Abstract
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
Examining tender offences purely as norms of criminal law would cause these offence types to be treated in a manner that is remote from real life, incomplete and one-dimensional. Yet these offences concern many institutions that directly affect society, the economy first among them. For this reason, examining tender offences from a broad perspective and from many angles is important for revealing the functions they perform within the social structure.
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE OFFENCES RELATING TO THE TENDER PROCESS IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC OFFENCES
Murat Volkan Dülger*
INTRODUCTION
To examine the tender offences purely as norms of criminal law would mean treating these types of offence in a manner that is remote from real life, incomplete and one-dimensional. Yet these offences concern a great many institutions that directly affect society, first and foremost the economy. For this reason a multifaceted examination of the tender offences from a broad perspective is important for bringing out the functions they perform within the social structure.
The tender offences are, first of all, closely related to the economy (economics), because the rate at which these offences are committed and the damage arising from them directly affect the national economy. Economics is the branch of science that examines how a balance is to be struck between production and consumption and between supply and demand, and how the factors of production are to be used1. The economic system, for its part, may be defined briefly as the method of production, income distribution and consumption applied in a country. The principal aim of every country, whether capitalist or socialist, is to raise the level of individual welfare that will bring about economic development, and a rise in the level of welfare depends on the accumulation of capital. Incomes will increase at the same rate as the rate of increase in the accumulation of capital. Since all economic systems rest on the increase of individual welfare, their aims are the same; where they differ is in the means they use to reach that aim. In general it is stated that there is a capitalist system where an intermediary class acting for the purpose of making a profit exists between producers and consumers and private property is recognised, and a socialist system where production is carried out by firms owned by the state and is likewise passed on to the consumer by those firms2.
However, irrespective of which economic system has been chosen in a country and of how it is applied, it may safely be said that the largest purchaser in that country is the public sector. These purchases directly affect the country’s economic balances, the stability of the economy, the welfare of the people and the confidence placed in the public sector. At the same time the public sector is a major seller and lessor, and these transactions too have a considerable effect on the economy. It must be said at this very point, however, that although tender offences may also occur in socialist systems, it is only natural that, in qualitative terms, tender offences are encountered more often in capitalist systems, because a class pursuing the aim of making a profit comes between production and consumption and, by the nature of the system, this class also takes part in the tenders of the public sector.
In fact, in an economic system – whether it be a capitalist or a communist one – there are seen to be, basically, a public sector and a private sector. What varies according to the political system is their weight within the economy and who owns more of the means of production. Of these, the public sector may be defined in broad terms as the part of the economy that ensures the administration of the state and the performance of public services. Naturally, the performance of these administrative activities and public services is possible only with money. The result is that the public sector rests on an economic structure. It is this economic structure in the public sector that makes up “public finance”. Public finance, as a structure that is at once legal, financial and political, constitutes the economic element of the performance by the state apparatus of its functions. To put it another way, public finance is, as it were, the fuel of the ship of state.
Public finance in fact stands on a tripod. Its legs are public revenues, public expenditure and the budget, which secures and sets out the balance between revenues and public expenditure3. In order that this delicate balance may be preserved, that the expenditure allocated from the budget may be used honestly, transparently and in accordance with the requirements of the economy, and that resources which are scarce in any case may be put to use in line with the interests of the country, it is of the utmost importance that public expenditure be made in conformity with the principles of probity and honesty. Proceeding from the fact that the base determines the superstructure, this is an extremely important element of social and individual welfare and of being a strong, social and democratic country. In this way taxes, which are another very important factor of public finance and make up a very significant part of state revenues, will also have been spent in an appropriate manner4, and this will both contribute positively to public savings and help economic resources to be used in the most appropriate way5.
The public service activities that the social state is obliged to perform in a country both extend over very wide fields and require, to a large extent, planning and the allocation of human and material resources. Particularly in countries that have adopted the liberal economic system, the state, proceeding from the principle that it should shrink and occupy as small a place as possible in the economic system, transfers many public services to private persons, and to this end the administration concludes contracts with private persons6.
The method to which the state most frequently resorts, when ensuring the functioning of the administration and performing public services, in order to influence the economic balances favourably and to secure equality, transparency, honesty and efficiency, is the tender. When national and international practice is considered, the public sector is seen to be the largest purchaser of goods and services. The public sector, for its part, makes use of the tender mechanism to a large extent, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, in the procurement of services and goods7. In addition, the public sector affects the economy directly or indirectly by leasing or selling the immovable property or the enterprises it owns, or by privatising them. These latter transactions, too, may be carried out by way of tender. For this reason it is clearly seen that the tender mechanism is an important instrument of public finance and, by extension, a factor affecting the national economy.
However, no matter how well the tender mechanism is regulated, and no matter how many precautions are taken in this regard both in terms of legislation and in terms of the persons who will conduct the tender, it is an area extremely open to abuse and to the obtaining of undue advantage. What is more, the fact that the sums of money at stake in this area are generally extremely large gives rise to the motive of obtaining undue advantage, which is one of the most important factors in the commission of economic offences. For this reason, in the criminal law system of every country the acts committed through abuse of the public tender system are defined as offences. In this way an attempt is made, on the one hand, to ensure the protection of the country’s economic balance and interests and, on the other, to protect the confidence placed in the public authorities.
In our country too, both in the Turkish Criminal Code No. 765, which was in force until 1 June 2005, and in the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237, which has been in force since 1 June 2005, acts aimed at obtaining undue advantage in the tender process and in the process, continuing after the tender, of concluding the contract and performing the obligation have been defined as types of offence. The subject of this study is the examination of these types of offence by the method peculiar to the discipline of criminal law, yet without losing sight of the fact that they are economic offences. In the study, an outline of public procurement law will first be given, after which the types of offence will be examined.
I. Public Procurement Law
A. The Place of Public Procurement Law within Public Finance
As briefly explained above, the international and the national economy consist of the supply and demand of the public and the private sector. Of these, public finance in particular, which constitutes the body of economic rules of the public sector, is made up of revenues, public expenditure and the budget. The elements of these that directly affect the economy consist of taxes, which make up the greater part of revenues, and of personnel expenses and public tenders, which make up a large part of public expenditure. Moreover, since the leasing and sale of property belonging to the public sector and privatisation transactions may also be carried out by way of tender, public tenders have a revenue-generating side as well. Particularly in “developing countries” such as ours, revenue is provided to the Treasury through privatisations and/or the state economic enterprises that place a financial burden on the public sector are disposed of, so that these sources of expenditure are got rid of, an attempt is made to put the economic balances on a firm footing, and an attempt is made to act in conformity with liberal economic programmes.
For this reason public tenders constitute, in particular, an important expenditure item of public finance and, through the sales, leases and privatisation carried out by way of tender, also bring in revenue. Thus, by reason of their field of application, public tenders directly affect public finance, the private sector and the economic system alike. This shows that public procurement law directly affects the national economy.
B. The Concept of the Public Tender
The word ihale (tender) is of Arabic origin and is explained as “leaving a piece of work to someone; awarding to the bidder in an auction or reverse auction”8 or as “in contracts made by way of auction or reverse auction, the declaration of intent of the party putting the matter up for auction or reverse auction, having the nature of an acceptance of the proposal (offer) of the person who bids highest or lowest; public auction; a method of contracting applied in order to find the most suitable price; giving the work (the goods) to the person who offers the most suitable price”9.
The tender is defined in Art. 4 of the Public Procurement Law No. 4734 in a manner that covers public purchases in particular. In that Law the tender is defined as “the procedures which show that the procurement of goods or services or the works have been awarded, by the procedures and under the conditions laid down in this Law, to one person to be selected from among the tenderers, and which are completed by the signing of the contract following the approval of the contracting officer”. As can be seen, this definition covers only public purchases, whereas the concept of the tender covers a wider field: it covers the purchases made by the public sector and equally the sale and leasing of the property owned by the public sector. Indeed, in Art. 4 of the State Tender Law No. 2886 the definition is drawn with this breadth.
In this study the concept of the tender is used in its broad sense, and all tenders relating to the procurement of goods and services, the commissioning of works, privatisation and the sale and leasing of the property owned by the public sector are considered to fall within the concept of the “public tender”.
Accordingly, public tenders may be defined as “…a series of procedures denoting the process of formation of the contracts to be signed with a view to having the goods and services, or a piece of work, required for the performance of the services falling within the administration’s field of duty carried out, against payment by the administration, by a private person who submits the most suitable bid from among the candidates participating in a competitive environment created by complying with the procedural rules laid down by law…”10.
The method adopted in public tenders is as follows. For sale and letting transactions the method of bidding up the price has been adopted; for transactions such as the procurement of goods and services or hiring, the method of bidding down the price. Accordingly, in auctions the highest of the prices offered, provided that it is not below the estimated price, and in reverse auctions the preferred one among the prices offered, provided that it does not exceed the estimated price, is chosen, and the tender is awarded to the person who has submitted the bid meeting these conditions. The whole of the administrative procedure up to the signing of the contract, taking as its basis the declaration of intent having the nature of an acceptance of the offer of the highest or lowest bidder and the conditions that bring about the formation of that intent, is defined as the tender process11. With the signing of the contract the tender process comes to an end, and thereafter the process of performance of the obligation begins; this part consists of the parties’ performing their reciprocal obligations in accordance with the rules of the law of obligations.
