Introduction
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
The right to the protection of personal data, having become the subject of legislation and of special laws enacted on the matter, is today accepted as a new branch of law. However, this branch of law still contains uncertainties as regards its scope, its content and, in particular, the manner of its application. For these uncertainties to be removed and for a law of personal data protection in the full sense to be regarded as having formed, disputes on the subject must come before the judicial authorities so that case law develops, and the bodies entrusted with protecting data must issue statements and decisions and share them with the public.
In this context, the publications of the Personal Data Protection Board, which is provided for by legislation and entrusted with this matter, the guides it has prepared to aid understanding of the subject, its communiqués and above all its decisions are of great importance. An assessment of these decisions will show which points data controllers must attend to with care, in which areas breaches are concentrated, and how and on what basis a breach is to be assessed in a specific case. With this in mind, on 20 April 2018 the Board had published summaries of eight of the decisions it had rendered in the specific cases brought before it. By sharing some of its subsequent decisions with the public for a second time on 3 August 2018, it sought to answer, to a certain extent, the questions that come to mind on the subject.
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
ASSESSMENT OF THE DECISION SUMMARIES PUBLISHED BY THE PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION BOARD ON 3 AUGUST 2018
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger*
The right to the protection of personal data1, having become the subject of legislation and with special laws on the matter having been enacted, is today accepted as a new branch of law. However, this branch of law still contains uncertainties as regards its scope, its content and, in particular, the manner of its application. For these uncertainties to be removed, and for it to be accepted that a law of personal data protection in the full sense has come into being, disputes on the matter must come before the judicial authorities so that case law develops, and the bodies entrusted with the protection of data must issue statements and decisions and share them with the public.
In this context, the publications of the Personal Data Protection Board, which is provided for by the legislation and has been entrusted with the matter, the guides it has prepared to promote understanding of the subject, its communiqués and, above all, its decisions are of great importance. Which points controllers must pay attention to and approach with care, on which matters infringements are concentrated, and how and on what basis the assessment of an infringement is to be made in a specific case can be understood by evaluating these decisions.
With this in mind, the Board had published on 20 April 2018 the summaries of eight of the decisions it had rendered in specific cases brought before it2. By sharing with the public for a second time, on 3 August 2018, some of the decisions it has rendered since then, it sought to answer to a certain extent the questions that come to mind on the subject. I should state at the outset that it is to be welcomed that decisions have been published which deal with subjects different from those of the decisions published earlier and which address data security breaches from different angles. New decisions have thus been added to those that provide guidance, in particular for those concerned with the subject and for controllers and processors who are required to become compliant with the obligations introduced by the Law.
I shall examine the decisions in question published by the Board from the standpoint of the obligation introduced by Law No. 6698 that is at issue in the decisions, and shall address the points on which an infringement was found in the specific case. In this way I shall try to ensure that the Board’s perspective on the subject is understood and that the Law is considered in the light of the decisions rendered.
Decisions of the Personal Data Protection Board
Before turning to an explanation of the decisions, I think it useful to recall the article which regulates the controller’s obligations to ensure data security and which is therefore the basis of the infringements it has committed. The controller’s duties and powers in relation to ensuring the security of personal data are regulated in Article 12 of the Law, headed “obligations concerning data security”3. Accordingly:
• The controller must take all necessary technical and administrative measures in order to prevent the unlawful processing of personal data and unlawful access to such data, and to ensure the safekeeping of the data.
• Where there is a processor, the controller and the processor are jointly responsible for taking these measures.
• The controller must carry out, or have carried out, the necessary audits in order to ensure the application of the Law.
• Controllers and processors may not unlawfully disclose or use the personal data they have learned in the course of their duties; this also applies after they have left office.
• Where the personal data processed are obtained by others by unlawful means, the controller must notify the person concerned and the Board of this as soon as possible.
1. Request for the erasure of a newspaper column in which the name of a natural person is mentioned
In addition to the rules on data security which it is required to observe under Article 12 of the Law, the controller must also comply with the requests which the data subject, under Article 11 of the Law headed “Rights of the data subject”, makes by applying to the controller in respect of the information concerning him4.
