2014Murat Volkan DülgerArticle

Abstract

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

An important stage in the development of the theory of crime is the separation of unlawfulness from culpability. This is directly linked to wrongdoing and guilt. This link also forms an organic connection with the grounds of justification and the circumstances affecting culpability. Once this important distinction had been drawn, the grounds of excuse were defined among the circumstances affecting culpability. It was understood that grounds of excuse differ from the other circumstances affecting culpability.

These distinctions also provide an important starting point for comparing the Continental European legal system with the Anglo-Saxon legal system. Our article examines, from a comparative law perspective, the historical process by which these distinctions emerged, the reasons for them and their consequences. In this way, an attempt is also made to compare these two major legal systems and, in particular, German criminal law and Turkish criminal law.

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Peer-Reviewed Article

A COMPARATIVE ESSAY ON THE HISTORY, NATURE AND NECESSITY OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION AND GROUNDS OF EXCUSE

Asst. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER*

Abstract: The separation of unlawfulness from culpability constitutes an important stage in the development of the theory of the offence. It is directly connected with wrongdoing and culpability. This connection also forms an organic link with the grounds of justification and the circumstances affecting culpability. Once this important distinction had been drawn, the grounds of excuse were defined within the circumstances affecting culpability. It came to be understood that the grounds of excuse differ from the other circumstances affecting culpability. These distinctions also constitute an important point of departure for the comparison of the Continental European legal system with the Anglo-Saxon legal system. In our article, the historical process by which these distinctions emerged, the reasons for them and their consequences are addressed from the perspective of comparative law. In this way, an attempt has also been made to compare these two great legal systems and, in particular, German criminal law and Turkish criminal law.

Keywords: Grounds of Justification, Grounds of Excuse, Grounds Excluding Culpability, Grounds Affecting Culpability, Necessity, Comparative Law.

A COMPARATIVE ESSAY ON THE HISTORY, CHARACTERISTIC AND

NECESSITY OF THE SEPERATION BETWEEN JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE

Abstract: Separation of wrongdoing and culpability is an important milestone of development of crime theory. This is directly relevant with wrongfulness and culpa. This link also establishes an organic link between justification and the attractive reasons of culpability. After having made this major separation, excuse has been determined in the attractive reasons of culpability. It has been understood that excuse is different other attractive reasons of culpability. These separations are also an important starting point for the comparison of Continental Law System and Anglo Saxon Law System. The history, characteristic and necessity of these separations were examined within the perspective of comparative law in this essay. Thus, these two comprehensive law systems and particularly German and Turkish Criminal Law Systems were examined as an attempt for the comparison.

Keywords: Justification, Excuse, Wrongdoing, Wrongfulness, Culpability, Mens Rea, Necessity, Comparative Law.

INTRODUCTION

The distinction between grounds of justification and grounds of excuse was unknown until the beginning of the last century. A look at the criminal codes enacted and the legal works written in the 1800s shows that no such distinction, and no definitions relating to it, existed. In this context, for example, grounds of justification were accepted in earlier periods for situations such as self-defence, but they did not find general acceptance and were not the subject of normative regulation. Unlawfulness, culpability and the circumstances precluding punishment were dealt with together or within one another1. The first step towards separating the grounds of excuse from the other grounds leading to exemption from punishment was the explicit statement, first made in the 1880s by the German jurist Franz von Liszt, of the view that unlawfulness, as a structural element of the offence, is distinct from culpability and is an element forming the objective side of the offence in the general theory of the offence2.

Examples of codes in which this distinction was not drawn are the German Criminal Code of 1871, the Italian (Zanardelli) Criminal Code of 1889 and the former Turkish Criminal Code No. 765 (ETCK). In keeping with the level of development of the criminal law of the period, the grounds excluding unlawfulness, the grounds precluding punishment or, as in the ETCK No. 765, “capacity for punishment and the grounds excluding or mitigating it” were regulated together. Under this heading the ETCK No. 765 regulated together, without drawing any distinction, mistake of law (Art. 44), intent and negligence (Art. 45), the circumstances excluding or affecting imputability (Arts. 46, 47, 48, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58), unjust provocation (Art. 51) and mistake as to the person and deviation (Art. 52). For this reason the ETCK did not contain a regulation of unlawfulness in the sense in which we understand it today either. Article 49 of the ETCK regulated the grounds of justification of carrying out the order of a superior and self-defence, and even necessity was included, in paragraph 3 of Article 49. Indeed, since the ETCK did not include the grounds of justification of exercise of a right and consent of the person concerned, these were examined in criminal law textbooks under the heading “grounds of justification not contained in the criminal code”3. It was therefore entirely natural that the code in question did not contain a separate regulation of grounds of excuse either.

It can be seen that in the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (TCK), which entered into force in 2005, an attempt was made to incorporate the distinctions and rules on this subject that developed in Western European criminal law scholarship, but especially in Germany, and were reflected in that country’s criminal code, but

that it nevertheless did not prove possible to escape entirely from the influence of the former code and of the draft TCK of 2000, which was prepared on the basis of that code. As a result, the grounds of justification, the circumstances excluding and affecting culpability, and the grounds of excuse were regulated together, without distinction, under the heading “Grounds Excluding and Diminishing Criminal Liability”4. This method of regulation, however, has rightly been criticised in legal scholarship5, for the circumstances that remove unlawfulness do not lead to the removal of criminal liability but to the result that the act occurs lawfully, that is, that no offence comes into being. They must therefore be regulated separately from the circumstances affecting culpability and from the grounds of excuse6. Likewise, the circumstances affecting culpability and the grounds of excuse also differ from each other, and both their theoretical foundations and their legal consequences are different; for this reason, regulating them under different headings is the better method7.

These distinctions have also given rise, in the Continental European legal system and in the Anglo-Saxon legal system, to debates stemming from different points of view. Debates between these systems, too, are still continuing. It can be seen, however, that in the Continental European legal system, and particularly in German criminal law scholarship, these distinctions are drawn more clearly, in greater detail and more definitively. Indeed, in German criminal law scholarship it is argued that grounds of justification and grounds of excuse must be separated from each other sharply, just like unlawfulness and culpability, and it is even stated that German criminal law’s present understanding of the general theory of the offence has this as its foundation8. In complete contrast, no such distinction exists in the Anglo-Saxon system; all of these legal institutions are gathered under a single heading called “grounds of defence” (defences), and this is a good example of the holistic approach of that system9.

In our study we shall attempt to explain and assess the origin, nature and necessity of this distinction, taking into account the perspectives of different legal systems and the situation in our country. First, however, we think it will be useful to explain the grounds of excuse. By contrast, since the grounds of justification and the circumstances excluding or diminishing culpability are examined in detail in all textbooks on the general part of criminal law, we do not explain them separately here and confine ourselves to referring to those works.

Before turning to the explanations concerning the substance of our subject, we wish to make some remarks on the method we have followed in our article and on the difficulties we encountered from the standpoint of comparative law.

I. DIFFICULTIES AND EXPLANATIONS CONCERNING THE COMPARISON BETWEEN SYSTEMS WITH REGARD TO THE CONCEPTS OF GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION, CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CULPABILITY AND GROUNDS OF EXCUSE

We began our study with the aim of setting out the difference between grounds of justification and grounds of excuse. In order to reflect this from a different perspective and to give the study an original aspect, we tried to do so by way of a comparison between systems, comparing the Continental European legal system with the Anglo-Saxon legal system. We came to realise, however, that this choice, which we had initially made in order to achieve originality and distinctiveness, was an extremely instructive but equally arduous path. The sources of the difficulties here were the following:

The first point we must make is that there is a significant difference of terminology between the Continental European legal system and the Anglo-Saxon legal system. For example, although the concept of grounds of excuse is found in both legal systems, the grounds leading to exemption from punishment that are attached to it differ from one another. In the Anglo-Saxon legal system the term grounds of excuse (excuse) is used in such a way as to cover the circumstances excluding or diminishing culpability10. The difference in this respect is so marked that a situation accepted as a ground of justification in one system may be accepted as a ground of excuse in the other. Consequently, when one of the grounds of excuse is mentioned from the standpoint of Anglo-Saxon

law, it is frequently found that in Continental European law this is a circumstance affecting culpability (and not a ground of justification or a ground of excuse). Since Anglo-Saxon law has no detailed scheme of the elements of the offence in the sense in which we understand it, it is extremely difficult to compare the two systems on that basis and to reach meaningful results. For this reason, in order to be able to make a meaningful comparison and explanation, we first chose, and took as the basis of our study, the approach proposed by Prof. Dr. Albin Eser of comparing the systems by reference to their “methods of defence”11.

Another important problem is that, whereas in the Continental European legal system the circumstances affecting culpability and the grounds of excuse have been distinguished at least on the theoretical level, no such distinction exists in Anglo-Saxon law because of its holistic approach. Consequently, in comparing the two systems, although, as will be seen below, we make the grounds of excuse the principal object of examination, these two institutions have been referred to together as “grounds excluding or diminishing culpability/grounds of excuse” in order to bring out their difference from the grounds of justification. Since “circumstances excluding or diminishing culpability” is a long expression that has to be used frequently, we have used in its place the shorter expression “circumstances affecting culpability”. This should not, however, be understood to mean that we use these two different institutions in the same sense.

Another important difficulty is the comparison of the German theory of the offence with the Turkish theory of the offence. Although the great majority of the institutions in the theory of the offence adopted by the TCK No. 5237 were taken from the German theory of the offence and the German Criminal Code (StGB), a one-to-one comparison is rather difficult, either because they were not taken over as a whole with all their components or because – partly under the influence of the past – different meanings have been attributed to them. For example, necessity is regulated in the TCK without its legal nature being specified, whereas Article 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) states that it is a circumstance excluding culpability. In other words, neither the TCK nor the CMK speaks of necessity as being either a ground of justification or a ground of excuse. In the German theory of the offence and in the StGB, by contrast, necessity is regulated both as a ground of justification and as a ground of excuse, separately in §34 and §35 of the code and on the basis of different legal characterisations, situations and conditions.

The list of these and similar differences and difficulties could be extended; for this reason we have tried to use the concepts scrupulously. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that, in reading our explanations below, the difficulties we have noted above should not be lost sight of.

II. DEFINITION AND LEGAL NATURE OF THE GROUNDS OF EXCUSE

There are two important debates concerning the definition and legal nature of the grounds of excuse. The first debate is whether, apart from the circumstances excluding or diminishing culpability, grounds of excuse also exist. The second debate is, if the existence of grounds of excuse is accepted, what the legal basis is for not imposing a penalty on the perpetrator where any one of them materialises in the specific case – in other words, what the legal nature of the grounds of excuse is. The answers to be given to these debates will reveal the definition and legal nature of the grounds of excuse12.

The distinction between unlawfulness and culpability is connected with the distinction between wrongdoing and culpability. Today it is accepted that culpability and wrongdoing are not the same thing, and that by finding that the act conforms to the statutory definition of the offence and is unlawful, only the wrongfulness of the act is determined. In short, wrongdoing is the contravention by the act of the norms of conduct (prohibitions and commands) that exist in the legal order and give rise to the offence type (objective imputation). This finding, however, is not sufficient to punish the perpetrator. For the wrongdoing to be attributed personally to the perpetrator, the perpetrator’s culpability must also be present in addition (subjective imputation)13. Accordingly, unlawfulness is a characteristic of the act conforming to the statutory definition, namely that the commands and prohibitions of criminal law are contravened; wrongdoing, by contrast, denotes the act conforming to the statutory definition and unlawful in itself, the object of the assessment of unlawfulness together with its value content14. In the assessment of culpability it is no longer the expectations valid for society in general that are taken into account but what the perpetrator was personally capable of doing; culpability is thus considered as one of the conditions of subjective imputation in determining whether or not a penalty is to be imposed on the perpetrator. In this context there is also a relationship of dependence between culpability and wrongdoing. Since, under the principle of culpability, culpability is the condition of punishment, for the perpetrator to be regarded as culpable he must, before acting, know – or at least be in a position to know – that the conduct is prohibited. This constitutes awareness of wrongdoing. In this respect, awareness of wrongdoing must exist before the offence15. It is thus apparent that unlawfulness and culpability differ from each other. Unlawfulness is part of wrongdoing and is assessed before culpability. In short, unlawfulness and culpability are different concepts. Unlawfulness is a contradiction, a disharmony, between the act and the legal order. Culpability, by contrast, denotes the judgment that the person who carried out the act constituting wrongdoing can be blamed for the act committed16.

Not every human conduct that at first sight appears to violate criminal norms is punished. For sometimes, although the act carried out by the perpetrator appears wrongful and culpable, there is a ground that brings it into conformity with the legal order, and unlawfulness, and hence wrongdoing, is removed. In some situations wrongdoing remains while it is not possible to attribute culpability to the perpetrator, or the perpetrator’s culpability is affected in a way that leads to a reduction of the penalty. In yet other situations both wrongdoing and culpability remain in respect of the specific act, but the content of wrongdoing diminishes and the perpetrator’s culpability is affected, so that wrongdoing and culpability do not reach a level sufficient for a penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator. The first of these concerns the grounds of justification, the second the circumstances excluding or diminishing culpability, and the third the grounds of excuse.

Where the offence is committed in reliance on self-defence, the exercise of a right, the carrying out of a statutory provision or the consent of the person concerned, there is a ground of justification, and no penalty is imposed on the perpetrator because the perpetrator’s act is lawful from the outset, in other words is not wrongful. On the other hand, where the offence is committed under mental illness, transitory causes, force-violence-threat (Art. 28 TCK), unavoidable mistake (Art. 30 TCK) or unjust provocation (Art. 29 TCK), no penalty is imposed on the perpetrator or (as in the example of unjust provocation) the penalty is reduced. This is because in the situations mentioned the perpetrator either has no culpability or his culpability has been substantially affected. Apart from these cases, there are also certain situations in which the perpetrator’s culpability is not removed entirely and yet no penalty is imposed on the perpetrator. These are called grounds of excuse, and the reason why no penalty is imposed on the perpetrator where they exist is, in essence, that the perpetrator cannot be expected, in the situation in which he is placed, to act in conformity with the rules of law (Unzumutbarkeit normgemäβen Verhaltens). In that case the perpetrator who has committed the wrongdoing conforming to the statutory definition is regarded as “excused”. Thus, in the case of grounds of justification the perpetrator’s act does not constitute wrongdoing, that is, an offence; in the case of circumstances excluding or diminishing culpability the perpetrator “cannot be blamed”; and where a ground of excuse exists the perpetrator is regarded as “excused”. In this case, although the perpetrator’s act is wrongful and blameworthy (culpable), the content of its wrongdoing and its blameworthiness (culpability) do not reach a level sufficient for punishment (not deserving of punishment). Necessity (Art. 25(2) TCK), the carrying out of an unlawful but binding order (Art. 24(2)-(3)-(4) TCK) and the exceeding of the limits of self-defence owing to excitement, fear or agitation that may be regarded as excusable (Art. 27(2) TCK) constitute the grounds of excuse17.

Although they have not yet found general acceptance in Turkish criminal law scholarship and there is no explicit provision on them in the TCK, the grounds of excuse differ from the grounds excluding or diminishing culpability, for there is an important difference between the two: in the grounds of excuse the diminution of culpability is, in dependence on the diminution of wrongdoing, connected to a significant extent with the effect of the reason that moved the perpetrator to act; that is, in the grounds of excuse what leads to the diminution of culpability is the impulse that moved the perpetrator to act. This at the same time diminishes the content of wrongdoing in the perpetrator’s act. In addition to the diminution in the content of wrongdoing, there is also a diminution in the content of culpability of the act, because the perpetrator carries out the act under the pressure of the extraordinary and exceptional psychological state in which he is placed. For the perpetrator’s culpability to be regarded as diminished, it is not necessary that culpability be removed entirely; if culpability has diminished substantially, there is no need for the act to be punished even though it is culpable18.

The fundamental idea underlying the grounds of excuse is that the perpetrator cannot be expected, in the situation in which he is placed, to act in conformity with the rules of law (Unzumutbarkeit normgemäβen Verhaltens)19. However, although the principle that the perpetrator cannot be expected, in the situation in which he is placed, to act in conformity with the rules of law forms the basis for the recognition of grounds of excuse, this principle is not sufficient on its own to explain the criteria for, and the recognition of, grounds of excuse. Rather, this principle occupies a position that supports the recognition of grounds of excuse and remains in the background20. Indeed, this principle does not yet have an objective content. It is therefore accepted that the existence of this principle alone is not sufficient to ensure that the perpetrator goes unpunished and that it is not a general regulative principle ensuring that no penalty is imposed on the perpetrator. For to accept the contrary could impair legal certainty by creating grounds of excuse whose limits and conditions are indeterminate. As can be seen, this principle, which has no objective content, is not sufficient on its own to form the basis of the grounds of excuse. For different views may attribute various meanings to this principle. For this reason, legal scholarship has put forward assessments that support this principle and are aimed at placing it on an objective footing21.

