2020Murat Volkan Dülger, Merve Bakdur, Onur ÖzkanArticle

Abstract

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

This study seeks to explain the doctrine of objective imputation. The doctrine examines whether the result can be regarded as the perpetrator’s own work and seeks to establish liability by means of a normative assessment. To reach a conclusion on objective imputation, it is first examined whether the act was causal. When the condition theory (conditio sine qua non) is chosen to identify the conduct that led to the result, that is, to establish causation, a large number of equivalent conditions producing the result are identified.

The limitation of these conditions and of criminal liability is likewise carried out in accordance with the doctrine of objective imputation. The study first sets out the framework of objective imputation and explains the criteria on which imputation rests. It then addresses how these criteria establish and exclude objective imputation, and assesses numerous possibilities and examples for each criterion. Finally, it deals with the legal consequences of the exclusion of objective imputation and seeks to explain why the absence of objective imputation excludes typicality (tipiklik).

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Objective Imputation in Criminal Law

Murat Volkan Dülger* / Merve Bakdur* / Onur Özkan*

SUMMARY

This study seeks to explain the doctrine of objective imputation. The doctrine of objective imputation examines whether the result can be regarded as the work of the perpetrator and seeks to establish responsibility by means of a normative assessment. In order to reach a conclusion on objective imputation, it is first examined whether the act was causal. When the condition theory (conditio sine qua non) is chosen in order to determine the act that led to the result, that is, to establish causation, a great many conditions of equivalent value that brought about the result are identified. The limitation of these conditions and of criminal liability is likewise effected in accordance with the doctrine of objective imputation. The study first outlines the framework of objective imputation and explains the criteria that establish attribution. It then considers how these criteria establish and exclude objective imputation, and assesses numerous possibilities and examples for each criterion. Finally, it addresses the legal consequences of the exclusion of objective imputation and seeks to explain why the absence of objective imputation excludes conformity with the statutory definition of the offence (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit).

Keywords: Objective imputation, Causal link, Permitted risk, Subjective imputation, Prohibition of regress, Condition theory, Protective purpose of the norm, Principle of trust.

ABSTRACT

In this study, the theory of objective imputation was tried to be explained. Objective imputation theory examines whether the result can be seen as a work of the perpetrator and tries to determine the responsibility with a normative evaluation. In order to reach a decision on objective imputation, it is firstly investigated whether the action is causal or not. When the causality is determined in accordance with the conditional theory (conditio sine qua non formula), many equivalent conditions are determined. The limitation of these conditions and criminal liability is also carried out in accordance with the objective imputation theory. In the study, firstly, the framework of objective imputation is drawn and the criteria that provide the declaration are explained. Subsequently, how these criteria achieve and remove objective imputation is discussed; many possibilities and examples were evaluated on the basis of each criterion. Finally, the legal consequences of removing objective imputation have been discussed, and it has been tried to explain why the absence of objective imputation removes the definiton of crime (in German “Tatbestand”).

Keywords: Objective imputation, Causal link, Permitted risk, Subjective imputation, Forbidden of recourse, Condition theory, Purpose of protection of norm, Trust principle.

I. The Concepts of Attribution and Subjective Imputation in General

A causal link between act and result is not in itself sufficient for criminal liability. For this reason, criminal law scholarship has developed the concept of attribution. Whereas causation is an ontological and logical process that forms the subject matter of the natural sciences, attribution is an assessment that belongs to legal science1. The dictionary defines attribution as “basing, imputing or ascribing an idea or a matter to a person or a cause”2. In criminal law, attribution consists of two parts, objective and subjective, and is concerned with whether the result can be imputed to the perpetrator and whether the perpetrator can be held responsible in mental terms.

Objective imputation, as will be explained below, seeks an answer to the question whether the result can be imputed to the perpetrator as his “work”, his “product”. An objective and normative assessment of whether the perpetrator bears responsibility for the result that has occurred owing to the act3 and the causal chain set in motion by that act forms the framework of the doctrine of objective imputation. Results that are not the work of the perpetrator, and the criminal liability arising from such results, cannot be imputed to him.

The other part of attribution is subjective imputation. Subjective imputation means that, for the perpetrator to be held responsible for his act, he must as a rule have acted intentionally and, exceptionally, negligently (Art. 21, 22 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK)). Here an assessment is made of the mental link between the perpetrator and the act. If it can be concluded that the perpetrator, in acting, behaved neither intentionally nor negligently, subjective imputation will not be established and no criminal liability will be imposed on the perpetrator. It should be noted that subjective imputation comprises not only the subjective side of wrongdoing and of conformity with the statutory definition of the offence, which is a part of it, but also culpability in the sense of the judgment of reproach directed at the perpetrator’s act. Indeed, it is widely accepted in legal scholarship today that intent and negligence, which we examine under the mental element, have a dual function in the spheres of both wrongdoing and culpability4.

With its two separate parts, attribution is a legal assessment of whether the individual is responsible for his conduct5. Indeed, the concept of the offence consists in the violation of the legal relationship both objectively and subjectively6. By virtue of this assessment, objective (strict) liability is excluded from criminal law7. In criminal law, liability may be accepted where an act committed intentionally or negligently has produced a result that can be regarded as the work of its perpetrator. In this sense, liability in criminal law is subjective. This is one of the most important achievements of modern criminal law8.

Now that the content and meaning of the subject matter of the assessment of attribution have been set out, it must be considered when and in what order these assessments are to be made. The assessment of objective imputation precedes subjective imputation. Only after a result has been imputed to the perpetrator as his work can it be examined how the perpetrator acted and whether he acted with intent or negligence (subjective liability). There can be no question of subjective imputation unless objective imputation has been established9. Objective imputation must first accept an existing event as capable of being assessed in terms of criminal liability. The situations of intent and negligence, which concern subjective imputation, form the subject matter of the heading on the mental (subjective) element of the statutory definition of the offence.

II. The Framework of the Doctrine of Objective Imputation

Once the attributability of a result to an act has been determined by means of causation, the attributability of the act to the person is clarified under objective imputation10. For objective imputation does not mean attributing the result to the act. Whether the result came about as a consequence of the perpetrator’s act is a matter for the causal link. Whether the perpetrator is to be held responsible for the causal course that he set in motion by his act, however, is examined under objective imputation. Objective imputation must therefore be understood as the question whether a piece of conduct, together of course with the results it has produced, can be imputed to the individual.

The condition theory, which is frequently accepted by scholarship and practice for establishing the causal link in modern criminal law doctrine and hence in the theory of the offence, does not limit the causal link and treats it broadly. The main problem dealt with within the condition theory is to establish the ontological connection of the finding as to causation, and this point must also be assessed separately by the judge in each specific case11. Causation is a first step towards attribution, but it is not the only or the final step. First, the causal acts (conditions) are identified by applying the condition theory12. These conditions are then subjected to the normative assessment of objective imputation. If the result can be regarded as a “product”, the “work”, of the perpetrator’s act, these results are imputed to the perpetrator. If the result that has occurred is not regarded as the work of the perpetrator’s conduct, objective imputation is not established13. Unlike the causal link, objective imputation serves to limit criminal liability and seeks to determine criminal liability.

It should be recalled that the assessment of objective imputation is made after the causal link has been established. Another point to be noted is that, if theories other than the condition theory14 are accepted, it is not possible for the doctrine of objective imputation to find any field of application. For the other theories carry out attribution and limitation within the causal link itself.

It is stated that the foundations of the theory of objective imputation (objektive Zurechnung) are to be found in the views of Aristotle, Hegel and Pufendorf15,16. Aristotle stated that only voluntary acts, in cases where the meaning of the norm is known, deserve praise or else blame and punishment17; Hegel, that the results occurring by reason of an act cannot always be imputed to the perpetrator. For in some situations the act may have been permitted, while at other times the result may not belong to the act. According to Hegel, results that rest on pure chance and can be regarded as misfortune or fate should not be imputed to the perpetrator18. “Misfortune” must be distinguished from “wrongdoing”19. These views of Hegel may be regarded as a primitive version of objective imputation.

The development of the doctrine, however, was made possible by the German criminal lawyer Richard Hönig20. Although, when the condition theory is followed, many equivalent conditions that brought about the result are identified (judgment of causation), it must also be examined of which condition the result came about as the work (judgment of attribution)21. For a person to be held responsible for an act, it is not in itself sufficient that the act was causal; the perpetrator must also have control over the causal course22. Hönig explained the theory by means of the concept of “objective purposiveness”. Results lying within the bounds of what the perpetrator could conceivably have aimed at by his act should be attributable to him (judgment of conformity to purpose). If, at the time when the perpetrator carried out his act (ex ante), it was not possible for him to aim at the occurrence of such a result, or at his act unfolding in such a way as to give rise to such side-effects, these results are not attributed to the perpetrator23.

It may be said that the doctrine of objective imputation, which has advanced along the path of the theoretical development described, has not yet attained full clarity and certainty24. Some of its problematic areas in particular still stand in need of examination and assessment. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that objective imputation has become an indispensable part of the theory of the offence.

At a time when the theory of objective imputation had not yet been fully developed, how the condition theory was to be limited and on what the perpetrator’s liability was to be based constituted a significant problem. According to an example given in this connection, the perpetrator sends his “enemy” into a wooded area in rainy weather and hopes that he will be struck by lightning and die. The person is indeed struck by lightning and loses his life. When the condition theory is applied, there is no doubt that a causal link exists between the act and the result25. On the other hand, to hold the perpetrator liable for the offence of killing because he sent a person into the forest would be unjust and would extend the scope of punishability to an extreme degree. Here, then, the avoidance of punishment was based on the absence of culpability on the part of the perpetrator. On this view, the perpetrator does not “will” the result; he merely “wishes” it. The perpetrator’s desire that his enemy should die does not operate on the result in the manner required by intent. Hence there is neither intent nor culpability26. It must be recalled here that at that time intent (and negligence) were assessed under culpability, and that culpability was not, as it is today, regarded as lying outside the elements of the offence.

In truth, this reasoning was by no means satisfactory. For there is no doubt that the perpetrator had intent. Moreover, intent knows no distinctions such as wishing and willing. The problem is in essence not that the perpetrator lacks intent; there are other factors that limit liability. The perpetrator cannot be held liable on account of a condition that is beyond his control (the lightning strike).

Likewise, in another example, A fired at B with the aim of killing him. B, however, died as a result of a fire that broke out in the hospital to which he had been taken. It is stated that, if a solution is pursued here in accordance with the classical theory of the offence, erroneous results are reached. In the classical theory of the offence, the deed consisted of the triad of act – causal link – result. If this theory is followed, it is seen that the result of B’s death has occurred (through the outbreak of fire in the hospital) and that there is a causal link between A’s act and the result of death (had A not made the attempt to kill, B would not have been taken to hospital and would not have lost his life in the fire that broke out there). If the classical theory of the offence is followed, there is no doubt that the objective elements of the offence are fulfilled. That theory accordingly attempts to resolve the problem by means of the subjective elements, and it is stated that the perpetrator’s intent in respect of the act of killing would lapse (on the ground that he had no intent as to death by fire). Yet it is plain that there is no problem of intent here either. For there to be an attempt to commit the offence, intent will have to be present. Intent will lapse only where the act causing death is no longer regarded as conforming to the statutory definition of the offence with respect to the result of death. It was the doctrine of objective imputation that made it possible to explain all these phenomena and to find reasonable answers.

There are certain criteria for objective imputation to be established:

• By his act the perpetrator must create a legally impermissible (prohibited) risk or increase an existing risk,

• The result must have occurred by reason of the risk created by the perpetrator or, in other words, the perpetrator must have control over the causal course that ends with the occurrence of the result,

• The creation of this risk must fall within the sphere of effect (scope) of the offence type; the risk in question must be relevant and punishable from the standpoint of the offence type27.

All of these concepts and criteria will be clarified below, and it will be examined how they establish and exclude objective imputation.

III. Cases Excluding Objective Imputation

A. Cases in Which No Legally Prohibited (Impermissible) Risk Has Been Created

For objective imputation to be in issue, the risk created by the perpetrator’s act must exceed the limits of permitted risk or increase an existing risk. What is meant here by the concept of “risk” must be explained. Risk is the fact that, by carrying out the act, the perpetrator gives rise to the possibility of bringing about the result of the offence and of violating the object of the offence and the legal interest protected by the offence. For example, where Kemal, who has obtained a licence to sell firearms under Law No. 252128, sells a firearm to another person, this creates a “risk” with regard to the occurrence of the result of death and the violation of the right to life. Kemal’s getting into his car and driving it at 100 kilometres per hour in urban traffic may likewise constitute a risk with regard to the result of another person’s death or injury. In the same way, Kemal’s throwing a knife at another person also gives rise to the risk of bringing about the results of death or injury. Accordingly, what is meant by the term “risk” – or “danger”, a term we do not prefer lest it be confused with the offence of endangerment – is the creation of a situation capable of bringing about the result.

The first condition for attribution is the emergence of a risk that is not legally approved, not permitted29. The limits of objective imputation must therefore be drawn by reference to permitted risk. In fact, every result conforming to a statutory definition presupposes the creation of a certain risk30. But the perpetrator cannot always be held liable for creating a risk – for increasing a risk. For the creation of that risk may in some situations have been permitted by the law. The specific weight of objective imputation lies in the requirement that the risky conduct must, as a rule, lie outside the law, in the sphere to which the law gives no licence. Where a risk is not permitted, the theory of objective imputation reasons this only negatively: where there is a risk that caused the result, it is first examined whether that risk was permitted. If any one of the conditions of permission is not met, the creation of that risk is not permitted and it becomes possible to attribute to the perpetrator the result that occurred by reason of that risk31.