C The Sources of Public Procurement Law and the Field It Covers
1. The Sources of Public Procurement Law
The sub-discipline of law that comprises public tenders as a whole is public procurement law. This discipline, in turn, forms part of administrative law. Tenders relating to public expenditure, which occupy an important place among public tenders, are regulated as a whole by the rules of public procurement law. However, just as public expenditure is not made solely by way of public tender, so the tender mechanism may also be applied in the revenue-generating transactions of the public sector.
Public procurement law was first regulated in our country in the Ottoman period, by the Regulation (Nizamname) of 1857. However, in addition to this instrument, whose content was inadequate and which therefore had little effect and was little applied, a regulation dated 1914 (10 Muharrem 1330) was issued. That regulation was in turn supplemented by a regulation issued on 4 June 1919 which entered into force in 1921. In the Republican period, tender law was first regulated on 22 April 1925 by Law No. 661, the “Law on Auctions, Reverse Auctions and Awards”. Various amendments were made to this Law as well, in 1926 by Laws No. 799, 878 and 1300, in 1929 by Law No. 1540 and in 1933 by Law No. 2338. Over time, however, on the view that this Law was not adequate, Law No. 2490, the “Law on Auctions, Reverse Auctions and Tenders”, was adopted on 10 December 1934 and took the place of Law No. 66112. Certain amendments were made to this Law too in the course of time and, after it had remained in force for forty-nine years, the “State Tender Law” No. 2886 of 08.09.1983 was adopted to replace it. Law No. 2886 entered into force on 01.01.198413.
In the period that has since elapsed, criticism of the State Tender Law No. 2886 has been concentrated in two areas in particular. First, it was argued that, in the economic process that has been changing and developing since the 1980s, the State Tender Law proved inadequate in the face of the growing variety of the products and services forming the subject of public tenders and of the constantly differing needs of a developing economy and technological infrastructure14. Secondly, it was stressed that the State Tender Law proved inadequate in the fight against corruption15, and evidence confirming this was also produced16. Apart from these criticisms, important changes took place in both economic and social life in our country after 1983, the year in which the State Tender Law was adopted. Efforts were made to bring about the transition to a free market economy, liberal economic programmes were put into practice and important steps were taken towards accession to the European Union (EU). Accordingly, efforts were made to structure the public sector and the private sector in line with the EU directives and the views of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this context the EU, the World Bank and the IMF were expressing the view that the system provided for by Law No. 2886 ought to be more transparent and accountable, and they were also voicing the criticism that no progress whatsoever had been made towards EU standards in the matter of public tenders17.
In the letters of intent given by the governments in power to the international financial institutions in question and to the European Union, it was stated that new arrangements would be made in the tender legislation; within this framework it was also stated that tenders relating to public expenditure and tenders generating revenue for the public sector, on account of their own distinct characteristics, needed to be regulated in separate laws18.
Within this framework a large number of bills were prepared with the aim of making new provision for public tenders, having regard to the fact that the provisions of the State Tender Law No. 2886 on public expenditure could not respond to the conditions of the day and to developing needs, proved inadequate in resolving the problems arising in practice, did not cover the tenders and contracts of all public institutions, and did not run parallel to EU and international tender practice19. At the end of this process the bills for the Public Procurement Law No. 4734 and the Public Procurement Contracts Law No. 4735 were adopted by the plenary of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) on 04.01.2002, became law and were published in the Official Gazette No. 24648 of 22.01.2002. The provisions of these Laws concerning the Public Procurement Authority entered into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette, and their other provisions on 01.01.2003.
In conclusion, departing from the system of the State Tender Law No. 2886, two separate laws were enacted under the names of the Public Procurement Law and the Public Procurement Contracts Law: the procurement of goods and services and the works requiring public expenditure were regulated in the Public Procurement Law, while the rules governing the contracts signed as a result of public tenders were regulated in the Public Procurement Contracts Law. In this way provisions parallel to the tender legislation of international organisations such as the EU and the World Trade Organization were also made20.
2. The Field Covered by Public Procurement Law
When the Public Procurement Law No. 4734 and the Public Procurement Contracts Law No. 4735 were put into force, the State Tender Law No. 2886 was not repealed. The reason for this, as mentioned above, is that Law No. 4734 regulates the tender procedure to be applied in public expenditure, and Law No. 4735 the contract to be concluded between the administration and the tenderer after the tender has been held and the performance of the obligation. These Laws, however, contain no rules on the tendering of the revenue-generating transactions of the public sector; it is the tender procedures in Law No. 2886 that will be applied in the revenue-generating transactions of the public sector. Accordingly, Laws No. 4734 and 4735 will apply to the procurement of goods and services and to works, in other words to matters that require the public sector to spend money, whereas the relevant articles of the State Tender Law No. 2886 that are in force will apply to revenue-generating matters that do not require the public sector to spend money21.
Alongside the innovations mentioned above, one of the most important innovations introduced by Law No. 4734 is that public purchases have been brought under discipline under a single roof. This is also directly connected with the scope of application of the laws governing tender law. In particular, as part of the financial reform attempted at the request of the international financial institutions and in the course of the efforts to align with EU legislation and practice, and in connection with budgetary discipline, all institutions and bodies financed from public resources, together with the unions and partnerships established by them, were brought within the scope of this Law in an effort to ensure that expenditure is made by the same method. In this way an end was put to the divergent practices in public purchases, in particular of the State Economic Enterprises and of other institutions and bodies, which had been the subject of criticism in the period of Law No. 288622.
In conclusion, Laws No. 4734 and 4735 will apply to all public institutions and bodies and to their subsidiaries and unions where they procure goods and/or services or have works carried out, and Law No. 2886 where they carry out a revenue-generating transaction. It should be noted at once that the direct procurement method, although it is regulated by Law No. 4734, is not designated as a tender procedure. Determining which administrative transaction is or is not a tender, and which law is to be applied to it, is necessary first of all from the point of view of administrative law, in terms of procedure, application and review; but it is also of the utmost importance from the point of view of criminal law, first as regards whether or not the articles on the tender offences are to be applied and, secondly, as regards deciding on the secondary sanctions contained in the laws on tender law.
II. The Regulation of the Offence of Bid Rigging in the Course of History
In fact the history of the offences of bid rigging and of rigging the performance of an obligation, which are regarded as economic offences, does not, as with all economic offences, go back very far23. These types of offence emerged long after the offences against persons and property, which may be described as the classic types of offence, in particular with the formation of modern nation states based on parliamentary democracy. The reasons for this are that the bourgeois class, the dynamic force of the nation state, engaged in production and trade outside the public sector and sold its products to the public sector as much as to the private sector, and, in addition, that with parliamentary democracy a treasury budget came into being, separate from the king’s treasury, over which the representatives of the people had a say, and that the expenditure made from it was subjected to scrutiny. As a result of these developments it became necessary to make purchases from private persons for the functioning of the state and so that public services could be performed; but the need also arose to ensure that this accumulation of money, formed as it was from the people’s taxes, was spent in a transparent, competitive and equal manner and in the most appropriate way. The tender method was found as the remedy for this.
Thus, as with every new development, once public purchasing had emerged as a new development in the administration of the state and the tender method had begun to be applied in an effort to secure equality and competition, there also appeared persons who sought to obtain an unjust gain for themselves by rigging these tenders in one way or another. Naturally, although this situation arose, in the course of history, after the emergence of the nation state and parliamentary democracy, the economic and sociological foundations of this offence, as with many economic offences, came into being in this way.
The criminological side of the emergence of these offences can be explained by the concept of “white-collar criminality”, because the great majority of the perpetrators of these offences (and indeed, in part, the members of the profit-oriented criminal organisations described as the “tender mafia”) fall within the definition of the white-collar criminal. The term white-collar crime entered the scientific literature for the first time with the publication in 1940, in the American Sociological Review, of the article entitled “White-Collar Criminality” written by the American criminologist Edwin H. Sutherland24. This is a concept that Sutherland coined in order to denote a particular form of conduct contrary to the law25. According to Sutherland, white-collar crime is defined as “offences committed by a person of respectability and high standing in society, in the course of his occupation, by breaching the trust placed in that person”26. The great majority of the offences said to be committed as white-collar crime consist of types of offence classified in criminal law as economic offences, such as giving false or misleading information in financial matters or disclosing information that ought not to be disclosed, influencing stock exchanges, bribing civil servants, particularly in business done with the state, rigging tenders and the performance of obligations, using untrue information in advertising and sales, abuse of trust, tax offences and offences of fraudulent bankruptcy27. Many of these offences, moreover, are types of offence that emerged in the last century, in particular with the application and spread of the free market economy.