In this context we must state that the legal nature of the grounds of excuse is best explained by the view which holds that the person must be excused as a result of the diminution of the content of wrongdoing and of the content of culpability of the act22. The content of wrongdoing of the act is diminished because the perpetrator acts in order to achieve the aims of defending against an attack, protecting against a danger, or complying with the obligation to obey an order that has been

given. In such situations the perpetrator’s act on the one hand violates certain values and on the other hand seeks to protect certain values. In that case the content of wrongdoing in the perpetrator’s act diminishes the closer it comes to the level of lawfulness. For the content of wrongdoing to diminish and the ground of excuse to arise, it is not necessary that the act achieve the intended result – for example, in the case of necessity, that protection from the danger actually be achieved; what matters is that the act was directed at a legitimate aim of this kind and that the content of wrongdoing of the act is diminished. In addition to the diminution in the content of wrongdoing, there is also a diminution in the content of culpability of the act, because the perpetrator carries out the act under the pressure of the extraordinary and exceptional psychological state in which he is placed. For example, where the limits of self-defence are exceeded (Art. 27(2) TCK), since the state of mind that is brought about by the perpetrator’s feeling of being under threat in the face of an attack directed at himself or at another person, and that is dominated by excitement, fear or agitation, prevents the formation of a will in conformity with the law, the perpetrator’s culpability does not reach even the lowest threshold of the need for punishment. In the case of necessity constituting a ground of excuse, the perpetrator and a person close to him are in such danger that, even if the legal order prohibits the perpetrator’s acts of escaping or rescuing and attaches no exceptional legal consequence to these acts, the perpetrator nevertheless carries them out under the pressure and compulsion of the psychological state in which he is placed. Consequently, in such situations the content of culpability of the perpetrator’s act diminishes. The diminution in the content of culpability, which alongside the diminution in the content of wrongdoing of the act is the other factor leading to the recognition of grounds of excuse, need not be of such a degree as to remove culpability entirely, as is the case with the grounds excluding culpability. However, since in situations where grounds of excuse are at issue, unlike the grounds excluding culpability, the content of wrongdoing of the act is also diminished, imposing a penalty on the perpetrator leads to inequitable results. For this reason the legal order excuses the perpetrator in these situations. Accordingly, there is no requirement that culpability be removed entirely; it is sufficient that culpability has fallen to a level at which the imposition of a penalty is no longer necessary23.

Where grounds of excuse exist, it is not only the perpetrator’s will that is affected; the wrongfulness of the act diminishes as well. Accordingly, the grounds of excuse form a concept separate from the circumstances excluding culpability. In the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) the concept of excuse appears only in Art. 27(2), in the provision “if the exceeding of the limits of self-defence resulted from excitement, fear or agitation that may be regarded as excusable, no penalty shall be imposed on the perpetrator”, through the use of the expression “that may be regarded as excusable”. Apart from this, the expression “ground of excuse” does not appear directly in the TCK24.

A provision concerning the legal nature of the grounds of excuse is also contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 (CMK). Article 223(3) of the CMK contains the following provision: “(3) In respect of the accused, where; a) minority, mental illness or deaf-muteness, or transitory causes, exist in connection with the offence charged,

b) the offence charged was committed by carrying out an unlawful but binding order, or under the influence of necessity or of force or threat, c) the limits of self-defence were exceeded owing to excitement, fear and agitation, d) a mistake excluding culpability was made, a decision that there is no ground for imposing a penalty shall be given on account of the absence of culpability.” By this provision, on the one hand, the nature and consequence of the grounds of excuse have been set out, in that it is expressly provided that, where the circumstances which we regard as grounds of excuse materialise, the decision to be given in respect of the perpetrator is not an acquittal but a decision that there is no ground for imposing a penalty25; and, on the other hand, it has been stated that necessity, on whose legal nature there is controversy, is, at least as far as Turkish law is concerned, a circumstance excluding culpability (in our view, a ground of excuse)26.

As we have stated above, although the grounds of excuse have not yet found general acceptance in Turkish criminal law scholarship, there are authors who expressly accept the grounds of excuse, as well as authors who accept/express this implicitly:

For example, Koca/Üzülmez, although they do not expressly speak of the existence of grounds of excuse in their work, state in the relevant chapters that presumed consent, the carrying out of an unlawful but binding order and necessity are each a ground of excuse affecting culpability27.

According to Özgenç, where a ground of excuse exists the act committed retains its character as wrongdoing. By contrast, the person who has committed the wrongdoing in question is not regarded as culpable on account of the existence of the state of necessity. Although the act carried out by the perpetrator constitutes wrongdoing in terms of its nature, the perpetrator is regarded as excused (as having an excuse) because the capacity of will in relation to this act has been removed or generally affected. In other words, the perpetrator is not blamed for this act. For culpability to be attributed to a person, it must be possible to expect that person to act in conformity with the norms of conduct. If the person cannot be expected to act in conformity with the norm, the person is not regarded as

culpable. For this reason the grounds of excuse are regarded as a different expression of the grounds affecting culpability. The difference between a ground of excuse and the other grounds excluding culpability is that, where a ground of excuse exists, culpability is not attributed to the perpetrator and, in addition, there is no question of any measure being applied to the perpetrator. By contrast, where the other grounds excluding culpability exist, a measure may be applied to the perpetrator even though culpability is not attributed to him28. In this context the author cites necessity, the carrying out of an unlawful but binding order, and the exceeding of the limits of self-defence owing to excitement, fear or agitation as examples of grounds of excuse29,30. Sözüer, too, accepts the existence of grounds of excuse. According to the author, where circumstances constituting a ground of excuse exist in a given case, the person possesses the capacity for culpability and awareness of wrongdoing. In cases where grounds of excuse are present, the situation is one in which a person possessing the capacity for culpability acts contrary to the norm on account of circumstances affecting that capacity31. Grounds of excuse are distinguished from the grounds excluding culpability in that they affect culpability in different ways. In these cases exemption from punishment is provided for because the person possessing the capacity for culpability and awareness of wrongdoing does not reach the threshold of deserving punishment32.

In conclusion, we must state that the grounds of excuse differ from the circumstances affecting culpability. For example, whereas a security measure may be applied to the person in the case of circumstances affecting culpability such as mental illness or minority, no security measure is applied in the case of necessity, which is a ground of excuse33. Accordingly, where grounds of excuse exist, there is no question of a measure being applied to the person either34,35.

III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CULPABILITY/GROUNDS OF EXCUSE

Having explained the legal nature of the grounds of excuse and which circumstances are to be regarded as grounds of excuse for the purposes of the TCK, we wish to turn to our main subject, the point of departure of the grounds of excuse and their difference from the grounds of justification, and to set out our explanations in that regard. In doing so, in order that the subject may be presented better and from a broad perspective, we also proceed from the ways in which the Continental European and Anglo-Saxon legal systems deal with the subject.

1. The Approaches of the Continental European and Anglo-Saxon Legal Systems to the Subject

Between the theories of the offence found in the Anglo-Saxon legal system and those found in the Continental European legal system, different methods leading to the same goal can be observed. This difference rests on the differences in the philosophical approaches underlying these legal systems, in their criminal policies and in the needs of these jurisdictions. Particularly in the way in which grounds of justification and circumstances affecting culpability/grounds of excuse are viewed, a significant similarity can be seen between the two systems, and this provides a basis for reaching agreement at the abstract level among jurists belonging to these different cultures36. According to many Anglo-Saxon jurists, however, this distinction is nothing more than an unnecessary “intellectual game”37. For this reason the distinction has no importance either in the field of practice or in the field of theory. This does not mean that the Anglo-Saxon legal system does not recognise the differences between defences such as self-defence or the lack of competence of the national authorities and defences such as the absence of culpability due to mental illness; but these are gathered under the heading of grounds of defence and are not subjected to any further distinctions, since in the end all of them, where they exist, lead to exemption from punishment.

From the standpoint of criminal law practice, it can be seen that in Anglo-Saxon law no dogmatic distinction with defined boundaries is drawn between justification and circumstances affecting culpability/grounds of excuse, as it is in Continental Europe. By contrast, in German criminal law scholarship and practice, and likewise in many other legal systems (in general, in the Continental European legal system and the countries following that system), the existence and definiteness of the distinction between justification and circumstances affecting culpability/grounds of excuse are beyond dispute38. For this distinction between justification and circumstances affecting culpability/grounds of excuse, together with the content and scope of the concept of the offence, helps in dividing the unlawfulness (wrongdoing / Rechtswidrigkeit) falling within that scope into the wrongdoing constituted by the act (wrongfulness / unrecht) or contrariety to statute (unlawfulness / Rechtswidrigkeit), and in determining, within the scope of culpability (culpability / Schuld), the perpetrator’s

accountability for the offence (blameworthiness / persönliche Vorwerfbarkeit)39.

2. Grounds of Excuse According to the Anglo-Saxon Legal System

Notwithstanding the point we made in the first sentence of the preceding paragraph, it can be seen that in Anglo-Saxon criminal law a distinction is drawn between grounds of justification (justification) and grounds of excuse (excuse) which, although not dogmatic, is based on the grounds of defence. According to this legal system, conduct constituting an offence in criminal law has the character of a violation of a prohibitory norm. For liability to be asserted on account of conduct amounting to a violation, no circumstances creating an exception, such as grounds of justification or excuse, must attach to the commands or prohibitions accepted as the criminal norm40. An act accepted as being justified is an act that is not unlawful. Where grounds of excuse exist, however, the situation is different; for even though grounds of excuse prevent criminal liability from arising, the conduct in question remains unlawful. Accordingly, where grounds of excuse exist the perpetrator’s act remains unlawful, but the perpetrator is excused for the act41. On this view, the precondition for an act to be punishable is that the act has the character of an offence. In addition, for punishment there must be no types of defence, such as grounds of justification and grounds of excuse, in respect of the act corresponding to the definitions of offences42. Where, although the person carried out the act, a ground of justification or of excuse exists in the specific case, it would not be right to convict that person of the offence in question. These two circumstances affecting criminal liability, which are regarded as types of defence, relate to the person’s being in the right and are therefore similar to each other43. Like grounds of justification, grounds of excuse are general defences that can be applied against all offences. Whereas grounds of justification take the person’s act as their focal point, grounds of excuse concentrate on whether the person can objectively be held responsible. In these cases criminal liability arises as a result of the person’s choosing to perform the act constituting the offence. But where a ground of excuse exists, the person bears no liability even if the act performed is unlawful44. For certain characteristics of that person, or the situation in which he is placed, remove his responsibility for the offence in question45.

An important point that should be noted here, since the occasion has arisen, is that, although in the Anglo-Saxon legal system culpability is an important ground of defence relating to the mental element, there is no distinction between the circumstances affecting culpability and the grounds that we call grounds of excuse. In this legal system the grounds falling outside the grounds of justification (and in this system necessity is accepted as a typical example of the grounds of justification46) are examined under the heading of grounds of excuse (excuse). It can thus be seen that there is no uniformity between the two legal systems on this point either, and that different functions are attributed to the same concepts. On the other hand, in the Continental European legal system, and even in the national scholarship of the countries belonging to that system, different functions are attributed to the same concepts, as we illustrated in the introductory part, and different legal topics are examined under them.

Some of the grounds of excuse found in American criminal law in particular are mental illness, force or threat, minority and alcohol taken involuntarily. Although the person has engaged in conduct involving social harm, he is excused for this conduct of a criminal nature. For example, since, as a result of mental illness or of alcohol taken involuntarily, the person lacks the capacity to understand the nature of the act carried out or to direct his conduct in accordance with the requirements of the law, the person is excused, despite having committed an offence, on account of the existence of grounds of excuse. In addition to minority, force and the other grounds of excuse, general excuses based on the person’s mistake are also accepted in legal scholarship47. For example, a ground of excuse based on mistake may be accepted in situations in which the person could not be expected to know, such as where the person reasonably believed that the authorities had conveyed the law incorrectly or where the relevant information contained in the law was not reasonably accessible. These additional grounds of excuse do not appear only in doctrinal debates; they are also accepted by some judicial bodies48. It is stated, however, that the judicial bodies are not in complete agreement as to whether a particular defence is a ground of justification or a ground of excuse49 and that they treat grounds of justification and grounds of excuse in the same way50.

In the Model Penal Code, too, which was prepared with the aim of creating uniform criminal legislation in the United States of America, it can be seen that no clear distinction is drawn between grounds of justification and grounds of excuse. It is argued that, even if this distinction were drawn, the ever-increasing confusion in the legal system would outweigh the benefits to be gained from drawing the distinctions51.

In American law there is a strong view that opposes the drawing of a distinction of this kind. According to its proponents, the distinction between grounds of justification and grounds of excuse is found in the old common law and today continues to exist only in theory52.

By contrast, those who defend the necessity of drawing the distinction between grounds of justification and grounds of excuse have put forward certain theoretical and pragmatic reasons for it. One of these is the sending of clear moral messages. On this view, criminal law is a moral compass that helps people to decide which path they should choose among many, and people should always choose the paths on which they will be found justified, not what is wrong but excusable. For example, if a person who has been attacked is thinking of attacking the assailant, the law should at that point tell that person that carrying out the conduct in question may result in his being excused or being found justified. The law should indicate clearly to individuals the paths they may choose, and the system should thus act as a guide for the individual. If the distinction between grounds of justification and grounds of excuse is disregarded, conduct that ought not to be engaged in but is excused is characterised as if it were justified conduct, and a moral error is thereby committed53. Determining the distinction between grounds of justification and grounds of excuse enables legislators to define the defences relating to criminal proceedings in a coherent manner. Some elements of the offence can be explained in terms relating to grounds of justification, whereas others can be explained on the basis of grounds of excuse. When an offence is explained by inconsistent principles, however, problems arise in the application of the law. For this reason, another rationale for distinguishing between the two is that this distinction helps to ensure theoretical consistency in criminal law54.

Another reason for drawing a distinction between grounds of justification and grounds of excuse concerns the liability of accomplices (participation in the offence). To explain by way of an example: a person goes to a friend and obtains a weapon from the friend in order to carry out an act constituting an offence. Where this person carries out the act, if he is found justified in committing it – for example, if the weapon is used in a situation of self-defence – then, since this act does not constitute an offence, the participation in the act of the friend who supplied the weapon is not unlawful either, and the friend is acquitted at the end of the trial. On the other hand, on the assumption that the person had no justifying reason for committing such an offence but is not punished on account of mental illness, the one who supplied the weapon is held liable for that act. Thus, in the offence of intentional killing in question, while the person who carried out the act may escape criminal liability on account of his mental disorder, the liability of the person who participated in the offence by supplying the weapon continues. In this context, in the case of Taylor v. Commonwealth the court held that, because grounds of excuse relate to circumstances particular to the person himself, they cannot be applied to other persons and that, consequently, where grounds of excuse exist they are not valid in respect of accomplices55.

Another rationale for the distinction is formed by the acts of third parties. These views are close to the approach concerning the liability of accomplices. If a person carries out an act in order to protect his own rights, another person should also be able to perform the same act in order to protect that person and should be found justified. In the case of grounds of excuse, only the person who is excused on account of the act benefits from them. In some cases, however, this generalisation does not operate so directly and easily. For example, if a person, acting in self-defence against someone who has made an unjust attack on him, kills the attacker, that person is found justified. Indeed, a third party who performs the same act in order to rescue that person is also regarded as justified. If, however, the person is excused in respect of this act on account of being mentally ill, the third party’s liability continues unless he has another ground of excuse56.

A further point we wish to note here is the place of necessity in Anglo-Saxon law. In American criminal law the legal nature of necessity is generally accepted to be that of a ground of justification. It is even stated that necessity is the most typical example of the grounds of justification in American criminal law. Since necessity can be invoked only when a person is hard pressed in emergency situations, in the absence of necessity a person has no right to weigh harms against benefits and violate the laws57. For this reason, too, the defence relating to necessity is called choice of evils, the choice of the lesser evil, or the general ground of justification. Among the grounds of justification, necessity is regarded as the form of defence that best displays the structure of grounds of justification58. Court decisions on necessity take the place of legislation. It may be said that necessity as a ground of justification found its place in the 21st century and has given direction to the logic of the necessity defence. In this case necessity, like self-defence, rests on superior personal rights and involves collective interests in the reduction of harm59. In American criminal law, however, there is no complete clarity as to whether necessity is in fact a ground of justification or a ground of excuse, or whether it bears the characteristics of both60.

3. Comparison of the Approaches of the Anglo-Saxon Legal System and the Continental European Legal System

In criminal law, for an act conforming to the statutory definition to be made subject to a sanction, the act must at the same time be unlawful. The legal order, however, does not consist solely of “prohibitory norms”; it also contains “permissive norms” which, under certain conditions, render lawful what a particular prohibition forbids. Where these situations, which are called grounds of justification, arise, one can no longer speak of the unlawfulness of the act and hence of “wrongdoing”61. In the case of circumstances affecting culpability, by contrast, although the perpetrator acts unlawfully, it does not appear just to blame him; for criminal law does not expect anyone to engage in superhuman conduct. Although the legal consequences (exemption from punishment) of grounds of justification and of circumstances affecting culpability are the same, these two institutions carry different meanings. Whereas a justified act is approved by the legal order, an act committed within the scope of circumstances affecting culpability is merely “excused” by the legal order62. This distinction also shows itself when grounds of justification and grounds of excuse are approached from the moral point of view. Grounds of justification are a legal practice possessing moral value, for where acts that would normally constitute an offence are carried out under certain conditions permitted by statute, the act is perceived not as bad but as good. By contrast, where a ground of excuse exists, the act retains its badness from the social point of view even if it was carried out under the same conditions, for grounds of excuse are built on understanding and on excusing, and they do not amount to a justification from the moral point of view either63.

The most important consequence of this distinction is that, whereas no sanction whatsoever is applied to a perpetrator who has carried out the act within the grounds of justification, the sanction of a security measure may be applied where the same act has been committed within the scope of circumstances affecting culpability. As regards self-defence, the consequence of the distinction is that, since the fact that the person carrying out the attack lacks the capacity for culpability for a reason such as mental illness or minority is immaterial to the wrongful character of the act, self-defence against such an act is possible; whereas, since an act committed under a ground of justification cannot be regarded as an unjust attack, self-defence against it is not possible64. For the purposes of criminal law, culpability denotes the blameworthiness of the perpetrator. In this context culpability expresses the judgment of personal blameworthiness concerning the perpetrator’s act, separately from the fact that the act constituting the offence is a wrongdoing based on intent or negligence or is found to be unlawful65.

Accordingly, grounds of justification and circumstances affecting culpability, and hence grounds of excuse, are concepts that differ from one another66.

