Introduction
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
The increasingly widespread use before judicial authorities of information and documents that contain personal data and were obtained by unlawful methods, and the claims of data subjects in response that their rights have been violated, have brought the matter before the courts and made it necessary for it to be resolved by them. The European Court of Human Rights (the Court/ECtHR) recently delivered its judgment in “Benedik v. Slovenia” after examining precisely this issue, on an applicant’s complaint of a violation of rights on the ground that the police had unlawfully gathered information in a way that led to the applicant’s identity being revealed.
In order to understand whether there can be exceptions to the rule on whether evidence that contains personal data and was obtained by unlawful methods may be used against the data subject, I will first describe how the case that is the subject of the application came before the Court and then explain on what grounds it was examined under Article 8. I will then assess whether there was an interference with the applicant’s right and, if so, whether that interference was legitimate, and try to determine whether the case complied with Article 8. In doing so I will address the matter from three different angles: the lawfulness of obtaining the subscriber information; the problem of unlawfully obtained evidence in respect of the identity information allegedly obtained by unlawful methods; and the protection of personal data, since the information constitutes personal data.
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger*
Whether information and documents which, having been obtained by unlawful methods, constitute unlawfully obtained evidence may be used as evidence at the various stages of the proceedings and, if it is accepted that as a rule they may not, whether there can be exceptions to that rule, is a controversial issue in every other country of the world just as it is in ours. The debate on unlawfully obtained evidence is a phenomenon that has been known since very early times on account of recourse to prohibited methods such as torture and ill-treatment; the subject has been much discussed, has been dealt with in numerous publications and scholarly events and, finally, has been addressed in a large number of national and supranational legal texts. The fact that, with the development of technology, the possibilities offered by information systems have given rise to new unlawful methods and have also made existing methods easier to apply has made it necessary today to approach the phenomenon of unlawfully obtained evidence from different angles. Yet evidence obtained by means of, or with the help of, technology has not been the subject of such widespread debate, nor has it yet found its way into legal texts to the extent expected.
On the other hand, electronic applications that have entered our lives as a result of the innovations brought about, again, by technology, in particular websites, social media applications, biometric systems or cameras, have made individuals more transparent and easier to monitor. The data of individuals can thus be accessed with ease and be subjected to processing without a legitimate purpose or the consent of the individual. Starting from the idea that the data of individuals are in danger and must therefore be protected, this situation gave rise to the right to the protection of personal data. Today, in almost every country of the world, the protection of personal data is protected and safeguarded as a right by statutory rules. Even in countries where no special law on the subject has yet entered into force, work on the protection of personal data continues.
The period in which personal data are more easily accessible and individuals are more visible and easier to monitor runs parallel with the growing ease and prevalence of obtaining such data by unlawful means. For this reason, the unlawful obtaining and processing of personal data is frequently encountered today. Personal data obtained by unlawful methods are obtained by law enforcement or judicial authorities and used at the trial stage, and may also be introduced into the proceedings through one of the parties to them.
The party whose personal data have been unlawfully obtained and used as a means of proof against him objects, in the face of this situation, that his right to the protection of personal data has been violated and that data of this nature may in no way be used against him. Indeed, such a party may raise this objection by way of defence in the proceedings conducted against him, and may also assert it in a separate action. This situation has added a new dimension to the question whether evidence obtained by unlawful methods and containing personal data may be used in proceedings, and has made it necessary to address unlawfully obtained evidence in the context of the right to the protection of personal data.
The increasingly widespread use before the judicial authorities of information and documents obtained by unlawful methods and containing personal data, and the fact that the person to whom the personal data belong claims in response that his rights have been violated, have brought the matter before the courts and made it necessary for it to be resolved through them. The European Court of Human Rights (the Court/ECtHR), too, recently delivered its judgment in “Benedik v. Slovenia”1 following an examination of precisely this issue, upon the complaint of an applicant that his rights had been violated because information had been gathered by the police through illegal means in such a way as to lead to the disclosure of his identity.
In order to understand whether there can be exceptions to the rule on whether evidence obtained by unlawful methods and containing personal data may be used against the person to whom the data belong, I shall first describe how the events giving rise to the application came before the Court and then explain on what grounds they were examined under Article 8. I shall then seek to determine whether the events at issue were compatible with Article 8 by assessing whether there was an interference with the applicant’s right and, if so, whether that interference was legitimate. In making that determination, I shall address the subject from three different angles: the lawfulness of the obtaining of the subscriber information; the problem of unlawfully obtained evidence as regards the identity information allegedly obtained by unlawful methods; and, since the information constitutes personal data, the protection of personal data. In this context I shall set out my own views in the light of the Court’s decision and reasoning in the case at issue and of its judgments on similar subjects, and shall offer an assessment of the problem of unlawfully obtained evidence in the context of the protection of personal data.
I. The Events Giving Rise to the Application and How They Came Before the Court
The case concerns the finding that the applicant, Igor Benedik, who was born in 1977 and lives in the town of Kranj in Slovenia, had committed the offence of displaying, producing, possessing and distributing pornographic material; that finding was the result of monitoring conducted in 2006 by the judicial authorities of the Canton of Valais in respect of the users of the “Razorback” network. In the course of their monitoring, the judicial authorities of the Canton of Valais established that some users held content in the form of pictures or videos and shared that content by means of a p2p (peer-to-peer) file-sharing network in which each of the connected computers functioned both as a user and as a server. Every user on that network was thus able not only to access the files shared by another user but also to download them.
