28 November 2018Murat Volkan DülgerCommentary

Introduction

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

The “Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy” has been the subject of debate many times and, so to speak, has never quite been put on a firm footing. The first version of the Regulation was criticised as a premature piece of regulation. It was published when Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK) had only just been published, when some of the concepts and definitions in it had not yet been fully understood and, most importantly, when the Personal Data Protection Board, to which it frequently refers, had not yet taken office, and therefore without the Board’s views on the matter having been obtained. Indeed, the execution of the Regulation was suspended by the Council of State; some amendments were then made accordingly and the Regulation was published again in its amended form.

I think the amendments clearly showed the aim of trying to make rules that are compatible with and parallel to the personal data protection legislation. Nevertheless, I should state that even the amended version of the Regulation leaves a number of serious doubts as to whether the protection of personal data is ensured. Indeed, in my previous assessment of the subject I set out my criticisms of each individual amendment. Because the Regulation, even in its amended form, failed to bring satisfactory innovations for the protection of personal health data, it was challenged before the Council of State by the Turkish Medical Association and the Turkish Dental Association.

Full text

This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger*

Personal health data, which form one of the most important fields of data protection law and constitute a special category of personal data, were regulated by the “Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy”, which was published in the Official Gazette No. 29863 of 20 October 2016 and entered into force. The aim was thus to ensure the protection of the data and data privacy at every stage of the processing of personal health data.

I must state first of all that, since the date of its publication, the Regulation has been debated, criticised from many different angles, amended and, finally, had its execution stayed by a decision of the Council of State. The stages through which the Regulation has passed can be understood more clearly as follows:

• On 7 April 2016, Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK) was published.

• On 20 October 2016, the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy was published in the Official Gazette No. 29863 and entered into force.

• On 12 January 2017, the members of the Personal Data Protection Board took the oath and took up their duties.

• On 6 July 2017, a decision staying the execution of the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy was delivered1.

• On 24 November 2017, the Regulation Amending the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy, which also took account of the said decision on the stay of execution, was published in the Official Gazette No. 30250 and entered into force2.

• On 9 October 2018, a decision staying the execution of the Regulation Amending the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy was delivered3.

As will be understood when attention is paid to the dates and amendments set out above, the Regulation has been the subject of debate on many occasions and, so to speak, could never be made to settle into place. The original version of the Regulation was criticised as a premature piece of legislation because it was published when Law No. 6698 had only just been published, when certain concepts and definitions contained in it had not yet been fully understood and, most importantly, when the Personal Data Protection Board, to which frequent reference is made, had not yet taken up its duties, and therefore without the Board's views on the subject having been obtained. Indeed, the execution of the Regulation was stayed by the Council of State; however, certain amendments were made along those lines and the Regulation was published again in its amended form. I think that the amendments made clearly revealed the aim of attempting to adopt rules that are compatible and in line with the legislation on the protection of personal data. I must nevertheless state that even the amended version of the Regulation contains a number of serious doubts as regards ensuring the protection of personal data. Indeed, in my previous commentary on the subject I also expressed my criticisms with regard to each individual amendment.

Because, even in its amended form, the Regulation failed to bring satisfactory innovations as regards the protection of personal health data, it was challenged before the Council of State by the Turkish Medical Association and the Turkish Dental Association. Finally, the Council of State decided to stay the execution of the Regulation Amending the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy.

Such being the developments up to this point, I shall below assess the Council of State decision in question by considering the articles whose stay was requested and the conformity of these articles with the legislation on the protection of personal data.

The Decision of the Council of State and an Assessment of the Decision

1. On the request for a stay of execution and annulment of the Regulation Amending the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy in its entirety

The claimants requested a stay of execution and the annulment of the said Regulation in its entirety. The grounds for this request are as follows:

a. The fact that the execution of the original Regulation had been stayed by a decision of the Council of State

The claimants argued that the execution of the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy had been stayed by the Council of State, but that after that decision the Ministry had, by the Regulation at issue, made amendments to certain articles of the original Regulation; that what was in essence at issue was a Regulation whose execution had been stayed being put back into force after certain amendments had been made to it; and that the said Regulation was therefore unlawful in its entirety.

As already stated, the execution of the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy was stayed by the Council of State, in particular on the ground that it had been issued without the views of the Personal Data Protection Board on the subject having been obtained4.

A decision on a stay of execution is in the nature of an interim measure preceding the court's final decision in an action for annulment; it signifies that the lawfulness of the administrative act has been suspended. Accordingly, the administrative act in question must not be applied and its execution must be stayed until the action has been concluded.