1. Permitted Risk

The creation of certain risks is regarded as necessary for the continuation of everyday life, and the creation of these risks is legally permitted. For if an attempt were made to prohibit risks of this kind altogether, scientific, social and cultural progress would be impeded. For this reason, the risks and the violations of legal interests to which these activities may give rise have been accepted.

Permitted risk, however, involves a number of uncertainties as regards its content and its place in the theory of the offence, and attempts are made in scholarship to explain it in different ways. Some authors define permitted risk as socially adequate and accepted conduct32. According to another author, by contrast, it is to be distinguished from socially adequate conduct and is regarded as consent or a ground of justification in the case of conduct contrary to the duty of care and diligence33. The view that permitted risk is to be accepted as a ground of justification only in negligent offences is also advocated, albeit rarely34.

When these views are examined, it is seen that they generally state that permitted risk and intent cannot coexist and that each excludes the other. However, the view that has gained ground in scholarship, and which we too advocate, holds that permitted risk may also be applied in respect of intentional offences35. It is possible that, despite the presence of intent, the act nevertheless remains within the sphere of permitted risk and cannot be objectively attributed to the perpetrator. This is so, as we shall see, generally in cases where the risk is increased in a manner that is of no legal significance: where a person is sent into a storm-swept forest in the hope that he will be struck by lightning and die, is persuaded to board an aircraft in the hope that it will crash, or is encouraged to take up a dangerous kind of sport in the wish that he will die. In these cases it is not possible to hold the perpetrator liable for intentional killing on the basis of his intent alone. For the act still lies within the sphere of permitted risk36.

Activities such as road, air, sea and rail traffic, industrial activities, sporting events, medical interventions, atomic energy work, large construction projects, the manufacture of explosives and the operation of mines fall within the scope of permitted risk37. Activities of this kind by their nature involve a certain dangerousness. The emergence of certain risks has been accepted from the outset; the carrying out of the activities has not been prevented but has been made subject to certain rules. These rules have been developed with a view to preventing dangerous results from occurring, and the framework of the sphere of permitted risk has thus been drawn. For example, the rules on road traffic and the sphere of permitted risk are determined by the Highway Traffic Law No. 2918 (KTK). This Law regulates “the measures to be taken on highways to ensure traffic order with regard to the safety of life and property and in all matters concerning traffic safety” (Art. 1 KTK). Provided that individuals comply with these rules and take the precautions, the activities in question may be carried out.

Motor vehicle traffic is, by its nature, one of the dangerous activities. Modern vehicles can move at great speed, and this brings certain risks with it. Every year a great many traffic accidents occur, with loss of life and property38. Nevertheless, it is not possible to prohibit road traffic. Admittedly, if “handcarts” were used instead of vehicles capable of reaching speeds of 200 – 300 kilometres per hour, no such risk would arise and no results of death or injury would occur. However, considering the contribution that such a rapid means of transport makes to the economy, to social life, to culture and to raising the level of prosperity of humankind, it is quite clear that the use of road traffic cannot be dispensed with and that it cannot be prohibited. Indeed, transport is indispensable for the continuation of social and economic life. Moreover, permitting motor vehicle traffic makes possible the production of new and modern cars, the development of technologies capable of preventing accidents and the production of cars equipped to protect life and property in accidents, and thus safer traffic. Of course, the fact that motor vehicle traffic is permitted does not mean that objective imputation is automatically excluded in traffic accidents and that the perpetrators will go unpunished. As stated above, the permitted spheres are set out in the legislation, and the perpetrator may, by his act, have failed to observe the traffic rules and acted in breach of the KTK. In that case there is no doubt that objective imputation will be established.

The rules permitting a risk need not necessarily be laid down by a legal provision. Alongside the legislation, rules of conduct and duties of care and diligence may draw the boundaries of the sphere of permitted risk. For example, with regard to medical interventions there are Law No. 1219 on the Mode of Practice of Medicine and its Branches, the Public Health Law No. 1593 and various regulations. However, the framework for medical interventions is not drawn by these alone. It must be stated that certain medical standards (rules of professional conduct – medical deontology) and, in their absence, the duty of care and diligence will determine these limits. Where, on examination of all of these, it is seen that the result occurred because of a complication39, it is not possible to attribute the result objectively to the perpetrator (the physician)40,41.

Having touched on the content of the concept of permitted risk, let us explain by means of examples when the result occurs as a consequence of a permitted risk and when the sphere of permitted risk is exceeded:

A is driving his vehicle in compliance with the traffic rules. At that moment B, a five-year-old pedestrian who suddenly appears in front of him, jumps in front of the vehicle. A is unable to brake in order to stop his car, hits B and causes his death. There is no doubt that A’s driving the car is causal for B’s death. Nevertheless, the result of death cannot be attributed to A. Taking part in road traffic in compliance with the rules falls within permitted risk. A therefore cannot be held liable for the offence of negligent killing; moreover, there is no conduct on his part contrary to the duty of care and diligence either42. On the other hand, if the traffic rules have been breached – if there are circumstances such as improper overtaking, exceeding the speed limit, driving on without stopping at a pedestrian crossing or a red light, or failing to take the necessary precautions in rainy or snowy weather – the sphere of permitted risk will have been left.

As regards medical interventions, where the physician has taken every precaution, he will not be held liable for the results that arise from complications owing to the risky nature of the intervention to be performed. By contrast, the physician may have failed to notice the complication in time, may have noticed it but not taken the necessary measures, or may have taken measures that proved inadequate by medical standards. In that case the physician’s conduct is now outside the sphere of permitted risk. Consequently, the results can be attributed to him. In the fields of criminal law and health law this is called “malpractice”.

Certain sporting activities, too, although dangerous by their nature, fall within the sphere of permitted risk. In boxing, the sport most frequently cited as an example in this connection, it is common for athletes to be injured and sometimes to die43. Where the rules of the sport and the necessary protective measures are observed, the acts carried out fall within permitted risk. For, as between the freedom to engage in sport and the “very slight dangerousness” it entails for life, the benefit in the freedom of sport weighs more heavily, and sporting activities are not prohibited. On the other hand, where these rules are not observed and, for instance, boxers are put into a life-and-death struggle with pieces of metal in their gloves, one can no longer speak of permitted risk, since the danger to life in a sporting activity carried out in this way increases intolerably44.

To give another example, the position of the arms dealer must also be assessed within the scope of permitted risk. Even if the person who buys the weapon kills someone else with it, the act of selling weapons is permitted. Indeed, the pursuit of activities of this kind has become a profession45.

The relationship between permitted risk and negligence must also be addressed. It can be seen that acts going beyond the sphere of permitted risk at the same time constitute a breach of the duty of care and diligence. Confusing these two concepts may give rise to problems. Indeed, in the modern theory of objective imputation the first condition for speaking of wrongdoing is the creation of an impermissible risk through conduct in breach of the duty of care46. The starting point of negligent offences lies at the point where the sphere of permitted risk is left.

In essence, permitted risk does not mean that failure to fulfil / neglect of the duty of care and diligence is legally permitted. Such a failure to fulfil the duty of care and diligence will of course be substantiated and punished by way of negligence47. Permitted risk ensures that the result is not attributed where the activity carried out – acts which by their nature involve a certain dangerousness – is performed within the rules laid down. By contrast, any breach of a duty of care and diligence within this sphere will entail both a departure from the sphere of permitted risk and the perpetrator’s liability on account of a negligent act. In this respect, the subjective side of negligence must not be forgotten either48.

2. Increase of a Risk to a Legally Insignificant Extent

Where the act performed has increased a permitted risk to an extent that is of no significance for the violation of the legal interest, the result that occurs cannot be objectively attributed to the perpetrator. In such cases the perpetrator does not reduce a risk, but at the same time does not increase it to a legally significant extent either49.

By way of example one may think of the case, also given above, in which a person is persuaded to go into the forest and loses his life when struck by lightning in a storm there. Accidents occurring in exceptional circumstances of this kind during activities such as going for a walk in the forest, hiking in the mountains, swimming or climbing stairs lie within the sphere of permitted risk. Indeed, such activities carry, in the ordinary course of life too, minimal risks like that in the example50. Persuading a person to go into the forest is likewise an act of no legal significance. In essence, the perpetrator here places the victim, by his act, within a certain sphere of risk, but this risk does not exceed the limits of the sphere of permitted risk. These are, for instance, forms of conduct that are socially normal and, generally speaking, not dangerous.

Other examples may also be given. Suppose that A gives his friend B, whom he does not like at all, two plane tickets as a present every month so that B will board an aeroplane and die. B, unaware of A’s intent to kill him and believing him to be a very good friend, constantly accepts the gift tickets and travels by air. One day, when B is once again on a plane, the aircraft crashes because of bad weather conditions and everyone, including B, loses their lives. It can be said that there is a causal link between A’s act and B’s death. For if A had not bought the ticket and persuaded B to board the plane, B would not have boarded that plane and would not have died. However, it is not possible to hold A liable for the offence of intentional killing either, because air traffic and air travel remain within permitted risk, and A’s persuading B to board the plane and buying the ticket does not increase this risk to a legally significant extent. B’s death is not A’s “work”51.

The same applies where a danger already in existence is raised by an insignificant amount. In the example, also widely given in German legal scholarship, concerning whether the offence of “causing a flood” in section 313 of the German Criminal Code is made out, it has been held that the result cannot be attributed to the perpetrator where he pours in the small quantity of water that causes the dam to overflow52. Where the danger of overflowing is already highly probable (for example because more rain has fallen than expected), although the addition of a small quantity of water appears causal for the occurrence of the flood, there is, with regard to the existing danger, no significant increase in the risk of the water overflowing53.

Nevertheless, there may also be certain situations in which objective imputation can be established. Where the perpetrator possessed special knowledge beforehand and shaped his act in accordance with that knowledge, the increase in risk is treated as legally significant and it becomes possible to attribute the result objectively54. For example, if the perpetrator who persuades a person to go into the forest knows that there is a murderer in that forest, the result of death that occurs can be attributed to him. For the risk created here is not merely that a person is sent into the forest; it is that he is sent to a place where there is a murderer and where his death is probable. This situation will fall outside the sphere of permitted risk, and the results arising from it can be attributed to the perpetrator. Of course, if the murderer in the forest and the perpetrator who persuades the victim to go into the forest act in concert in thought and deed, participation in the offence will be at issue; otherwise each will be held liable for his own acts55.

Likewise, if the perpetrator who persuades a person to board an aeroplane knows that the aircraft has a technical defect and will in all probability crash, and nevertheless carries out his act, the risk has been created in a manner exceeding the permitted limit. In that case the result of death can be attributed to the perpetrator56. Similarly, the act of an employer who does not have his employees work remotely but requires them to be physically present at the workplace lies, under normal conditions, within the sphere of permitted risk. However, where the employer knows that there is a serious epidemic in the world and nevertheless forces even those employees whose work at the workplace is not essential to come to the workplace, the results of the employees’ death or injury through contracting the disease at the workplace can be attributed to him.

What is decisive here is, in essence, that the perpetrator is treated as an average person57 living in the society in question and that, making an assessment before the conduct conforming to the statutory definition of the offence (ex ante), he is aware that he is increasing the risk by his act58. In fact, this special prior knowledge (Sonderwissen), possessed before the result occurs, is a constitutive element of the impermissible risk that the objective elements already require59. The fact that the perpetrator shapes his act in possession of this special knowledge falls within the concept of wrongdoing. Whether a legal interest has been violated and whether there is wrongdoing can be determined only by an assessment relating to the moment of the event / the time before it60. Consequently, for the perpetrator to be able to commit a wrong by his act, he must, when acting, have knowledge of the objective dangerousness of the act. This special prior knowledge, too, forms part of the assessment the perpetrator makes beforehand. Since the conclusion the perpetrator reaches by his assessment is the dangerousness of his act, carrying out the conduct causes him to leave the sphere of permitted risk.

3. Reduction of Risk

Besides creating or increasing a risk, the perpetrator may also have acted so as to reduce a risk. Cases of risk reduction generally arise in connection with rescue activities. According to the doctrine of objective imputation, as a rule, the perpetrator’s liability arising from his creating or increasing a risk is accepted. Since acts that reduce a risk are not covered by this, it is not possible to attribute them to the perpetrator either.

For example: A, intending to kill B, drives his car at speed towards him. B is walking on the road and does not see the car coming towards him. C pushes B in order to save him. As a result of the push B is thrown towards the side of the road, strikes his head on the kerb and is injured. On examination of the case, C has, by his rescue intervention, caused the result (B’s striking his head on the kerb and being injured). For, without C’s intervention , it cannot be said that this result would have occurred. On the other hand, by this intervention C has prevented a graver risk. For had C not intervened, A would have run B over with his car and caused his death. Since C has reduced a risk, the result of B’s injury cannot be attributed to him.

Looking at the case, there is no problem as regards causation; indeed, there is no problem as regards the mental element either, since acts of this kind are generally performed intentionally. The solution must therefore be found at the level of attribution, before that stage is reached. For prohibiting acts directed at improving, rather than worsening, the situation in which the protected legal interest finds itself would not accord with the purpose of the criminal laws; a contrary approach would cause criminal law, which draws its source from the norms of social conduct, to be at odds with an important norm of social conduct, namely the rule that individuals should help one another and stand in solidarity.

It will also be noticed that there is no situation of self-defence in the case. C has not defended against A, who was carrying out an unlawful attack. He has intervened against B. There is therefore no ground of justification in this case. Nevertheless, some authors propose a solution in such situations on the basis of the ground of justification of “presumed consent”. In their view, there is no difficulty in attributing the result that has occurred objectively to the perpetrator. The act is, however, lawful by virtue of presumed consent. Had B been aware of A’s act, which would lead to the result of death, he would have consented to C’s act of injury aimed at saving him61.

