26 April 2019Murat Volkan DülgerCommentary

Introduction

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

Unlawfully obtained evidence is one of the most controversial subjects of criminal procedure law and, at the same time, one that never loses its topicality. Many principles have been put forward in this field, and numerous legal systems have adopted differing rules in accordance with the different criminal procedure policies they follow. In Turkish criminal procedure law, unlawfully obtained evidence is subject to an absolute prohibition on use. The focus of this article is the decision of the İzmir 2nd Assize Court on this subject, which concerns an unlawful search warrant and the evidence obtained on the basis of that warrant.

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This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

The Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Methods and the Rendering of an Acquittal: An Assessment of the Judgment of the İzmir 2nd Assize Court

I. Introduction

Unlawfully obtained evidence is one of the most controversial topics of the law of criminal procedure and, at the same time, one that never loses its topicality. In this field there are many principles that have been put forward and differing rules that a large number of legal systems have adopted in line with the different criminal procedure policies they pursue. In Turkish criminal procedure law, for its part, unlawfully obtained evidence is subject to an absolute prohibition on evaluation.

Indeed, this was made clear when, on 3.10.2001, the following paragraph was added to Article 38 of the Constitution by Article 15 of Law No. 4709: “Findings obtained in violation of the law cannot be accepted as evidence.” In addition, Article 206 of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 (CMK) provides: “A request for the presentation of evidence shall be refused in the following cases: a) If the evidence has been obtained in violation of the law (…)” and paragraph 2 of Article 217 provides: “The offence charged may be proved by any kind of evidence obtained in a lawful manner”; it has thereby been established that unlawfully obtained evidence both falls within the scope of the prohibition on evaluation and cannot be taken as the basis of the judgment.

Although the principal aim of criminal proceedings is to arrive at the material truth, and although the systems of freedom of evidence and of the judge's inner conviction have been adopted, the fact that unlawfully obtained evidence falls within the scope of an absolute prohibition on evaluation is a consequence of the principles of respect for human rights and of legal certainty. The General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation emphasises this point in its decision of 19.12.2017, E. 2017/4 - 291 and K. 2017/558, in the following terms: “In criminal procedure there is no restriction as to the evidence by which a matter is to be proved; the judge conducting the trial must, by using evidence obtained in a lawful manner and by investigating and evaluating evidence in favour of the accused just as much as evidence against him or her, reach a conclusion free from all doubt. Accordingly, every means used for the purpose of proof in order to clarify the event that is the subject of the trial and to find the material truth has been accepted as evidence. However, the material truth must be investigated not at any cost, but within the rules of law and with the rights of the suspect and of the accused being protected.”1

The focal point of this article, for its part, is the judgment2 of the İzmir 2nd Assize Court on this subject, which concerns an unlawful search warrant and the evidence obtained on the basis of that warrant.

II. The Facts

According to the facts of the case, a report was made to the Police Directorate in İzmir on the night of 5 April 2016. The report conveyed the information that the accused might be terrorists; it contained statements to the effect that for several days they had been entering and leaving the house in different clothes, that they might be carrying weapons and bombs, and that they were arousing suspicion by their uneasy behaviour. An investigation was opened on the basis of this report.

In the course of the investigation the law enforcement officers, relying on the existence of a situation in which delay would be prejudicial, resorted to the measure of a judicial search of a dwelling on the oral order of the public prosecutor, which was subsequently converted into a written order. In the search, the door of a flat on the ground floor of the residential building was first broken down, but no one was found in the flat. The law enforcement officers then broke down the door of another flat and entered it. While the search and checks were being carried out in the building, sounds of talking and movement were heard from yet another flat, whereupon the officers moved to break down the door; before they did so, however, the door was opened and they went in.

