Abstract
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
In terms of economic and social relations, the world has shown great development and progress, particularly over the last two centuries. It can be seen that the driving force behind this was, first of all, the developments in science and technology that came with the invention of the steam engine, that these brought economic growth, and that this economic growth and relations of interest have shaped the world in the full sense. It is notable that, as a result of the extraordinary development in information technology in particular and its immediate application to the communications and finance sectors, borders have now disappeared and the whole of humanity has become part of globalisation, and that the economy and the banking sector have thus grown on an international scale.
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
BANKING SECRETS AND OFFENCES RELATING TO THE DISCLOSURE OF SECRETS
Murat Volkan Dülger*
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two centuries in particular, the world has shown great development and progress in terms of economic and social relations. It can be seen that the driving force behind this was, first and foremost, the developments in science and technology that came with the invention of the steam engine, that these brought economic growth, and that this economic growth and relations of interest have shaped the world in the full sense of the term. It is striking that, as a result in particular of the extraordinary development in the field of information technology and of its immediate application to the communications and finance sectors, borders have today disappeared and the whole of humanity has become part of globalisation, and that the economy and the banking sector have thus grown on an international scale.
Faced with this situation, countries have taken measures at international level and made various regulations on the matter in their own domestic law, in order to make their economies grow and to render that growth sustainable in the environment of competition that has intensified with globalisation1. At the very heart of this economic machinery lie the financial sector and its most important institution, the banks.
Economics is the branch of science that examines how a balance is to be achieved between production and consumption and between supply and demand, and how the factors of production are to be used2. An economic system, in turn, may be briefly defined as the method of production, income distribution and consumption applied in a country. The principal aim of every country, whether capitalist or communist3, is to raise the level of personal welfare that will bring about economic development; and the raising of the level of welfare depends on the accumulation of capital. Incomes will increase at the same rate as the rate of increase in the accumulation of capital. Since all economic systems are based on the increase of personal welfare, their aims are the same; where they differ is in the means they use to achieve that aim. It is stated that, in general, where there exists an intermediary class acting with the aim of making a profit between producers and consumers and private property is recognised, the system is capitalist; and that where production is carried out by firms owned by the State and is passed on to the consumer again by those firms, the system is communist4.
However, irrespective of which economic system has been chosen in a country and of how it is applied, banks and banking activities exist. The setting of the economy in motion, the distribution of economic resources and the carrying out of day-to-day financial transactions all take place through banks. This is because banks lend to the State by purchasing financial instruments such as bonds and bills which the State issues in order to provide revenue for the treasury for public services, or act as intermediaries in the sale of these to investors; they create the dynamism of the economy by providing cash and non-cash credit to large, medium-sized and small commercial enterprises; and they provide the individuals who make up society with facilities for meeting their daily needs by granting credit cards and consumer loans or by means of cash machines. These facts clearly show that banking activity has an important place in the economic and social sphere5.
For this reason, legal rules in the form of statutes in which the public-law character predominates are made in respect of banks, and, either in those statutes or in the general criminal codes, a great many acts that are incompatible with banking activities or harmful to them are defined as offences.
One of the most important matters calling for attention in banks, which are of such great importance in economic life, is that the various items of information which the partners, managers and employees of banks have learned in the course of these banking activities are to be characterised as secrets and that it is necessary that they be kept absolutely confidential, apart from certain exceptional cases arising from statute. This is extremely important both as a requirement of the functioning of the economy and for the protection of the reputation of banks and of their character as institutions of trust.
In this study too, after the nature of banking law has first been briefly indicated, an attempt will be made to explain the main subject, namely banking secrets and the related provisions in the Banking Law and in the Turkish Criminal Code.
I. Banking Law
A. Legislation Enacted in Our Country in the Field of Banking Law and Banking Secrets
1. Legislation Enacted in the Field of Banking Law
In our country banking activity developed in parallel, in particular, with the development of international maritime trade; for this reason, in the period of the Ottoman Empire, banking activity began in the second half of the nineteenth century, first in Istanbul and later in Izmir. Banking activity continued in the Republican period as well, and large banks having the status of State Economic Enterprises (KİT) were established by the State in order to revive and finance the economy. From the 1980s onwards, as a requirement of the opening-up to the outside world experienced in the economy and in politics and of the free market economy, a large number of private banks were established and the banks having the status of KİT were also privatised. At this stage, however, banks were directly affected by the crises experienced by the economy, and a great many banks had to be transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF). It is these developments in the banking sector that led to the enactment of various laws for the purpose of regulating banks.
In the period of the Ottoman Empire, banking activities were not regulated by a general law; within the framework of the understanding of law of the time, they were conducted on the basis of special imperial edicts relating to the matter6. The first law in the field of banking law is the Law on the Protection of Deposits No. 2243 of 30.05.1933. In fact this law is not a banking law in the full sense; it is a law aimed at protecting depositors, but one that directly concerns banks. In this law, the rules on deposits and the rules to be observed by deposit-taking banks in their activities were regulated in an intermingled fashion7. This was followed by the entry into force of the Banks Laws No. 2999 in 1936 and No. 7129 in 1958, of Decree-Law No. 70 on Banks in 1983 (which became law in 1985 by Law No. 3182), of the Banks Law No. 4389 in 1999 and, finally, of the Banking Law No. 5411 in 2005.
2. Legislation Enacted in the Field of Banking Secrets
The first provisions on the offence of disclosing banking secrets were included in Art. 19(4)8 and in Art. 229 of the Law on the Protection of Deposits No. 2243. Thereafter, the offence of disclosing banking secrets was also regulated in Arts. 5510 and 5611 of the Banks Law No. 2999. In the Banks Law No. 7129, which replaced that law, the offence of disclosing banking secrets was included in Art. 74 under the heading “divulging of secrets”12. In addition, in Art. 75 of that law the obligation of confidentiality was specified among the obligations of the sworn bank auditors as well13. Subsequently, amendments were made to Arts. 7414 and 7515 of Law No. 7129 by Art. 1 of Decree-Law No. 28. By Decree-Law No. 70, the offence of disclosing banking secrets was regulated anew in Art. 82 of the law, under the heading “keeping of secrets”, by increasing the fines and by removing from the text of the article the prohibition on working and the penalty of disqualification from public office contained in paragraph 2 and the three-year period in the last paragraph16. Similar amendments having been made to the responsibilities of the sworn bank auditors as well, the provision concerning them was made in Art. 84 of the law17. As for the Banks Law No. 3182, the types of offence in question were regulated in Art. 83 under the heading “keeping of secrets”18 and in Art. 85
Such persons may not be employed again in the service of the State.”
under the heading “responsibilities of the sworn bank auditors”19. In the Banks Law No. 4389, the offence of disclosing banking secrets was included in Art. 22(8), (9) and (10), headed “judicial offences and penalties”20.
When the historical process of the regulation of banking offences set out above is examined, it is seen that in Laws Nos. 2243, 2999, 7129 and 3182 and in Decree-Laws Nos. 28 and 70 two separate types of offence were regulated, directed at bank employees and at bank auditors; that the case in which third parties commit this act was not made the subject of regulation; that the criterion adopted was that of learning the information in the nature of a secret, in the case of bank employees, by reason of “their duties and capacities” and, in the case of auditors, “in the course of their duties”; and that, as regards the quantum of the sanction, bank auditors were given a heavier penalty than bank employees.
It was by Law No. 4389 that third parties came to be specified as perpetrators of the offence of disclosing banking secrets. Law No. 5411 adopted the system of Law No. 4389 unchanged and, in addition, provided that persons and organisations providing support services to the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK) or to banks, and their employees, may also be perpetrators of this offence21.
B. The Nature of Banking Law
The legal rules to which banks are subject are of a mixed nature, because banks, on the one hand, have commercial relations with their customers and with other financial institutions, and these are governed by rules of private law, while, on the other hand, many other areas in the banking sector are governed by norms of a public-law nature and various restrictions are imposed on banks. For this reason, banking law in the broad sense falls, in one respect, within the scope of private law and, in another, within that of public law. Banking law in the narrow sense, by contrast, is the body of regulatory and restrictive rules contained in the laws enacted specifically in relation to banking activities. To the disputes that may arise between banks and their customers or other financial institutions, the rules of commercial law and the law of obligations, which are a part of private law, are applied, and the laws enacted specifically for banks contain no provisions of this kind, save in exceptional cases. Consequently, it is seen that banking law in the narrow sense is a part of public law22.
The general and fundamental regulatory norms on banking law are to be found in the Banking Law. In our country the Banking Law No. 5411, which entered into force upon the publication of Official Gazette No. 25983 on 01.11.2005, is currently in force as the basic legislation in the field of banking law.
The Banking Law is the basic statute which regulates, in their public dimension, the financial sector, one of the most important building blocks of economic life, and the banking sector, which is the heart of that sector. Disputes arising from the commercial activities of banks are resolved by the legislation governing private relations, such as the Turkish Commercial Code or the Code of Obligations, and their sanction generally takes the form of pecuniary sanctions such as liability for damages, the invalidity of the transactions carried out and so on. In banking law, and in the Banking Law, which is its basic statute, by contrast, the powers and responsibilities of banks, bank managers and employees are regulated, as are the rules on the functioning of banks, whose public side predominates in economic life. The sanctions provided for in this Law for bank managers and employees are pecuniary and criminal sanctions to which the managers and responsible officers of an ordinary commercial company would not be exposed23.
An important provision that is an indication of this public-law character of banking law and of the Banking Law is that the disclosure, by the persons specified in the Law in question, of information in the nature of a secret which they have learned by reason of banking activities is treated as an offence, and that provision is made for this both in the Banking Law and in the Turkish Criminal Code.
II. Offences Relating to Banking Secrets
A. The Concepts of Secret and Banking Secret
The concept of secret has been explained neither in the Turkish Criminal Code, in which the general provision on the matter is made, nor in the Banking Law. In Art. 73 of the Banking Law, headed “keeping of secrets”, and in Art. 159, headed “disclosure of secrets”, no definition or explanation of the banking secret is given. Accordingly, the legislature has left the definition of the concepts of secret and banking secret to legal scholarship and practice. However, in determining the scope and limits of the banking secret, in addition to the duty of loyalty owed to the bank by bank employees and by those in a close relationship with the bank, criteria such as transparency, which are important particularly in the management and supervision of banks, must not be disregarded either24.
