CD. 23.6.2014, E. 2013/27402, K. 2014/15379. ↑
  122. For explanations of the theoretical background of the general principles governing the processing of personal data defined in Art. 4 of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK) see: Ayözger, s. 124 vd. ↑
  123. 12. CD. 10.2.2014, E. 2013/10707, K. 2014/. ↑
  124. “e) Processing of personal data: any operation performed on data, such as the obtaining, recording, storage, preservation, alteration, re-organisation, disclosure, transfer, taking over, making available, classification or prevention of the use of personal data, wholly or partly by automated means or, provided that it forms part of a data filing system, by non-automated means, …”. ↑
  125. Art. 6(1) “Data relating to persons’ race, ethnic origin, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion, sect or other beliefs, appearance and dress, membership of associations, foundations or trade unions, health, sexual life, criminal convictions and security measures, as well as biometric and genetic data, are special categories of personal data”. ↑
  126. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.695, 696; Karagülmez, s. 451. ↑
  127. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.696. ↑
  128. For examples of this see: Walden, pn. 4.46- 4.64. ↑
  129. Küzeci, s. 98. ↑
  130. As amended: Resmi Gazete 11.6.201, 29739. ↑
  131. Data Retention Directive (Veri Saklama Direktifi), 2006/24/EC. ↑
  132. Ayözger, s.174. ↑
  133. The following lines, which I quote verbatim from their author, reveal the gravity of the situation: “… the data retention obligation is a restriction of the right to the protection of personal data and of the right to privacy that underlies this right. In cases that satisfy the conditions for the restriction of rights contained in the national texts, it is possible to retain personal data in the electronic communications sector for a certain period. However, the ground for the restriction must be clearly stated and the statutory provision relating to it must be enacted. The retention of personal data without the purpose of the restriction being stated and on the basis of provisions introduced by a regulation is manifestly unlawful. The fact that the EHSKVİY, which was drawn up in conformity with the Data Retention Directive – the most important reason for whose annulment was that the limits of its purpose had not been properly drawn – contains no provision whatsoever on the purpose of the retention of data is a legal oddity”. Ayözger, s.174, 175. ↑
  134. For detailed explanations of unlawfully obtained evidence, the exclusionary rules and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine see: Murat Volkan Dülger, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukukunda Dışlama Kuralı ve Hukuka Aykırı Delillerin Uzak Etkisi (Zehirli Ağacın Meyvesi Öğretisi), Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2014, s. 106 vd. ↑
  135. 12. CD. 29.9.2014, E. 2014/5104, K. 2014/18858. ↑
  136. For a similar view see: Küzeci, s. 98, 99. See also: Kerem Altıparmak, “Büyük Biraderin Gözetiminden Çıkış: Telefonların İzlenmesinde Devletin Sorumluluğu”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, S.63, Mart – Nisan 2006, s. 47. ↑
  137. Malone v. Birleşik Krallık, pr. 84. For the Turkish translation see: Osman Doğru, İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi İçtihatları, C.I, Legal Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2004, s. 764 – 779. ↑
  138. Hakeri, Verileri Hukuka Aykırı Olarak Verme, s. 131. ↑
  139. For the explanation brought to the subject by the theory of presumed consent before the Law see: Sabire Sabem Yılmaz, Tıp Alanında Kişisel Verilerin Açıklanması Suçu, Seçkin, Ankara, 2014, s. 98, 99. ↑
  140. Hakeri, Verileri Hukuka Aykırı Olarak Verme, s. 127. ↑
  141. Yokuş Sevük, s. 791. ↑
  142. “In the second paragraph of the article, the recording of information on persons’ political, philosophical or religious opinions, racial origins, moral tendencies, sexual lives, state of health or trade-union affiliations is defined as an offence. However, the recording of information on persons’ moral tendencies, sexual lives, state of health or trade-union affiliations among these may be permitted by the laws to a certain extent, particularly in the context of combating crime, for the purpose of ensuring that offences and offenders are brought to light. In these cases the offence in question will not arise.” ↑
  143. In legal scholarship Erdoğan has examined this matter with regard to the offence of illegal access to an information system and of continuing to remain in the system regulated in Art. 243 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK), and has defended the view we have set out above. In our view, however, the place where this matter should be examined is the relevant sub-headings of the offences of recording and of obtaining personal data regulated in Arts. 135 and 136 TCK. For explanations on the subject see: Yavuz Erdoğan, Türk Ceza Kanunu’nda Bilişim Suçları (Avrupa konseyi Siber Suç Sözleşmesi ve Yargıtay Kararları ile), Legal, İstanbul, 2012, s. 161. ↑
  144. For these views and reasons see: Kayıhan İçel, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, Yenilenmiş Bası, Beta Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2016, s. 309 – 311. ↑
  145. Nur Centel, Hamide Zafer, Özlem Çakmut, Türk Ceza Hukukuna Giriş, 9. Bası, Beta Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2016, s. 298; Veli Özer Özbek, M. Nihat Kanbur, Koray Doğan, Pınar Bacaksız, İlker Tepe, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 7. Bası, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2016, s. 288, 289. ↑
  146. İzzet Özgenç, Türk Ceza Hukuku, 12. Bası, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2016, s.295, 296. ↑
  147. To the same effect see: Karagülmez, s. 476. ↑
  148. “The rendering of a conviction as written (under Art. 230(1) TCK), without considering that the conditions in Arts. 16 and 21 of the Law on Notifications, on which the judgment was based, for effecting service were not present while the addressee was working as a worker in Germany, and that the elements of the offence of neglect of duty were therefore not present in the act of the accused on account of the accused’s not being able to serve in Türkiye the decision given in absentia on a person who had taken up employment in Germany, has required that the judgment be quashed.” 4. CD., Kt. 09.06.1976, E. 1976/4075, K. 1976/4100; cited in: Sahir Erman, Kamu İdaresine Karşı İşlenen Suçlar (TCK 202 – 281), Dünya Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1992, s. 163, 164. ↑
  149. Yokuş Sevük, s. 809. ↑
  150. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 701, 702, 716. ↑
  151. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 724. ↑
  152. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 717. ↑
  153. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.702. ↑
  154. 12. CD. 11.9.2012, E. 2012/17703, K. 2012/18222. ↑
  155. 12. CD. 7.7.2014, E. 2013/27724, K. 2014/16601. ↑
  156. 12. CD. 11.9.2012, E. 2012/17703, K. 2012/18222. ↑
  157. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 702, 717. ↑
  158. Tezcan, Erdem, Önok, s. 632; Yokuş Sevük, s.810. ↑
  159. 12. CD. 8.9.2014, E. 2014/1463, K. 2014/17262. ↑
  160. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s. 725. ↑
  161. Berrin Akbulut, “Türk Ceza Hukukunda Bilişim Suçları”, Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Kamu Hukuku Anabilim Dalı Ceza ve Ceza Usul Hukuku Bilim Dalı, Konya, 1999, s. 245. ↑
  162. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.726, 727. ↑

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