In our view, however, attribution will be excluded by the review of objective imputation to be carried out at the stage of conformity with the statutory definition of the offence (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit), and there will then be no need to embark on an inquiry into grounds of justification. Indeed, if a solution were sought under the heading of lawfulness, the reduction of risk would first have to be regarded as a violation of a legal interest, and, as will be seen in the case, there is no violation of a legal interest62. In criminal law it is not prohibited to prevent attacks on a legal interest or to mitigate such attacks. Nor does the theory of objective imputation include the case of the reduction of a risk within its scope. The act of a perpetrator who reduces the risk excludes conformity with the statutory definition of the offence. Since the assessment of conformity with the statutory definition also precedes that of unlawfulness, there is no need to proceed to that stage63.

What, then, if the perpetrator “cannot reduce” the risk? Thinking this through with the example: C pushed B in order to save him from a fatal collision with a car; but B struck his head on the kerb and lost his life because of the brain haemorrhage he suffered. In other words, the risk could not be reduced, and the result of death occurred even in the scenario in which a rescue intervention was made. An ethical, philosophical question in fact also arises here. When the perpetrator engages in a risky act of rescue, he is in truth acting not in order to end a life but in order to save that life. He is not obliged to undertake the act of rescue; he is under no duty to prevent the result. How fair is it to attribute the result of death to a perpetrator who acts in order to save life; is there really wrongdoing here, or is punishment legitimate?

In our view, the exclusion of attribution by risk-reducing acts should apply only in situations where the risk has actually been reduced. If the perpetrator has been unable to reduce the risk by his act, the result can be attributed to him. The perpetrator is already acting outside the sphere of permitted risk. That attribution is not established although he exceeds the permitted risk ought to be possible only in situations where that risk is reduced. By embarking on that act of rescue the perpetrator gives rise to a new risk and also takes an existing risk upon himself, acting in the hope of reducing it. Perhaps the result would not have occurred even if he had not acted (in the example above, A might prevent the collision or lessen its impact by braking at the last moment and steering the car away), or a successful rescue might come about through the victim’s own efforts or through the act of some other third party. Where a perpetrator who sets a new causal course in motion and gives rise to a risk does not reduce the existing risk, the result must be objectively attributed to him. The doctrine of risk reduction should not cover situations in which the risk is not reduced.

This must not, however, lead to the conclusion that the perpetrator will be punished. The objective imputation of a result is the first stage in examining whether the perpetrator can be held liable for the result. Even where the result is objectively attributed to the perpetrator, it may be concluded that he is not to be punished for other reasons. In this example, criminal liability must be resolved at another stage, and an inquiry must be made with regard to negligence (subjective imputability). If it can be said that the perpetrator made every effort necessary to prevent the result but the result nevertheless occurred, no negligent wrongdoing can be imputed to him. For in that case the perpetrator has exercised the requisite care and diligence. If, however, it can be said that the perpetrator breached this duty, and that the victim would not have died had he exercised the requisite care in carrying out the act of rescue, his liability for the offence of negligent killing will arise. In any event, it must not be forgotten that A, who began the commission of the offence of killing with means suitable for it, is liable for attempted intentional killing (it must not be forgotten that, in the example given above, A drove his vehicle at B intentionally, in order to kill him).

There may also be other examples in which the risk is not reduced and the effects of the causal process continue. Objective imputation may also be at issue where the perpetrator does not simply prevent / halt the effects of a causal process that has begun but, in addition, sets an entirely new causal course in motion. In the example above, too, the perpetrator is in essence held liable because he set a new causal course in motion. This distinction can, however, be sharper still.

For example, the railway signalman A sees that a train travelling at great speed is about to collide with a stationary passenger train and warns the engine driver B. As communication between them cannot be established, B does not receive A’s warning message. Rather than let all the passengers lose their lives, A changes the points and diverts the train onto tracks on which several railway workers are carrying out maintenance. By this decision A has saved the lives of dozens of train passengers but has also caused the death of the railway maintenance workers. Here, the reduction of risk cannot be accepted because of the new causal process that has been created, and the results of death can be attributed to A. The decision as to whether A will be punished will rest not on the reduction of risk but on the assessment to be made under negligence or necessity64.

B. Cases in Which the Result Does Not Stem from the Risk Created and the Perpetrator’s Control Has Ceased

In what has been discussed so far, the risks created / increased by the perpetrator either remain within the sphere of permitted risk or, where the permitted risk is exceeded, the perpetrator acts so as to reduce an existing risk. Will the perpetrator, then, be held liable for every form of conduct that exceeds the permitted risk? The answer to this question must be “no”. For even where the perpetrator performs an act exceeding the permitted risk, there are situations in which the results of that act cannot be objectively attributed to him.

In situations of this kind, the result has not occurred because of the risk created by the perpetrator, and the perpetrator’s control over the causal course has ceased. Whatever the case, the perpetrator will not be held liable on account of a causal course and results which he did not foresee and could not be expected to foresee. In such situations the perpetrator may not have planned that the result would occur in that way (subjective foreseeability), and he may not be expected objectively to foresee it either (objective foreseeability)65,66. A causal course that cannot be expected may come about because of a natural event, or equally because the victim or a third party takes the risk upon himself by his own act. It will be noted that in all these situations the result has been brought about not by the risk created by the perpetrator but by other risks. Consequently, the result that has occurred cannot be attributed to the perpetrator.

By contrast, not every different way in which the result comes about will mean that the causal course has passed out of the perpetrator’s control. Where the perpetrator has, by his act, created a legally prohibited (impermissible) risk, insignificant deviations in the causal link will not prevent the result that has occurred from being objectively attributed to him. For example, A throws B, who cannot swim, into the river so that he will die by drowning. But before falling into the water B strikes his head on the pier of the bridge and dies not by drowning but from the brain haemorrhage he suffers. The deviation here is insignificant. The result of B’s death occurred because of the risk created by A and under his control. The result of death will be attributed to him67.

1. Cases in Which the Result Occurs because of an Atypical Causal Process (a Natural Event, Chance)

The first possibility in which the result required by the statutory definition of the offence does not arise as the materialisation (realisation) of the risk created by the perpetrator and cannot be attributed to him is that in which the result occurs within atypical (extraordinary) causal processes. Whether a causal process is extraordinary will be determined according to the experience of everyday life. Events that are regarded as lying outside the customary course of things and whose occurrence cannot be expected in the light of general experience of life are considered atypical. A result that occurs because of an atypical development is the work not of the perpetrator but of chance68.

Such atypical causal processes mostly come about as the work of a natural event or of chance. For example: A has fired a gun at B and wounded him. The wounded B has been taken to hospital. However, B has lost his life not because A fired the gun at him but because of an earthquake or a fire occurring at the hospital. Here the causal link must first be established. Had A not fired the gun at B, B would not have been taken to hospital and would not have been affected by the natural disaster or the chance event there. A’s act is therefore causal for the result of death. The second assessment will be made at the level of permitted risk. There is no doubt that, by firing a gun at B, A created a risk outside what is permitted. Nevertheless, it is not possible to attribute this result to A. For the result did not occur because of the risk created by A. The result of death is a product of the natural event or of chance. B’s death will not be regarded as A’s work69.

On examining the causal development, it should be recalled that a fire or an earthquake at the hospital is not something that can be expected. Fires or earthquakes are not encountered in hospitals every day or frequently; such occurrences are exceptional (objective foreseeability). Nor is it possible to say that, before firing the gun at the victim (ex ante), the perpetrator foresaw that the victim would be taken to hospital, that a fire would break out or an earthquake occur at that hospital, and that he would lose his life for that reason (subjective foreseeability).

Examples of this kind can be multiplied. While B is being taken to hospital, the health worker carrying the stretcher has a heart attack, B falls from the stretcher onto the stairs and loses his life because of the blows he receives70. A biological process (the heart attack) happened by chance to occur at that moment, gave rise to an atypical causal development and excluded objective imputation.

Nevertheless, it cannot be said that an atypical causal development will always exclude objective imputation. There may also be certain exceptional situations. This is so where the risk triggers a special condition existing in the victim and the result occurs for that reason. B is a haemophiliac. A wants to kill B and attacks him with an axe. A fails to bring the axe down on B’s head but wounds him in the arm. Because of B’s illness his blood does not clot, and the wound, which might not normally have been fatal, causes his death. Here, too, there is no deviation to be taken into account and no change in the content of the intent. The perpetrator (A) is liable for the completed offence of killing71,72 (whether A knew of this condition of B’s is examined under the heading of the mental element and is not a matter of objective imputation).

2. Cases in Which the Result Occurs because of the Victim’s Act (Assumption by the Victim)

Liability in criminal law is limited and subjective. Where another person’s conduct enters into the causal course, that other person’s entirely free and self-responsible conduct cannot be imputed to the perpetrator. Individuals can be held liable only on account of their own conduct73. If the victim has, of his own free will, harmed himself or placed himself in a danger of harm, the results arising from that conduct cannot be objectively attributed to the perpetrator74.

For example, A has wounded B, and B has thereupon been taken to hospital. B, who is losing blood because of the wound, is conscious and there is no significant danger of death. The doctors say that B must be given a blood transfusion. However, because of his religious beliefs B does not accept the blood transfusion and loses his life. Here the victim has, of his own free will, refused the treatment and the blood transfusion, and the result of death arising for that reason cannot be attributed to the perpetrator.

In another example, B is a heroin addict and a regular customer of the heroin dealer A. One day B once again obtains heroin from A, but when injecting himself with the heroin he misjudges the dose and dies of an overdose. Trafficking in heroin lies outside the sphere of permitted risk and is an offence in its own right (Art. 188 TCK). However, it is not possible to hold A liable for B’s death on account of this risk created by A (selling heroin). For B acted of his own will and injected the heroin into himself.

The examples may not always be so clear, however. Situations may also arise in which the perpetrator and the victim assume the risk together. For example, B has gone to a bar and enjoyed himself until sunrise. B, who is under the influence of alcohol, leaves the bar together with his friends. A, although he knows that B is under the influence of alcohol, tells B to drive him home. While B and A are travelling in the car, B loses control of the vehicle, has an accident and causes A’s death. In another example, B takes part in illegal racing events held at night. A thinks that this is very cool and offers to act as B’s co-driver in the passenger seat during the races. During a race B’s car crashes into the barriers and A, in the passenger seat, loses his life.

In the third example, A is a great adrenaline enthusiast and has long wanted to go car surfing. Although aware of the danger, he gives in to his passion and says that, while B drives the car at a certain speed, he wants to climb on top of the car and will try to keep his balance on it75. While B is driving in accordance with the speed instructions A has given him, A loses control, falls and dies. Finally, what solution should be followed where a partner who knows that the other carries the AIDS virus consents to the conduct creating the danger of transmission of the virus (sexual intercourse) and the virus is transmitted to him as a result of the sexual intercourse?76

In truth, in all these examples the risks overlap in time and compete with one another. It can also be seen that each of the risks lies outside the permitted sphere.

In such cases, according to the German criminal lawyer Roxin, who has made a major contribution to the theory of objective imputation, the “principle of personal responsibility” (Prinzip der gleichrangigen Eigenverantwortlichkeit) must be followed. Where competing risks are created, the victim, who acts freely and places himself in this danger, is expected to foresee the danger at least as much as the perpetrator, or the victim in fact already foresees it. Where the victim accepts the danger in question, the results that arise must not be imputed to the perpetrator77. In all the examples above, the victim too is, at least as much as the perpetrator, in the position of creator of the risks.

In the case concerning the AIDS virus heard before the Bavarian Supreme Court, the court held that the act of transmitting the AIDS virus could not be attributed to the perpetrator. It is true that the risk of transmitting AIDS originated with the perpetrator and was created by him. However, by the conduct of engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse the victim created a new risk on his own account. In accordance with the principle of personal responsibility, the victim, who creates a risk of equivalent degree, is taken also to have assumed the possible results of the act. In that case no result attributable to the perpetrator remains78. Likewise, in the decision of the Düsseldorf Regional Court of Appeal examining car surfing, the victim had given the perpetrator an instruction to drive at a certain speed during the surfing. The perpetrator, however, deliberately failed to keep to this speed limit. Here the Court took the view that the victim had consented to the act but that this consent was vitiated by the failure to comply with the speed instruction79. For that reason it decided that the result of death was to be attributed to the perpetrator. On the other hand, had this limit not been exceeded, it hardly seems possible to attribute the result objectively to the perpetrator80.

When the principle of personal responsibility is followed, it must not be forgotten that the perpetrator and the victim must have the same level of knowledge with regard to the risk created and the consequences of the risk. For example, in the example of the drunk driver, if the victim is unaware of this state of affairs or the perpetrator gives the impression of having consumed alcohol only to a degree at which he will not lose command and control of the vehicle, the victim does not have as much knowledge as the perpetrator about the risk he takes by getting into that vehicle and about the consequences of the risk. Again, in the AIDS example, for the result not to be objectively attributable to the perpetrator carrying the virus, the victim must have the requisite level of knowledge of all the circumstances of the situation81. If one can speak of the same level of knowledge of the danger, the principle of personal responsibility must be followed and the conclusion reached that the result cannot be objectively attributed. The victim’s conscious assumption of the danger excludes objective imputation82.

A distinction must be noted in situations where the victim consciously assumes the danger. In such situations there may sometimes also be cases in which the perpetrator has established full control over the act, and it may be possible to hold him liable for the result that occurs. In cases where the perpetrator has established control over the act, too, the victim may have consciously accepted, wanted and assumed this danger. However, this assumption, which may be assessed in law as consent, will not result in the exclusion of objective imputation83.