A secret is any information which, from the standpoint of a person’s honour, there is a need for and an interest in others not knowing, and which is known to the holder of the secret or to a limited number of persons25. In short, the concept of secret may be explained as any information that is not known, and need not be known, by others. However, information that is already known to the public, even if it is in fact information in the nature of a personal secret, a trade secret or a banking secret, has lost its character as a secret; such information can no longer be defined as a secret. Consequently, the concept of secret consists of two parts, a subjective and an objective one. The subjective part is the will of the holder of the secret that it should not be known by others; the objective part is the fact that the information in the nature of a secret is not known by others. It must be stated at once, however, that the fact that information which its holder wishes to remain secret is known by more than one person does not cause it to lose its character as a secret; information shared by a limited number of persons also retains its character as a secret where the will of those sharing it is to that effect26.
A banking secret, in turn, is information and documents which relate to banking activities and in whose being known outside the circle of those concerned there is no public interest. Accordingly, the disclosure of the balance sheet of a bank whose shares have been offered to the public is not in the nature of a banking secret, because this is information that is not to be kept secret but, on the contrary, to be disclosed. By contrast, since the amount of a customer’s deposit account or of the loan he has taken out concerns that customer alone, this information is in the nature of a banking secret. In conclusion, any information which, in the course of banking activity, does not in general need to be known by the public falls within the scope of the banking secret27.
That banks must keep the secrets of those who have dealings with them, and in particular of their customers, is accepted as a traditional view. Banks are required to fulfil what follows from their being institutions of trust. As one of the elements that secure this trust, banks must also fulfil the obligation of confidentiality. However, the bank secret cannot be limited solely to the keeping of the secrets arising between banks and their customers. This obligation of confidentiality also includes information concerning the bank’s own functioning and economic situation28. Consequently, the banking secret is itself divided into two: the bank’s own secret and the customer secret. The bank’s own secret is any information revealing the economic strength of the bank. The customer secret, for its part, covers any personal or economic information given, within the scope of banking activity, by those who enter into a relationship with the bank in the capacity of customer29.
On this subject there is a “Draft Law on Trade Secrets, Bank Secrets and Customer Secrets”, which is currently before the Prime Ministry, and Art. 2 of this draft explains the concepts of trade secret, bank secret and customer secret. Under this draft law, bank secret means “the information relating to the financial, economic, credit and cash position known to the members of the bank’s management and supervisory bodies, its staff and its other officers, and every kind of information and document relating to the bank’s customer potential, lending, deposit-taking, management principles, other banking services and activities and risk positions”; and customer secret means “all information and documents relating to the personal, economic, financial, cash and credit position of the customer which commercial enterprises and companies, banks, insurance companies and intermediary institutions operating in the capital market and the financial markets acquire, directly or indirectly, in their dealings with the customer in connection with their own fields of activity”. As can be seen, in this draft law the bank secret and the customer secret are defined in a more detailed and specific manner.
Accordingly, all the information obtained before and after the contract by banks, financial institutions and other commercial enterprises by reason of their dealings with the customer, the customer’s cash and asset position, the letters of guarantee issued by branches, suretyships, counter-guarantees, avals given, profit and loss accounts30, the account statements sent to customers, mortgages taken, transfer instructions to the bank, investment activities, creditworthiness, bills given to banks for collection or as security, and information relating to legal enforcement proceedings and lawsuits concerning the customer are information in the nature of customer secrets31. Information such as the transactions relating to banking activity and the bank’s financial, credit and cash position, whether it fulfils its obligations towards the Central Bank, the share of the bank or of the branch in the market in which it is located, the number of depositors and credit customers, the management principles, every kind of decision taken, including the bank’s policies, the technical methods applied in transactions, total deposits and the amount of foreign currency in the foreign exchange position is in the nature of bank secrets32.
The banks’ obligation of confidentiality is based on three main foundations. First, if there is a contractual relationship between the person whose secret is disclosed and the bank, the disclosure of the secret will amount to a breach of that contract; this is therefore a contractual obligation. Secondly, since the disclosure of secrets will amount to a violation of the personality rights defined in Arts. 23 and 24 of the Civil Code, keeping secrets is a statutory obligation in the context of civil law. Finally, the obligation of confidentiality has been imposed by Art. 73 of the Banking Law, and the disclosure of banking secrets has been defined as an offence by Art. 159 of the same Law and by Art. 239 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK). Consequently, the keeping of these secrets has been made a statutory obligation in the context of administrative law and criminal law as well33.
This distinction between the bank secret and the customer secret is of the utmost importance, particularly for identifying the legal interest protected by the offence of disclosing banking secrets and for determining the subject matter of the banking secret and drawing its boundaries.
In this study the concept of banking secret is used as an umbrella heading covering both the bank secret and the customer secret. For this reason, when the banking secret is referred to, both types of secret are to be understood.
The concept of banking secret is a sub-element of the concept of professional secret. For this reason, while in some countries separate types of offence are provided for on account of the disclosure of banking secrets, in other countries provision is made within the scope of the offence of disclosing professional secrets34. Indeed, in our country too the offence of disclosing banking secrets has been regulated as a separate type of offence both in the Banking Law and in the TCK.
B. The Offence of Disclosure of Secrets in the Banking Law
1. In General
Banks are institutions of trust. Consequently, in their dealings with their customers they are obliged, as a requirement of being trustworthy, to take care to act in accordance with the statutory rules, with commercial custom and usage and with the rules of objective good faith. Keeping in confidence the documents and information acquired about customers and third parties in the course of banking activities is, for banks, an obligation arising from their function35. On this matter, Art. 73 of the Banking Law states that the partners of banks, the members of their boards of directors, their members of staff, persons acting on their behalf and their officers may not disclose the secrets belonging to banks or to their customers which they have learned by reason of their capacities and duties to anyone other than the authorities expressly empowered by law in this regard, and the limits of the secret have thus been determined. By the reference made in Art. 159 of the Banking Law to Art. 73, the offence of disclosing banking secrets has been regulated. When Arts. 73 and 159 of the Law are read together, it is seen that the offence of disclosure of secrets has been regulated with three separate groups of perpetrators in mind. This does not mean, however, as is stated by some authors in legal scholarship, that three separate types of offence have been regulated36.
The first of these groups is regulated in Art. 73(1). Under that provision, the offence of disclosing banking secrets is committed where the chairman and members of the Board and the staff of the Agency, and the chairman and members of the Fund Board and the staff of the Fund, disclose the secrets belonging to banks and to their subsidiaries, affiliates and jointly controlled partnerships and to their customers, which they have learned in the course of their duties, to anyone other than those authorised under this Law and under special laws. This may be briefly referred to as “the case in which the offence of disclosing banking secrets is committed by officials of the Agency”.
In the Banking Law the second group of perpetrators within the scope of the disclosure of banking secrets is regulated in Art. 73(3). Under that provision, it is an offence for the partners of banks, the members of their boards of directors, their members of staff, persons acting on their behalf and their officers to disclose the secrets belonging to banks or to their customers which they have learned by reason of their capacities and duties to anyone other than the authorities expressly empowered in this regard. This may be briefly referred to as “the commission of the offence of disclosing banking secrets by bankers”.
The third group of perpetrators in this regard consists of third parties who are employees neither of the Agency nor of a bank. Accordingly, in the last sentence of Art. 159(1) the case of disclosure of banking secrets by third parties has also been regulated as an offence. This too may be briefly referred to as “the case in which the offence of disclosing banking secrets is committed by third parties”37.
In the light of this explanation, it should also be stated that the offence of disclosing banking secrets is not a banking offence in the narrow sense. For banking offences in the narrow sense are offences that can be committed only by the bank, in other words, only by bank employees. If an offence can be committed on behalf of a natural person or of another legal person other than the bank, that offence is not regarded as a banking offence in the narrow sense38. Indeed, this type of offence, forming as it does a part of the offence of disclosing professional secrets, does not fall within the scope of a banking offence in the narrow sense.
2. The Legal Interest Protected by the Offence
The legal interest protected by this type of offence takes a different form as regards the customer secret and the bank secret.
The customer secret contains certain information belonging to the individual, whether a natural or a legal person. Banking secrets, as also stated above, are a part of the professional secret. Where a person’s secret becomes known by reason of a professional secret, that person’s private life is entered. Accordingly, where this information in the nature of a secret is disclosed, the individual freedom of the holder of the secret is infringed, and, as regards banking activity too, where the customer secret is disclosed the person’s private life is infringed. Consequently, the primary interest protected by the offence of disclosing banking secrets, as regards the customer secret, is the customers’ freedom to have their private lives remain confidential39.
On the other hand, as stated earlier, banks are institutions of trust, and that trust also includes the non-disclosure of the secrets of bank customers. When such an act is committed, trust in the bank in question and its reputation will be shaken, and, where the scale of the disclosure of secrets in the specific case is large, commercial losses for the bank concerned may perhaps also be at issue. By making the disclosure of the customer secret an offence, an attempt is thus also made to protect the reputation and trustworthiness of banks. Consequently, the legal interest of a secondary nature protected by this offence is the reputation and trustworthiness of banks.
The primary legal interest protected by the bank secret, for its part, is the economic structure of the individual banks and hence of the country as a whole. As stated above, today in all countries banks lie at the heart of the financial sector, and the economies of countries are steered through banks. The staff of banks and of the institutions that supervise and control banks become privy to extremely important and confidential information both about the functioning of banks and about their economic situation. The disclosure of this information in the nature of a secret is capable of affecting the situation and stability both of the bank or banks concerned and, progressively, of the entire national economy. Consequently, the primary legal interest protected by the offence concerning banking secrets, as regards bank secrets, is the confidentiality of the information relating to the functioning and the economic structure of the bank, together with the protection of economic order and stability.
The secondary legal interest protected by the bank secret is the trust placed in the staff of banks and of the institutions that supervise and control banks. This is because these persons are trusted by the institutions for which they work, and very important information is placed under their control and at their disposal. These persons, for their part, must be bound to the institutions for which they work with complete loyalty and must not betray that trust. Consequently, this legal interest too is protected by this offence.