As has also been seen above from their criminological side, the types of offence under examination are offences that emerged in the recent past with the development of the economy and the transition to the free market economy. For this reason the entry of the offences relating to public tenders into the legislation of our country does not go back very far either. In the period before the proclamation of the Republic, the first provision made in relation to public procurement law is found in Article 83, in Chapter Four, entitled “Theft of State Property and Other Malversations”, of Title One, entitled “On Felonies and Misdemeanours Injurious to the Public and the Punishments Attaching to Them”, of the Imperial Penal Code (Ceza Kanunname-i Hümayun) of 1274. The type of offence in that article was defined as follows: “whoever, by rigging the purchase, the price, the quantity or the manufacture of goods of any kind which he is charged with purchasing, selling or manufacturing on the account of the property of the Sublime State, commits malversation in any manner whatsoever shall, since he will be a thief, suffer the punishment prescribed in the preceding article”28.
After the proclamation of the Republic, a new criminal code was adopted through the legal reform that formed part of the revolutionary movement carried out in every field in the country. This code, whose source was the Italian Criminal Code of 1889, was adopted by the TBMM on 01.03.1926 as Law No. 765, was published in the Official Gazette No. 320 of 13.03.1926 and, pursuant to its Article 591, entered into force on 01.07.1926. By including types of offence relating to public procurement law in the articles of this Law indicated below, provision was made on this subject for the second time in the law of our country.
The offence of “rigging purchases, sales and works carried out on the account of the State” in Art. 205 of Law No. 765 is not found in the Italian Criminal Code of 1889, from which Law No. 765 was taken. This article was taken from Art. 83 of the Imperial Penal Code of 1274 mentioned above, whose original is the French (Napoleonic) Penal Code of 181029. However, Art. 176 of the Italian Criminal Code of 1889, from which Law No. 765 was taken, contains a similar type of offence relating to public procurement law. It contains a provision to the following effect: “any civil servant who, directly or through an intermediary, by collusive acts secures a private interest in a matter belonging to the office to which he is attached shall be sentenced to heavy imprisonment for one month to five years and to a fine of one hundred to five thousand lire”. It is stated that, again within Italian law, the Tuscan Criminal Code and the Sardinian Criminal Code contained more detailed provisions, that the government bill of 1887 likewise contained a detailed provision, but that a general provision was made so as to leave no gap, and that the Italian Criminal Code of 1889 was enacted in this form30.
Arts. 366, 367 and 368 of the Turkish Criminal Code No. 765 (TCK), which are among the types of offence relating to public procurement law, were for their part taken from Art. 299 of the Italian Criminal Code of 1889, each of the three paragraphs of that article having been turned into a separate type of offence. This manner of regulation has been criticised in legal scholarship on the ground that it is defective31.
After remaining in force for seventy-nine years, TCK No. 765 was repealed, at the end of a process of some twenty years and as the outcome of a large number of drafts prepared by various commissions, by Law No. 5237, which was adopted on 26.09.2004 and published in the Official Gazette No. 25611 of 12.10.2004. Since TCK No. 5237 entered into force on 01.06.2005, TCK No. 765 ceased to be in force as of that date.
In Law No. 5237 the offences connected with public tenders were regulated for the third time, and the types of offence were shaped having regard to the economic dynamics that had developed in the intervening period. In Law No. 5237 provision was made in Article 235 under the name “bid rigging” and in Article 236 under the name “rigging the performance of an obligation”.
III. Offences relating to the Tender Process and the Tender Contract in TCK No. 765
Types of offence relating to public tenders were laid down in various articles of TCK No. 765, which was in force in our country until 1 June 2005. They were regulated not only in different articles but also in different titles and chapters of the Law. This scattered regulation of the types of offence relating to public tenders, which involved needless repetition, met with justified criticism in legal scholarship. Indeed, when TCK No. 5237 was drafted these criticisms were taken into account and the types of offence were regulated in two articles in connection with one another.
When the subject is examined in the order followed by TCK No. 765 itself, it is seen that the first type of offence laid down in relation to public tenders is the offence of “Rigging Purchases and Sales Made on the Account of the State” laid down in Article 205, which is found in Chapter One, entitled “Simple and Aggravated Embezzlement and Obtaining Benefit in State Purchases and Sales”, of Title Three, entitled “Felonies Committed against the Administration of the State”, of Book Two of the Law, entitled “Felonies”. This type of offence was defined in the Law as follows: “a person who, by rigging the purchase or sale, the price, the quantity or the making of goods of any kind which he is charged with buying, selling or making on the account of the Turkish State, commits malversation in any manner whatsoever shall be punished with heavy imprisonment for not less than ten years and shall be made to pay for the damage”.
It has been stated in legal scholarship that the manner in which this type of offence was framed in the Law was incompatible with the principles of criminal law, that the text of the article was not properly expressed in terms of language either, and that for this reason the elements of the offence were not sufficiently clear32. It is further stated that it cannot be understood what is meant by the expression “on the account of the Turkish State” used in this article and that, particularly when set against the expression “on the account of the Government” in Art. 366 of TCK No. 765, this expression becomes wholly meaningless33.
The second type of offence laid down in TCK No. 765 in relation to public tenders is the “Offence of Trading in the Purchase or Sale of Goods for the State” laid down in paragraph 1 of Article 208. This type of offence too was placed in Chapter One, entitled “Simple and Aggravated Embezzlement and Obtaining Benefit in State Purchases and Sales”, of Title Three of the Law, entitled “Felonies Committed against the Administration of the State”. According to this article, “Any civil servant of the State who, in matters which he is charged with administering and supervising, trades for his own gain, whether secretly or openly, whether directly in person, through another or by way of partnership, in the purchase or sale of goods or materials, in small or large quantities, for the State, or who becomes a partner of those who have undertaken manufacture or construction for a lump sum, shall be punished with heavy imprisonment for not less than three years.”
This type of offence is not found in the Italian Criminal Code of 1889, which is the source of TCK No. 765; it was taken into the Law from the Imperial Penal Code of 1274. It is rightly stated in legal scholarship that no decision that might serve as an example of the application of this type of offence has been encountered to date34; indeed, this article has not been applied in practice.
Art. 208(2) of TCK No. 765, for its part, laid down the “Offence of Taking a Commission in the Purchase or Sale of Goods for the State”. By way of reference to the first paragraph of the article, it provides: “If a commission is taken in such dealings, or a gain is obtained in the exchange of cash or coin, the heavy imprisonment shall be not less than five years”.
In legal scholarship there are two different views: that this provision of the article is an aggravating circumstance of the type of offence laid down in the first paragraph35, and that it is an independent type of offence. However, although “commission agency” is also a kind of trade, the acts referred to here and those referred to in the first paragraph differ from one another. The perpetrator cannot be expected to trade in a given matter and at the same time act as a commission agent in it. The perpetrator either trades in the purchase and sale of goods and materials on the account of the State or acts as an intermediary, that is, as a commission agent, for this business to be done; they should therefore be regarded as different types of offence.
The second division of TCK No. 765 in which provision was made for public tenders is Title Six, entitled “Felonies against Public Confidence”, of Book Two of the Law, entitled “Felonies”. In this Title, provisions connected with the tender process were laid down in Articles 361, 362, 364, 365, 366, 367 and 368, in Chapter Five, entitled “Fraud and Rigging in Commerce, Industry and Auctions”.
Among the types of offence laid down in this Title, the one most often applied in practice and most often discussed in legal scholarship is the offence of “Rigging an Auction or Reverse Auction Held on the Account of the Government” laid down in Article 366 of the Law. This type of offence was defined in the Law as follows: “Whoever, in an auction or reverse auction held on the account of the Government, prevents or disturbs competition by violence or threat, by promising or giving gifts, by procuring other benefits, by secret collusion or by other fraudulent means, or induces those bidding in the auction or reverse auction to withdraw, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for three months to one year and to a heavy fine of thirty to two hundred liras”.
The use, in the definition of this type of offence, of the expression “on the account of the Government”, in contrast to the expression “on the account of the State” in Article 205, was rightly criticised in legal scholarship on the ground that it is legally impossible to determine what is meant by it; it was further stated that, proceeding from the expression “on the account of the Government”, this type of offence could not be applied to unlawful acts arising in tenders held on behalf of other public bodies such as “local authorities” and “state economic enterprises”36. Taking into account the criticism voiced in legal scholarship on this point and the problems that had arisen in practice, the legislature, when defining the “offence of bid rigging” in TCK No. 5237, framed the definition of the offence so as to cover acts committed to the detriment of all public institutions and bodies.
The other types of offence found in this division also contain provisions connected with public procurement law. Thus Article 367 laid down the “Offence of Rigging an Auction Held through a Public Authority or Conducted by a Private Person”, Article 368 the “Offence of Withdrawing from a Tender in Return for Money or Other Benefit”, Article 361 the “Offence of Failure to Perform an Undertaking towards the Public Authorities” and Article 362 the “Offence of Fraud in the Performance of an Undertaking towards the Public Authorities”. Since the subject and the dimensions of this study do not allow each of these types of offence to be explained individually, we confine ourselves, as regards them, to referring to the works cited above.