One of the most striking of the requests which the data subject may make by applying to the controller, and the point on which uncertainties are concentrated in practice as to how and when it is to be made, is that the data subject may request “the erasure or destruction of personal data within the framework of the conditions provided for in Article 7”. Article 7 of the Law, for its part, requires that personal data, even though they have been processed in accordance with the provisions of the Law and of other relevant laws, be erased, destroyed or anonymised by the controller of its own motion or at the request of the data subject where the reasons requiring their processing have ceased to exist.
Accordingly, personal data obtained, collected or processed in accordance with the rules laid down by the Law must, once the purpose of the processing has ceased to exist, be eliminated by being subjected to one of the operations mentioned. If this requirement is not fulfilled by the controller of its own motion, it may also be requested by the data subject. A controller that fails to comply despite the data subject’s justified request will have prevented the person from enjoying the right to the protection of his data and will, moreover, have acted unlawfully by failing to act in accordance with the principle, among the principles of data protection law listed in the Law, of “being retained for the period provided for in the relevant legislation or necessary for the purpose for which they are processed”. Before turning to the specific case, the point I wish to make in connection with this principle is that, in order not to encounter problems regarding the retention periods of personal data, controllers must comply with the periods laid down in the relevant legislation as to which personal data are to be erased at the end of which periods, where such a period exists, and must determine reasonable periods where it does not. To this end, an “institutional policy” on the erasure, destruction and anonymisation of personal data must be drawn up; and, when the personal data inventory is prepared, which data sets are to be destroyed, erased or anonymised and when, under the relevant law if there is one or under the institutional policy if there is not, must be clearly indicated in the field reserved for this purpose, and this must be complied with.
From the first of the decision summaries published by the Board, it is understood that the name of a natural person appeared in a column in a newspaper, that a certain period of time had elapsed, and that the data subject requested the erasure of the column in question. Before turning to how the Board decided on this request, I wish to touch upon the connection between the data subject’s request for the erasure, destruction or anonymisation of his data and the “right to be forgotten”.
Although there is debate as to whether such a right really exists and, if it does, what its scope and limits are, there is a right to be forgotten which has emerged in order to serve as a safeguard against the dangers created by the possibilities offered by information technologies and to meet a contemporary need, which over time has also been recognised by the decisions of judicial authorities, and which provides for the person concerned to be forgotten. Accordingly, an individual whose information was obtained, collected or processed a long time ago and who no longer has any right of control over those data does not have to go on bearing today the burden of an event that took place at that time. I should state at this point that the event need not necessarily be of such a nature as to create a negative judgment about the person. Today, when personal data are protected as such, the mere presence of personal data in an event which took place a long time ago and over which the data subject no longer has any power of participation or control is sufficient for this right to be relied upon.
The “Google Judgment” of the European Court of Justice, which caused interest in and curiosity about the right to be forgotten to intensify, is highly important in that it ensured that this right was recognised by court decisions as well. In the case giving rise to the judgment, a Spanish lawyer named Costeja González claimed that the newspaper reports which appeared when he searched for his name in the Google search engine, and which contained information about his having had to sell his property a long time before in order to restructure his social security debts, constituted a breach of Directive 95/46/EC. In its judgment of 13 May 2014 the Court of Justice found in favour of the applicant, relied on Article 12 of the Directive, which concerns the person’s right of access, and held that personal data published under the person’s name must be erased where, after having become invalid or irrelevant, they go beyond their purpose.
The Court did not consider reasonable the fact that the personal information in question, although it had lost its topicality, amounted to a disclosure of the data subject’s personal data and financial information, and that 10-15 years after the actual events this information could still reach a wide audience. Although these events had caused significant moral and economic harm at the time they occurred, the circumstances that had led to their publication no longer existed at the time of the proceedings.