The last legal interest protected by the bank secret is, just as in the case of the customer secret, the freedom to have private life remain confidential. For banks too are legal persons organised in the form of joint-stock companies. Consequently, these persons too have an interest in the non-disclosure of the information in the nature of a secret that belongs to them. Where this information belonging to the legal personality of the bank is disclosed by the persons referred to above, their individual freedom to have the secret remain confidential is violated.
3. Perpetrator and Victim
As regards the perpetrator of this offence, various distinctions have been made in the Law. Accordingly, three similar types of offence, which may in fact be committed by three different groups, have been regulated in Art. 159 by way of a reference to Art. 73. These groups are, in brief, officials of the Agency, bankers and third parties. Although at first sight the meaning emerges that these offences may be committed by anyone, when the articles are examined in detail it is seen that a single type of offence has been defined for three different groups. For this reason each of the three groups of perpetrators will be examined separately.
The victim of this offence is the legal personality of the bank whose secret is disclosed, or the customer. Where a secret common to both is disclosed, both will be victims. Even if, as a result of the disclosure of a banking secret, it is only the customer whose personality rights are impaired and who is the victim, the bank too will, as a consequence of this act, be in the position of a person harmed by the offence.
a. Employees of the Agency as Perpetrators of the Offence
The case in which the persons whom we have briefly referred to as employees of the Agency are perpetrators of the offence of disclosing banking secrets is regulated in Art. 73(1) of the Law. However, since the abbreviations used throughout the Law are used in this article, these must first be explained. In Art. 3 of the Banking Law, headed “definitions and abbreviations”, Board is defined as the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board; Agency as the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency; Chairman as the Chairman of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board; Fund as the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund; Fund Board as the Board of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund; and Chairman of the Fund as the Chairman of the Board of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. Support service organisation, for its part, is defined in the same article as organisations which, within the framework of the principles to be determined by the Board, provide to the organisations within the scope of the Banking Law services in the nature of an extension or complement of their main services, with the exception of those established by the Central Bank or operating within the Central Bank and of the clearing, custody and central registry service organisations under the supervision of the Capital Markets Board.
By virtue of the reference made by Art. 159 of the Banking Law to Art. 73, the perpetrator of the offence of disclosure of banking secrets by officials of the Agency may, under Art. 73(1), be the chairman and members of the Board and the staff of the Agency, and the chairman and members of the Fund Board and the staff of the Fund. In addition, the persons and organisations from which the BDDK obtains external support services, and their employees, may also be perpetrators of this offence. As is also stated in the explanatory memorandum to the Law, this is an innovation introduced by Law No. 5411 which was not to be found in the Banks Law No. 438940.
The distinguishing element in determining the perpetrator of this offence is that the information which must not be disclosed has been learned by the perpetrator in the course of his duties. Where the perpetrator learns such a secret before he has yet officially taken up his duties and discloses it, it will not be possible for this act to be punished under Art. 159 of the Banking Law. In that case, however, if the elements of the offence in Art. 239 TCK are present, the perpetrator will be punished under the general provision laid down in that article41.
A further important point that must be mentioned in this context is what will happen where secrets learned while the joint-stock company is at the stage of formation, before it has yet acquired the status of a bank, are disclosed. This situation is dealt with in Art. 73(2). Accordingly, after it is stated in the second sentence of the paragraph that the information and documents in the nature of a secret which the Agency obtains may be used in the granting of establishment and operating licences, in the supervision of activities, in monitoring whether the regulations are complied with and in the hearing of administrative actions brought against decisions of the Board, it is stated in the third sentence that the information and documents in the nature of a secret which the Agency has obtained within the scope of this paragraph may not be disclosed to any person, institution or organisation. Accordingly, where members of the Agency’s staff disclose information in the nature of a secret concerning a company which has applied for establishment but has not yet obtained an operating licence and has therefore not acquired the status of a bank, the offence of disclosing banking secrets under Art. 159 of the Banking Law will be committed. In short, the managers and employees of the Agency will also be perpetrators of the offence of disclosing banking secrets where they disclose information in the nature of a secret concerning a company that is still at the stage of being established as a bank.
The last point to be made in this regard is that the obligation of confidentiality of these persons will continue after the termination of their duties as well. This is expressly regulated in the last sentence of Art. 73(1), which states that “this obligation shall continue after leaving office”. In addition, the explanatory memorandum to the article states that “there is no limitation in time as regards the obligation of confidentiality”. That being so, as regards members of the Agency’s staff the obligation of confidentiality will continue until the end of their lives42.
b. Bank Employees as Perpetrators of the Offence
The obligation of confidentiality of bank employees is regulated in Art. 73(3). Under this paragraph, the partners of the bank, the members of its board of directors, its members of staff, persons acting on their behalf and its officers are under an obligation to keep banking secrets. Consequently, if these persons disclose information in the nature of a banking secret which they have learned, they will be perpetrators of the offence of disclosing banking secrets. As regulated in paragraph 1 of the article, the persons and organisations from which banks obtain external support services, and their employees, may also be perpetrators of this offence.
It hardly seems possible that the shareholders, who are referred to in the Law as partners of the bank, would normally know secrets belonging to the bank or to customers. However, if a person bearing this capacity learns such information for whatever reason, he is under an obligation not to disclose that secret. By the expression members of staff of the bank, all those employed in the bank are meant, whatever duty they perform there43. With this term no distinction has been drawn between those directly engaged in banking activities and those engaged in ancillary service activities. Accordingly, the general manager of the bank, the branch manager, the cashier, the security guard and the janitor are all under the same obligation. This is because all of these persons become privy to bank and customer secrets to a degree and of an importance that vary according to the nature of their duties.
In order for these persons to be perpetrators, they must have learned the information in the nature of a banking secret by reason of their capacities and duties. As can be seen, the rule in this paragraph differs from the element of learning in the course of duty laid down for employees of the Agency in paragraph 1. This difference is due to the fact that paragraph 1 regulates the situation in which employees of the Agency are able to learn secrets belonging to all banks and the disclosure of these, whereas paragraph 3 regulates only the disclosure of a secret belonging to one bank. Under the rule in paragraph 1, the perpetrator will be able to gain access to this information only in the course of his duties. A perpetrator who is a banker, by contrast, may gain access to such information by reason of his capacity or duties as a banker even when not in the course of his duties. This difference will be easier to understand if it is explained by an example. For instance, where a person tells a bank manager, even though not in the course of the latter’s duties, that he wishes to take out a housing loan from his bank and states the cash he has and how much credit he wishes to take out, the bank manager, even though he is not on duty, may not disclose this information which he has learned. This is because this information, which is in the nature of a customer secret, was given to him by reason of his capacity. No similar situation, however, will arise as regards employees of the Agency.
Some authors in legal scholarship state that the bank and customer secret does not cover only the bank of which the perpetrator is a member of staff or its customers, that it is to be understood more broadly as covering all banks and customers, and that bank employees will therefore be liable for the disclosure of all these bank and customer secrets44. It is not possible to agree with this view as it stands, because this is an extensive interpretation, and when Art. 73 is interpreted together with Art. 159 it is not possible, from the standpoint of the application of criminal law, to accept such an extensive interpretation. In fact, as regards the scope of Art. 73(3) of the Law, there is no need for such an interpretation, because the criterion determining the liability of bank employees in respect of banking secrets is given in the same paragraph as the information which they have learned “…by reason of their capacities and duties…”. The explanation of this was given in detail in the preceding paragraph. In fact, a distinction must be drawn in this situation. If a bank employee has learned a secret belonging to another bank or to its customer by reason of his capacity and duties, he is obliged to keep it; otherwise he will have committed an offence. On the other hand, if the bank employee has learned information in the nature of a secret belonging to another bank or to its customer not by reason of this capacity and these duties but at a gathering of friends, his disclosing it will not constitute an offence, for two reasons. First, since this information will lose its character as a secret upon being disclosed, the offence will no longer have a subject matter. If the person who discloses this information is also a banker, the act may constitute an offence only as regards that person; but, since the information will lose its character as a secret upon being disclosed, it is not possible for the offence to be committed as regards the banker who learns the secret in this way and discloses it. Secondly, since the banker has learned this information not by reason of his capacity and duties as a banker but from a friend on account of his personal relationship, his disclosing it will not constitute an offence on that ground either.
With regard to the obligation of confidentiality of bank employees, the explanatory memorandum to the article states: “in the Banks Law No. 4389, which is repealed by this Law, the obligation of confidentiality was addressed not to the legal personality of the bank but directly to ‘those who take part in the application of the Law and in the supervision of its application’ and to ‘members of staff and other officers, and the article was regulated solely from the criminal standpoint. Consequently, the provision in question was not such as to provide a basis for the obligation of confidentiality of the bank as a legal person. By this rule, which is addressed to the legal personality of the bank, a direct basis has been created, from the standpoint of private law, for the obligation of confidentiality of banks (and of the other organisations specified in the Law)”. With this reasoning, it is stated that Art. 73(3) has regulated the obligation of confidentiality in respect of the legal personality of banks as well. Frankly, it is difficult to derive such a meaning from the text of this paragraph. Moreover, it is not possible for information in the nature of a secret to be learned and disclosed by an abstract legal person; it can only be disclosed by the organs of legal persons and attributed to the legal person. Consequently, the liability of the legal person for disclosing a banking secret can hold good only in terms of the legal personality of the bank being held liable in respect of the claims for damages of a person whose rights have been infringed on account of a secret disclosed by an organ of a bank. Apart from this, for the legal person to be liable in respect of the offence of disclosing banking secrets is in any event not possible in view of the system of criminal law in force in our country and of the scheme of the TCK. This is because the criminal liability of legal persons is not accepted in the TCK.
The obligation of confidentiality of the partners, managers and employees of banks and of the employees of the organisations providing support to banks will likewise continue after the termination of their duties. This is expressly regulated in the last sentence of Art. 73(3), which states that “this obligation shall continue after leaving office”. In addition, the explanatory memorandum to the article states that “there is no limitation in time as regards the obligation of confidentiality”. That being so, as regards bank personnel the obligation of confidentiality will continue until the end of their lives.
c. Third Parties as Perpetrators of the Offence
The case in which third parties are perpetrators of the offence of disclosing banking secrets is regulated in the last sentence of Art. 159(1). Under that provision, the same penalties are to be applied to third parties who disclose secrets belonging to banks and customers.