IV. Offences relating to the Tender Process in TCK No. 5237
A. In General
In TCK No. 5237, which entered into force on 1 June 2005, the types of offence relating to public procurement law are laid down and defined very clearly, in a single chapter and as two separate types of offence, and not – as was criticised in TCK No. 765 – as a large number of mutually similar types of offence scattered over various divisions of the Law37. Accordingly, the offences relating to public procurement law are laid down in Book Two of the TCK, entitled “Special Provisions”, in Part Three, entitled “Offences against Society”, in Chapter Nine, entitled “Offences against the Economy, Industry and Commerce”, in Article 235 under the heading “Bid Rigging” and in Article 236 under the heading “Rigging the Performance of an Obligation”.
Unlike the arrangement in Law No. 765, the offences relating to the tender process laid down in Arts. 235 and 236 of Law No. 5237 are placed not among the offences against public confidence or the offences against the reliability and functioning of the public administration – which are the counterparts in Law No. 5237 of the offences against the administration of the State and the offences against public confidence – but, quite differently, among the offences against the economy, industry and commerce. Considering that in the criminal code the types of offence are classified and arranged by taking as the criterion the legal interest they protect, this manner of regulation shows that the legal interest which the types of offence under examination are intended to protect is now also conceived differently. This matter will be explained in detail below in the discussion of the legal interest protected by the type of offence.
When the offences of bid rigging and of rigging the performance of an obligation were being laid down in TCK No. 5237, the legislature had regard to the basic laws on this subject, namely the State Tender Law No. 2886, the Public Procurement Law No. 4734 and the Public Procurement Contracts Law No. 4735, and parallelism was secured between the types of offence and the provisions of these Laws. Indeed, when Arts. 235 and 236 of Law No. 5237 are examined, they are seen to contain provisions parallel to the system of Laws No. 2886, 4734 and 4735 and to the tender procedure of these Laws. Criminal law is a discipline of a subsidiary nature in relation to the other legal disciplines. It comes into play when problems cannot be resolved by the rules and sanctions proper to a given legal discipline, for example the law of obligations or administrative law. The provisions made in Arts. 235 and 236 TCK were thus designed to come into play where the rules contained in Laws No. 2886, 4734 and 4735 are insufficient and where there are serious violations; in this way, by defining certain unlawful acts relating to public procurement law as types of offence, the aim is to reduce the unlawful acts in question by drawing on the general preventive function of penalties38.
Another important matter to be noted here concerns the scope of application of the types of offence in Arts. 235 and 236 of TCK No. 5237. It should first be noted that the first condition that must be present for Article 235 to apply is that the tender be held on behalf of “public institutions or bodies”; accordingly, even if the tender is held not under Law No. 2886 or No. 4734 but, for example, under the provisions of Law No. 4046 on Privatisation Practices, Article 235 will apply where the tender is rigged39, because a tender held under Law No. 4046 is held on behalf of “public institutions or bodies”40.
Another matter to be noted with regard to the field in which the type of offence may be applied is that paragraph 5 of Article 235 has considerably widened the scope of application of the type of offence. Under that provision, the type of offence in question will also apply where there is rigging of auctions or reverse auctions conducted through public institutions or bodies, or of the purchases or sales of goods or services or the leases made on behalf of professional organisations having the character of public institutions, companies established with the participation of public institutions or bodies or of professional organisations having the character of public institutions, foundations operating within them, associations working for the public benefit, or cooperatives.
In addition, Article 235 can be applied where the tender held relates to the purchase of goods or services, the sale of goods or services, leasing or works. Yet the tenders held on behalf of the public sector are not limited to these. Apart from these categories of tender there are also tenders concerning barter, the establishment of rights in rem and transport services; but, by virtue of the principle of legality of offences and penalties and its sub-principle, the principle of certainty, it does not seem possible to apply Article 235 to these kinds of tender, which do not appear in the definition of the offence. Had the legislature, when framing the type of offence, not enumerated the kinds of tender at all, or had it also mentioned the kinds of tender noted above as missing, it would not have given rise to such a gap. Alongside all the positive provisions made in relation to the type of offence, this point stands as a shortcoming41.
Moreover, while paragraph 5 of Article 235 widens the application of the type of offence in terms of the public institutions and bodies on whose account the tender is held, it mentions the rigging of “purchases or sales of goods or services or leases” but makes no provision for the rigging of works. Consequently, by virtue of the principle of legality of offences and penalties, Article 235 cannot be applied where a tender for works is held on behalf of the institutions or bodies listed in paragraph 5. For example, where a works tender that the Turkish Red Crescent Society, an association working for the public benefit, has held for a facility to be used as a blood centre is rigged, Article 235 cannot be applied and, in the result, this unlawful act will remain without sanction. This too is seen as another shortcoming in the framing of the type of offence.
B. The Offence of Bid Rigging
The “offence of bid rigging” was laid down in Art. 235 of TCK No. 5237 to replace the types of offence laid down in Arts. 205, 208, 366, 367 and 368 of TCK No. 765, which appeared in the Law in forms similar to one another. As stated above, when framing this type of offence the legislature sought to achieve harmony with the Public Procurement Law No. 4734 and the Public Procurement Contracts Law No. 4735, and this was to a large extent achieved.
1. The Legal Interest Protected by the Offence
There are differing views in legal scholarship as to what the legal interest protected by this offence is. Some authors state that the legal interest protected by this offence is the confidence placed in the public official42. The explanatory memorandum to the article likewise states that the legal interest protected by this offence is “the confidence placed in public officials that public activities are conducted in accordance with the principle of honesty and, in particular, with regard to the conduct of tender procedures such as the purchase or sale of goods or services on behalf of the public sector”. Indeed, it is stated in legal scholarship that the legal interest protected by the similar offence laid down in Art. 205 of TCK No. 765, the offence of “rigging tenders for purchases, sales and works carried out on the account of the State”, is also the confidence placed in the public official43, and even that this is a special form of abuse of official duty and is therefore of a mixed nature44. It is thus seen that the authors who maintain that the legal interest protected by the offence of bid rigging laid down in Law No. 5237 is the confidence placed in the public official hold a view parallel to that on the legal interest protected in the similar type of offence of Law No. 765.
Other authors, by contrast, state that the legal interest protected by this offence is of a mixed nature, but that the interest particularly and predominantly protected is, in general, the functioning of economic rules and, specifically, the environment of free competition45.
As explained above, public purchases constitute one of the most important items of state expenditure; moreover, through the public expenditure that is made, an attempt is made, as a requirement of the social state, to secure the development of the country through the balanced distribution of its resources and the proper and appropriate use of the taxes collected from the people. Indeed, with the democratisation of the masses and of public administrations, citizens wish to have more information and more of a say about what governments and the administration do and how, and want the taxes they pay to be spent appropriately and efficiently; yet, on the other hand, they do not wish to pay more tax either. For this reason governments and administrations feel obliged to make themselves more effective in terms of the cost of public services and to provide better-quality service at lower cost46. One of the important reasons for the increase in these costs and for the service not being of sufficient quality is the rigging of tenders and of the performance of obligations. Moreover, through the trial of those who commit this offence it becomes possible, in a sense, to ask on behalf of the public where and how the taxes paid by the citizen have been spent.
At the same time, the sales and leases made by the public sector, as in the case of privatisation tenders, directly affect the public sector and the private sector. By the type of offence under examination, acts capable of disrupting this functioning are made into a type of offence. In fact, sanctions against acts of this kind are also found in Laws No. 2886, 4734 and 4735, but those are sanctions of an administrative nature. By making the acts in question into a type of offence, an attempt is made to prevent them by drawing on the general and special preventive functions of criminal law. Accordingly, the primary interest sought to be protected by this type of offence is the protection of “in general, the economic functioning and balance of the country and its limited resources; and, in particular, the competitive environment in order to secure these”47.
Moreover, this type of offence is placed not, as in TCK No. 765, among the offences against public confidence or the offences against the reliability and functioning of the public administration, but among the offences relating to the economy, industry and commerce. Since in criminal codes the types of offence are grouped together with similar types of offence on the basis of the legal interest they protect, the placing of this type of offence in the chapter on offences relating to the economy, industry and commerce has a particular significance. For this reason it can also be said, proceeding from the place in which the type of offence is laid down, that the legal interest protected by the offence of bid rigging is primarily the functioning of the country’s economic order and the preservation of economic stability and balances.
In addition to this and in connection with it, this type of offence also seeks to protect the environment of free competition within the private sector. Another aim pursued in carrying out public purchases, sales or leases, or privatisations, by way of tender is to create an environment of free competition so that the greatest benefit in terms of quality and quantity may be obtained, and to prevent acts that would hinder that competition. This type of offence seeks to achieve that aim, which accordingly constitutes one of the legal interests protected by the offence.