Accordingly, there is a difference between the victim’s participation, in the form of consent, in an external danger brought about by another person and the danger lying within the victim’s own sphere of control. In both it can be said that the victim consciously exposes himself to a danger. However, where the danger materialises entirely within the victim’s sphere of control, these results cannot be attributed to another person84.

For example, precisely this difference exists between the case in which A buys heroin from the drug dealer B and dies by giving himself a golden shot with that heroin, and the case in which the person asks the dealer B to inject this high dose and the dealer, by injecting the high dose, causes the person’s death. In the first situation the act lies entirely within the sphere of control of the victim A. In the second situation, although the dealer B carries out his act at A’s request and upon A’s assumption of the danger, control over the act of injecting the heroin belongs to him. In this case it must be accepted that objective imputation is established and that the elements of the statutory definition of the offence are fulfilled. On the other hand, it is not possible to rely on a ground of justification in the form of A’s consent either. For A’s consent to the ending of his own life cannot be regarded as valid. Where B, by injecting the heroin, causes A’s death through the high dose, he bears criminal liability since he has control over the act85.

Finally, the example given concerning illegal races must be resolved. In an illegal car race, besides competing risks and the principle of personal responsibility, the extent to which the perpetrator controls the causal process is also an important question. Although the driver of the car is indeed the one who steers and controls it, this alone should not lead to the conclusion that the result can be attributed to him. In consenting to take part in an illegal race, the victim knows that the perpetrator does not have definite control over the race and the car. Although the driver of the car does not want the result, he may lose his control over the act and be unable to prevent the unwanted results in question from occurring. As regards control or knowledge of the risk, there is no difference between the perpetrator in the driver’s seat and the victim in the passenger seat. By taking the risk of participating in an illegal race, the victim takes upon himself the dangers arising from it. The doctrine of objective imputation was developed in order to ensure a fair distribution of risk. If the result is attributed to the perpetrator in the driver’s seat, one cannot speak of a fair distribution of risk. The result must not be objectively attributed to the perpetrator86.

3. Cases in Which the Result Occurs because of the Act of a Third Party (Assumption by the Third Party)

Just as the risk created by the victim may exclude the objective imputation of the result to the perpetrator, it is also possible for a risk created by someone else, that is, by a third party, to intervene and bring about the result. Since everyone can be held liable on account of his own act and its consequences, if the third party’s act has brought about the result, that result cannot be attributed to the perpetrator87. However, as noted earlier, the intentional act of a third party is not a factor that breaks the causal link either. The act is causal for the result, but an examination is required as to whether or not the legal link exists. This derives from the “prohibition of regress”88. The prohibition of regress means that, where there is more than one act conforming to the statutory definition of the offence, only the last act, which brings about the result, is taken as the basis for attribution and there is no going back to the first act.

For example: A shoots and wounds the mafia boss B. C has long been making plans to take revenge on the mafia boss B, who killed his entire family. Finding B unprotected in hospital, C kills him. In this example B’s death came about not through the materialisation of the risk created by A but as the materialisation of the risk created by C. There is no doubt that A’s act is causal, because it caused B to be taken to hospital and C carried out the act of killing in the hospital. However, since C created a new and independent risk by his act, the result of death cannot be attributed to A. C alone is liable for the offence of intentional killing. A’s liability extends up to the stage at which B was taken to hospital and killed by C. If A fired with the aim of killing B, he is liable for attempted intentional killing; if he fired with the aim of wounding him, he is liable for the completed offence of intentional injury.

In another example, B has again been taken to hospital following A’s act of firing a gun. However, B has lost his life not because a third party intentionally killed him but because the driver of the ambulance in which he was being taken to hospital exceeded the speed limit and lost control of the steering. Here, too, the result of B’s death cannot be attributed to A. Although A, by his act, caused B to be taken to hospital and to be placed in an ambulance for that purpose, the negligent act of the ambulance driver intervened and the result came about as the materialisation of that risk. The ambulance driver is liable for negligent killing, and A for attempted intentional killing / intentional injury.

As will be seen, the examples relate to the problems of “overtaking causation”, which are also dealt with under the causal link. In connection with overtaking causation, examples have been given of cases of “multi-stage causation” in which the first act is regarded as causal. In these situations, although the act performed first has causal value, it should not be possible to attribute the result objectively to the perpetrator, since the result that occurred was brought about by a third party89.

In the examples above, the perpetrator who performs the first act creates a risk by his intentional conduct. Situations may also arise, however, in which the perpetrator performs a negligent act and this act constitutes the preliminary stage of the intentional or negligent act of a third party90. In such situations the perpetrator creates a risk by his negligent act, and the materialisation of that risk in the form of the result is completed by the intentional or negligent act of the third party91. What is disputed in the context of attribution is precisely the liability of the person who acted negligently at the first step. A number of theories have been developed on this subject:

i. Theory of the Adequate Attribution Relationship (Durchgängigkeitserfordernis)92

According to this theory, the liability of A, who performed the first act in the example above, does not cease. The intentional and culpable act of the third party does not affect the liability for negligence of the person who, by the first step, brought about the suitable conditions. The result cannot be attributed to the person who performed the first act only if the third party’s act was, judged by common experience of life, in no way foreseeable93. Taking the condition theory as its basis, it argues that the causal connection should not be regarded as interrupted, since the result could not come about if the intermediate causes created by the first person did not arise. As a limitation, it relies on the situations in which the intentional intervention is connected with the conduct in breach of duty and this effect continues until the result occurs94.

ii. Theory of the Interruption of the Attribution Relationship95

According to this theory, the fact that a third party acting with full responsibility intentionally and culpably takes charge of the course of events will remove the first person’s liability for negligence. In the example case the result cannot be objectively attributed to A. The theory has been justified on the ground that criminal norms command the avoidance of results that can be controlled96. A’s full control over the result has ceased because of the other person, who entered into the act with full responsibility. Since causing the result already leads to the punishment of the perpetrators who act intentionally, there is no need to include the negligent acts in the background within this sphere of responsibility. In some situations it is possible for even persons acting lawfully to prepare the ground for persons who subsequently act intentionally. For example, one may think of the case in which a person who goes with a weapon to a shopping centre open to the public, acting with due care, deposits this weapon for safekeeping, and the person in charge of the lockers then takes the weapon and shoots his friend. Had the person not deposited the weapon for safekeeping, this result might not have occurred, since in the ordinary course of life the likelihood of coming to a shopping centre with a weapon is very low. The theory rests on the idea that even persons acting lawfully cannot provide complete assurance as regards the occurrence of a wrong, and that even lawful conduct may lead to wrongdoing where the necessary conditions are present.

iii. Theory of Limited Responsibility (die Theorie der begrenzten Verantwortungsbereiche)97

According to this theory, in determining attribution the spheres of responsibility of everyone taking part in the act must be assessed separately from one another. For the result to be objectively attributed to the first, negligent act, an assessment must be made from two angles. Accordingly, it will be possible to attribute the result to the first person where there are obvious signs that the third party acting intentionally is “inclined to commit the act”98, or where the person who performs the first act is bound, as a “guarantor”99, to ensure that the result does not occur.

Starting from the principle of personal responsibility, the theory limits the sphere of responsibility. Everyone is therefore expected to act in such a way as not to endanger another person’s legal interest. In addition, however, they may also trust that others will not engage in conduct that creates danger. Since acting in a state of permanent distrust is impossible if everyday life is to continue, providing for a criminal sanction against the person who performed the first act should be possible only where punishment is required because he gave rise to the offence or where a special duty of protection is at issue. Under this solution, too, negligent participation in an intentional offence will be accepted only in exceptional situations.

For example, A, who is a soldier, puts his weapon on the coffee table. His son B, seeing the weapon there, takes it and kills his friend C, who constantly makes fun of him. There is no doubt that A’s act is causal: had A not left the weapon there, B would not have taken the weapon and would not have killed C100. A’s act, moreover, is a negligent act constituting a breach of the duty of care and diligence. He ought to take the necessary safety precautions and keep the weapon in a place that no one can reach. Can A, then, be held liable on account of this risk he has created (leaving the weapon in the open)?

In another example, the head of laboratory B keeps in his cabinet the very powerful snake venom they have developed. However, he has not locked his cabinet and everyone is able to access it. His assistant C takes this venom and, by adding it to the food of the laboratory employee A, with whom he is in constant rivalry, causes his death. Can the result of death be attributed to B?

In legal scholarship a view called the “prohibition of regress”, set out above, has been developed as a solution. In these situations, in which the rules on participation cannot be applied, the entire responsibility lies with the perpetrator who performs the second act. In our view, too, the prohibition of regress should be adopted in such cases and the problem of objective imputation resolved in that way. Indeed, the theory determines the sphere of responsibility more accurately. The tendency to exempt persons from criminal liability appears just as negative as the attempt to bring every act under a criminal sanction. For the third party has created a different risk by his own entirely free conduct, and the result came about through the materialisation of that risk. The result should not be attributed to the perpetrator who performed the negligent first act, and punishability should not be drawn so widely. No one is under a duty to reckon with the possibility that his conduct will provide the ground for an offence to be committed by another. Liability for conduct that constitutes the preliminary stage of another act is possible only in cases where the rules on participation can be applied101.

When the cases above are examined within the framework of the prohibition of regress, the results of death in question cannot be attributed to the soldier A and the head of laboratory B, who by their negligent acts prepared the ground for a third party to commit an offence; in determining liability there will be “no going back” to the first act. In the first case, in any event, since the duty of care to be observed by a person who keeps a weapon is at the level of a guarantor’s duty and arises from statute, attribution will be possible in the examination of the negligent offence102. The remaining part must be resolved under the subject of participation.

As can be seen, always applying the prohibition of regress so strictly may lead to certain unjust results. If, by the act of the perpetrator who performs the negligent act, provisions ensuring safety have been breached and a legally significant danger exceeding the sphere of permitted risk has been created, attribution should be possible103. Within this framework, the soldier, by leaving his weapon in the open, and the head of laboratory, by leaving the snake venom in the open, and by failing to take the necessary protective measures, have breached provisions ensuring safety. Keeping instruments capable of producing a lethal effect, such as weapons and poison, under appropriate conditions is an obligation for the persons who use them. For that reason, the prohibition of regress should not be applicable to them. If it were not a weapon or poison but a knife that had been left on the kitchen worktop, and a third party killed someone with that knife, one could not speak of a similar safety obligation here, and the result could not be attributed to the person who forgot the knife on the worktop. In conclusion, perpetrators who fail to keep duly safe instruments which, like weapons or poison, involve danger to human life by their main purpose of use are liable for negligent killing, and the perpetrators who kill the victim using that weapon and poison are liable for intentional killing, each separately.

C. Cases Falling Outside the Protective Purpose (Scope) of the Norm

For every offence type there is a legal interest that it is intended to protect and a body of conduct and results that it is sought to prohibit. Sometimes, however, even though the perpetrator’s conduct leads to the violation of these values, the result he brings about does not fall within the sphere protected by the norm.

According to a classic example given on this subject, A and B are cycling at night, riding one behind the other along the road in their neighbourhood. Neither of them has a bicycle light. At that moment C, who is passing by in his car, turns into the street where the cyclists are, fails to see A, who is riding in front, hits him and causes his death. Here the case of falling outside the protective purpose of the norm is applied not with regard to the car driver C but with regard to the second cyclist B. If the bicycle of B, who was riding behind, had had a light, C would have been able to see the cyclists and the accident in question would not have happened. In this respect B’s act is causal. Moreover, riding a bicycle on the road without lights is also a breach of duty, and the limits of permitted risk have been exceeded. Yet the result of A’s death cannot be attributed to B. For the duty not to ride an unlit bicycle on the road is a duty concerning the protection of that very cyclist himself. One cannot speak of a duty-imposing norm requiring a person, by using a light, to provide illumination and safety for other persons. As can be seen, since B’s act lies outside the protective purpose of the norm, the result of A’s death cannot be attributed to him and he is not liable for the offence of negligent killing104.

The subject can also be related to the examples concerning permitted risk. For example, A is driving his car and is complying with the applicable speed rules. At that moment the five-year-old child B darts into the road, and A hits B with his car and causes his death. The act of A, who is complying with the speed rules, is within the limits of permitted risk. However, five minutes before hitting B he went through a red light. Had A stopped at the red light, he would not have hit B. Can it be argued that he acted in breach of the red-light rule and that the result of death can therefore be attributed to him?

Such reasoning is mistaken. When the protective purpose of the norm is examined, it is seen that stopping at a red light has a function only with regard to the pedestrian and vehicle traffic in front of or very near that light. Failing to stop at a red light does not result in liability for an accident that occurs five or ten minutes later. The result did not occur within the protective scope of the norm breached by the perpetrator (failing to stop at a red light several kilometres away); consequently, the result cannot be attributed to the perpetrator105.

The protective purpose (scope) of the norm is one of the elements limiting attribution in both intentional and negligent offences. Another example concerning the protective scope of the norm is as follows: a speed limit of 30 km/h is applied near a residential area so that there will be no noise. While A is driving along the road without observing this speed limit, he is unable to brake in time because of a pedestrian who steps into the road, hits him and causes his death. It would nevertheless not be possible to attribute the offence of negligent killing objectively to A, who could have prevented the accident had he complied with the speed limit. For here the purpose for which the norm was laid down is precisely to prevent a result entirely different from the one that actually occurred in the specific case, namely the creation of noise. The perpetrator cannot be punished for results that come about through the breach of norms laid down in order to prevent results directed at an entirely different purpose106. The aim is to bring out the specific relationship between the result that has occurred and the duty of care, and in this way it has sought to narrow the limits of punishability107.