The ability to analyse the distinction between grounds of justification and circumstances affecting culpability within the framework of the general theory of the offence is extremely important for learning the structure of the offence fully and, in particular, with regard to the applicability of penalties and security measures, which are the types of sanction, and to the fact that the perpetrator, while not being held liable under criminal law, may be held liable under the law of obligations (tort/compensation). This analysis is also important for the comparisons to be made between Anglo-Saxon law and Continental European law. If, without investigating what lies at the foundation of the offence, a comparison is made that is limited merely to intent, negligence, harm, strict liability, the cases of mistake (mistakes of fact and law), attempt and the forms of participation in the offence (complicity), where mutual similarities exist, the results reached cannot be a real and sound comparison. In that case the results that emerge when different criminal law systems are compared will be accidental rather than substantive. Indeed, even within the national scholarship of individual countries there are differences in defining the structural elements of the offence and the concept of the offence and in explaining them with their distinctions67. Nevertheless, if an attempt is made to compare only the basic structures of the various criminal law systems, the concepts of the offence that emerge will, when compared with one another in terms of their characteristics, yield different results, and this will diminish the hope of finding any common denominator68.

This is true in particular in connection with the concept of the offence in the Anglo-Saxon criminal law system, for in this legal system the classical structures relating to the elements of the offence as we know them are not to be found. In the Anglo-Saxon criminal law system there is a result-oriented (utilitarian) approach of “holism”. Since there is no hierarchical ordering between “actus reus” and “mens rea” (the material element and the mental element of the offence), a defence directed at either of the two to the effect that the elements are absent has the same degree of effect. By contrast, in our criminal law system, in terms of the general theory of the offence, a particular sequence is followed in structuring the assessment of the accused’s punishability, and assessments are made by means of different levels and a hierarchical method69.

When the approaches of the two different legal systems to the subject are compared, it can be seen that Anglo-Saxon criminal law is concerned only with the outcome – in other words, with whether all the elements of punishability are present. In German criminal law and other similar criminal law systems, by contrast, without it mattering whether all the elements of punishability have been fulfilled in a given case, in other words without a holistic approach being taken, the elements of the offence are examined one by one, it is investigated whether the act can be based on grounds excluding culpability or on grounds of justification, or whether it can be deprived of punishability because of a deficiency in the structural elements of the offence, and the defence is built on this.

As regards the comparison of these legal systems, Albin Eser states that a different method must be followed. The author states that these two different theories of the offence can be explained by means of the example of a house, and that here both the foundation forming the main structure of the house and the external appearance of the house differ. Accordingly:

In Continental Europe the concept of the offence is constructed like a multi-storey house. For punishability to be established, one has to pass through each storey one by one and reach the top storey. In this model there is an exit from each storey for escaping liability, according to the various types of defence. The lower the level of the storey at which the exit takes place, the less the accused’s connection with the offence, which at the same time gives rise to a weaker social effect and social stigmatisation than in the case of an accused who exits from higher storeys. For in this system each added stage of the offence has a content that is prior as regards the conditions70. On the other hand, in Anglo-Saxon law the concept of the offence gives the appearance of a single-storey house with two entrances in the form of the “material element” and the “mental element” and with many exits of equal standing in the form of defences. As a result, for exemption from punishment it makes no difference whether the entrance is fitted with iron bars or the exit is open. Even the provisions sought to be introduced by the Model Penal Code, which was prepared so that there might be a uniform criminal code at the federal level in the United States of America and hence for the structuring of criminal law, do not essentially change this “single-storey” structure; they merely increase the sensitivity towards the places designated as entrance and exit71.

The comparison of these buildings, which differ fundamentally in appearance, points to the existence of a real dilemma. If, in attempting to compare matters of criminal law, no attention is paid to what underlies and forms the foundation of the concept of the offence, a superficial inference will be drawn and there will thus be no proper comparison that really carries any meaning. But when, in the course of the comparison, one goes deeper and brings out what underlies and forms the foundation of the concept of the offence, the fact that the existing structures of the concept of the offence differ from one another in appearance will make this comparison difficult72.

According to Albin Eser, what needs to be done is, in examining the structural features of the buildings in question, to analyse the buildings from their rear façades instead of their front façades. In that case it is not necessary, at the first step of the comparison, to inquire into the “positive” elements of punishability. It will be more useful to analyse the methods of defence (as in the Anglo-Saxon legal system) instead of the positive elements. In this context the comparison will result in a positive or negative judgment as to the punishability of the act. In any criminal law system there may be situations in which, although the elements contained in the statutory definition are fulfilled, an act does not constitute an offence or the perpetrator is not punished. Although the types of defence that bring this about appear similar, on closer examination it can be seen that the considerations causing them to be excluded from constituting an offence or from being punished differ. For example, where the situations of self-defence and mental illness are compared: in a homicide based on self-defence, since the person is protecting a personal right and an interest protected by statute, it is not possible to regard the act of killing that has occurred as “contrary to law (and hence to statute)”. In the case of mental illness, by contrast, the person will go unpunished solely because he is mentally ill; although the mentally ill person cannot be held responsible for the act, it is not possible in this case to claim that he was exercising a right or safeguarding a legal (statutory) interest, and the act therefore retains its unlawfulness and its content of wrongdoing. Even if, in defining these different situations, one refrains from making an assessment within the framework of “grounds of justification” and “circumstances affecting culpability”, there is no doubt whatsoever about the differing rationales of the defences of self-defence and mental illness and about their differing effects leading to exemption from punishment. Indeed, whereas in the former the act becomes lawful in its entirety, in the latter, although the perpetrator will not be punished, it cannot be said that the act accords with the interest which the law seeks to protect, that is, that it is lawful73.

Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish between defences that have different rationales and effects, some having a lesser and some a more comprehensive effect as regards escaping criminal liability. In this way one speaks of different stages of formation in the process of development of the offence. On the one hand (as in self-defence), even though the performance of the act is not expected, this act is capable of being recognised by law. On the other hand (as in mental illness), the acts performed

are of a kind of which the public does not approve and which it condemns. It is thus possible, by looking at the various theories of the offence from their different façades, to look at the “rear façade” containing the rationales and characters of the defences. It then emerges that the defences have different effects as regards removing punishability. In this way the door is opened to a more fruitful comparison of the buildings representing the offence. With the acceptance that the types of defence produce different results in terms of their rationales and effects, it becomes possible to examine similar distinctions and assessments in other criminal law systems. If there are similarities of content on these points, the consequences that the concept of the offence will produce can also be examined. On the one hand the defences may be assessed differently, but on the other hand this has certain consequences affecting the structure of the offence. For example, if the defence is built on the basis of “grounds of justification”, what is at issue is a “wrongdoing” that is negated by “grounds of justification”; if, on the other hand, the defence is tied merely to a personal “ground affecting culpability”, what is at issue is the existence of a kind of “culpability” that can be negated by “grounds affecting culpability”74.

When it is considered that “grounds of justification” and “circumstances affecting culpability” are different concepts for the purposes of assessing the offence, it can be seen that this distinction is in fact an important matter for understanding and comparing different theories of the offence. It is the fundamental point to be used, first, for distinguishing the defences according to their rationales and the ways in which they eliminate criminal liability, and then for understanding and explaining the structure of the offence75.

The grounds excluding and affecting culpability in this distinction constitute the first step towards the grounds of excuse. As we have stated above, since the matters that we define as grounds excluding or diminishing culpability are accepted as grounds of excuse in Anglo-Saxon law, the concepts have been used specifically in accordance with the Continental European legal system in order to avoid conceptual confusion. As an interim conclusion we can say that in both of these different legal systems grounds of justification and grounds excluding or diminishing culpability (and hence grounds of excuse) have been separated from one another.

As for the situation in our country, it is as follows: as we have stated above, since grounds of justification remove the element of unlawfulness of the act, one cannot speak of the existence of an offence. For this reason, although grounds of justification ought not to be confused with grounds excluding criminal liability, the heading of the second chapter of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK), in which the grounds of justification are contained, is “Grounds Excluding or Diminishing Criminal Liability”. This chapter consists of eleven articles, namely: the provision of a statute and the order of a superior (Art. 24), self-defence and necessity (Art. 25), exercise of a right and consent of the person concerned (Art. 26), exceeding of the limits (Art. 27), force and violence, intimidation and threat (Art. 28), unjust provocation (Art. 29), mistake (Art. 30), minority (Art. 31), mental illness (Art. 32), deaf-muteness (Art. 33) and transitory causes and being under the influence of alcohol or narcotic substances (Art. 34)76.

This arrangement of Arts. 24-34 TCK shows that, from the dogmatic point of view, grounds of justification and circumstances affecting culpability, whose legal natures differ from one another, have been gathered under the same heading as “Grounds Excluding or Diminishing Criminal Liability”77. This situation has been made the subject of criticism particularly with the TCK No. 5237, which entered into force in 2005. We must state, however, that there is very little debate concerning grounds of excuse. It can thus be seen that, compared with the debates conducted in German law and in Anglo-Saxon law, the debates conducted in this field in our country are still at a very basic level and that, although these views are voiced by many authors in legal scholarship, it has not been possible to carry them over into legislation.

IV. THE REASONS FOR DRAWING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION AND GROUNDS OF EXCUSE

From the standpoint of Anglo-Saxon law, the pair “grounds of justification” and “grounds of excuse” is one of the alternatives relating to the types of defence which exist in that system and function almost like elements of the offence, and these may be multiplied. These two, however, have particular features compared with the other types of defence. Although the other types of defence have neither a justifying nor an excusing function for the perpetrator, they are able to remove criminal liability by virtue of the choices of criminal policy78. In German law and in the other legal systems that follow the same system, grounds of justification and grounds of excuse are the basic types of defence for a person faced with a charge and, in terms of the structure of the offence, also constitute important reasons for not imposing a penalty on the perpetrator. Yet there must be reasons for subjecting to a distinction these two institutions, which ultimately lead to similar results. Those reasons are as follows79:

1. Doing Justice in the Best Possible Way

The first reason for distinguishing between grounds of justification and grounds of excuse is that justice be done in the best possible way both for the accused who is alleged to have violated the criminal norm and for the person who complies with the norms80.

Where an accused charged with intentional killing is acquitted on the ground of self-defence, justice is seen to be done in the form of a judicial finding that the accused is “not guilty”. But how fair, in the ideal sense, is this outcome when it is compared with the position of an accused who goes unpunished solely because of mental illness or a mistake of law? Of course this – that is, the accused being found “not guilty” – will be the main outcome, and the reason for being found not guilty makes no difference in the perception of the average accused or the average citizen. As long as differentiated responses to the different types of defence have not developed, a person is not affected by the consequences that the absence of differences in this respect entails either. Yet, according to our own “natural sense of justice”, it must be accepted that the case in which an act is entirely lawful and the case in which the perpetrator is not punished for want of capacity for culpability, the wrongfulness of the act remaining untouched, give rise to different moral consequences and ought to be placed in different categories within the law. Admittedly, as long as the only alternatives in the decision given at the end of the trial are “guilty” and “not guilty”, the difference between a “ground of justification” and “grounds of excuse” cannot be stated explicitly in the formal verdict. But if this is true, the moral reaction attaching to punishing and not punishing, and the social stigma associated with it, are affected not only by the outcome given as the verdict but also by the relevant facts and legal assessments, that is, by the reasoning of the court. In that case it does matter on what ground the perpetrator is not punished81.

Proceeding from this, it can be seen that a different structure has been adopted in Turkish criminal law. In paragraph 2 of Article 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271, which entered into force on 1 June 2005, among the cases in which a decision of acquittal is to be given,

sub-paragraph (d) lists the case where “although the offence charged was committed by the accused, a ground of justification is present in the case”. Paragraph 3 of the same article provides that, where circumstances excluding culpability are present, “a decision that there is no ground for imposing a penalty” is to be given. In this sense, therefore, a normative distinction has been made in our law. The decision so given thus performs an important function, through its reasoning and through the decision itself, as regards the doing of justice. In the context of the reason of doing justice, under the arrangement introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK), although the practical consequence for the perpetrator is that no penalty is imposed, a difference has been made both as regards the reasoning for this and its appearance in the eyes of society and as regards the applicability of security measures.

This provision of Article 223 of the CMK, which sets out the types of judgment, not only ensures harmony with the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) but can also be seen to clarify certain points in the TCK. For example, whereas under paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (d), a decision of acquittal is to be given where one of the grounds of justification is present, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (b), provides that where an order that is unlawful but binding has been carried out, or where a state of necessity exists, it is to be decided that there is no ground for imposing a penalty on account of the absence of culpability. It has thus been expressly emphasised that the carrying out of an order that is unlawful but binding and the state of necessity are not grounds of justification within the meaning of the TCK but grounds excluding culpability82. In our view, in these two situations, which constitute grounds of excuse, it has been laid down by statute that culpability is affected and that, as a result, no penalty is to be imposed in the absence of culpability83.

Moreover, what has to be assessed at this point is not only the criminal trial and its outcome. The effect which the existence of such a distinction has on the everyday life of an ordinary citizen who abides by the rules is also important. When, in the course of everyday life, this citizen encounters a situation which corresponds to the statutory definition of an offence but is not punished because of the types of defence, he must know whether the defence of the act performed rests on a particular reason and whether the act he would undertake against that act would remain within the limits of the law. That this is not merely a theoretical debate is better understood today in medical law, for example in the debates on abortion. Although Article 99 of the TCK defines as an offence the procuring of a miscarriage in a pregnancy that has exceeded ten weeks, paragraph 2 of the same article designates the existence of “a medical necessity” as a ground of justification; accordingly, a physician who performs an abortion in order to save the mother from a possible emergency is not punished. As may be understood, the medical profession, like other professions of high social prestige, is not satisfied with merely being “excused”; it wants the situation requiring the abortion to be recognised among the “grounds of justification”84, because otherwise this act of the physician, although not punishable, would remain unlawful85.

If this distinction between grounds of justification and grounds of excuse were not made, the physician’s act would have to be regarded as unlawful and, even though there would be no liability under criminal law, there would be liability under the law of obligations (liability for damages arising from a tortious act), which is not a desirable result in the situation described.

2. The Difference in Their Legal Nature

In the case of grounds of justification, the reason why no penalty is imposed for the perpetrator’s act is that the act involves no wrongdoing and consequently becomes lawful. In the case of grounds of excuse, by contrast, the reason why no penalty is imposed on the perpetrator is, in addition to the reduction of the act’s content of wrongdoing by virtue of the aim at which it is directed, the reduction of the act’s content of culpability because the perpetrator carries out his act under the influence of the exceptional, compelling psychological situation in which he finds himself. Hence, where a ground of excuse is present, the act’s content of wrongdoing is reduced but does not disappear altogether. This is also the most important point at which grounds of excuse part company with grounds of justification. In the case of grounds of justification the act is lawful because it involves no wrongdoing; where grounds of excuse are present, by contrast, the act, although it is not punished, remains unlawful because it continues to involve wrongdoing86. This is the most important consideration that makes it necessary to distinguish between grounds of justification and grounds of excuse.

3. The Difference in the Reasons for Their Consequences and in Their Sanctions

Where either grounds of justification or grounds of excuse are present, no penalty is imposed on the perpetrator for the act he has committed. However, the reasons for the consequences attached to the two differ from one another. In cases involving grounds of justification, since the act was carried out lawfully from the very outset, the perpetrator is regarded as justified and a decision of acquittal (Art. 223(2) CMK) is given in respect of him, whereas where a ground of excuse is present the perpetrator is regarded as excused and, on account of the absence of culpability on his part, a decision that there is no ground for imposing a penalty (Art. 223(3) CMK) is given in respect of him87. As an extension of these consequences and their reasons, where a ground of justification is present no sanction whatsoever is applied to the perpetrator; where a ground of excuse is present, on the other hand, since there is a culpable act, it is possible to apply a security measure (although in the case of grounds of excuse the application of such a security measure is not preferred).

4. Providing a Basis for the Dual-Track System of Sanctions

The distinction between grounds of justification and grounds of excuse can be related to the distinction between the unlawful act conforming to the statutory definition – that is, wrongdoing – and the perpetrator’s responsibility in terms of culpability. In this way another important aim and policy of criminal law emerges: the “dual-track system of sanctions”. This policy secures, within one and the same system of sanctions, the distinction and the consistency between penalties (custodial sentences and judicial fines) and security measures (which do not call for a penalty)88.

It is also useful to explain briefly what security measures, which form part of criminal law, are. As in the Anglo-Saxon legal system, in the Continental European legal system too, when one speaks of “punishment” one in fact has in mind the narrow sense of the “penal” sanction. This, however, while not making it impossible, gives rise to great difficulty in resolving cases concerning persons lacking criminal capacity (on account of mental illness, intoxication, etc.). Since “punishing” requires capacity for culpability, where the perpetrator is mentally ill and thus lacks capacity for culpability, and there is no other suitable sanction, the way to punishing the perpetrator for his wrongful act is closed and, at the end of the criminal case, no sanction at all can be applied to the accused. This outcome is regarded as one that fails to satisfy the sense of justice, particularly where it is possible and necessary to apply security measures to the perpetrator (for example, his placement in an institution for care and treatment, his being kept away from society for a certain period or the seizure of his driving licence). In order to overcome this problem, the German and Turkish legislatures adopted the “dual-track system” in their sanctions.

In this system there are, on the one hand, punitive measures (the traditional conception of punitive justice and blaming the perpetrator for his culpable act) and, on the other, security measures not based on punishment (providing treatment or averting a possible danger in response to conduct that is without culpability but wrongful, without any need to blame the perpetrator for his act). Thus, where the perpetrator cannot be held culpable in the course of the criminal trial, it is not necessarily required that a decision imposing no sanction at all be given. For under this arrangement a security measure may also be applied to the perpetrator at the end of the criminal trial, either together with a penalty or independently of a penalty89. In this way, even if no penalty in the narrow sense is imposed on the perpetrator, the act he has committed and the dangerousness he presents for society do not remain without sanction. This system was also introduced in our country by the TCK No. 5237. Accordingly, if the perpetrator who has committed the wrongdoing is also held to be culpable, he is punished with a penal sanction in the narrow sense (Arts. 45-52 TCK), whereas if he is not held to be culpable, only security measures (Arts. 53-60 TCK) are ordered.