After the IP addresses found to have connected to the network in question had been obtained as a result of the inquiry conducted by the Swiss police, the Slovenian police, on 7 August 2006, requested an internet service provider company (the ISP) to disclose the data of the person to whom the IP address obtained had been assigned at the specified date and time. The police did not base this request on any court order but relied on the relevant provision of the Slovenian Code of Criminal Procedure (SCMK), which provided that operators of electronic communications had to disclose to the police information on the users or owners of means of electronic communication whose details were not available in the relevant directory. Thereupon the ISP disclosed to the police, in respect of the IP address indicated, the name and address of the applicant’s father, since he was the subscriber to the internet service. Subsequently, relying on a court order of 14 December 2006 obtained from the investigating judge of the Kranj District Court, the police requested and received from the ISP the personal information and the traffic data of the subscriber of the IP address in question. Lastly, on the basis of a search warrant that had been obtained, the house belonging to the applicant’s father was searched and four computers were seized.
The examination of the hard disks of the computers seized by the police revealed a file containing child pornography, and it was further established that the files downloaded by means of the file-sharing program called eMule also included child pornography. Despite the applicant’s submissions that he had not been aware of the files in question and that the ISP had unlawfully handed his personal data to the police without a court order, on 5 March 2008 the investigating judge of the Kranj District Court opened an investigation against the applicant for the offence of displaying, producing, possessing and distributing pornographic material. However, an objection was lodged against the decision to open the investigation on the ground that the identity information and the traffic data of the user of the IP address in question ought not to have been disclosed without a court order, failing which the evidence would have been obtained by unlawful means.
At the end of the trial it was held that the applicant had committed the offence in question and he was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment. It was further found that the data alleged to have been obtained by unlawful means had been obtained in accordance with the Slovenian Code of Criminal Procedure and that there was therefore no unlawfully obtained evidence.
Against the judgment of the court of first instance the applicant lodged objections with the Ljubljana Higher Court and then with the Supreme Court, arguing that all evidence based on data obtained by unlawful means also had to be excluded; those objections were, however, dismissed. Noteworthy at this point is the view of the Supreme Court that the Slovenian police had not obtained the applicant’s electronic communications traffic data but had merely gained access to the information of a particular user accessing the internet.
The individual application lodged by the applicant with the Constitutional Court was also dismissed, on the ground that his constitutional rights had not been violated, despite the view of the Information Commissioner that the provisions of the Electronic Communications Act in force required a court order for all data relating to electronic communications, irrespective of whether they concerned traffic data or identity data, and that the relevant provision of the SCMK, which regarded a mere written request by the police as sufficient for obtaining data relating to the persons communicating, was problematic. A dissenting opinion was appended to this decision of the Constitutional Court by Judge J. Sovdat:
• Judge J. Sovdat stated, first, that the provisions to be applied were the relevant provisions of the Electronic Communications Act, since they were more recent than the SCMK, and that under those provisions the police, if they wished to gain access to the subscriber’s identity information, had to obtain a court order. The judge further took the view that, by the decision it had given, the Constitutional Court
did not protect traffic data separately from and independently of the content of communications, and that this was not lawful. The judge also emphasised that, contrary to what the Constitutional Court asserted, the applicant had not made himself public under his own name, and that the only thing made public was the digits of the IP addresses.
• Judge Jadek Pensa, too, in a dissenting opinion, dwelt on the applicant’s expectation of anonymity on the internet. According to that opinion, the applicant had not made public the data that would reveal his identity. He was therefore entitled to require that those data be kept confidential. In this context, although there was a provision of the SCMK on which the police had based their request, that provision did not relate directly to the confidentiality of electronic communications and the protection of that confidentiality, and the Electronic Communications Act, which had the character of a special law, was in force. Since that Act provided that the confidentiality of communications could be interfered with only on the basis of a decision of a competent authority, the conclusion reached was that the police had been required to obtain a court order.
Having thus exhausted all domestic remedies, the applicant lodged an application with the Court against the Republic of Slovenia on the basis of Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights, entitled “Individual applications”, which governs applications to the Court by natural persons, alleging a violation of his rights, in particular under Article 8 of the Convention, entitled “Right to respect for private and family life”.
II. Assessment of the Judgment from the Standpoint of a Violation of Article 8 of the ECHR
Article 8 of the ECHR protects everyone’s right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. Interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right is possible only where the interference is in accordance with the law and is a measure that is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
The applicant complained that the police had obtained the subscriber data associated with the dynamic IP address and that, as a result, his identity had been revealed arbitrarily, without a court order and in breach of Article 8 of the Convention, and that his right to respect for his private life had therefore been violated. The judgment accordingly examines the case from the standpoint of Article 8.