An important problem with this limitation is that in most norms imposing a duty of care the legal interest placed under protection or the protective purpose is not specified. Some norms serve to protect more than one legal interest. This may be both a legal interest protected by an offence and a legal interest protected by a misdemeanour (administrative offence) or a tort. Norms of this kind are laid down in order to regulate the whole of the healthy and safe course of everyday life. However, there is a likelihood of problems arising where these general norms are breached108. For example, norms such as the speed limit given above, even though laid down in particular places for a particular purpose, in fact have as their main aim the prevention of all conduct that could, in the ordinary course of life, lead to results of death and injury. In all areas that are dangerous according to general experience of life, the laying down of rules of conduct has as its aim the protection of human life and of all the individuals in society (for example the elderly, persons with visual or walking impairments, children in places near school exits). Consequently, in our view, for the protective scope of the norm, which is difficult to determine in the specific case, all matters that are connected with the purpose of the norm and that the protection aims to prevent must be taken into account109.

D. Special Situations Excluding Objective Imputation

1. Cases in Which the Nexus of Breach of Duty Must Exist (Cases of Hypothetical Causation in the Event of Lawful Conduct)

The perpetrator has acted contrary to a duty incumbent on him. However, even if he had fulfilled the duty, he would not have been able to prevent the result in question from occurring. The same result would occur irrespective of whether or not the duty is complied with. In this way, a hypothesis is made in determining liability, and an assessment is carried out as to whether the result would nevertheless have occurred had the conduct been lawful. If it can be said that the result would definitely have occurred , it is argued that the result does not stem from the perpetrator’s breach of his duty, and attribution is not established110.

For example, the businessperson A has shoes and slippers made of leather produced in his factory. The hides purchased from China are disinfected and given to the workers to work on. A mistakenly gave the workers hides that he had not yet had disinfected; the workers fell ill because of a bacterium in the leather and lost their lives. As a result of the investigations carried out, it emerged that no disinfectant could have been effective against the bacterium111.

In another example, the doctor A got drunk while on duty and for that reason was unable to give the necessary treatment to a patient who came in late at night. The patient lost his life, but the autopsy carried out revealed that A could not have prevented the patient’s death even if he had not been drunk and had given the necessary treatment112. As will be seen, in both of these examples the examinations carried out after the event revealed that the result would have occurred “with certainty” even if the perpetrators had not acted contrary to their duties. The result cannot be attributed to them.

In examples of this kind, the ground on which the exclusion of liability is to be based has been a matter of debate. Particularly in the early stages of the theory’s development, it was argued that recourse should be had to the principle that “the accused is given the benefit of the doubt”. If it is accepted that the result would also have occurred had the duty been complied with, it is not certain that the result occurred because of the perpetrator’s act. Another view, by contrast, proceeds from the “increase of risk”. If the perpetrator’s breach of his duty increased the risk of the result occurring, it should also be possible to attribute the result to him.

In our view the “increase of risk” view is the more accurate. The principle that “the accused is given the benefit of the doubt” cannot be used in the interpretation of rules of substantive law. This principle arises only from the requirement, in the law of criminal procedure, that full conviction be reached in establishing proof. First and foremost, therefore, what is at issue here is a problem not of “proof” but of “attribution”. And in order to speak of a result attributable to the perpetrator, he must create a risk exceeding the permitted limits or increase an existing risk. In situations where the result would in any event, with certainty, occur even if the perpetrator had acted in accordance with his duty, he does not create or increase this risk. Nevertheless, if the perpetrator’s act increases the risk of the result occurring, he must be held liable for the result113.

2. The Principle of Trust

The principle of trust applies in situations where many persons are engaged in the same activity at the same time. Although initially accepted in relation to offences committed in traffic, it is a principle that has broadened today and that, in addition to offences committed in traffic, generally comes into play in teamwork and in acts committed negligently114. According to this principle, persons are under no duty, when engaging in a form of conduct, to reckon with the possibility that others may act unlawfully. An individual acting lawfully may “trust” that the other person will likewise act lawfully, and he incurs no criminal liability for harm that occurs because of this trust115. In conduct that is the opposite of conduct in breach of the objective duty of care, that is, where a legal interest is violated as a result of an act performed in conformity with the duty of care, what is at issue will no longer be “wrongdoing” but “misfortune”116.

For example, a person who is driving his car in compliance with the traffic rules and has the right of way is not obliged to act on the assumption that someone else may cross the junction improperly and cause an accident. He may act trusting that the others, too, will comply with and respect these rules. He need not reduce his speed on the supposition that a third party will fail to respect his right of way. In the accident that occurs for this reason, the result will be imputed to the perpetrators who acted in breach of this rule; no liability on his part will arise117.

Likewise, in teamwork the members of the team are not obliged to check whether the others are acting unlawfully and to act accordingly. Indeed, constantly checking the conduct of the others might in turn prevent them from properly fulfilling the principal responsibilities incumbent on themselves118. As a rule, each team member is responsible only for his own conduct and may content himself with carrying out that conduct lawfully. No responsibility beyond this is placed on them, in accordance with the principle of trust.

The principle of trust too, however, has certain limits. The two limits indicated in this regard are the unlawful conduct of another person that is very clearly foreseeable and preventable, and the situations in which the hierarchical superiors responsible for inexperienced persons within the team remain indifferent to the act119. As an example of the first, one may point to the case in which one of the doctors operating as a team is very drunk and could cause serious harm to the patient if he takes part in the operation. Indeed, if the principle of trust is applied strictly, the conclusion is reached that everyone is responsible for his own act and that trusting that others too will comply with the rules cannot be punished. However, the harm that the drunk doctor will cause is very clear and foreseeable. In this situation the other team members must intervene and prevent him from entering the operation and causing harm. Otherwise their liability, too, will arise.

As an example of the second limit, one may cite the requirement that an inexperienced junior doctor who has newly joined the team be supervised and monitored by the doctor who is responsible for him and who heads the surgical team. The doctor heading the surgical team must without fail keep watch over his conduct. It is not possible for the liability of the doctor in the position of superior to be excluded by relying on the principle of trust120.

IV. The Criminal-Law Consequences Attached to the Exclusion of Objective Imputation

The theory of objective imputation examines the question whether or not the objective elements can be attributed to the perpetrator. The aim of the examination is to determine the general objective elements of attributable conduct121. The determination as to whether or not an act is to be attributed is made independently of what the perpetrator thought and of the wish and purpose in pursuit of which he acted. Once these subjective elements have been filtered out, what remains of the assessment are objective and normative criteria. For this reason the theory is called the “theory of objective imputation”.

In assessing a causal act, the theory looks at whether it creates a risk corresponding to the form described in the offence type and whether the result occurred under that risk122. Whether the permitted risk at the first stage has been exceeded is determined by examining the criminal norm. For there are certain rules of conduct and care that these norms prescribe, and acting in a certain way is prohibited. Where this standard is departed from, the risk falls outside the permitted sphere and one can speak of a legally prohibited risk. Consequently, with the creation of the offence type, a framework of risk and a protective purpose belonging to it are determined.

The elements of the offence belonging to the statutory definition laid down in the law, and the rules of conduct it sets (norms of command and prohibition), cannot be considered bare and in isolation. When the instructions as to conduct will not have been complied with can be determined in the light of the meaning and purpose of the norm. The mere fact that an act is causal for the result does not mean that it is an act conforming to the statutory definition of the offence and that its consequence is a result conforming to that definition. In order to be able to make this finding, the question whether or not the act creates an impermissible risk must be clarified123.

Hence, the causal connection alone cannot complete the element of conformity with the statutory definition of the offence (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit). For the norms of conduct underlying the statutory definition cannot be regarded as a prohibition in the sense of “not causing”. Considering the chain reaching backwards that emerges when the condition theory is followed, it is not possible to regard every single act as conforming to the statutory definition. This theory can be limited by the assessment of attribution to be made by reference to the meaning and purpose of the norm, that is, by the theory of objective imputation. Since this limitation rests on the statutory definition and results in the imputation of the elements belonging to the statutory definition, the exclusion of objective imputation results in the exclusion of conformity with the statutory definition of the offence124,125.

There are decisions of the Court of Cassation in which it erroneously deals with objective imputation together with concepts such as culpability or negligence126,127. Decisions of this kind are, from the standpoint of the systematic structure of the examination of the offence, wrong and, in addition, cause the meanings of the concepts used in criminal law to be misinterpreted. For proceeding to the examination of culpability in respect of a form of conduct means accepting that the element of conformity with the statutory definition of the offence is present and, moreover, that the act has been found unlawful. From that point on, what is examined is whether or not the perpetrator can be normatively reproached for his conduct and whether or not awareness of wrongdoing existed. By contrast, in the light of the explanations given above, objective imputation cuts the examination short at the stage of conformity with the statutory definition, and there is no need for us to form a judgment of reproach. If the result cannot be objectively attributed to the perpetrator, no wrongdoing has come into being. In wrongdoing committed negligently, the “increase of danger” or the “departure from permitted risk” are matters that must be interpreted correctly. Together with the other criteria of objective imputation in intentional offences, the objective foreseeability of the result in negligent offence types is the problematic area that must be examined for the purposes of attribution.

In contrast to its incorrect assessments, there are also sound decisions of the Court of Cassation that refer directly to the theory of objective imputation. In the assessment contained in one of these decisions the following point was emphasised128:

“Although the existence of the causal link is indispensable with regard to the result that has occurred, it is not sufficient on its own; it must additionally be assessed whether or not the result is to be imputed to the perpetrator. In this context, for the graver result to be objectively imputable to the perpetrator, this is possible where this graver and different result is the realisation and direct consequence of the specific danger that is bound up with, adjacent to and peculiar to the commission of the basic offence type. For example, where loss of sight is caused as a result of a blow to the eye, the perpetrator will be held liable for the graver result that has occurred, it being accepted that he foresaw that loss of sight might occur. However, where the perpetrator has no conditional intent with regard to the graver and different result that has occurred, but was able to foresee that this graver and different

result might occur, at least negligence on his part will be required in order for the perpetrator to be held liable with regard to this result. For liability for negligence it is sufficient that the result be objectively foreseeable (…)”

In the decision, the criterion of objective foreseeability mentioned in connection with objective imputation in negligent offences was assessed. This criterion, as mentioned above, is decisive for attribution. If the consequence of the danger that the perpetrator will create by his conduct is not objectively foreseeable, the risk will have materialised as a fortuitous accident and in an unexpected manner. For example, in a scenario in which the perpetrator knows that the victim suffers from a heart condition, where he begins to punch the victim and the victim ultimately dies of a heart attack brought on by fear, it is accepted that the perpetrator was able, on account of the knowledge he possessed, objectively to foresee the result. For it can be accepted that a normal person who is a member of the society in which we live, taken as the point of reference when an objective assessment is made for the purposes of criminal liability, would be able to foresee the result of a possible attack where violence is used against a person known to have a heart condition. In this case, in liability for negligence, the result can be attributed to the perpetrator as his work. Under normal conditions, had the victim not had a heart condition, one could then have spoken of a result slight enough to be remedied by simple medical intervention. Where, moreover, the perpetrator has no knowledge of the heart condition, the result of death will not be attributed, since he will not be able objectively to foresee the result of death.

With regard to the same example, in cases of this kind, where the perpetrator’s conduct is not of a degree that can be remedied by simple medical intervention, the risk will in any event lie within the danger created by the act. The point that needs to be discussed, however, is whether or not there is intentional injury aggravated by its result. The examination therefore concerns whether or not the perpetrator’s conduct provides the dangerousness required with regard to the result of death129.

Conclusion

Where the condition theory is accepted for the causal link, the theory of objective imputation performs a very important function in limiting the perpetrator’s intolerably broad liability. In fact, as regards establishing the causal link, it is not possible to use the condition theory without the theory of objective imputation. They are theories that are, as it were, joined to one another like Siamese twins and cannot be used without each other. When the two are used together, however, they produce better and fairer results in determining the causal link than all other theories. For this reason, while we too have accepted the condition theory for determining the causal link, we consider that objective imputation must also be used in establishing liability. Nevertheless, accepting objective imputation is not sufficient to resolve the problem; the problems and atypical situations that arise must be resolved one by one.

The doctrine of objective imputation is, when the history of criminal law is considered, a subject that may be regarded as relatively new. The doctrine began to be developed from the middle of the 20th century onwards. Perhaps for this reason, many areas and assumptions in the theory are still being debated, and it cannot be said that they have yet been brought to any certainty. In this study, the aim has been to test these problematic and disputed areas of the doctrine of objective imputation and to explain them by means of various examples. By drawing a general framework of the doctrine through examples and debates, it has been sought to determine the criteria under which the result can be attributed to the perpetrator. Since the conditions identified in defining objective imputation do not in every case lead directly to the conclusion that the result is to be attributed to the perpetrator, a great many disputed examples have been assessed in order to determine the limits of these conditions.

Finally, we wish to touch on the practical effect, within criminal law, of the exclusion of objective imputation as regards the solution of specific cases. If a result has been found not to be attributable to the perpetrator for any of the reasons discussed above, the conclusion must be reached, without making a second assessment, that conformity with the statutory definition of the offence is to be denied. Whether in a trial or in an exercise in the course of legal education, when criminal liability is being assessed, the act and the result required by the statutory definition are determined at the first step; the act and the existing result are stated and it is explained on what ground the result cannot be attributed to the perpetrator; and thereafter that act should not enter into the discussion in the second and subsequent questions. For the examination is deemed to be complete in respect of that act. If the result cannot be objectively attributed to the perpetrator, there is no longer any need to discuss mental elements such as intent or negligence, grounds of justification or culpability.