This arrangement makes it possible, within the criminal justice system, to apply sanctions to perpetrators by two different routes but by the same method. It also serves to ensure that the act constituting an offence is assessed consistently and jointly in the fields of criminal law and the law of criminal procedure. This method, however, cannot operate without the difference between the wrongfulness of the act and the culpability of the perpetrator and, consequently, without the distinction between justification and the circumstances affecting culpability/grounds of excuse. This becomes clearer when the defining character of security measures is taken into account. On the one hand, since these measures are non-punitive in nature, the existence of culpability is not required, so that they may also be ordered where a ground excluding culpability is present. On the other hand, like the sanctions in the field of criminal law, they require a wrongful

act. Otherwise (in the absence of a wrongful act) there is neither a basis nor a reason for criminal justice to intervene in the situation90. For without a deed, in other words an act (+ unlawfulness = wrongdoing), the intervention of criminal law is impossible.

In this connection the German Criminal Code has several security measures which do not require culpability but respond to a (merely) wrongful act: for example, detention in an institution for care and treatment (§63), withdrawal of the driving licence (§69), prohibition from practising a profession (§70) or confiscation of unlawful gains (§73). Thus, while the fact that an accused who caused death in a traffic accident while driving under the influence of an epileptic seizure lacks capacity for culpability may mean that he receives no penalty for homicide, his driving licence is nevertheless withdrawn, at least on account of his wrongful act91. The same holds true for the TCK. As we stated above, the TCK provides for such situations deprivation of the exercise of certain rights (Art. 53), confiscation of property (Art. 54), confiscation of gains (Art. 55), security measures specific to children (Art. 56), security measures specific to the mentally ill (Art. 57), recidivism (Art. 58), deportation (Art. 59) and security measures concerning legal persons (Art. 60).

5. Determining the Exceeding of the Limits in Self-Defence

a. General Practice Regarding the Exceeding of the Limits in Self-Defence

Unlawful attacks mostly occur as a result of confusion or as a result of the person attacked being overcome by fear, agitation or excitement and exceeding the limits of self-defence. If the perpetrator were held to be justified in such situations, the mistaken result might arise that the exceeding of the limits is approved. If, on the other hand, the perpetrator were punished for this, he would then feel that he had suffered an injustice because the intense emotional state in which he was at the time of the act had not been taken into account, and he would be right to think so. Here, according to the solution provided by German law, the perpetrator is not held to be justified, since he has exceeded the limits of self-defence (StGB §32)92, but he may be excused if he exceeded those limits under the influence of excitement, fear or terror (StGB §33)93.

The position is regulated in a similar way in Turkish law. Accordingly, where the limits are exceeded in circumstances excluding criminal liability, if the negligent form of the act is punishable, the penalty prescribed for the negligent form is reduced by one-sixth to one-third; if the negligent form is not punishable, no penalty is imposed on the perpetrator (Art. 27(1) TCK). We should note that the expression “circumstances excluding criminal liability” here means the “grounds of justification”94. Where, in self-defence, the limits are exceeded on account of excusable excitement, fear and agitation, no penalty is imposed on the perpetrator (Art. 27(2) TCK). Paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the CMK also expressly mentions, as one of the cases in which no penalty is to be imposed on account of the absence of culpability on the part of the person, the provision of Art. 27(2) TCK on the exceeding of the limits of self-defence on account of excusable excitement, fear or agitation. Under this provision too, it is apparent that the legislature regards the case in which the limits of self-defence have been exceeded on account of excitement, fear or agitation as a ground affecting the person’s culpability95. In the legal scholarship of our country, however, while some authors regard this as a circumstance affecting culpability96, others state that it is a ground of excuse97.

While it is accepted that this affects culpability, in our opinion, with regard to a person whose ability to direct his conduct is impaired under the influence of excitement, fear and agitation while he is acting in a situation of self-defence, and who for that reason exceeds the limits of self-defence, it should be accepted that the legal nature of this situation is that of a ground of excuse affecting culpability98. On this point, with regard to the StGB, which contains a provision similar to that of the TCK, the prevailing view in German scholarship is likewise that the provision is to be regarded as a ground of excuse. There are nevertheless those in legal scholarship who regard the exceeding of the limits of self-defence on account of excusable excitement, fear and agitation as a ground excluding culpability99.

It should be noted that grounds of excuse have a character different from that of grounds excluding culpability such as the lack of capacity for culpability or an unavoidable mistake as to wrongdoing. Unlike in the case of grounds excluding culpability, a person who commits an offence under grounds of excuse possesses capacity for culpability and also awareness of wrongdoing. In this context, when an offence is committed under the influence of grounds of excuse, the wrongdoing contained in the person’s act and his own culpability do not disappear altogether; the content of that wrongdoing and culpability is, however, considerably reduced, and for that reason the threshold of punishability is not reached in respect of the act committed by the person100. It is from this standpoint that, since the threshold of punishability is not reached because the content of wrongdoing of the defence in question, which exceeds the limits of self-defence, and the person’s culpability in respect of that act are reduced, no penalty is imposed on the person101.

The general and special preventive purposes of punishment also play a role in determining whether, in the case of grounds of excuse, the act reaches the threshold of punishability102. Roxin, however, states that, because the preventive purpose of punishment is absent, such cases should be regarded as grounds excluding responsibility103.

b. Mutual Attacks Resting on a Justified Ground

This distinction between justification and the circumstances affecting culpability/grounds of excuse can also provide a solution to certain other problems. For example, it needs to be clarified what is to happen where the mutual attacks of two parties rest on a justified ground or the parties have been left free in this respect, where the perpetrator has a right of self-defence against an act which itself constitutes a situation of self-defence or against a justified act, for instance in the case of a counter-act carried out on a superior’s order or in the exercise of a right. On the one hand, it is quite clear that the right of self-defence cannot be exercised against an act which is itself self-defence; otherwise one would enter a vicious circle in which each person would be justified in injuring the other victim and no one could come away without being injured. If the law exists in order to prevent “civil war”, then, in a situation in which each person claims to be in the right from his own point of view, the right of self-defence and almost all the other grounds of justification and grounds affecting culpability/grounds of excuse cannot exist on both sides at once. In this respect, the “self-defence test” applied in German case law in order to decide whether a person may exercise the right of self-defence against an attack on his own rights has turned into a “rule of thumb”. According to it, self-defence may be resorted to if the attack itself does not constitute a ground affecting culpability.

c. Comparison of the Systems and a Concrete Reason for the Necessity of the Distinction: The Goetz Case

On the other hand, even in situations which constitute an exception to self-defence, it is possible that the person exercising self-defence will not be punished. For the person may be excused, for example, on account of a mistake or in cases such as that in which the exceeding of the limits by the act takes place under the influence of extreme fear and terror (agitation, fear or excitement), and this constitutes a ground of excuse104. The Goetz case, which provides an example of this subject, unfolded as follows:

On the Saturday afternoon before Christmas 1984, at the Manhattan subway station in New York, a person named Bernhard Goetz was asked for five dollars by one of four black youths who were there and were acting together. Thereupon Goetz fired five shots at them105. When it was debated, first, whether there had been an attack on Goetz or whether he had merely believed that he was going to be attacked and, secondly, whether he had confined his reaction to self-defence alone or, as stated in many commentaries on the case, had acted out of anger, confusion, fear or terror, and whether he had continued to fire although the attackers were – in all probability, at the time of the incident – wounded or fleeing, it was established that Goetz had exceeded the limits of self-defence106.

In this case public opinion was sharply divided in two, between accepting and not accepting self-defence in respect of this incident. The following views were put forward as the reason for these two different perspectives: on the one hand, those who wanted Goetz not to be punished could reach that result by no route other than accepting self-defence; on the other hand, those of the opposite view feared that this could be interpreted as meaning that Goetz had acted lawfully. They therefore thought that, in this way, other people in the same situation might also be permitted to exceed the limits in the same manner. This led those who argued that there was no self-defence to reject all the claims of defence in order to prevent a disastrous outcome that would turn the accused into a crime machine, namely the accused’s killing of a person whom he regarded as an aggressor only in his own mind, or of a person who, even if he had attacked, was in flight.

Instead of this one-sided “black or white” approach, the distinction between justification and the grounds affecting culpability/grounds of excuse offers a solution capable of satisfying both sides. First, self-defence that is unnecessary in that it goes beyond protecting oneself against an aggressor is rejected; as an alternative to this, in cases where the person assumed to be an aggressor was not an aggressor, or was an

aggressor but withdrew after the attack – whether it had taken place or was likely to take place –, the act directed at killing or at attempting to kill is declared to be wrongful and prohibited (Art. 27(1) TCK, StGB §32). Secondly, where the accused has acted wrongfully by violating these limits of self-defence, he may nevertheless go unpunished on account of a ground of excuse. This is the case, for example, where the limits of self-defence are exceeded under the influence of fear and terror (fear, excitement or agitation) (StGB §33, Art. 27(2) TCK). Hence, if this distinction, which does not exist in Anglo-Saxon law, were brought into use, even hard cases such as the Goetz case could readily be given an appropriate solution107.

This shows us that the German system of criminal law, and hence the system of criminal law and the criminal code of our country, are in this respect more advanced than the Anglo-Saxon legal system, and also how important and necessary the distinction between grounds of justification and circumstances affecting culpability/grounds of excuse is in practice.

6. Differentiating the Application of Participation in the Offence

As we stated above, the distinction between justification and circumstances affecting culpability/grounds of excuse, and the distinction between wrongdoing and culpability, are not merely a conceptual matter but also a matter of practice. Indeed, in this sense the effect of the distinction in question on participation in the offence must also be touched upon108.

Where one of the co-perpetrators carries out his act while in a situation that excludes his culpability, another acts lawfully, and yet another carries out his act without either of these being present, the criminal liability of these persons and the sanctions to be applied will differ from one another. The first will not receive a penalty in the narrow sense but, in accordance with the dual-track system, a security measure will be applied; the act of the second will not constitute an offence at all; and the third will receive in full the penalty corresponding to his act. If no distinction were made between a ground of justification and the circumstances affecting culpability/grounds of excuse, the question of what kind of sanction is to be applied to the first and the second perpetrator would give rise to problems in practice.

Where grounds of justification are present, the act is lawful, and this holds good for everyone. Since there is therefore no offence, participation in an offence does not arise either. Where a ground of excuse is present, by contrast, exemption from punishment is a consequence that applies only to the perpetrator, so that the liability of the accomplices for participation in the offence continues. Moreover, whereas as a result of grounds of justification the act becomes lawful for all branches of law in accordance with the principle of the unity of the legal order, grounds of excuse remove liability for the act only under criminal law. In addition, whereas it is not possible to rely on a ground of justification against a person acting within the scope of a ground of justification, it is possible to rely on a ground of justification against a person acting within the scope of a ground of excuse. The reason for this is that, in cases involving a ground of excuse, since the act continues to be contrary to the legal order and the reason why no penalty is imposed on the perpetrator is the psychological situation in which he finds himself, the ground of excuse produces a personal, exceptional consequence for the perpetrator alone. Grounds of justification are not limited to the provisions of positive law; it is also possible for there to be a ground of justification that is not regulated by statute; grounds of justification may therefore also derive from customary law. Grounds of excuse, by contrast, since they arise in exceptional situations and as the result of an unlawful act, can come into existence only if they are regulated by statute; otherwise legal certainty would be undermined109.

V. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE

This distinction, which began to be articulated from the end of the 19th century onwards, was expressly recognised by the German legislature when the reform of the new criminal code of 1969 was enacted110. Yet, although this legislative process occupied a very short period, it must be said that the truly long period was the one that elapsed before the distinction took shape. The distinction can be fully understood only by recounting this historical process and development. And this is possible only by setting out why and how German law and scholarship arrived at their present state111. Since a similar distinction was also introduced in our country by the legislative activity carried out in 2004, with the TCK No. 5237, understanding this process is important for the theory and practice of criminal law in our country as well.

1. The Starting Point

In order to understand this historical development, which took a long time, one must first recall the German Imperial Criminal Code of 1871, in which – not unlike Anglo-Saxon legislation and case law – justification and the circumstances affecting culpability/grounds of excuse were completely intermingled. In that code no provision made room for self-defence, justification or necessity, because the Imperial Code designated these acts as “not punishable”. The reason why no such distinction was made is that, when the Imperial Criminal Code of 1871 was being drafted, the distinction between an act’s constituting wrongdoing and the culpability of the perpetrator – and, consequently, the distinction between

justification and the circumstances affecting culpability/grounds of excuse – was unknown in German criminal law scholarship, or at least was not generally accepted112.

The fact that today the distinguishing differences between justification and the circumstances affecting culpability/grounds of excuse can be arrived at without the support of written law shows that this distinction involves a less positivist approach than the other rules contained in the concept of the offence. Even when comparing different systems of criminal law, account must be taken of the various national traditions and of criminal justice systems that are perhaps organised differently from one another. The absence of such a distinction from statutory provisions and case law does not prevent such a distinction from being found and developed; rather, it is by its nature concealed within the concept of the offence; in other words, it is inherent in the concept of the offence113.

Since this area of the theory of the offence is connected with discovering the international elements of the offence, it may be called an “international discipline”114. This does not of course mean that the scope of, for example, self-defence or consent does not vary from country to country. But when we look at the reasons underlying the relevant rules, it is seen that national differences rest on coincidence rather than on necessity. It is therefore possible to have recourse to common principles in respect of the rules in question.

It must be said that German criminal law prepared itself for the legislative process by separating necessity from coincidence and by directing itself towards general rather than particular situations. In this sense, explaining the development of the concept of the offence in German criminal law up to the present day may serve as an example showing how and why this whole process took place. Since, particularly when one goes into the details, there are still unresolved problems, the present stage cannot be said to be a final result. But when the basic structure of the subject is considered, it may be said that at least some of the essential steps in the process of development, having become necessary and settled matters, lend themselves to the universalisation of the theory of the offence115.

2. The Distinction between Wrongdoing and Culpability

In German criminal law the differentiation in the structuring of the concept of the offence basically consists of three parts: the elements of the statutory definition of the offence (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit), the wrongfulness of the act (Rechtswidrigkeit) and culpability in terms of the perpetrator’s accountability (Schuld). While the process of developing the structure thus established continues, there being many different approaches and terminologies in legal scholarship, this basic content of the structure is very largely accepted116. This finding also holds true for the criminal law scholarship of our country.

The first point to be addressed in this regard is the development of the wrongfulness of the act and the culpability of the perpetrator as elements of the offence that are independent of one another in meaning and in systematic position. The process of development relating to culpability goes back to the middle of the 19th century117. This should not be taken to mean that the principle of culpability was entirely unknown in German criminal law before that time118. Culpability was important as an element of the act constituting an offence. The important point here, however, is that at that time culpability was regarded as an auxiliary element of the broader concept of “imputation”. On this view culpability is a constitutive element of the wrongfulness of the act; by means of it, the function of imputation distinguishes the act done by a “human being” from the mere “occurrence” of an event. Although at that time wrongdoing and culpability were not understood within the framework of the theory of the offence, it may be said that combining wrongdoing and culpability in the concept of culpability as imputation was considered necessary for the concept of wrongdoing. Indeed, in 1867 Adolf Merkel was able to state that there can be no wrongdoing without culpability – a theory that had also been supported in the earlier writings of Karl Binding119.

Although a consensus on this matter had formed in the theory of the offence at that time, it is interesting that the first views concerning a concept of wrongdoing independent of and distinct from personal culpability – the separation of objective wrongdoing from subjective accountability – developed in the sources of private law. It was Rudolph von Jhering who first argued, relying on the right of ownership which an owner has against a person who has obtained his property by unlawful means – a person who, even if he acts in good faith, has no right to acquire ownership –, that subjective culpability (Verschuldung) is not a precondition of objective wrongdoing (Unrecht) and that in some situations wrongdoing arises even if subjective culpability is left out of account120. Of course, the problem of how wrongdoing is to be separated from culpability still persists, but with the development of “objective wrongdoing” an important step was taken towards the development of several independent categories within the analysis of the theory of the offence. In criminal law scholarship, Ernst Beling and Franz von Liszt are the foremost scholars in making “objective wrongdoing” an element of the offence and in developing it121.

Before examining their theories more closely, it may be useful to give some brief information about Karl Binding’s “preparatory doctrine”. He is probably the first person to have given the concepts of

wrongdoing and culpability a concise meaning within a comprehensive system. Bearing in mind that Binding’s “Theory of Norms” (Normentheorie) is too complex and unusual to be conveyed within the limits of this study, we should note that Binding, by separating the “norm” from the “penal provisions”, pointed out a way of detaching the element of wrongdoing from the statutory text. Wrongdoing was thereby accorded an autonomous function: what is violated by the act constituting an offence is not the penal provision that calls for a sanction; what is violated is in fact the commands and prohibitions of the legal system. For this reason the concept of wrongdoing was directed entirely towards the essence of the norms and was conceived on the basis of them122. According to Binding, culpability is “the will of a person with capacity causing wrongdoing” or “the will directed towards wrongdoing”. Will and capacity are the elements of culpability, which – as a comprehensive element – also includes the perpetrator’s intent and negligence. By thus attaching a special meaning to the element of culpability, he contributed to the distinction between wrongdoing and culpability. He cannot, however, be placed on a par with Beling and von Liszt, because he is still attached to the common idea of his time that “wrongdoing cannot arise without culpability”123.

3. Setting Out the Elements of the Offence

Although the development had hitherto been directed primarily towards the distinction between wrongdoing and culpability, Beling’s attention was concentrated on wrongdoing as distinct from the definition of the offence. In his famous “Lehre vom Verbrechen” (1906) he treated and developed the elements of the offence (Tatbestand) as a comprehensive catalogue of the definitional elements making up the various types of offence. According to him, conformity with the statutory definition constitutes an independent element of the offence. Since conformity with the statutory definition merely designates the act that corresponds to the type laid down in the criminal norm, he explained the concept of the offence in a three-part system which contains no normative judgment as to the wrongfulness of the act: conformity with the statutory definition of the offence, unlawfulness and culpability124. On the basis of these three parts v. Liszt, in a system of his own which is still very refined, defined the offence as an act (a) fulfilling the statutory definition, (b) wrongful and (c) culpable (in the sense of a voluntary bodily movement).

