Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
A LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF THE BLOCKING OF INTERNET COMMUNICATION AND THE REGULATION INTRODUCED BY LAW NO. 5651
Murat Volkan Dülger
INTRODUCTION
In the 20th century humanity achieved great advances and successes in almost every field of science and technology and immediately reflected these advances in its daily life. These scientific advances and technological developments continued at an increasing pace from the beginning of the 20th century and continue to increase in the 21st century. This research, however, was carried out not only so that people might live in better conditions, more comfortably and longer, but also in order to develop military technology with which they could destroy one another. The knowledge obtained in this work was applied to technology and entered daily life.
When the effects of these developments in the field of technology on human life are considered, it is seen that electronic devices and information systems in particular play a very important and indispensable role in almost every area of the daily life of modern society. The most recent and most widely used of these scientific and technological developments are the advances in information technology and, linked to them, the development of the internet. In particular, the opening of the internet to use by the general public from the early 1990s onwards, its sudden spread and its rapid entry into daily life have given this invention the character of a veritable information and technology revolution.
The internet is the very extensive network formed by the interconnection of networks which are themselves formed by the interconnection of millions of information systems spread across the world1. As these networks grow day by day and new network backbones are added to this system, the internet is also called “the network of all the world’s computer networks”2 or “the network of networks”3. On this basis the internet may be defined as the network between information systems, formed jointly by more than one communication network, in which files such as text, pictures, music, graphics, written text and the like, together with software – in short, every kind of information created by
This article was published in İstanbul Barosu Dergisi, Volume: 81, Issue: 2007/4, July – August 2007, pages 1477 – 1545.
Attorney-at-law; doctoral student in the Department of Public Law, Institute of Social Sciences, Istanbul University. human beings – are shared and transmitted in the form of data4.
In this study it is deliberately the term information system, and not the term computer, that is used. This is because the concept of information system is a broader concept which also encompasses the term computer. Today, besides computers in the classic sense, consisting of components such as a monitor, read-only memory, random-access memory, a central processor, a keyboard and the like, there are also numerous devices such as pocket computers, mobile telephones, in-vehicle computers, vehicle tracking systems, and systems or servers providing storage services, and these too can access the internet and transfer data there. Consequently, individuals can also express their thoughts by means of these devices and, accordingly, offences can also be committed with them. For this reason, in this study and in our earlier studies the concept of “information system” has been deliberately preferred so as to cover all these devices5.
The fact that the internet spread within a very short time after its emergence and entered daily life in every area of modern society has provided humanity with new opportunities and conveniences in many fields. However, as has been seen throughout the history of civilisation, not only people leading a normal life but also those engaged in illegal activities, those who commit offences, those who attack individual freedoms and those who oppose the social order are able to benefit from these opportunities and conveniences. These persons continue their acts contrary to the social order or aimed at disrupting that order by making use of these opportunities and/or conveniences6. Sometimes people may even, through what they do on the internet, breach rules laid down as criminal norms without being aware of it.
Over the last twenty years the internet has entered the daily life of modern society with ever-increasing intensity and has become the vital artery of developed societies in terms of the production and transmission of information. Their importance becomes clearer when it is considered that possessing information is today regarded as the greatest power. As with all new technological inventions, as information systems and data transmission networks, and the internet in particular, became widespread, abuses inevitably emerged and steadily increased7. Thus, not only have new types of offence called “cybercrime” emerged, but classic types of offence such as terrorist activities, insult or fraud have also come to be committed by using this new technology8.
In this study an attempt will be made to discuss, from a legal standpoint, the measures that will be taken and ought to be taken where there is a suspicion that criminal norms have been breached via the internet or where it is established that such a breach has occurred, and, among these measures, the problem of whether access to the content containing elements of an offence may be blocked; to set out the questions and problems relating to this subject; and to propose solutions.
In doing so, an attempt will be made, with a scholarly approach, to classify the subject of the blocking of internet communication according to the common features it displays within itself, and it will be examined according to these distinctions.
In addition, Law No. 5651 of 04.05.2007 “on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Offences Committed by means of Such Publications”, which was adopted only very recently and entered into force on its publication in the Official Gazette No. 26530 of 23 May 2007, and which we have long argued ought to exist (but ought not to exist in this form), will also be examined and assessed in this study from the standpoint of the regulation and blocking of internet communication.
I. Distinctions Relating to the Blocking of Internet Communication
1. The Distinction between Blocking Access to the Internet and Blocking Internet Communication
The first distinction encountered in relation to the blocking of internet communication is the question whether it is access or communication that may be blocked. Access to the internet is an individual act and denotes being able to go online. What is examined here, however, is not the blocking of individuals’ access to the internet but the blocking of communication over the internet. For this reason the concept of “blocking of internet communication” is used in the title of the study.
It should be noted at once that communication on the internet may be one-way, as in the case of website publication, internet journalism, advertising on web pages and the like, or may take place by way of mutual interaction (interactively), as in the case of taking part in forums or chat rooms, chatting over the internet, writing comments on news items in internet newspapers and the like. This study examines the problem of the blocking of communication, whether it is one-way or takes place by way of mutual interaction.
Blocking of access to the internet, on the other hand, may result, for example, from the failure of a person who accesses the internet by using the access service provided by an Internet Service Provider (ISP) – an “access provider” in the words of Law No. 5651 – to perform his obligations under the access subscription contract concluded with the ISP, or, conversely, from the access provider’s failure for whatever reason to perform its own obligation. This, however, falls within the law of obligations and cannot be regarded as a restriction of freedom of thought or as blocking of internet communication. For, in whatever way it comes about, an individual who is unable to obtain the necessary service from an access provider may perfectly well obtain the same service from another access provider.
On this subject, Law No. 5651 introduces the concept of “blocking of access”. Art. 8 of this Law, headed “decision to block access and its implementation”, states that “a decision to block access shall be given in respect of publications made on the internet where there are sufficient grounds for suspicion that their content constitutes the following offences…”. This provision regulates the blocking by access providers of access to websites in respect of which there is sufficient suspicion that the types of offence listed in the article have been committed. It is seen, however, that this provision was drafted without taking into account that on the internet there is also communication in the form of mutual interaction and that offences may also be committed in this way – for example, that data relating to child pornography may be transferred during a virtual chat. This article was drafted on the assumption that the internet is purely an area of one-way publishing, without taking the part consisting of mutual interaction into account.
2. The Distinction between the Technical and the Legal Possibility of Blocking Internet Communication
It should first be noted that the concept forming the title of the study, “the legal assessment of the possibility of blocking internet communication”, is the result of a deliberate choice. This is because whether it is technically possible to shut down a given website or to block access to it is a separate subject of examination. For example, the website “www.volkandulger.av.tr”, which has been found by a court decision to contain elements of an offence and ordered to be shut down, may be made accessible again in identical form by changing its ending to identifying extensions such as “com.tr”, “com” or “gen.tr”. Likewise, where the court orders access to this site to be blocked, although it will not be possible to access the site via access providers (internet service providers) operating within the country, it may perfectly well be possible to access it via access providers operating from abroad.
The legislature, being aware of this, also provides in Art. 8 of Law No. 5651 that the decision given to block access to a website is to be notified to the access provider (ISP) for implementation. As a result of the implementation of this decision it will not be possible to reach the website concerned from within the country.
As can be seen, this constitutes the technical part of the subject under examination and falls outside the limits of this study; the question of the technical possibility of blocking will therefore be touched upon only where and to the extent necessary. In this study only the legal dimension of the blocking of internet communication will be examined, within the framework of legal scholarship, practice and the statutory provisions.
3. The Distinction between Blocking Internet Communication by the Methods of “General Blocking” and “Special Blocking”
As regards the blocking of internet communication, beneath the distinction between technical blocking and legal blocking mentioned above, legal blocking is itself subject to a further distinction between “general blocking” and “special blocking”. This sub-distinction closely resembles the distinction between “general prevention” and “special prevention” which the criminal norm is intended to achieve. Accordingly, “general blocking” is the blocking of access to certain websites by subjecting internet access to a filter before any element of an offence has yet arisen, while “special blocking” is the blocking of access to a website containing elements of an offence where there is a suspicion that a criminal norm has been breached or where the court has found such a breach to be established. Another matter that may fall within special blocking is whether it is possible to impose on the perpetrator of an offence, as a security measure, a “ban on access to the internet”. The making and enforcement of such an order would constitute an example of special blocking of internet communication.
Another matter that needs to be mentioned under the heading of special blocking is the administrative decisions taken in practice by various institutions with a view to blocking access to websites. Since these decisions have no legal basis, they may be described as “administrative practice”.
The question of the legal assessment of the possibility of blocking internet communication will likewise be explained according to these distinctions and within these limits.
II. The Provisions Introduced by Law No. 5651 “on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Offences Committed by means of Such Publications”
1. In General
Until now, academics working in the field of information technology, people from the sector and lawyers have stated on every platform and in every publication that there was no legal infrastructure for the regulation of the internet and that such an infrastructure was extremely necessary both for preventing and detecting unlawful acts and for determining who is responsible for those acts.
This important deficiency in the field of information technology was taken up by the Ministry of Transport, the highest and most influential institution in this field in our country, and a bill was drawn up by that Ministry with a view to determining the liabilities of internet actors and regulating the internet. This bill was prepared in eight articles under the title “Law on the Prevention of Offences Committed in the Electronic Environment and on the Amendment of Laws Nos. 2559 and 2937”. However, after the bill had been referred in that form to the relevant committee, articles regulating the definition of internet actors and the right of reply and correction in respect of internet publishing were added and the title of the law was also changed; it was then referred to the plenary of Parliament, where it was adopted in that form and became law.
Art. 1 of the Law defines the purpose and scope of the Law as being “to regulate the obligations and liabilities of content providers, hosting providers, access providers and public use providers and the principles and procedures for combating certain offences committed on the internet through content, hosting and access providers”. It is appropriate that this Law should make provision concerning content, hosting and public use providers and the administrative management of the internet. However, making provision in this Law for combating offences committed on the internet through content, hosting and access providers is contrary to the purpose which this Law ought to have.
It should first be noted that crime cannot be combated through “content, hosting and access providers”. These internet actors are not subjects through whom crime is to be combated. Crime is combated by education, laws, the law enforcement agencies and the machinery of justice as a whole. The second point to be made is that the articles enacted under the heading of combating crime are “coercive measures” belonging to the law of criminal procedure. These articles ought therefore to be located in the chapter on coercive measures of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271.
2. Definitions
Art. 2 of the Law, under the heading of definitions, gives the definitions of certain concepts used in the Law. According to it, the terms are defined as follows: Presidency means the Telecommunications Communication Presidency within the Authority; information means the form of data that has acquired meaning; access means gaining the possibility of use by connecting to an internet environment; access provider means any natural or legal person providing its users with the possibility of access to the internet environment; content provider means the natural and legal person who produces, alters and provides any kind of information and data offered to users over the internet environment; internet environment means the environment created on the internet which is open to the public and falls outside communication and personal or corporate computer systems; publication made on the internet environment means data which is located on the internet environment and whose content can be accessed by an indefinite number of persons; monitoring means the tracking of information and data without affecting the data on the internet environment; public use provider means one who provides persons with the possibility of using the internet environment at a certain place and for a certain period; traffic data means values such as the parties, time, duration, type of service used, amount of data transferred and connection points relating to any kind of access carried out on the internet environment; data means any kind of value that can be processed by a computer; publication means publication made on the internet environment; and hosting provider means the natural and legal persons who provide or operate the systems that host services and content.
3. The Obligation to Inform the Public
Art. 3 of the Law, under the heading of obligation to inform, makes provision concerning internet publishing. Accordingly, content, hosting and access providers are to keep their identifying information on their own internet environment, in a form accessible to users and up to date, in accordance with the principles and procedures laid down by regulation. This provision is, as it were, analogous to the rule on the mandatory information to be included in printed works laid down in Art. 4 of the Press Law No. 51879. It is a positive provision included in the Law as a solution to a problem frequently encountered in practice. When an offence is committed by means of an internet web page, the identity details of those who prepared the content of that web page generally cannot be obtained and the perpetrators cannot be apprehended. With the application of this article, content providers are placed under an obligation to publish information of this kind. By contrast, no problem arises in obtaining the information referred to in the article as regards access and hosting providers, because, these generally being commercial companies, it is extremely easy to obtain the information in question. Moreover, in the course of any investigation access and hosting providers also hand over the information they hold on content providers. Nevertheless, the introduction of this provision for every internet actor is to be welcomed.
The first problem that comes to mind with regard to this provision, however, is the question of which content providers will be subject to the obligation to inform in question. Art. 2 of the Law defines a content provider as any natural or legal person who produces, alters and provides any kind of information or data offered to users over the internet. Accordingly, everyone who opens a blog on the internet, writes a comment on a news item in any internet newspaper, takes part in chat rooms or takes part in internet forums is a content provider under this definition. But is it possible, both technically and in terms of practicability, for all the persons listed to display the information in question on the website each and every time? Will this information, for example, be given at the end or at the beginning of every sentence written in a forum? In our view, the answers to these questions are in the negative. In fact, what the legislature had in mind in this article was not content providers within the meaning of Art. 2, but those who own and/or operate a website. There is no doubt that, technically, these too are content providers and that they even make up a large part of all content providers; but since content providers do not consist of these persons alone, and since it is not feasible for persons other than the owner and/or operator of a website to give the information in question every time they provide content and for that information to be kept on the website in a visible form, the provision is a flawed one. It would therefore be far more consistent with the aim pursued by this Law to use the term “website owner and/or operator” instead of content providers in this article of the Law.
Art. 3(2) of the Law, for its part, provides that a content, hosting or access provider who fails to fulfil the obligation set out in paragraph 1 shall be given an administrative fine of from two thousand YTL to ten thousand YTL by the Telecommunications Communication Presidency. The point to be made here is that the reason why sanctions leaving a choice between a stated lower and upper limit have a place in the system of sanctions is to enable those who perform the judicial function and are professional judges to individualise the sanction according to the personality of those who have been proved to have committed an offence, their propensity to reoffend and the gravity of the manner in which the offence was committed. When the penalty is fixed between that lower and upper limit, a large number of criteria are taken into account, such as the manner in which the act was committed, the means used in committing it, the importance and value of the object of the act, the time and place at which it was committed, the gravity of the harm and of the danger, the intensity of the perpetrator’s culpability, the reasons and motives for the act and the perpetrator’s aim, and the perpetrator’s past and his personal and social circumstances10. Moreover, the settled case law of the Court of Cassation in criminal cases states that, whether the penalty is fixed at the lower limit or at the upper limit, reasons must without fail be given for it11. Under this article, however, those who will apply the administrative sanction are not professional judges and may well be persons who have not even had a legal education. On the basis of what experience and what criterion, then, will those who take this decision individualise the penalty in question? As it stands, the provision is in open contradiction with criminal law and with the theory of sanctions. The basis of this provision, however, is Art. 17(2) of the Misdemeanours Law No. 5326, in which administrative sanctions are regulated in general terms and which states that “an administrative fine may also be determined by indicating its lower and upper limits in the law. In that case, in determining the amount of the administrative fine, the degree of wrongfulness of the misdemeanour committed and the culpability and economic situation of the perpetrator shall be considered together”. The degree of wrongfulness of the misdemeanour is said to refer to matters such as the social interest infringed by the act, the manner, place and time of its commission and the gravity of the danger12. Even so, the reservations we have set out above as regards the framing of administrative sanctions in relative form have not been dispelled.
Since Art. 8(12) of the Law states that the legal remedies provided for in the Administrative Jurisdiction Procedures Law No. 2577 may be pursued against decisions on administrative fines imposed by the Presidency or the Authority for the misdemeanours defined in the Law, where an administrative fine is imposed under Art. 3(2) an action for the annulment of that decision may be brought before the administrative courts within sixty days.
4. Liability of Internet Actors
Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Internet Publications governs the liability of the content provider in Art. 4, of the hosting provider in Art. 5, of the access provider in Art. 6 and of public use providers in Art. 7. A look at these rules shows that, in general, they are similar in nature to the provisions of the German Teleservices Act.
a. Liabilities and Obligations of Content Providers
Art. 4 of the Law states that content providers are liable for any kind of content they make available for use on the internet. It is accepted, however, that content providers will not be liable for content belonging to another to which they provide a link. For example, where the owner of a website provides links to other websites from his own site in the form of a “link” or a “banner” and unlawful content is to be found in the content of those links, he will not be liable for it.
The second sentence of Art. 4(2) of the Law states that content providers will be liable under the general provisions if it is clearly evident from the manner of presentation of the content to which they provide a link that they have adopted that content and intend the user to reach it. It is not clear what is meant by this provision. First of all, what is intended by “the general provisions”? Are the general provisions of this Law meant, the general provisions of the Criminal Code, or the general provisions of the Code of Obligations? Unless a content provider states openly, on his own website for instance, that he adopts a particular item contained in another site, by what criteria will “adoption and the intention that it be reached” be determined, and how will they be proved? If a content provider provides a link from his website to a website containing a large number of critical articles and openly praises that website, but certain persons are insulted in one article on that site, will the content provider who provided the link be liable for that article? Another important example that will be encountered in this connection concerns search engines. If a content provider pays a fee to have his own link displayed among the top results but the content is unlawful, will the search engine, which by virtue of its contract intends that this link be reached, be liable for it? This list could be extended. It appears that this article of the Law was drafted without consideration of the hypotheses set out above, which are highly likely to materialise. It is internet actors and lawyers who will pay the price for this. The article should therefore be redrafted after these hypotheses and similar ones have been thought through in all their dimensions.
b. Liabilities and Obligations of Hosting Providers
Art. 5 of the Law governs the liability of the hosting provider, that is, of those who provide the service commonly known as the “host service/hosting” service. Under this article, hosting providers are not obliged to check the content they host or to investigate whether an unlawful activity is involved. It should be said at once that this is an appropriate provision; it is plain that, under a provision to the contrary, requiring hosting providers to obtain knowledge of the content of the millions of data items for which they provide their service and holding them liable for it would be both physically impossible and extremely unjust.
The second paragraph of this article states that, without prejudice to the provisions on criminal liability, hosting providers are obliged to remove the unlawful content they host from publication if they are notified of it in accordance with Arts. 8 and 9 of Law No. 5651 and to the extent that this is technically possible. It must first be said that there is as yet no criminal provision directly relevant to this matter. It is reasonable to suppose that, in making this provision, the legislature acted with an eye to criminal provisions directly relevant to the matter, or indirect criminal provisions, to be enacted in the future. Apart from this, the way in which the article is drafted is fit for its purpose.
c. Liabilities and Obligations of Access Providers
Art. 6 of Law No. 5651 deals with the legal liability and obligations of access providers, that is, of internet service providers. Under this article, the access provider is, first of all, obliged to block access to unlawful content published by any of its users if it is notified of it in accordance with Law No. 5651 and to the extent that it has the technical means to block it. This, too, is an appropriate provision; for what it lays down is that access providers are, as a rule, not liable for unlawful content, but will be liable where they have been notified of the situation and are technically able to block access to that content.
Art. 6(1) of Law No. 5651 provides, secondly, that access providers shall be obliged to retain the traffic data specified in the relevant regulation concerning the services they provide for a period to be determined in the regulation, being not less than six months and not more than two years, and to ensure the accuracy, integrity and confidentiality of these data. Imposing on access providers an obligation to retain all traffic data for up to two years is a provision that is objectionable in some respects and positive in others. Such an obligation will require access providers to make additional investment in order to keep traffic data. The additional devices needed to keep these data, and the additional facilities in which those devices will be housed, mean a considerable cost for access providers, and this is the negative side of the provision. Looked at from the other side, however, retaining these data for a fairly long period will prevent the loss of data that are very important and necessary for combating offences committed over the internet and will enable perpetrators to be identified. This constitutes the positive side of the provision. When this paragraph is examined in terms of the balance between freedom and security, it does no harm to individual freedoms and merely gives rise to additional costs for some entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the benefit it provides in combating criminals is too great to be compared with the harm it does. It can therefore be seen to be, on the whole, a positive provision.
Sub-paragraph “c” of Art. 6(1) of the Law under examination provides that, where the access provider ceases its activity, it is obliged to notify the Telecommunications Authority, its content providers and its customers of the situation at least three months before ceasing its activity. While it is entirely natural and necessary for the access provider to notify this situation to the content providers who receive service from it, that is, to its customers, it is not considered necessary for the same obligation to be imposed, as the wording of the Law has it, in respect of all content providers. The paragraph goes on to state that an access provider that is to cease its activity is obliged to hand over to the Telecommunications Authority the traffic data on internet communication which it is obliged to retain, in accordance with the principles and procedures to be specified in the regulation to be issued on this subject.