One of the most recent judgments dealing with the right to be forgotten is the judgment in “M.L. and W.W. v. Germany” delivered by the European Court of Human Rights on 28 June 20185. The case giving rise to the judgment began when the applicants applied to the Hamburg Regional Court in 2007, requesting the anonymisation of their data on newspaper pages which still carried the homicide they had committed in 1990 and for which they had been convicted in 1993. This request, which was also rejected by the German Federal Court, was finally brought before the ECtHR. The Court held that the public’s right of access to archived news reports outweighed the right to be forgotten of persons convicted of criminal offences. While accepting that the rights of a person who has been the subject of internet publication must also be protected against the public’s right to be informed about past events and history, in particular through the use of digital press archives, and that it may be a matter of concern for offenders to have to confront their past acts long after the public’s interest in being informed has ended, the Court struck the balance in the case at hand in favour of access to the archives. In conclusion, the Federal Court’s decision rejecting the request for the anonymisation of the data was not found by the ECtHR to be contrary to the Convention (there had been no violation of Article 8). In the light of the explanations given and of the judgment of the Court of Justice, it can be said that the right to be forgotten is a power, recognised by international courts, by which the data subject may request the erasure of data which date back a long time and over which he has lost the power of access and control. Therefore, although it is a right that has only recently come onto the agenda, data subjects must be allowed to benefit from this right and the necessary steps must be taken to that end.
From the decision on the matter it is understood that the Board decided, on the basis of Article 28(1)(c) of the Law, that there was no action to be taken on the request for the erasure of the column in question, on the grounds that the person named in the column still occupies a position that is of concern to the public and that the column is deemed to fall within freedom of the press, which is a reflection of freedom of expression6. According to this article, the Law will not apply to personal data processing activities carried out within the scope of freedom of expression.
Before setting out my assessment of and views on the decision, I must state that, although the decision is closely related to important concepts such as the right to be forgotten, freedom of the press and freedom of expression, it has been explained in a very general and vague manner. I would therefore recall that the assessments relate only to the points set out in the decision and are of a general nature, and do not include a detailed application of the concepts in question to the case.
First, there is no doubt that the column mentioned in the case falls by its nature within freedom of the press, and that this freedom arises as a reflection of freedom of expression. Nevertheless, it is not possible to accept every column, whatever its content and scope, as lawful on the ground of freedom of expression. While I accept that individuals must be allowed to enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms in a manner that does not harm the concepts of human rights, human dignity, individual autonomy and the right to develop one’s material and spiritual integrity, it must not be forgotten that these fundamental rights and freedoms also have limits and cannot be applied absolutely in every situation. In the case at hand, while freedom of the press is at issue as regards the column, the right to the protection of his personal data is at issue as regards the data subject. Freedom of the press and the right to the protection of personal data thus stand opposed to each other7. Accordingly, by virtue of the principle of “proportionality”, which is required for the limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms, the benefit expected from the column must be weighed against the legitimate interest which the individual expects from the right to the protection of his personal data. In making this comparison and in deciding concrete cases, I think that the basic point of departure should be as follows: a fair and reasonable balance must be struck between freedom of the press and of expression, which takes concrete form as the right of the press to inform the public and to report news to the public by means of columns, and the individual’s existing expectation and demand to be allowed to enjoy the right to the protection of personal data which, although they date back a long time, are in danger because they can still be accessed by wide audiences.
Although I am able to state in abstract terms that the decision ought to be rendered according to the balance I have described, it does not appear possible to apply this view to the concrete example and thereby assess the decision rendered by the Board. For it is clear that such an assessment would be remote from reality and flawed. Questions such as how many years back the newspaper column in question dates, which of the data subject’s personal data it contained and to what extent, and whether its subject matter is of concern to the public remain unanswered.