A. The Court assessed the events giving rise to the application under Article 8
Although Article 8 of the Convention, in essence, directly provides only for the right to respect for a person’s private and family life, it is clear that this right indirectly affects, and encompasses, many other rights. Taken together, “private life” and “correspondence” afford legal protection to almost all the attributes and conduct that define an individual’s identity as a human being, including the expectation of keeping interpersonal communications away from the prying eyes of the State. In various judgments the Court has stated that the notion of private life is not confined to a person’s private sphere or to information of a secret nature, thereby seeking to prevent the scope of private life from being construed narrowly.
On this subject the Court takes the view that it is neither possible nor necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of “private life”. It has nevertheless stated that it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an “inner circle” in which the individual may live his own private life as he chooses and to exclude entirely from it the outside world not encompassed within that circle, and that the right to private life must also comprise, to a certain degree, the establishment and maintenance of relationships with other human beings. Accordingly, the ECtHR expressly states that private life must comprise, for example, “the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings”2.
In addition, a person’s name3, ethnic identity4, gender identity/sexual life5, photographs and images6, personal data7, fingerprints and DNA profiles8 and medical data9 have also been dealt with by the Court in its judgments as falling within private life. In a case brought before it on a complaint concerning the interception of telephone conversations by the Ministry of the Interior at the request of the police, the Court concluded that data relating to communications10 fell within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention and was firmly satisfied that there had been an interference with the right to respect for private life11.
In the judgment under review, the traffic data relating to the person which were disclosed at the request of the police are any data processed for the purpose of the conveyance of a communication on an electronic communications network, and it is clear that IP addresses are included in such traffic data. Even if the service provider handed to the police only the data identifying a person who had a subscription contract with it, in so doing it in fact also handed over the traffic data relating to that person on the electronic communications network. Thus, in order to determine whether the events in which a person’s communications data were disclosed may be examined under Article 8 of the Convention or not, the relationship between communications data and private life must be established. As mentioned above, the Court has dealt with communications data in that context in its earlier judgments.
With regard to the case, the Court stated that there are a number of elements relevant to assessing whether a person’s private life is put at risk by measures affecting him outside his own home or private property. In order to ascertain whether the notions of “private life” and “correspondence” apply, it must be assessed whether individuals had a reasonable expectation that their privacy would be respected and protected. In this context, in the present case too, regard being had to the publicly accessible nature of the network in question, it must be examined whether the applicant had a reasonable expectation that his privacy would be respected and protected.
In assessing the applicant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the Slovenian Constitutional Court attached importance to his participation in the Razorback network. It took the view that the applicant, who had knowingly done nothing whatsoever to conceal his online activity and the dynamic IP address associated with it, had consciously exposed himself to the public and therefore had no legitimate expectation of privacy. According to the Constitutional Court, in such circumstances the applicant’s expectation could not be said to be legitimate and, more importantly, he might even be considered to have waived that expectation.
The ECtHR, however, does not agree with the Constitutional Court and considers that the fact that the applicant did not conceal his dynamic IP address should not be taken as the yardstick in assessing objectively whether the expectation in question was reasonable. In the Court’s view, what must be taken as the basis is not the applicant’s expectation with regard to his dynamic IP address but his expectation with regard to his identity. In the examination conducted along those lines, since there was no allegation that the applicant had disclosed his identity in the online activity in question or that he was, for example, identifiable by the website provider through an account or contact data, the Court concluded that the applicant’s activity was associated with anonymity and that there could therefore be no question of his having made his identity public.
Since communications data are, as is well established, examined as falling within private life, and since it is apparent that the applicant, whose communications data were taken without his consent, did not make those data public and may therefore have had a reasonable expectation of privacy, it is legally sound for the present case to be examined from the standpoint of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
B. Assessment of the compatibility of the events giving rise to the application with Article 8
Having reached the view that the case before it fell within the scope of private life, the Court assessed it from the standpoint of compliance with Article 8 of the Convention. I, too, as explained in detail above, consider that Article 8 must be applied to the events, which came about through the applicant’s unlawfully obtained communications data revealing his identity. What must be done next is to examine the applicant’s allegation that the right concerned was violated. In the present case, examined under Article 8 of the Convention, did the authorities act in conformity with that Article, as the Government maintained, or was the applicant’s right to respect for his private life violated?
1. Whether there was an interference with the applicant’s right
In order to examine whether the events at issue were compatible with the Convention, the first step is to assess whether there was an interference with the applicant’s right concerned. Here it must first be established whether the disclosure of the applicant’s identity really constituted an interference with the right to respect for private and family life.
What was at issue in the case was the use of subscriber information which the police had acquired upon a request addressed to the ISP, an internet service provider company, and which revealed the applicant’s identity. Moreover, that request was complied with in the absence of any court order. Yet, particularly in communications conducted by means of communication devices, individuals have a reasonable expectation that the confidentiality of these data will be respected and protected. In the present case, too, although the network in question was publicly accessible, it is clear that the applicant had given no consent to, and made no waiver in respect of, the disclosure of his identity. Although the applicant had a reasonable expectation that his privacy would be respected and protected, the data covered by that expectation were obtained without his consent and used against him. In this context I am of the opinion, in line with the Court, that the applicant was unable to benefit from notions protected by Article 8 of the Convention such as the privacy of private life, the protection of private life and respect for private life, and that there was an interference with those rights.