Art. 6(2) of Law No. 5651 provides, as noted above, that access providers are not obliged to check whether the content of the information accessed through them is unlawful and whether it gives rise to legal liability. This provision resembles the German Teleservices Act and is a positive one as regards the liability of access providers.
The last paragraph of the article provides that an access provider who fails to fulfil the obligations laid down in sub-paragraphs b and c of the first paragraph shall be given an administrative fine of from ten thousand YTL to fifty thousand YTL by the Ministry of Transport. Since Art. 8(12) of the Law states that the legal remedies provided for in the Administrative Jurisdiction Procedures Law No. 2577 are to be pursued against decisions on administrative fines imposed by the Presidency or the Authority for the misdemeanours defined in the Law, where an administrative fine is imposed under Art. 6(3) an action for the annulment of that decision may be brought before the administrative courts within sixty days.
d. Liabilities and Obligations of Public Use Providers
Art. 7 of Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Internet Publications, under the heading “obligations of public use providers”, governs the legal liabilities of those who provide access to the internet in places open to the public free of charge or for commercial purposes in what are described as “internet cafés”. Under this article, public use providers operating for commercial purposes are obliged to obtain a permit from the local civil administrator of the place where they are located in order to carry on these activities. Within thirty days of the application for the permit, the information concerning the permit is to be notified to the Telecommunications Authority by the local civil administrator to whom the application was made. The accuracy of the information required for the permit and, within this framework, the supervision of public use providers operating for commercial purposes are to be carried out by the local civil administrators. The principles and procedures for the granting and supervision of the permit are to be regulated in the relevant regulation. The article in question has thus introduced a system of permission and of supervision by the civil administrator for the opening of internet cafés and the continuation of their activities. What follows, conversely, from this paragraph is that the system of permission and supervision does not apply to public use providers that do not operate for commercial purposes. Accordingly, where a non-commercial internet access service is provided in places such as universities, hotels, airports and libraries, no permit is required for it, and the local civil administrator has no duty of supervision as regards access to the internet in such places.
Paragraph 2 of the article provides that all public use providers, whether or not they operate for commercial purposes, are obliged to take measures to block access to content constituting an offence; but public use providers have not been made liable for failure to comply with this rule, and no sanction has been provided for it. This provision therefore serves no function other than to set out the intention and the wish of the legislature. Laws, however, are not a collection of the legislature’s good intentions and wishes. Every norm in a law must perform a particular function. This should not, however, be taken to mean that public access providers ought to be held liable under the article in question if they fail to take measures to prevent access to content constituting an offence. To impose on public access providers an obligation that has not been imposed on access providers and hosting providers would be neither equitable nor lawful. In any case, where public access providers intentionally direct their customers to content constituting an offence, this will be assessed under the general provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) within the framework of participation in the offence; it would, moreover, be inappropriate to make a similar provision in this Law as well without any determination as to the culpability of the perpetrator. For this reason, the paragraph in question is a provision that need not be included in Law No. 5651.
Paragraph 3 of the article states that persons who act in breach of the obligation to obtain a permit referred to in paragraph 1 shall be given an administrative fine of from three thousand YTL to fifteen thousand YTL by the local civil administrator. Since Art. 8(12) of Law No. 5651 states that the legal remedies provided for in the Administrative Jurisdiction Procedures Law No. 2577 are to be pursued against decisions on administrative fines imposed by the Presidency or the Authority for the misdemeanours defined in the Law, where an administrative fine is imposed under Art. 7(3) an action for the annulment of that decision may be brought before the administrative courts within sixty days.
III. General Blocking of Internet Access
It is beyond dispute that the internet is a field in which freedom of thought is exercised more freely, directly and easily than ever before. Whether individual freedoms and freedom of thought have a limit, however, is a question that has always been a matter of debate in the history of political thought. In the liberal view, the classic theory is advanced, as regards individual freedoms, that “the place where one individual’s freedom ends is the place where another individual’s freedom begins”, and it is accordingly stated that freedoms have a limit and that this limit is to be determined by rules of law. In the socialist view, on the other hand, it is stated that individual freedoms can be realised only by being exercised, that freedoms which are defined in the abstract but cannot be exercised are not in reality freedoms at all, and that for this reason only rights which it is actually possible to exercise are defined as freedoms in the communist system13. The relevance of this theoretical debate to the subject under examination is that, on the internet, freedoms can be exercised in fact and directly by everyone who has an information system and an internet connection. It is at this point that it has to be determined whether a freedom that can be exercised in fact has a limit and, if there is a limit, where it lies.
As explained above, everyone who has an information system and an internet connection enters cyberspace and is able to exercise his individual freedom with ease. A person in the Kingdom of Sweden, which has adopted a liberal regime, a person in the People’s Republic of China, which has adopted a communist regime, or a person in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has adopted a sharia regime, can each, for example, access the internet directly and, in theory, have the possibility of exercising these freedoms. What has to be determined is where the limit of this freedom begins and ends and whether it is legally possible to restrict this freedom.
On the other hand, exercising freedom of thought on the internet is extremely easy. Examples of such exercise are providing content for websites, using chat rooms, taking part in forums in forum areas, writing comments on the news items found on websites engaged in internet journalism, creating a personal blog and sending electronic mail to individuals or groups. In an environment in which freedom of thought is exercised concretely and with such ease, in a manner unknown until now, it must be clearly established whether this freedom has a limit and, if there is such a limit, where it lies.
An examination of the content and limits of freedom of thought is broad enough to exceed the scope of this study and substantial enough to form the subject of a separate one. Since it bears directly on the subject, however, a brief explanation of freedom of thought is in order. Freedom of thought, understood, as it should be, in a manner that also covers the freedom to express one’s thoughts, that is, freedom of expression14, may accordingly be defined as follows:
“Freedom of thought essentially comprises the right to express a particular thought and to bring people together around that thought. In reality, thought as such is a phenomenon relating to a person’s inner world. There can in any event be no question of restricting or obstructing a person’s ability and capacity to think. It is for this reason that ‘freedom of thought’ also includes the right to express thought. It is for this reason that, from the standpoint of political science, since freedom of thought in reality also covers the right to disseminate a thought and to unite people around it, the possibilities of expressing a thought and of making propaganda for it also fall within the framework of freedom of thought. This is also why some authors use the term ‘freedom of expression’ to designate freedom of thought”15.
The limits of this freedom are set out in Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to which our country too is a party. Under that article, a) the restriction must have been made by a legal rule in the form of a law, that is, it must be prescribed by law; b) the restriction must be based on a legitimate ground, that is, on one of the grounds set out in Art. 10(2) of the Convention16; c) the grounds for restriction must be interpreted narrowly, and it must not be forgotten that freedom is the rule17. As the limit to this restriction, the European Court of Human Rights has introduced the criteria of “necessity in a democratic country” and “proportionality”. In other words, where freedom of thought is restricted on the basis of the grounds set out in Art. 10 of the Convention, the limit of that restriction lies in conformity with the two criteria mentioned above. Where these criteria are not met, freedom of thought cannot be restricted even if the other grounds are present.
These criteria must without fail be borne in mind in the blocking of internet communication as well; this is a necessity arising from the specific structure of the internet, from supranational conventions and from the Constitution alike. Moreover, when rules are made in this field, it should not be forgotten that the internet is, by its nature, a field in which freedoms can be exercised more broadly.
At this point a large number of questions arise: first of all, whether the internet is a field that is subject to legal regulation; if it is accepted that the internet is a legal field, who is to make such regulation and to supervise compliance with the rules laid down; whether the rules of press law can be applied to publications made over the internet; whether the filtering method is fit for its purpose; what the practice in this field is and what it ought to be; and whether Law No. 5651, a new piece of legislation on this subject, is adequate and fit for this purpose. In the following pages of the study, an attempt will be made to set out answers and proposals in relation to these questions.
1. The Internet Is a Field Subject to Legal Regulation
The first point to be made in answering the problems and questions set out above is that cyberspace and, within it, the internet as the most widespread network system are most certainly a legal field, and that rules of law suited to the specific structure of the internet are needed in order to regulate this field.
Accordingly, network systems in cyberspace such as the internet or intranets exist under the regulation of various legal norms, and they ought to continue to exist in accordance with such regulation. In fact, the data transmission networks that we call cyberspace are no more than another dimension of concrete life. It is therefore entirely natural that an act which is an offence or is subject to an administrative sanction in the concrete sphere should also be an offence or be met with an administrative sanction in cyberspace. For example, while the perpetrator of an insult against a person committed through the press is punished (Art. 125(2) TCK), leaving the same act unsanctioned when it is committed on a personal website or in an internet newspaper would not only constitute a great injustice but would also turn the internet into a paradise for the commission of offences, and it is therefore not possible to leave such an act unsanctioned. Cyberspace, and the internet in particular, is therefore a field which must be regulated by legal norms and in which unlawful acts must be punished by criminal and/or administrative norms.
The most important point to be observed here is that these legal norms should be drawn up and applied with the specific structure of the internet in mind. As noted above, the internet is the only field so far in which freedom of thought can be exercised concretely and directly. When the rules in question are made, extreme care must be taken, and restrictions that could stand in the way of freedom of thought must be avoided. Regulation in this field should aim to prevent the violation of individual freedoms, the carrying out of terrorist activities or the aiding of such activities, human trafficking and child pornography, and publications advocating racism. The rules made in order to achieve these aims should not, however, go to extremes, and the specific structure of the internet should be preserved.
2. Models for the Regulation of Cyberspace
Once it has been established above that the internet must be regulated by rules of law, the question arises of how cyberspace is to be regulated. One of the most effective of the measures to be taken in combating unlawful acts committed in cyberspace, and cybercrime in particular, is the regulation of the internet, which is today the most widespread data transmission network18. As noted above, the internet continues to exist as the only field in the world so far in which there is freedom of thought in the true sense and in which it is not restricted or, more precisely, cannot be restricted. Allowing unlimited freedom on the internet, however, alongside the benefits it brings to society and the individual, can also lead to harms such as child pornography, racism and ethnic discrimination, international and/or cyber terrorism, the theft of personal data or fraud by means of information systems, and attacks on personality rights19.
The fact that people have entered into communication and begun to trade over the internet has inevitably given rise to disputes and disagreements among them. For this reason, some of those present in cyberspace still hope that, for the resolution of these disagreements and the prevention of harm, only rules which are not legal norms, such as the “netiquette” or “social pressure” produced by the virtual community itself, will apply. The fact that new users join cyberspace every day and that, as a result, the financial structure of cyberspace grows a little more each day has brought out the need for some new rules which, unlike the arrangements mentioned above, have the character of legal norms, and the necessity of putting them into practice as soon as possible. The essence of this problem is the question of who is to lay down these rules on the regulation of the internet and who is to supervise their application20.
Basically, four options are put forward for regulating cyberspace, and these proposals compete with one another. None of these proposals, however, has yet been fully accepted and applied. The first three of these proposals are classic and centralised models, whereas the fourth proposal is a model that is neither classic nor centralised. The fourth option is a form of regulation proposed with regard to the ethical conduct of those who use cyberspace, and for this reason the fourth model is called the “self-regulation” model21. The models for regulating cyberspace are, in brief, the following:
a. The Model of Regulation at National Level
This model is the oldest and most classic method of legal regulation and of sovereignty, covering the regulation a state makes in the territory over which it is sovereign. Today, in a great many countries, the rules for the regulation of cyberspace and, in connection with this, for combating cybercrime are made by this method, whether for the regulation of internet access from the standpoint of administrative law, for the identification of those responsible from the standpoint of criminal law or for the settlement of disputes from the standpoint of private law22.
b. The Model of Regulation by International Conventions
Another way of regulating cyberspace is to lay down new rules applicable to cyberspace by means of international conventions. This solution also provides an answer to the universal aspect of the problem. Indeed, the most concrete regulation made in this way is the “European Convention on Cybercrime” produced by the Council of Europe. With this convention an attempt has been made to remove the problems arising from the international nature of cybercrime, and, in connection with this, rules on the regulation of cyberspace have also been introduced23. Another instrument on this subject is the “Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Cybercrime for the Criminalisation of Racist and Xenophobic Acts Committed through Information Systems”, likewise produced by the Council of Europe24. There are also documents on the subject produced by the European Union, the United Nations, the G 8 and the O.E.C.D.25. In the name of combating cybercrime, there are also instruments produced by the Council of Europe and the European Union on child pornography in particular26.
The shortcoming of this model of regulation is that the documents produced by supranational organisations must either be taken into the domestic legislation of the states that are parties to them or be made part of domestic law in due form. This, in most cases, can cause both the process of harmonisation to take a long time and these documents not to be applied in domestic law in the way they should be.
c. Regulation through International Organisations
A third way envisaged for regulating cyberspace is to create new rules to be applied in this field and, in order to follow up their application, to set up new international organisations or to give existing organisations certain new tasks in this field. This model has been envisaged in order to bring an international approach to the activities of national administrations27. What has given rise to this model is the similarity between cyberspace, and the internet in particular, and areas regulated by the rules of international law such as international waters, the continent of Antarctica or outer space28.
For example, the organisation known for short as WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) both makes rules at international level on how internet domain names are to be created and allocated and takes part in the resolution of disputes arising in connection with domain names.
These models too, however, share the shortcomings of the model described in sub-paragraph (b), because the rules that such organisations will apply have the character of documents produced by supranational organisations. It is also likely that various difficulties will arise, and that the process will be prolonged, in the course of having the powers of such organisations accepted in the international community.
d. The Self-Regulation Model (Self Regulation)
The fourth model on this subject is based on gathering together a body of rules created spontaneously by internet users and system operators (moderators, internet service providers, etc.) and putting them into practice in cyberspace without centralising them29. The methods of “self-regulation” (self regulation) and “cooperation-based regulation” (co-regulation) may be cited as examples of this model30.
In this model of regulation, which of the spontaneously emerging rules are to be applied to cyberspace, what filtering is to be carried out, which users are to enter cyberspace, which virtual systems are to be communicated with, which personal filtering systems are to be applied and by whom the system is to be steered will be decided, applied and supervised by the internet actors themselves31, in the manner mentioned above. It is stated that the rules which have likewise arisen spontaneously in cyberspace and are called “netiquette” constitute the first step towards these arrangements to be applied to cyberspace32.
Although this model appears to be the model of regulation best suited to the specific, freedom-oriented structure of the internet, it is regarded as a model that is difficult to apply on its own because it involves many uncertainties. For example, there is no requirement that the solutions this model brings be adopted by all internet users, and, where the rules of netiquette are not observed, there is uncertainty as to who is to monitor such non-compliance and, if need be, who is to apply the sanction. In short, this model contains neither an obligation to comply with the rules it lays down nor a sanction; it is therefore a model of regulation that can, and indeed should, be applied on a secondary basis alongside the coercive models.
e. Our View on the Models of Regulation
None of the methods of regulating cyberspace, and the internet in particular, described above is by itself capable of solving this problem of regulation and of combating cybercrime; nor, at the same time, will the adoption of one of these methods, or of all of them at once, solve this problem overnight. For this reason, the rules to be made on the governance of cyberspace and on combating cybercrime should be brought about through the simultaneous and gradual application of the four options described above33.
The rules in question must without fail be made by way of international conventions, with the support and work of supranational organisations, by binding statutory rules to be made in domestic law, and also by rules of netiquette, binding in ethical terms, to be produced by internet actors. The most important point to be observed in making these rules is that the internet is the field in which freedom of thought is exercised most easily and directly, together with the specific structure of the internet.
3. The Internet as a Mass Medium and the Blocking of Its Communication
Under this heading, the situation is examined in which, with the aim of blocking internet publications such as a website, a forum room and the like which contain content suspected of containing elements of an offence, internet communication is blocked in general by a public authority concerned with the matter, without there yet being any court decision.
Besides being an instrument of individual use and communication, the internet also functions as a mass medium. Just as this network system enables individuals to chat with one another or to send one another electronic mail, so it also makes it possible for every kind of thought to be expressed and propagated by means of websites and for every kind of news to be made known instantly to broad masses of people by means of internet journalism. For this reason, in order to clarify the subject, the concept of “mass communication” should first be briefly explained.
a. The Concept of Mass Communication in General
As a concept, “mass communication” covers every kind of broadcast or publication made by radio, television, cinema films, videotapes and the internet, which are defined as the mass media. The common feature of these media is that they convey news, thoughts and feelings to anonymous masses by reproducing them as text, pictures, images and/or sound (all of which are referred to for short as multimedia). Another important feature of theirs is that they have the functions of enlightening, educating and entertaining society34.
Mass communication, like interpersonal communication, is an act based on the exchange of messages; but whereas in personal communication this act remains at the individual level, in mass communication it acquires a public character. The most important difference that distinguishes mass communication from personal communication is therefore that the former is public in nature and reaches very broad masses of people, while the latter is individual in nature and reaches a limited number of persons35.
b. The Phenomenon of the Misuse of Internet Communication
Whereas, during the communications revolution that preceded the information technology revolution, developments in communications technology centralised the power held by groups or persons, in the information age in which we live today central control has become impossible. While this is a very positive development for the democratisation and liberation of the individual and of society, unlimited freedom and the freedom of anyone to reach and disseminate any information they wish also give certain persons of ill will the opportunity to reach and disseminate information capable of harming the individual and society36. For example, the information systems used by nuclear energy plants, the defence industry and the facilities in which public services such as transport, health, water, heating and electricity are provided can be accessed for malicious purposes just as much as for purposes that are in good faith and connected with their ordinary operation. Moreover, the internet, on which information of great benefit to society and the individual is shared, can at the same time be a platform on which information regarded as extremely harmful to them is disseminated and shared. This situation is called “the democratisation of violence”37.
In forward-looking forecasts made in the late 1990s, it is stated that the greatest concern felt for the future of the international community is that developments in information systems, and hence in information transmission and communications technology, may give terrorism a new dimension. It is also stated that the information transmission and communications system which the public sector and the private sector have built with information systems for the functioning of the contemporary social order constitutes a very favourable environment for terrorists who may take action with the aim of damaging its complex and integrated structure38.
It is known that profit-oriented criminal organisations and terrorist organisations use the internet in order to ensure secrecy in their communications, to make their propaganda and to increase their financial resources. For example, Ramzi Yousef, the planner of the act in which the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York were destroyed and a great many innocent people were killed, confessed that he had planned to destroy the encrypted files of American Airlines using his laptop computer. Moreover, terrorist organisations which use information systems in their own interests are able to transfer and use their funds over the internet39. Indeed, terrorist or mafia-type organisations need financing in order to survive and to continue their acts; this financing is provided by transactions carried out through virtual banking, and the money which these criminal organisations have obtained by unlawful means is even laundered and rendered legal by the same methods40. These constitute very striking examples, drawn from real life, of the misuse of internet communication.
c. The Problem of the Applicability of the Rules of Press Law to Internet Publishing
The most important place in the use of the mass media is occupied by the written, visual and electronic press. This being so, publications made over the internet raise, particularly with regard to internet journalism, the problem of whether the rules of Press Law that have developed for the written and visual press can be applied, and hence the concept of “internet publishing”. And where the concept of publishing is concerned, one of the first questions that comes to mind is whether “censorship” is possible with regard to internet publishing.
It should, however, be emphasised at this juncture that the concept of “censorship” has deliberately not been used in this study. For Art. 28 of the 1982 Constitution states in clear terms that “the press is free and shall not be censored”. There should be no doubt that this mandatory provision of the Constitution also applies to internet publishing.
Additional Art. 9, which was added by Art. 26 of Law No. 4756 of 15.05.2002 to Press Law No. 5680, since repealed by Press Law No. 5187, stated that “The provisions of this Law concerning pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage arising from false news, insult and similar acts shall also apply to every kind of text, picture, sign, image with or without sound and the like published by means of information technologies and by opening a page on the internet or by way of an electronic newspaper, electronic bulletin, etc.”. This provision, however, met with intense criticism in legal scholarship, and no similar provision was included in the new Press Law No. 5187.
Indeed, the repealed Press Law No. 5680 contains no rule on “false news”, “insult” and similar acts. The offence of insult is regulated in the Turkish Criminal Code. That law contains no provision on pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage arising from false news, insult and similar acts. It cannot be understood what is meant by the notion of an act similar to the act of insult; this provision is in clear breach of the principle of certainty, which is a sub-principle of the principle of legality of offences and penalties41. The criticisms of the provision in question could be multiplied and continued in this vein.