Nevertheless, I also think that the reasons which the Board gave as the basis for its conclusion that there was no action for it to take on the request for the erasure of the column containing the data subject’s personal data are insufficient. First, the fact that the data subject whose personal data appear in the column occupies a position that is of concern to the public cannot be a sufficient reason for holding that he will not be allowed to enjoy the right to the protection of personal data and cannot request the erasure of his data. Even if a person occupies a position that is of concern to the public and has become a public figure, he must be able to request the erasure of personal data that have been left without a purpose where the specified purposes of processing have ceased to exist. The fact that the person is of concern to the public cannot mean that his data will be kept or processed without a legitimate purpose. For such a view is contrary to the point of departure and the philosophy of the right to the protection of personal data. Moreover, in the judgment of the Court of Justice which I mentioned above, it was stated that the events contained in the newspaper report at issue had likewise caused significant moral and economic harm at the time they occurred. Being of concern to the public therefore does not, on its own, confer legitimacy on an interference with the right to the protection of personal data.
On the other hand, the argument that the Law will not apply because the personal data in the case were processed within the scope of freedom of expression, and that the Board therefore cannot take action on the request in question, does not appear to be a sufficient reason either. In response to this reasoning, my explanations above concerning freedom of expression apply; I think that a balance must be struck between the concepts of freedom of expression and the right to the protection of personal data on the basis of the specific case.
While I make the assessments set out above on the basis of the information on the specific case that can be gathered from the text of the decision summary, my expectation, in order to be able to make a more detailed and realistic assessment, is that decisions related in particular to fundamental rights and freedoms will be explained more comprehensively.
2. Sharing of special categories of personal data on internet and social media channels in a manner contrary to the Law
Some personal data are defined as sensitive data, in other words as special categories of data. The reason why certain data are termed sensitive and are thereby placed under more effective protection lies in the fact that these data are more closely connected with the person’s fundamental rights and freedoms. For such a distinction has rightly been drawn out of the concern that, should the data in question be misused, the harm and hardship that may be caused to the data subject will be greater. Which data belong to the special categories is listed exhaustively in the Law, and data falling outside those listed cannot be accepted as special categories of data.
The importance of special categories of data requires that these data benefit from more extensive protection. In line with this, the Law too makes the processing of special categories of personal data subject to stricter conditions. Health data, which are among a person’s most intimate information and information that he does not wish to be shared, and which denote all personal data obtained at every stage such as examination, diagnosis and treatment, are listed among the special categories of data in the Law and in all national and international instruments on the subject in which special categories of data are recognised.
In the specific case, a screen image of the data subject’s health report, which constitutes special category personal data, taken from an application belonging to the controller and used on mobile devices, was photographed using another device by physicians involved in the treatment of patients at a hospital. As a result of events that developed with the photograph taken being shared on internet and social media channels, the individual’s special category personal data were disclosed to a wide audience through social media. In the examination it carried out on the matter, the Board concluded that the responsibility imposed on the controller by Article 12 of the Law of “ensuring the appropriate level of security in order to ensure the safekeeping of personal data” had not been fulfilled by the controller and, relying on Article 18 of the Law, imposed an administrative fine on the controller concerned.
As regards the case, described in this degree of detail, I agree with the Board’s finding of an infringement and consider it right that the necessary sanction was applied. For it cannot be accepted that a screenshot, taken unlawfully, of special category data belonging to a person should be disclosed by being shared on social media. Indeed, there would have been an infringement even if these data had not been special category data. At this point, I think that the fact that the data which are the subject of the infringement are special category data is a matter that ought to affect the administrative fine. Nevertheless, points such as which measure the controller failed to take so that the infringement at issue in the decision occurred, and which measures ought to be taken in situations of this kind, are unclear. For example, by whom can the application belonging to the controller and used on mobile devices be accessed, and who, in this context, ought to have had access? Was the screenshot taken by a person who was able to gain access although he ought not to have been authorised to do so? Would it have been possible to take a technical measure preventing screenshots from being taken in the application in question? It would have been more useful for controllers, who are required to act in compliance with the Law, if questions of this kind that come to mind on the matters mentioned had also been explained in the published decisions.