2. The legitimacy of the interference with the applicant’s right
It is clear that the act carried out by handing the applicant’s subscriber information to the police and thereby revealing his identity amounted to an interference under Article 8 of the Convention. Interferences with fundamental rights and freedoms may, however, be regarded as legitimate depending on the particular circumstances in which the events occurred. It cannot therefore be said that every interference is unlawful, and the existence of such unlawfulness must be examined separately. In order to establish whether the interference carried out was legitimate, an examination must be conducted as follows, in line with the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention12:
• In accordance with the law: This notion means, first of all, that the measure applied must have a legal basis in domestic law, but it also relates to the content of the law. The measure must in addition be accessible to the person concerned, the consequences that will arise for him must be foreseeable, and it must be compatible with the principle of the rule of law. On the basis of the Convention and the case law of the ECtHR, it can be seen that the legitimacy of an interference under Article 8 of the Convention depends, first of all, on the interference in question being carried out in accordance with the law. Where it is found that the interference does not satisfy the requirement of lawfulness, the conclusion is reached that the interference is in breach of the Article concerned, without regard to the other criteria set out in paragraph (2) of Article 8 of the Convention13.
• Legitimate aim: The aim of the act can be said to be legitimate where the interference is a measure that is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. For the interference to be regarded as legitimate, it must pursue a legitimate aim.
• Necessity in a democratic society: The last point to be examined is whether the interference carried out in order to achieve the legitimate aim referred to above is necessary in a democratic society. The criterion of necessity in a democratic society is, in turn, determined by examining whether the interference “answers a pressing social need” and whether it is “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”. What calls for attention at this point is from whose perspective the criterion of necessity is to be addressed. Although the ECtHR underlines that it is for the Court itself to judge whether the reasons are sufficient and effective, it accepts that the power to assess whether the interference is necessary and relevant belongs in the first place to the national authorities. In this connection the Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation which varies according to the nature of the activity that is the subject of the proceedings and the aim of the restriction14.
a. Lawfulness from the standpoint of the method by which the subscriber information was obtained
In the case at issue, the request by the police for the subscriber information associated with the dynamic IP address in question was based on the SCMK. Under the provision concerned, where the conditions listed in it are met, the police may, in order to detect an offence, request the operator of the electronic communications network in writing to hand over the information to them even without the consent of the person to whom the information relates. It may therefore be said that the interference carried out in the present case had a basis in domestic law.
However, in order to be able to say that the criterion of being in accordance with the law is met, it is not sufficient for the act constituting the interference to be set out in statutory provisions. Being in accordance with the law means not only that the interference is provided for by statutory provisions of domestic law but also that the law in question is accessible and foreseeable and, moreover, compatible with the rule of law15. On the other hand, the ECtHR is also bound to examine whether the manner in which that domestic law is applied produces consequences that are consistent with the principles of the Convention. A statutory provision existing in domestic law will therefore also be examined from these angles.
The Court emphasises that, for a law to be regarded as accessible and foreseeable, the provision concerned must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable a person to regulate his conduct16. It can accordingly be said that, viewed objectively, the provision forming the basis of the interference in the present case was accessible and foreseeable. Compatibility with the rule of law, by contrast, requires domestic law to afford adequate protection against arbitrary infringements of the rights under Article 817. Therefore, for the Court to be able to reach the view that there is compatibility with the rule of law, domestic law must contain adequate and necessary safeguards against the interference. The existence of such safeguards means that the reasons justifying the measure, and the scope and limits of the power or procedure in question, are defined.
In the case at issue, although the interference was based on the relevant provision of the SCMK, that provision does not contain precise rules on the relationship between a dynamic IP address and subscriber information. Furthermore, the Slovenian Constitution provides that an interference with the confidentiality of communications is possible only by court order. On the other hand, the Electronic Communications Act, which at the material time had the status of a special law on the subject, did not contain any provision either that made it possible to access traffic data for the purposes of a criminal investigation. The legislation on the subject was therefore not coherent. In such circumstances, were the Court to decide which provision ought to be applied, it would be taking the place of the national courts. By its very nature, however, the Court has no such power. It must therefore, rather than doing so, conduct its examination by turning to the way in which the domestic courts viewed the matter.
In assessing the decisions given by the domestic courts on the matter, the ECtHR attaches importance to the provision of the Slovenian Constitution according to which a court order is required for a measure of this kind. Accordingly, the identity of a person who is communicating is one of the important aspects of the confidentiality of communications, and the disclosure of subscriber information associated with a particular dynamic IP address is, as a rule, subject to a court order; it should not be obtainable by a simple written request from the police. The Court also disagrees with the view of the Constitutional Court that the applicant had waived his expectation of privacy and underlines that there is no concrete evidence whatsoever showing this. It can therefore be said that the applicant had a reasonable expectation that his identity information would remain confidential. Moreover, since in the present case there was no compelling circumstance that tied the hands of the police as regards obtaining a court order, a court order was indispensable for this information to be obtained.