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Footnotes

  1. Assoc. Prof. Dr., Faculty Member, Department of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, Faculty of Law, İstanbul Aydın University, volkan.dulger@dulger.av.tr, ORCID: 0000-0003-4034-5436, Date of Submission of the Article: ... ↑
  2. Attorney-at-Law, İstanbul Bar Association; Doctoral Student, Department of Public Law, Institute of Social Sciences, İstanbul University; LL.M., Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn, merve.bakdur@dulger.av.tr, ORCID: 0000-0003-0150-916X.
  3. Attorney-at-Law, İstanbul Bar Association; Master’s Student, Department of Public Law, Institute of Social Sciences, İstanbul University, onur.ozkan@dulger.av.tr, ORCID: 0000-0002-3391-4728.
  4. Hans Kelsen, Nedensellik ve İsnadiyet, Çev. Zeki Hafızoğulları, Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 1978, Cilt 35, Sayı 1-4, s. 221 - 222. ↑
  5. TDK Güncel Türkçe Sözlüğü, (Çevrimiçi) https://sozluk.gov.tr/?kelime=isnat, (Erişim Tarihi: 11.05.2020). ↑
  6. In accordance with the finalist theory of the offence, which we accept with regard to intentional offences of commission, we use the terms “conduct” (“deed”) and “act” synonymously. ↑
  7. According to the view advocated in German legal scholarship, which we too share together with the modern doctrine of the offence, neither intent nor negligence is merely a part of the wrong. According to this view, which we call the dual function, intent is in one respect a form of conduct and in another respect a form of culpability. The situation in which this twofold view displays its function, specifically in intentional offences, is that of mistake as to the conditions of the grounds of justification, see: Hans Heinrich Jescheck/Weigend Thomas, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, 5. Auflage, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1996, s. 243; Helmut Satzger, “Die sog. »Retterfälle« als Problem der objektiven Zurechnung”, JURA 2014, s. 695-706. Doğan too points, as an argument for the dual function of intent, to the fact that the intentional form of an offence is punished more severely than its negligent form. Indeed, whereas the Turkish Criminal Code provides for life imprisonment where the offence of killing is committed intentionally (Art. 81), it provides for imprisonment of two to six years for its negligent form (Art. 85). This difference in punishment stems from the fact that intent also takes effect in the sphere of culpability. See: Koray Doğan, Neticesi Sebebiyle Ağırlaşmış Suçlar, 2. Bası, Ankara, Adalet Yayınevi, 2015, s. 197. ↑
  8. Kelsen, s. 221. ↑
  9. Michael Köhler, “Der Begriff der Zurechnung” in: Festschrift für Hans Joachim Hirsch zum 70.Geburtstag am 11. April 1999, Hrsg. Thomas Weigend/Georg Küpper, Berlin New York, De Gruyter, 1999, s.68. ↑
  10. Art. 20 TCK lays down the principle of the personal nature of criminal liability by stating: “Criminal liability is personal. No one may be held liable for the act of another”. Although only the principle of culpability is brought to the fore when the personal nature of criminal liability is discussed, it should not be forgotten that this also encompasses objective imputation. Indeed, Article 20 makes no reference to culpability. What is brought to the fore is not culpability alone but attribution, see: Yener Ünver, “YTCK’da Kusurluluk”, Ceza Hukuku Dergisi, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Yıl 1, Sayı 1, Eylül 2006, s. 48; Uğur Ersoy, “Türk ve Alman Ceza Hukuku Sistemlerinde Kusur Prensibinin Kapsamı ve Objektif Cezalandırılabilme Şartlarının Kusur Prensibi ile Bağdaşabilirliği”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, Sayı 109, Yıl 2013, s. 205, dn. 2. ↑
  11. See: Claudius Geisler, Zur Vereinbarkeit objektiver Bedingungen der Strafbarkeit mit dem Schuldprinzip-Zugleich ein Beitrag zum Freiheitsbegriff des modernen Schuldstrafrechts, Berlin, 1998, s. 19; Pierluigi Schaad, Die objektiven Strafbarkeitsbedingungen im schweizerischen Strafrecht mit Berücksichtigung des deutschen und des österreichischen Rechts, Winterthur, 1964, s. 6; Ersoy, Kusur Prensibinin Kapsamı, s. 207. ↑
  12. Doğan, Neticesi Sebebiyle Ağırlaşmış Suçlar, s. 103. ↑
  13. Heinz Koriath, “Fahrlässigkeit und Schuld” in: Festschrift für Heike Jung zum 65.Geburtstag am 23. April 2007, Hrsg. Heinz Müller-Dietz/Egon Müller, Baden Baden, Nomos, 2007, s. 400. In his article explaining the relationship between negligence and culpability, Koriath used for causation, rather than a logical link, the formula of the link between act and result, in order to make it easier to understand. As he notes in his article, however, the real problem is the assessment to be made in terms of “purpose/will”, that is, in today’s sense, in terms of intent or negligence. The difference between the element of will and the conduct and the result will be the subject of subjective imputation. ↑
  14. Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Band I Grundlagen Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre, 4. Auflage, Verlag C.H.Beck, München, 2006, § 11, kn. 20. ↑
  15. The condition theory, also called the “Äquivalenztheorie” in German legal scholarship, determines causation by the “condicio sine qua non” formula, that is, by an assessment of the kind “had it not been for this, the result would not have occurred” with regard to the occurrence of the result, see: Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 6 vd. ↑
  16. See: Doğan, Neticesi Sebebiyle Ağırlaşmış Suçlar, s. 104; Koriath, Fahrlässigkeit und Schuld, s. 400. Once causation and objective imputation have been established, the result is regarded as a work of the perpetrator (Werk des Täters). Doğan, Neticesi Sebebiyle Ağırlaşmış Suçlar, s. 135; Timur Demirbaş, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 13. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2018, s. 245. ↑
  17. These theories on the causal link are the theory of the efficient cause (Die wirksamste Bedingungstheorie), the theory of adequate causation (Adäquanztheorie) and the theory of legal relevance (Relevanztheorie), see: Mehmet Emin Artuk/Ahmet Gökcen/Mehmet Emin Alşahin/Kerim Çakır, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 13. Bası, Ankara, Adalet Yayınevi, 2019, s. 358 vd. ↑
  18. Christoph Hübner, Die Entwicklung der objektiven Zurechnung, Schriften zum Strafrecht, Heft 150, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2004, s. 29 vd.; Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 223; Carl-Friedrich Stuckenberg, “Causation”, in: The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, Eds: Markus D. Dubber/Tatjana Hörnle, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, s. 487. ↑
  19. Kant treated attribution as an ethical problem. According to Kant, attribution consists of two parts. The first of these parts enables us to regard the person as the one who carried out this act (the perpetrator) (Zuschreibung). The second part concerns the determination of responsibility and the imputation of the result to the perpetrator (Zurechnung). There is a difference between holding a person responsible for his act and regarding him as the owner of that act. For example, where the patient cannot be saved in the medical intervention (operation) carried out and loses his life, there is no doubt that doctor A, who carried out the intervention, will be regarded as the author (perpetrator) of the act. Whether he can be held responsible for this act, however, belongs to the second part of attribution. This will require a separate legal and moral assessment. We must point out that the question whether a person can be regarded as the perpetrator does not form the subject of objective imputation in modern criminal law scholarship. Since this concerns whether or not the act is causal, it is explained under the causal link. Responsibility for the causal act or, in other words, whether the perpetrator can be held responsible is assessed under objective imputation. At this stage it is useful to give Kant’s definition of attribution: “Attribution (imputatio) in the moral sense is the judgment that a person is the author/doer (causa libera) of an act which is thereafter called a deed (factum) and is subject to laws; if we are speaking here of a judgment that has legal consequences (imputatio iudicaria), it will be legally binding; otherwise it remains merely an assessment concerning attribution (imputatio diudicatoria)”, see: Matthias Kaufmann, et al. (Ed.), Zurechnung als Operationalisierung von Verantwortung, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 134, Franz Steiner Verlag Nomos, 2004, s. 247-262, 250. Kant continues as follows: “The person (physical or moral) who is legally authorised to make this attribution is called the judge or the court.” ↑
  20. Köhler, Der Begriff der Zurechnung, s. 66. ↑
  21. Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 223; Kay Schumann, “Von der sogenannten „objektiven Zurechnung“ im Strafrecht”, Juristische Ausbildung (JURA), 2008, s. 408 vd. ↑
  22. Stuckenberg, s. 487; Bahri Öztürk/Mustafa Ruhan Erdem, Uygulamalı Ceza Hukuku ve Güvenlik Tedbirleri Hukuku, 18. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2018, kn. 384. ↑
  23. See also: Claus Roxin, Strafrechtliche Grundlagenprobleme, Berlin New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1972, s. 123 vd. ↑
  24. Richard Honig, "İlliyet Nazariyesine Dair", Çev. M. Yavuz Abadan, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası, C. II, S. 5-6, 1936, s. 180-181. ↑
  25. Honig, İlliyet Nazariyesine Dair, s. 184. ↑
  26. Honig, İlliyet Nazariyesine Dair, s. 183, 184. ↑
  27. Jescheck/Weigend, s. 257; Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 46; Berrin Akbulut, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 6. Bası, Ankara, Adalet Yayınevi, 2019, s. 341, dn. 492. ↑
  28. Welzel deals with the example in question under the explanation of the subjective elements. The author stated that, if the objective elements are accepted as fulfilled in this example, punishment can be prevented only by denying intent. At the level of intent, however, the elements of knowledge and will do not suffice to explain this. For the person who sends the other into the forest knows that a lightning strike can cause a person’s death and, moreover, also wants the person he sends to die. Only fortuitous events out of the ordinary, over whose course the person in the background, with a mere hope or wish, cannot establish control, ought not to be punished, see: Hans Welzel, Das Deutsche Strafrecht, 11. Auflage, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1969, s. 66. Roxin, however, has said that in this example too the person’s wish and his plan are subjectively intertwined and have been realised, and that the reasoning is therefore not entirely satisfactory. In his view, the wholly fortuitous death must be assessed objectively, and the problem must therefore be solved before the sphere of subjective imputation is reached, see: Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 44. ↑
  29. Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 222, 223; Öztürk/Erdem, (18), kn. 384. ↑
  30. Roxin dealt with the first two criteria in his textbook on the general part as “principles of objective imputation”, see: Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 47, 48. In his book dealing with problems of criminal law, on the other hand, he took the last criterion from Larenz as a deepening of Honig’s theory of attribution. Accordingly, he regards as attributable the result “which is understood to have been regulated in the law for this purpose”, see: Roxin, Grundlagen, s. 124. ↑
  31. Law No. 2521 on the Manufacture, Purchase, Sale and Possession of Rifles Used in Hunting and Sport, Target Pistols and Hunting Knives, Official Gazette Date: 10.03.1982, Official Gazette No.: 17629. ↑
  32. Urs Kindhäuser, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 8. Auflage, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2017, § 11, kn. 5; Rudolf von Rengier, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 11. Auflage, München, C. H. Beck, 2019, § 13, kn. 46. ↑
  33. Kindhäuser, AT, § 11, 2008, kn. 4, 5. ↑
  34. Kindhäuser, AT, § 11, 2008, kn. 5. ↑
  35. See: Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 65-66; Welzel, (11), s. 132; Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk. ↑
  36. Jescheck/Weigend, s. 401. ↑
  37. See also: Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 65, dn. 160-162, s. 271-273. ↑
  38. Kristian Kühl, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 8. Auflage, München, Vahlen, 2017, § 4, kn. 38; Johannes Wesels/Werner Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil und Ihr Aufbau, 39. Aufl., Heidelberg München Landsberg Frechen Hamburg, 2009, § 6, kn. 178. ↑
  39. Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 275; Roxin too has stated that permitted risk, which is regarded as a ground of justification, in fact takes effect before the assessment of justification and precludes the attribution of the material (objective) elements of the statutory definition of the offence, see: Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 66. ↑
  40. Kayıhan İçel, Taksirden Doğan Sübjektif Sorumluluk, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1967, s. 145 ; Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 9, 11; Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 66, 67. ↑
  41. An examination of the annual accidents occurring in Türkiye shows that in 2018 there were 428,311 accidents, 307,071 persons were injured, 3,368 persons lost their lives at the scene of the accident and 3,307 persons after the accident. Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü Trafik Başkanlığı, Yıllara Göre Trafik Kaza İstatistikleri, (Çevrimiçi), http://trafik.gov.tr/kurumlar/trafik.gov.tr/04-Istatistik/Genel/Genel_Kazalarr.pdf (Çevrimiçi) 15.05.2020. ↑
  42. A complication may also be defined as harm which, although an intervention conforming to the medical standard has been carried out, is acknowledged by medical circles as capable of arising and which occurs unavoidably despite every precaution having been taken, see Pervin Somer, Komplikasyon Yönetimi Tıp Hukuku Atölyesi-I, Ed. Akyıldız/Hakeri/Çelik/Somer, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2013, s. 110. ↑
  43. Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 281. ↑
  44. The General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation has also underlined in various decisions that medical interventions fall within the scope of permitted risk. “Medical interventions are, in general, interventions carried out within the scope of ‘permitted risk’. Permitted risk is described as the sphere of creating danger that is allowed by law. Persons should not be under the threat of punishment for all of their conduct that gives rise to harm or danger. In order to ensure social development or to attain more valuable legal interests, persons must in some cases be permitted, by reason of the nature of the work they do, to create risk to a certain extent and degree. What matters is that conduct carried out in conformity with the rules laid down takes place within the sphere of permitted risk and that the result, too, has been realised within this sphere. In that case there will be no responsibility. The performance of surgery as a type of medical intervention, the operation of a mine, sporting activity, the manufacture of explosives, driving a vehicle in traffic, hunting in conformity with the rules and the operation of an industrial plant are cited as examples of spheres of permitted risk. It can be said, however, that fault in taking on a task, in the sense of a doctor who is not a specialist in the matter taking on the diagnosis or treatment, and organisational fault, both individually on the part of the doctor and institutionally on the part of the institution where he works, lie outside permitted risk.” YCGK, E. 2017/12-271, K. 2017/278, 16.5.2017. For decisions to the same effect see: YCGK, E. 2014/12-103 K. 2014/552, 9.12.2014; E. 2013/653 K. 2015/430, 1.12.2015; E. 2014/9-790 K. 2015/146, 5.5.2015. ↑