The first point I wish to make in the assessment of the case is that the capturing of images of information and documents containing persons’ data, and the sharing of these images with third parties, mostly through mobile applications, or their disclosure on internet and social media channels, is a very frequently encountered problem. With the help of technological tools, persons can easily gain unlawful access to personal data, record these data and share them with third parties. On the other hand, a person who has obtained the data lawfully may exceed the limits of the specified, explicit and legitimate purpose that enabled him to obtain them. At the present time, when this possibility is always present, it is not possible to avoid unlawful acts of this kind either if awareness of the protection of personal data cannot be created.
How to prevent the unlawful sharing of patients’ health information is also regarded as a major problem area by the health-care institutions in whose compliance processes we are involved. It is stated that persons who have no interest or legitimate purpose in accessing patient information are able to access it, that physicians, owing to the close relations among them, give information about patients to outsiders, that they talk among themselves about patients’ health data in a manner going beyond the sharing of professional information and that this conversation somehow reaches other persons, but that it is very difficult to prevent this.
It must first be stated that, in a situation in which the human factor is involved, it is not possible to foresee every eventuality and to prevent entirely all the dangers created by all these eventualities. Sometimes, whatever you do, you cannot prevent a member of staff, a nurse, a physician or other employees who take and record a patient’s data from sharing data unlawfully. This, of course, cannot be a valid defence on its own. For this defence to come into consideration, the controller must already have taken all the necessary measures. For a defence along the lines of “whatever I did, I could not have prevented this act” cannot be accepted.
My recommendation to controllers is, first of all, that they take the technical and administrative measures which the Law and other legal provisions require to be taken. After that, the best way to counter the human factor is to provide training and raise awareness on the subject. A person who grasps the importance of the protection of personal data, who is aware that by sharing data belonging to others he will infringe those persons’ fundamental rights and freedoms, and who is capable of the empathy of not wanting the same infringement to be committed against himself, is always less likely to engage in the conduct described.
Therefore, health-care institutions in this specific context, and all controllers in general, should, as part of the measures they take in order to ensure data security, organise broad and comprehensive training on the protection of personal data that includes all the staff attached to them. They should also repeat this training at regular intervals, incorporating current developments. In this way, a controller that takes all the technical and administrative measures necessary for compliance with the Law and that undertakes awareness-raising initiatives so that none of the persons within its organisation engages in unlawful acts in this regard cannot be said to have also breached its obligations concerning data security.
3. Unlawful sharing of personal data processed in the job application process
One of the points in the field of personal data protection at which debates, questions and uncertainties arise most often is undoubtedly the employee–employer relationship. In which cases the data of employees may be collected or processed, namely the data taken at the time of their application before the employment begins, the data collected from candidates whose application is received but who are not hired, and the data collected in the course of the employment, and, beyond that, what is to happen to employees’ data after their period of employment has ended, form a very broad subject and debate. For this reason, rather than explaining in detail at this point the right to the protection of personal data in the employee–employer relationship, I shall confine myself to an assessment and explanation specific to the two decisions which the Board has published concerning personal data processed in the job application process.
The first of the decisions rendered concerns the sharing of the data of a candidate who applied for a job with the other candidates who applied. According to it, the job candidate applied for a job on a platform belonging to the controller, which provides human resources services online. The personal data comprising the information on the application made, the first name and surname, and the e-mail address were shared with the other applicants without any legal ground. It was concluded that this sharing meant that the company in question had not fulfilled its obligations concerning data security and that an administrative fine had to be imposed.
The first step in the employee–employer relationship is the job application stage. How this application stage is to be carried out, which data may be requested in the application form and, in particular, how and to what extent the information received during the application may be processed and at the end of what period it must be erased are questions that concern the field of personal data protection and must be answered in accordance with this legislation. The job application stage therefore constitutes an area that is important in terms of personal data and whose limits need to be defined. For this reason I recommend that controllers lay down definite and clear rules, consistent with the legislation on the protection of personal data, as to how job applications are to be received, and set this out in their relevant procedures.