The three suspects who were in the dwelling were apprehended. The suspects were searched in person, and the house in which they were staying was searched by the law enforcement officers. It was established that the identity cards produced by the suspects when their identities were checked were forged; three explosive bombs and bomb-making materials were found in the house, together with firearms and ammunition prohibited under Law No. 6136. In the investigation conducted it was established that the accused were members of an armed organisation and were wanted by the police. The suspects were first taken into police custody and subsequently placed in pre-trial detention.

III. The View of the Court

The Court first stated that the aim of criminal procedure is the investigation of the material truth. It went on to state, however, that this investigation cannot be carried out “at any cost”, and that the investigating and prosecuting authorities must, “whatever the cost”, act lawfully and not depart from the principle of the rule of law. According to the Court, evidence may be gathered only by the ways and methods indicated by the law.

The Court then stated, with regard to prohibited evidence, that under the relevant provisions of the Constitution and of the Code of Criminal Procedure the intention of the legislature is to prevent the use at trial of any evidence obtained by unlawful means. According to the Court, a balancing of values has to be undertaken between the interest sought to be attained by evaluating the unlawfully obtained evidence and the interest of the individual whose rights have been violated. However, evidence obtained by any unlawful interference with a person's “secret sphere of life” (without any distinction between minor and serious, or formal and substantive, illegality) must be excluded from evaluation without exception. In other words, according to the Court, the judge should have no discretion in this matter.

In its assessment of the specific case, in criminal proceedings conducted against the persons concerned for membership of an illegal organisation and for more than 10 serious offences, the Court finds that the search order, which had been given orally, was converted into writing after the search had been carried out, pursuant to Art. 161(3) CMK, and, emphasising that the bombs alleged to have been found were not entered in the record, concludes that the evidence obtained on the basis of a procedurally irregular order is unlawful.

With regard to this conclusion the Court used the following words: “It has been accepted that the act constituting the reason for the search, the person to be searched, the dwelling in which the search was to be carried out and the period for which the order was to be valid were not (in the record), that the search was not carried out on the basis of a duly obtained warrant, and that the evidence is unlawful. It is understood that, before finding and searching the house belonging to the accused, they searched two other houses by mistake. Photographs of the bombs were requested, and it was found that the modification date of some of the photographs was 2009, although the date of the offence was 2016.” On the ground that, leaving aside the evidence that was unlawful and subject to the prohibition on evaluation, it had not been established on the evidence in the file either that the accused had committed the offences charged, the Court acquitted the accused of all the offences.

IV. Legal Assessment of the Judgment

Under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the “judicial search” is a coercive measure that may be resorted to where there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect or the accused may be apprehended or that evidence of the offence may be obtained. Under the same article of the CMK, moreover, searches of dwellings may be carried out only by decision of a judge or, in cases where delay would be prejudicial, by written order of the public prosecutor.

The third paragraph of Article 161, by contrast, states: “The public prosecutor shall give his or her orders to the judicial police officers in writing; in urgent cases, orally. An oral order shall also be communicated in writing as soon as possible.” In the case that is the subject of the judgment, too, it is seen that the prosecutor's order for the search of the dwelling was given orally on the basis of this article and subsequently converted into a written order. Does this provision then mean that the public prosecutor may give orally any order for which a written order is specifically required? To accept this would, of course, amount to trampling underfoot the principle of the rule of law and the principle of legal certainty that derives from it!

Coercive measures are procedural measures that entail the restriction of a person's right to liberty and security and of many fundamental rights and freedoms, above all “personal liberty”. Rules of law concerning the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms are exceptional provisions and must be interpreted narrowly. This approach rests on the principle of “deciding in favour of liberty in case of doubt” (in dubio pro libertate), which has been part of the legal order and of the principles of interpretation since Roman law. In addition, since the provision of the CMK on the search warrant is the “special provision” on this subject, it is also clear that Article 161 of the CMK, entitled “Duties and Powers of the Public Prosecutor”, will not find application as the “general provision”.