In the light of all these explanations, the Court reached the view that domestic law afforded no protection whatsoever against unwarranted and, indeed, arbitrary interferences. For although domestic law obliged internet service providers to hand over data on a large scale to the police, it did not provide, at the material time, for an independent supervisory mechanism to review the exercise of this power by the police. According to the Court, the legal basis of the impugned interference lacked clarity and no adequate protection had been afforded against arbitrary interferences with regard to Article 8. It can thus be seen that the Court came to the view that domestic law did not comply with the principle of the rule of law.
b. The problem of the use of data obtained by unlawful methods
The fact that the subscriber information was obtained on the basis of a statutory provision that does not comply with the principle of the rule of law, and that the Slovenian Constitution provides that interferences with the confidentiality of communications are possible by court order, leads to the conclusion that the method applied in the present case to obtain the identity information was unlawful. At this point the problem of unlawfully obtained evidence arises. It is therefore necessary to touch upon the Court’s decisions and views on whether information and findings obtained by unlawful methods may be used at any stage of the proceedings.
The Court states that its own views on the admissibility of a piece of evidence on account of its unlawfulness cannot take the place of the views of the national courts on that matter. Proceeding from this, it has refrained from laying down rules and principles on the prohibitions of unlawfully obtained evidence that all States Parties would be obliged to observe. It carries out its own assessment by reference to whether the proceedings were fair. Although the right to a fair trial is guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, that Article does not contain any rule on the admissibility of evidence. The resolution of this question has therefore been left in the first place to the national courts. The discretion exercised by the national courts on the matter, for its part, is not subjected by the Court to an assessment specifically in terms of prohibitions of evidence but to an overall assessment in the context of the case as a whole. The sole exception is where the national courts, notwithstanding the facts submitted to them, give an arbitrary or grossly unjust decision. That said, even though the Court has left the discretion on the matter to the national courts, it is inevitable that, through the judgments it delivers, it will be binding on, or at least provide guidance for, the domestic legal order and the courts.
In cases brought before it on the allegation that unlawfully obtained evidence was used against the applicant, the Court does not concern itself with specific questions such as the classification of evidence or the exclusion of particular evidence from the basis of the judgment; rather, it seeks to determine whether the applicant’s right to a fair trial was violated by looking at the proceedings as a whole. The Court’s essential point of departure therefore lies in whether the proceedings as a whole were fair18.
In the present case, the applicant’s subscriber information was unlawfully obtained by the police through the internet service provider, and the evidence subsequently reached by seizing the applicant’s computers became available only in the light of that unlawfully obtained information. It was thanks to the information they had obtained by unlawful methods that the police reached the evidence forming the basis of the proceedings.
In this context the Court ought also to have examined the case at issue from the standpoint of the theory of unlawfully obtained evidence. The Court does not, however, appear to have conducted any examination in terms of unlawfully obtained evidence and the right to a fair trial. While I regard this as a shortcoming19, I attribute the fact that it did not conduct an examination from this angle in the present case to the fact that the police were able to base their request on a statutory provision. The request by the police for the subscriber information from the internet service provider, and the disclosure of that information to the police by the internet service provider without the consent of the person concerned, were indeed not devoid of a legal basis. In fact, the problem in the present case is not that the judicial authorities carried out an act or used a method prohibited by law. The obtaining of the information that enabled the police to obtain evidence was not prohibited by national law. Nevertheless, the law relied on was not sufficiently clear on the matter, and nor did it manage to define the scope and limits of the power of the police.
Furthermore, the subscriber information obtained is dealt with under the right to the confidentiality and protection of communications. The Slovenian Constitution contains a provision to the effect that interferences with this right must without exception be based on a court order. The identity information of the person communicating is, for its part, one of the most important elements that must be protected if this right is to be secured. An interference with the identity information of a person who is communicating therefore also ought to have been carried out by court order.
In the light of these explanations, the essential problem in the present case is that the law relied on was unclear and that it could not be determined which law ought to prevail and be applied. For this reason the Court saw fit to conduct its examination on the basis of the reasons given by the national courts in the decisions they reached and of their view of the matter. My opinion, by contrast, remains that the Court ought also to have conducted an examination with regard to the evidence reached by means of information obtained by unlawful methods.
c. Unlawfulness from the standpoint of the legislation on the protection of personal data
I have explained in detail above that the information of which the applicant complained contained communications data, that those data constitute personal data, and that personal data are examined under the notion of private life referred to in Article 8 of the Convention. Indeed, the term “correspondence” in the text of the Article indicates that communications information is also protected here. While it is not in dispute that the information obtained in the present case without the consent of the person concerned was information relating to the applicant’s private life, the fact that this information specifically constitutes his personal data makes it necessary also to establish the lawfulness of the interference in the context of the protection of personal data.
First of all, Slovenia is a party to the “Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data”, which was opened for signature in 1981 and has been ratified by all the member States of the Council of Europe; it brought this Convention into force in 1994. By this Convention, the essential purpose of which is to secure in all member countries the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their rights with regard to the automatic processing of personal data relating to them, the protection of personal data was treated as a right separate from the right to respect for private life and countries were placed under an obligation to legislate on the subject.
The “Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime”, opened for signature in 2001, has likewise been in force in Slovenia since 2005. The aspects of this convention that are important for the present case are as follows:
• Traffic data are defined in detail in the Convention and mean “any computer data relating to a communication by means of a computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of communication, indicating the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or the type of underlying service used in the communication”. Data relating to a dynamic IP address must therefore be traffic data within this meaning. Since such data are inseparably linked to a particular communication, traffic data, too, must benefit from the protection of the confidentiality of communications.