I think that data protection was breached in the case, which occurred through the sharing with other candidates of personal data of a job candidate received during the job application, and I agree with the Board’s decision. For when we consider what benefit the controller could derive from sharing data belonging to one candidate with another candidate, no legitimate interest within the meaning of the Law is apparent. The controller therefore acted contrary to its obligations concerning data security by conduct for which no legitimate interest can be discerned.
The point I may criticise regarding the content of the decision will again concern its omissions. What was the controller’s defence regarding its conduct in sharing the personal data of a candidate who applied with other candidates? For what purpose did it carry out this sharing? Could the sharing at issue in the case be accepted as lawful in any circumstances; and if so, to what purpose must it relate? Furthermore, were the other candidates with whom the data were shared candidates applying for the same position? Does it make any difference in terms of the infringement whether the candidates with whom the data were shared were applying for the same or a different position? It would have been more useful for those concerned with the subject and for controllers if the answers to these questions could also have been understood from the decision.
The second decision on the subject concerns the transfer between controllers of personal data received during the application. According to it, the personal data of the person received during the job application were shared among controllers forming part of a group of companies by means of the use of the same database. The Board decided that an administrative fine should be imposed on the Company that carried out this sharing, on the ground that it had not fulfilled its obligations concerning data security.
The main question concerning this decision that causes confusion and needs to be answered is whether each of the companies within a group of companies is to be regarded as a separate controller. Proceeding from this, whether such treatment will take the form of complete separateness or whether there may also be common points, and under what heading sharing and transfers between controllers regarded as separate are to be assessed, constitute the other points of interest on the subject.
While at the outset the position of each company within a group of companies was not clear and definite, and the matter created uncertainty in the processes of compliance with the Law, it was subsequently stated, in the guides published and the statements made by the Board, that each company within a group of companies would be regarded as a separate controller. In this context it was determined that the data sharing and transfer operations carried out among the companies under a group of companies must also be assessed as sharing with or transfer to a third party. The uncertainties on the matter were thus removed, and it became clear that, in the processes which a group of companies carries out in order to become compliant with the Law, what a controller is required to do will be repeated for each company within the group. Accordingly, the sharing and transfers to be carried out by companies of this kind must also satisfy the conditions for sharing with or transfer to a third party. There should be no difference in this respect.
To return to the case, the personal information of a candidate who applied for a job with a controller within a group of companies was transferred by the controller to which the application was made to another controller within the same group. However, since this transfer was in the nature of a transfer of personal data to third parties, it ought to have satisfied one of the conditions set out in Article 8 of the Law, headed transfer of personal data. Under that provision, although personal data may not be transferred without the explicit consent of the person concerned, they may be transferred without explicit consent where the conditions for the processing of personal data are present and, provided that adequate measures are taken, where the conditions for the processing of special categories of personal data are present.
The decision states that the data subject had not given any explicit consent to the transfer of his data to third parties. From the fact that the Board found an infringement in respect of this transfer, we understand that the conditions for processing were not present in the specific case either. It is clear that a transfer carried out in this way must be contrary to the Law.
The point I wish to address here concerns the databases used by companies. A database means software in which information is stored. By using such software, companies are able to hold large quantities of data securely, to make rapid access to information possible and, more importantly, to provide access to more than one user at the same time. Although this greatly facilitates companies in carrying on their activities, it also entails risks from the standpoint of the protection of personal data. For this reason I recommend that, in the compliance processes they conduct, companies also review the databases they use and the persons authorised to access those databases and, if there are points on which they are deficient or at fault, bring these points into line with the Law.
Conclusion
| The points which, on the basis of an assessment of the summaries of the decisions that came before the Personal Data Protection Board and were published |
|---|
| following the examinations carried out, I think need to be borne in mind |
| are as follows: |
• Within the scope of the rights conferred on him by Article 11, headed “Rights of the data subject”, the data subject may apply to the controller and request “the erasure or destruction of personal data within the framework of the conditions provided for in Article 7”.