The number and the soundness of these criticisms, together with the fact that the provisions in question were not taken into the new Press Law, clearly show that it is not possible to regulate the internet by the provisions contained in the Press Law, because there is a significant incompatibility of fabric between the two. Just as television broadcasting and newspaper publishing differ from each other, so internet publishing displays a structure different from both of them and makes use of the possibilities peculiar to the internet42.
For example, applying to internet publishing the rules on the exercise of the right of reply and correction in the written and visual press can lead to various problems and confusion. On the internet, arranging the right of reply and correction, in the form in which it is regulated in the Press Law, in accordance with the criteria of publication in the same place, in the same form and in the same type size causes problems by reason of the nature of the internet.
Another problem that arises in connection with internet publishing is that content containing elements of an offence remains there for a very long time and, in particular, that even if this publication is not being looked for, it can appear before a person when a search is run in any search engine using a term that occurs in the publication43.
For the reasons touched on above, then, a law and related regulations should be enacted in which internet communication and internet publishing are regulated with due regard to the internet’s own philosophy and technical structure. By such regulation, the internet should be rid of the impression of being a field without law, and at the same time every effort should be made to ensure that democratic rights and freedoms are exercised to the widest extent and also that the violation of individual freedoms is prevented. Indeed, this point is explained very well in legal scholarship in the following pithy statement:
“The internet is like a lighthouse… It gives light. It shows the way. Life goes on on the internet. Our choices as to how you will carry on life will also determine the future of the country. We must accept freedom and rights as the rule and restrictions as the exception, and change our mentality accordingly. This is the only option. The contrary options are proof that we do not believe in the supremacy of law and in the principles of the rule of law44.”
Indeed, in Art. 9 of Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Internet Publications, headed “removal of content from publication and right of reply”, an attempt has been made to regulate the removal from publication of content in which a personality right is violated, and the right of reply and correction, with the specific structure of the internet in mind. This matter will be examined below under a separate heading.
d. Reflections on the General Blocking of Internet Communication
As a rule, the press and internet publishing tend, in line with the great eagerness to learn of events that cause a stir in society, to give more space to events of a “sensational” nature. All the more so today, in a media market described in terms of “ratings” and founded on commercial concerns, this has to be regarded as entirely natural. This tendency of the press and of internet publishing can lead, sometimes knowingly and sometimes unknowingly, to the publication of news items that contain elements of an offence. This in turn raises the question of restricting freedom of the press and of blocking internet communication.
Whereas the publications of the written and visual press are consumed weekly, daily or instantly, the fact that the news and opinions in the electronic press remain published and accessible on a continuing basis makes the matter a more particular one as regards internet publishing. Separate importance must therefore be attached, within this framework, to the general blocking of internet communication45.
The debates on the reporting by the internet of content containing elements of an offence have also brought with them concerns about the restriction of freedom of the press46; for the “relative freedom” which the press enjoys today has been won only through a struggle lasting very many years. The concerns about the restriction of the freedom of internet communication likewise stem in particular from the restrictions that it is proposed to place on the manner in which acts of terrorism are reported47. On this subject there have been debates on how the restriction is to be effected as regards the mass media, and various views have been put forward48; these views are also valid as regards the blocking of internet communication. Today, as stated above, there are four different views, according to which the blocking and restriction of internet communication should be effected by legal norms having the character of a law, by international conventions, by supranational institutions or by self-regulation.
In doing this, however, the least possible concession should be made as regards the individual’s right to obtain information and the freedom of the press to report, and the restriction to be made should also be prevented from being used by the political power as an instrument for silencing the press. For this reason, for press organisations, which are closely concerned with the healthy and orderly functioning of the society in which they find themselves, the method of self-regulation is regarded as the most suitable method of restriction. In this respect, important tasks fall in particular to the boards and/or bodies that bring press organisations and organisations engaged in internet publishing together under one roof; but this restriction must be no more than a method of self-regulation to the extent necessary and must never turn into censorship. For this reason, the assignment of this task to the Telecommunications Communication Presidency by Law No. 5651, and the relevant articles of that law, are not regarded as suitable means for the aim sought to be achieved.
e. The Regulation of Cyberspace by States and General Filtering
The idea that, in the face of unlawful acts that are carried out or are likely to be carried out over the internet, data transmission networks, and today the internet in particular, need to be supervised and that communication, and hence publishing, in this field needs to be kept under control is put forward by various circles. It is stated, however, that the fundamental problem in the supervision of cyberspace is whether a supervisory mechanism can be established without impairing the indispensable principles of democratic societies, such as the private life of the person and the freedom of communication. The dilemma experienced in this regard is the difficulty of combating cybercrime and other unlawful acts carried out by means of the internet without touching the essence of the universal fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual49.
A further important problem encountered as regards the supervision of cyberspace by states is, from the technical point of view, which state is to carry out this supervision and within which borders; for in cyberspace there are no definite and fixed borders in the classic sense. When an electronic mail message or a website publishing over the internet is traced, it is seen that one is faced with operations carried out in very different countries and with persons who are likewise located in very different countries. The persons, information systems, hosting providers or service providers that can be associated with a country or a place in cyberspace may not be present, in the physical sphere, in the country in which the unlawful act was carried out50. From the technical point of view this problem needs to be overcome in the supervision of cyberspace, and international cooperation is proposed for this purpose51.
It is also a curious fact that today, in parallel with the ever louder voices in favour of freedom of thought, there is an increase in the rhetoric calling for still greater state control52. At present there are two opposing tendencies on the question of state supervision of cyberspace: these are freedom in the full sense and control in the full sense. In this respect the “Echelon Project”, which will be briefly explained below as an example, has the character of an extreme as regards state supervision of cyberspace53.
Today the most extreme practice enabling the state to supervise cyberspace, and thereby to keep watch over all people who are in communication, is the project named “Echelon”, whose very existence is a matter of debate. Echelon is the code name of the project which the intelligence organisations of the USA, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have set up and put into operation in order to supervise communication throughout the world54.
The foundations of the Echelon project were laid by the UKUSA agreement of 1947, and the project was put into operation in 1971. With the project, all the data transmitted by telephone, mobile telephone, electronic mail, fax and telefax and over data transmission networks can be monitored. It is stated that two million telephone calls a minute and three billion a day are listened to by the system used in the Echelon project55. The system uses various means in order to carry out this monitoring and to collect the data. Satellite communications are intercepted by antenna systems, as are telephone line and internet connections and intercontinental communication lines. The information passing over the lines is collected on a regular basis and passed through a filtering system called the “dictionary”, and the data are tracked by experts with the help of keywords56.
The existence of Echelon is not acknowledged by the USA, but the governments of Australia and New Zealand have acknowledged the existence of this system. The report on Echelon commissioned by the European Parliament states that 90% of communication in Europe is monitored by the USA. It is stated that there is evidence that the project is used, beyond the aim of protecting the national security of the states party to the UKUSA agreement, for authoritarian purposes such as industrial espionage, the supervision of civil transport and keeping personal communication under control57.
The Echelon system is an important measure that states can take against cybercrime and against unlawful acts carried out over data transmission networks; but a measure of this kind should have no place in a world struggling for liberation, because it is always open to abuse and will pave the way for authoritarian attitudes. Indeed, a similar filtering system is applied in the People’s Republic of China, where individuals cannot reach any site that the government has not permitted; although that government describes the system it applies, as briefly explained in the introduction, as real democracy, even this method applied on its own reveals the authoritarian structure of the system58.
Although, as far as our country is concerned, the intention was to carry out a kind of supervision by means of the Internet Supreme Board that was set up, this is a body which is far from meeting its purpose and which could easily slide into an authoritarian structure59. By Law No. 5651, this function has been given to the Telecommunications Communication Presidency. Notwithstanding these assignments, what could be contemplated, given the natural structure of the internet, is only that a civil institution which is open to public scrutiny and under the supervision of independent judges should carry out filtering in relation to certain principal offences, and child pornography in particular, without restricting fundamental rights and freedoms, and should thereby identify possible offences and offenders. Consequently, the regulation of the internet by an institution which has no autonomy, forms part of the administrative structure and is therefore subject entirely to the rules of administrative law, and the conferral on that institution of the power to restrict internet communication in general, would mean the creation of a “censorship authority” in breach of Art. 28 of the Constitution, and the sword of Damocles would at once begin to swing over the internet. This would at the same time mean the slaughter of the concrete exercise of freedom of thought that exists on the internet.
These reservations, however, have been borne out by Law No. 5651, and a heavy blow has been dealt to the internet, where, as far as our country is concerned, freedoms are exercised easily and directly. By Art. 10 of Law No. 5651 the TİB has been granted a very wide scope for supervision and filtering, that is, for censorship. This is diametrically opposed to the specific structure and philosophy of the internet.
4. An Administrative Practice of General Blocking of Internet Communication – The Powers of the Telecommunications Authority over the Internet and the Decisions It Has Taken
One of the most important criteria that distinguish administrative law in particular, and all public law in general, from private law is that the freedom, found in private law, to do anything in areas where there is no prohibition, and the principle of freedom of contract, do not hold good for public law and hence for administrative law. Accordingly, any administrative institution that is bound to act in accordance with the rules of administrative law cannot perform an administrative act or action unless it has been empowered to do so by the relevant law, by-law or regulation. Acts which the administration carries out without a legal basis are called “administrative practice” in order to emphasise this very lack of legality. For here the administration relies not on legislation conferring power on it but on its own practice; this, however, does not render the action or act carried out lawful. Nor is it conceivable that there should be an exception to this as far as administrative law is concerned; the contrary would mean breaching the principles of government in the sunshine and of the rule of law.
In our country, the task of carrying out telecommunications services and making the necessary regulations has been assigned by Telegraph and Telephone Law No. 406 to the “Telecommunications Authority”, established60 by Art. 5 of Wireless Law No. 2813 of 05.04.1983 as amended by Law No. 4502 of 27.01.2000. The concept of telecommunication is defined in Art. 1 of Law No. 406 as “the transmission, sending and receiving of all kinds of signs, symbols, sounds and images and of all kinds of data that can be converted into electrical signals by means of cable, wireless, optical, electrical, magnetic, electromagnetic, electrochemical, electromechanical and other transmission systems”. As can be seen, internet communication also falls within the definition of telecommunication. Consequently, making the rules on the provision of the services and infrastructure for internet communication and, for example, granting the necessary licences to access providers fall within the remit of the Telecommunications Authority.
The duties and powers of the Telecommunications Authority are set out in Art. 2(f) of Law No. 406 as amended by Law No. 4673 of 12.05.2001. According to that provision, the duties and powers of the Authority are “to take the measures necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of the contracts it has signed with operators, including Türk Telekom, and of the general authorisations and telecommunications licences it has granted; to monitor and supervise that activities are carried out in conformity with the legislation and with the terms of the authorisation and concession agreement, the telecommunications licence or the general authorisation; in the event of non-compliance, to impose an administrative fine of up to 3% of the turnover of the operator concerned in the preceding calendar year; to take the necessary measures for the purposes of national security, public order or the proper performance of the public service; where necessary, to take over the installations against compensation; or, in the event of gross fault, to revoke the concession agreement, the telecommunications licence or the general authorisation”.
Before Law No. 5651 entered into force, however, neither any provision of Law No. 406 nor the secondary legislation issued on the basis of that law contained any provision to the effect that the Telecommunications Authority could carry out filtering in respect of internet communication or could block internet communication for any reason whatsoever. Nevertheless, it is seen that Türk Telekom A.Ş., which operates under the licence it obtained from the Telecommunications Authority, performs a virtual public service under that licence and is therefore, as regards that service, subject to the rules of administrative law touched on above, filtered whatever website it wished at its own discretion. Users who wished to reach a site subjected to filtering were therefore led to believe that the site’s publication had been stopped. It is stated, however, that during the same period it was possible to access the sites in question from abroad and that access to these sites was impossible only from Türkiye. This is said to be a practice virtually amounting to censorship. When a user attempts to enter the filtered site, the request is forwarded to the remote server and the server begins to send the content of the site, but since the data sent do not reach the client, the page cannot be displayed. This is a practice that is extremely objectionable from the standpoint of freedom of thought and, at the same time, contrary to law and to statute. It is thus stated that Türk Telekom A.Ş. is able to block access to certain sites at its own discretion and describes the situation as “preliminary technical work”61. Faced with this situation, the Telecommunications Authority, which has powers ranging from revoking the licence of the institution concerned to imposing on the company concerned a penalty of 3% of the previous year’s turnover, looks on at this unlawful state of affairs and shows no reaction whatsoever. Yet the same Authority, as will be seen below, considers itself entitled, this time without having any power at all, to punish certain companies with sanctions going as far as closure on the ground that they have no licence.
This shows that the legal infrastructure and the methods of application of telecommunications services and of services for internet access have not yet become fully established in our country. It shows that, in order to prevent this, separate rules determining both telecommunications services and internet access and the powers of internet actors must be prepared and enacted as soon as possible. Law No. 5651 has not been able to reach the level expected in this field.
5. General Blocking of Internet Communication under Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Internet Publications
Law No. 5651 contains no article bearing the heading of the general regulation or supervision of internet communication. The regulation and supervision of internet communication are, however, governed by Art. 10(4) and (5) of the Law, headed “administrative structure and duties”. It is truly thought-provoking that so important a provision concerning the internet, which ought to have appeared under a separate heading, appears under an article concerning the administrative structure, as if the provision were being hidden.
After Art. 10(1) of the Law has stated that the administrative duties provided for by Law No. 5651 are to be performed by the Telecommunications Communication Presidency within the Telecommunications Authority, paragraph 2 provides for the creation of the posts for the experts to be appointed to this Presidency, and paragraph 3 provides that all purchases of goods or services to be made by the Telecommunications Communication Presidency in connection with its duties are to be made without being subject to Public Procurement Law No. 4734 and Public Procurement Contracts Law No. 4735 and that the expenses are to be met from the budget of the Telecommunications Authority.
After these paragraphs on the administrative structure, paragraph 4 of the article states that, without prejudice to the other duties assigned to the Telecommunications Communication Presidency by Law No. 5651, the duties described below have also been assigned to it. The duties, which virtually amount to subjecting the internet to censorship, are accordingly as follows:
a. The Presidency shall, by establishing coordination between the ministry (what is meant here is the ministry of transport), the law enforcement agencies, the relevant public institutions and organisations, the content, hosting and access providers and the relevant civil society organisations, carry out work aimed at preventing activities and publications on the internet whose content constitutes the offences falling within the scope of Law No. 5651, and shall for this purpose set up working committees where necessary, the expenses of which are to be met by the Authority.
It must first be said that there is no catalogue of offences covered by this Law. Art. 8(1), however, specifies the types of offence in respect of which a decision to block access may be given. If, as regards the general blocking of internet communication, only these types of offence fall within the scope of the Law, this is a provision that is both incomplete and flawed. For not only are these not the only offences committed by means of the internet, but the types of offence in question are also not presented, in Art. 1, in which the purpose of this Law is explained, as the only types of offence that have to be combated; they are presented, by way of enumeration, solely as the types of offence in respect of which, in the event of suspicion, a decision to block access may be given for the purposes of blocking internet access (which, as will be explained below, is an article concerning the special blocking of internet communication).
b. The Presidency shall monitor the content of the publications made on the internet and, where it is established that offences falling within the scope of Law No. 5651 have been committed, shall take the measures likewise provided for in Law No. 5651 with a view to blocking access to the publications in question.
By this provision an “internet censorship authority” is openly being created in our country. In the world, this is found only in countries such as North Korea, the People’s Republic of China and Saudi Arabia, where there is no freedom of thought whatsoever and where the administration places no trust in its people and attaches no value to them at all. It must be said with regret that our country’s legislature deems our people, who ought to be “free in thought, free in conscience”, worthy of the system applied to their peoples by the governments of the countries given as examples. There is no respect in which this can be accepted. The people of our country have the quality, the education and the awareness to distinguish, of their own free will, which content is of benefit and which is harmful to themselves and their families. The people of our country have long since passed the stage at which others think and decide on their behalf. The article, which reflects this mentality left over from the imperial era, must therefore be repealed immediately. For on the basis of the power conferred by the Law in question, not only data whose content contains an offence but every kind of content will be subjected to supervision, and it will be possible to find some obscenity or abuse in anything and to block access to the internet. Under the scheme of this Law and of this article, the internet in our country will be governed not with very little interference in an environment of freedom, as its nature requires, but virtually with an iron fist by a dictator.
Moreover, it is also unclear what is to be understood by the concept of publication intended by this provision. In Art. 2 of the Law, in which the definitions are given, publication is defined as publication made on the internet; but this is not sufficient either, and it does not explain what is to be understood by internet publication. In any case, the term used is, as we have also explained above, incorrect: what is regulated in this Law is not internet publications but internet communication, since publication is a one-sided act whereas the majority of the activities carried out over the internet are interactive, so that this act can be described not by the term publication but only by the term communication. If the term publication is understood as communication, however, the question comes to mind whether the electronic mail that people send to one another is to be intercepted by the Presidency in question. This is a frightening question. If the answer to the question is yes – and this is the meaning that emerges from the scheme of the Law – every kind of communication on the internet, including communication between individuals, will be intercepted. This will lead to the emergence in our country of a structure similar to Echelon, to our country becoming not a state governed by the rule of law but a police state, and to both the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights being trampled underfoot.
The last point to be made on this subject is that the finding that an offence has been committed can be made solely and exclusively by the courts having jurisdiction and competence. No institution, organisation or person other than this authority may make a finding that an offence has been committed. Where there is a suspicion that an offence has been committed, however, individuals or the persons charged with this task report the offence or lodge a complaint with the places specified in the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 (CMK), and, after the necessary investigation has been carried out by the public prosecutor’s office, a public prosecution is brought if there is sufficient evidence that the perpetrator or perpetrators committed the offence. Yet none even of these stages is a finding that an offence has been committed; one proceeds merely on the basis of suspicion. While the Constitution and the relevant laws have entrusted the decision establishing the offence to the independent courts, the fact that such a power and duty has been conferred by law on an administrative institution renders the article in question clearly unconstitutional. For this reason, the article of the Law in question should be brought before the Constitutional Court and annulled by that court.
c. The Presidency shall determine at what level, at what time and in what manner the monitoring of the content of the publications made on the internet is to be carried out.
By this paragraph, too, the Presidency is given the power and the duty to determine how the filtering and censorship it is to carry out on the internet will be performed; the explanations and criticisms made above in respect of sub-paragraph “b” also apply to this provision.
ç. The principles and procedures concerning the systems to be used in filtering and blocking, and the arrangements to be made, in the authorisation of operators by the Telecommunications Authority and in the permits to be issued by the civil administrators to commercial public use providers shall be determined by the Presidency.
It is also understood from this provision that the operating permit will be granted to commercial public access providers on condition that they use filtering and blocking methods, and that the principles and methods relating to this will be determined by the Presidency. Many perpetrators, in order to cover their tracks, carry out the unlawful acts they commit on or by means of information systems by using the services of the commercial public access providers in question. For this reason the application of filtering and blocking systems in these places is not very surprising, and it is regarded as a positive provision particularly when it is borne in mind that the great majority of those who use these places most are children under the age of 18. This too, however, blocks only access to content constituting an offence; it does not, in addition, prevent acts such as uploading content constituting an offence to the internet or, in particular, obtaining an economic benefit unlawfully by this means. For that purpose it is of the utmost importance that the identity of persons who commit offences, especially in places of this kind, be established. For this reason, as is done in many countries, a proper chronological record of those receiving service in places of this kind should be kept and sufficient identity and address information should be taken. It is regrettable and thought-provoking that, while certain excessive and unnecessary measures have been taken by Law No. 5651 for the purpose of combating crime, very simple but very necessary measures have not been taken.
d. It is the duty of the Telecommunications Communication Presidency to set up or have set up every kind of technical infrastructure required, including a monitoring and information reporting centre, and to operate this infrastructure or have it operated, in order to prevent, by monitoring the publications on the internet, the commission of the offences listed in Art. 8(1) of Law No. 5651 (Art. 84 of the TCK No. 5237, inducement to suicide; Art. 103(1), sexual abuse of children; Art. 190, facilitating the use of narcotic and stimulant substances; Art. 194, supplying substances dangerous to health; Art. 226, obscenity; Art. 227, prostitution; Art. 228, providing a place and means for gambling; and the offences contained in Law No. 5816 on Offences Committed against Atatürk).