Although the legal interest protected by the offence of bid rigging is primarily the economic functioning and balance of the country, the confidence placed in the public official and the confidence placed in the probity of the public administration are protected alongside it. Accordingly, the legal interest protected by this type of offence is in fact of a mixed nature. The legislature, however, rightly placed the type of offence in the chapter on “offences relating to the economy, industry and commerce”, having regard to the predominant legal interest it protects.
2. Perpetrator and Victim
Anyone may be the perpetrator of this offence; indeed, the article states this expressly by referring to “any person who rigs”48. Although the expression “a person” was likewise used in the offence of “Rigging Purchases and Sales Made on the Account of the State” in Article 205, one of the similar types of offence in TCK No. 765, it used to be stated that this offence could be committed only by persons regarded as “civil servants for the purposes of the application of criminal law”, as defined in Art. 279 of TCK No. 765, and that it was therefore a special offence49. As for another similar type of offence, the offence of “Rigging an Auction or Reverse Auction Held on the Account of the Government” laid down in Art. 366 of TCK No. 765, it used to be stated that it could be committed by anyone and was not a special offence50. When the offence of bid rigging was being laid down in Law No. 5237, the intention was to put an end to this confused situation found in the similar types of offence in TCK No. 765, and the type of offence was framed, as it should be, in such a way that it can be committed by anyone.
Although tenders held on behalf of the public sector are conducted by public officials, influencing these tenders in the manner described in the material element of the offence may be done by persons who are not public officials just as much as by public officials. In this case the position of the public official has a special feature. Where the public official obtains an undue benefit as a result of the act of bid rigging, and where this also gives rise to other offences, then pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 235 it is not the provisions on notional concurrence but those on real concurrence that will apply, and the public official concerned will be tried separately for those offences as well.
The victim of this offence is the person or persons who, as a result of the act defined in the type of offence and committed by the perpetrator, are prevented from taking part in the procedures of the tender process51. Since participation in a tender may also be on behalf of a legal person, where the acts in question are directed at the representatives of the legal person the victim is both those representatives and the legal person itself. In addition, the institutions or bodies on whose behalf the tender is held are also persons harmed by the offence.
As stated above, since the legal interest protected by this type of offence is primarily “in general, the protection of the economic functioning and balance of the country and of its limited resources; and, in particular, the protection of the competitive environment in order to secure these, or the confidence placed in the public official”, it is seen that the public, that is to say society, is generally in the position of the party harmed in this offence. For where a tender for a public purchase is rigged, an unduly large sum of money leaves the public institution or body, whose budget is made up of the taxes collected from the people; and where a tender for a sale or lease on behalf of the public sector is rigged, then this time less is paid than ought to be paid to the public institution or body, which in fact belongs to the people and works for the benefit of the people. As can be seen, in both cases a loss is caused to the public, and the public is therefore, as a result of this act, in the position of the party harmed by the offence.
3. Material Element
In Art. 235(1) TCK, where the offence of bid rigging is laid down, the type of offence is first defined in general terms as “any person who rigs tenders for the purchase or sale of goods or services or for leases held on behalf of public institutions or bodies, or tenders for works, … shall be punished”; then, in paragraph 2 of the article, the acts constituting the material element of the offence are listed one by one and the act of “bid rigging” is thereby defined.
It should be noted, however, that for this offence to be constituted there must first of all be a tender relating to the purchase of goods or services, or to the sale of goods or services, or to leasing, or to works, and it must be held on behalf of public institutions or bodies. These are required as the precondition of the offence. Where matters other than these, or tenders not held on behalf of public institutions or bodies, are rigged by the acts listed in the article, this offence will not be constituted.
The material element of the offence is set out item by item in four sub-paragraphs in the second paragraph. The first of these four sub-paragraphs covers the commission of the act of bid rigging by fraudulent conduct, the second the rigging of the tender by disclosing documents that must be kept confidential, the third the commission of the offence by force, threat or other unlawful conduct, and the last sub-paragraph of the paragraph the rigging of the tender by those taking part in it through an agreement among themselves.
This type of offence is framed as an offence with alternative acts. The offence will be committed where one or more of these acts is carried out, whereas this offence will not be constituted where the tender is rigged by an act other than these. It should be noted, however, that by a detailed provision the legislature sought to cover in this article all the modes of commission capable of constituting the offence of bid rigging.
According to the first sub-paragraph, the cases of rigging a tender by fraudulent conduct are the following:
1. Preventing persons who have the qualifications or meet the conditions for participating in the tender from participating in the tender or in the procedures of the tender process,
2. Enabling persons who do not have the qualifications or do not meet the conditions for participating in the tender to participate in the tender,
3. Excluding the goods offered from evaluation on the ground that they do not have the characteristics stated in the specifications, although they do have them,
4. Admitting the goods offered to evaluation on the ground that they have the characteristics stated in the specifications, although they do not have them.
The tender is rigged where these acts are brought about by fraudulent conduct. Where these acts are carried out by conduct that is not fraudulent, no offence can be constituted under this paragraph. For example, where a tenderer who has the qualifications or meets the conditions for participating in the tender is prevented by the use of force or threat from participating in the tender or in the procedures of the tender process, the perpetrator will be punished not under this sub-paragraph but, since the same act is provided for in sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2 of Article 235, under that sub-paragraph. What has to be investigated here is then no longer the existence of fraud but that of force and threat.
Sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 of Article 235, for its part, defines another alternative act: “enabling others to gain access to information relating to the bids which must be kept confidential under the tender legislation or the specifications”. Indeed, in order to secure competition and the best use of resources in particular, certain information in the tender process must not be known, especially by the tenderers. For example, where the “estimated cost”, which occupies an important place in the process of putting a matter out to tender, is communicated to one or more of the tenderers, the material element of the offence will have been fulfilled under this sub-paragraph. Indeed, the last sentence of Art. 9 of the Public Procurement Law No. 4734 (KİK), headed “estimated cost”, provides that the estimated cost shall not be included in the tender and pre-qualification notices and shall not be disclosed to tenderers or to persons who have no official connection with the tender process. The sanction for this provision, too, is laid down in the criminal code by the sub-paragraph under examination.
Sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph, for its part, covers the case in which the offence of bid rigging is committed by preventing, through the use of force or threat or by other unlawful conduct, persons who have the qualifications or meet the conditions for participating in the tender from participating in the tender and in the procedures of the tender process. Accordingly, this offence will be constituted where, for example, a tenderer is prevented from participating in the tender by the application of physical or psychological force or by being told that harm will be done to his children if he participates. In the Law’s explanatory memorandum the example given for this sub-paragraph is “misleading the tenderers, on the day or at the hour of the tender, as to the place where the tender is to be held and thereby causing them to miss the time prescribed for bidding or negotiation”, and some authors in legal scholarship state that they share this view52. This example, however, may serve as an example of the act laid down in item 1 of sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2, because the example given describes tenderers who have the qualifications required for the tender being misled by fraudulent conduct, and gives no example of an act involving force or threat. Moreover, in the face of item 1 of sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2, the concept of “other unlawful conduct” referred to in sub-paragraph (c) does not hold good for the act in this example.
Sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 2 of Article 235, the paragraph in which the material element of the offence is defined, lays down as the last act constituting the offence the case in which persons who wish to take part in the tender and those who take part in it conclude an open or secret agreement among themselves in order to influence the conditions of the tender and, in particular, the price. The purpose of carrying out public purchases, sales or leases by tender is to secure the best and most efficient return at the most suitable price by ensuring competition among the tenderers. The case in which persons who wish to take part or who take part in the tender, by agreeing among themselves in advance, frustrate these aims which the tender seeks to achieve, and competition, is defined as an act constituting this offence.
For this offence to be constituted it is sufficient that the acts mentioned above be carried out; the occurrence of a result as a consequence of the acts carried out is not additionally required. For this reason the offence of bid rigging is a type of offence in which the result is inherent in the act. Moreover, for this offence to be committed it is sufficient that the acts directed at rigging the tender be carried out; it is not additionally required that, as a result of these acts, damage be caused to the institution or body holding the tender. This type of offence is therefore an offence of concrete endangerment, because the legal interests protected by this offence are violated as a result of the acts carried out with a view to rigging the tender.
4. Mental Element
There is nothing particular to note as regards the mental element of this offence. For the offence to be committed the perpetrator must carry out the act of bid rigging knowingly and willingly. In short, this offence can be committed with general intent; the motive with which the perpetrator carries out the act is of no importance53.
5. Special Forms of Appearance of the Offence
Since, as stated above when examining the material element of the offence, the offence of bid rigging is a type of offence in which the result is inherent in the act, it cannot as a rule remain at the stage of attempt54. However, an attempt to commit the offence is possible in cases where the acts specified as alternative acts are divisible. For this reason, in each individual case the judge must examine whether the act is divisible and whether the conduct has remained at the stage of attempt.
Every form of participation in the offence (iştirak) is possible in respect of the type of offence under examination.