Consequently, wrongdoing relates to the objective elements of the offence, whereas culpability may be understood as the subjective precondition for the sanction. In his later writings v. Liszt examined culpability in greater detail from the psychological point of view, as the perpetrator’s subjective relationship to the unlawful harm. By thus separating the objective and subjective elements of the offence from one another, he created a definition of the offence that had been unknown until then. Compared with the criminal theories of the 19th century, this was regarded as a great advance125.

4. The Essence of Wrongdoing and the Normative Element of Accountability

Nevertheless, the definition of the offence given by Beling and v. Liszt underwent certain changes through later developments. Of the two, v. Liszt, while relating the wrongfulness of the act and culpability to the perpetrator, proposed that all the objective elements of the statutory definition be related specifically to wrongdoing and that all the subjective elements be attributed to culpability. Likewise Beling put forward the idea that wrongdoing and culpability could be separated as objective and subjective elements, proceeding from the distinction based on internal and external elements or on v. Liszt’s concept of the “psychological aspect of culpability”, which would later be considered inadequate. Two of the important modifications and criticisms made of the system of Beling and v. Liszt must be mentioned here126:

First, it was demonstrated by August Hegler and Edmund Mezger that the elements of the offence consist not only of objective elements (for example, the taking by theft of a thing in the possession of another) but also of subjective elements (such as the perpetrator’s intent to convert the property to his own use) (StGB §242). It was shown that the distinction according to which wrongdoing relates entirely to objective elements while culpability comprises entirely subjective elements is incorrect and superficial, in that it is simply directed solely at (objective or subjective) factual points of view127. When the matter is approached not from a “natural” point of view but from a more “positivist” angle, it becomes clear that all the elements of the offence, whether objective or subjective, relate to wrongdoing and that these elements make up the material substance of wrongdoing. By contrast, all the elements (objective or subjective) concerning the perpetrator’s accountability with regard to his mistake or motive belong to culpability128. Apart from this reciprocal conceptual crossing between objective and subjective elements, the essence of wrongdoing was conceived of as primarily objective, while subjective elements were associated primarily with culpability. This view was also supported by Mezger’s distinction between “objective norms of evaluation” (Bewertungsnormen) and “subjective norms of determination” (Bestimmungsnormen). The objective norms of evaluation examine whether any human act (or any other event or state of affairs) is lawful and, if it is not lawful, adjudge it to be wrongdoing without regard to the perpetrator’s capacity or motive; the subjective norms of determination, by contrast, serve to establish the perpetrator’s individual motive and, where this is defective, decide in relation to the perpetrator’s personal accountability129.

Secondly, once culpability began to be understood as accountability, a further correction of the system of Beling and v. Liszt became necessary: that of the assumption that culpability is to be understood as consisting in the establishment of a psychological relationship between the act and the perpetrator’s intent or negligence. This “psychological” concept of culpability was replaced by the “normative” concept of accountability developed by Reinhard Frank and James Goldschmidt. On this view intent or negligence are conditions that are necessary for culpability but not sufficient; beyond this psychological relationship, culpability requires that the perpetrator “can be held accountable” for his (intentional or negligent) act: for example, that the perpetrator was able to act in conformity with the law and had the capacity to perform an act in that direction “that could be expected of him given his personal abilities and his situation at the time”. Later this view, as the doctrine of “Zumutbarkeit” (the possibility of expecting the perpetrator to act lawfully), became one of the cornerstones in the explanation of the grounds of excuse130.

In sum, although this system has been corrected on certain points – in particular as regards the act being linked with “causation” and “result”, and intent (or negligence) being an element of wrongdoing or not relating solely to the blameworthiness of the perpetrator –, it has proved, as in the doctrine that the offence consists of three elements, to be stable only to a certain degree131.

5. The Final Step towards the Distinction between Grounds of Justification and Excuse

The distinction between wrongdoing and culpability was not yet sufficient of itself to draw an adequate distinction between grounds of justification and grounds of excuse and to explain the foundations of that distinction. Moreover, although the concept of “circumstances excluding culpability” (Schuldausschließungsgründe) had already been found in legal scholarship, it had no precise meaning. Indeed, the term was sometimes used even for grounds of justification132.

James Goldschmidt was the first jurist to establish a proper and comprehensive distinction between, and system of, grounds of justification and excuse. A full understanding of the distinction he drew requires a detailed explanation of the “theory of norms of duty” (Pflichtnormentheorie), and his views constitute an important touchstone in this field. Goldschmidt used the concept of the “legal norm” (Rechtsnorm), as typified in statute. The legal norm first presupposes a hypothetical external act and indicates that the norm of duty, which tacitly accompanies that act and determines the individual’s inner attitude, must correspond to the external act that conforms to the legal norm133. The unlawfulness of violating the legal norm can be overcome by the principle of justification; but if the perpetrator bases his act on grounds of excuse by which his responsibility in terms of capacity for culpability is removed, he cannot be said to be culpable on account of a violation of the norm of duty. Although Goldschmidt sought to explain this contrast by different principles apart from punishability, he ultimately based the grounds of justification on the principle of the “superior objective interest”. He stated that in this case non-punishment could be founded on an “appropriate superior motive”; that, for example, in the case of an “extraordinary motive” the perpetrator acted with a “motive of duty”; that with such an appropriate superior motive – “humanly understandable”, even if legally “not approved” – “necessity as a ground of justification” was not made out; or that, as can be seen in cases based on self-defence, in such cases – such as the exceeding of the limits of self-defence out of fear – the perpetrator could not be blamed because he had acted in order to protect his own interest134.

Although Goldschmidt’s theory needs to be verified and simplified in various respects, it advanced our subject on two main points. First, it differentiated grounds of justification and grounds of excuse, particularly with regard to necessity. This is known as the differentiation theory (Differenzierungstheorie). Secondly, it explained grounds of justification on the basis of a superior objective interest and grounds of excuse on the basis of a superior subjective motivation.

Thus the distinction between grounds of justification and excuse is today, at least in principle, fully accepted in the theory and practice of German criminal law135. It has been stated that, for German criminal law, the clearest and most concrete example of this distinction is the differentiation made in §34 and §35 of the German Criminal Code between “necessity as a ground of justification” and “necessity as a ground of excuse”, and that with this statutory provision the distinction in question has also been accepted from the normative point of view136.

VI. THE STRUCTURE, COMMON FEATURES AND LIMITS OF THE GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION

As a result of this distinction, the common features and limits of the grounds of justification emerge as follows:

1. The Harmonious Interaction of Prohibitory and Permissive Norms

The German Criminal Code leaves no room for doubt that, where an act conforms to the statutory definition of an offence and the perpetrator raises a defence of justification, he will be “not guilty” (not having acted wrongfully) (StGB §32). In short, an act based on the grounds specified in the statute is regarded as lawful. The structural system that produces this result becomes meaningful when criminal law is conceived of as a system of norms which prohibit or permit acts.

On the one hand, the prohibitory norms containing the definitions of offences have, in order to protect certain legal interests, provided for the prohibition of certain harmful acts or, in the case of omission, for the prevention of the prohibited harm by commanding that an act be performed137,138. On the other hand, through the permissive rules which it accepts in certain exceptional situations, the law has recognised that another legitimate interest may outweigh the value protected by the offence realised in the concrete case, so that the general method of prohibition may not be applicable and the infringement of the protected value may be permitted. Thus, even if the offence type defined in the statute, and hence the act causing the harm, is unlawful in general terms, the act may, despite its wrongfulness at first sight, be permitted by a special rule of justification139.

2. The “Monist” and “Pluralist” Theories of the Grounds of Justification

Notwithstanding the views set out above, it must be established what the reason for granting a permission of this kind is. It must also be discussed whether the general principle in this matter can be applied to every different situation. With these questions one is looking for the basic rationale of the grounds of justification. This touches on an important problem of the theory of the offence that is still highly controversial. Viewing the matter broadly in this context, it can be seen that the grounds of justification show a marked shift from the monist theory towards the pluralist theory140.

Monist theories attempt to explain all the foundations of the grounds of justification by a single general principle. This is generally the theory which rests on treating “the doing of what is appropriate in order to achieve a legally recognised purpose” as lawful, namely the “theory of purpose”141. This theory can explain self-defence and even necessity, but it is difficult to apply to cases based on the consent of the victim. The same is true of the explanations which the theories of “more benefit than harm” or the “balancing of interests” offer and which are found suitable for some principles of justification142. For this reason what finds acceptance in the pluralist theory is, in particular, the explanations of the “dualist approach”, which rests on reducing the principles of justification to two basic premises: a) Where the infringement of a value arises from its conflict with far more important values, that value may, as a premise, be infringed for the sake of the other values (for example, self-defence, necessity, conflict of duties). b) A person may waive the protection of the legal interest (lawful and legitimate consent). It was Mezger who placed these situations within the rules of the dualist approach to the grounds of justification by relying on the rationales of superior or lacking interest143. These principles, however, are still too abstract to be applied to concrete cases. But if superior or lacking interest is taken as a general rule of the grounds of justification, one at least has an important starting point for applying the accepted principles of justification or for developing new principles in this field144.

3. Types of Grounds of Justification – the “Unity of the Legal Order”

In order to form a broad idea of the grounds of justification, a number of rules must be observed. In doing so it must not be forgotten that the grounds which render the offence type lawful are reasoned and are not found in criminal law alone. On the basis of the principle of the “unity of the legal order”, all grounds of justification must be taken into account regardless of where they are regulated – criminal law, administrative law and even private law. If the rationales of the grounds of justification are classified according to their purposes or sources, they are seen to fall into four main groups: a. The consent (express or implied) of the person harmed shows that he himself has waived the protection of the legal interest. In this case the rationale of the ground of justification is “lacking interest”. b. Rights of defence against infringement: in particular self-defence (StGB §32)145. c. Acts in a situation of necessity or conflict of interests: in addition to “necessity as a ground of justification” (StGB §34) or the conflict of duties (Pflichtenkollision), the “state of aggressive necessity” (§904 of the German Civil Code). This means that it is lawful where it is necessary to act in order to avert another, disproportionate harm that may arise from the destruction of or damage to another person’s property146. d. Finally, the cases in which the perpetrator, being aware of the offence type, exercises a particular right – for example where freedom of thought harms the social standing of another person (StGB §193) – or acknowledges a legal authority147 may be gathered by us into one group of these grounds of justification148.

It is evident that it is not possible, within the limits of this study, to discuss all the principles of the grounds of justification. But at least,

in order to show some of the features and problems of the grounds of justification, we need to examine the grounds of superior value (interest), which constitute the most important examples of grounds of justification under German criminal law149: these are self-defence and necessity as a ground of justification150.

4. Self-Defence

Self-defence151 is in fact the oldest of the grounds of justification found in all legal systems and has become an almost universal rule152. However, since the old idea expressed in the proposition “right must not bring gain to wrong” still holds good, its scope must be discussed. What does it mean that “right” must not bring gain to wrong? What does “wrong” mean? Is this only an unlawful attack? And what of proportionality between the various interests?153 Two considerations may be taken as a basis with regard to these and similar questions154: although self-defence has for a very long time been seen essentially as an independent right in terms of a person’s protecting himself against attack155, today the social function of self-defence also has the same scope, and perhaps even a somewhat wider one. Apart from the perpetrator’s defending his individual interest, self-defence is also regarded as the realisation of a legal interest with the aim of promoting public peace156. Thus, with the coming together of individual defence and the socially protective role of the legal order, self-defence undergoes a development that is in part expansive and in part restrictive157. In this context self-defence, on the one hand, is not confined to the person attacking the individual concerned but also expands, in relation to third persons, to cover assistance and thus the protection of the public interest158. On the other hand, it is restrictive that self-defence is not an absolute right to be exercised in every case and that the social function of the right may not be distorted in any way. This also points to two important limits of self-defence: the person exercising self-defence has a duty to retreat if he can avoid the attack “without losing his dignity”159, and where resorting to self-defence has been made a necessity, even then it may be required that self-defence be limited or even not exercised at all160.

The subject closely connected with the bad-faith exercise of the right of self-defence forms the second point of the discussion. “Disproportionate” self-defence means that the harm caused by the defence is disproportionate to the interest endangered by the aggressor. There is no hesitation on this matter in cases such as that of the owner of an apple tree who, in order to protect the fruit, shoots the thief and causes him to be seriously or even fatally injured, or that of a security guard who kills a person for stealing a small bottle of syrup. Indeed, the views of earlier times rest on the idea that by his unlawful act the aggressor has in a sense “barred himself from the protection of the law” and has thus taken upon himself the risk of any harm to which he may be exposed through self-defence, so that, as a result, there is no need to have regard to proportionality. This view is still held by a few authors, because in their opinion self-defence would otherwise be greatly weakened161. The growing tendency in this field, however, is for self-defence not to apply where the interests attacked and defended are strikingly disproportionate162. On this view it matters little which reason is put forward in such cases: “abuse” of self-defence, “denial of the normative need for defence”163 or simply that a “proportionate” defence is required164. The only certain point here is that self-defence is not recognised as a counter-attack that is permitted as a matter of course and that the weighing of interests has gained in importance165.

For these reasons self-defence constitutes a ground of justification on the rationale of the superior interest. Nevertheless, the interest to be protected by self-defence need not necessarily be an interest more valuable than the harm caused. Moreover, self-defence has both an individual function and social functions. For the person exercising self-defence does not merely defend his own interest; he also helps to preserve the general peace, and this social interest too is placed on the scales of the person defending. For this reason self-defence loses its lawfulness only where, even though social peace is added to the account of the person carrying out the defence, the harm caused to the aggressor still weighs heavier on the scales166.

5. Necessity as a Ground of Justification

In the provision of the German Criminal Code on self-defence (StGB §32) the balance of the legal interests protected by criminal law is not expressly taken into account; that balance can be achieved only by interpretation. In the case of “necessity as a ground of justification” (StGB §34), by contrast, the text of the statute states expressly that there must be a superior value for the ground of justification to be made out167. It is stated that this ground of justification is the last principle to have been expressly defined in written law168.

In this type of necessity a legal interest protected by criminal law is in danger and, in order to protect it, another legal interest protected by criminal law is adversely affected. In this situation the legal interests are subjected to an evaluation, and the legal interest adversely affected by the act is qualitatively of lesser weight than the value that is in danger. This type of necessity therefore rests on the “principle of the balancing of values and duties” (Güter und Pflichtenabwägung), and the protection of a value that is in danger is preferred to the norm that ought to be observed169.

The most important step in the development of this subject was taken with an important decision of the German Imperial Court of 11 March 1927, by which abortion was legally recognised for the purpose of saving a mother’s life and restoring her health. This case concerning the medical termination of pregnancy involved proceedings concerning an abortion performed, in order to avert the danger of suicide, on a pregnant woman who was in danger of committing suicide, and brought against the physicians who performed it. In the case, a woman had, after becoming pregnant, fallen into a depression carrying a strong risk of suicide. After obtaining the opinion of a psychiatrist, the woman’s gynaecologist terminates her pregnancy in order to prevent her from attempting suicide. Proceedings are brought against the two physicians before the local court. Upon the local court’s decision to acquit, the public prosecutor’s office applies to the higher regional court. The Mannheim Higher Regional Court likewise acquitted the two accused, on the ground that the infringement of an interest protected by law is not unlawful where it appears as an appropriate means of protecting one of the aims adopted by the legal order – in the concrete case, the protection of health. The public prosecutor’s office, however, appealed on points of law. In its decision the Imperial Court for the first time expressly distinguished grounds of justification from grounds of excuse; it thereby adopted the differentiation theory in respect of necessity, accepted a state of necessity as a ground of justification not contained in written law, and founded this new ground of justification on the theory of the “comparison of values and duties”170. At that time German criminal law already recognised certain cases of necessity, but these were confined to material property and therefore did not cover the destruction of a human foetus. Although the statute provided a ground of justification for the mother, it did not provide such a ground for the doctor, since he was not personally endangered. Nevertheless, thanks to the fact that the provisions of the code were amenable to general principles, they could be developed by the courts. In this situation, where interests are balanced, what the perpetrator did for the sake of a better, superior legal interest was accepted as a justified act171. This extra-statutory necessity as a ground of justification, developed by legal scholarship and especially by case law, was placed on a statutory footing in the criminal law reform of 1975 and regulated in StGB §34172.

Necessity as a ground of justification has conditions relating to the danger and conditions relating to the protection. The conditions relating to the danger are the following: first, it is necessary and sufficient that an interest protected by law be protected. No limitation has been made such as that in necessity as a ground of excuse. Secondly, there must be a present danger; this may be a danger already in existence or a danger that is highly likely to materialise. The danger may be directed at a

right belonging to the perpetrator, or it may equally be directed at a person close to the perpetrator or at a third person173. The conditions relating to the protection are the following: it must not be possible to guard against the danger in any other way, and there must be an objective necessity. Of the conflicting legal interests, the legal interest protected must weigh substantially more heavily than the one harmed, and the act must be proportionate to what is needed to escape the danger. In addition, the person must know that he is carrying out his act of protection against the danger within the scope of a state of necessity. Where all of these conditions are present in the concrete case, necessity as a ground of justification exists174.

StGB §34 is the enacted form of the grounds of justification based on the balancing of conflicting interests. Several problems, however, prevent this rule from operating properly. One of the basic points of the debate on this matter is the “appropriateness requirement” contained in StGB §34(2). Whereas, until this provision came into force, the grounds of justification required only that the act be appropriate for averting the danger, the legislature quite clearly attempted to combine the principle of the balancing of interests (Güterabwägungsprinzip) with the principle of the theory of purpose (Zwecktheorie). It thus limited necessity as a ground of justification to the case “where the act committed by the perpetrator out of necessity appears to be an appropriate and lawful solution and is acceptable in terms of public values”. In legal scholarship no practical need is seen for such a limitation; at the least, it is thought that all the relevant functions are already fulfilled by the content of the balancing of interests175. It is not denied, however, that this appropriateness requirement has a certain clarifying function in that it calls for a comprehensive social-ethical assessment of the act176.