Carrying out technical monitoring for the purpose of combating the offences in question and installing a system for this is a positive provision, but it is not sufficient to confine this to the types of offence in question alone. It is impossible to understand, for example, why no such monitoring is carried out for terrorist offences. In carrying out this monitoring, however, there should be no recourse to a method such as the examination of every kind of communication one by one, as mentioned above under sub-paragraph “b”. The balance between freedom and security must be maintained very carefully. This is also the greatest problem of this Law. It is a great contradiction, for example, that monitoring can be carried out in connection with the offence of providing means for gambling whereas no such monitoring can be carried out for acts of terrorism. Nor is it possible to understand why, under this provision, these decisions, which bear directly on fundamental rights and freedoms, are taken not by judges but by administrative institutions. The infrastructure for these operations should be created by this institution, but these operations should not be put into effect without a judge’s decision.
e. The Presidency is charged with determining the minimum criteria for the production of hardware and the making of software in accordance with the principles of filtering, screening and monitoring to be carried out in the various services open to everyone on the internet.
It is not clear what is meant by the concept of the “various services open to everyone on the internet” referred to in this paragraph. Nor is any such concept or definition of it to be found in Art. 2 of the Law. By carrying out filtering, screening and monitoring in these services, whose meaning is not clear, it will also become possible to violate the right to respect for private life and the freedom of communication and to restrict freedom of thought. Consequently, making provisions to the effect that every kind of restriction may be imposed over the internet in an open-ended manner, without any specific rule being laid down, is wholly incompatible with the structure of the internet.
f. Ensuring cooperation and coordination with international institutions and organisations in the field of information technology and the internet has also been included among the duties of the Presidency.
g. Lastly, the Presidency has also been given the duty of providing, within its technical capabilities, every kind of assistance required to the law enforcement agencies and investigating authorities having power and competence, and of ensuring coordination, with a view to preventing the promotion, the bringing into the country, the possession, the hiring out or the sale of products containing any kind of representational image, text or sound whose subject is the commission on the internet of the offences listed in Art. 8(1) of Law No. 5651.
It is an ordinary provision that the Presidency should be given the duty of assisting the law enforcement agencies and the investigating authorities by providing information for the purpose of combating the offences specified in Art. 8(1) of the Law. But where another offence contained in the TCK is committed by means of the internet, and information on the commission of that offence and on its perpetrators is obtained by the Presidency and requested by the competent authorities, will this information not be given? If this information is not to be given, what is the reason for that? What is the difference between the types of offence specified in Art. 8 and the other types of offence? It appears difficult to give a logical answer to these questions. What appears to be the case is that the legislature, influenced by the debates of the day, made the types of offence in question the subject of special regulation by way of a reaction, but that this too has turned out to be an incomplete and flawed provision.
h. The last duty assigned to the Telecommunications Communication Presidency by Art. 10(5) of Law No. 5651
is to ensure the necessary cooperation and coordination with the Internet Board, which is to be formed by the Ministry of Transport, pursuant to Additional Art. 1 of Law No. 3348 on the Organisation and Duties of the Ministry of Transport62, with the participation of a representative to be selected from among the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of State responsible for children, women and the family, the Telecommunications Authority and such other ministries, public institutions and organisations as are needed, as well as internet service providers and relevant civil society organisations; and to take every kind of measure and decision required in connection with the proposals to be made by the Internet Board on the identification of the publications relating to the content to be monitored, filtered and blocked and on similar matters.
By this paragraph, therefore, the Telecommunications Communication Presidency is also given the task of taking a direct part in the process of adopting and implementing the filtering and blocking decisions taken by the internet supreme board. The Presidency has accordingly been made the most influential institution, taking on an active and direct role in the regulation and supervision of the internet.
IV. Special Blocking of Internet Communication
What is meant by the special blocking of internet communication is the blocking of internet communication in response to a concrete act or situation. Where there is a suspicion that an offence has been committed by means of internet communication, or that an unlawful situation such as an infringement of personality rights has been brought about, or where this has been established by a court decision, the blocking of access to the website containing the element of the offence constitutes the special blocking of internet communication.
In practice, until Law No. 5651 entered into force, internet communication (access to the website) was generally blocked by court decision, but no decision was given for the closure of web pages. In spite of this positive practice, it was also seen, particularly in recent times, that administrative institutions, although they had neither the power nor the duty to do so, gave decisions on the blocking of internet communication that were wholly unlawful and null and void, and that this went as far as the closure of websites.
The special blocking of internet communication will be explained below, first, so as to show the practice to date, in the light of these two practices and within the framework of concrete examples taken from practice, and then according to the relevant provisions of Law No. 5651, which has recently entered into force.
1. Blocking of Internet Communication by Court Decision
Until recently there was no legal rule in our country on the blocking of internet communication in response to a concrete situation or on by whom and by what method this was to be done. In practice, however, it was seen that the courts gave decisions to block internet access and that these measures were carried out by the public prosecutor’s offices. This method was also the most widespread form of the special blocking of internet communication.
When the public prosecutor’s office, which is the authority competent to conduct judicial investigations in our country, received a report that an offence had been committed via the internet, or when a complaint was lodged in this regard, the public prosecutor’s office would apply to the criminal court of peace for “the blocking of access to the website containing the element of the offence”, and the judge of the criminal court of peace, having examined the website in question on a computer and/or in a printout of the website, would decide to grant or to reject that request. It should also be noted, however, that in practice such requests were granted where the request was serious and the content under investigation contained an element of an offence.
Similarly, in the event of an infringement of personality rights, it was likewise possible to apply to the civil courts with similar requests and to obtain from those courts decisions blocking access to the websites concerned.
In order to set out the situation in practice more clearly, a concrete example on the subject is as follows:
a. A Sample Case concerning the Blocking of Internet Communication by Court Decision
The names of many companies that are leaders in their sectors in our country, together with all the trade marks and logos owned by those companies, were published on a website; it was demanded that no business be done with the organisations in question and that these brands not be purchased, and these organisations and brands were described on the site in question as “godless capital” and “enemy of religion”.
Thereupon, counsel for one of the companies whose trade name appeared on the website in question filed a criminal report with the competent public prosecutor’s office and requested that access to the site carrying the publication in question be suspended and that the site be shut down. The petition in question contained the following statements verbatim:
“In the course of research carried out by the client company, it was established that, on the website named www.dindusmanlari.com, unjust and untruthful propaganda was being made against the client and the organisations affiliated to it.
In the section headed “Godless Capital” of the above-named website, a list is given which also includes the companies within …; the organisations named in this list are insulted by being described as ‘enemies of religion’, and visitors to the site are told not to buy the goods and services of these organisations. The statements appearing on the website in question are, verbatim, as follows:
‘O believ(er)s, even if you live in a village, do not shop from the enemies of Allah. Do not forget that even a single red cent that you give to the Enemies of Allah will seize you by the collar tomorrow in the hereafter and call you to account…
The organisations listed below are organisations that have made fighting with Allah their way of life. Not content with that alone, they also feed the enemies of religion. See to it that you do not buy any product of these institutions and do not make use of their services. Do not forget how, with their humbug about green capital, they want to put believ(ing) people into the class of lepers…
And if there are organisations of this kind in your own surroundings, that is, vile companies that have made enmity towards Allah and believ(er)s their philosophy, let us know. Let us expose them, so that these scoundrels do not grow rich on the backs of the Muslim people and practise enmity towards religion!’
……………………..
When the website in question is examined, and indeed as can be understood from the name of the site alone, the sole purpose of this site is to incite the public under the guise of religion by levelling unjust accusations, amounting to insult and without any grounds whatsoever being given, against respected persons and organisations that conduct their business lawfully and honestly. As can also be seen in the quotation above, the client is insulted with expressions such as ‘having made fighting with Allah its way of life’, ‘enemy of religion’, ‘vile’ and ‘scoundrel’. It goes without saying that these publications of the website are of such a nature as to damage the reputation of the client, an organisation whose standing in Türkiye is beyond dispute, and of its affiliated organisations. In addition to these insults, the site attempts to influence the public by saying ‘do not buy any product of these organisations’, and in this way harm is caused to the client and its affiliated organisations. It is clear that the publications in question are contrary to morality and are of such a nature as to infringe personality rights. For this reason, these insults made through the website concerned by the parties against whom we request an interim injunction constitute a tort against the client and give rise to damage that is difficult to make good.
For the reasons set out, it is necessary that the accused (suspects) who are responsible for the company named … be punished; that, in order to prevent the accused (suspects) from causing further harm to the client company and its affiliated organisations, the publications of the site www.dindusmanlari.com be stopped immediately and the site be shut down; and that, should this not be possible, access from Türkiye to the website concerned be prevented by means of the internet service providers within the borders of Türkiye”
The competent public prosecutor’s office, on receiving this petition, opened an investigation immediately; on the one hand, it at once obtained an expert report “from a criminal law specialist” on whether the accusations made and the words used on the website constituted insult63, and on the other hand it asked the relevant units of the police directorate to determine the IP (Internet Protocol Number) numbers of the computers from which the site was being published and to whom they belonged. Following these steps, the duty Criminal Court of Peace was requested to stop the publications of the website. That letter contained the following statement:
“The preliminary investigation file relating to the complainant … is enclosed herewith; in connection with the publications appearing on the accused’s website named ‘www.dindusmanlari.com’, which contain insult and openly incite the public to hatred and hostility on the basis of differences of religion and sect, it is requested that a decision be given to stop the publications on the website concerned.”
The duty Criminal Court of Peace, on receiving this request, responded favourably to it and gave the following decision:
“With regard to the article published under the heading ‘here is the godless capital’ contained in the file and the internet publication appearing on the site www.dindusmanlari.com showing capital companies and firms, an investigation has been opened under Art. 312 TCK by document no. … of 16.4.2004 of the … Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office; for this reason it has been decided, following an examination carried out on the file and subject to objection, that until the end of the investigation the publication in Türkiye and the transmission via the internet of the article headed ‘here is the godless capital’ published on the site www.dindusmanlari.com and of the publication relating to the company names and emblems of the companies indicated under the heading ‘here is the godless capital’ be stopped, and that the preliminary investigation file be returned to the public prosecutor’s office64.”
b. Assessment of the Sample Case concerning the Blocking of Internet Communication by Court Decision
This practice in the sample case detailed above has two good sides and one bad side. The first of the good sides of this practice is that the website is not shut down and that the decision merely blocks access to the relevant sections of that website. Accordingly, where it is technically possible, what is sought is not the blocking of access to the entire website but only the blocking of access to the sections containing the element of an offence. It must be pointed out at once, however, that in practice no attention is paid to this, and the access providers to whom a court decision to this effect is sent block access to the whole of the website in question. In fact, this too appears as an unlawful practice on the part of the access providers. Yet these undertakings, rightly, since there is no statutory regulation on the matter, merely implement the court decision that reaches them in the way they understand it and to the extent that their technical means allow. It should also be stated that, in practical terms, such decisions produce effects for the country in which the decision is given, and the site concerned can no longer be displayed; however, since the decision is binding only on access providers located within the borders of the country, if the website in question is publishing from abroad, access to the website from abroad remains possible in spite of the decision.
The real good side of the practice, however, is that the blocking of access to a website is seen as a matter of a fundamental right and freedom falling within freedom of thought, and that the restriction can be imposed only by a judge’s decision. However, as will be explained below, this practice is being breached by an administrative practice encountered recently, and likewise, in the provisions of Law No. 5651, contrary to this rule which had formed of its own accord, an administrative body is given the power and the duty to take decisions blocking access.
The bad side of the practice is that this decision to block communication was carried out without being based on any legal norm. Yet law is a body of norms, and taking and implementing a decision without a norm, that is, without a rule, and moreover in an area such as this which concerns fundamental rights and freedoms, is at odds with the principle of the rule of law. It should be noted, however, that Law No. 5651 “on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Offences Committed by means of Such Publications”, after regulating in Arts. 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively “the liability of the content provider”, “the obligations of the hosting provider”, “the obligations of the access provider” and “the obligations of public use providers”, regulates in Art. 8 “the decision to block access and its implementation” and in Art. 9 “the removal of content from publication and the right of reply”. In this way an attempt has been made to place internet communication on a statutory footing. The relevant provisions of the Law in question will be explained below from the standpoint of the general blocking of internet communication. Thus the decision to block access, taken until now by court decision, will as a rule again be given by the courts, but it will now rest on a statutory basis.
2. Blocking of Internet Communication by Administrative Practice - The Example of the Blocking of Communication by Decision of the Telecommunications Board
In this sample case, an assessment will be made from a legal standpoint of the fact that the Telecommunications Authority (TK), although it had neither the power nor the duty to do so, took a decision to block access to the website through which a commercial company carried on all of its activities, and of the consequences of the implementation of that decision.
a. A Sample Case concerning the Blocking of Internet Communication by Administrative Practice
In this sample case, the party subjected to the unlawful practice is a company which operates in the IT sector and carries out almost all of its commercial activities through its own website. In addition to operating in almost every field of the IT sector, the company is also engaged in the business of sending bulk SMS (bulk short messages) and carries out this business through the website on which its other commercial activities are also located.
The company has produced software for sending bulk SMS and, under a contract concluded with the GSM (mobile telephone communication) operators, uses the infrastructure and communication services of those GSM operators to enable its customers, by logging on to the website in question with the user code and password it has given them, to send whatever SMS message they wish to whatever telephone numbers they wish; in reality it merely allows software that it has itself produced to be used and invoices its customers for the price of that use combined with the communication service fee which it itself pays to the GSM operators. In fact, the company here claims from its customers only the fee for the use of the software it has produced and, apart from this, does not engage in any activity that could be defined as a communication activity. However, because the GSM operators do not wish to come face to face with the end user directly, they collect the fee for the communication service they provide from the company instead of collecting it directly from the end user, and the company passes this fee on to its customers, who are the end users. This practice has been applied in this way for approximately seven years both by the company subjected to this sanction and by the other companies in the sector that provide this service.
The Telecommunications Board, acting on a complaint made to it, decided that this practice was a “telecommunications service” subject to a licence under the Telegraph and Telephone Law No. 406 and demanded that it be stopped; in connection with the matter, the Telecommunications Authority sent a letter each to the governor’s office of the province in which the company’s head office is located, to the GSM operators whose communication services the company uses, and to the companies providing the internet access used by the company, requesting that the provision of the services in question to the company be stopped and that the governor’s office put an end to the activity of the company in question.
In this connection, by the letter sent by the TK to the access provider which provides internet service provider services and enables users to access the website belonging to the company in question, it was stated that, pursuant to decision no. 2007/DK – 08/18 of 28.02.2007 taken by the Telecommunications Board, it was not lawful for the company to sell bulk SMS without a licence, and the blocking of access to the company’s website was requested. The Board decision in question and the letter sent by the TK to the companies providing access read as follows:
“With regard to the assessments carried out in the light of the complaints made to our Authority to the effect that certain companies not authorised by the Authority give GSM operators undertakings to send large volumes of SMS and, by reaching agreement with them, purchase SMS in bulk, and subsequently make these SMS available via the internet for use by third parties in return for a fee, in decision no. 2007/DK– 08/118 of 28/02/2007 of the Telecommunications Board, on the basis of ‘Art. 1, Art. 2(a) and (f) of Law No. 406, Art. 18(2) of Law No. 406, Art. 6 of the Regulation on Authorisation for Telecommunications Services and Infrastructures, and Art. 5.2 of the regulatory annex concerning the ‘Annex-A6 Wired and Wireless Internet Service Provider Service’ included among the ‘Annex-A Service-Specific Annexes’ to the Regulation on Authorisation for Telecommunications Services and Infrastructures’ and Art. 9 of the Regulation on the Organisation and Duties and the Working Procedures and Principles of the Telecommunications Authority;
1. That the access of internet users;
………….
to the websites so named be blocked by all Internet Service Providers providing services in our country, and that the necessary steps be taken to ensure this,
2. That, since it has been established that the above-mentioned companies offer to third parties the services from which they benefit under subscription contracts, a letter be written to the GSM operators with a view to the cancellation of the subscription contracts concluded with these companies,
3. That, pursuant to the provision contained in Art. 18(2) of Law No. 406, which reads: ‘The facilities of those who provide telecommunications services without obtaining a general authorisation and licence, contrary to Art. 2(a), shall be closed down by the relevant civil administrators at the request of the Authority and their services shall be terminated. In the event of repetition, the perpetrators shall be sentenced to a fine of two hundred million lira to three billion lira’, the necessary steps be initiated for the activities of the companies in question, which have been found to provide a messaging service without obtaining an authorisation certificate from our Authority, to be closed down by the relevant civil administrators at the request of the Authority…’
have been resolved.
Within the framework of the said Board Decision, I respectfully and urgently request that the necessary action be taken to cancel the service contracts concluded with the companies whose trade names and internet addresses are indicated above, to block access to the websites, and to inform our Authority of the outcome.”
Thereupon, access to the website in question was cut off by the ISP. As a result of this measure, access to the website through which the company also carried on all of its other commercial activities was blocked, and anyone wishing to view this site was met with the notice “access has been blocked by court decision”. Moreover, as a result of this decision and its implementation, the company’s communications by electronic mail were also blocked, both those with its customers and those of its staff among themselves, as well as the personal communications of its staff. In other words, what is at issue in this example is the blocking of internet communication in the full sense of the term.
Thereupon, counsel for the company subjected to the decision and measure in question brought an action for annulment before the administrative court having jurisdiction and competence, seeking the annulment of the above-mentioned decision of the Telecommunications Board and a stay of execution.
b. Assessment of the Sample Case concerning the Blocking of Internet Communication by Administrative Practice
The Telecommunications Authority and the Telecommunications Board are independent, autonomous administrative bodies and are subject to the rules of administrative law. From the standpoint of administrative law, the basic rule is that the administration has no power; the administration may perform acts and actions only where power is expressly conferred on it by a rule of law. It is therefore not possible for an administrative body to take a decision on any matter and to implement it without a legal norm on which it relies. In short, in situations in which no power has been conferred on it by a rule of law, the administration is, as a rule, without power and cannot perform any act. Furthermore, under the Constitution it is likewise not possible for a regulation concerning fundamental rights and freedoms to be made by an administrative regulation other than a law.
In the light of this explanation, the Telecommunications Board will be able to take and implement a decision to this effect only if the relevant statutory regulation has conferred on it the power “to take, and have implemented, a decision on the blocking of internet communication”. The establishment and powers of the Telecommunications Authority and Board are regulated by the “Telegraph and Telephone Law No. 406”. When this Law is examined, it is seen that the Telecommunications Authority has not been given “the power to take and implement a decision on the blocking of internet communication” and that the Law in question contains no provision to that effect.
Moreover, the company subjected to the sanction in question does not merely offer a bulk SMS service through its website; it also engages in other commercial activities and, most importantly, carries out its corporate and individual communication through this website as well. By contrast, neither the TK nor the Board has any power to block internet access, either under Art. 18(2) of Law No. 406 or under the other provisions of the legislation applicable to them. It is therefore seen that this decision given by the Telecommunications Board was given contrary to the general principles of administrative law and to the legal rules on this subject, and without either the Authority or the Board having any such power.
A further proof that it is unlawful for the Telecommunications Authority and Board to take a decision aimed at blocking internet communication is that, as also explained above, in practice this decision is given by the courts. The internet and the innovations it has brought entered our country in the last fifteen years and have come into widespread use. At the time when the administrative practice under examination took place, there was no adequate legal regulation concerning the internet infrastructure; in particular, there was no regulation on the legal liability of content providers, access providers and hosting providers, who are the persons in various positions on the internet referred to in short as “internet actors”, or on the legal measures that could be taken in this field, and consequently none on internet communication and publishing. Nevertheless, despite this legal vacuum, practice found certain remedies for the matter, and in particular the courts began to issue interim measures blocking access to websites published on the internet that contained insult or unlawful propaganda. As explained above, this decision was given only at the request of the parties or of the Public Prosecutor, by the Civil Courts of Peace or the Criminal Courts of Peace depending on its subject matter, or, where an action had been brought, by the court hearing the merits. This was because it was accepted in practice that what was at stake was a fundamental right and freedom relating to freedom of communication and that it could be restricted only by a judge’s decision. Indeed, this state of affairs has also been turned into a rule of law by Law No. 5651, which provides that, as a rule, internet access may be stopped by a judge’s decision. While the development of legal scholarship and practice in our country has been in this direction, it ought not to be possible for an autonomous administrative institution to usurp power and give such a decision. However, as seen in the example given above, the Telecommunications Authority and Board, by the decision they gave, usurped a judicial power which, both before and after Law No. 5651, belongs to the independent courts.