In respect of this offence, certain cases of concurrence of offences (içtima) appear possible55. What will be dwelt upon here in particular is the provision in paragraph 4 of Article 235, in which the offence under examination is laid down. Under that provision, officials who obtain an undue benefit by reason of bid rigging will, on that account, additionally be punished under the relevant criminal provision. For example, if a public official who rigs a tender also receives money in return for his act, he will also be punished for the offence of bribery on account of that act.
6. Sanction and Prosecution
Under paragraph 1 of Article 235 of the Law, a person who commits the offence of bid rigging will be sentenced to imprisonment for five to twelve years. As can be seen, the amount of the penalty has been considerably increased compared with Articles 205 and 368, the similar articles of TCK No. 765. It is considered that the provision of so heavy a sanction for this offence – which is very important from the point of view of criminal policy, is very frequently encountered in practice, and concerns the whole of the people, who use the country’s resources and create those resources – will have a deterrent effect on the commission of the act and is consistent with the aim of general and special prevention pursued with regard to this type of offence.
Under Art. 235(3) TCK, where the public institution or body concerned with the tender suffers damage as a result of the act of bid rigging committed by the perpetrator, the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator will be increased by one half. Furthermore, where it is established that damage has occurred as a result of the rigging of the tender but the amount of that damage cannot be determined, the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator will likewise be increased by one half.
Since the lower limit of the penalty prescribed for this type of offence is five years and this is not regarded as short-term imprisonment under Art. 49(2) TCK, the penalty imposed on the perpetrator cannot be converted into a judicial fine under Art. 50 TCK. Likewise, the penalty imposed for this offence cannot be suspended under Art. 51 TCK.
The administrative sanctions laid down in Art. 17 of the Public Procurement Law No. 4734 will also be applied to a perpetrator who commits this offence.
The investigation of this offence is not dependent on a complaint; accordingly, as soon as the Public Prosecutor’s Office learns that this offence has been committed, whether by way of a report of the offence or in any other way, an investigation will be opened of its own motion and, where there is sufficient suspicion that the offence has been committed, a public prosecution will be brought against the perpetrator. Pursuant to Art. 12 of Law No. 5235 on the Establishment, Duties and Powers of the Courts of First Instance of the Ordinary Judiciary and the Regional Courts of Appeal, the courts having jurisdiction to try this offence are the assize courts of the place where the offence was committed.
C. The Offence of Rigging the Performance of an Obligation
The tender process comes to an end with the holding of the tender and the conclusion of a contract between the successful tenderer and the administration. Thereafter the performance stage begins, which rests on the fulfilment of the reciprocal obligations between the parties. Accordingly, whereas the procedures preceding the signing of the tender contract fall within the field of administrative law, the subsequent process of performance of the reciprocal obligations falls within the field of the law of obligations. It should be noted at once, however, that even at this stage traces of the mandatory character of public law can be seen. Thus, while Art. 235 of TCK No. 5237 defines as offences certain acts at the stage up to the signing of the tender contract, certain acts after the signing of the contract are laid down in Article 236 of the Law under the name of the “offence of rigging the performance of an obligation”.
As stated above, the Public Procurement Law No. 4734 was enacted for public procurement by tender within the framework of alignment with EU legislation and of public administration reform. As its complement, the Public Procurement Contracts Law No. 4735 was enacted to regulate the conclusion of the contract relating to the public tender and the method of performance of the obligations thereafter. That Law, however, regulates only the conclusion of contracts and the performance of obligations relating to the tender procedures laid down in Law No. 4734. The State Tender Law No. 2886, which is to be applied to tenders falling outside the scope of Law No. 4734, will also govern the tender contracts to be concluded under that Law and the method of performance of the obligations. Accordingly, as regards the applicability of the offence of rigging the performance of an obligation laid down in Art. 236 of TCK No. 5237, what is decisive is not the law under which the tender was held but whether the tender was held on behalf of the public sector.
1. The Legal Interest Protected by the Offence
Differing views have also been put forward in legal scholarship as to the legal interest protected by this type of offence. Some authors state that the legal interest protected by this offence is the proper functioning of commercial life and the institution of trust56. Other authors, by contrast, state that the legal interest protected by this offence is to secure the confidence placed in the public authorities and in public officials and to ensure honesty, and that the economy is indirectly protected as well57.
As was also explained in connection with the offence of bid rigging, public purchases constitute one of the most important items of state expenditure; moreover, through the public expenditure that is made, an attempt is made, as a requirement of the social state, to secure the development of the country through the balanced distribution of its resources and the proper and appropriate use of the taxes collected from the people. At the same time, the sales and leases made by the public sector, as in the case of privatisation tenders, directly affect the public sector and the private sector. By this type of offence, acts capable of disrupting this functioning at the stage, following the holding of the tender, at which the parties perform their reciprocal obligations are defined as offences. Sanctions for the acts covered by this offence are also found in the State Tender Law No. 2886 (DİK) and in the Public Procurement Contracts Law No. 4735, but those are sanctions of an administrative nature. By making the acts in question into a type of offence, an attempt is made to prevent them by drawing on the general and special preventive functions of criminal law. Accordingly, the primary interest sought to be protected by this type of offence is “the protection of the economic functioning and balance of the country and of its limited resources”.
Moreover, this type of offence is placed not, as in TCK No. 765, among the offences against public confidence or the offences against the reliability and functioning of the public administration, but among the offences relating to the economy, industry and commerce. Since in criminal codes the types of offence are grouped together with similar types of offence on the basis of the legal interest they protect, the placing of this type of offence in the chapter on offences relating to the economy, industry and commerce has a particular significance. For this reason it can also be said, proceeding from the place in which the type of offence is laid down, that the legal interest protected by the offence of rigging the performance of an obligation is primarily the preservation of economic functioning and balances.
Although the legal interest protected by the offence of rigging the performance of an obligation is primarily the economic functioning and balance of the country, the confidence placed in the public official and the confidence placed in the probity of the public administration are protected alongside it. Accordingly, the legal interest protected by this type of offence is in fact of a mixed nature. The legislature, however, rightly placed the type of offence in the chapter on “offences relating to the economy, industry and commerce”, having regard to the predominant legal interest it protects.
2. Perpetrator and Victim
Anyone may be the perpetrator of this offence; the Law requires no particular quality in this respect. Although the words “a person” were used for the perpetrator in Article 205, one of the similar types of offence in TCK No. 765, it used to be stated in practice and in legal scholarship that this offence could be committed only by a civil servant and that it was therefore a special offence. One of the innovations introduced by the new Law has been that this type of offence has ceased to be a special offence.
The condition required as regards the perpetrator of this offence is that the person has entered into an undertaking towards the institutions or bodies specified in the text of the article as a result of a tender held for them; otherwise it is not possible for any person to be the perpetrator of this offence58.
The victim of this offence and/or the party harmed by it are the institutions or bodies on whose behalf the tender was held and in respect of which the performance they expect from the successful tenderer has been rigged.
3. Material Element
The offence of rigging the performance of an obligation is laid down in Art. 236 of TCK No. 5237. In paragraph 1 of this article the type of offence is first defined in general terms as “any person who rigs the performance of an obligation undertaken towards public institutions or bodies, professional organisations having the character of public institutions, companies established with their participation, foundations operating within them, associations working for the public benefit or cooperatives … shall be punished”; then, in paragraph 2 of the article, the acts constituting the material element of the offence are listed one by one and the act of “rigging the performance of an obligation” is thereby defined.
For this offence to be constituted there must first of all be a tender under which an undertaking has been entered into towards the institutions or bodies specified in the first paragraph of the article. This is required as the precondition of the offence; logically, too, it is not possible to rig the performance of an obligation assumed as a result of a tender unless there is a tender under which an undertaking has been entered into towards these institutions or bodies. Accordingly, this offence will not be constituted where what is rigged is the performance of an obligation arising from a contract other than one signed at the end of a tender process, for example from a contract signed with a public institution or body as a result of the negotiated procedure. In that case, depending on the circumstances, the offence of aggravated fraud against public institutions or bodies may come into question.
The material element of the offence is set out item by item in five sub-paragraphs in paragraph 2. This type of offence is framed as an offence with alternative acts. The offence will be committed where one or more of these acts is carried out, whereas this offence will not be constituted where the performance of the obligation is rigged by an act other than these. It should be noted, however, that by a detailed provision the legislature sought to cover in this article all the modes of commission capable of constituting the offence of rigging the performance of an obligation.
It should also be noted that, unlike the offence of bid rigging laid down in Article 235, all of the acts in this type of offence must be carried out by fraudulent conduct; the forms in which the offence is committed are the following:
1. Delivery or acceptance of goods other than the goods whose description (quality) is specified in the tender decision or in the contract,
2. Delivery or acceptance of a quantity of goods smaller than that specified in the tender decision or in the contract,
3. Acceptance of the obligation as having been performed in time although it was not performed within the period specified in the tender decision or in the contract,
4. In tenders for works, acceptance of the work or of the materials used although they do not conform to the conditions, quantities or qualities laid down in the specifications or the contract,
5. Acceptance of an obligation consisting of a service as having been rendered although it was not rendered, or was rendered incompletely, in accordance with the conditions specified in the tender decision or in the contract.