Article 138 of the Constitution, headed “Independence of the courts”, expresses the obligation to comply with court decisions without delay, and the fact that these decisions may not be altered, as follows: “The legislative and executive organs and the administration must comply with court decisions; these organs and the administration may not alter court decisions in any way and may not delay their execution.”

In addition, Article 28 of the Administrative Procedure Law No. 2577, headed “Consequences of decisions” , provides that acts must be adopted or action taken without delay in response to decisions on a stay of execution: “The administration is obliged to adopt acts or take action without delay as required by the decisions of the Council of State, the regional administrative courts and the administrative and tax courts on the merits and on a stay of execution. This period may in no circumstances exceed thirty days from the service of the decision on the administration.”

Consequently, the administration is obliged to comply with court decisions in general, and with the courts' decisions on a stay of execution in particular, and to adopt acts or take action without delay in response to these decisions. As far as our subject is concerned, it follows that the administration must take all necessary measures to ensure that the Regulation whose execution has been stayed is not applied in any way until the end of the proceedings.

Although the defendant administration, in response, argued in its defence that the Board's views had been obtained after the members of the Board had been appointed, and that it had begun to adopt acts after obtaining those views before 6 July 2017, the date on which the decision on the stay of execution was delivered, and that the requirements of the decision had therefore been fulfilled, no part of this defence is such as to be considered well-founded.

First of all, a defence to the effect that the Board's views had in any case been obtained before the decision on the stay of execution could be a defence not in these proceedings but only in the action for annulment of the original Regulation. For what is at issue here is not the Regulation whose execution was stayed, but the attempt to put a Regulation whose execution has been stayed back into force with certain amendments. Consequently, a defence such as that the Board's view had in any case been obtained before the stay of execution can only be a ground for arguing that execution ought not to have been stayed. Yet here there is no doubt whatsoever that the execution of the Regulation was stayed.

Furthermore, a defence to the effect that the requirements of the decision had in any case been fulfilled because the Board's views were obtained after the members of the Board had been appointed conflicts with the rules and principles of administrative law and with the statutory provisions cited above. For what a decision on a stay of execution requires is not to continue applying the act after making certain amendments to the administrative act in question in the light of the reasons for which the Court stayed execution; it is not to apply and not to execute the administrative act in any way. At this point I think that the only defence open to the administration could be that the amended provisions of the Regulation whose execution was stayed had been brought into conformity with the law. Such a defence, however, would in turn amount to an implicit admission that the provisions which were not amended were unlawfully put back into force. For the Council of State stayed the execution not of the amended provisions of the Regulation but of the Regulation in its entirety.

The only course to be followed by the administration here in a manner compatible with the principle of the rule of law is to adopt a new and lawful administrative act, taking into account the Court's reasoning, and thereby to fill the gap that has arisen. In the present case, however, a Regulation whose execution had been stayed was put back into force with a few amendments, so that the decision was, as it were, circumvented and left unapplied.

Indeed, the Council of State too stated that it is not legally possible to revive a piece of legislation whose unlawfulness has been established by making partial amendments to legislation whose execution has been stayed. The Court held that the decision was capable of being implemented in the light of the factual and legal circumstances, but that the administration, whereas it ought to have fulfilled the requirements of the decision in the face of mandatory rules, had refrained from implementing a judicial decision as it stood and without delay.

For the reasons explained, it was decided to stay the execution of the Regulation Amending the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy, published in the Official Gazette No. 30250 of 24/11/2017, in its entirety.

b. The fact that the measures to be taken in the processing of personal health data

had not been determined by the Board

The claimants argued that personal data processing activities to be carried out under the Regulation in question would be unlawful as long as the measures to be taken in the processing of special categories of data had not been determined by the Board.

The last paragraph of Article 6 of Law No. 6698, headed “Conditions for the processing of special categories of personal data”, provides that, in the processing of special categories of personal data, it is mandatory that measures be taken by the Board. In line with this provision, Decision No. 2018/10 of the Personal Data Protection Board dated 31/01/2018 on the “Adequate Measures to Be Taken by Controllers in the Processing of Special Categories of Personal Data” was published on 7 March 2018. The Regulation in question, by contrast, entered into force before that decision, on 24 November 2017. Consequently, the Regulation, whose essential subject matter is health data, entered into force when the measures to be taken in the processing of special categories of data had not yet been determined, and it was drawn up without regard to those measures.