Indeed, Art. 8 of the newly adopted Law No. 5651 provides that the decision to block access is to be given by the courts. Art. 8(4) of this Law, for its part, provides that, in the situations specified in that paragraph, the decision to block access is to be given by the “Telecommunications Communication Presidency” within the Telecommunications Authority, as defined in Art. 2(1)(b) of the same Law. As can be seen, this Law assigns new duties to the Telecommunications Communication Presidency for the blocking of access, and states that access may be blocked only where there is suspicion that certain types of offence have been committed, and that the decision is to be given as a rule by the courts and by way of exception by the Telecommunications Communication Presidency. The very fact that this provision has been made shows very clearly that the Telecommunications Authority and Board had no such power, either before this Law or after the entry into force of this provision.
The last point to be made on this subject is that such a regulation concerning fundamental rights and freedoms may be made only by law. As also stated above, the company subjected to the administrative sanction in question, in operating in the IT sector, does not merely sell bulk SMS; through this site it carries out its other commercial activities and also provides communication by electronic mail, based on the site in question, between its customers and its own company employees. Consequently, the said decision also restricts the company’s freedom of communication.
Freedom of communication is regulated in Art. 22 of the 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye, which is located in Part Two, entitled Fundamental Rights and Duties. In this article, freedom of communication is defined as follows: “Unless there is a decision duly given by a judge on one or more of the grounds of national security, public order, prevention of the commission of offences, protection of public health and public morals, or protection of the rights and freedoms of others; and, again on these grounds, unless there is a written order of the authority empowered by law in cases where delay would be prejudicial; communication shall not be impeded nor its secrecy be violated. The decision of the competent authority shall be submitted for the approval of the judge having jurisdiction within twenty-four hours. The judge shall announce his decision within forty-eight hours; otherwise, the decision shall be lifted automatically…”.
In addition, Art. 13 of the same Part of the Constitution, entitled “Restriction of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms”, explains under what conditions and in what manner fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted. It states: “fundamental rights and freedoms may be limited, without affecting their essence, only on the grounds specified in the relevant articles of the Constitution and only by law. These limitations shall not be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution, to the requirements of the democratic order of society and of the secular Republic, or to the principle of proportionality”. Consequently, Arts. 13 and 22 of the 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye, which are relevant to the subject, clearly regulate the content of the right in question and the form and conditions of its limitation. It is stated clearly and unequivocally that “freedom of communication”, which is one of the fundamental rights and freedoms, may be restricted solely and exclusively by “law”, and that a decision restricting this right may be given only by a judge.
In the face of this constitutional regulation, freedom of communication cannot, as in the Board decision under examination, by a communiqué published and/or a decision taken by the Telecommunications Board, which is an organ of the Telecommunications Authority, an autonomous administrative body, be restricted or impeded. Any decision and practice to the contrary constitutes a very clear violation of the Constitution and of the principle of the rule of law. For this reason, the decision to block access to the website belonging to the said company, since it is a regulation concerning fundamental rights and freedoms, is seen to be manifestly contrary to the Constitution in terms of both subject matter and form.
V. Assessment of Law No. 5651 from the Standpoint of the Special Blocking of Internet Communication (Blocking of Access)
The decisions on the blocking of access explained above, in particular those given by the courts, gave rise to a practice of their own accord, but its legal infrastructure remained deficient. This lack of legal infrastructure was voiced in every forum by those concerned with the IT sector and IT law. The legislature, taking this gap in the legislation and the criticisms into account, sought to remedy the deficiency by Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Internet Publications; as explained above, it first regulated in Arts. 4, 5, 6 and 7 the legal liabilities and obligations of the internet actors, and then regulated in Arts. 8 and 9 the subject of this section, namely the special blocking of internet communication or, in other words, the blocking of access.
1. Types of Offence for which a Decision to Block Access May Be Given
Art. 8 of Law No. 5651 provides that a decision to block access shall be given in respect of publications made on the internet where there are sufficient grounds for suspicion that their content constitutes the offences of inducement to suicide under Art. 84, sexual abuse of children under Art. 103(1), facilitating the use of narcotic and stimulant substances under Art. 190, supplying substances dangerous to health under Art. 194, obscenity under Art. 226, prostitution under Art. 227 and providing a place and means for gambling under Art. 228 of the TCK No. 5237, or the offences set out in Law No. 5816 on Offences Committed against Atatürk. Since the Law characterises the blocking of internet communication in this respect as the blocking of access, the term “blocking of access” will be used in order not to give rise to confusion and so that the subject may be understood more easily.
Under this provision, a decision to block access may be given solely and exclusively in respect of the types of offence listed above; here, no discretion has been granted to the judge, or to the Presidency which decides by way of exception, as regards the types of offence for which a decision to block access may be given. Although at first sight it might be thought appropriate to make such a restrictive provision for a coercive measure such as the blocking of access, which may have serious consequences, in reality this limitation renders the provision inadequate and unfit for its purpose. This is because the fact that the giving of a decision to block access is confined to these types of offence alone, and that this coercive measure cannot be applied in respect of many other important types of offence, is regarded as a significant shortcoming. For example, if a website were to describe methods of killing a person by using poison without leaving a trace behind, or to explain how to make a fragmentation bomb with tools and materials that are very easy to obtain, would access to this content not be blocked? Or if it were to become apparent that the members of an organised criminal organisation were communicating on a website, that money-laundering operations were being carried out there and that they were planning in that environment the offences they were going to commit, would access to that site not be blocked, for the purpose of preventing the offence, after the necessary and sufficient technical surveillance had been duly carried out by the law enforcement agencies? If a terrorist organisation, through a website that it owns, were to make propaganda, defy the State and the security forces and recruit members to the organisation through that site, would access to that site not be blocked because these acts are not among the catalogue offences? In the face of the way the Law is drafted, the answer to these questions is, unfortunately, in the negative. In the face of this provision, it is not possible for a decision to block access to be given for any type of offence other than those specified in Art. 8(1) of the Law. As it stands, the provision does not serve the intended purpose and remains incomplete. It is considered that it would have been a more effective and purposive regulation if, when Art. 8 of the Law was drafted, the types of offence regarded as very important had been specifically indicated, as in Art. 100 of the CMK No. 5271, and the giving of a decision to block access thereby facilitated in those cases, while the judge was also given discretion in respect of the other types of offence.
There are also certain reservations regarding the types of offence which this Law specifies as those whose commission may give rise to a decision to block access. In particular, it is debatable how necessary it is that obscenity and the offence of providing a place and means for gambling should be among the types of offence that call for a decision on this coercive measure. First of all, it must be noted that the content of the concept of obscenity changes according to time and place, that it is extremely difficult to define what is obscene, what is erotic and what is pornographic, and that the boundaries between them are extremely blurred. As is well known, what is obscene and what is pornographic changes from era to era, and also varies from country to country and even between different cultural groups within the same country65. Nevertheless, materials that have an artistic, medical, scientific or similar value may be regarded as non-pornographic materials66. For this reason, it would be more appropriate to use the concept of pornography instead of the concept of obscenity in Art. 226 of the TCK No. 5237 and in this Law67. Indeed, in the European Convention on Cybercrime produced by the Council of Europe, the term pornographic act is used instead of the term obscene, and which acts are characterised as pornographic is defined in the Convention by express enumeration. For this reason, adopting a coercive measure on the basis of this concept, whose content varies from person to person, is liable to lead to its abuse.
An important matter that needs to be mentioned here is also the question whether pornographic materials featuring adults constitute an offence. Today, in countries that are developed in socio-economic terms and, in parallel with this, generally in terms of freedom of thought, there is a settled understanding that materials relating to adult pornography, and their distribution, do not constitute an offence68. Another important point to be noted here is that in the USA the concepts of pornography and obscenity are clearly defined and conceptualised differently from the way they are in the European Convention on Cybercrime. Accordingly, pornography is regarded as falling within freedom of thought, whereas obscenity remains outside this freedom and is defined as an offence. Accordingly, adult pornography is in fact regarded as a victimless crime. The reason why it is referred to as an offence is based on moral values coming down from the past. Yet the persons who would have to be the victims here are those who appear in the pictures or films in question as models or actors. The performers in these films or pictures, however, are over the age of 18, take part in these shoots for a fee under the contracts they have signed with the producers, and there is no question of their being deceived or forced to take part in these shoots. Consequently, there is no victim in the criminal-law sense either. As for those who consume these materials, on the other hand, the materials are not sold openly and can be purchased and viewed solely and exclusively by persons over the age of 18. In this way an attempt has been made to prevent the psychological development of children from being affected by these materials. Moreover, there can be no question of the adults who view these materials being victims. This is a conscious choice by persons who have reached sexual maturity. Whether the production and consumption of such materials is morally right does not fall within the sphere of interest of criminal law, nor does the State have any duty to protect adults from such materials. This is because the secular State does not interfere in the sexual lives and desires of its citizens unless these affect the freedom of another person; that could be possible only in a regime governed by religious rules. For this reason, in our country too, which claims to have a secular State, acts of this kind should be decriminalised and no coercive measures should be taken in respect of them. Otherwise, it may soon become possible for websites containing pictures of ladies in swimsuits or bikinis, or sites that advertise and sell underwear or women’s nylon stockings electronically, to be regarded as obscene, for access to them to be blocked as a coercive measure under this article, and for their managers to be punished. All of these explanations, however, relate to adult pornography; child pornography, and the protection of children from products intended for adults, are definitely outside their scope. The State is also responsible under international conventions for protecting children from this and must take every kind of measure.
The offence of providing a place and means for gambling should also be assessed in this context. Whether or not an individual wishes to gamble is definitely an individual choice. People who have money in their pockets for gambling fill the casinos located in neighbouring countries and generate a large economic input there. In order to obtain a share of this economic input, both physical and virtual gambling should be permitted in our country too, but restrictions relating to both age and income level should be introduced with regard to the persons who may gamble. Otherwise, the sector both goes underground and carries this on illegally and also continues this activity in neighbouring countries and diverts the economic input in question. However, as far as the present situation is concerned, under the criminal policy in force in our country this act has been made an offence; for this reason, the operation of gambling in cyberspace should also be regulated in an express manner in Art. 228 of the TCK69. On the other hand, the fact that the coercive measure of blocking access can be applied for the act of gambling, while this measure cannot be applied for types of offence whose protected legal interest is far more important by comparison, creates a major contradiction.
Frankly, when this Law was drafted by the legislature, certain moral concerns were brought to the fore rather than the interests of society and the individual and the importance of the legal interest protected by the offence. This, as explained above, has led to the entry into force of a law that is odd in many respects.
2. The Decision to Block Access as a Coercive Measure
Art. 8(2) of the Law regulates the “blocking of access” as a coercive measure of criminal procedure. That this is a coercive measure of criminal procedure is apparent from the provisions in Art. 8(2), “an objection may be lodged against a decision on the blocking of access given as a coercive measure in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 of 4/12/2004”, in paragraph 10, “those who fail to comply with a decision to block access given as a coercive measure…”, and in paragraph 11, “where a decision to block access given as an administrative measure is not complied with…”. Otherwise, neither the heading nor the content of the paragraph states that this is a coercive measure. From the standpoint of legislative technique this is an extremely poor manner of drafting, since the article of the Law has virtually been turned into a puzzle.
An important point of criticism in this regard also concerns the place in which this paragraph has been regulated; coercive measures of criminal procedure are regulated in the relevant chapter of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is the general law on this subject, although for certain special types of offence (for example, banking offences) it is possible to provide for coercive measures that relate to the manner in which they are committed and are applicable only in respect of those types of offence. Yet when one looks at the regulation made by Law No. 5651, it is seen that the coercive measure in question may be applied to a great many types of offence in different fields. That being so, it would have been more appropriate for Law No. 5651 to amend the CMK No. 5271, changing the heading of Book One, Part Four, Chapter Five, “interception of communications made by means of telecommunication”, to “interception and blocking of communications made by means of telecommunication and the internet”, and for the articles in question to be regulated after Art. 138 as Art. 138a et seq. The fact that this course was not chosen and that these matters were regulated in a separate law has caused the rules of criminal procedure, which form a whole, to be fragmented.
The decision to block access will be given by the judge at the investigation stage and by the court at the prosecution stage. At the investigation stage, in cases where delay would be prejudicial, the blocking of access will be decided by the public prosecutor. Where the blocking of access is decided by the public prosecutor, the prosecutor will submit the decision for the approval of the judge having jurisdiction and competence within twenty-four hours, and the judge will decide on the matter within twenty-four hours of receiving the prosecutor’s decision. If the prosecutor’s decision is not approved within twenty-four hours, that is, if the judge has given neither a favourable nor an unfavourable decision by the end of twenty-four hours from receipt of the prosecutor’s decision, the prosecutor’s decision will be deemed not to have been approved and the decision in question will be lifted by the prosecutor. It is also possible to lodge an objection against a decision to block access given as a coercive measure under Arts. 267 et seq. of the CMK No. 5271.
It must first be noted that it is a positive development that the interim decision on the blocking of access, which until today has been given without any statutory basis by judges, as it should be, by virtually “creating law”, which is the task of the private-law judge, has been placed on a statutory footing. In this way the practice is being made lawful. That the power to give such an important decision has been conferred on judges is a further positive development. As to which cases are those in which delay would be prejudicial, it is the public prosecutor who will determine this and who will decide accordingly. However, the likelihood of cases in which delay would be prejudicial arising in respect of the types of offence specified in Art. 8(1) appears slight. This is because types of offence that call for immediate intervention, such as homicide, organised crime or terrorist offences, are not on this list. Nevertheless, the fact that this decision taken by the prosecutor is also made subject to review by a judge, that both the transmission of this decision and its review are made subject to short time-limits of twenty-four hours, and that a consequence is also attached to the situation in which the judge gives no decision, it being specified that this means the lifting of the measure, makes this an extremely good and democratic provision.
Under Art. 8(3) of the Law, a copy of the decision to block access given by the judge, the court or the public prosecutor, depending on whether the file is at the investigation or the prosecution stage, will be sent to the Presidency for the necessary action to be taken. In this way the Presidency will inform all access providers of the matter in writing, also indicating the relevant decision, and will ensure that the decision to block access to the addresses indicated in the decision is implemented. This decision will be carried out immediately after notification has been made by the Presidency to the access providers, and at the latest within twenty-four hours from the moment the decision is notified (Law No. 5651, Art. 8(5)).
Where a decision not to prosecute is given at the end of the investigation conducted by the public prosecutor’s office, the decision to block access will automatically become void. In that case the public prosecutor’s office will send the Presidency the decision of non-prosecution in question and a letter stating that the coercive measure has become void, and the Presidency will notify the access providers of this situation and ensure that the block is lifted. What will be the position of the measure of blocking access if an objection is lodged against the decision not to prosecute under Art. 173 of the CMK and, as a result of the objection, the President of the Assize Court requires that a public prosecution be brought? Art. 8(7) of Law No. 5651 expressly states that, where a decision not to prosecute is given, the previously given decision to block access will automatically become void without there being any need for a further decision. Consequently, where the prosecutor gives a decision not to prosecute under Art. 172 of the CMK, the measure in question will be lifted automatically even if that decision subsequently becomes the subject of an objection. If, as a result of the objection and upon the decision of the president of the assize court, the prosecutor draws up an indictment and brings proceedings, then, should this measure be needed again, a decision may be given by following the method explained above; but this will now be a second, different decision on a measure.
In a manner similar to the situation in the case of the decision not to prosecute explained above, where a judgment of acquittal is given in respect of the perpetrator at the end of the prosecution, the decision to block access will automatically become void. In this case too, a copy of the judgment of acquittal will be sent to the Presidency and the Presidency will take the necessary action in the manner explained above. However, as is well known, in criminal procedure it is not the act but the accused who carried out the act that is tried. What will happen if, at the end of the trial, it becomes apparent that the act carried out really is an offence but that the person who did it is not the accused on trial? What will be the fate of the measure if several persons are accused in the trial and some of them are acquitted while others are convicted of the offences with which they are charged? When this article was drafted, the provision was made virtually as if it were the act that was being tried, or as if a single perpetrator were to be tried, and this is liable to give rise to problems. The answers to the above questions should be as follows. In the first scenario, since the unlawful act continues to exist but the accused has been acquitted, this situation should be stated in the judgment and an investigation should be conducted by the public prosecutor’s office under a different preliminary investigation number; and since, under Art. 8(8) of Law No. 5651, the decision on the measure will automatically become void as a result of the judgment of acquittal, a decision to block access will be requested anew, together with this new investigation, by again following the required method.
In the second scenario, if they are convicted on account of a publication whose content constitutes the offences specified in Art. 8(1), the coercive measure will continue. However, this too gives rise to a situation that is not in keeping with the law of criminal procedure. This is because coercive measures remain in existence throughout the investigation and prosecution stages, for their purpose is to ensure that the investigation and prosecution are conducted more swiftly and effectively. If it is desired that the measures should continue, this is stated in the judgment given by the court as a sanction or a security measure. The measure of blocking access will likewise be lifted automatically in the event of the acquittal of the perpetrator or of all the perpetrators; but what will become of the decision given in the event of a conviction? For coercive measures are lifted by decisions that bring the proceedings to an end, such as an acquittal or a conviction. It is for this reason that a new security measure, in the nature of a continuation of this measure, should be provided for in the chapter entitled “security measures” regulated in Book One, Part Three, Chapter Two of the TCK No. 5237. As the Law stands, there is a legal vacuum as to what the fate of the measure of blocking access will be in the event of a conviction. And in accordance with the principle of legality of offences and penalties, it is not possible for this vacuum to be filled by way of interpretation or analogy.
Where the content whose subject matter constitutes the offences listed in Art. 8(1) of the Law is removed from publication, the decision to block access will be lifted by the public prosecutor at the investigation stage and by the court at the prosecution stage (Law No. 5651, Art. 8(9)). No application by the parties affected by the measure is required for this; the prosecutor or the court may take this decision of their own motion, but this does not prevent those concerned with the matter from making a request either. It was not appropriate for the prosecutor to decide ex officio on the lifting of the coercive measure; just as this decision is given by the judge at the prosecutor’s request, or is submitted for the judge’s approval in cases where delay would be prejudicial, so too the decision on lifting should be effected by the judge’s decision or with the judge’s approval. Nevertheless, this provision too is a purposive and democratic one that protects the rights of individuals.
The responsible persons of hosting or access providers who fail to comply with a decision to block access given as a coercive measure will be punished with imprisonment for a term of six months to two years, unless the act constitutes another offence requiring a heavier penalty. By this paragraph the legislature has created a new type of offence. Accordingly, if hosting or access providers fail to comply with the decision to block access notified to them by the Presidency under Art. 8(5) within twenty-four hours at the latest from that notification, they will be punished under Art. 8(10). That effective solutions of this kind have been adopted so that the decision to block access can be carried out is an appropriate provision from the standpoint of the applicability and effectiveness of the Law.
3. The Decision to Block Access as an Administrative Measure
Art. 8(4) of Law No. 5651 regulates the blocking of internet access as an administrative measure. That this has been regulated as an administrative measure is apparent not from the heading or the content of the paragraph in which it appears but from the provision in paragraph 11. Accordingly, since paragraph 11 says “where a decision to block access given as an administrative measure is not complied with” and since the preceding paragraphs indicate that the provision in paragraph 2 is in the nature of a coercive measure of criminal procedure, it is understood that the provision in paragraph 4 is an administrative measure. It must be reiterated that this style of drafting is an extremely poor example from the standpoint of legislative technique, because the article of the Law has virtually been turned into a puzzle.
Accordingly, where the content or hosting provider of publications whose content constitutes the offences specified in Art. 8(1) (inducement to suicide under Art. 84, sexual abuse of children under Art. 103(1), facilitating the use of narcotic and stimulant substances under Art. 190, supplying substances dangerous to health under Art. 194, obscenity under Art. 226, prostitution under Art. 227 and providing a place and means for gambling under Art. 228 of the TCK No. 5237, and the offences set out in Law No. 5816 on Offences Committed against Atatürk) is located abroad, or, even if the content or hosting provider is located in the country, in respect of publications whose content constitutes the offences set out in items (2) and (5) of sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 1, the decision to block access will be given ex officio by the Telecommunications Communication Presidency. This decision will be notified to the access provider, which will be asked to take the necessary action.