For this offence to be constituted it is sufficient, as in the offence of bid rigging, that the acts defined in paragraph 2 be carried out; the occurrence of a result as a consequence of the acts carried out is not additionally required. For this reason the offence of rigging the performance of an obligation is likewise a type of offence in which the result is inherent in the act.
For the offence under examination to be committed it is sufficient that the acts directed at rigging the performance of the obligation be carried out; it is not additionally required that, as a result of these acts, damage be caused to the institution or body with which the contract relating to the tender was concluded. This type of offence is therefore, like the offence of bid rigging, an offence of concrete endangerment, because the legal interests protected by this offence are violated as a result of the acts carried out with a view to rigging the performance of the obligation.
4. Mental Element
There is nothing particular to note as regards the mental element of this offence. For the offence to be committed the perpetrator must carry out the act of rigging the performance of the obligation knowingly and willingly. In short, this offence can be committed with general intent; the motive with which the perpetrator carries out the act is of no importance59.
5. Special Forms of Appearance of the Offence
Since, as stated above when examining the material element of the offence, the offence of rigging the performance of an obligation is a type of offence in which the result is inherent in the act, it cannot as a rule remain at the stage of attempt60. However, an attempt to commit the offence is possible in cases where the acts specified as alternative acts are divisible. For this reason, in each individual case the judge must examine whether the act is divisible and whether the conduct has remained at the stage of attempt.
Every form of participation in the offence (iştirak) is possible in respect of the type of offence under examination. As stated in the type of offence, where the person who performs the obligation fraudulently, the person who carries out the inspection for its acceptance and the person who accepts it do so together with the intent to commit the offence, each of them will separately be held liable and punished as a perpetrator under Art. 37(1) TCK.
Certain cases of concurrence of offences (içtima) are possible in respect of this offence. It is possible that, in the course of the rigging of the performance of the obligation, the offence of causing a shortage of things necessary to the public, laid down in Article 238, is also committed. In that case, since more than one article of the Law will have been violated by a single act of the perpetrator, the rule of notional concurrence will be applied and the perpetrator will be sentenced for the offence of rigging the performance of an obligation, which carries the heavier penalty. In addition, it is also possible for the perpetrator to carry out the act of rigging the performance of the obligation by forging a document. In that case the rules on real concurrence will be applied pursuant to Art. 212 TCK and the perpetrator will be given the penalty for both offences.
Another matter to be touched upon here is the provision in paragraph 3 of Article 236. Under that provision, officials who obtain an undue benefit by reason of rigging the performance of an obligation will, on that account, additionally be punished under the relevant criminal provision. For example, if a public official who rigs the performance of an obligation also receives money in return for his act, he will also be punished for the offence of bribery on account of that act61.
6. Sanction and Prosecution
Paragraph 1 of Article 236 of the Law prescribes imprisonment for three to seven years for the offence of rigging the performance of an obligation. As can be seen, the amount of the penalty has been considerably increased compared with Articles 205 and 368, the similar articles of TCK No. 765. It is considered that the provision of so heavy a sanction for this offence – which is very important from the point of view of criminal policy, is very frequently encountered in practice, and concerns the whole of the people, who use the country’s resources and create those resources – will have a deterrent effect on the commission of the act and is consistent with the aim of general and special prevention pursued with regard to this type of offence.
Unlike under Art. 235(3) TCK, where the public institution or body concerned suffers damage as a result of the rigging of the performance of an obligation laid down in Article 236, the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator will not be increased. That this situation is laid down in Article 235 as a circumstance aggravating the penalty, while the same aggravating ground is not provided for in respect of Article 236, which is in the nature of a complement to that type of offence, stands as a shortcoming in the Law.
Since the lower limit of the penalty prescribed for this type of offence is three years and this is not regarded as short-term imprisonment under Art. 49(2) TCK, the penalty imposed on the perpetrator cannot be converted into a judicial fine under Art. 50 TCK. Likewise, the penalty imposed for this offence cannot be suspended under Art. 51 TCK.
The administrative sanctions laid down in Art. 28 of the Public Procurement Contracts Law No. 4735 will also be applied to a perpetrator who commits this offence.
The investigation of this type of offence is not dependent on a complaint; accordingly, as soon as the Public Prosecutor’s Office learns that this offence has been committed, whether by way of a report of the offence or in any other way, an investigation will be opened of its own motion and, where there is sufficient suspicion that the offence has been committed, a public prosecution will be brought against the perpetrators. Pursuant to Arts. 10, 11 and 12 of Law No. 5235 on the Establishment, Duties and Powers of the Courts of First Instance of the Ordinary Judiciary and the Regional Courts of Appeal, the courts having jurisdiction to try this offence are the criminal courts of first instance of the place where the offence was committed.
CONCLUSION
As was also stated in the introductory section of this study, the close relationship which the offences of bid rigging and of rigging the performance of an obligation have with public finance, and hence with the national economy, is very clear. The commission of these offences adversely affects the economic stability and balance of the country, public finance and hence the country’s limited resources, and also the confidence placed in public officials. These offences relating to the tender process are made the subject of regulation, and their importance is emphasised, not only in our country but equally in the legal systems of other countries and by the supranational bodies to which we are, or are seeking to become, a party.
Although the offences relating to the tender process are of such importance, in the other similar types of offence contained in TCK No. 765, such as Article 205 and the like, the offences were both regulated in a convoluted manner and not placed, within a definite order, where they ought to have been. It is with Arts. 235 and 236 of TCK No. 5237, which have been examined and explained above, that the types of offence relating to the tender process have been regulated both within a definite order and, with the aim of covering the whole of this process, in a detailed and broad manner.
Art. 235 of TCK No. 5237 regulates the “offence of bid rigging” and Art. 236 the “offence of rigging the performance of an obligation”, and in this way the acts regarded as offences in relation to the process of holding a tender on behalf of the public sector and also to the process, following the tender, of performing the obligation undertaken through the tender have been regulated. Accordingly, the recognition as an offence of acts directed at rigging the performance of an obligation is a positive innovation introduced by Law No. 5237.
As was also explained above, there are at present three basic laws in which public procurement law is regulated. These are the State Tender Law No. 2886, the Public Procurement Law No. 4734 and the Public Procurement Contracts Law No. 4735. For Articles 235 and 236 to apply, it is not necessary that the tender held and/or the contract concluded as a result of the tender and the obligation performed should be a tender held under these Laws. Where a tender is held on behalf of the public sector, even if on the basis of a law other than these, these articles will apply. The decisive element here is therefore that the tender is held on behalf of the public sector. It should be noted, however, that in regulating the types of offence a parallel was established with the provisions of Laws No. 4734 and 4735.
The most important shortcoming as regards the offence of bid rigging is that this offence cannot be applied in respect of tenders concerning barter, the establishment of rights in rem and transport services. In accordance with the principle of legality of offences and penalties, since tenders relating to these matters are not expressly mentioned in the Law, Article 235 ought not to be applied to them. This in turn creates a shortcoming in the type of offence.
A further innovation contained in Art. 235 of TCK No. 5237, which regulates the offence of bid rigging, is the statement that this article will also apply where auctions or reverse auctions conducted through public institutions or bodies, or purchases or sales of goods or services or leases made on behalf of professional organisations having the character of public institutions, companies established with the participation of public institutions or bodies or of professional organisations having the character of public institutions, foundations operating within them, associations working for the public benefit, or cooperatives, are rigged. By this provision Article 235 is brought into harmony with the Public Procurement Law No. 4734 (KİK).
Another important matter that must be touched upon is that, in defining the offence in Article 235, the commission of the act in the form of giving or receiving a bribe ought also to have been included in the text of the article, for the offence of bid rigging is generally carried out by giving bribes to the public officials who have duties in the tender. The failure to define this act as a mode of committing the offence constitutes an important shortcoming.
The last point that must be noted is that the concept of “other unlawful acts”, which is laid down as a mode of commission of the offence in sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2 of Article 235, is so broad as to be capable of infringing the principle of legality of offences and penalties. What the legislature in fact sought to do here was to meet with a sanction the commission of the offence by similar acts other than force and threat as well, and to ensure that no act directed at bid rigging should go unpunished. However, the principle of “certainty” constitutes an important sub-principle of the principle of legality of offences and penalties. According to this principle, the articles containing a penal norm that are made the subject of regulation must be definite, clear and comprehensible. The concept of “other unlawful acts” found in the article, by contrast, stands in the statutory provision as a regulation whose content has to be filled in and which for that reason runs counter to the principle of certainty.