Law No. 6698 has the character of basic framework legislation in the field of the protection and processing of personal data. Accordingly, the provisions of the Law lay down the basic rules on the processing of personal data and make it compulsory to comply with these rules in every kind of activity and regulation relating to the processing of personal data. It is thus clear that rules on the processing of personal data must be in conformity with the Law. Moreover, irrespective of the subject matter, the provisions of a regulation must not be contrary to the provisions of a law.

A regulation concerning personal data such as health data, which form the most important part of the field of personal data and, since they contain the most intimate information about individuals' health, require a high level of protection, must be drawn up with careful regard to the adequate measures determined by the Board on the matter. Even if a regulation on health data could be regarded as lawful at that moment, when the measures concerning special categories of data had not yet been determined, I consider that it has become unlawful since the publication on 7 March 2018 of the Decision in which the measures were determined. Consequently, the Regulation at issue is unlawful in this respect as well.

No examination of this point by the Council of State can, however, be seen in the decision. I consider that this is due to the fact that, on the date on which the decision was delivered, the adequate measures had been determined by the Board. On the other hand, in the Council of State decision of 6 July 2017 staying the execution of the original version of the Regulation, the fact that the adequate measures had not yet been determined by the Board was given as a ground. It is therefore possible to say that there is no obstacle to the same ground being relevant here too, and that the Council of State is of the opinion that a regulation on health data must be drawn up taking into account the adequate measures on the matter.

2. On the request for a stay of the relevant provisions of the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy

A stay of execution and the annulment of the relevant provisions of the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy were requested.

Before considering the provisions whose annulment is sought and the grounds for annulment, however, I must state that there is a serious discrepancy between the provision whose annulment is sought by the claimants and the grounds for annulment. As far as can be seen from the Council of State decision, the claimants have no legal interest in once again challenging various provisions of a Regulation whose execution has already been stayed, nor does this have any meaning or effect. The execution of the provisions whose annulment is sought has already been stayed; although the decision on the stay of execution has not been duly implemented, this is not a valid ground for bringing an action again on the same subject. Here, recourse should be had to the judicial remedy concerning the failure to implement the decision duly, or it should be possible to seek the annulment of the relevant provisions of the Regulation as published in its amended form.

The claimants, for their part, stated that they were challenging the amending regulation whose annulment is sought in its entirety, together with certain paragraphs of Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the original regulation, which were amended by the said amending regulation and which they therefore now regard as a new rule.

However, a piece of legislation providing for the amendment of a regulation whose execution has already been stayed is legally non-existent. Consequently, although the claimants' application may be regarded as correct in practical terms, in terms of the law as it ought to be what must be requested is not a stay of execution of what was amended by the new amendment but a declaration that it is legally non-existent. For when a stay of execution is requested and the court delivers a decision to that effect, the impression arises that legal existence is being conferred on an act that is legally non-existent.

What I have said above is meant to state what ought to be the case in theoretical terms. Otherwise, by the action they brought and the request they made, the claimants have in my view done something extremely positive and appropriate, both from the standpoint of legal practice and in terms of their social responsibility.

The provisions which are the subject of the request for annulment are as follows:

• Art. 5(8): “Personal health data shall be transferred by health service providers to the central health data system in accordance with the procedures and principles determined by the Ministry.”

• Art. 7(1):“Personal health data may be processed, without the explicit consent of the data subject being sought, by persons under an obligation of secrecy or by authorised institutions and organisations, for the purposes of protecting public health, preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of treatment and care services, and the planning and management of health services and their financing.”

• Art. 8(1):“Personal health data may be transferred to the relevant public institutions and organisations, for the purposes of protecting public health, preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of treatment and care services, and the planning and management of health services and their financing, where this is expressly provided for in their laws, provided that the measures determined by the Board are also taken and the conditions laid down in the third paragraph are met.”

The grounds for the request in question are as follows:

a. The unlawfulness inherent in the very rule that personal data be transferred

to the central health data system

In the original version of the Regulation it was stated that, when health service providers make transfers to the central health data system, processing must be carried out in accordance with the procedures and principles determined by the Ministry. In the amended version of the Regulation, by contrast, it is provided that, in the processing activity in question, in addition to the procedures and principles determined by the Ministry, the mandatory provisions of the Law and the procedures and principles determined by the Board must also be complied with.