  45. Veli Özer Özbek/Koray Doğan/Pınar Bacaksız, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 10. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2019, s. 251; Artuk/Gökcen/Alşahin/Çakır, Genel Hükümler (13), s. 360; Bernd Heinrich, Ceza Hukuku Genel Kısım, Cilt I-II, Ankara, Adalet Yayınevi, 2014, C. I, kn. 237. ↑
  46. Although no official study on the subject has been found, a report by the international news agency CNN stated that 1,604 boxers lost their lives between 1890 and 2011 and that approximately 13 boxers die each year. See: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/17/sport/boxing-deaths-patrick-day-spt-intl-trnd/index.html (Çevrimiçi) 16.05.2020. While the death statistics are as stated, it is also a fact that almost every boxer who steps into the ring is injured. ↑
  47. Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 186. There are also views that seek to explain dangerous sporting activities by the consent of the victim rather than by permitted risk. It must be said, however, that in our law the right to life and bodily integrity are not rights of which a person may dispose absolutely, and that a person’s consent to his own death and to acts of injury that seriously violate his bodily integrity is not regarded as valid. Moreover, it would not be correct either to say that athletes, by engaging in sporting activity, consent to their own death or injury; to this effect see: Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 187. ↑
  48. Welzel, (11), s. 55. The situation is different, however, where the arms dealer knows that the buyer is acquiring the weapon in order to kill another person and nevertheless wants to sell the weapon (direct intent) or accepts this (conditional intent). One may then speak of an act of participation (aiding) in an objectively attributable act of killing. Such situations have been examined under the topic of participation. For a detailed study on occupational acts and the establishment of the link of participation in an offence, see also: Muhammed Demirel, “Mesleki Hareketlerle Suça Yardım Etmenin Cezalandırılabilirliği”, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası, C. LXXV, S. 2, 2017, s. 489-534. ↑
  49. Ingeborg Puppe, in: Nomos Kommentar Strafgesetzbuch, Hrsg: Urs Kindhäuser/Ulfrid Neumann/Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen, 5. Aufl., Nomos, 2017, § 15, kn. 1. ↑
  50. See: Roxin, AT/I § 24, kn. 6. ↑
  51. In drawing the distinction in legal scholarship, Jescheck/Weigend treated the breach of the objective duty of care as “the wrong of the act”, and the occurrence of the result, the causing of the result and the foreseeability of the result as “the wrong of the result”, Jescheck/Weigend, s. 577 vd. The causing of the result has been assessed in the context of unlawfulness and treated as a problem of objective imputation, see: Roxin, AT/I § 24, kn. 9. Roxin too has said that the breach of the duty of care is an element of criminal law containing various criteria of attribution, see: Roxin, AT/I § 24, kn. 10 vd. ↑
  52. Walter Gropp, Strafrect Allgemeiner Teil, 4. Aufl, Heidelberg, Springer, 2015, s. 157; Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 55; Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 281; Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 250; Öztürk/Erdem, (18), kn. 384; Akbulut, Genel Hükümler, (6), s. 354. ↑
  53. See also: Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 55. ↑
  54. It may, moreover, also be said that the perpetrator had no control over the result. For the result of death occurred on account of a natural event. Likewise, had the aircraft crashed owing to pilot error, the result would have occurred on account of the risky act of a third party. However, since A’s act of buying the ticket does not exceed the sphere of permitted risk, there is not even any need to inquire whether this risk brought about the result. By virtue of the assessment of permitted risk to be made at the preliminary stage, one does not proceed to the assessment of control at the subsequent stage. See also: Heinrich, C. I, kn. 245. ↑
  55. Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 55. ↑
  56. Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 55. Although ultimately reaching the same conclusion as Roxin, Puppe followed a different path in solving this problem: in her view, accepting the causal link in the sense understood in this case would entail the attribution of the wrong in its entirety, see: Puppe, Nomos Kommentar, §§ 13, kn. 69, 74-76. ↑
  57. Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 250; Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 56. Otto opposes this view. In his view, this situation falls within the sphere of responsibility of the last person who has control over the act, see: Harro Otto, Grundkurs Strafrecht, 7. Auflage, Berlin De Gruyter, 2005, § 6, kn. 4. ↑
  58. Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 250, 251; Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 56. ↑
  59. This special additional knowledge (Sonderwissen) has been subjected to criticism. Authors who adopt the finalist theory of the offence have said that, in the situation of knowledge given in the examples, accepting that the perpetrator must have knowledge of the creation of a legally disapproved situation in order for the danger to be created takes the theory of objective imputation out of the material element of the offence and places it within the intent of the offence. They have stated that this accordingly means dealing with the mental element and that this remains superficial, see: Armin Kaufmann, “Objektive Zurechnung beim Vorsatzdelikt?”, in: Festschrift für Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Hrsg: Theo Vogler/Joachim Hermann, Band I, Dunckner&Humboldt, 1985, s. 260 vd. Jakobs, however, regarded this special knowledge as insignificant and irrelevant so long as it is not part of the perpetrator’s occupational, social or cultural position and of the knowledge deriving from these. For example, he does not accept that a biology student who, at the place where he works as a waiter, realises by reason of his studies that a vegetable he sees in the salad is poisonous but nevertheless turns a blind eye to the salad being served should be held liable for the offence of killing. Yet, even though an attempt has been made to avoid an extension of the sphere of punishability, the conclusion does not seem plausible, see: Günther Jakobs, “Tätervorstellung und objektive Zurechnung”, in: Gedächtnisschrift für Armin Kaufmann, Hrsg: von Dornseifer/Horn/Schilling/Schöne/Struensee/Zielinski, Köln Berlin, Heymann, 1989, s. 273. ↑
  60. In German this reasonable observer is referred to as “ein einsichtiger Beobachter”. What is meant, however, is a standard just like that of the person expected to comply with the objective duty of care in negligent offences. For the term see: Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 56. ↑
  61. Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 56. ↑
  62. Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 57. ↑
  63. Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 57. ↑
  64. Michael Köhler, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Berlin - Heidelberg, Springer, 1997 s. 148; Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 251, dn. 181. ↑
  65. Jescheck/Weigend, s. 287; Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 54. ↑
  66. Cf. Heinrich, C. I, kn. 247. ↑
  67. Cf. Heinrich, C. I, kn. 248. It should be noted, however, that in examples of this kind necessity, which is accepted as a ground of justification in German law, will not apply. In such situations, which are referred to in legal scholarship as a “community of risk”, the sacrifice of the right to life against the right to life is not accepted as a ground of justification. It should be noted, though, that this position is not entirely settled either and that, with different examples, it may be argued that the act is lawful. The discussions on this point are left to the topic of necessity. We must point out, however, that where workers who were not in danger until that moment are placed in danger by the switching of the points, it is certain that the perpetrator will no longer benefit from necessity as a ground of justification. In German law the perpetrator can benefit only from necessity excluding culpability. Finally, it should be said that in Turkish law necessity is regulated solely as a circumstance excluding culpability and no such distinction is made. For the views on the community of risk see: Zeynel Temel Kangal, Ceza Hukukunda Zorunluluk Durumu, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2010, s. 320 vd. ↑
  68. Objective foreseeability and subjective foreseeability form the limits of ordinary (simple) negligence and of objective imputation. Where there is unforeseeability, it cannot be accepted that the perpetrator acted negligently with regard to the act, and at the same time the act cannot be objectively attributed to him, see: Mehmet Cemil Ozansü, Ceza Hukukunda Kasttan Doğan Sübjektif Sorumluluk, Ankara, Seçkin, 2007, s. 54. ↑
  69. When these two criteria of foreseeability are examined, it is seen that the limits of negligence and of objective imputation are determined in the same way. For the result to be attributed to the perpetrator, the requirement of objectively foreseeing that the result would occur must be capable of being imposed on the perpetrator. For the negligent offence this means the need to examine, after the result has occurred, the causal process between the perpetrator and his conduct in breach of the duty of care. If a definition of objective foreseeability is to be given, it denotes the situation in which, had the duties of care that are established by legal norms or by the common experience of life and that persons are ordered to observe been complied with, the occurrence of the result described in the statutory definition could have been foreseen in the specific case and could therefore have been avoided. For a definition to this effect see: Mahmut Koca/İlhan Üzülmez, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 12. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2019, s. 211; Kühl, AT, § 17, kn. 40. The reason why the realisation of these elements of the statutory definition was not foreseen must be the failure to exercise the care and diligence expected and required. At this common boundary between objective foreseeability, which is one of the material elements of the negligent offence, and the doctrine of objective imputation, it may be said that the limit of the obligations arising from the law and of the situations specifically regulated by the law lies within the part concerning negligence, whereas in intentional offences it lies within the sphere of objective imputation. ↑
  70. Roxin, AT, § 11, kn. 69, 70; Artuk/Gökcen/Alşahin/Çakır, Genel Hükümler (13), s. 356; Akbulut, Genel Hükümler, (6), s. 355. ↑
  71. Heinrich, C. I, kn. 249. ↑
  72. If A fired with intent to kill, he will be punished for attempt to commit the offence of intentional killing; if he fired with intent to injure, for the completed offence of intentional injury. In this scenario it is not possible to hold A liable for a completed offence of intentional killing. ↑
  73. Cf. Heinrich, C. I, kn. 249. ↑
  74. Cf. Jescheck/Weigend, s. 289; Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 286; Artuk/Gökcen/Alşahin/Çakır, Genel Hükümler, (13), s. 356; Akbulut, Genel Hükümler, (6), s. 355; Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 244. ↑
  75. A question may come to mind here as to how attribution will take place where the perpetrator has no intent to kill. We must first point out that in this case too the result of death will be objectively attributed. However, for the perpetrator to be held liable for a result, not only objective imputation but also subjective imputation is required. If it can be said that the perpetrator did not act intentionally with regard to the offence of killing but was negligent, his liability for an offence aggravated by its result comes into question. If, on the other hand, he was not negligent, he is liable only for the offence of intentional injury. For instance, A, without intent to kill, throws a dart at B in order to injure him. B thereupon suffers one of the panic attacks he frequently experiences, has a heart attack and dies. Since A did not act here with intent to kill, he will, if he was negligent (if A knows of the panic attacks and can be expected to foresee that this situation might trigger one), be liable for the offence of injury aggravated by the result of death. The offence of intentional killing, however, cannot be attributed to him. Cf. Heinrich, C. I, kn. 249. ↑
  76. Öztürk/Erdem, (18), kn. 388; Gropp, § 5, kn. 48. ↑
  77. Heinrich, C. I, kn. 252. ↑
  78. For a detailed and comparative study dealing with sample problems see: Reşit Karaaslan, “Ölüm veya Yaralanma ile Sonuçlanan Yasadışı Araba Yarışlarının Olası Kast-Bilinçli Taksir Ayrımı ve Objektif İsnadiyet Teorisi Çerçevesinde Değerlendirilmesi”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, S. 145, 2019, s. 203 – 272. ↑
  79. Mustafa Ruhan Erdem, “Cinsel İlişki Yoluyla Başkasına HIV Virüsü Bulaştırmanın Cezalandırılabilirliği Sorunu”, Atatürk Üniversitesi Erzincan Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, C.VIII, S. 1 – 2, 2004, s. 84. ↑
  80. Claus Roxin, “Zur einverständlichen Fremdgefährdung: Zugleich Besprechung von BGH, Urteil v. 20. 11. 2008 – 4 StR 328/08”, Juristen Zeitung, C. 64, S. 8, 2009, s. 401; Karaaslan, Yasadışı Araba Yarışları, s. 264. ↑
  81. Roxin, Zur einverständlichen Fremdgefährdung, s. 401; BayObLG, Mögliche Straflosigkeit des einverständlichen Geschlechtsverkehrs eines HIV-Infizierten, NJW 1990, s. 131. ↑
  82. The courts and some views in legal scholarship, influenced by the solutions of private law, have set about explaining the institutions in question by the consent of the victim. It should not be overlooked, however, that the victim does not consent to the result of his own death and, since this is not a right of which he may dispose absolutely, cannot consent to it; that the victim in fact acts in the belief that the danger in question will not materialise; and that, moreover, it is not possible to consent to a negligent offence, Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 123 vd.; Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 312. Accordingly, in solving cases of this kind, a solution should be pursued according to whether the victim had sufficient knowledge of the existence and extent of the risk and whether he consciously assumed the danger. ↑
  83. Karaaslan, Yasadışı Araba Yarışları, s. 264. ↑
  84. Erdem, HIV Virüsü Bulaştırmanın Cezalandırılabilirliği, s. 84; see also: Roxin, Zur einverständlichen Fremdgefährdung, s. 403. ↑
  85. Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 244. ↑