Finally, it should be stated that, apart from certain important shortcomings enumerated above, the regulation made in Law No. 5237 with regard to the tender offences is in general extremely clear, comprehensible and in conformity with national and supranational legislation and, in terms of the sanctions it introduces and of its attempt to cover all modes of commission of the offence, is also such that the penal norm is capable of serving the purposes of both general prevention and special prevention.
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Footnotes
- Attorney-at-law; doctoral student in the Department of Public Law, Institute of Social Sciences, Istanbul University. ↑
- Ali Özgüven, İktisat Bilimine Giriş, 8. Bası, İstanbul, Filiz Kitabevi, 2005, s.3. It should be noted, however, that since this definition is made according to the rules of the market economy, it is suited rather to the capitalist system and is not valid as regards the socialist system. ↑
- Özgüven, a.g.e., s.158. ↑
- M. Kamil Mutluer/Erdoğan Öner/Ahmet Kesik, Bütçe Hukuku, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006, s. 10. ↑
- M. Kamil Mutluer, Vergi Genel Hukuku, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006, s. 25,26. ↑
- Uğur Emek, Kamu Alımlarında Etkin İhale Tasarımı, İstanbul, TÜSİAD Yayını, 2001, s.29. ↑
- Sıddık Sami Onar, İdare Hukukunun Umumi Esasları, C.III, İstanbul, Hak Kitabevi, 1966, s.1591-1595. ↑
- Abdullah Uz, Kamu İhale Hukuku, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 2005, s.1. ↑
- Mustafa Nihat Özön, Osmanlıca – Türkçe Sözlük, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1971, s.332,333. ↑
- Ejder Yılmaz, Hukuk Sözlüğü, 5. Bası, Ankara, Yetkin Yayınları, 1996, s.362. ↑
- Meltem Kutlu, İdare Sözleşmelerinde İhale Süreci, İzmir, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1997, s.76; Uz, a.g.e., s.9. ↑
- Mustafa Reşit Karahasan, İnşaat İmar İhale Hukuku, C.III, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1997, s.54. ↑
- Muammer Parlar, “Kamu İhale Kanunu”, (Çevrimiçi) www. huder.org/dergi.htm, 27.02.2007. ↑
- Uz, a.g.e., s.128,129. ↑
- Mesut Hastürk, “Kamu İhale Kanunu İle İhale Sisteminde Yapılan Değişiklikler”, (Çevrimiçi) www.mukder.org.tr/17mh.htm, 25.02.2007. ↑
- Ahmet Başsoy, “Kamu İhale Kanunu”, Dünya Gazetesi, (Çevrimiçi) http://www.dunyagazetesi.com.tr/news_display.asp? upsale_id=111420 21.01.2003; Uz, a.g.e., s.130. ↑
- Leyla Boulton, “Delay Castas Doubt on Ankara’s Reformist Zeal”, Financal Times, (Çevrimiçi) http://search.ft.com/ ftArticle?queryText=%E2%80%9CDelay+Castas+Doubt+on+Ankara%E2%80%99s+Reformist+Zeal%E2%80%9D&y=8&aje =true&x=12&id=030103000574, 03.01.2003. ↑
- World Bank Report – Turkey Draft County Procurement Assesment Report, Volume I, 6 March 2001. ↑
- Uz, a.g.e., s.131, Hastürk, a.g.y. ↑
- For criticism of the bills see: Şevket Çorbacıoğlu, “Beşinci (12.11.2001) Kamu İhale Kanunu Tasarısı’nın Değerlendirilmesi”, Türkiye Mühendislik Haberleri, Y.46, S.414, 2001/4 s.27-29; Uz, a.g.e., s.131. ↑
- Hastürk, a.g.y.; Uz, a.g.e., s.131,132, ↑
- Uz, a.g.e., s.134. ↑
- Uz, a.g.e., s.132. ↑
- With regard also to the “offence of rigging purchases, sales and works carried out on the account of the State”, regulated in Art. 205 among the “offences against the administration of the State” in TCK No. 765, it is stated that this offence, like the other offences committed against the administration of the State, is a type of offence whose history does not go back very far. On this point see: Murat Balcı, Devlet Hesabına Yapılan Alım, Satım ve Yapıma Fesat Karıştırma Suçu (TCK m.205), Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi (Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü), İstanbul, 2004, s.24. ↑
- This article consists of the address which Edwin Sutherland delivered, in his capacity as the 29th president of the American Sociological Society, at the society’s annual meeting held in Philadelphia in December 1939. ↑
- Selman Dursun, Ekonomik Suçlar ve Bankacılık Suçları Bağlamında Bankacılık Düzenine Karşı İşlenen Suçlar, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2006, s.27. ↑
- Edwin H. Sutherland, “White Collar Criminality”, American Sociology Review, V.5, 1940, s.1-12; Edwin H. Sutherland/Donald R. Cressey, Principles of Criminology, Fiftih Edition, Chicago, Philadelphia, New York, J.B. Lippincott, 1955, s.40; Edwin H. Sutherland, “Crime and Business”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Socal Science, CCXVII, 1941, s.122-118; Edwin H. Sutherland, “Is’White Collar Crime’ Crime”, The Sociology of Crime and Delinquency, Ed. Marwin E. Wolfgang/Leonard Savitz/Norman Johnston, New York - London, John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1962, s.20-27. ↑
- Timur Demirbaş, Kriminoloji, 2. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2005, s.254. ↑
- The version of the article adapted to present-day Turkish is as follows: “Whoever, by rigging the purchase, the price and quantity or the manufacture of any kind of goods which he is charged with purchasing, selling or making on the account of the State, commits malversation in any manner whatsoever shall, since he will be a thief, suffer the penalty specified in the preceding article.” For the original version and the simplified version of the article see: Ahmet Gökçen, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Ceza Kanunları ve Bu Kanunlardaki Ceza Müeyyideleri, İstanbul, Fazilet Neşriyat, 1989, s.26. ↑
- Gökcen, a.g.e., s.26. ↑
- Majno, Ceza Kanunu Şerhi: Türk ve İtalyan Ceza Kanunları, C.II, Ankara, Yargıtay Yayını, 1978, s.182,183. ↑
- Sahir Erman, Kamu Güvenine Karşı İşlenen Suçlar (TCK 316-368), İstanbul, Dünya Yayıncılık, 1996, s.692. ↑
- İzzet Özgenç, Ekonomik Çıkar Amacıyla İşlenen Suçlar, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2002, s.236. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.237. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.245,246. ↑
- Sahir Erman, Kamu İdaresine Karşı İşlenen Suçlar (TCK 202-281), İstanbul, Dünya Yayıncılık, 1992, s.65; Ayhan Önder, Türk Ceza Hukuku Özel Hükümler, İstanbul, Filiz Kitabevi, 1994, s.135. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.251. ↑
- Behiye Eker Kazancı, İhaleye Fesat Karıştırma ve Edimin İfasına Fesat Karıştırma Suçları, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2007, s.109,110. ↑
- Eker Kazancı, a.g.e., s.20. ↑
- Önder Öztürel, 5237 Sayılı TCK’daki Ekonomi, Sanayi ve Ticarete İlişkin Suçlar, Kazancı Hukuk İşletme ve Maliye Bilimleri Dergisi, S.5, Ocak 2005, s.132; Eker Kazancı, a.g.e., s.28. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.252, dn.46; . Eker Kazancı, a.g.e., s.28. ↑
- Eker Kazancı, a.g.e., s.29. ↑
- Necati Meran, Yeni Türk Ceza Kanununda Sahtecilik Malvarlığı Bilişim Suçları ile Ekonomi ve Ticaret Alanında Suçlar, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2005, s.310. ↑
- Erman, Kamu İdaresine Karşı İşlenen Suçlar, s.55; Balcı, a.g.e., s.30. ↑
- Önder, a.g.e., s.132. ↑
- Eker Kazancı, a.g.e., s.114. ↑
- Nevzat Saygılıoğlu/Selçuk Arı, Etkin Devlet: Kurumsal Bir Tasarı ve Politika Önerisi, İstanbul, Sabancı Üniversitesi Yayını, 2002, s.10. ↑
- Eker Kazancı, a.g.e., s.114,115. ↑
- Meran, a.g.e., s.310. ↑
- Erman, Kamu İdaresine Karşı İşlenen Suçlar, s.56; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.242. ↑
- Özgenç, a.g.e., s.255. ↑
- Meran, a.g.e., s.310. ↑
- Meran, a.g.e., s.312. ↑
- Meran, a.g.e., s.315. ↑
- Eker Kazancı, a.g.e., s.190; for the opposing view see: Meran, a.g.e., s.315. ↑
- For the opposing view see: Meran, a.g.e., s.315. ↑
- Meran, a.g.e., s.310. ↑
- Eker Kazancı, a.g.e., s.114. ↑
- Eker Kazancı, a.g.e., s.218. ↑
- Meran, a.g.e., s.323. ↑
- Eker Kazancı, a.g.e., s.230; for the opposing view see: Meran, a.g.e., s.323. ↑
- Eker Kazancı, a.g.e., s.232.233. ↑
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