When the wording of StGB §34 is examined, it is seen that the provision requires the grounds of justification to look to more than a simple balance of conflicting legal interests – for example, the comparison between the foetus’s right to life and the mother’s right to life and bodily integrity. What is involved is in fact a comprehensive assessment of all the relevant factors, for example the degree of risk or harm, the cause of the danger, the duty to accept the risk, etc. If, after a comprehensive balancing of all the values involved in the act, the act clearly serves a superior interest, the act, although it corresponds to the definition of an offence, now becomes lawful177.

VII. THE STRUCTURING OF THE GROUNDS OF EXCUSE

1. The General and Evident Consequences of the Grounds of Excuse

Unlike grounds of justification, grounds of excuse do not affect the wrongfulness of the act. They merely remove the perpetrator’s personal accountability (blameworthiness): that is, the perpetrator merely becomes non-punishable in the eyes of society; in other words, he is excused. Moreover, grounds of excuse apply only to those participants who act in accordance with these conditions; all the other participants may be punished for the unlawful act178.

2. Types of Grounds of Excuse

In contrast to Anglo-Saxon law, which confines the grounds of excuse to mental illness, threat, mistake and, to a certain extent, mistake of law, in German law self-defence that exceeds the measure on account of fear, terror or confusion (StGB §33), necessity as a ground of excuse (StGB §35) and the collision of duties (although there is no statutory provision on this) are grounds of excuse. In Turkish law, the exceeding of the limits of self-defence (Art. 27(2) TCK), a superior’s unlawful but binding order (Art. 24(1)-(2) TCK) and necessity (Art. 25(2) TCK) are accepted as grounds of excuse.

In the German theory of the offence a distinction is drawn between principles precluding culpability and principles of excuse. In the former – for example mental illness and unavoidable mistake as to wrongdoing (mistake of prohibition) – it is accepted that, although the perpetrator has not been excused, the act was committed without culpability from the outset. In the latter – in the case of the exceeding of the limits during self-defence on account of intense fear, terror or confusion, of necessity as a ground of excuse, or of the exceeding of the limits on account of a collision of duties – the perpetrator, although culpable, is exculpated (no penalty is imposed because, the culpability being slight, the act does not merit punishment)179.

Whereas the principles precluding culpability arise from an intellectual (mistake as to wrongdoing) and/or volitional (mental illness) deficiency in terms of culpability, the principles of excuse involve an extraordinary psychological pressure on the perpetrator. Such, indeed, is Goldschmidt’s explanation, which is accepted by many scholars180. With regard to grounds of excuse in particular, the question has arisen whether they can be explained on the basis of all these subjective reasons. Thus, where the limits of self-defence are exceeded, blameworthiness is limited by reason of fear (StGB §33). Beyond this, however, it is noted that, because the perpetrator is reacting to a wrongful attack – albeit excessively –, there is also a limitation within the concept of objective wrongdoing. The same is true of necessity as a ground of excuse, which ties the reason for non-punishment to the act’s having been committed

under necessity and to the averting of harm to a legal interest (StGB §35). On this matter present-day German criminal lawyers, without denying the state of psychological compulsion or of being under pressure which is the subjective reason for non-punishment, consider that the limited concept of objective wrongdoing plays a part in the perpetrator’s being excused181.

Beyond this, it is also stated that there is a growing tendency to apply the policies of deterrence and special prevention in explaining the rationale and scope of the grounds of excuse. It is stated that the application of these policies, which would set a limit to non-punishment on the grounds mentioned, may be used not to suspend entirely the policies peculiar to grounds of justification and grounds of excuse but to weaken/limit the effect of those policies182.

3. Necessity as a Ground of Excuse

In order to examine the grounds of excuse in greater detail and to bring out the difference from the grounds of justification, we consider it necessary, after “necessity as a ground of justification” (StGB §34), which we explained earlier under the grounds of justification, now to examine “necessity as a ground of excuse” (StGB §35) as well. As we stated above, no such distinction has been made in the TCK; indeed, necessity is regulated in the TCK without any legal characterisation, but Art. 223(3)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) states that it is a circumstance excluding culpability. Although the statutory provision offers guidance as regards legal characterisation, it does not restrict doctrinal views. It can therefore readily be argued, and is argued, that a twofold distinction of this kind is necessary and indeed that, even if it is not regulated by statute, this distinction is in fact inherent in this institution. It is also possible, on the other hand, to argue that there is no need for such a distinction and that it is the product of theoretical debates belonging to the past and of their reflection in statute. Since this subject has now been reflected in the legal scholarship of our country too, we include these views in our study in the belief that, for a better understanding of these debates, it is more appropriate to give an explanation based on this distinction.

In contrast to “necessity as a ground of justification”, which permits action for the protection of any legal interest without limitation, “necessity as a ground of excuse” is confined to attacks on life, bodily integrity or liberty183. This limitation and distinction are made because “necessity as a ground of justification” requires the protection of a superior legal interest. In “necessity as a ground of excuse”, by contrast, the protected legal interest need not be superior to the one harmed. For this reason “necessity as a ground of excuse” can arise only where one very important right stands against another important right (a situation of equality between values)184.

This gap in the objective balance of legal interests must be filled by the existence of a personal danger, which is in any event the essential characteristic of the grounds of excuse. The perpetrator must act for the benefit of the life, bodily integrity or liberty of himself or of a person close to him. The requirement that there be an extraordinary personal danger is expressly emphasised in StGB §35(1), second sentence. This provision specifies under what conditions the perpetrator must cope with the danger and is not permitted to rely on the ground of excuse. Accordingly, in this regard the perpetrator’s personal situation is the first thing to be taken into account. If he himself caused the danger or has accepted in advance that he will bear certain risks (for example as a security guard or a firefighter), dangers that might be regarded as extraordinary for others must be regarded as normal for him. In this way the fact that, given his personal circumstances, the perpetrator is not expected to act lawfully is recognised as a decisive element of the grounds of excuse185.

Whereas necessity as a ground of justification rests on the principle of the balancing of legal interests, necessity as a ground of excuse rests essentially on the principle that the perpetrator cannot be expected to act lawfully in the situation in which he finds himself (Unzumutbarkeit normgemäβen Verhaltens)186. Necessity as a ground of excuse has conditions relating to the danger and conditions relating to the protection. The conditions relating to the danger are the following: an interest protected by law must be in need of protection; unlike in necessity as a ground of justification, however, it is not a requirement that there be a qualitative difference in weight between the legal interest protected and the one harmed. Indeed, since there is no qualitative difference in weight between the protected legal interests, the act in question remains unlawful, but the fact that it is directed towards the aim of protecting an interest protected by law from danger reduces the act’s content of wrongdoing. In addition, unlike in necessity as a ground of justification, since the act is carried out as a result of psychological pressure, its content of culpability is also reduced. This leads to exemption from punishment. In this context, under StGB §35 there must be a danger to life, bodily integrity or personal liberty which is directed at the perpetrator or a person close to him, is present and

cannot be guarded against in any other way. Unlike under StGB §34, the legal interests in question are limited in number (numerus clausus). The danger constituting the ground of excuse must be directed at a right belonging to the perpetrator, to the perpetrator’s family or to another third person close to the perpetrator. Who is included in the concept of family referred to in StGB §35 is specified in StGB §11(1)187. The conditions relating to the protection are the following: as regards the concept of danger, the conditions specified in StGB §35 apply. The act of protection must be the last resort, and must be the last and only means of guarding against the danger. Under StGB §35(1), sentence 2, if the perpetrator can be expected to endure the danger because he himself caused it or because he stands in a special legal relationship, he does not benefit from this ground of excuse, but his penalty may be reduced under StGB §49(1). In addition, the person must know that he is carrying out his act of protection against the danger within the scope of a state of necessity. Where all of these conditions are present in the concrete case, necessity as a ground of excuse exists188.

4. The Situation in which “Lawful Conduct Cannot Be Expected” as a General Ground of Excuse

Beyond necessity as a ground of excuse as regulated in StGB §35, some authors have, in the light of the general principles underlying the grounds of excuse, also contemplated, for the case in which lawful conduct cannot be expected, the situation that “the perpetrator cannot be expected to act lawfully”. It is stated, however, that such excessive individualisation could cause criminal law to be weakened and to become ineffective, and that formulations of this breadth are therefore largely rejected today189.

This does not, however, mean that the fact “that he cannot be expected to act lawfully” may not be used as an element of excuse in situations such as the “collision of duties”, whose distinguishing feature resembles “necessity as a ground of excuse”. If the perpetrator is able only to choose between two evils – e.g. a doctor in a Nazi concentration camp is caught between taking part (in a restrictive manner) in the selection of mentally ill persons for the gas chamber and making way for another, less reluctant colleague – and has made the choice of the lesser evil a matter of honour, he may be forgiven. Moreover, in relation to the subject as discussed so far, the fact that lawful conduct cannot be expected may not encompass culpability in conduct by omission190.

Whereas the law, by accepting grounds of justification, seeks to maintain the objective good of the majority, by accepting grounds of excuse it also recognises the irresistible subjective motive. But, like all exceptions, these too can constitute examples of good practice only as long as they are not turned into the rule191.

VIII. NECESSITY UNDER TURKISH CRIMINAL LAW

Necessity is regulated in paragraph 2 of Article 25 of the TCK. As we stated at the beginning of our study, the heading under which this article is placed in the TCK contains no explanation as to the legal characterisation of necessity. Accordingly, in legal scholarship some authors state that necessity is regulated as a ground of justification192 and others that it is regulated as a ground of excuse. The authors who accept that it is a ground of excuse, for their part, put forward differing views as to whether it needs to be divided into a “ground of justification” and a “ground of excuse”.

In legal scholarship Özbek states that necessity has two aspects, the first being necessity constituting a ground of justification and the second necessity constituting a ground of excuse that excludes culpability. The author observes that the legislature has regulated in the TCK the necessity that excludes culpability, but that this does not amount to denying the existence of a form of this necessity that also constitutes a ground of justification. Indeed, he states that §34 of the German Criminal Code regulates necessity constituting a ground of justification and §35 necessity excluding culpability, but that there are very important differences between the two. Those differences are as follows: 1- Whereas necessity constituting a ground of justification arises in respect of every legally protected right, such as life, limb, liberty, honour and property, necessity excluding culpability arises only in respect of present dangers to life, limb and liberty. 2- Whereas necessity constituting a ground of justification arises in respect of a danger directed at oneself or at another, necessity excluding culpability can arise in respect of oneself, a relative or a person close to one. 3- Finally, necessity excluding culpability does not apply in cases where the perpetrator himself caused the danger and where he foresaw the danger193. In another, later work of which he is a co-author, Özbek

states that the provision in the TCK contains, in a manner open to criticism, necessity both as a ground of justification and as a ground of excuse, but that the provision of Art. 223(3) CMK, which lays down that a decision that there is no ground for imposing a penalty is to be given on account of the absence of culpability, is decisive as regards the legal nature of necessity194.

Kangal is of the same view and states that necessity is divided in two, into a ground of justification and a ground of excuse, and ought to be regulated in that way; that if the legal interest which is faced with the danger and which the perpetrator seeks to protect is substantially superior to the legal interest of the innocent third person infringed by the act of rescue, necessity as a ground of justification should be accepted, and if they are equal, necessity as a ground of excuse should be accepted provided that the other limitations are also present195.

According to Koca, by contrast, the fact that the TCK does not accept necessity as a ground of justification is sound, both because of the effect which this ground has on the perpetrator’s will and because Art. 52(2) of the former Code of Obligations No. 818 attaches a sanction to it. For an act cannot be lawful in one branch of law and unlawful in another196. Nor is it sound to provide, as in the German Criminal Code (§34 and §35), for a distinction between necessity that removes unlawfulness and necessity that removes culpability. That distinction does not alter the essence of necessity. Indeed, a person in a state of necessity is aware that he is committing wrongdoing, yet, owing to the circumstances in which he finds himself, he is helplessly compelled to carry out that wrongdoing. In the case of grounds of justification, by contrast, the commission of the act is supported by the legal order and the person is authorised to commit such an act. For grounds of justification serve the purpose of protecting and maintaining the legal order. A person who commits an offence in a state of necessity, however, does not act for the purpose of protecting the legal order.

On the contrary, he even knows that his conduct constitutes wrongdoing. But the circumstances in which he finds himself do not make it possible for that person to behave as the legal order expects of him. For this reason the legal order regards that person as excused. As regards a superior’s order, if the order is lawful, carrying out such an order will likewise constitute the ground of justification of performance of a duty. Where, by contrast, an order that is unlawful but binding is concerned, carrying out such an order does not constitute a ground of justification for the person who carries it out. Since the person who gave such an order remains responsible, the act retains its unlawful character. If the order is unlawful, the fact that the person who carries it out cannot be held responsible does not stem from the existence of a ground of justification but from the fact that the culpability of the person carrying out the order is affected197.

Özgenç likewise makes a similar criticism and states that there is no need for such a distinction. According to the author, necessity is a ground of excuse affecting culpability. Faced with the differing views advanced in legal scholarship as to the legal nature of necessity, the German legislature, by the provision it made in the criminal code in 1975, adopting a pragmatic approach and following a middle course, subjected necessity to a distinction between a ground of justification and a ground of excuse. From the standpoint of the law as it ought to be, however, this need not be done198.

Similar criticisms are also voiced by German authors. According to Frisch, the legal basis for not punishing the perpetrator where grounds of excuse are present is a matter of debate in German law as well. While some authors identify the idea that conduct in conformity with the norm cannot be expected as the basis of the exemption from punishment in the case of grounds of excuse, other authors point, as that basis, to the combination of a diminution of wrongdoing and psychological pressure, which lowers the degree of the perpetrator’s culpability to a level that is insufficient for the imposition of punishment. Authors holding yet another view explain this basis as a consequence of the idea that the imposition of punishment is neither necessary nor appropriate. Moreover, what is debated is not only the legal basis of the exemption from punishment but also whether, and to what extent, there are unwritten grounds of excuse beyond those laid down in the statute. In addition, it is also disputed whether certain provisions in the field of culpability that preclude punishment are grounds of excuse or grounds extinguishing punishment199.

In the law of our country, by contrast, no such distinction currently exists at the level of statutory regulation. In legal scholarship, the need to draw this distinction has in recent years been voiced by the authors

whom we have mentioned above. Accordingly, although Art. 25(2) of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) is not explicit as to the legal nature of necessity, it can be seen, when the wording of Art. 223(3)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) and of the explanatory memorandum to Art. 25 TCK is taken into account, that necessity has been regulated as a circumstance excluding culpability200. In addition, some articles of the TCK provide for special cases of necessity relating to particular types of offence. For example, with regard to the offence of trafficking in organs or tissues, Art. 92 TCK provides: “Having regard to the social and economic conditions of the person who sells his or her organs or tissues, the penalty to be imposed on that person may be reduced, or the imposition of a penalty may be dispensed with altogether”. As this provision also shows, while as a rule no penalty is imposed on a person in a case of necessity, in certain special situations a reduction of the penalty to be imposed may also come into consideration. Similarly, the provision in Art. 147 TCK, headed “necessity”, according to which “Where the offence of theft is committed in order to meet a grave and urgent need, the penalty to be imposed may, depending on the particular features of the case, be reduced, or the imposition of a penalty may be dispensed with altogether”, is an example of the situation in question. On the other hand, in another special provision, Art. 30(4) TCK, headed “Disrupting the unity of the State and the integrity of the country”, which reads “No penalty shall be imposed on this account on a citizen who, being in the territory of an enemy State in time of war, was compelled to be taken into service in the army of that State”, exemption from punishment is provided for in the manner laid down for general necessity (Art. 25(2) TCK)201. As can be seen, in the TCK necessity has been regulated, both in the general provisions and in the special provisions, as a circumstance affecting culpability.

According to the view that accepts necessity both as a ground of justification and as a ground of excuse, liability for compensation arises in certain situations. For example, if the legal interest that the perpetrator seeks to protect is substantially superior to the infringed legal interest of the innocent third party, necessity is accepted as a ground of justification, and in that case no such obligation arises202. In recognising necessity as a ground of justification, this view weighs the interests203. The weighing of conflicting legal interests means giving precedence to one of two legally protected interests and preferring it to the other. If the statute lays down a rule as to which of the conflicting values is to prevail, a statutory basis exists as to which legal interest is to prevail in which situation. However, particularly in cases not specified by the statute, such a measuring of values against one another brings with it certain problems, to which we have also referred above. Indeed, in the German legal system, taken as a whole, this twofold distinction concerning necessity has its place. In our system of criminal law, proceeding also from the fact that it is not contained in the statute, it can be seen that the principle of a substantial preponderance of one value over another and, naturally, the criteria relating to it are absent. In determining which value is substantially superior when legal interests are compared, it may happen that the same approach is not taken in similar cases, and this may mean that results which are acceptable from the standpoint of justice and legal certainty are not always achieved. For this reason we consider that the distinction in question could, at this stage, give rise to problems for our country204.

On the other hand, by virtue of the principle of the unity of the legal order, it is expedient for there to be parallelism between criminal law and the other branches of law. However, when we examine our legislation as a whole, we can say, on the basis of the existing provisions, that necessity is not treated as a ground of justification, or that it cannot be examined by means of a twofold distinction205.

This situation is important not only for the question whether or not liability for compensation arises but also with regard to participation. If necessity is accepted as a ground of justification, the provisions on participation cannot be applied. This is because, under the rule of accessoriness (Art. 40 TCK), participation in an offence requires the existence of an act committed intentionally and unlawfully. However, since necessity is a ground excluding culpability, the existence of an unlawful act is accepted and the participation in question becomes possible206.

In conclusion, in the case of necessity, which is a ground of excuse, there is exemption from punishment because a person who possesses the capacity for culpability and the awareness of wrongdoing is, having regard to the circumstances of the situation in which he finds himself, not considered deserving of punishment207. For this reason, as we have also stated above, participation in an act committed in a state of necessity is possible, and liability for compensation also arises208.

In American criminal law the legal nature of necessity is generally accepted to be that of a ground of justification; indeed, in American criminal law necessity is regarded as the most typical example of the grounds of justification209.