• Personal data obtained, collected or processed in accordance with the rules laid down by the Law must, once the purpose of the processing has ceased to exist, be eliminated by being subjected to one of the operations of erasure, destruction or anonymisation. If this requirement is not fulfilled by the controller of its own motion, it may also be requested by the data subject.
• In order not to encounter problems regarding the retention periods of personal data, controllers must comply with the periods laid down in the relevant legislation as to which personal data are to be erased at the end of which periods, where such a period exists, and must determine reasonable periods where it does not.
• The data subject’s request for the erasure, destruction or anonymisation of his data is closely related to the “right to be forgotten”.
• The right to be forgotten is a right which has emerged in order to serve as a safeguard against the dangers created by the possibilities offered by information technologies and to meet a contemporary need, which over time has also been recognised by the decisions of judicial authorities, and which provides for the person concerned to be forgotten.
• A fair and reasonable balance must be struck between freedom of the press and of expression, which takes concrete form as the wish of the press to inform the public and to report news to the public by means of columns, and the individual’s existing expectation and demand to be allowed to enjoy the right to the protection of personal data which, although they date back a long time, are in danger because they can still be accessed by wide audiences.
• The fact that the data subject whose personal data appear in the column occupies a position that is of concern to the public does not constitute a sufficient reason for holding that he will not be allowed to enjoy the right to the protection of personal data and cannot request the erasure of his data.
• As part of the measures they take in order to ensure data security, controllers should organise broad and comprehensive training on the protection of personal data that includes all the staff within their own organisation. They should also repeat this training at regular intervals, incorporating current developments. In this way, a controller that takes all the technical and administrative measures necessary for compliance with the Law and that undertakes awareness-raising initiatives so that none of the persons within its organisation engages in unlawful acts in this regard cannot be said to have also breached its obligations concerning data security.
• Since the job application stage constitutes an area that is important in terms of personal data and whose limits need to be defined, I recommend that controllers lay down definite and clear rules, consistent with the legislation on the protection of personal data, as to how job applications are to be received, and set this out in their relevant procedures.
• Each company in a group of companies is regarded as a separate controller, and the data sharing and transfer operations carried out between the companies under a group of companies are likewise treated as sharing with or transfer to a third party. Thus, in the processes which a group of companies carries out in order to become compliant with the Law, it must repeat, for each company within the group, what a controller is required to do.
• It is unlawful for the companies within a group of companies to transfer personal data among themselves by using the same database without the explicit consent of the data subject.
• In the compliance processes they conduct, companies must also review the databases they use and the persons authorised to access those databases and, if there are points on which they are deficient or at fault, bring these points into line with the Law.
Above all, and irrespective of the content and correctness of the decisions, it must be stated that the publication of the decisions rendered by the Board is highly important for the law of personal data protection, which is topical and still contains uncertainties as regards its scope, its content and, in particular, the manner of its application. The occurrence of specific cases, their being brought before the Board, their being examined and decided by the Board and their being shared with the public will ensure both the development of the field of personal data protection and, through discussion on the basis of concrete examples, the emergence of new perspectives.
For the reasons stated, the publication of decisions in this way is of importance for the right to the protection of personal data, for the understanding of the Law and, in particular, for controllers who are obliged to comply with the Law. That said, since I have set out my criticisms regarding the amount of information and detail given about the specific case in the decision summaries in detail above, at the points I found deficient, I confine myself here to recalling them.