• The Convention places the States Parties under an obligation to establish child pornography as a criminal offence.
• While accepting that subscriber information may be necessary in a criminal investigation and may be collected in such cases, the Convention provides for a less intrusive and less onerous measure which the law enforcement authorities can apply instead of measures such as the interception of content data and the real-time collection of traffic data. Moreover, the measures mentioned are limited to offences of a serious nature.
Slovenia, a member of the European Union, is bound by “Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data” and by the “European Union General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR)”, in force as of 25 May 2018. Being a party to the fundamental international instruments in the field of the protection of personal data, Slovenia is obliged to shape its national law in conformity with the said Directive and Regulation and also to act in compliance with them in its national proceedings. Slovenia must therefore ensure in its own domestic law the protection provided for in the provisions of the Directive and the Regulation. It should be noted at this point that the protection introduced by both texts, and in particular by the Regulation, is very broad in scope.
If we look at the national law of Slovenia, we see that a special “Personal Data Protection Act”, based on Directive 95/46/EC, has been in force since 2004. Article 2 of the Act provides that personal data, which the Act defines as “any data relating to individuals, irrespective of the form in which it is expressed”, must be processed lawfully and fairly. It is further laid down that personal data may be processed on the basis of statutory regulation or the consent of the person concerned. Under this Act, therefore, personal data may be collected only for the lawful purposes provided for and, accordingly, may be processed only where this is necessary for the achievement of those purposes.
If one looks at the international instruments on the protection of personal data to which Slovenia is subject and at its own domestic law, it can be seen that personal data are afforded broad and comprehensive protection. There is no doubt whatsoever that the subscriber information disclosed to the police in the present case without the consent of the person to whom the data belonged constituted the applicant’s personal data. Consequently, when that information was requested by the police, when the internet service provider disclosed it to the police and when the police collected and processed those data, the legislation on the protection of personal data listed above had to be complied with. In the case, however, it cannot be said that, from the very first of these stages at which personal data were involved, the personal data were the subject of a request that complied with the relevant legislation. If the Personal Data Protection Act, which provides that personal data may be collected only for lawful purposes provided for by law, is taken as the basis, it is clear that it was not complied with. As the Court also pointed out, although the request by the police to obtain personal data was not manifestly devoid of any basis, it did not rest on a clear, specific and circumscribed statutory provision. It is therefore not possible to speak of a legitimate personal data processing activity. In this context it may be said that the applicant was unable to benefit properly from the right to the protection of personal data under the international law to which Slovenia is a party and under the provisions of its own domestic law, and that there was an interference with that right.
Conclusion
The judgment I have examined above is of considerable importance for understanding the assessment made, and the Court’s approach, at a time when personal data are intensively made the object of unlawful activities. The increasingly widespread use before the judicial authorities of information and documents obtained by unlawful methods and containing personal data, and the fact that the person to whom the personal data belong claims in response that his rights have been violated, have frequently brought the matter before the courts and made it necessary for it to be resolved through them.
Since the judgment in question, which the ECtHR recently delivered in this context, will make a better understanding of the subject possible, it has been made the subject of this study, regard also being had to the Court’s past judgments, and the assessment carried out has led to the following conclusions:
• The events at issue concern the finding that, as a result of the monitoring conducted by the judicial authorities, the applicant had committed the offence of displaying, producing, possessing and distributing pornographic material; the disclosure of his subscriber information, and thus of his identity, by means of the dynamic IP address and without any court order was made the subject of examination before the ECtHR by the applicant, who alleged that Article 8 of the Convention and his other rights had been violated.
• Since communications data are, as is well established, examined as falling within private life, the Court addressed the present case from the standpoint of a violation of private life and examined whether the events were such as to violate Article 8.
• Within the framework of that examination, it first came to the view that, although the applicant had a reasonable expectation that his privacy would be respected and protected, the fact that the data covered by that expectation were obtained without his consent and used against him resulted in an interference with his right concerned.
• It is important that, in its examination of interference with private life, the Court not only took as its basis the yardstick of a “reasonable expectation that privacy will be respected and protected” but also set out criteria for determining in which cases that expectation does or does not exist. In order to reach the conclusion that an individual has no expectation of privacy, it wished to see that this expectation had been expressly waived. Thus, unless the contrary is clearly apparent, the individual
is accepted as having a reasonable expectation of privacy, the intention being to avert the dangers that would be created by arbitrarily reaching the conclusion that the individual has no such expectation. Indeed, the Slovenian Constitutional Court engaged in an arbitrary practice in that, although there was no concrete conduct on the applicant’s part indicating that he had no expectation of privacy, it judged the applicant on the assumption that he had waived that privacy by exposing himself to the public. Yet it is clear that care must be taken when making an assessment concerning a person’s private life and that, unless this is clearly apparent, there can be no question of a person having consented to the disclosure of his identity information. It will be beneficial for securing a person’s confidentiality and privacy if the courts proceed from this view of the ECtHR in proceedings on similar subjects.
• The ECtHR carries out its examination of whether interferences with the rights protected by the Convention are legitimate on the basis of the criteria “in accordance with the law”, “legitimate aim” and “necessity in a democratic society”.