In administrative law there is no separate legal act under the name of “administrative measure”; consequently, this is not a sui generis legal act or action. The administrative measure of blocking access regulated in this Law is a unilateral “individual-subjective” act which the administration performs for the purpose of ensuring public security, which is a public service70. Accordingly, decisions of this kind to be taken by the Presidency will be subject to the rules of administrative law, and the authority before which these decisions may be challenged will be the administrative courts.
It must be noted, however, that this provision is unlawful and unfit for its purpose. Empowering the administration in a field that falls within the remit of the judicial authorities constitutes a clear usurpation of power. The paragraph states that, where the content or hosting provider of publications constituting an offence specified in Art. 8(1) is abroad, the decision to block access will be given ex officio by the Telecommunications Communication Presidency, which is an administrative structure. It further provides that, even if the content and hosting provider is located in the country, the decision to block access will be given ex officio by the Presidency where the content constitutes the offences of sexual abuse of children under Art. 103(1) and obscenity under Art. 226 of the TCK No. 5237. In fact, measures in the nature of interim measures, which are a matter of procedural law, are encountered in the law of administrative procedure (stay of execution), in the law of civil procedure (interim injunctions and proceedings for the determination of evidence) and in the law of criminal procedure (pre-trial detention, search, etc.). The measures in question consist of the steps taken while the judicial activity is still in progress, both so that the judicial activity may be carried out properly and so that the decisions ultimately given may be enforced71. In addition, these measures have two characteristics: being instrumental and being temporary72. From the administration’s standpoint too, it is possible to carry out regulatory acts in the nature of an administrative measure. For example, the closure to vehicle traffic by the police, for the safety of the march, of the route along which a demonstration march is to take place is an administrative measure. But these administrative measures too display the characteristics both of being an instrument for achieving the purpose and of being temporary. The present provision on the blocking of access by the administration, however, has neither the characteristic of being instrumental nor that of being temporary. The paragraph in question does not indicate, when the administration takes a decision to block access, what this is an instrument of. By contrast, the decision to block access in the nature of a coercive measure has been regulated in connection with the activity of investigation and prosecution. The article does not state when a decision to block access in the nature of an administrative measure will come to an end, whereas for the decision to block access in the nature of a coercive measure these matters have been expressly regulated. All this shows clearly how flawed the provision is.
Moreover, when one looks at the nature of the administrative measure regulated in Art. 8(4) of Law No. 5651, it is seen that it is a measure relating to judicial activity and therefore that it is in reality a coercive measure. In paragraphs 2 and 3 of the article, the investigating and prosecuting authorities are given the power to adopt the measure of blocking access, in the nature of a coercive measure, for certain offences, and the method for doing so is regulated. In paragraph 4 of the same article, on the other hand, the administration is given decision-making power not with the aim of enabling administration to be carried out more properly, but in order that a decision on a measure may be taken, merely under slightly different conditions, for the same types of offence as those covered by the coercive measure of criminal procedure. Yet it is perfectly possible for the judicial organs to take a decision also where the content or hosting provider is abroad and where the content relates to the abuse of children or to obscenity. In any event, paragraph 2 confers on the prosecutor the power to decide in cases where delay would be prejudicial. Conferring power on the administration, outside the judicial authorities, in a matter of such importance concerning fundamental rights and freedoms is meaningless, anti-democratic and outside the law.
An important matter to be noted in this regard is the difference between the procedures followed in the decision to block access given as a coercive measure and in the decision to block access given as an administrative measure. It is provided that the decision taken as a coercive measure may as a rule be given by the court, but that in cases where delay would be prejudicial it may be given by the prosecutor, who is an official of the administration, and that the decision given by the prosecutor is to be submitted for the judge’s approval within twenty-four hours at the latest, the decision lapsing automatically if the judge directly declares that this decision is not approved or does not give a decision on the matter within twenty-four hours. As for the decision taken as an administrative measure, it will be taken directly by the Presidency only in the exceptional situations specified in the Law (which, by reason of the structure of the internet, will become the rule rather than the exception) and will not be submitted for the approval of any judicial authority. This is an extremely anti-democratic provision that is hard to comprehend, is wholly unsuited to the structure of the internet and will make it possible to interfere with fundamental rights and freedoms at any moment. While even a decision given by the prosecutor, who, although an official of the administration, is above all “a lawyer” and also performs activities of a judicial nature, is submitted for the judge’s approval within twenty-four hours at the latest, it is an extremely flawed provision that such a decision should be taken by a body made up of persons who in all probability have had no legal training, have no judicial function whatsoever and are agents of the administration, namely the Presidency, and that it should not be made subject to review by any authority. Although it is possible to bring an action for annulment against this decision before the administrative courts and to request a stay of execution, it is hardly possible to obtain a decision from those courts within a short time. And in a matter relating to communication in particular, even an interruption of the publication for a matter of minutes can cause significant problems. Set against the twenty-four-hour rules relating to the decision given as a coercive measure, this provision, against which recourse lies to the administrative courts, also harbours a major contradiction in terms of time.
Under Art. 8(4) of the Law, the decision to block access given by the Presidency will be notified to all access providers, and it will be ensured that the decision to block access to the addresses indicated in the decision is implemented. This decision will be carried out immediately after notification has been made by the Presidency to the access providers, and at the latest within twenty-four hours from the moment the decision is notified (Law No. 5651, Art. 8(5)).
In addition, where the identities of those responsible for the publication forming the subject matter of a decision to block access taken by the Presidency as an administrative measure under Art. 8(4) of the Law are established, the Presidency will file a criminal report with the public prosecutor’s office. This provision conflicts with the criminal code and the rules of criminal procedure. This is because, under Art. 278 of the TCK No. 5237, failure to report to the competent authorities an offence that is in the course of being committed is defined as an offence. What is meant here by an offence in the course of being committed is knowledge of the act constituting the offence; it is not necessary to have information about the identity of the perpetrator. Finding the perpetrator and establishing the perpetrator’s identity is the task of the investigating authorities. From the standpoint of criminal procedure too, when a complaint or a criminal report is to be filed, it is not necessary to state the identity and full address of the perpetrator; merely giving a description of the perpetrator is sufficient, and indeed merely reporting the act, with the perpetrator unknown, is accepted as a valid criminal report or complaint. Accordingly, by virtue of the provision it is inevitable that the subject matter of a decision to block access given by the Presidency is an offence; therefore, in the light of the explanations given above, as soon as the Presidency learns of the act (and, of course, of the perpetrator too, if it has learnt who that is) it is obliged to file a criminal report with the competent public prosecutor’s office with all the information in its possession. In any event, in view of the provision of the TCK, it is unnecessary to make a further provision on this matter. However, the fact that the paragraph makes the filing of this criminal report subject to the condition that the identity of the perpetrator be established is in clear conflict with the TCK and the CMK, and indeed, as far as the Presidency is concerned, makes it more difficult for the offence defined in Art. 278 of the TCK to be committed. Although it might be answered here that the identification in question will in any case be carried out by the Presidency, that answer too would be mistaken. First, an investigation is conducted even without the identity of the perpetrator having been established; for example, the identity of the perpetrator is investigated and at the same time efforts are made to gather the evidence relating to the act. Secondly, the investigating authorities are under no obligation necessarily to ask the Presidency to establish the identities of the perpetrators who carried out these acts. This inquiry may be carried out, for example, by the relevant units of the police, and this request may also be made to other institutions or bodies concerned with the matter. Discretion and choice in this regard lie with the investigating authorities. In conclusion, Art. 8(6) of Law No. 5651 has been produced as a flawed provision that conflicts with the TCK and the CMK.
Access providers that fail to comply with a decision to block access given as an administrative measure will be given an administrative fine of ten thousand YTL to one hundred thousand YTL. In addition, if the decision is not complied with within twenty-four hours from the moment the administrative fine is imposed, the Authority may, at the request of the Presidency, decide to revoke the authorisation to provide access provider services. Accordingly, if access providers fail to comply with the decision to block access given to them by the Presidency under Art. 8(5) within twenty-four hours at the latest from that notification, they will be punished with an administrative fine under Art. 8(11), and if they have still not blocked access within twenty-four hours after the administrative fine has been imposed, this time their authorisation may be revoked. That effective solutions of this kind have been adopted so that the decision to block access can be carried out is an appropriate provision from the standpoint of the applicability and effectiveness of the Law. However, there is no logical explanation for the fact that, although no sanction such as revocation of authorisation has been provided for in respect of the decision to block access as a coercive measure, such a severe sanction has been provided for the administrative measure, and moreover for the access provider. This provision has taken the administrative measure in question out of the category of a measure, has virtually turned it into a rule in its own right and its consequence into a sanction, and in doing so no proportionality whatsoever has been observed.
Since Art. 8(12) of the Law states that legal remedies against decisions on administrative fines imposed by the Presidency or the Authority on account of the misdemeanours defined in the Law are to be pursued in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Jurisdiction Procedures Law No. 2577, where an administrative fine is imposed under paragraph 11 or the Authority decides to revoke the authorisation, it is possible to bring an action for annulment before the administrative courts within sixty days for the annulment of those decisions.
4. Removal of Unlawful Content from Publication and the Right of Reply
Art. 9 of Law No. 5651, entitled “removal of content from publication and right of reply”, makes provision for the removal from publication of content transmitted via the internet at the request of persons whose rights have been infringed on account of that content, and for the related right of reply. In this way an attempt has also been made to find a solution to a problem that is very frequently encountered on the internet. With regard to the right of reply in particular, the provision was drafted with the right of reply and correction contained in the Press Law in mind.
Under this article, a person who claims that his rights have been infringed on account of content on the internet may apply to the content provider or, if the latter cannot be reached, to the hosting provider, and request that the content concerning him be removed from publication and that the reply he has prepared, which may not exceed the extent of the publication, be published on the internet for a period of one week. The content and hosting provider will comply with this request within two days from the date on which the request reaches it. If the request for publication is not complied with within this period, the request will be deemed to have been refused.
Although this is a provision suitable for application, it will cause difficulty on two points. The first of these is that the request in question will be able to find application only in respect of those who provide content or hosting from within the country. This is because those who carry out this act from abroad will remain outside the scope of the Law in question, both as regards the Law’s field of application and by reason of the impossibility of applying sanctions to them. This, however, is not a cause that lies in the hands of the legislature, nor is it a defect in the drafting of the article. Rather, this state of affairs reveals the international dimension of the subject and shows the need for similar regulations in all countries and the necessity of cooperation between countries.
The second point that causes difficulty is the case in which, where it is not possible to reach the content provider, the request is addressed to the hosting provider; for the hosting provider has no authority to interfere with the content for which it provides its service. To act otherwise may lead to the commission of the “offence of interfering with or disrupting an information system, destroying or altering data” regulated in Art. 244 of the TCK. Although it may be said that Art. 9(1) of Law No. 5651 constitutes a ground of justification for content providers in respect of the offence regulated in Art. 244 of the TCK, this holds only for the removal of the content causing the infringement of rights. That, however, cannot be done without interfering with the website, which forms a whole; and since hosting providers do not have the passwords needed to interfere with the content of the website, the only thing they can do is to block access by removing, together with the content causing the infringement of rights, the entire web page on which that content appears. Since this will not constitute the ground of justification specified in Art. 9(1) of Law No. 5651, it will give rise to criminal liability on the part of hosting providers. For this reason, the provision under which the request in question is addressed to hosting providers is not a sound one.
Where the request for removal of the content from publication is deemed to have been refused because no reply has been given within two days, the person making the request may, within fifteen days from the end of that period, apply to the criminal court of peace of his own place of residence and ask it to order that the content be removed from publication and that the reply he has prepared, which may not exceed the extent of the publication, be published on the internet for a period of one week. The judge of the criminal court of peace will decide on this request within three days without holding a hearing. It is possible to lodge an objection against this decision of the judge of the criminal court of peace under Arts. 267 et seq. of the CMK No. 5271.
The reservation stated above also applies to the provision in this paragraph. What is to be decided where the content and/or hosting provider is abroad, and even if a decision is taken, how will it be implemented? Where the content and/or hosting provider in question is abroad and the decision given cannot be implemented, will access to the content infringing rights remain possible? It is here that, as stated above, the shortcomings of the decision to block access regulated in Art. 8 make themselves felt. For in such a situation it ought to have been possible to give a decision to block access in respect of the content constituting the infringement of rights, and to that end the offences should not have been limited in the article in question, or else the offence of insult should also have been included in this catalogue.
Within two days of service of the decision given by the judge of the criminal court of peace, once it has become final, on the content or hosting provider that failed to comply with the application made under paragraph one, the content in question will be removed from publication and publication will begin of the reply prepared by the person whose right has been infringed, the publication of which has been ordered by the judge.
Although the wording of the paragraph gives the impression that a reply must also be submitted together with the request for removal of the content from publication, there is no such requirement. The person whose right has been infringed may request only the removal of the content from publication. Likewise, where the reply prepared contains unlawful content, the judge may order only that the content be removed from publication and refuse the request for publication of the reply. In such a case, it is possible to lodge an objection under the CMK against the decision refusing the request for publication of the reply or, provided that this is done within the time-limit, to amend the text and make a fresh request. However, the explanations given in respect of paragraph 1 with regard to the hosting provider also apply to the provision in this paragraph.
The responsible person who fails to comply with the above-described decision of the judge of the criminal court of peace in accordance with its conditions and within the time-limit will be punished with imprisonment for a term of six months to two years.
Where the content or hosting provider is a legal person, this paragraph will be applied to the person responsible for publication.
By this article too, the legislature has created a new type of offence. It has thus characterised as an offence the failure of content and hosting providers to comply with the decision given by the judge of the criminal court of peace on the removal of the content and the publication of the reply, and has prescribed a custodial sentence for it. The trial of this offence, however, will be conducted not by the judge of the criminal court of peace who gave the decision to remove the content from publication but, since the place where the offence is committed will be the place where the content or hosting provider is located, by the criminal court of peace of that place.
The second sentence of the paragraph, for its part, introduces the concept of “a person responsible for publication”, which does not exist in the Law. Art. 3 of the Law, entitled “obligation to inform”, does not impose on content, hosting and access providers any obligation to designate such a responsible person. Who, then, will be punished when the internet actors in question have not designated a person responsible for publication and are legal persons? Even if the regulation to be issued in connection with this Law were to introduce a requirement to indicate a person responsible for publication, it would then not be possible to punish these persons, because criminal liability would in effect have been introduced by a regulation. This has therefore been a technically defective provision. Moreover, even if there were no such technical defect, by introducing for the internet a requirement to designate a person responsible for publication, like the responsible managing editor of the print media, an attempt has in effect been made to create a “scapegoat” for content on the internet. On the other hand, this person responsible for publication, for fear of being punished, will be sure to want to publish the publications in question, and compliance with the judge’s decision will thus be secured. However, this provision will lead to problems of criminal liability similar to those experienced in the press, particularly in respect of responsible managing editors, being experienced in the field of the internet too, and on a very widespread scale.
CONCLUSION and RECOMMENDATIONS
In our country, as throughout the world, very different views and methods are put forward on the regulation and “supervision” of the internet. However, the common problem on which everyone concerned with the subject agrees is that the statutory infrastructure in this area is inadequate. Nevertheless, as is the nature of life and as with every technological development, in the field of information technology too the number of unlawful acts committed, in particular by using the internet as an instrument, and the quantity and quality of the harm caused, are increasing with every passing day.
Yet life, and of course legal practice, which is a part of it, adapted to this situation at once and developed various methods for stopping unlawful acts committed via the internet and identifying their perpetrators. Indeed, this process of developing methods manifested itself, in a manner deserving of appreciation, in the form of the creation of law by the judge. As a result, as explained in detail above, decisions on the “blocking of access” were given by judges of the criminal courts of peace at the request of public prosecutors, particularly at the investigation stage of criminal procedure, and in this way access to unlawful content was blocked and individuals and society were prevented from suffering further harm.
The judicial branch, which is made up of lawyers, despite the absence of a statutory basis, acted with the interests of the individual and of society in mind, displayed the sensitivity that a lawyer ought to have and, conscious that it was restricting a fundamental right and freedom, obtained the decisions in question from a judge. Regrettably, the administrative branch was unable to display the same sensitivity. Certain administrative institutions or bodies, examples of which were given above, usurped power by giving, without having any power or duty to do so, decisions such as the shutting down of a website, which even the judiciary did not give, and thereby gave rise to unlawful acts and actions.
On the other hand, starting from the premise that the internet is not a lawless space, the debates on how this space is to be regulated and how it is to be supervised have never left the agenda either, and a great many ideas have been put forward on the matter. While, on the one hand, ideas are put forward to the effect that security should be sought by filtering and supervising the internet in general, on the other hand ideas are also put forward to the effect that the internet has to date been the only space in which freedom of thought is fully and directly effective and can easily be exercised, and that filtering and supervising the internet would destroy its distinctive structure. What needs to be done at this point is to find solutions that reconcile these two views and to enable both security and freedom to live side by side on the internet. And the best solution for this is to take a number of measures together and, in particular, to ensure that the task of regulating and steering the internet is carried out by independent bodies.
While these intense debates and searches were continuing in our country, a draft law prepared by the Ministry of Transport was adopted by the plenary of the parliament and became law, and was brought into force upon its publication by the President of the Republic. This law is Law No. 5651 “on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Offences Committed by means of Such Publications”.
In fact, by this Law an attempt was made to provide a solution to the criticisms and debates mentioned above and to establish the legal infrastructure of internet communication in our country. However, as explained in detail above, it is seen that the legislature has not been very successful in this. Alongside the positive and democratic provisions contained in the Law, there are also provisions that are definitely contrary to law and to the nature of the internet and, moreover, anti-democratic.
The first and important criticism to be levelled at the Law is that the legislature, influenced by the debates of the day and with the aim of producing a reaction, made offences such as obscenity and child abuse in particular the subject of regulation in a restrictive manner. Child abuse and child pornography are types of offence which all States must especially combat and in respect of which they must take measures. However, as also explained above, the fact that the regulation was confined to these types of offence alone has resulted in the Law being an incomplete regulation.
Art. 1 of this Law defines the purpose and scope of the Law as follows: “to regulate the obligations and liabilities of content, hosting, access and public use providers and the principles and procedures for combating certain offences committed on the internet through content, hosting and access providers”. Although it is a positive step that this Law makes provision for content, hosting and public use providers and for the management of the internet from the administrative standpoint, the making of provisions on combating offences committed on the internet through content, hosting and access providers is contrary to the purpose of the Law. It must first be pointed out that crime cannot be combated through “content, hosting and access providers”. These internet actors are not subjects through whom crime is to be combated. Crime is combated by means of education, laws, law enforcement agencies and the machinery of justice. The second point to be made is that the articles regulated under the head of combating crime are “coercive measures” belonging to the law of criminal procedure. Consequently, these articles ought to be located in the chapter on coercive measures of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271.
In Art. 3 of Law No. 5651, what is meant is not content providers within the meaning of Art. 2 but those who own and/or operate a website. There is no doubt that technically these too are content providers and indeed that they make up a large proportion of content providers; but since content providers do not consist solely of these persons, and since it is not practicable for persons other than the owner and/or operator of the website to give the information in question each time they provide content and for that information to be kept on the website in a visible form, this has been a flawed provision. Consequently, using the term “website owner and/or operator” instead of content providers in this article of the Law would be more in keeping with the aim sought to be achieved by this Law.
The second sentence of Art. 4(2) of the Law states that content providers will be liable under the general provisions if it is clearly evident from the manner of presentation of the content to which they provide a link that they have adopted that content and intend the user to reach it. It is not clear what is meant by this provision. First of all, what is intended by “the general provisions”? Is the law to whose general provisions reference is made the Criminal Code or the Code of Obligations? Unless a content provider states openly, on his own website for instance, that he adopts a particular item contained in another site, by what criteria will “adoption and the intention that it be reached” be determined, and how will they be proved? If a content provider provides a link from his website to a website containing a large number of critical articles and openly praises that website, but certain persons are insulted in one article on that site, will the content provider who provided the link be liable for that article? Another important example that will be encountered in this connection concerns search engines. If a content provider pays a fee to have his own link displayed among the top results but the content is unlawful, will the search engine, which by virtue of its contract intends that this link be reached, be liable for it? This list could be extended. It appears that this article of the Law was drafted without consideration of the hypotheses set out above, which are highly likely to materialise. It is internet actors and lawyers who will pay the price for this. The article should therefore be redrafted after these hypotheses and similar ones have been thought through in all their dimensions.