CONCLUSION

It can be seen that the various elements of the offence – for example the statutory definition of the offence, wrongdoing and the perpetrator’s accountability for the offence, as well as the grounds of justification and the grounds of excuse by which these positive elements may be negated – must, as regards their characteristics, be examined in connection with one another. To date, in order to combine the elements of the offence in a particular hierarchical order, countless attempts

have been made. Although full consensus has still not been reached on every detail of this structure, at least some basic foundations and tiers have been widely accepted. Nevertheless, we must be aware that simplifying the various – positive and negative – elements of the offence by means of a scheme may not offer a complete solution either. More precisely, when one attempts to compare the expressions and patterns of the Continental European legal system with other systems of criminal law, for example with Anglo-Saxon law, it becomes apparent that sufficient similarities and a common terminology are lacking210.

In this context it can be seen that the Continental European theory of the offence has aspects that are clearly superior to the Anglo-Saxon theory of the offence. As to the first of these, it can be seen that structuring the constituent elements of the offence and the circumstances affecting exemption from punishment within a particular system and in the form of a pyramid is more suitable for the examination and systematisation of the offence, and in particular that, thanks to the gradation, ranking the missing elements – all of which lead to exemption from punishment – from the non-existence of the offence down to the slightness of culpability and of wrongdoing is more in keeping with the conscience of society and with the sense of justice that resides in our own conscience.

In the opening part of our article we stated that the regulation of the grounds of justification together with the circumstances affecting culpability and the grounds of excuse is the subject of significant criticism in legal scholarship. As a result of the explanations we have given so far, the necessity and importance of this distinction have emerged more clearly. The following reasons may be given for the necessity of drawing this distinction. First, grounds of justification remove not criminal liability but the unlawfulness of the act. Secondly, grounds of justification should not be assessed together with the circumstances affecting culpability and the grounds of excuse, since they concern two different elements. To designate the circumstances that exclude or diminish culpability as grounds excluding or diminishing criminal liability is not consistent with the theoretical structure of either institution. Thirdly, the expression “circumstance excluding criminal liability” is not correct either. In criminal law there are circumstances that exclude or reduce the penalty. Grounds of justification deprive the act of its unlawful character, whereas circumstances excluding culpability remove not criminal liability but culpability. In this context the expression “criminal liability” is not correct either. Although there is the concept of criminal capacity in this field, it has no connection with unlawfulness and relates to the capacity for culpability. Consequently, this regulation disregards an important distinction that has emerged in this field as the result of a long period of time and gives rise to a regulation that is contentious from a theoretical point of view. Accordingly, it must be stated that it would be more appropriate to regulate the grounds of justification and the grounds excluding or diminishing culpability under separate headings211. In addition, regulating the circumstances excluding and diminishing culpability and the grounds of excuse under the same main heading but under different headings would mean that these theoretical developments and their consequences are also recognised at the statutory level, which would enable the theory and the practice of criminal law to advance in parallel and far more detailed and satisfying case law to emerge.

Alongside all these differences and similarities, both in cases where grounds excluding culpability are present and in cases where grounds of excuse are present, a decision that there is no ground for imposing a penalty on the perpetrator on account of the absence of culpability is given pursuant to Art. 223(3)(b) CMK. Here the expression “on account of the absence of culpability” is mistaken. For where grounds of excuse are present, culpability does not disappear entirely. It merely does not reach the threshold that calls for the imposition of a penalty. Moreover, the sole reason for not imposing a penalty on the perpetrator in this situation does not relate to the perpetrator’s culpability. In addition to the diminution of the perpetrator’s culpability, the diminution of the content of wrongdoing of the act also removes the need to impose a penalty on the perpetrator. For this reason Article 223 of the CMK, which concerns the judgment, gives the impression that grounds of excuse have not been accepted by the legislature and that the circumstances which we regard as grounds of excuse have been assessed by the legislature as circumstances excluding culpability. Indeed, the practice of the Court of Cassation is also to this effect212. This assessment runs counter to the legal structure of the circumstances that have the nature of grounds of excuse. Besides, although the legislature, for example in the provision of Art. 27(2) TCK, which has the nature of a ground of excuse and according to which “if the exceeding of the limits of self-defence resulted from excitement, fear or agitation that may be regarded as excusable, no penalty shall be imposed on the perpetrator”, has expressly stated that the act in question is to be excused, the fact that Art. 223(3) CMK attaches to this situation the consequence that a judgment that there is no ground for imposing a penalty on account of the absence of culpability is to be given constitutes a contradiction. In our opinion this contradiction should be removed by expressly stating the legal nature of these provisions in the TCK. For it is a mistaken approach to try to clarify the nature of institutions of substantive law by regulating them in the procedural code213.

In our view there is no need to divide necessity into two as a ground of justification and a ground of excuse. For, as has also been stated above, this distinction does not alter the essence of necessity. In our view it is not sound to accept a matter resting on the same foundation as a ground of justification on the one hand and as a ground of excuse on the other. Consequently, in our view necessity is, from a theoretical perspective, a ground of excuse. Under the regulation of the TCK, however, it is a circumstance excluding culpability. Moreover, it is unnecessary to regulate necessity as a ground of justification.