  86. A distinction must be drawn between the victim’s consent to the risk created by the perpetrator and the consent that we assess under the grounds of justification. For this consent, which is examined under objective imputation, will bring the examination to an end in the sphere of causation, since no offence has come into being. As the material and mental elements are not made out, there will be no need to examine the grounds of justification. See: Roxin, Zur einverständlichen Fremdgefährdung, s. 402. ↑
  87. Heinrich, C. II, kn. 1047. ↑
  88. For the decision of the German Federal Court of Justice to this effect see: BGH: Strafrecht - Besonderer Teil: Körperverletzung mit Todesfolge, JuS 2004, s. 350 vd; Heinrich, C. II, kn. 1049. ↑
  89. Karaaslan, Yasadışı Araba Yarışları, s. 266. Where a question mark arises as to negligence, the situation in which the risk is fully covered by the consent of the injured person should be considered. If the party causing the harm, that is, the perpetrator, has committed no other avoidable error and the injured person bears the same responsibilities as the person causing the harm, the risks will be regarded as equal, see: Roxin, Zur einverständlichen Fremdgefährdung, s. 404 vd. ↑
  90. Kühl, § 4, kn. 84; Otto, § 6, kn. 84; Heinrich, C. I, kn. 253. ↑
  91. Roxin, AT/I § 11, kn. 28. ↑
  92. Heinrich, C. I, kn. 253. ↑
  93. Artuk/Gökcen/Alşahin/Çakır, Genel Hükümler, (13), s. 359; Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 247. ↑
  94. Roxin, AT/I, § 24, kn. 26. ↑
  95. Puppe, Strafgesetzhbuch Nomos Kommentar, §§ 13 kn. 253 vd. This view may also be called Durchgängigkeitserfordernis, that is, the adequate causal link. The term, which in Turkish may also be understood as the requirement of consistency, excludes unexpected circumstances between the result and causation; see also: Koca/Üzülmez, Genel Hükümler, s. 222. In general, it is this theory that is frequently preferred in the decisions of the German Federal Court of Justice, see: Heinrich, C. II, § 28 kn. 1051. ↑
  96. Medical interventions have been cited as the strongest example of the soundness of the theory. For where, after a person has prepared the ground for the result by a first negligent act, the injury is subsequently inflicted in hospital by a person acting intentionally or negligently, this liability of the person who performed the first act ought not to be removed. Otherwise there is a danger of rendering the first person’s act lawful. The theory opposes the unlawful character of the first danger being rendered lawful in this way, see: Puppe, Nomos Kommentar, §§ 13 kn. 254; see also: Roxin, AT/I, § 11, kn. 135. ↑
  97. Heinrich has stated that this is a restrictive, regulatory effect, see: Heinrich, C. II, § 28 kn. 1051. In addition, as an argument concerning the restrictive character, the necessity of the existence of a negligent act for the facilitation of another offence made possible by a negligent act has been pointed to. The possibility of negligent participation in an intentional act has been pointed to in this connection. This view has been criticised on the ground that it extends the sphere of punishability excessively. For it gives rise to the need, in every investigation conducted, also to inquire into the persons who performed the negligent initial acts. ↑
  98. The interruption of the link is used as “Unterbrechung”. The absence of an intention to contribute to another person’s subsequent intentional act should not be regarded as causing an opportunity for the subsequent intentional act to arise. See: Köhler, AT, s. 145; Otto, AT, s.62 vd. Under the name of the theory of the interruption of the causal link see: Koca/Üzülmez, Genel Hükümler, s. 222. ↑
  99. Köhler considers this theory necessary for every situation in which there is cumulative causation (which may also be called alternative or double causation). He has, moreover, also regarded the assessment made in legal scholarship as an insignificant deviation as an excessive extension in relation to the perpetrator’s intent, see: Köhler, AT, s. 146. ↑
  100. The theory was developed in order to prevent the drawbacks of the theories mentioned above and has today come to be generally accepted in German case law as well, see: Roxin, AT/I, § 24, kn. 26 vd; Kühl, AT, § 4, kn. 49 vd, 67; Rengier, § 52 kn. 58. “Although some display their endeavour to find a solution for cases of this kind in theories which they have produced on the basis of the principle of the ‘prohibition of regress’ (Regressverbot), the principle that must really be relied on here is the ‘principle of responsibility’ (Verantwortungsprinzip). The principle must apply not only in situations of personally endangering another person’s life but in these cases too.” See: Detlev Sternberg-Lieben/Frank Peter Schuster, in: Schönke/Schröder Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar, Albin Eser (Gesamtredaktion), 30. Aufl., 2019, § 15 kn. 171; on the prohibition of regress see also: Kindhäuser, AT, §11 kn. 37 vd. ↑
  101. Johannes Kaspar, Grundprobleme der Fahrlässigkeitsdelikte, JuS 2012, 112, s.114: Kaspar, explaining the state of being inclined to commit the act, says that in an apartment building inhabited by a perpetrator who plans to burn down the whole building and constantly voices this aloud, a person who, despite having heard the perpetrator’s remarks, has left flammable materials in the stairwell can no longer act in reliance on the assumption that no one will engage in wrongful conduct. This has been expressed as a recognisable inclination to commit the act (erkennbare Tatgeneigtheit). ↑
  102. Rengier, AT, § 52 kn. 58. ↑
  103. Cf. Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 247. ↑
  104. Jescheck/Weigend, s. 573; Roxin, I, § 24, kn. 27 vd; Gropp, § 5, n. 48 vd.; Kühl, § 4, kn. 49; Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 247; Artuk/Gökcen/Alşahin/Çakır, Genel Hükümler, (13), s. 359. ↑
  105. To this effect see: Jescheck/Weigend, AT, s. 573; Heinrich, C. II, § 28 kn. 1053; Koca/Üzülmez, Genel Hükümler, s. 224; Sulhi Dönmezer/Sahir Erman, Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku, C. I-II, 14. Bası, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2019, no. 975. ↑
  106. Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 247; Artuk/Gökcen/Alşahin/Çakır, Genel Hükümler, (13), s. 359; Heinrich, C. I, kn. 254. ↑
  107. Roxin, I, § 8, kn. 25; Heinrich, C. I, kn. 250; Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 292, 293. ↑
  108. Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 289; Doğan, Neticesi Sebebiyle Ağırlaşmış Suçlar, (2), s. 140, 141. ↑
  109. For more extensive information on the theory see: Elvan Keçelioğlu, Taksirli Suçun Dogmatiği, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 2015, s. 128 vd. ↑
  110. Koca/Üzülmez, Genel Hükümler, s. 218. A number of views agreeing with and opposing this theory have been put forward; for these see: Keçelioğlu, Taksir, s. 130 vd; Kühl, AT, § 17, kn. 70. ↑
  111. See: Kühl, AT, § 17, kn. 76. ↑
  112. For further examples see: Kühl, AT, § 17, kn. 74 vd.; Heinrich, C. II, § 28 kn. 1046. ↑
  113. Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 249; Kühl, § 4, kn. 58, 73; Otto, § 10, kn. 19; Heinrich, C. I, kn. 251; Roxin, Grundlagenprobleme, s. 170-175. ↑
  114. Roxin, AT/I, § 11, kn. 74, 88 vd.; Gropp, § 5, kn. 48; Öztürk/Erdem, (18), kn. 390; Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 306. ↑
  115. Doğan, Neticesi Sebebiyle Ağırlaşmış Suçlar, (2), s. 141. ↑
  116. Roxin, AT/I, § 11, kn. 76 vd.; Kühl, § 4, kn. 58, 73; Otto, § 10, kn. 19; Gropp, § 5, kn. 47; Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 249; Akbulut, Genel Hükümler, (6), s. 350; Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 232 vd. ↑
  117. Akbulut, Genel Hükümler, (6), s. 364; Öztürk/Erdem, (18), kn. 805. ↑
  118. Tuğrul Katoğlu, “Ekip Halinde Yürütülen Faaliyetlerde Güven İlkesi ve Ceza Sorumluluğu”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, S. 63, 2007, s. 29, 31; Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 339, 340; Doğan, Neticesi Sebebiyle Ağırlaşmış Suçlar, (2), s. 161. ↑
  119. Welzel, (11), s. 129 vd. ↑
  120. Roxin, AT/I § 24, kn. 21 vd.; Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 341; Akbulut, Genel Hükümler, (6), s. 365. ↑
  121. Katoğlu, Güven İlkesi, s. 30. ↑
  122. In another example, taking a risk in reliance on the assumption that a person approaching a red light at speed in traffic will comply with the rule cannot be accepted within this scope. See: Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, Schönke/Schröder Strafgesetzbuch, § 15 kn. 150 vd. ↑
  123. Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 345; Akbulut, Genel Hükümler, (6), s. 367. ↑
  124. Roxin, AT/I, § 10, kn. 55, § 11, kn. 46; Puppe, Nomos Kommentar, § 16, kn. 9. ↑
  125. Heinrich, C. I, kn. 243. ↑
  126. Kindhäuser, § 11, kn. 4. ↑
  127. To this effect see: Roxin, I, § 11 kn. 53; Theodor Lenckner/Jörg Eisele in: Schönke/Schröder Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar, Albin Eser (Gesamtredaktion), 30. Aufl., 2019, vor §§ 13 ff. kn. 92. ↑
  128. In legal scholarship the views are concentrated on the legal nature of permitted risk, and in determining that legal nature there are a great many differing views to the contrary which maintain that it is a ground of justification. For the views see Ünver, İzin Verilen Risk, s. 126-162. For a view in Turkish criminal law scholarship which regards permitted risk as a ground of justification not contained in the TCK see: Öztürk/Erdem, (18), kn. 513 vd. According to Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız in legal scholarship too, in situations where the risk is reduced there is in fact a result that can be objectively imputed to the perpetrator. In examples of this kind, a solution reaching a similar outcome on the basis of the grounds of justification is doctrinally more correct. The grounds of justification that may come into consideration could, depending on the specific case, be presumed consent or necessity, see: Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 251, dn. 181. ↑
  129. “It is established that the accused and the other accused were racing each other in the cars they were driving on a road in a built-up area; that the accused, who was travelling in the left-hand lane, did not give way to the accused who wished to overtake him and did not allow him to pass; and that the accused, by travelling at a speed above the statutory speed limits and failing to adapt the speed of his vehicle to the conditions required by the state of the road and the traffic, infringed the statutory speed limits laid down in Article 100 of the Highway Traffic Regulation and failed to fulfil his obligations under sub-paragraph ( b ) of the first paragraph of Article 52 of Law No. 2918. Although there is a possibility that conduct of this kind on his part constitutes the offence of endangering traffic safety regulated in Art. 179(2) TCK, in view of the fact that, had the accused, who was travelling at approximately 110-120 km/h in the left-hand lane, moved into the right-hand lane in order to give way to the other accused who wished to overtake him, there was a danger of his colliding with the lorry driven by the witness, which was travelling ahead of him at approximately 30 km/h, it must be accepted that the accused could not be expected to give way to the other accused; that the result, which materialised in the form of the accused who was racing him running into the back of the lorry travelling ahead, lay outside the sphere which the accused was able to control; that it cannot be said that, had the accused fulfilled his duty of care and diligence, the accident caused by the other accused would definitely not have occurred, that the incident occurred on account of the risk which the accused created by travelling above the statutory speed limits, or that the result which materialised was the work of the accused; that, consequently, the traffic accident, which resulted in the intervening party being injured in such a way as to cause the loss of function of one of his organs, cannot be objectively attributed to the accused; and that, accordingly, the accused bears no culpability in the incident that occurred. For this reason, it must be decided to uphold the judgment of acquittal concerning the accused which is the subject of the Local Court’s decision to persist in its judgment and which is found to be in conformity with procedure and the law.” YCGK, E. 2017/12-269, K. 2019/210, T. 14.3.2019; “whereas it is understood that, since no causal link can be established between the offences committed by S. T. and his team and the omission attributed to the accused, it is not considered possible to attribute the result that materialised objectively to the accused, and that the conditions for liability for conduct by omission have therefore not been fulfilled either”, 16. CD., E. 2019/1950, K. 2019/2164, T. 29.3.2019. ↑
  130. There is, however, also an example in the affirmative: “In our specific case, in the incident in which the accused, while travelling through a forest area in the vehicle he was driving, struck a mass of earth and, the vehicle having caught fire, the fire spread to the forested area and the forested area burned: whereas the accused, who caused the vehicle he was driving to overturn without exercising sufficient care and diligence, ought to have foreseen that the vehicle might overturn and that certain harmful consequences might arise as a result, it was not possible for him to foresee the result that materialised in the form of the flames spreading to the forested area and the trees burning as a result of the vehicle catching fire, nor is such a result capable of being foreseen. For there is no hesitation whatsoever on the point that the result which occurred lay outside the sphere which a human being is able to control. Controllability means that the result is, to a significant extent, capable of being steered and directed. Accordingly, even if the perpetrator creates a legally significant danger, the result cannot be imputed to the perpetrator if there is a wholly atypical result, that is, if the result could not be expected by anyone because the course of events lies entirely outside the ordinary course of life and general experience of life. For the result is then no longer a work of the perpetrator but, on the contrary, an outcome of chance. It is so clear as not to require discussion that the vehicle catching fire as a result of overturning and, in addition, the resulting fire spreading to the forest is not an outcome to be expected according to everyday experience of life. The contrary view would amount to accepting the theory of objective imputation, which is not accepted in our legal system in cases where there is no legally significant danger: it is clear that such an acceptance would be contrary to the principles of legality and equity, which are among the indispensable principles of criminal law, and would also be contrary to settled case law. In the light of the explanations above; in the incident which ended with the fire arising from the overturning of the vehicle spreading to the forest and the wooded area burning, whereas a judgment of acquittal ought to have been given in respect of the accused for the offence, which was not made out in terms of its elements because the result was neither foreseen by the accused nor of a foreseeable nature, the giving of a judgment of conviction as written, without explaining in the judgment, in a manner permitting review, how the finding that the result which occurred ought to have been foreseen was arrived at(…)” 19. CD., E. 2015/36080, K. 2017/7049, T. 20.9.2017. ↑
  131. Yargıtay 3. CD., E. 2010/6651, K. 2012/32108, T. 1.10.2012. ↑
  132. Doğan, Neticesi Sebebiyle Ağırlaşmış Suçlar, s. 158. ↑

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