Art. 6(1) of Law No. 5651 provides, secondly, that access providers shall be obliged to retain the traffic data specified in the relevant regulation concerning the services they provide for a period to be determined in the regulation, being not less than six months and not more than two years, and to ensure the accuracy, integrity and confidentiality of these data. Looked at from the other side, retaining these data for a fairly long period is very important for combating offences committed over the internet, for preventing the loss of the necessary data and for enabling perpetrators to be identified. This constitutes the positive side of the provision. When this paragraph is examined in terms of the balance between freedom and security, it does no harm to individual freedoms and merely gives rise to additional costs for some entrepreneurs; on the other hand, the benefit it provides in combating criminals is too great to be compared with the harm it does. It can therefore be seen to be, on the whole, a positive provision.
Art. 6(2) of Law No. 5651 provides, as also noted above, that access providers are not obliged to check whether the content of the information accessed through them is unlawful and whether it gives rise to legal liability. This provision resembles the German Teleservices Act and is a positive one as regards the liability of access providers.
Art. 7(2) of the Law provides that all public use providers, whether or not they operate for commercial purposes, are obliged to take measures to block access to content constituting an offence; but public use providers have not been made liable for failure to comply with this rule, and no sanction has been provided for it. This article therefore serves no function other than to set out the intention and the wish of the legislature. Laws, however, are not a collection of the legislature’s good intentions and wishes; every norm in a law must perform a particular function. This should not, however, be taken to mean that public access providers ought to be held liable under the article in question if they fail to take measures to prevent access to content constituting an offence. To impose on public access providers an obligation that has not been imposed on access providers and hosting providers would be neither equitable nor lawful. In any case, where public access providers intentionally direct their customers to content constituting an offence, this will be assessed under the general provisions of the TCK within the framework of participation in the offence; it would, moreover, be inappropriate to make a similar provision in this Law as well without any determination as to the culpability of the perpetrator. For this reason, the paragraph in question is a provision that need not be included in Law No. 5651.
Law No. 5651 contains no article bearing the heading of the general regulation or supervision of internet communication. The regulation and supervision of internet communication are, however, governed by Art. 10(4) and (5) of the Law, headed “administrative structure and duties”. It is truly thought-provoking that so important a provision concerning the internet, which ought to have been made the subject of regulation under a separate heading, has been placed under an article concerning the administrative structure, as if the provision were being hidden.
There is no catalogue of offences covered by the Law under examination. Art. 8(1), however, specifies the types of offence in respect of which a decision to block access may be given. If, as regards the general blocking of internet communication, only these types of offence fall within the scope of the Law, this is a provision that is both incomplete and flawed. For not only are these not the only offences committed by means of the internet, but the types of offence in question are also not presented, in Art. 1, in which the purpose of this Law is explained, as the only types of offence that have to be combated; they are presented, by way of enumeration, solely as the types of offence in respect of which, in the event of suspicion, a decision to block access may be given for the purposes of blocking internet access (which is an article concerning the special blocking of internet communication).
By the provision made in Art. 10 of the Law an “internet censorship authority” is openly being created in our country. There is no respect in which this can be accepted. Under the scheme of this Law and of this article, the internet in our country will be governed not with very little interference in an environment of freedom, as its nature requires, but virtually with an iron fist by a dictator.
Moreover, it is also unclear what is to be understood by the concept of publication intended by this provision. In Art. 2 of the Law, in which the definitions are given, publication is defined as publication made on the internet; but this is not sufficient either, and it does not explain what is to be understood by internet publication. In any case, the term used is, as we have also explained above, incorrect: what is regulated in this Law is not internet publications but internet communication, since publication is a one-sided act whereas the majority of the activities carried out over the internet are interactive, so that this act can be described not by the term publication but only by the term communication.
A further point to be made on this subject is that the finding that an offence has been committed can be made solely and exclusively by the courts having jurisdiction and competence. No institution, organisation or person other than this authority may make a finding that an offence has been committed. Where there is a suspicion that an offence has been committed, however, individuals or the persons charged with this task report the offence or lodge a complaint with the places specified in the CMK No. 5271, and, after the necessary investigation has been carried out by that authority, a public prosecution is brought if there is sufficient evidence that the perpetrator or perpetrators committed the offence. Yet none even of these stages is a finding that an offence has been committed; one proceeds merely on the basis of suspicion. While the Constitution and the relevant laws have entrusted the decision establishing the offence to the independent courts, the fact that such a power and duty has been conferred by law on an administrative institution renders the article in question clearly unconstitutional. For this reason, the article of the Law in question should be brought before the Constitutional Court and annulled by that court.
A further important shortcoming of the Law lies in the provision made for public use providers. In places such as internet cafés in particular, a proper chronological record of those receiving service should be kept and sufficient identity and address information should be taken; this practice is currently applied in many countries. It is regrettable and thought-provoking that, while certain excessive and unnecessary measures have been taken by Law No. 5651 for the purpose of combating crime, very simple but very necessary measures have not been taken.
For the purpose of combating the offences listed in Art. 8 of the Law, under Art. 10(4), sub-paragraph
d) technical monitoring is to be carried out and a system installed for this; this is a positive provision, but it is not sufficient to confine it to the types of offence in question alone. It is impossible to understand, for example, why no such monitoring is carried out for terrorist offences.
It is not clear what is meant by the concept of the “various services open to everyone on the internet” referred to in Art. 10(4)(e) of the Law. Nor is any such concept or definition of it to be found in Art. 2 of the Law. By carrying out filtering, screening and monitoring in these services, whose meaning is not clear, it will also become possible to violate the right to respect for private life and the freedom of communication and to restrict freedom of thought. Consequently, provisions to the effect that every kind of restriction may be imposed over the internet in an open-ended manner, without any specific rule being laid down, are wholly incompatible with the structure of the internet.
It was not appropriate to confine the giving of a decision to block access to the types of offence specified in Art. 8 alone, with the result that this coercive measure cannot be applied in respect of other very important types of offence. In the face of this provision, it is not possible for a decision to block access to be given for any type of offence other than those specified in Art. 8(1) of the Law. This provision, however, does not serve the intended purpose and remains incomplete. It is considered that it would be a more effective and purposive method if, in the drafting of Art. 8 of the Law, the types of offence regarded as very important were specifically indicated, as in Art. 100 of the CMK No. 5271, and the giving of a decision to block access thereby facilitated in those cases, while the judge was also given discretion in respect of the other types of offence.
There are also certain reservations regarding the types of offence in respect of which a decision to block access may be taken. In particular, it is debatable how necessary it is that obscenity and the offence of providing a place and means for gambling should be among the types of offence that call for a decision on this coercive measure.
Nor is the place in which the decision to block access in the nature of a coercive measure has been regulated appropriate. It would have been more appropriate for Law No. 5651 to amend the CMK No. 5271, changing the heading of Book One, Part Four, Chapter Five of the CMK, “interception of communications made by means of telecommunication”, to “interception and blocking of communications made by means of telecommunication and the internet”, and for the articles in question to be regulated after Art. 138 of the CMK as Art. 138a et seq. The fact that this course was not chosen and that these matters were regulated in a separate law has caused the rules of criminal procedure, which form a whole, to be fragmented.
It is a positive development that the interim decision on the blocking of access, which until the entry into force of Law No. 5651 was given without any statutory basis by judges, as it should be, by “creating law”, has been placed on a statutory footing. In this way the practice is being made lawful. That the power to give such an important decision has been conferred on judges is a further positive development. In addition, the fact that the decision to block access taken by the prosecutor is also made subject to review by a judge, that both the transmission of this decision and its review are made subject to short time-limits of twenty-four hours, and that a consequence is also attached to the situation in which the judge gives no decision, it being specified that this means the lifting of the measure, makes this an extremely good and democratic provision.
The decision to block access in the nature of a coercive measure will be lifted automatically in the event of the acquittal of the perpetrator or of all the perpetrators; but it is not clear what will become of the decision given in the event of a conviction, for coercive measures are lifted by this decision, which brings the proceedings to an end. It is for this reason that a new security measure, in the nature of a continuation of this measure, should be provided for in the chapter entitled “security measures” regulated in Book One, Part Three, Chapter Two of the TCK No. 5237. As the Law stands, there is a legal vacuum as to what the fate of the measure of blocking access will be in the event of a conviction. And in accordance with the principle of legality of offences and penalties, it is not possible for this vacuum to be filled by way of interpretation or analogy.
The provision on deciding to block access in the nature of an administrative measure is unlawful and unfit for its purpose. Empowering the administration in a field that falls within the remit of the judicial authorities constitutes a clear usurpation of power. Coercive measures of criminal procedure and measures of administrative procedure display the characteristics both of being an instrument for achieving the purpose and of being temporary. The provision in question, however, has neither the characteristic of being instrumental nor that of being temporary. The paragraph in question does not indicate, when the administration takes a decision to block access, what this is an instrument of. By contrast, the decision to block access in the nature of a coercive measure has been regulated in connection with the activity of investigation and prosecution. The article does not state when a decision to block access in the nature of an administrative measure will come to an end or for what purpose it has been provided, whereas for the decision to block access in the nature of a coercive measure these matters have been expressly regulated. It is precisely these points that clearly show how flawed the provision is.
Moreover, when the nature of the administrative measure regulated in Art. 8(4) of Law No. 5651 is considered, it is seen that this is a measure relating to judicial activity and that this provision is therefore in fact a coercive measure. On so important a matter concerning fundamental rights and freedoms, conferring power on the administration as well, in addition to the judicial authorities, is at once meaningless, anti-democratic and outside the law. Although it is possible to bring an action for annulment against this decision before the administrative courts and to request a stay of execution, it is hardly possible to obtain a decision from these courts within a short time; and in a matter concerning communication in particular, the interruption of a publication even for minutes can cause serious problems. In contrast to the twenty-four-hour rule applying to the decision given as a coercive measure, this provision, against which recourse lies to the administrative courts, also contains a great contradiction in terms of time.
In addition, where the identities of those responsible for the publication forming the subject matter of a decision to block access taken by the Presidency as an administrative measure under Art. 8(4) of the Law are established, the Presidency will file a criminal report with the public prosecutor’s office. This provision conflicts with the criminal code and the rules of criminal procedure. This is because, under Art. 278 of the TCK No. 5237, failure to report to the competent authorities an offence that is in the course of being committed is defined as an offence. What is meant here by an offence in the course of being committed is knowledge of the act constituting the offence; it is not necessary to have information about the identity of the perpetrator. Finding the perpetrator and establishing the perpetrator’s identity is the task of the investigating authorities. In conclusion, Art. 8(6) of Law No. 5651 has been produced as a flawed provision that conflicts with the TCK and the CMK.
There is no logical explanation for the fact that, although no sanction such as revocation of authorisation has been provided for in respect of the decision to block access taken as a coercive measure, such a severe sanction has been provided for the administrative measure, and moreover for the access provider. This provision has taken the administrative measure in question out of the category of a measure, has virtually turned it into a rule in its own right and its consequence into a sanction, and in doing so no proportionality whatsoever has been observed.
Art. 9 of Law No. 5651, headed “removal of content from publication and right of reply”, makes provision for the removal from publication of the content concerned and for the related right of reply of persons whose rights are infringed by content transmitted by means of the internet. An attempt has thus been made to find a solution to a problem that is very frequently encountered on the internet as well. As regards the right of reply in particular, the provision has been made with the right of reply and correction contained in the Press Law in mind. On the whole this is a positive provision. However, imposing on hosting providers the obligation to remove content from publication conflicts with the structure of the internet and with the type of offence regulated in Art. 244 of the TCK.
It is, furthermore, inevitable that the application of this article will remain confined to content and/or hosting providers located within the country. For this reason, preventing similar infringements of rights and combating them effectively requires international cooperation and the making of similar provisions in other countries as well.
In conclusion, although Law No. 5651 is in fact a law that was awaited for the purpose of regulating the infrastructure of internet communication in our country, it has become a censorship law that is far from meeting those expectations. The Law regulates the filtering of the internet and the blocking of access, as a coercive measure, by judicial decision and by administrative decision. It must first be stated that a decision which is a coercive measure of criminal procedure should be located in the CMK. On the other hand, the administration should not be granted the power to take a decision of this kind, even one in the nature of a coercive measure. Moreover, conferring the power of filtering on the TİB is also extremely misguided. By this Law the blocking of access in the nature of a coercive measure has been regulated for offences of a sexual nature in particular and for a certain limited number of offences, but a great many important types of offence have been left outside this regulation. For these reasons, Law No. 5651 is not a law of the desired quality but a piece of legislation that is liable to give rise to many problems in practice.
In order to remedy the drawbacks and reservations explained in detail above, the Law should be reviewed and redrafted by a body in which representatives of the information technology sector and lawyers concerned with the subject sit together, and the supervision and regulation of the internet should be carried out by a civil organisation. In this way this medium, in which freedom of thought is exercised directly and easily, should both cease to be a place where offences are easily committed and be kept away from the influence of political powers.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Akdeniz, Yaman, “Çağdaş İnternet Yönetimi”, Güncel Hukuk, S.6, İstanbul, Haziran 2004.
Akdeniz, Yaman, Internet Governance: Towards the Modernization of Policy Making Process in Turkey, İstanbul Ankara İzmir Adana, TBV Serise 1, Papatya Publication Education, 2003.
Alacakaptan, Uğur, “Terörün Değişen Yüzü ve Dünya - 1”, Hukuk ve Adalet Eleştirel Hukuk Dergisi Y.1, S.1, Ocak-Mart 2004.
Atakan, Yurtsan, “İnternette Gazete Yayıncılığı”, Bilişim Hukuku, Der. Mete Tevetoğlu, İstanbul, Kadir Has Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006.
Aydın, Öykü Didem, Üç Demokraside Düşünce Özgürlüğü ve Ceza Hukuku, C.I, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004.
Centel, Nur/Hamide Zafer/Özlem Çakmut, Türk Ceza Hukukuna Giriş, 3. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2005.
Centel, Nur/Hamide Zafer, Ceza Muhakemesi hukuku, 3. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2005.
Çeken, Hüseyin, Council of Europe’s Convention 2001 on Cybercrimes and Turkey, Unpublished Master of Science Thesis (University of Marmara European Community Institute Law of European Union), İstanbul, 2003.
Darlington, Roger, “Should The Internet Be Regulated?”, (Çevrimiçi)
http://www.rogerdarlington. co.uk/regulation.html, 19.04.2004.
Değirmenci, Olgun, Mukayeseli Hukukta ve Türk Hukukunda Suçtan Kaynaklanan Malvarlığı Değerlerini Aklama Suçu, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 2007.
Derksen, Roland, “Strafrechtliche Verantwortug für in internationalen Computernetzen verbeitete Daten mit strafbarem Inhalt”, NJW, S.29, Frankfurt, Juli 1997.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Teknolojideki ve Kitle İletişim Araçlarındaki Gelişmelerin Uluslararası Terörizme Etkileri”, Hukuk ve Adalet Eleştirel Hukuk Dergisi, Y.4, S.10, İlkbahar 2007.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, Bilişim Suçları, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Avrupa Konseyi ve Avrupa Birliği Düzenlemelerinde Çocuk Pornografisinin İnternet Aracılığıyla Yayılmasına Karşı Yapılan Düzenlemeler”, İstanbul Barosu Dergisi, İstanbul, S.4, 2004.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi’nde Düşünce Özgürlüğü”, Prof.
Dr. Çetin Özek Armağanı, İstanbul, Galatasaray Üniversitesi Yayını, 2004, s.283-300.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Kararlarında Organize Suçla Mücadelede Özel Koruma Tedbirleri”, Yıldızhan Yayla’ya Armağan, İstanbul, Galatasaray Üniversitesi Yayını, 2003.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Kitle İletişim Araçları ve Terörizm”, Çevrimiçi:
http://www.hukukcu. com/bilimsel/kitaplar/kitleiletisim _teror.htm, 02.04.2007.
Elcock, Ward, “Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence”, June 24, 1998.
Erkan, Boğaç/Murat Songür, Açıklamalı Bilgisayar ve İnternet Terimleri Sözlüğü, Ankara, Hacettepe – Taş Yayınevi, 1999.
Gözübüyük, A. Şeref, Yönetim Hukuku, 9. Bası, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 1996.
İçel, Kayıhan/Yener Ünver, Kitle Haberleşme Hukuku, 6. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2005.
İçel, Kayıhan/Füsun Sokullu Akıncı/İzzet Özgenç/Adem Sözüer/Fatih S. Mahmutoğlu/Yener Ünver, Yaptırım Teorisi, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2000.
İlkiz, Fikret, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve İfade Özgürlüğü Açısından Basın, Radyo ve Televizyon Kanunlarının Değerlendirilmesi”, İfade Özgürlüğü ve Türk Ceza Hukuku, İstanbul, Ceza Hukuku Derneği Yayını, 2003.
Johnson, David. R., “Lawmaking and Law Enforcement İn Cyberspace”, (Çevrimiçi)
http://www.cli.org/DR/make.html, 19.04.2004.
Johnson, David R./David G. Post, “Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace” SLR, (Çevrimiçi) http://www.cli.org/ X0025_LBFIN.html, 19.04.2004.
Johnson, David R. /David G. Post, “And How Shall the Net Be Governed? A Meditation on the Relative Virtues Of Decentralized, Emergent Law”, (Çevrimiçi) http://www.cli.org/emdraft.html, 19.04.2004.
Kolb, Anton, “Siberetik: Dijital Bir Dünya İçinde Sorumluluk”, Çev: Tekin Memiş, Atatürk Üniversitesi Erzincan Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Erzincan, C:V S:1-4, 2001.
Köksal, Ahmet Turan/Dilek Oktay/Sarp Eser, Kim Korkar Bilgisayardan? İnternet, ;İstanbul, Pusula Yayıncılık, 1999, s.407; Zafer Demirkol, İnternet Teknolojileri, İstanbul, 2001.
Kunter, Nurullah/Feridun Yenisey, Muhakeme Hukuku Dalı Olarak Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku, 10. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1998.
Mac Neill, Michael, “Cyberspace Governance: Canadian Reflections”, (Çevrimiçi)
http://www.carleton.ca/• mmacneil/ 118/1999/draft-macneil-cyber.htm, 19.04.2004.
Memiş, Tekin, “İki Uluslararası Sempozyum ve Bir Özet”, Atatürk Üniversitesi Erzincan Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, C.V, S.1-4, 2001.
Ocak, Alp Tekin, “Denetim Toplumu: Gözetleniyoruz”, Günışığı Aylık Hukuk Dergisi, S:14, Nisan 2004.
Otacı, Cengiz, Türk Kabahatler Hukuku, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 2006.
Özay, İl Han, Günışığında Yönetim, İstanbul, Alfa Yayıncılık, 1996.
Özcan, Mehmet, “Siber Terörizm ve Ulusal Güvenlik”, İnternet ve Hukuk, Der: Yeşim M.
Atamer, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayını, 2004.
Özdilek, Ali Osman, İnternet ve Hukuk, İstanbul, Papatya Yayıncılık, 2002.
Özek, Çetin, Basın Özgürlüğünden Bilgilenme Hakkına, İstanbul, Alfa Yayıncılık, 1999.
Özek, Çetin, Türk Basın Hukuku, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1978.
Ruh, Jr. Joseph F., “Introduction to the Internet, The Internet and Business: A Lawyer’s Guide to the Emerging Legal Issues”, (Çevrimiçi) www.wahburnlaw.edu, 28.12.2003.
Salıcı, Berfu/İsmail Güneş, “İnternette Güvenlik ve Denetim: Masumiyet Yitiriliyor Mu?”
(Çevrimiçi) http://www.bilgiyonetimi.org/cm/pages/mkl_gos.php?nt=243, 14.04.2004.
Sardar, Ziauddin/Jerry Ravets, “Reaping the Technological Whirlwind”, Ed. Ziauddin Sardar/Jerry Ravets, Cyberfutures: Culture and Politics on the Information Superhighway, London, Pluto Press Ltd., 1996.
Sınar, Hasan, İnternet ve Ceza Hukuku, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2001.
Sieber, Ulrich, “Legal Aspects of Computer - Related Crime in the Information Society – Comcrime Study”, (Çevrimiçi) http://europa.eu.int//ISPO/legal/en/comcrime/ sieber.html, 20.05.2007.
Tanilli, Server, Devlet ve Demokrasi Anayasa Hukukuna Giriş, 8. Bası, İstanbul, Çağdaş Yayınlar, 1996.
Tanör, Bülent, TCK. 142. Madde Düşünce Özgürlüğü ve Uygulama, İstanbul, Forum Yayınları, 1979.
Wall, David S., “İnternet Rejimi ve Düzenleme Sorunu”, Çev. Hasan Sınar, Adalet Yüksekokulu 20. Yıl Armağını, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2001.