• Being in accordance with the law means not only that the interference is provided for by statutory provisions of domestic law but also that the law in question is accessible and foreseeable and, moreover, compatible with the rule of law.
• For a law to be regarded as accessible and foreseeable, the provision concerned must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable a person to regulate his conduct.
• Compatibility with the rule of law, for its part, requires domestic law to afford adequate protection and safeguards against arbitrary infringements of the rights under Article 8. The existence of such safeguards means that the reasons justifying the measure, and the scope and limits of the power or procedure in question, are defined.
• In the present case, although the statutory provision on which the obtaining of the subscriber information was based poses no problem in terms of accessibility and foreseeability, that provision does not fulfil the necessary conditions as regards compatibility with the rule of law. The provision does not contain precise rules on the relationship between a dynamic IP address and subscriber information, and nor did it manage to establish an independent supervisory mechanism capable of reviewing the power it confers on the police. The provision on which the interference was based is therefore not a provision of the quality required by the Court. For that reason, an interference carried out on the basis of a provision that is at odds with the principle of the rule of law cannot be said to be legitimate.
• The fact that the subscriber information was obtained on the basis of a statutory provision that does not comply with the principle of the rule of law, and that the Slovenian Constitution provides that interferences with the confidentiality of communications are possible by court order, leads to the conclusion that the method applied in the present case to obtain the identity information was unlawful. Although the case is, in this respect, of importance for the theory of unlawfully obtained evidence, the Court made no assessment from this angle, thereby maintaining the views it had expressed in its earlier judgments and refraining from discussing prohibitions of evidence. In my view, however, this constitutes a shortcoming on the part of a judicial body which, like the ECtHR, is binding and provides guidance.
• Since the information of which the applicant complained contains communications data and those data constitute personal data, the judgment under review is also important for the right to the protection of personal data, which, alongside the notion of private
life, has gained increasing importance over time and has acquired the character of a right in its own right. It has been beneficial that the Court, conscious of this, although it did not conduct a separate examination specifically in respect of personal data, set out the legislation on personal data, referred to the nature of communications data and touched upon the importance of personal data.
Today, particularly on account of the electronic applications that have entered our lives as a result of the innovations brought about by technology, we live in a period in which personal data are more exposed and individuals have become more transparent. So much so that we often hand over our personal data with our own hands. The right to the privacy and protection of private life is thus, with each passing day and more than ever before, coming under threat and standing in need of protection. Although this need has been recognised by almost all countries, which have sought to meet it through numerous international and national legal instruments, in order to be able to say that individuals enjoy a full guarantee it is essential that, in practice too, the judicial authorities give their decisions in such a way that the data of individuals are afforded the protection required. The judgment under review is a judgment that is important precisely from this point of view and provides guidance.
At a time when electronic means of communication are actively used in every area of life, from everyday activities to professional ones, the personal data that arise through the use of these means must also enjoy effective protection. It must be clearly determined in which cases an interference with the confidentiality of individuals’ communications and correspondence is possible, and also how and in what manner such an interference is to be carried out and what its limits are to be. In addition, the body empowered to interfere must be supervised by an independent body so as to establish whether that power is being exercised as determined. Only in this way can the rights of individuals to private life, to the confidentiality of communications and to the protection of personal data enjoy full protection as far as communications data are concerned.
Footnotes
- Academic/Attorney-at-law. ↑
- “Benedik v. Slovenya”, B. No: 62357/14, 24.04.2018. ↑
- For judgments to this effect, see: “Niemietz v. Almanya”, B. No:13710/88, 16.12.1992; “CostelloCostella – Roberts v. Birleşik Krallık”, B. No:13134/87, 25.03.2003. ↑
- “Burghartz v. İsviçre” B. No:16213/90, 22.02.1994; “Güzel Erdagöz v. Türkiye” B. No: 37483/02, 21.10.2008. ↑
- “Aksu v. Türkiye” B. No: 4149/04 ve 41029/04, 15.03.2012; “Mihai Ciubotaru v. Moldovya” B. No: 27138/04, 27.04.2010. ↑
- “Van Kück v. Almanya” B. No: 35968/97, 12.09.2003. ↑
- “Van Hannover v. Almanya” 59320/00, 24.06.2004; “Reklos v. Yunanistan” B. No: 1234/05, 15.01.2009. ↑
- “Rotaru v. Romanya” B. No: 28341/95, 04.05.2000. ↑
- “S. ve Marper v. Birleşik Krallık” Başvuru No. 30562/04 ve 30566/04, 04.12.2008; “McVeigh, O’Neill ve Evans v. Birleşik Krallık” B. No: 8022/77, 8025/77, 8027/77, 18.03.1981; “Murray v. Birleşik Krallık” B. No: 14310/88, 28.10.1994. ↑
- “Chave nėe Jullien v. Fransa” B. No: 14461/88, 09.07.1991. ↑