Footnotes
- Academic/Attorney-at-law. ↑
- In fact, even before the constitutional amendment of 2010, the right to the protection of personal data had already been regulated in Articles 135-140 of the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (TCK) of 1 June 2005, which provided for offences relating to the matter. Nevertheless, although the protection of personal data against offences committed in respect of them had been secured by those provisions, the fact that the right did not enjoy constitutional protection prevented the provisions of the TCK, too, from affording full protection. It may therefore be said that the right to the protection of personal data acquired its true meaning with the additional paragraph 3 inserted in 2010 into Article 20 of the Constitution, headed “Right to respect for private life”. Indeed, work on the statutory instruments regulating the matter also gained in importance after that amendment. The additional paragraph 3 inserted into the Constitution reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to request the protection of personal data concerning him or her. This right also includes being informed about the personal data concerning oneself, having access to such data, requesting their rectification or erasure, and learning whether they are used in accordance with their purposes. Personal data may be processed only in the cases provided for by law or with the explicit consent of the person. The principles and procedures governing the protection of personal data shall be regulated by law.” ↑
- For the assessment I wrote on the decision summaries in question, see: https://www.academia.edu/36536342/K%C4%B0%C5%9E%C4%B0SEL_VER%C4%B0LER%C4%B0_KORUMA_ KURULU_NUN_20.4.2018_TAR%C4%B0H%C4%B0NDE_YAYINLAMI%C5%9E_OLDU%C4%9EU_KARAR_%C3% 96ZETLER%C4%B0NE_%C4%B0L%C4%B0%C5%9EK%C4%B0N_DE%C4%9EERLEND%C4%B0RME ↑
- For the Personal Data Security Guide (Technical and Administrative Measures), see: https://kvkk.gov.tr/SharedFolderServer/CMSFiles/7512d0d4-f345-41cb-bc5b-8d5cf125e3a1.pdf. ↑
- Accordingly, a person has the right to learn whether personal data concerning him are being processed; to request information in that regard if they have been processed; to learn the purpose of the processing of the data and whether they are used in accordance with that purpose; to know the third parties, in the country or abroad, to whom the data are transferred; and to request the erasure or destruction of the personal data within the framework of the conditions provided for in Article 7, or their rectification where the content of the data is incomplete or untrue. ↑
- AİHM, “M.L. ve W.W. v. Almanya” Başvuru No: 60798/10, 65599/10. ↑
- Article 28 – “(1) The provisions of this Law shall not apply in the following cases: … c) Where personal data are processed for artistic, historical, literary or scientific purposes or within the scope of freedom of expression, provided that this does not violate national defence, national security, public security, public order, economic security, the right to respect for private life or personality rights and does not constitute an offence.” ↑
- It must be pointed out here that the newspaper column which the data subject made the subject of the complaint is not known, and nor are the subject matter and content of that column or the extent to which it included which of the data subject’s data. Consequently, since the information provided is very limited, all that can be understood is that the right to the protection of personal data is at issue. It is, however, likely that fundamental rights and freedoms closely related to this right, such as the right to respect for private life and the freedom of communication, are also at issue. ↑
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Right to Be Forgotten” (Unutulma Hakkı), Essays in Honour of Prof. Dr. Yadigar İzmirli (Prof. Dr. Yadigar İzmirli’ye Armağan), Savaş Publishing, Ankara, 2024, pp. 1019–1141.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Assessment of the Amendments to the KVK Law on the Processing of Special Categories of Personal Data and the Transfer of Data Abroad” (KVK Kanunu’nda Özel Nitelikli Kişisel Verilerin İşlenmesi ve Yurt Dışına Veri Aktarımı Kapsamında Yapılan Değişikliklere İlişkin Değerlendirmeler), Academia.edu, 25 March 2024.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Our Assessment of the Decision Summaries Published by the Personal Data Protection Board on 18 July 2022” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulunun 18 Temmuz 2022 Tarihinde Yayınlanan Karar Özetlerine İlişkin Değerlendirmelerimiz), Dülger Law Office, 1 September 2022.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Use of Personal Health Data as Evidence in Divorce Proceedings” (Kişisel Sağlık Verilerinin Boşanma Davasında Delil Olarak Kullanılması), Hukuk ve Daha Fazlası Dergisi (Law and More), No. 9, June 2022, pp. 76–84.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “A Very Important Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board on Lawyers' Access to Enforcement Files Without a Power of Attorney” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulu’ndan Avukatların İcra Takip Dosyalarına Vekaletname Olmaksızın Erişebilmesine İlişkin Çok Önemli Bir Karar), Dülger Law Office, 15 August 2021.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, Personal Data Protection Law (Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku), 4th ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2026.