What is meant here by third parties is everyone other than “the chairman and members of the Board and the staff of the Agency, and the chairman and members of the Fund Board and the staff of the Fund” specified in Art. 73(1), “the partners of the bank, the members of its board of directors, its members of staff, persons acting on their behalf and its officers” specified in Art. 73(3), and the employees of the organisations providing support to them.
For example, where a person who provides legal advice and advocacy services to the Agency under a contract of mandate discloses information in the nature of a banking secret concerning the functioning of the bank, its economic situation, its commercial customers or the enforcement proceedings brought against some of its customers, that person will be the perpetrator of the offence of disclosing banking secrets committed by third parties.
4. Subject Matter of the Offence
The subject matter of this offence is the “banking secret”. Since the explanations concerning the banking secret were given in detail in the section of this study entitled “secret and banking secret”, they will not be repeated here. However, certain notions added to the concept of the banking secret by this Law need to be mentioned.
Art. 73(1), in which the obligation to keep banking secrets is regulated, lays down the obligation imposed on Agency employees. For the offence to be constituted in respect of this group of perpetrators, the secrets that must not be disclosed must belong to banks and to their subsidiaries, affiliates, jointly controlled partnerships and customers. For the managers and employees of the BDDK and the TMSF, the subject matter of the offence consists of the banking secrets belonging to those mentioned above.
Under Art. 73(3), where the provision concerning bankers is made, by contrast, bank managers and employees are obliged to keep only the secrets belonging to the bank at which they work and to its customers. No obligation has been imposed on them to keep the secrets belonging to the subsidiaries, affiliates and jointly controlled partnerships of banks. Accordingly, for perpetrators who are bankers the subject matter of the offence consists only of the secrets belonging to the bank at which they work and to its customers. Although, for these persons, keeping the secrets belonging to the subsidiaries, affiliates and jointly controlled partnerships of banks is an obligation that may be imposed by contract within the framework of the provisions of private law, the disclosure of information of this kind will not constitute an offence under Art. 159 even where such a contract has been concluded. The disclosure of such information may give rise to termination of the employment contract for just cause and to claims for damages on account of the breach of the contract concluded between the bank and its employee. Moreover, provided that the other elements are also present, where such information can be characterised as a trade secret, its disclosure may also constitute the offence of disclosing trade secrets under Art. 239 TCK.
For third parties, the subject matter of the offence consists only of bank secrets and customer secrets. As explained above, where secrets belonging to the subsidiaries, affiliates and jointly controlled partnerships of banks are disclosed by third parties, this may constitute the offence of disclosing trade secrets under Art. 239 TCK.
5. Material Element
a. Act
The material element of this offence consists in the disclosure of information in the nature of a banking secret. Whether the disclosure is made in writing, orally, visually or in a virtual environment, or by what means it is made, has no bearing on the constitution of the offence45. The offence of disclosing banking secrets may be committed by a commissive act as well as by an omissive act. Where the perpetrator directly discloses the information in the nature of a secret to the person in front of him, or sends this information by e-mail to everyone on the mailing list, the offence will have been committed by a commissive act. Where the perpetrator leaves documents which contain information in the nature of a secret and which he is required to keep safe on his desk in such a way that others will see them, or gets up and walks away while this information is on his computer screen, the offence will have been committed in the form of commission by omission46.
For the act component of the offence to be fulfilled, it is not necessary for the banking secret to become public and to become known to the public. The act component of the offence is fulfilled even where the information in the nature of a secret is disclosed to a single person other than the holder of the secret. What matters for this offence is to ensure that information in the nature of a secret is not disclosed; once the information has been disclosed, it makes no difference to the holder of the secret whether it has been disclosed to one person or to a thousand. Accordingly, for the act component of this offence to be constituted, the information in the nature of a secret need not become public or be disclosed to the public47.
Moreover, this offence is an offence of endangerment; for the offence to be completed it is not necessary that any harm should ultimately arise. Whether or not the bank or the customer who holds the secret suffers harm as a result of the disclosure of the information in the nature of a banking secret, the offence is completed.
Where a banking secret belongs to more than one person, giving the information to any one of these persons will not constitute the offence of disclosure of a secret. For example, no offence will be constituted by giving each of the holders of a joint account information on the amount in these accounts and on the account movements. For each of these persons is in any event entitled to be apprised of the information in question. However, where one of the joint account holders has an individual account at the same bank and information on this individual account is given to one of the other joint account holders, the offence will be constituted. For information on this individual account can no longer be disclosed to anyone other than the account holder.
The information disclosed must be true. For example, where information is given as though there were such a thing when no matter relating to the sale of the bank is on the agenda, or where information is given about a person who is not a customer of the bank as though he were one, this offence will not be constituted because no true information has been given. In such a case, however, damage to the reputation of the bank may be at issue.
Nor is it necessary, for the offence to be constituted, that the whole of the information in the nature of a banking secret be disclosed. If the disclosure of a part of the information in the nature of a secret enables third parties to obtain knowledge, this is sufficient for the offence to be constituted48.
A person who acts in the belief that he is disclosing a banking secret, but who has in fact made a disclosure that is not of that nature, will not be held liable for this act. At the time when TCK No. 765 was in force, this situation was described as a “putative offence or imaginary offence”, and it was stated that, although there was no express provision on the matter in the Code, it was not possible to impose punishment, on account of something that did not in reality constitute an offence, by having regard solely to the culpability of the perpetrator49. In the new system introduced by TCK No. 5237, by contrast, this situation is expressly regulated in Art. 30(1) of the Code, which provides that “a person who, at the time of carrying out the act, is unaware of the material elements in the statutory definition of the offence shall not be deemed to have acted intentionally”. In legal scholarship this is called mistake as to the material elements of the offence, and it is explained that mistake as to the material elements of the offence (mistake of element) denotes, in a concrete case, ignorance of, or incomplete and incorrect knowledge about, the material elements of the offence; in short, that in this situation the idea which the perpetrator has of the concrete case does not correspond to reality50. The perpetrator will therefore not be punished in this situation, because what he disclosed was not in reality information in the nature of a secret and no offence has been committed either.
Where, on the other hand, the perpetrator discloses information that is in reality a secret without knowing that it is of that nature, regard must again be had to the provisions of the TCK on mistake. In this case too the perpetrator cannot be punished, because he has fallen into a mistake as to the material element of the offence. Even if the perpetrator fell into this mistake as a result of his negligent conduct, when he ought not to have done so, it is not possible to hold him liable for this act, since the offence of disclosing banking secrets cannot be committed by negligence. However, the perpetrator’s defence that he did not know that he was under an obligation not to disclose information of this nature will not be valid, since this is a mistake of law and, under Art. 4 TCK, ignorance of the law is not regarded as an excuse; this mistake of the perpetrator will be disregarded and he will be punished.
There is an important difference, affecting the material element of the offence, between Art. 73(1) and (3) of the Banking Law, in which the obligation of confidentiality is regulated. The first paragraph provides that those who learn banking secrets may not disclose them and, in addition, “may not use them for their own benefit or for the benefit of others”. This provision, however, does not appear in the third paragraph of the same article. This gives rise to the impression that the shareholders, managers and employees of banks might use this information for their own benefit or for that of another. That, however, is not the case; irrespective of who has learned the banking secret, there can be no question of its being used by those who have learned it for their own benefit or for that of a third party. There is no point in mentioning, in the first paragraph, an act of wrongful use in addition to the act of disclosure. This offence is constituted by the disclosure of the information in the nature of a secret, and the act also comes to an end at that point; for the offence to be constituted there is no further need for the information to be used or for an unjust benefit to be obtained from it. This is therefore a superfluous expression; the use of the secret for personal benefit after its disclosure can only be regulated as an aggravating circumstance of the offence. In the third paragraph, by contrast, no such expression has, rightly, been included, and for the offence to be constituted only the act of disclosing has been specified. It was a mistake to create a difference of this kind between the paragraphs in which the perpetrators and their obligations are determined for the purposes of the offence of disclosing banking secrets. However, since Art. 159(2), in which the offence itself is regulated, treats as an aggravating circumstance the case where the perpetrator obtains a benefit for himself or for another through the disclosure of banking secrets, this defective provision in Art. 73 will not cause any problem in practice51.
b. Result
For the offence to be committed it is sufficient that the act directed at disclosure be carried out; the occurrence of any further result is not required. The offence is constituted as soon as the act is carried out. This type of offence is therefore, as a rule, a type of offence in which the result is attached to the act.
Since the offence will be constituted only at the moment when the secret is disclosed, where the act is carried out orally or visually the offence will be constituted at that moment and it will not be possible to divide the act into parts. However, the situation presents a particular feature where the secret is disclosed by e-mail, mobile telephone message, letter or video. What will happen, for example, if the perpetrator sends the secret he is obliged to keep by e-mail but it is returned before reaching its addressee, if it is sent by mobile telephone but cannot reach its addressee because of a fault at the operator, or if the letter or the video footage is lost in the post? In such a case, since the act can be divided into parts and the information in question has not reached its addressee and has therefore not been disclosed, the result will be deemed not to have occurred and the offence not to have been constituted. However, since the act has been carried out by the perpetrator, the offence will be deemed to have remained at the stage of attempt, and the perpetrator will be punished under the articles of the TCK on attempt.
6. Mental Element
There is nothing particular to note as regards the mental element of this offence. For the offence to be committed, the perpetrator must carry out the act of disclosing information in the nature of a banking secret knowingly and willingly. In short, this offence can be committed with general intent; the motive with which the perpetrator carried out the act is of no importance. The perpetrator is not required to have acted with any specific intent for the offence to be committed.
The perpetrator’s obtaining a benefit through the disclosure of the information in question, on the other hand, has been provided for as an aggravating circumstance of the offence. Some authors in legal scholarship state that this provision denotes specific intent and forms part of the mental element of the offence; that, for this provision to produce effects in terms of the material element of the offence, the wording ought to relate not to intent but to the result; in other words that, for this provision to be an aggravating circumstance, it ought to contain the expression “the benefit having been obtained through the disclosure of the secrets” or a similar expression52. However, since the offence will be committed even if the perpetrator has not acted with such an intent, this has no effect on the intent of the perpetrator. This is the case in which the direct existence of such an aim on the part of the perpetrator is met with a heavier sanction than the basic form of the offence.