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Footnotes

  1. Member of the Faculty in Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, Faculty of Law, Istanbul Medipol University. ↑
  2. Mehmet Emin Artuk/Ahmet Gökcen/A. Caner Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 7. Bası, Ankara, Adalet Yayınevi, 2013, s.370, 371. ↑
  3. Timur Demirbaş, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 9. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2013, s.254. ↑
  4. Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, s.371. See, for example: Sulhi Dönmezer/Sahir Erman, Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku, C.II, 12. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1999, kn.701-760; Ayhan Önder, Ceza Hukuku Dersleri, İstanbul, Filiz Kitabevi, 1992, s.226 vd.; Turhan Tufan Yüce, Ceza Hukuku Dersleri, C.I, Manisa, Şafak Basım ve Yayınevi, 1982, s.278 vd.; Yüksel Ersoy, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, Ankara, İmaj Yayıncılık, 2002, s.98, 99. ↑
  5. The reasons for this and the proposal that was made are explained as follows: “During our work on the new Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) in the Justice Sub-Committee of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM), we, as academics, had proposed that Part Two of Book One of the Code should contain two separate Chapters entitled “Grounds of Justification” and “Grounds Affecting Culpability”, and that the articles under the present Chapter Two should be reclassified and reformulated accordingly. However, we were unable to obtain a positive result from our initiative in this direction. Had our idea been realised, we would have regulated necessity not merely as a ground excluding culpability but, more generally, as a ground affecting culpability. However, since we did not succeed in this initiative, it became necessary to include separate provisions on necessity in the context of various offence definitions in the Book of Special Provisions of the Code.” İzzet Özgenç, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 9. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2013, s.403. ↑
  6. Veli Özer Özbek/Mehmet Nihat Kanbur/Koray Doğan/Pınar Bacaksız/İlker Tepe, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 4. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2013, s.355; Özgür Küçüktaşdemir, Türk Ceza Hukukunda Maddi ve Manevi Cebir, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2012, s.35. ↑
  7. Nur Centel/Hamide Zafer/Özlem Çakmut, Türk Ceza Hukukuna Giriş, 7. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2011, s.288; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, s.371. ↑
  8. The Report of the Justice Committee states that, because the nature of these institutions is still a matter of debate, the institutions in question were regulated in this way with regard solely to their legal consequences, so as not to be binding. See: İzzet Özgenç, Türk Ceza Kanunu Gazi Şerhi (Genel Hükümler), 3. Bası, Ankara, Adalet Bakanlığı Eğitim Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2006, s.47. On the other hand, those who put forward the view that imputability is an element of the offence state that the articles regulating imputability should not have been placed under this heading. See: Ersan Şen, “Ceza Sorumluluğunu Kaldıran ve Azaltan Nedenler”, Türk Ceza Kanununun 2. Yılı Sempozyumu, İstanbul, Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Yayını, 2008, s. 74. ↑
  9. Elvan Keçelioğlu, “Kusurluluğu Ortadan Kaldıran Sebeplerle Hukuka Uygunluk Sebepleri Arasındaki Ayrımın TCK’nın Uygulanması Bakımından Pratik Sonuçları”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, S.87, Mart-Nisan 2010, s.300. ↑
  10. David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th Edition, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, s.284. ↑
  11. Alec Buchanan, Phsychiatric Aspects of Justification; Excuse and Mitigation the Jurisprudence of Mental Abnormality in Anglo-American Criminal Law, London, Jessica Kingsley Publishers Ltd., 2000, s.22. ↑
  12. Albin Eser, “Justification and Excuse: A Key Issue in the Concept of Crime”, Rechtfertigung und Entschuldigung: rechtsvergleichende Perspektiven, Max-Planck-Inst. für ausländ und intern Strafrecht, Bd. 1, Freiburg, 1987, s.17-65. ↑
  13. For details of these debates and views see: Serkan Meraklı, “Mazeret Sebeplerinin Türk Ceza Kanunu Bakımından Değerlendirilmesi”, Ceza Hukuku Dergisi, Yıl 5, Sayı 12, 2010, s.262-264. ↑
  14. Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, Türk Ceza Hukuku, s.279, 280. ↑
  15. Mahmut Koca, “YTCK’da Hukuka Uygunluk Sebepleri”, Ceza Hukuku Dergisi, Yıl 1, Sayı 1, 2006, s.116. ↑
  16. Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, Türk Ceza Hukuku, s.356. ↑
  17. Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, s.372. ↑
  18. Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, Türk Ceza Hukuku, s.391. Bekar, by contrast, while accepting the grounds of excuse, states that these are the cases of the carrying out of an unlawful but binding order (Art. 24(2) TCK), the exceeding of the limits of self-defence owing to excitement, fear or agitation (Art. 27(2) TCK) and force and threat (Art. 28 TCK), and further states that the case of mistake as to the conditions of the grounds of excuse must also be dealt with within the scope of the grounds of excuse. Elif Bekar, Türk ve Amerikan Ceza Hukukunda Zorunluluk Hali, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2013, s.44, 45. ↑
  19. Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, Türk Ceza Hukuku, s.391; Meraklı, s.264. ↑
  20. Veli Özer Özbek/Koray Doğan, “Zorunluluk Halinin (TCK m.25/2) Hukuki Niteliği”, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi dergisi, C.9, S.2, İzmir 2007, s.198; Meraklı, s.265. ↑
  21. Walter Gropp, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 2. Auflage, Berlin Heidelberg New York, 2001, §7, kn.106. ↑
  22. Meraklı, s.265. For the views in question see also the same author, s.265-268. ↑
  23. Gropp, §7, kn.64; Meraklı, s.262. ↑
  24. Gropp, §7, kn.64; Meraklı, s.268, 269. ↑
  25. Meraklı, s.262. ↑
  26. “The decision that there is no ground for imposing a penalty is a new institution in our law. At the time of the former Code of Criminal Procedure (CMUK), both the local courts and the Court of Cassation used to give decisions that there was no ground for imposing a penalty. However, the absence of a ground for imposing a penalty formed the reasoning of the decision, and an acquittal was pronounced on that reasoning. The legislature has now incorporated this concept into the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) and created a situation similar to acquittal. However, the cases that require an acquittal and the cases that require a decision that there is no ground for imposing a penalty differ from one another.” Veli Özer Özbek/Mehmet Nihat Kanbur/Koray Doğan/Pınar Bacaksız/İlker Tepe, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku, 5. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2013, s.713. ↑
  27. It is, however, also rightly stated that the regulation introduced by Art. 223(3) CMK leads to the conclusion that the circumstances which we have accepted as grounds of excuse may be assessed as grounds excluding culpability. Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, Türk Ceza Hukuku, s.391. ↑
  28. Mahmut Koca/İlhan Üzülmez, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 6. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2013, s.282, 302, 305, 310. ↑
  29. Özgenç, Türk Ceza Hukuku, s.401-403. ↑
  30. Özgenç, Türk Ceza Hukuku, s.401, 408, 422. ↑
  31. Özgenç, Türk Ceza Hukuku, s.402. ↑
  32. Adem Sözüer, “Yeni Türk Ceza Kanunu Uygulamasında Sorular - Cevaplar”, Hukuki Perspektifler Dergisi, S.6, Mayıs 2006, s.230-233. ↑
  33. Adem Sözüer, Einführung in die Gesamtreform des Türkischen Strafrechts (I), İstanbul, Alfa Yayıncılık, 2006, s.43. ↑
  34. Bekar, s.43. ↑
  35. Özgenç, Türk Ceza Hukuku, s.401, 402. ↑
  36. However, it is not correct to state that it is only in the case of grounds of excuse that security measures are not applied; for no security measure is applied to the person in the case of mistake as to wrongdoing either, which is a ground excluding culpability but not a ground of excuse. See: Sözüer, Mazeret Sebepleri, s.230-233. ↑
  37. George P. Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comperative and International, Volume I: Foundations, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, s.19, 20. ↑
  38. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.19. ↑
  39. Even if it is not expressly stated in the criminal codes, this holds true at least for the prevailing theory of the offence. Examples of these are Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Latin America, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and – with certain reservations – Italy, Scandinavia and Türkiye. For a general assessment: Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, “Neue Strafrechtsdogmatik und Kriminalpolitik in rechtsvergleichender Sicht”, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, Vol. 98, Issue 1, 1985, s.7. ↑
  40. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.20. ↑
  41. George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, s.562; John Gardner, “Suçlar ve Savunmalar Hakkında Fletcher’in Görüşleri”, Çev: Elif Bekar, İÜHFM, C.LXVI, S.2, 2008, s.415; Eugene R. Milhizer, “Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are and What They Ought To Be”, St. John’s Law Review, Issue 3, Volume 78, Summer 2004, s.725 vd. ↑
  42. Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law Model Penal Code, New York, Foundation Press, 2002, s.209. ↑
  43. Dubber, s.186-189; Bekar, s.55. ↑
  44. Russell L. Weaver/Leslie W. Abramson/John M. Burkoff/Catherine Hancock, Criminal Law: Cases, Materials and Problems, American Casebook Series, St. Paul MN., Thomson-West, 2002, s.405. ↑
  45. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, Volume I, St. Paul MN., West, 1984, s.405. ↑
  46. Weaver/Abramson/Burkoff/Hancock, s.480; Bekar, s.55. ↑
  47. Dubber, s.194. ↑
  48. Robinson, Criminal Law, s.381-384. ↑
  49. Bekar, s.46; Robinson, Criminal Law, s.381-384. ↑
  50. David Crump/Neil P. Cohen/Laurie L. Levenson/John T. Parry/Penelope Pether, Criminal Law: Cases, Statutes and Lawyering Strategies, Second Edition, New Jersey, Lexis Nexis, 2010, s.370. ↑
  51. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, Fifth Edition, San Fransisco, Lexis Nexis, 2009, s.207. ↑
  52. Dressler, s.218; Bekar, s.55. ↑
  53. Paul H. Robinson, “A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm As A Prerequisite for Criminal Liability” UCLA Law Review, Vol.23, 1975-1976, s.276. ↑
  54. Dressler, s.218, 219; Bekar, s.56. ↑
  55. Dressler, s.219; Bekar, s.56. ↑
  56. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 521 S.E. 2d 293, 297; see: Dressler, s.219; Bekar, s.57. ↑
  57. Dressler, s.220; Bekar, s.57. ↑
  58. Dubber, s.194. ↑
  59. Bekar, s.64, 65. ↑
  60. George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, s.142. ↑
  61. Dressler, s.289; Bekar, s.59, 60. ↑
  62. Demirbaş, s.261. ↑
  63. Keçelioğlu, s.304, 305; Demirbaş, s.261. ↑
  64. Boaz Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal Law, Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2006, s.12. ↑
  65. Demirbaş, s.261. ↑
  66. Udo Ebert, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 3. Auflage, Heidelberg, 2001, s.92; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, s.449. ↑
  67. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.21. ↑
  68. For example, Demirbaş, while stating that unlawfulness is not included in culpability, states, because he accepts intent and negligence as forms of culpability, that culpability consists in the link between the act and the perpetrator, whereas unlawfulness is the expression of the connection between the legal order and, on the one hand, the perpetrator and, on the other, the act. Demirbaş, s.255. ↑
  69. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.21. ↑
  70. It is important that this method is described as “holistic”. For, since what is spoken of here is the holistic character of the method, a difficulty arises at this point with regard to the punishability of the act, owing to the inadequacy of Anglo-Saxon law in the matter of “structuring” and to the fact that it arrives at a result-oriented “whole” and has no perspective focused on “structure”. To the effect that the function of the structure of the offence is to create a more rational, predictable and equal system of criminal justice, see: Hans Heinrich Jescheck, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, 3d ed., Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1978, s.156-158; Joachim Hruschka, “Kann und sollte die Strafrechtswissenschaft systematisch sein?”, Juristenzeitung, 40. Jahrgang, 4 Januar 1985, s.1-10. ↑
  71. Hans Joachim Hirsch, “Kusur İlkesi ve Ceza Hukukundaki Fonksiyonu”, Çev: Yener Ünver, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı İçin Müzakereler, Konya, Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1998, s.298. ↑
  72. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.21-23. ↑
  73. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.23. ↑
  74. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.24. ↑
  75. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.24, 25. ↑
  76. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.25. ↑
  77. Demirbaş, s.260. ↑
  78. Demirbaş, s.261. ↑
  79. The same as the “public policy defenses” of American law; compare: Paul H. Robinson, “Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis” California Law Review, Vol.82, 1982, s.199, 203. ↑
  80. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.26. ↑
  81. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.26. ↑
  82. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.26, 27. ↑
  83. Cumhur Şahin/Neslihan Öztürk, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku II, 2. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2013, s.156. ↑
  84. In connection with the TCK, provision has been made for two kinds of judgment which bear the same name, namely “decision that there is no ground for imposing a penalty”, but differ in their nature and consequences. Whereas the decision that there is no ground for imposing a penalty on account of the absence of culpability is close to an acquittal, the decision that there is no ground for imposing a penalty is closer to a conviction, because the act retains its character as an offence. The difference between these two decisions bearing the same name becomes apparent, for example, in the criminal records. Under Article 4, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (g) of Law No. 5352 on Criminal Records, a decision that there is no ground for imposing a penalty given on account of effective remorse is among the information to be entered in the criminal record. By contrast, decisions that there is no ground for imposing a penalty given on account of the absence of culpability are not entered in the criminal record. Şahin/Öztürk, s.156, 157. ↑
  85. See: Albin Eser, “Reform of German Abortion Law”, American Journal of Comperative Law, No.34, 1986, s.369-383. ↑
  86. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.27, 28. ↑
  87. Meraklı, s.270. ↑
  88. Meraklı, s.270. ↑
  89. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.28. ↑
  90. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.28, 29. ↑
  91. This should not, of course, be taken to mean that criminal law is the only way of preventing social harm. For this reason there are in German law, beyond the dual-track system of sanctions, other measures not requiring punishment for the prevention of dangerous conduct, for example the obligation of mentally ill persons to undergo treatment or the withdrawal of a driving licence by an administrative decision. Accordingly, we may speak – in the system as a whole – of three-track or multi-track systems of preventive measures. These non-punitive measures, however, do not necessarily presuppose an offence. Rather, these measures may be imposed on account of the person’s mental and physical condition (for example, because he suffers from a contagious disease and, owing to that disease, becomes harmful to society) or for his own good (for example, in order to save the person from suicide). The preventive measures imposed by the criminal court merely constitute an alternative to punishment. Nevertheless, relying on the precondition that a wrongful act defined in criminal law may occur requires that there be certain indications of personal dangerousness. On the other hand, the imposition of a criminal sanction may also be ordered even though the perpetrator lacks the capacity for culpability. In this way it is ensured that the criminal court can give a decision in one way or another without being obliged to transfer the case to another court or to an administrative body. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.29, 30. ↑
  92. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.30. ↑
  93. StGB §32: “(1) Where a person commits an act made necessary by self-defence, his or her act is not unlawful. (2) Self-defence is the defence that is necessary in order to avert a present and unlawful attack directed against oneself or against another.” ↑
  94. StGB §33: “If the perpetrator exceeds the limits of self-defence out of confusion, fear or panic, he or she shall not be punished.” ↑
  95. Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, s.442. ↑
  96. Aykut Ersan, Ceza Hukukunda Meşru Savunma ve Meşru Savunmada Sınırın Aşılması, İstanbul, XII Levha Yayıncılık, 2013, s.126. ↑
  97. Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, s.446. ↑
  98. Koca, YTCK.’da Hukuka Uygunluk Sebepleri, s.147; Ersan, s.115 vd. ↑
  99. To the effect that it is a ground of excuse see: Adem Sözüer, “Prof. Dr. Dr. H.c. mult. Hans-Heinrich Jescheck’in Türk Ceza Hukuku Reformuna Katkıları”, Criminal Law in the Global Risk Society – Risk Altındaki Global Dünya Toplumu ve Ceza Hukuku, Ed: Ulrich Sieber/Feridun Yenisey, Series of the Max Planck Institute Foreign and International Criminal Law and Bahçehir University joint Research Group, 2011, s.266; Koca, YTCK’da Hukuka Uygunluk Sebepleri, s.147. ↑
  100. Öztürk/Erdem, s.230. ↑
  101. Ersan, 127. ↑
  102. Sözüer, Sorular ve Cevaplar, s.231; Ersan, 128. ↑
  103. Sözüer, Sorular ve Cevaplar, s.231; Ersan, 128. ↑
  104. Claus Roxin, “Rechtfertigungs und Entschuldigungsgründe in Abgrenzung von sonstigen Strafausschlieβungsgründen”, Rechtfertigung und Entschuldigung – Rechtsvergleichende Perspektiven – Band I, Ed: Albin Eser/George P. Fletcher, Freiburg i. Br., Max Planck Institut für Ausländisches und Internationales Strafrecht, 1987, s.236, 237. ↑
  105. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.32. ↑
  106. For details of the case and of the trial stage see: Doug Linder, “The Trial of Bernhard Goetz”, (Çevrimiçi) http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/goetz/goetzaccount.html, 15.1.2014. ↑
  107. For further details see: N.Y. Court of Appeals, People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y. 2d. 96 (1986), (Çevrimiçi) http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/archives/p_goetz.htm., 15.1.2014. ↑
  108. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.32, 33. ↑
  109. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.33, 34. ↑
  110. Meraklı, s.270, 271. ↑
  111. The clearest example is the separate provisions introduced for “necessity as a ground of justification” (StGB §34) and “necessity as a ground of excuse” (StGB §35). ↑
  112. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.34. ↑
  113. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.34, 35. ↑
  114. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.35. ↑
  115. George P. Fletcher, “Criminal Theory as an International Discipline: Reflections on the 1984 Freiburg Workshop: 1985”, Criminal Justice Ethics, Volume 4, Issue 1, 1985, s.60-77. ↑
  116. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.35, 36. ↑
  117. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.37. ↑
  118. Jescheck, Lehrbuch, s.159-172. ↑
  119. In this way we can find interesting similarities with the concept of mens rea in Anglo-Saxon law; see: Gerhard O. W. Mueller, “On Common Law Mens Rea”, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 1043, 1958, s.1060. ↑
  120. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.37, 38. ↑
  121. Rudolph von Jhering, Das Schuldmoment im römischen Privatrecht, Eine Festschrift, Gießen, Verlag Emil Roth, 1867. Cited in: Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.38, 39. ↑
  122. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.38, 39. ↑
  123. Jescheck, Lehrbuch, s.160. ↑
  124. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.39, 40. ↑
  125. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.40. ↑
  126. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.40, 41. ↑
  127. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.41. ↑
  128. See: Edmund Mezger, Strafrecht, ein Lehrbuch, München-Leipzig, 1931, 168. kısım; August Hegler, Die Merkmale des Verbrechens, 36 ZStW 19, 1915, s.31-38; cited in: Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.42, dn.46. ↑
  129. See: Eberhard Schmidt, Einführung in die Geschichte der deutschen Strafrechtspflege, Jurisprudenz in Einzeldarstellungen, Band 1, 3. Auflage, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965, 383. Kısım; cited in: Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.42. ↑
  130. Cf.: Mezger, 163. Kısım; Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.41-43. ↑
  131. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.43. ↑
  132. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.43, 44. ↑
  133. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.44. ↑
  134. James Goldschmidt, “Der Notstand, ein Schuldproblem”, 4 Österr. Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 1913, 144. Kısım; cited in: Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.44. ↑
  135. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.44, 45. ↑
  136. Jescheck, Lehrbuch, s. 283. ↑
  137. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.45, 46. ↑
  138. On the still disputed question whether the prohibited harm is to be seen primarily as harm to objective legal interests (Erfolgsunwert) or whether the essence of wrongdoing lies in the personal disvalue attached to the act (Handlungsunwert), see: Albin Eser, “The Principle of ‘Harm’ in the Concept of Crime”, Duquesne University Law Review, No.4, 1965-1966, s.345-417. ↑
  139. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.46, 47. ↑
  140. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.47. ↑
  141. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.47. ↑
  142. Alexander Graf zu Dohna, Die Rechtswidrigkeit als allgemeingültiges Merkmal in Tatbeständen strafbarer Handlungen, 1905, §48; Franz von Liszt/Eberhard Schmidt, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Strafrechts, 16. Auflage, 1932, §187; cited in: Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.47. ↑
  143. See: Hans Joachim Hirsch, Leipziger Kommentar zum Strafgezestbuch, 10. Auflage, Berlin, 1985, §32; Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.47, 48. ↑
  144. Mezger, s.207, 225. ↑
  145. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.48, 49. ↑
  146. Jescheck, Lehrbuch, s.268-282, 285. ↑
  147. Jescheck, Lehrbuch, s. 286-288. ↑
  148. Jescheck, Lehnrbuch, s.313-322. ↑
  149. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.49, 50. ↑
  150. Self-defence is one of the most important grounds of justification in Turkish criminal law as well; necessity, however, is in our view an excuse or at least a circumstance excluding culpability, and in this respect differs from German criminal law theory. ↑
  151. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.50. ↑
  152. On the theoretical foundations of self-defence, its place in the legal order and, in particular, its place and application in the Anglo-Saxon legal system see: Sangero, s.1 vd. ↑
  153. Sangero, s.6. ↑
  154. Cf.: Friedrich-Christian Schroeder, “Die Notwehr als Indikator politischer Grundanschauungen”, Festschrift für Reinhart Maurach zum 70, 1972, s.127. ↑
  155. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.51. ↑
  156. Jescheck, Lehnrbuch, s.270; Sangero, s.6. ↑
  157. Jescheck, Lehnrbuch, s.270. ↑
  158. Cf.: Claus Roxin, “Die “sozialethischen Einschränkungen” des Notwehrrechts”, ZStW, No.93, 1981, s.68-104. ↑
  159. In practice, because of the existence of public officials, whose primary task in their work is to provide defence in the public interest, this rule of defence in the public interest could not be maintained. The most instructive source on this point is a case reported in 5 BGHSt 245 (1954): the accused asserted, relying on the defence of others, that the photographing of an indecent act was lawful in the name of the public interest, but was unsuccessful. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.51. ↑
  160. An important case in the practice on this matter can be found at 71 RGSt 133 (1937). The accused was attacked by another guest in the courtyard of a lodging house and in this situation was caught between necessarily retreating into the lodging house and calling for the help of others before striking the attacker: “If it is possible for the person exercising self-defence to escape the present and unlawful attack without surrendering or without endangering his or her own legitimate interest, that is to say, if the act carried out by the person exercising self-defence is not necessary for the defence, that person is not justified here in infringing a legal interest of the attacker. Thus, so far as the circumstances permit, the person attacked is expected to accept the help of a third person who is able and ready to help.” As a principle this has been almost universally accepted. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.51. ↑
  161. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.51, 52. ↑
  162. See: Günter Spendel, Leipziger Kommentar, 10. Auflage, Berlin, 1982, no.224-230, 246; Paul Bockelmann, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 3. Auflage, München, 1979, s.94. ↑
  163. Schroeder, s.137. ↑
  164. Jürgen Baumann/Ulrich Weber, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 9. Auflage, Bielefeld, 1985, s.303; Roxin, s.78. ↑
  165. Schroeder, s.137. ↑
  166. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.53, 54. ↑
  167. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.54. ↑
  168. StGB §34: “Whoever, being in a present danger to life, limb, liberty, honour, property or another legal interest which cannot be averted otherwise, commits an offence in order to avert the danger from himself or herself or from another, does not act unlawfully if, upon comparison of the competing interests of the parties, in particular of the legal interests concerned and the degree of the danger threatening them, the protected interest substantially outweighs the threatened interest. However, this provision applies only in cases where the act committed is an appropriate means of averting the danger.” ↑
  169. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.54. ↑
  170. Meraklı, s.276, 277. ↑
  171. Kangal, s.103. For the decision and its assessment see: Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Band I, 4. Auflage, München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 2006 §16, No.4; Walter Gropp, “Alman Bakışına Göre Türk Ceza Kanunu 1989 Öntasarısında Hukuka Uygunluk Sebepleri”, Çev: Faruk Turhan, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı İçin Müzakereler, Konya, Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1998, s.218. ↑
  172. Thus, for example, a doctor’s breach of the principle of confidentiality is lawful where this act is done in order to prevent a person who is not qualified to drive from driving a car (BGH, 1968 NJW 2288), and a similar situation exists where property is entered without permission in order to prevent drug dealing (OLG München, 1972 NJW 2275). Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.54, 55. ↑
  173. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, s.140, 141; Bekar, s.68. ↑
  174. Özbek/Doğan, s.209. ↑
  175. For a detailed explanation of the conditions in question see: Meraklı, s.276-278. ↑
  176. Maurach/Zipf, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Teilband 1, 6. Auflage, Heidelberg, 1983, s.364-366; Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.55. ↑
  177. Jescheck, Lehrbuch, s.201; Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.55, 56. ↑
  178. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.56. ↑
  179. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.57. ↑
  180. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.57, 58. ↑
  181. Baumann/Weber, s.442. ↑
  182. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.58. ↑
  183. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.59. ↑
  184. StGB §35: “(1) Whoever, being in a present danger to life, limb or liberty which cannot be averted otherwise, commits an unlawful act in order to avert the danger from himself or herself, from a member of his or her family or from a person close to him or her, is not deemed culpable. The above provision does not apply if, in the circumstances of the case, in particular because the perpetrator himself or herself caused the danger or because he or she stands in a special legal relationship, the perpetrator can be expected to endure the danger; however, for the penalty to be capable of being reduced pursuant to §49(1), the perpetrator must not be under an obligation to endure the danger on account of a special legal relationship. (2) If, in committing the act, the perpetrator mistakenly assumes the existence of circumstances which would be capable of excluding his or her culpability under paragraph 1, he or she is punished only in cases where it was possible for him or her to avoid the mistake. The penalty is reduced pursuant to §49(1).” ↑
  185. Hirsch, n.62; Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.59, 60. ↑
  186. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.60. ↑
  187. Özbek/Doğan, s.212; Meraklı, s.279. ↑
  188. StGB §11(1): “For the purposes of this Code, 1. the term family member means: a person who is one of the persons listed below. A) Relatives by blood in the direct line and relatives by marriage, the spouse, the partner in a same-sex marriage, the fiancé or fiancée, including those within the meaning of the Act on Life Partnership (Marriage of Same-Sex Persons), siblings, the spouses and same-sex partners of siblings, and the siblings of spouses and of partners in a same-sex marriage, even if the marriage or same-sex marriage which gave rise to the relationship no longer exists or the relationship by blood or by marriage has ended. 2. Foster parents or foster children. ↑
  189. For a detailed explanation of the conditions in question see: Meraklı, s.279-281. ↑
  190. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.60. ↑
  191. Jescheck, Lehrbuch, s. 515; Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.61. ↑
  192. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.61. ↑
  193. Kayıhan İçel/A. Hakan Evik, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, C.II, 4. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2007, s.132; Bahri Öztürk/Mustafa Ruhan Erdem, Uygulamalı Ceza Hukuku ve Güvenlik Tedbirleri Kanunu, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2008, s.206; Ali Kemal Yıldız, 5237 Sayılı Türk Ceza Kanunu – Açıklamalar Değerlendirmeler Öğretiden Görüşler ve Yargıtay Kararları, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayını, 2007, s.51; Yener Ünver, “YTCK’da Kusurluluk”, Ceza Hukuku Dergisi, S.1, Eylül, 2006, s.59; Nevzat Toroslu, Ceza Hukukunda Zaruret Hali, Ankara, Sevinç Matbaası, 1968, s.67, 68; Hafızoğulları, s.367; Meraklı, s.284. ↑
  194. Veli Özer Özbek, TCK İzmir Şerhi: Yeni Türk Ceza Kanununun Anlamı, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2005, s.322. To the same effect: Hamide Zafer, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2010, s.227. ↑
  195. Özbek/Doğan, s.218. ↑
  196. Zeynel Kangal, Ceza Hukukunda Zorunluluk Durumu, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2010, s.42, 48, 55. ↑
  197. However, the Code of Obligations No. 818 referred to by Koca in his article has been repealed and the Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098 (TBK) has entered into force in its place. Under the law of obligations, compensation based on equity must be paid to the third party who has suffered loss as a result of an act committed in a state of necessity. The basis of this obligation is Article 52 of the former Code of Obligations No. 818. While Articles 62 and 63 of the new Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098 contain a regulation parallel to that of the Code of Obligations No. 818, the expression “zorunluluk hali” (necessity) has been used in line with the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK). Whereas the Code of Obligations No. 818 contained no clear statement as to the legal nature of necessity, Article 63 of the TBK expressly states that necessity is a ground of justification. The picture that emerges from this characterisation is as follows: from the standpoint of criminal law, the act committed by the person in a state of necessity retains its unlawfulness, but the perpetrator bears no criminal liability for this act (culpability and the content of wrongdoing have diminished to such an extent that they do not deserve punishment). From the standpoint of the law of obligations, by contrast, the act committed is lawful, but liability for compensation arises from this act (balancing of interests). This constitutes a contradiction in the light of the principle of the “unity of lawfulness”. Consequently, the articles on necessity contained in the TBK need to be brought into line with the new theory of the offence contained in the TCK. Bekar, s.86, 87. ↑
  198. Koca, s.129, 13. ↑
  199. Özgenç, 9. Bası, s.401. ↑
  200. Wolfgang Frisch, “Hukuk Devleti Ceza Hukukunda Cezalandırılabilirliğin Esaslı Şartları”, Çev: Hakan Hakeri, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı İçin Müzakereler, Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, Konya, 1998, s.127, 128. ↑
  201. Bekar, s.80. ↑
  202. Bekar, s.81. ↑
  203. Kangal, s.48. ↑
  204. Zafer, s.227, 228. ↑
  205. Bekar, s.87, 88. ↑
  206. Bekar, s.88. ↑
  207. Bekar, s.88. ↑
  208. Sözüer, Mazeret Sebepleri, s.230-233. ↑
  209. Bekar, s.88. ↑
  210. Dubber, s.194. ↑
  211. Eser, Justification and Excuse, s.61-63. ↑
  212. Özbek/Kanbur/Doğan/Bacaksız/Tepe, Türk Ceza Hukuku, s.282. ↑
  213. “…On the other hand, whereas necessity was accepted as a ground of justification in the TCK No. 765, it has been classed in the TCK No. 5237 as a ground excluding culpability; consequently, in the application of the TCK No. 5237, the decision to be given in respect of a person who commits an offence in a state of necessity is not an ‘acquittal’ but, pursuant to Art. 25(2) of the TCK, a decision that ‘there is no ground for imposing a penalty’. This point is also clearly apparent from Art. 223(3)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 (CMK)…” Yargıtay Ceza Genel Kurulu, Kt. 19.2.2013, E. 2012/8-1551, K. 2013/64. Kazancı İçtihat Programı. ↑
  214. Meraklı, s.272, 273. ↑

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