The claimants argued that, although the amended version of the provision is more appropriate than its previous version, the unlawfulness inherent in the essence of the rule persists. Indeed, at first sight no unlawfulness is apparent at this point. For the provision whose annulment is sought requires the transfer activity to be carried out in accordance with the mandatory rules of the Law and the procedures and principles determined by the Board and the Ministry. A transfer activity carried out in accordance with these requirements could thus be regarded as lawful processing. The point to which attention must be paid, however, is not the rules according to which the transfer is to be made but the transfer activity in itself. There is no method whatsoever of differentiation or filtering as to which health data are to be transferred, in what quantity, in what manner and according to what criteria.

It must not be forgotten that Law No. 6698 has the character of framework legislation on the processing of personal data and cannot possibly explain in detail the processing activities relating to each individual type of personal data. What is required is to determine, by means of special rules, the processing activities relating to the personal data in question in conformity with the provisions of the Law and, in particular, with the general principles on the processing of personal data laid down by the Law. Consequently, the Regulation, which has the character of a special set of rules on health data, should not content itself with stating the requirements with which transfer activities must comply, but should also regulate which health data are to be transferred to the central data system and according to what criteria.

It must be pointed out here that the Regulation imposes on health service providers a limitation to the effect that personal data may be processed only in connection with what the health service provided requires. It might therefore be thought that the data to be transferred to the central data transfer system can be limited only to the requirements of the health service provided. But is this limitation sufficient for a transfer activity to the central data transfer system, and is it capable of explaining the transfer activity in all its details? These questions must be debated. In my view, “the requirements of the health service” is a very broad and vague expression and needs to be clarified.

Otherwise all health data will be transferred without any distinction. This conflicts in particular with the principles of “processing for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes” and of “being relevant, limited and proportionate to the purposes for which they are processed” applying to personal data. I therefore consider that the provision whose annulment is sought is, in its essence, incompatible with the aims and principles of the protection of personal data.

b. The fact that anonymisation is not provided for in the activity of transfer to the central data system

The fact that no method of anonymisation is provided for with regard to the transfer activity is along the same lines as the ground set out above. Although the anonymisation of data is not sufficient on its own, it essentially forms one leg of the solution to the shortcomings mentioned above. I stated above that the failure to regulate which health data are to be transferred, according to what criteria and in what manner is incompatible with the aims and principles of the protection of personal data. In order to ensure the protection and confidentiality of personal data, it is useful and necessary to provide that the health data transferred to the central data system be transferred in anonymised form. For in a situation in which even those who are authorised to access the system are not known, having the data in the system in anonymous form would be the most appropriate course from the standpoint of the protection of personal data.

c. The fact that no limitation has been placed on the administration's access

As stated above, a limitation by reference to the requirements of the health service provided, albeit an insufficient one, has been laid down for health service providers with regard to the personal data they must transfer. On the side of the central data system, however, there is no limitation or rule whatsoever with regard to the administration's access. Yet it ought to have been clearly stated who is authorised to access a system of this kind, to which all the health data in the country are transferred. Particularly in a situation in which no method of anonymisation has been provided for, unlimited and absolute access by the administration is extremely dangerous.

d. The fact that the software standards which health service providers must use

have not been specified

Under the Regulation, health service providers are obliged to use software that conforms to the standards determined by the Ministry. However, not only is it not stated what the standards to be complied with are, it has also not been laid down by whom they are to be determined.

e. The fact that Art. 7(1) and Art. 8(1) introduce an obligation of transfer

The claimants argue that the provisions in question introduce an obligation for data to be transferred, without any distinction being made, to the central health data system established by the Ministry of Health, and state that the Ministry may in turn transfer these data to other public institutions and organisations. Attention has also been drawn, however, to the fact that the scope of the transfer obligation imposed on health service providers has been neither determined nor limited.

The provisions of the Regulation in question regulate the cases in which health data may be processed and transferred without the explicit consent of the data subject. Accordingly, where any one of the exceptional conditions laid down is present, personal health data may be processed, without the explicit consent of the data subject, by persons under an obligation of secrecy or by authorised institutions and organisations. In addition, where adequate measures are taken by the Board and the necessary conditions are met, it is possible for the health data in question to be transferred to the relevant public institutions and organisations.