Since the definition of the offence does not state that it may also be committed by negligence, no offence will be constituted where the perpetrator causes a secret to be disclosed through his negligence. For example, where the perpetrator, through his negligent conduct, puts documents containing information in the nature of a secret in a place where everyone can see them, sends a card or a letter unsealed, or where, because he speaks loudly on the telephone, the information is learned, it is not possible for him to be punished. However, this situation may give rise to liability for damages and to termination of the employment contract for just cause as regards the perpetrator’s relations with the bank and the bank’s relationship with its customers53. Where, on the other hand, the perpetrator carries out these acts not through negligence but intentionally, the act will, as also explained above, have been carried out in the form of commission by omission. In this respect it is important to determine the type of culpability which the perpetrator had when carrying out these acts.
7. The Element of Unlawfulness
The non-disclosure of secrets relating to banking activities is extremely important both for the reputation of banks and for their being institutions of trust. For this reason acts of this kind have been regulated as a type of offence both in the Banking Law and in the TCK. However, the non-disclosure of these secrets should not lead to certain offences being concealed in this way. The types of offence most frequently found to be concealed under cover of the banking secret are those relating to the laundering of assets derived from crime (dirty money) and to tax evasion. In this situation, determining the scope of the banking secret acquires great importance for determining the delicate balance between the right to have personal and commercial information kept confidential and the fight against crime. Indeed, Art. 40 of the Convention against Corruption drawn up by the United Nations calls on the States Parties to make provision in their own domestic law for overcoming the obstacles arising from laws on the confidentiality of bank accounts54. For this reason, these reservations too must be taken into account when grounds of justification are created for the offence of disclosing banking secrets.
Where banking secrets are disclosed to “the authorities expressly empowered by the laws”, the act will become lawful and no offence will be constituted. The first point to be examined in this ground of justification is therefore that the power must rest on a statutory provision. Accordingly, this offence will not be constituted where, for example, information falling within the scope of the banking secret is given, at their request, to the Ethics Board for Public Officials under Art. 9(2) of Law No. 3628 “on the Declaration of Assets and Combating Bribery and Corruption”, or to the Financial Crimes Investigation Board and the audit bodies authorised by that Board under Art. 4 et seq. of Law No. 5549 “on the Prevention of Laundering of the Proceeds of Crime”. The most frequently encountered example in this regard is the case where, because the economic structure of banks is monitored and supervised by the BDDK, information on the economic structure and situation of the bank is given to the BDDK; since this is regulated by law, it too constitutes a ground of justification. For, by virtue of the power conferred by the laws in question, it is stated that these boards are empowered to request information and documents from natural and legal persons on matters connected with their inquiries, and that the persons from whom information is requested may not refrain from giving information and documents by invoking the confidentiality provisions of special laws55. Similarly, since neither the Code of Civil Procedure (HUMK) nor the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) lists the “banking secret” as a ground for refusing to testify, the disclosure of banking secrets in an investigation or prosecution conducted under the CMK, or in testimony given before a commercial court of first instance under the HUMK, will not constitute an offence.
The second point to be noted here is that the notion of competent authority denotes not only the body which has been given power to request information but also the body to which, by express provision of the law, the employee of the Agency, the Fund or the bank is obliged to give information. Accordingly, where the minister of trade or a governor requests information from the bank about a customer, since there is no statutory provision imposing on the bank employee an obligation to give information in this respect, an offence will be constituted if the requested information is given, and this will no longer be regarded as a ground of justification56. In conclusion, where the perpetrator is charged by law with the duty of giving information, either of his own motion or upon request, this will constitute a ground of justification57.
It is stated in legal scholarship that the case of disclosure to the authorities expressly empowered by the laws is limited to answering the questions asked and to disclosing the information relating to those questions, and that banks may not grant the authorities empowered under this article permission to examine the bank’s records58. Indeed, this ground of justification must be confined to the concrete case and the questions asked; particularly as regards customer secrets, the disclosure of all this personal information to the competent authorities should not be accepted as a ground of justification. However, in an audit which the BDDK conducts by virtue of its function in relation to the situation of the bank, opening for examination the records relating to the general situation of the bank, though not the information relating to individual customers, will also constitute a ground of justification arising from the law.
Where a cheque belonging to a customer of the bank is dishonoured, notifying that there is not a sufficient amount in the customer’s bank account to pay the amount of the cheque and notifying how much money there is in the account for partial payment, or that there is none at all, and also giving the holder of the cheque or his representative the address for service of the bank’s customer for the purposes of the enforcement proceedings to be brought against the bank’s customer on account of the dishonoured cheque, are likewise accepted as a ground of justification as regards the offence of disclosing banking secrets.
Similarly, in enforcement proceedings brought against a debtor, where, in the context of the attachment of the debtor’s claims against third parties and following a notice of attachment sent to the bank at which he holds a deposit, the bank gives the enforcement office information on the deposit of its depositor held with it and enables the attachment to be carried out, this offence will not be constituted either59. Indeed, in a decision which it delivered on this matter, the 12th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation stated that the information given by the bank to the enforcement office about its depositor was lawful, but that this too was limited to giving the information relating to the proceedings in respect of which information was requested60.
The consent of the holder of the secret also constitutes a ground of justification for this offence. However, the person giving consent must be fully entitled to give consent in this matter. Where any piece of information belongs at the same time both to the customer and to the bank, the consent of both the bank and the customer must be required; the absence of the consent of even one of them will prevent the act from becoming lawful61. It will be very useful, for the purposes of proving it, for the customer’s consent to be in writing62. Where banks give a letter of reference about their customers, this too will constitute a ground of justification, since the customer’s request and consent will exist beforehand. For the purposes of proof, this request of the customer should also be obtained in writing.
The case in which the bank gives information about its own corporate structure and internal functioning is also a ground of justification. As a rule, the power to give information about a bank secret belongs to the bank’s board of directors and, where the latter delegates authority, to the bank’s general management. Apart from these organs, the act of making a disclosure about a bank secret will, as a rule, constitute an offence63. However, in this situation a conclusion should be reached in each concrete case only after it has been examined whether there has been a delegation of authority and a grant of permission as regards the perpetrator.
The consent in question must exist before the offence is committed or at the time it is committed. Consent, as a ground of justification, has an effect on whether or not one of the elements of the offence is constituted. However, it is only where the consent exists before or during the commission of the act that the act carried out cannot be characterised as an offence, since the element of unlawfulness will then be absent. Otherwise, ratification given after the act has been completed and the offence constituted will not affect the criminal character of the act. Ratifying the act after it has been carried out and refraining from lodging a complaint will not prevent the investigation, since this is in any event a type of offence that can be investigated ex officio, and will not remove the criminal nature of the act64. Accordingly, the fact that some authors in legal scholarship give explanations as though the case in which consent is given after the offence has been committed were also a ground of justification65 is incompatible with the general theory of the offence.
A superior’s order cannot be accepted as a ground of justification for this offence, because a superior’s order to disclose information in the nature of a banking secret would be an order whose subject matter constitutes an offence and is therefore, pursuant to Art. 24(3) TCK, not a ground of justification. In this case both the superior who gave the order and the official who carried it out will be held liable for it.
Where, on the other hand, information in the nature of a banking secret is disclosed under force, violence, intimidation and threat, this will be accepted as a ground of justification pursuant to Art. 28 TCK and the perpetrator will not be held liable for it.
Grounds of justification are also set out in Art. 73(2) and (4) of the Law. According to paragraph 2, the information and documents which the Agency provides within the framework of the agreement it concludes with its counterpart supervisory authorities abroad do not fall within the scope of secrecy. It is further stated that the Board is charged with ensuring the protection of the secrets it obtains through the agreement documents it draws up and otherwise than through those documents. Again in the same paragraph it is stated that the Agency may not give the information and documents in the nature of a secret which it obtains under this paragraph to any person, institution or organisation, and in the last sentence it is said that “the Agency may not be held liable for the provision of information falling within the scope of a secret made subject to a court decision”.
Given the globalisation of the economy and the fact that banks have customers from all over the world, that commercial business is done with every part of the world and that even the banks’ own shareholders come from all over the world, nothing could be more natural and necessary than for supervisory institutions to share information with one another and for this to be regulated by law. This, however, does not remove the character of the information shared as a secret. Just as the sharing of a secret concerning the bank by the bank’s general manager with the bank’s board of directors will not affect the character of that information as a secret, so the sharing of information of this kind with foreign supervisory institutions will not affect its character as a secret either. It is therefore an extremely defective provision for the paragraph to state that the information and documents shared are not in the nature of a secret. Indeed, in the subsequent sentences of the paragraph it is stated that this shared information “shall be kept as a secret” and may not be disclosed to others, which indicates that it is in the nature of a secret. In short, sentences 1 and 2 of Art. 73(2) contradict each other. In fact, what should have been stated here is not that the information shared is not in the nature of a secret but that sharing it does not amount to disclosure of a secret, and it should have been made clear that this is a ground of justification within the meaning of Art. 159. Although the provision is wrongly drafted, the paragraph in question must be understood in this way.
Moreover, it cannot be understood what the last sentence of the paragraph is intended to convey either. There is no such concept in our country as a “secret made subject to a court decision”; for a piece of information to be in the nature of a secret it is not necessary for it to have been made the subject of a decision by a court. If what is meant here is that disclosure of the information obtained as a result of the sharing in question before the investigating and prosecuting authorities, for the purposes of an investigation or prosecution, cannot be refused, there is in any event no need for a separate provision for that either. Provided that it is not in the nature of a State secret and that there is no impediment to testifying, any information, whether in the nature of a secret or not, has to be disclosed by witnesses at the public prosecutor’s office and in the courts if it is requested. The last sentence of the paragraph is therefore a defective and superfluous provision. In short, the act of the BDDK in giving information in the nature of a secret within the framework of the agreements it has concluded with similar institutions abroad is also a ground of justification.