Whine, Michael, “Cyberspice – A New Medium for Communication Command and Control by Extremist”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Routledge, Vol.22, N.3, July 1999.
Yarsuvat, Duygun, “Müstehcenliğin Neresindeyiz”, Güncel Hukuk, S:9, İstanbul, Eylül 2004.
Yenidünya, Caner/Olgun Değirmenci, Mukayeseli Hukukta ve Türk Hukukunda Bilişim Suçları, İstanbul, Legal Yayıncılık, 2003.
Yıldız, Sevil, Suçta Araç Olarak İnternetin Teknik ve Hukuki Yönden İncelenmesi, Ankara, Nobel Yayıncılık, 2007.
Yurtcan, Erdener, Ceza Yargılaması Hukuku, 11. Bası, İstanbul, Vedat Kitapçılık, 2005.
Zittrain, Jonathan/Benjamin Edelman, “Internet Filtering in China” SSRNEL, (Çevrimiçi)
http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=399920, 14.04.2004.
Footnotes
- Boğaç Erkan/Murat Songür, Açıklamalı Bilgisayar ve İnternet Terimleri Sözlüğü, Ankara, Hacettepe – Taş Yayınevi, 1999, s.282. ↑
- Roland Derksen, “Strafrechtliche Verantwortug für in internationalen Computernetzen verbeitete Daten mit strafbarem Inhalt”, NJW, S.29, Frankfurt, Juli 1997, s.1878; Ziauddin Sardar/Jerry Ravets, “Reaping the Technological Whirlwind”, Ed. Ziauddin Sardar/Jerry Ravets, Cyberfutures: Culture and Politics on the Information Superhighway, London, Pluto Press Ltd., 1996, s.1. ↑
- Ahmet Turan Köksal/Dilek Oktay/Sarp Eser, Kim Korkar Bilgisayardan? İnternet, ;İstanbul, Pusula Yayıncılık, 1999, s.407; Zafer Demirkol, İnternet Teknolojileri, İstanbul, 2001, s.2; Jr. Joseph F. Ruh, “Introduction to the Internet, The Internet and Business: A Lawyer’s Guide to the Emerging Legal Issues”, (Çevrimiçi) www.wahburnlaw.edu, 28.12.2003; Caner Yenidünya/Olgun Değirmenci, Mukayeseli Hukukta ve Türk Hukukunda Bilişim Suçları, İstanbul, Legal Yayıncılık, 2003, s36. ↑
- Murat Volkan Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004, s.51; Ali Osman Özdilek, İnternet ve Hukuk, İstanbul, Papatya Yayıncılık, 2002, s.13. ↑
- To the same effect see: Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.46,47. ↑
- Murat Volkan Dülger, “Kitle İletişim Araçları ve Terörizm”, Çevrimiçi: http://www.hukukcu.com/bilimsel/kitaplar/kitleiletisim _teror.htm, 02.04.2007. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.9. ↑
- Murat Volkan Dülger, “Teknolojideki ve Kitle İletişim Araçlarındaki Gelişmelerin Uluslararası Terörizme Etkileri”, Hukuk ve Adalet Eleştirel Hukuk Dergisi, Y.4, S.10, İlkbahar 2007, s.60-64. ↑
- Press Law, Art. 4: “Every printed work shall indicate the place and date of printing, the names of the printer and, if any, of the publisher, and, if any, their trade names and business addresses. This provision shall not apply to announcements, price lists, circulars and the like. In every kind of periodical publication, with the exception of news agency publications, the place of management, the names of the owner, of the representative, if any, and of the responsible editor, and the type of the publication shall also be indicated.” ↑
- Nur Centel/Hamide Zafer/Özlem Çakmut, Türk Ceza Hukukuna Giriş, 3. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2005, s.582-603; Kayıhan İçel/Füsun Sokullu Akıncı/İzzet Özgenç/Adem Sözüer/Fatih S. Mahmutoğlu/Yener Ünver, Yaptırım Teorisi, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2000, s.158-168. ↑
- “At the end of the proceedings conducted following the quashing of the judgment; although the quashing was in favour of the accused, the fixing of a penalty above the minimum limit without sufficient reasons being given is contrary to law…” 9. Yargıtay Ceza Dairesi, Kt. 28.01.1997, E.1996/5362, K.1997/457, Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi, C.25, S.10, 1999, s.1478; for similar decisions see: İçel vd., a.g.e., s.160 dn.44-162 dn.57. ↑
- Cengiz Otacı, Türk Kabahatler Hukuku, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 2006, s.68. ↑
- Server Tanilli, Devlet ve Demokrasi Anayasa Hukukuna Giriş, 8. Bası, İstanbul, Çağdaş Yayınlar, 1996, s.161-167. ↑
- In the past, freedom of thought was artificially divided by some authors in legal scholarship into “freedom to think and freedom to express thought”, and it was stated that freedom to think was unlimited whereas freedom to express thought was limited. Yet a thought that cannot be expressed cannot be said to be free; to accept that a person has the freedom to think to himself but to state that he does not have the freedom to express those thoughts constitutes a logical contradiction in itself. For details on this subject see: Bülent Tanör, TCK. 142. Madde Düşünce Özgürlüğü ve Uygulama, İstanbul, Forum Yayınları, 1979, s.82-84; Murat Volkan Dülger, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi’nde Düşünce Özgürlüğü”, Prof. Dr. Çetin Özek Armağanı, İstanbul, Galatasaray Üniversitesi Yayını, 2004, s.296. ↑
- Çetin Özek, Türk Basın Hukuku, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1978, s.27. ↑
- These grounds are stated as i) national security, the integrity of the country, public safety; ii) maintaining the authority and independence of the judiciary; iii) preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence; iv) the protection of order, the prevention of crime; v) the protection of public morals and health; vi) the protection of the honour, reputation and rights of third parties. ↑
- Dülger, Düşünce Özgürlüğü, s.296. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.328. ↑
- Roger Darlington, “Should The Internet Be Regulated?”, (Çevrimiçi) http://www.rogerdarlington.co.uk/regulation.html, 19.04.2004. ↑
- David. R. Johnson, “Lawmaking and Law Enforcement İn Cyberspace”, (Çevrimiçi) http://www.cli.org/DR/make.html, 19.04.2004. ↑
- Hüseyin Çeken, Council of Europe’s Convention 2001 on Cybercrimes and Turkey, Unpublished Master of Science Thesis (University of Marmara European Community Institute Law of European Union), İstanbul, 2003, s.10. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.329. ↑
- For details on this subject see: Ulrich Sieber, “Legal Aspects of Computer - Related Crime in the Information Society – Comcrime Study”, (Çevrimiçi) http://europa.eu.int//ISPO/legal/en/comcrime/sieber.html, 20.05.2007; Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.104 vd. ↑
- Çeken, a.g.e., s.61; Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.108. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.109,110. ↑
- Murat Volkan Dülger, “Avrupa Konseyi ve Avrupa Birliği Düzenlemelerinde Çocuk Pornografisinin İnternet Aracılığıyla Yayılmasına Karşı Yapılan Düzenlemeler”, İstanbul Barosu Dergisi, İstanbul, S.4, 2004, 1485-1496. ↑
- Çeken, a.g.e., s.12. ↑
- Michael Mac Neill, “Cyberspace Governance: Canadian Reflections”, (Çevrimiçi) http://www.carleton.ca/• mmacneil/ 118/1999/draft-macneil-cyber.htm, 19.04.2004. ↑
- David S. Wall, “İnternet Rejimi ve Düzenleme Sorunu”, Çev. Hasan Sınar, Adalet Yüksekokulu 20. Yıl Armağını, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2001, s.207-209. ↑
- Yaman Akdeniz, Internet Governance: Towards the Modernization of Policy Making Process in Turkey, İstanbul Ankara İzmir Adana, TBV Serise 1, Papatya Publication Education, 2003, s.51-57; Yaman Akdeniz, “Çağdaş İnternet Yönetimi”, Güncel Hukuk, S.6, İstanbul, Haziran 2004, s.24. ↑
- David R. Johnson/David G. Post, “And How Shall the Net Be Governed? A Meditation on the Relative Virtues Of Decentralized, Emergent Law”, (Çevrimiçi) http://www.cli.org/emdraft.html, 19.04.2004. ↑
- Tekin Memiş, “İki Uluslararası Sempozyum ve Bir Özet”, Atatürk Üniversitesi Erzincan Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, C.V, S.1-4, 2001, s.445. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.330, Çeken, a.g.e., s.16. ↑
- Kayıhan İçel/Yener Ünver, Kitle Haberleşme Hukuku, 6. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2005, s.9-11. ↑
- Sevil Yıldız, Suçta Araç Olarak İnternetin Teknik ve Hukuki Yönden İncelenmesi, Ankara, Nobel Yayıncılık, 2007, s.8,9. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.323. ↑
- Uğur Alacakaptan, “Terörün Değişen Yüzü ve Dünya - 1”, Hukuk ve Adalet Eleştirel Hukuk Dergisi Y.1, S.1, Ocak-Mart 2004, s.134,135. ↑
- Michael Whine, “Cyberspice – A New Medium for Communication Command and Control by Extremist”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Routledge, Vol.22, N.3, July 1999, s.231; Ward Elcock, “Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence”, June 24, 1998. ↑
- Berfu Salıcı/İsmail Güneş, “İnternette Güvenlik ve Denetim: Masumiyet Yitiriliyor Mu?” (Çevrimiçi) http://www.bilgiyonetimi.org/cm/pages/mkl_gos.php?nt=243, 14.04.2004. ↑
- For details on this subject see: Olgun Değirmenci, Mukayeseli Hukukta ve Türk Hukukunda Suçtan Kaynaklanan Malvarlığı Değerlerini Aklama Suçu, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 2007, s.125 vd. ↑
- Fikret İlkiz, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve İfade Özgürlüğü Açısından Basın, Radyo ve Televizyon Kanunlarının Değerlendirilmesi”, İfade Özgürlüğü ve Türk Ceza Hukuku, İstanbul, Ceza Hukuku Derneği Yayını, 2003, s.92. ↑
- Yurtsan Atakan, “İnternette Gazete Yayıncılığı”, Bilişim Hukuku, Der. Mete Tevetoğlu, İstanbul, Kadir Has Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006, s.344. ↑
- Atakan, a.g.y., s.345. ↑
- İlkiz, a.g.y., s.94. ↑
- Atakan, a.g.y., s.345. ↑
- Çetin Özek, Basın Özgürlüğünden Bilgilenme Hakkına, İstanbul, Alfa Yayıncılık, 1999, s.15–36. ↑
- Özek, Türk Basın Hukuku, s.283 vd. ↑
- For the debates conducted and the views put forward on this subject in the field of the internet see: Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.328-330. ↑
- Salıcı/Güneş, a.g.y. ↑
- David R. Johnson/David G. Post, “Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace” SLR, (Çevrimiçi) http://www.cli.org/ X0025_LBFIN.html, 19.04.2004, s.6,7. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.326. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.326. ↑
- Anton Kolb, “Siberetik: Dijital Bir Dünya İçinde Sorumluluk”, Çev: Tekin Memiş, Atatürk Üniversitesi Erzincan Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Erzincan, C:V S:1-4, 2001, s.452. ↑
- Alp Tekin Ocak, “Denetim Toplumu: Gözetleniyoruz”, Günışığı Aylık Hukuk Dergisi, S:14, Nisan 2004, s.42. ↑
- Mehmet Özcan, “Siber Terörizm ve Ulusal Güvenlik”, İnternet ve Hukuk, Der: Yeşim M. Atamer, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayını, 2004, s.324. ↑
- Ocak, a.g.y., s.42; Özcan, Siber Terörizm, s.324. ↑
- Salıcı/Güneş, a.g.y.; Ocak, a.g.y., s.42. ↑
- Jonathan Zittrain/Benjamin Edelman, “Internet Filtering in China” SSRNEL, (Çevrimiçi) http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=399920, 14.04.2004. ↑
- For details on this subject see: Hasan Sınar, İnternet ve Ceza Hukuku, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2001, s.113-117; Salıcı/Güneş, a.g.y. ↑
- “By this Law, the Telecommunications Authority, which has public legal personality and administrative and financial autonomy and a special budget, has been established in order to exercise the powers and responsibilities provided for by the Laws and to perform the other duties assigned to it, within the framework of the general principles set out in the Telegraph and Telephone Law No. 406 of 4.2.1924. The Authority is independent in the performance of its duties. The ministry with which the Authority is associated is the Ministry of Transport. For the performance of the services listed in Art. 4(g), the monitoring of the operation of wireless systems in accordance with the prescribed techniques and procedures, the detection and elimination of interference, cooperation with the State security authorities, within the legislation in force, in matters of wireless activity concerning the security of the State and of persons, and national and international technical monitoring services and activities shall be carried out by the Authority. The decision-making body of the Authority is the Telecommunications Board, consisting of a chairman of the board and (Amended wording: 5189 - 16.6.2004 / Art. 7) "six" members.” ↑
- Atakan, a.g.y., s.347. ↑
- Law No. 3348 on the Organisation and Duties of the Ministry of Transport, Additional Art. 1 - (as amended by Law No. 4502 of 27.1.2000) The Ministry may set up temporary advisory boards, with the participation of experienced and qualified persons and representatives of organisations from outside the Ministry, for the determination of the policies to be formulated in relation to the new transport and communication services brought about by technology. The travel and accommodation expenses of the members of these boards, together with the other operating expenses of the board, shall be met from the budget of the Ministry of Transport. The board in question is the board which previously operated under the name “Internet Supreme Board”. ↑
- In fact, public prosecutors, who deal solely with criminal law, ought to be, and are required to be, perfectly able to determine whether the words or accusations contained in any text constitute insult. This, however, constitutes a striking example in that it shows how the institution of expert evidence is abused. ↑
- This investigation is still in progress, and the decision in question to stop the publication also remains in existence. ↑
- Duygun Yarsuvat, “Müstehcenliğin Neresindeyiz”, Güncel Hukuk, S:9, İstanbul, Eylül 2004, s.49. ↑
- Dülger, Çocuk Pornografisinin İnternet Aracılığıyla Yayılmasına Karşı Yapılan Düzenlemeler, s.1490. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.292. ↑
- The principal example in this regard is the practice in the United States of America. In that country the presentation of pornographic materials is assessed within the scope of freedom of thought. Accordingly, the most important provision relating to the concept of “freedom of thought” in the USA is the “First Amendment” contained in the US Constitution. Assessed in terms of its content, the First Amendment is not confined to freedom of expression alone; it is a protective provision which also encompasses other freedoms such as those of the press, assembly, petition and association. Under the US Constitution, the source of freedom of thought is a requirement of the State’s duty towards the people. In other words, the State is obliged to protect these freedoms by virtue of its duty of service. At first sight the First Amendment may give the impression of providing absolute protection in respect of freedoms. Contrary to what is supposed, however, the area of absolute protection is quite narrow. The rule is that freedoms are restricted by means of particular methods and criteria. These methods and criteria are developed through case law and are adopted as “tests” to be applied to similar situations. Among the freedoms protected under the First Amendment, freedom of thought and expression is of great importance. The fact that early practice in the USA moved in the direction of leaving certain expressions of thought outside protection, without regarding them as an “expression of thought”, narrowed the scope of the First Amendment. Pornography too, in this early practice, was not regarded as an “expression of thought” and was left outside the scope of protection. In time dynamic interpretations were introduced, and the scope of protection of the First Amendment, which had been narrowed, began to be construed broadly. Pornography too found a place for itself within the scope of protection as a result of the developing dynamic interpretation. The point that calls for particular emphasis here is the distinction between the concepts of pornography and obscenity. In the Miller vs. California judgment, obscenity and pornography were defined and the limits of protection under the First Amendment were determined. Accordingly, explicit expressions and images presented with the aim of sexually arousing the viewer were defined as “pornography”, whereas expressions, images or acts that are immoral, offensive, repulsive or involve sexual abuse were treated as falling within “obscenity”. The distinction drawn here also determines the area of protection of the First Amendment. That being so, while pornography will be able to benefit from the general protection within the scope of freedom of thought and expression, obscenity will not be able to benefit from the general protection. In order to determine this twofold distinction, the “Miller test” was established by court decision and the criterion laid down. (Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 1973) Under the Miller test an assessment of content is made, and an expression, depiction or act whose content has the following features is defined as “obscene”: the lack of political, artistic and genuinely scientific value; the violation of community standards relating to obscenity; and appeal solely to the person’s immoral interests. As can be seen, however, this criterion too draws extremely vague boundaries. The fact that pornography is assessed within the scope of freedom of expression should not lead one to think of expression by means of pornography as lying within an area that is absolutely protected without any limitation. The spread over time of child pornography, which is built on the abuse of children and on regarding children as sexual objects, has prompted people to reflect on the limits of pornography. Indeed, today, children, and women who, although adults, are forced without their consent and by violence to be models or objects for pornography, mark the limits of pornography in relation to freedom of expression. Öykü Didem Aydın, Üç Demokraside Düşünce Özgürlüğü ve Ceza Hukuku, C.I, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004, s. 55, 58, 62, 82. ↑
- Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.333. ↑
- “By subjective acts, in general, a special legal situation is created for a particular person or between particular persons. The legal situation created is both subjective and personal. A subjective act is an act that gives rise to a new legal situation. In the field of administration, subjective acts may be unilateral or they may be bilateral. The subjective acts that are common in the field of administration are unilateral acts; in subjective acts of this kind, such as the assessment of tax on a particular person or the seizure of a newspaper, the administration, in determining the content of the subjective act, is again bound by rules laid down in advance; the administration is not entirely free in determining the content of the act. In bilateral subjective acts, by contrast, for example in contracts, room is given to the will of the persons concerned as regards whether or not the act is carried out and the determination of its content. Those who conclude the contract are free, to a certain extent, both as to whether or not to conclude it and as to the determination of its content.” A. Şeref Gözübüyük, Yönetim Hukuku, 9. Bası, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 1996, s.260. “In the field of administrative law too, in the case of sanctions whose limits are determined by statutory provisions, such as closure for up to fifteen days, or prohibition from a profession or trade, or a fine of up to five million lira, the acts in which the penalties decided upon in the light of subjective circumstances are given concrete form are ‘subjective’. İl Han Özay, Günışığında Yönetim, İstanbul, Alfa Yayıncılık, 1996, s.343. ↑
- Erdener Yurtcan, Ceza Yargılaması Hukuku, 11. Bası, İstanbul, Vedat Kitapçılık, 2005, s.301; Nur Centel/Hamide Zafer, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku, 3. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2005,s.244; Murat Volkan Dülger, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Kararlarında Organize Suçla Mücadelede Özel Koruma Tedbirleri”, Yıldızhan Yayla’ya Armağan, İstanbul, Galatasaray Üniversitesi Yayını, 2003, s.276. ↑
- Nurullah Kunter/Feridun Yenisey, Muhakeme Hukuku Dalı Olarak Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku, 10. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1998, s.605,606. ↑
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “The Use of Crypto Assets in the Laundering of Proceeds of Crime and the Measures to Be Taken” (Kripto Varlıkların Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasında Kullanılması ve Alınması Gereken Önlemler), Istanbul Aydın University Faculty of Law Journal (İstanbul Aydın Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi), Vol. 10, No. 1, 2024, pp. 41-94.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “The Legal Regime of Social Network Providers, Internet News Sites and Over-the-Top Service Providers, and a Critique” (Sosyal Ağ Sağlayıcıların İnternet Haber Sitelerinin ve Şebekeler Üstü Hizmet Sağlayıcıların Hukuki Rejimi ve Eleştirisi), Dülger Law Office, 1 June 2023.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “The Electronic Document as the Object of Document Forgery Offences” (Belgede Sahtecilik Suçlarının Konusu Olarak Elektronik Belge), Symposium on Forgery of Documents and Tax Offences (Belgede Sahtecilik ve Vergi Suçları Sempozyumu), 21–24 October 2019, Publication of the Presidency of the Court of Cassation / TOBB ETÜ Faculty of Law, Ankara, 2020.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “What Does WhatsApp's Privacy Change Mean? Will Our Data Be Shared?” (WhatsApp Güvenlik Değişikliği Ne Anlama Geliyor? Verilerimiz Paylaşılacak mı?), Dülger Law Office, 5 January 2021.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Commercial Electronic Messages and the Message Management System” (Ticari Elektronik İleti ve İleti Yönetim Sistemi), Dülger Law Office, 15 November 2020.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, Cybercrime and Internet Communication Law (Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku), 11th ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2025.