Consequently, whether or not the exceptional conditions set out in the relevant provisions are met, and whether or not any processing or transfer is carried out on the basis of these conditions, the fact that this right and power has been conferred imposes on health service providers an obligation to make transfers in any event. For, in order that such a right may be exercised, the transfer has implicitly been made compulsory. Faced with such an obligation, whose scope and limits have not been determined, it is inevitable that the transfer of all health data that are not in anonymous form, without their being subject to any distinction, will give rise to serious drawbacks.

f. The fact that the recording obligation incumbent on health service providers is uncertain

On the other hand, it is also uncertain according to which regulatory act and in conformity with which standards health service providers are to carry out the activities of recording and transferring the data of persons who apply to them in order to receive health services. Although the Regulation provides for the sanction to be applied where the obligation is breached, it has not specified the criteria and standards to be complied with.

g. The fact that the relevant provisions constitute an interference impairing the essence of the fundamental right

The claimants argued that, for all these reasons explained, the provisions in question whose annulment is sought impair the essence of the right to the protection of personal data and constitute an interference that is not in keeping with the aim.

It must be pointed out that no examination by the Council of State of the provisions whose annulment is sought can be seen. I think that the reason for this is, as already stated, that a decision on a stay of execution had already been delivered earlier in respect of the whole of the Regulation containing the provisions whose annulment is sought.

The provisions in question concern the transfer of personal health data by health service providers to the central health data system. To describe the process briefly, the health service provider, which is responsible for providing or producing health services, records the health data relating to the persons who apply to it in order to receive health services. These recorded data are transferred to the central health data system, a term denoting the data system established by the Ministry of Health in which health data are collected. In this way all health data throughout the country, in both the public and the private sector, are collected in the central health data system. There is no doubt that processing of such a serious nature relating to health data must be clear, unambiguous and definite in every respect. In addition, one should not be content with all the rules laid down being clear; particular emphasis must also be placed on whether they are in conformity with the legislation on the protection of personal data and with the essence of the right. In the rules in question, by contrast, it is apparent that, in complete contrast to the legislation on the protection of personal data, the processing of personal data has been made not an exception but a rule.

Conclusion

The conclusions reached as a result of the assessment of the Council of State decision of 9 October 2018 explained above are as follows:

• Since the date of its publication, the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy has been criticised and debated from many different angles.

• Following the decision on a stay of execution delivered on 6 July 2017, the said Regulation underwent various amendments by the Regulation of 24 November 2017 amending it and was put back into force.

• Because, even in its amended form, the Regulation failed to bring satisfactory innovations as regards the protection of personal health data, it was challenged before the Council of State by the Turkish Medical Association and the Turkish Dental Association.

• It was argued that what was at issue in the amendment made after the Council of State decision was an attempt to put a Regulation whose execution had in essence been stayed back into force after making certain amendments to it, and that the health data Regulation of 24 November 2017 was therefore unlawful in its entirety.

• What a decision on a stay of execution requires is not to continue applying the act after making certain amendments to the administrative act in question in the light of the reasons for which the Court stayed execution; it is not to apply and not to execute the administrative act in any way.

• For this reason, the only course to be followed by the administration in a manner compatible with the principle of the rule of law is to adopt a new and lawful administrative act, taking into account the Court's reasoning, and thereby to fill the gap that has arisen.

• Indeed, the Council of State too stated that it is not legally possible to revive a piece of legislation whose unlawfulness has been established by making partial amendments to legislation whose execution has been stayed.

• Moreover, the Regulation was drawn up before the adequate measures to be taken in the processing of special categories of personal data had been determined by the Board. Yet a regulation concerning personal data such as health data, which form the most important part of the field of personal data and, since they contain the most intimate information about individuals'

health, require a high level of protection, must be drawn up with careful regard to the adequate measures determined by the Board on the matter.

• For these reasons, it was decided to stay the execution of the Regulation Amending the Regulation on the Processing of Personal Health Data and Ensuring Their Privacy, published in the Official Gazette No. 30250 of 24/11/2017, in its entirety.

• In addition, various provisions of the original version of the Regulation were challenged. However, the claimants have no legal interest in once again challenging the provisions of a Regulation whose execution has already been stayed, nor does this have any meaning or effect.

• The provisions in question concern the transfer of personal health data by health service providers to the central health data system.

• The claimants stated that there is unlawfulness in the essence of the rule that personal data be transferred to the central health data system, and that anonymisation should be provided for in the transfer activity, the administration's access to the system should be limited, the software standards which health service providers must use should be definite, and the recording obligation should be regulated. It was also argued that the provisions impose an obligation of transfer on health service providers and that the processing of personal data has thereby been made not an exception but a rule.