Art. 73(4) of the Banking Law, for its part, provides that the exchange of information and documents and the provision of services which credit institutions and financial institutions carry out, within the framework of the written contracts they conclude with support service organisations, for the purposes of monitoring, assessing and controlling the risk situation of the customers of these institutions and of performing customer services, and also every kind of exchange of information and documents which credit institutions and financial institutions carry out among themselves, either directly or through companies to be established by at least five banks, cannot be assessed within the scope of Art. 73. As is well known, banking is the profession of measuring risk, taking risk and managing risk. For this reason, a bank’s carrying out research, particularly on its credit customers or on persons who have applied before credit is granted, and trying to foresee the risk it will assume is one of the most important elements of this profession66. To achieve this, banks set up risk-monitoring departments within their own organisation, collect information from other banks and financial institutions, and also obtain support services from institutions that deal solely with this work. Art. 73(4) thus states that an exchange of information of this kind is not a disclosure of a secret and that it is therefore a ground of justification for the purposes of Art. 159.
8. Circumstances Affecting the Offence
As regards the banking secret, the circumstance affecting the offence is regulated in Art. 159(2), the article in which the type of offence is laid down; according to this, if the persons who are perpetrators of the offence of disclosing banking secrets have disclosed the secrets with the aim of obtaining a benefit for themselves or for others, the penalty to be imposed on them will be increased. For the aggravating circumstance to be fulfilled, the perpetrator need not have obtained an unlawful benefit as a result of the secret he disclosed. It is sufficient for the aggravating circumstance to be fulfilled that the perpetrator acted with this aim.
9. Special Forms of Appearance of the Offence
Since the offence of disclosing banking secrets is, as noted above when the material element of the offence was examined, a type of offence in which the result is attached to the act, it cannot as a rule remain at the stage of attempt. However, developing technology makes it possible in some situations for the material element of this offence to be divided into parts. For example, where a secret is disclosed by e-mail and, before the message has reached its addressee, the system breaks down and the message cannot be delivered, the act will have been completed on the part of the perpetrator but, since the disclosure has not taken place, the result will not have occurred and the offence will not have been completed either. In such a case, since the act can be divided into its parts, the offence will be deemed to have remained at the stage of attempt and the perpetrator will be given the penalty for an offence that has remained at the stage of attempt.
As regards the concurrence of offences, the type of offence under examination presents a particular feature, especially in relation to the offence of “disclosure of information and documents in the nature of a trade secret, banking secret or customer secret” regulated in Art. 239 TCK. For the type of offence regulated in the TCK and the type of offence regulated in the Banking Law are identical to each other; the type of offence in the Banking Law is merely regulated in a much more detailed and complex manner than that in the TCK. The only difference between the type of offence regulated in the Banking Law and the type of offence regulated in the TCK is that, whereas the Banking Law regulates the case in which the perpetrator discloses information in the nature of a secret after having come into possession of it lawfully, the TCK regulates the same situation also for secrets which the perpetrator has obtained unlawfully. Accordingly, Art. 159 of the Banking Law will apply in cases where information in the nature of a banking secret is disclosed after having been obtained lawfully, and Art. 239 TCK in cases where it is disclosed after having been obtained unlawfully. The reason for this is that the Banking Law is both the later law and the special law in relation to the TCK67.
Another important problem that may arise in this connection is what will happen where banking secrets that are in the nature of personal data are disclosed. For Art. 136 TCK makes it an offence unlawfully to give personal data to another, to disseminate them or to obtain them. Since the act of an employee of the Agency or of a bank in giving a secret that is in the nature of personal data to another will, for these persons, be regarded as the unlawful disclosure of the secret, two different articles of two different laws will have been breached by a single act of the perpetrator. In this case, since two different offences have been committed by the same act, the rules on notional concurrence will be applied. Accordingly, under Art. 44 TCK, Art. 136 TCK will be applied, because the penalty for the type of offence regulated in Art. 136 TCK is heavier than that for the type of offence regulated in Art. 159 of the Banking Law. Since Art. 136 TCK does not regulate a banking offence, it does not seem possible, as far as this article is concerned, to regard the Banking Law as a special law and to apply it. In this situation, since information in the nature of a customer secret in particular will be regarded as personal data and Art. 136 TCK will be applied where it is disclosed, the scope of application of Art. 159 of the Banking Law will be extremely limited.
As regards participation in the offence, on the other hand, the type of offence presents no particular feature; every form of participation in the offence is possible.
10. Sanction
Art. 159 of the Banking Law provides that perpetrators who commit the offence of disclosing banking secrets shall be sentenced to imprisonment for one year to three years and to a judicial fine of one thousand days to two thousand days. This penalty has been laid down without any distinction between perpetrators who are Agency employees, perpetrators who are bank employees and perpetrators who are third parties. Where the offence is committed by the perpetrator with the aim of obtaining a benefit, the penalty in question will be imposed increased by one sixth. Since the custodial penalty and the judicial fine are not provided for here as alternative sanctions, both types of sanction will be imposed where it is established that the perpetrator carried out the act with which he is charged. The judge has not been given any choice in this respect.
The rates of the custodial penalty are the same in the offence of disclosure of secrets in Art. 239 TCK and in the offence of disclosure of secrets in Art. 159 of the Banking Law; accordingly, imprisonment for one year to three years is provided for in both types of offence. However, whereas Art. 159 of the Banking Law provides for a judicial fine of one thousand days to two thousand days, Art. 239 TCK provides for a judicial fine of up to five thousand days without specifying a lower limit.
The purpose of regulating the banking secret was stated above under the heading of the legal interest protected by the offence. As will also be seen from the explanations given there, this is a type of offence introduced essentially for the employees of the Agency, the Fund and banks. Indeed, information in the nature of a banking secret is at all times within the knowledge and at the disposal of these persons, and access to it poses no problem for them. However, the fact that no distinction has been made in the type of offence between the sanctions for these persons and for third parties, and that the act committed by the employees of the Agency, the Fund and banks is not met with a heavier penalty than in the case of third parties, as required by their loyalty to the place where they work and by the protection of the reputation of their profession, has created an injustice68.
As a security measure additional to these offences, the last sentence of Art. 159(2) provides that, depending on the importance of the act of disclosing banking secrets, those responsible shall be prohibited, temporarily or permanently and for not less than two years, from serving in the institutions falling within the scope of the Banking Law. It must be noted at once that it is not possible to apply this security measure alone to the perpetrator; where, at the end of the perpetrator’s trial, it is established that his guilt of the act with which he is charged has been proved, the security measure in question will also be ordered after a custodial penalty and a judicial fine have been imposed on him. Nor has the legislature given the judge any discretion as regards the application of this security measure. Where a judgment of conviction is delivered against the perpetrator, this security measure must without fail also be included in the same judgment. The importance of the act plays a role only in determining the duration. Having regard to criteria such as the importance of the secret disclosed by the perpetrator, the effect which the disclosed secret has had on the economy, the bank or the customer, and even the importance of the office held by the person who disclosed the secret, this period may be temporary, of at least two years, or indefinite. The judge will exercise his discretion in determining the period according to these criteria. Although this security measure is appropriate, it must be stated plainly that in the banking sector it is in any event very difficult for a person who has been convicted of such an offence to find work in the same sector again; by this statutory provision that practice has in effect been placed on a legal footing.
11. Prosecution
Under Art. 162 of the Banking Law, in order for an investigation and prosecution to be initiated in respect of the offences specified in this Law, a written application must be made by the BDDK or the TMSF to the competent chief public prosecutor’s office. The Law expressly states that this is a procedural condition; in other words, it is not possible to conduct an investigation and prosecution in this matter without the written request of the Agency or the Fund. Although an exception has been created whereby the public prosecutor may, in cases where delay would be prejudicial, commence an investigation ex officio and subsequently inform the Agency and the Fund of the situation, this can be applied only in respect of the abstract banking embezzlement regulated in Art. 160(3). Accordingly, as regards the other offences contained in the Banking Law, the prosecutor cannot commence an investigation of his own motion even where there is a situation in which delay would be prejudicial. There is no logical explanation for the legislature’s having made such a distinction between types of offence, and this situation is moreover liable to give rise to various problems for the proper conduct of the investigation69. Where the public prosecutor, by mistake, for example by forgetting the existence of this provision, commences an investigation of his own motion, he must, as soon as he becomes aware of the procedural condition, halt the investigation at the stage it has reached, inform the BDDK or the TMSF of the matter and continue the investigation upon the written request received from them.
However, Art. 162(2) of the Banking Law states that, in respect of the offences of damaging reputation, disclosure of secrets and embezzlement, the right of action of those concerned and the provisions of the CMK are reserved. In fact, the inclusion of the first part of this provision is unnecessary. The person harmed by the offence and the victim, who fall within the category of those concerned by the offence, already have the right to bring an action under the Civil Code and the Code of Obligations; this right exists even if it is not mentioned in the paragraph in question.
On the other hand, the same paragraph states that the provisions of the CMK are reserved in respect of the offences of damaging reputation, disclosure of secrets and embezzlement, that is, that for these types of offence it is not Art. 162(1) but the CMK directly that will apply. In legal scholarship too it is stated that the persons harmed by and the victims of these three types of offence may report the offence to the public prosecutor’s office, and indeed that, in view of this paragraph, public prosecutor’s offices may commence an investigation ex officio for the types of offence in question70. Indeed, this view was expressly stated in the decision delivered by the General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation concerning the similar provision of the Banks Law No. 438971.
Art. 163 of the Law provides that, where the Agency or the Fund requests that an investigation be initiated, prosecutors are not obliged to bring a public prosecution at the end of the investigation they conduct, and that the decision not to prosecute which the prosecutor gives at the end of the investigation shall be served, as the case may be, on the Agency or the Fund and on the bank concerned. The Agency, the Fund and the banks will be able to object to this decision under Art. 173 CMK, and where, as a result of the objection, it is decided that an indictment is to be drawn up, a copy of that indictment will be served on the Agency or the Fund. That the bank, which is given no place at any stage of the investigation and prosecution, is granted only the right to object to the decision not to prosecute, but that, where an indictment is drawn up upon the objection being upheld, this indictment is not served on the bank which lodged the objection, is both an omission and an error. It would have been a far more appropriate arrangement to include the bank, which is in the position of the party directly harmed, at every stage of this process. As regards the offence of disclosing banking secrets, the objection to the decision not to prosecute will be lodged by those harmed by the offence in accordance with the relevant provisions of the CMK.