Within this framework, in view of the provision that a search of a dwelling may be carried out by decision of a judge or, in cases where delay would be prejudicial, by written order of the public prosecutor, carrying out the search on an oral order constitutes a manifest breach of the law.

The second dimension of my assessment is that, because the search was not based on a written order, the law enforcement officers did not know in which dwelling they were to carry out the search and, for that reason, searched two other houses by mistake in the course of executing it. In fact, it is precisely for this reason that the existence of a written search order and the requirement that the record contain certain elements are of great importance for preventing arbitrariness and ensuring accountability.

Under paragraph 2 of Article 119 of the CMK, the search warrant must clearly indicate the act constituting the reason for the search, the person to be searched, the dwelling in which the search is to be carried out and the period for which the warrant is to be valid. Indeed, as the General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation has most rightly held: “In the specific case it is also clear that the consent given to the search to be carried out in the dwelling for the purpose of seizing the narcotic substances that are the subject of the offence has no validity and no basis in statute; that the fact that the witness, who had the status of an informant and had no connection with the accusation or with the search, consented to a search being carried out in his or her dwelling does not mean that the accused who were in the dwelling could be subjected, in their persons and belongings, to a search; and that, in this context, consent does not remove the obligation to obtain a decision from a judge or a written order from the public prosecutor for the search to be carried out in the dwelling and in respect of the persons present there, and does not confer legal validity on the acts thus performed. Consequently, it must necessarily be accepted that it should be examined whether there was a judicial search warrant or a written search order obtained pursuant to Articles 116 - 119 of the CMK in order for a search to be carried out in the witness's residence and on the accused who were present there.”3 These are deficiencies that cannot be remedied, even by the subsequent consent or ratification of the person concerned. Consequently, evidence obtained as a result of search measures carried out in breach of the CMK and of the Regulation on Judicial and Preventive Searches will be unlawful, can in no way be evaluated and cannot be taken as the basis of the judgment.

At this point I must state that the theories which assess the degree of the unlawfulness or the gravity of the right infringed have no validity in our law4. In my view, in a State bound by law the end can never justify the means or render them lawful; there can be no excuse for acting unlawfully. The court does not have the power to alter the principles and rules laid down by statute for the evaluation of evidence. In this sense I am of the opinion that the distinction between “absolute illegality” and “relative illegality” can find no place either in positive law, given the extremely clear provisions of the Constitution and of the CMK, or in ideal law. Accordingly, while I criticise the court's judgment for taking into account the “theory of the balancing of values”, which cannot possibly be valid in our law, I find this judgment extremely innovative and liberal from the standpoint of the principle of the rule of law, and extremely important in that it sets out the ideas I have expressed above.

If, as a matter of criminal procedure policy, the aim is to arrive at the material truth by using evidence obtained by entirely lawful methods, then, whatever the purpose and whatever the offence, where there has been a violation, the evidence obtained by means of that violation, whether it was obtained directly or is other, indirect evidence obtained by using that evidence, must not be used at any stage of the proceedings, and it must be expressly stated that such evidence has been excluded. Otherwise the fairness of the proceedings in question will always be open to debate5.

Footnotes

  1. YCGK, E. 2017/4-291 K. 2017/558 T. 19.12.2017. ↑
  2. İzmir 2. Ağır Ceza Mah., E. 2016/199 K. 2019/123 T. 08.03.2019. ↑
  3. YCGK, E. 2016/20-851 K. 2018/619 T. 6.12.2018. ↑
  4. Murat Volkan Dülger, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukukunda Dışlama Kuralı ve Hukuka Aykırı Delillerin Uzak Etkisi (Zehirli Ağacın Meyvesi Öğretisi), Seçkin, Ankara 2014, s. 89. ↑
  5. Murat Volkan Dülger, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’nin Gafgen Kararı Bağlamında Ceza Muhakemesinde İşkence Tehdidi İle Elde Edilen Delillerin Kullanımı Sorunu”, TBB Dergisi, 2014/111, s.407. ↑

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