• It was argued that, for all these reasons, the provisions in question impair the essence of the right and constitute an interference contrary to the aim.

• No examination by the Council of State of the provisions whose annulment is sought can be seen. I think that this is due to the fact that a decision on a stay of execution had already been delivered earlier in respect of the provisions in question.

I must state that the reasoning in the Council of State's decision staying execution is extremely well prepared and is in the nature of a lesson with regard to the “principle of the rule of law”, which has recently suffered great erosion in our country.

I consider that the whole of society owes a debt of thanks to the Turkish Medical Association and the Turkish Dental Association, and to the lawyers of these institutions, for their determination, persistence and sensitivity on this subject.

The fact that the Ministry of Health, despite the judicial decisions on this subject, is so determined “not to ask people whether they wish their data to be collected in a database”, and its insistent attitude in regarding the recording and processing of individuals' data as its own right, point to yet another problem. Is this the result of a desire to do something good for the people in spite of the people, or of the boldness that comes from a disregard for the law so great as to ignore court decisions? My hope and wish is that it is the former and that this insistence on error will be abandoned as soon as possible. I regard the attempt to impose an unlawful health and personal data protection policy, in a matter in which a large majority would in any case be likely to give explicit consent if the data subjects were asked, as the reflection of a general mindset.

This is in fact what constitutes the greatest problem. I do not think that the Ministry of Health will use these personal health data which it collects for malicious purposes; on the contrary, I am of the opinion that, even though there may be certain disruptions and errors, they will use these data for the health of individuals and of the public. However, all public institutions and organisations, and the Ministry of Health first and foremost, must begin as soon as possible the process of compliance and transformation with regard to personal data which the private sector has already begun, and must become aware of the fact that the paradigm in this field has now changed. The data subject must not be treated as a nobody and subjected to the mindset of “you are my property anyway, so why should I ask”; the rights which the data subject derives from the law must also be accorded to him in practice, and he must be enabled to exercise them. Indeed, the annulments of the regulations underline this change of paradigm.

Notwithstanding what I have said, I must regretfully state that I think the Ministry of Health will publish a new regulation, taking into account the points set out in the Decision, and will try to continue on its way. I therefore consider that the institutions, organisations and individuals concerned must continue to insist on their demand that the general principles in Article 4 of Law No. 6698 be complied with, and must stress at every opportunity that, in the processing of personal data, the requirement that they be relevant, limited and proportionate to the purposes for which they are processed must be observed.

Personal health data form one of the most important fields of data protection law and, at the same time, contain the most intimate information about individuals; for this reason they constitute a category of data in need of the highest level of protection. Care must therefore be taken to ensure that rules on health data are clear and definite in a manner compatible with the principles on the processing of personal data. To that end, and in order to avoid repetition, I confine myself to referring to the criticisms I have made above with regard to each individual ground, and I must state that particular emphasis needs to be placed on the points in question.

Footnotes

  1. Member of the academic staff for Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and IT Law, Yeditepe University, Faculty of Law / Attorney-at-law. ↑
  2. 15. D. 2016/10488, 2016/10500 YD. T. 06.07.2017 ↑
  3. For a commentary on the Regulation see: Murat Volkan Dülger, “Kişisel Sağlık Verilerinin İşlenmesi ve Mahremiyetinin Sağlanması Hakkında Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik’in Getirdikleri ve Dikkat Edilmesi Gereken Hususlar”; www.academia.edu.tr. ↑
  4. 15. D. 2018/1490 YD. T. 09.10.2018 ↑
  5. "…that on 20/10/2016, the date on which the Regulation at issue was published in the Official Gazette, the Personal Data Protection Board had not yet been established; that, consequently, the adequate measures referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 6 of Law No. 6698 had not been determined by the Board, and that the rules at issue were adopted without the opinion of the Board having been obtained, as provided for in sub-paragraph (h) of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Law, on draft legislation prepared by other institutions and organisations and containing provisions on personal data; that, according to the general explanatory memorandum of the Law and the provisions of the Law, the Personal Data Protection Board has a power of control and supervision of a general nature in the matter of the protection of personal data; that it is mandatory to obtain the opinion of the Personal Data Protection Board on draft legislation prepared by other institutions and organisations and containing provisions on personal data; and that the rules at issue, which were prepared without having been subjected to the control and supervision of the Personal Data Protection Board and which entered into force upon publication in the Official Gazette on 20/10/2016, are for this reason not in conformity with the legislation and the law…" ↑

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