According to the last sentence of Art. 162(1) of the Law, where the Agency or the Fund makes an application, they automatically acquire the status of intervening party and take part in the proceedings. Apart from this application, they are not required to apply separately to the court for their status as intervening party to be accepted, nor does a decision need to be taken on the matter. However, this application must not be confused with the request made by the Agency or the Fund for the investigation to be initiated. That request is a procedural condition and sets the investigation in motion, whereas this application is one made after the prosecutor has drawn up the indictment and the public prosecution has been brought by the court’s acceptance of the indictment. What distinguishes it from the normal procedure for intervening in the proceedings is that the Agency or the Fund acquires the status of intervening party automatically at the moment when the petition containing the request to intervene in the proceedings is submitted to the court, without any further decision by the court being required. It is not possible to understand why the legislature followed a path different from the normal procedure. Where, on the other hand, a public prosecution is brought as a result of an investigation initiated upon the report of an offence made by the victim and/or the person harmed by the offence in connection with the offence of disclosing banking secrets, it is not possible for those harmed by the offence to acquire the status of intervening party automatically. If they request to intervene in the proceedings, they must address this request to the court that will conduct the prosecution, and the court must accept this request and decide that they are to intervene in the proceedings.
In conclusion, the rule in Art. 162(1) does not apply to the offence of disclosing banking secrets; anyone harmed by this offence and anyone who learns of the offence may report it, and the public prosecutor’s office may commence an investigation of its own motion when it learns that this offence has been committed.
For the offences contained in the Banking Law, Art. 164 of the Law, entitled “special jurisdiction”, provides that the prosecution shall be conducted in a specially authorised court. It must be noted at once that this is an appropriate provision and that, since it is a provision introduced before the trials to be held, it does not infringe the principle of the natural judge either. Moreover, banking offences are a field which requires knowledge of both criminal law and banking law and in which there are detailed and technical rules. For this reason, the creation of specialised courts in this field by conferring special jurisdiction on certain courts is an extremely appropriate practice.
Under Art. 164 of the Law, the offence of disclosing banking secrets will be tried in the assize courts numbered (1) bearing the name of the province to which the place where the act was committed is attached. In addition, where it is deemed necessary, it is also possible, on the proposal of the Ministry of Justice and by decision of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, for the other assize courts in those places to be assigned, or for new assize courts to be established, to deal with offences of this kind. Indeed, on the basis of this article of the Law, the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors stated, by its decision of 24.03.2005 No. 2005/188, that the 8th Assize Court has jurisdiction within the administrative boundaries of the province of Istanbul and that the assize courts numbered 2 have jurisdiction in the provinces other than Istanbul. The point to be noted here is that, for offences committed on or before the date on which the decision was taken, it is the court having jurisdiction in accordance with the principle of the natural judge that may conduct the trial, whereas the court so authorised may conduct the trial only in respect of offences committed after the decision was taken. Otherwise the principle of the natural judge, which is a universal human right, would be abandoned for the sake of creating a specialised court, and for our country, which is a State governed by the rule of law, this should not even be contemplated.
C. The Offence of Disclosure of Secrets in the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK)
Apart from the offence of disclosing banking secrets regulated in Art. 159 and, by way of the reference it makes, in Art. 73 of the Banking Law No. 5411, which was examined in detail above, our law also regulates, in Art. 239 of TCK No. 5237, the offence of “disclosure of information or documents in the nature of a trade secret, banking secret or customer secret”.
TCK No. 5237 entered into force on 1 June 2005, whereas the Banking Law No. 5411 entered into force on 01.11.2005, that is, exactly five months after the entry into force of the TCK. There is no logical explanation whatsoever for including the same type of offence in the Banking Law, without any change affecting its substance, after this type of offence had been included in the criminal code, which is the basic instrument in the field of criminal law. Both types of offence were prepared by the same legislature, and both of the laws containing these types of offence were submitted to the general assembly and enacted at the end of a long process. If this type of offence was already in the Banking Bill, why was it included in the TCK or, conversely, why was it regulated once more in the Banking Law after this type of offence had entered into force? This shows that these provisions were unfortunately made without the necessary care and seriousness. It is not possible to understand the reason for including this offence in the Banking Law despite the TCK, nor is it explained in the explanatory memorandum of that Law.
Moreover, the provision on the offence of disclosing banking secrets regulated in the Banking Law is also contrary to the principle of certainty, which is a sub-element of the principle of legality of offences and penalties. As is well known, under the principle of legality of offences and penalties, every act accepted in law as a criminal norm, together with its penalty, must without fail be contained in a written provision having the character of a statute. However, it is not enough for this norm merely to be contained in a statute; under the principle of certainty, the definition given and the penalty must also be comprehensible to everyone. The offence of disclosing banking secrets regulated in the Banking Law, however, is regulated by means of the reference made by Art. 159 to Art. 73. Art. 73, for its part, is an article drafted with obligations under private law and administrative law in mind. Consequently, this type of offence is extremely difficult to understand and to explain. This situation constitutes a breach of the principle of certainty. In Art. 239 TCK, by contrast, the same type of offence is drafted in very clear, definite and plain language, and it is very easy for everyone to understand this article.
In the Turkish legal system, as regards the offence of disclosure of secrets in general, the preference is to refer to the TCK rather than to make a special provision. By Art. 159 of the Banking Law, however, a special offence provision has been made containing the same amount of custodial penalty as Art. 239 TCK. Yet when the earlier banking laws in the historical process are also examined, it is seen that the offence of disclosing banking secrets was regulated in all of them. In the new TCK, on the other hand, a change of system was made and many types of offence found in special laws were regulated within this general law. With such a choice having been made, making a provision of this kind when only five months had passed is also at odds with that choice. However, in legal scholarship this choice of the TCK is also criticised, and it is stated that it was a wrong course for the TCK to bring back within its scope the matters regulated in special laws72. The other view on this matter criticises the fact that, although such a type of offence existed in the TCK, the same type of offence was regulated in the Banking Law, exactly five months after the entry into force of the TCK, in a manner that is complex and in conflict with the principles of criminal law73. Indeed, regulating this type of offence once again in the same way in the Banking Law has been meaningless and unnecessary.
The explanations given above in relation to the type of offence regulated in Art. 159 of the Banking Law apply equally to the type of offence regulated in Art. 239 TCK, and no further explanation will be given here74. Below, an attempt will be made to set out only the points on which the two types of offence differ.
The most important difference between Art. 239 TCK and the offence of disclosing banking secrets regulated by the reference of Art. 159 of the Banking Law to Art. 73 is to be seen in the last sentence of Art. 239(1). For both in the first sentence of Art. 239(1) and in the offence of disclosing banking secrets regulated in the Banking Law, the information in the nature of a secret is obtained lawfully by the perpetrator, either in the course of his duties or by reason of his duties and capacity, and the offence is constituted by the disclosure of this information. In the second sentence of Art. 239(1), by contrast, the case in which the perpetrator, after having obtained the documents in question unlawfully, gives them to unauthorised persons and discloses them is made an offence. The disclosure of information obtained unlawfully is regulated only by this article. Thus Art. 239 TCK has not been implicitly repealed and remains in force.
Where, on the other hand, the perpetrator, without disclosing the information in the nature of a banking secret which he has obtained unlawfully, hands it back to the authorised persons of the bank or does not hand it over at all, no offence will be constituted. For what this article makes an offence is not the unlawful obtaining of the information in question but its being given to unauthorised persons and disclosed. If the unlawful obtaining of this information constitutes another offence (for example, force, threat, theft or computer-related theft), the perpetrator will additionally be punished for that offence as well.
Apart from these differences, there is no difference in the definition of the offence in the two laws. It is only that in the Banking Law the type of offence has been regulated by means of a reference to Art. 73 and in an extremely confused manner.
Where an act breaches both Art. 239 TCK and Art. 159 of the Banking Law, Art. 159 of the Banking Law will be applied since, as also explained above, the Banking Law is both the special law and the later law in relation to the TCK.