- “Malone v. Birleşik Krallık” B. No: 8691/71, 02.08.1984. For judgments to similar effect, see: “P.G. ve J.H. v. Birleşik Krallık” B. No: 44787/98, 25.09.2001; “Vetter v. Fransa” B. No: 59842/00, 31.05.2005. ↑
- Indeed, it can be seen that in the judgments of the Constitutional Court, too, communications information is examined as falling within private life. The use against an individual of communications which he conducted by electronic means of communication, trusting that they would remain confidential, and which were obtained and processed without his consent, has been examined in the context of the person’s rights guaranteed by Article 20 of the Constitution, entitled “Privacy and protection of private life” , and by Article 22, entitled “Freedom of communication”. The situation, frequently encountered in practice, in which communications data belonging to employees are obtained and used against those employees may be cited as an example. As regards the situation in which the communications conducted by employees via their e-mail accounts are monitored and their correspondence, and thus their communications information, is obtained, the judgments of the Constitutional Court dealt in detail with the proportionality of the sanction faced by the applicants as a result of the interference with their right to respect for private life and their freedom of communication. It was also noted that this situation has been the subject of complaints under Article 8 of the ECHR. For judgments to this effect, see: AYM, Tevfik Türkmen Başvurusu, B. No: 2013/9704, 03/03/2016; AYM, Hüseyin Yelkenci Başvurusu, B. No: 2013/9706, 10/03/2016; AYM, Hakan Erdoğan Başvurusu, B. No: 2013/9481, 24/03/2016. ↑
- “Özpınar v. Türkiye”, B. No: 20999/04, 19.10.2010; “Yeşilgöz v. Türkiye”, B. No: 45454/99, 20.09.2005. ↑
- “Bykov v. Rusya” B. No: 4378/02, 10.03.2009. ↑
- “Dudgeon v. Birleşik Krallık”, B. No: 7525/76, 22 .10.1981. ↑
- “Rotaru v. Romanya”, B. No:28341/95, 04.05.2000; “Liberty ve Diğerleri v. Birleşik Krallık”, B. No:58243/00, 1 Temmuz 2008. ↑
- Rotaru v. Romanya. ↑
- “Amann v. İsviçre” B. No: 27798/95, 16.02.2000. ↑
- “Göfgen v. Almanya”, B. No: 22978/05, 01.06.2010; “Schenk v. İsviçre”, B. No: 10862/84, 12.07.1988; Bykov v. Rusya. ↑
- Indeed, I am critical of the ECtHR’s general approach to the theory of unlawfully obtained evidence and consider that it has fallen short in this respect. It is a major shortcoming that, although it has examined very wide-ranging and important cases on the subject, it has not assessed the admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence or, where it has done so, has not reached definite conclusions. Although I agree with the Court that it does not have the function of taking the place of the national courts, and indeed ought not to have it, it is a fact that the States Parties to the Convention are bound by the Court’s case law. It is clear that the Court’s case law is, at the very least, an important guide in the national proceedings conducted within the States Parties themselves. I do not regard it as a correct approach for the Court, instead of laying down clear and definite rules capable of helping to resolve the problem of unlawfully obtained evidence, which is a highly controversial subject, to refrain from making an assessment of the matter on the ground that this lies outside its competence and to step in only when unlawfully obtained evidence deprives the proceedings as a whole of their fairness. I believe that, were the Court to make a detailed and comprehensive assessment of the subject and to lay down specific, clear and definite rules, the matter would also become more intelligible for the States Parties. For detailed information on the subject, see: Murat Volkan Dülger, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukukunda Dışlama Kuralı ve Hukuka Aykırı Delillerin Uzak Etkisi (Zehirli Ağacın Meyvesi Öğretisi), Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2014, s.103-105; Murat Volkan Dülger, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’nin Gäfgen Kararı Bağlamında Ceza Muhakemesinde İşkence Tehdidi ile Elde Edilen Delillerin Kullanımı Sorunu”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, Y.26, S.111, 2014, s.325-410. ↑
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Right to Be Forgotten” (Unutulma Hakkı), Essays in Honour of Prof. Dr. Yadigar İzmirli (Prof. Dr. Yadigar İzmirli’ye Armağan), Savaş Publishing, Ankara, 2024, pp. 1019–1141.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Assessment of the Amendments to the KVK Law on the Processing of Special Categories of Personal Data and the Transfer of Data Abroad” (KVK Kanunu’nda Özel Nitelikli Kişisel Verilerin İşlenmesi ve Yurt Dışına Veri Aktarımı Kapsamında Yapılan Değişikliklere İlişkin Değerlendirmeler), Academia.edu, 25 March 2024.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Our Assessment of the Decision Summaries Published by the Personal Data Protection Board on 18 July 2022” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulunun 18 Temmuz 2022 Tarihinde Yayınlanan Karar Özetlerine İlişkin Değerlendirmelerimiz), Dülger Law Office, 1 September 2022.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Use of Personal Health Data as Evidence in Divorce Proceedings” (Kişisel Sağlık Verilerinin Boşanma Davasında Delil Olarak Kullanılması), Hukuk ve Daha Fazlası Dergisi (Law and More), No. 9, June 2022, pp. 76–84.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “A Very Important Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board on Lawyers' Access to Enforcement Files Without a Power of Attorney” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulu’ndan Avukatların İcra Takip Dosyalarına Vekaletname Olmaksızın Erişebilmesine İlişkin Çok Önemli Bir Karar), Dülger Law Office, 15 August 2021.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, Personal Data Protection Law (Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku), 4th ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2026.