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Footnotes
- Attorney-at-law; doctoral student at the Department of Public Law, Institute of Social Sciences, Istanbul University. ↑
- Hamdi Yasaman, “Finansal Hizmetler Kanunu Tasarısı Uyarınca Bankaların Yönetimi ve Kurumsal Yönetim”, Banka Hukuku, İstanbul, Vedat Kitapçılık, 2005, s.14. ↑
- Ali Özgüven, İktisat Bilimine Giriş, 8. Bası, İstanbul, Filiz Kitabevi, 2005, s.3. It must be noted, however, that since this definition has been made according to the rules of the market economy, it is better suited to the capitalist system and is not valid for the socialist system. ↑
- Although some authors prefer the concept of the socialist economic system to that of the communist economic system, socialism is a stage passed through in the transition to communism; for this reason, according to the materialist school of philosophy, the ultimate economic system is communism. ↑
- Özgüven, a.g.e., s.158. ↑
- Cengiz Kostakoğlu, Banka Kredi Sözleşmeleri ve Kredi Kartlarından Doğan Uyuşmazlıklar, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2006, s.1. ↑
- Ahmet Battal, Bankacılık Kanunu Şerhi, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2006, s.37 ↑
- Ünal Tekinalp, Banka Hukukun Esasları, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1988, s.39 vd. ↑
- “Article 19 - …Those bank auditors who disclose the secrets of which they become aware on the occasion of inspection and audit shall not be employed again in the organisation and offices of the State or in banks. In addition, such persons shall also be punished by a heavy fine of not less than one hundred liras and up to one thousand liras and by imprisonment for not less than one month.” ↑
- “Article 22 – Any bank officials who disclose secrets belonging to the institution to which they belong, or who use information relating to the institution to their own advantage, shall be punished by imprisonment for up to three months or by a heavy fine of up to one thousand liras, or by both of these penalties.” ↑
- “Article 55 – Members of the staff of a bank who, without relying on an acceptable reason, disclose secrets belonging to the bank of which they have knowledge by reason of their capacity and duties shall be sentenced to imprisonment for up to three months and to a heavy fine of up to one hundred liras. If the persons referred to in the above paragraph disclose these secrets for the purpose of securing a benefit for themselves or for others, they shall be sentenced to imprisonment for six months to two years and to a heavy fine of one hundred liras to one thousand liras.” ↑
- “Article 56 – Sworn auditors who, without relying on an acceptable reason, disclose secrets of which they have knowledge by reason of their duties shall be punished by imprisonment for three months to one year. ↑
- “Article 74 – Members of the staff of a bank and other officials who disclose secrets belonging to the bank or to the customers of the bank, of which they have knowledge by reason of their capacity and duties, to anyone other than the competent authorities shall be sentenced to imprisonment for one month to one year and to a heavy fine of five hundred liras to two thousand liras. If the persons referred to in the above paragraph disclose these secrets for the purpose of securing a benefit for themselves or for others, they shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to two years and by a heavy fine of one thousand liras to five thousand liras and, in addition, an order shall also be made prohibiting them, permanently or temporarily, from employment in banks or depriving them of public office. The provision of this article shall also apply where members of the staff of a bank and other officials leave their posts, for a period of three years from the date on which they leave.” ↑
- “Article 75 – Sworn bank auditors and their assistants who disclose secrets of which they have knowledge by reason of their duties to anyone other than the competent authorities shall be sentenced to imprisonment for six months to two years and to a heavy fine of not less than two thousand liras. If the persons referred to in the above paragraph disclose these secrets for the purpose of securing a benefit for themselves or for others, they shall be sentenced to imprisonment for one year to three years and to a heavy fine of not less than five thousand liras and, in addition, an order shall also be made depriving them, permanently or temporarily, of public office and prohibiting them from employment in banks.” ↑
- “Article 74 – Members of the staff of a bank and other officials who disclose secrets belonging to the bank or to the customers of the bank, which they have learned by reason of their capacity and duties, to anyone other than the authorities expressly empowered by law in this respect shall be punished by imprisonment for one month to one year and by a heavy fine of ten thousand liras to forty thousand liras. If the persons referred to in the first paragraph disclose these secrets for the purpose of obtaining a benefit for themselves or for others, they shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to two years and by a heavy fine of twenty thousand liras to one hundred thousand liras and, in addition, an order shall also be made prohibiting them, temporarily or permanently, from being employed in banks or depriving them of public office. The provision of this article shall also apply where members of the staff of a bank and other officials leave their posts, for a period of three years from the date on which they leave.” ↑
- “Article 75 – Sworn bank auditors and their assistants who disclose secrets which they have learned by reason of their duties to anyone other than the competent authorities shall be sentenced to imprisonment for six months to two years and to a heavy fine of not less than forty thousand liras. If the persons referred to in the first paragraph disclose these secrets for the purpose of obtaining a benefit for themselves or for others, they shall be sentenced to imprisonment for one year to three years and to a heavy fine of not less than one hundred thousand liras and, in addition, an order shall also be made depriving them, permanently or temporarily, of public office and prohibiting them from being employed in banks.” ↑
- “Article 82 – 1) Members of the staff of a bank and other officials who disclose secrets belonging to the bank or to the customers of the bank, which they have learned by reason of their capacity and duties, to anyone other than the authorities expressly empowered by statute in this respect shall be punished by imprisonment for one month to one year and by a heavy fine of one hundred thousand liras to five hundred thousand liras. 2) If the persons referred to in the first paragraph disclose these secrets for the purpose of obtaining a benefit for themselves or for others, they shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to two years and by a heavy fine of two hundred thousand liras to one million liras. 3) The provision of this article shall also apply where members of the staff of a bank and other officials leave their posts.” ↑
- “Article 84 – 1) Sworn bank auditors and their assistants who disclose secrets which they have learned by reason of their duties to anyone other than the competent authorities shall be sentenced to imprisonment for six months to two years and to a heavy fine of not less than two hundred thousand liras. 2) If the persons referred to in the first paragraph disclose these secrets for the purpose of obtaining a benefit for themselves or for others, they shall be sentenced to imprisonment for one year to three years and to a heavy fine of not less than five hundred thousand liras and, in addition, an order shall be made depriving them, temporarily or permanently, of public office. 3) The provision of this article shall also apply where the persons referred to above leave their posts, for a period of three years starting from the date on which they leave” ↑
- “Article 83 – 1) Members of the staff of a bank and other officials who disclose secrets belonging to the bank or to its customers, which they have learned by reason of their capacity and duties, to anyone other than the authorities expressly empowered by statute in this respect shall be punished by imprisonment for one month to one year and by a heavy fine of one hundred thousand liras to five hundred thousand liras. 2) (As amended by Art. 2 of Decree-Law No. 538) The exchange of information concerning their customers which is carried out, for the monitoring and control of credits, between the financial institutions specified in Article 47, either directly or through companies to be established by at least ten institutions, falls outside this provision. 2) If the persons referred to in the first paragraph disclose these secrets for the purpose of obtaining a benefit for themselves or for others, they shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to two years and by a heavy fine of two hundred thousand liras to one million liras. 3) The provision of this article shall also apply where members of the staff of a bank and other officials leave their posts.” ↑
- “Article 85 – 1) Sworn bank auditors and their assistants who disclose secrets which they have learned by reason of their duties to anyone other than the competent authorities shall be sentenced to imprisonment for six months to two years and to a heavy fine of not less than two hundred thousand liras. 2) If the persons referred to in the first paragraph disclose these secrets for the purpose of obtaining a benefit for themselves or for others, they shall be sentenced to imprisonment for one year to three years and to a heavy fine of not less than five hundred thousand liras and, in addition, an order shall be made depriving them, temporarily or permanently, of public office. 3) The provision of this article shall also apply where the persons referred to above leave their posts, for a period of three years starting from the date on which they leave” ↑
- “Article 22(8) – Those who take part in the application of this Law and in the supervision of its application may not disclose the secrets belonging to banks and to their affiliates, establishments and customers, which they learn in the course of their duties, to anyone other than those authorised under this Law and their special laws, and may not use them for their own benefit. This obligation shall continue after they leave office as well. Persons who do not comply with this obligation shall be sentenced to heavy imprisonment for one year to three years and to a heavy fine of not less than two billion liras. Article 22(9) – The staff and other officials of banks may not disclose the secrets belonging to banks or to their customers, which they have learned by reason of their capacity and duties, to anyone other than the authorities expressly empowered by statute in this respect. This obligation shall continue after they leave office as well. Persons who are found to have acted contrary to the provision of this article shall be sentenced to heavy imprisonment for one year to three years and to a heavy fine of not less than one billion liras. The same penalties shall also apply to third parties who disclose secrets belonging to banks and their customers. The exchange of information concerning their customers which is carried out, for the monitoring and control of credits, between financial institutions whose main fields of activity are the money and capital markets and insurance and which operate with the authorisation and licence obtained in these fields under their special laws and the companies to be deemed appropriate by the Agency, either directly or through companies to be established by at least ten institutions, falls outside this provision. Article 22(10) – If the persons referred to in paragraphs (7) and (8) disclose the secrets for the purpose of obtaining a benefit for themselves or for others, they shall be sentenced to heavy imprisonment for three years to five years and to a heavy fine of not less than three billion liras and, in addition, depending on the importance of the act, they shall be prohibited, temporarily or permanently, from serving in the institutions falling within the scope of this Law.” ↑
- Uğur Yiğit, Bankacılık Suçları, İstanbul, Has Matbaacılık, 2006, s.418. ↑
- Battal, Bankacılık Kanunu Şerhi, s.38. ↑
- Battal, Bankacılık Kanunu Şerhi , s.39. ↑
- Süheyl Donay, Bankacılık Ceza Hukuku, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2007, s.94. ↑
- Servet Taşdelen, 4491-4672 ve 4743 Sayılı Yasalarla Değişik Bankalar Kanunu Şerhi, Ankara, Özbay Matbaası, 2002, s.651. ↑
- Süheyl Donay, Meslek Sırrının Açıklanması Suçu, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayını, 1978, s.4-6. ↑
- Donay, Bankacılık Ceza Hukuku, s.95. ↑
- Donay, Meslek Sırrının Açıklanması Suçu, s.220. ↑
- Donay, Bankacılık Ceza Hukuku, s.95,96. ↑
- Seza Reisoğlu, Bankalar Kanunu Şerhi, Ankara, 1998, s.830. ↑
- Yiğit, a.g.e., s.404; Donay, Meslek Sırrının Açıklanması Suçu, s.220. ↑
- Yiğit, a.g.e., s.405; Reisoğlu, a.g.e., s.831,832. ↑
- Ahmet Battal, Güven Kurumu Nitelendirmesi Işığında Bankaların Hukuki Sorumluluğu, Anakara, Banka ve Ticaret Hukuku Enstitüsü Yayını, 2001, s.211 ↑
- Donay, Meslek Sırrının Açıklanması Suçu, s.220. ↑
- Kostakoğlu, a.g.e., s.2. ↑
- Yiğit, a.g.e., s.403. ↑
- Yiğit, a.g.e., s.403. ↑
- Fatih Selami Mahmutoğlu, Ekonomik Suçlar Bağlamında Kredi Hukukundan Kaynaklanan Suç ve İdari Suçlar, Ankara, Seçkin yayıncılık, 2003, s.79. ↑
- Donay, Meslek Sırrının Açıklanması Suçu, s.72-79. ↑
- For the explanatory memorandum of the article see: Osman Oy, Genel ve Madde Gerekçeli 5411 Sayılı Bankacılık Kanunu ve 4389 Sayılı Bankalar Kanunun Yürürlükte Kalan Maddeleri, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2005, s.114. ↑
- Donay, Bankacılık Ceza Hukuku, s.97. ↑
- Donay, Bankacılık Ceza Hukuku, s.98. ↑
- Donay, Bankacılık Ceza Hukuku, s.98. ↑
- Yiğit, a.g.e., s.406. ↑
- Donay, Meslek Sırrının Açıklanması Suçu, s.110. ↑
- Where an offence that can be committed by a positive (commissive) act is brought about by a negative (omissive) act, there is a non-genuine omissive act. What occurs here is a failure to prevent a result which it is prohibited to bring about, that is, the causing of this result by not acting. Quasi-omission offences and offences of omission are different from each other. Offences of omission consist in the conduct prescribed by the law not being performed, that is, not being carried out. Offences of omission are the reverse of offences of pure commission. In these there is no obligation to prevent the result. In quasi-omission offences, by contrast, there is an obligation to prevent the result; the occurrence of the result forms part of the definition. In non-genuine offences of omission, what is at issue is the failure to prevent a result whose occurrence the law wishes to be prevented. However, for acts of this kind to be treated as equivalent to acts of commission and punished, there must be a special legal obligation on the perpetrator to act. In other words, for the person who does not prevent the result to be held liable, he must be under an obligation to prevent the result. Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, a.g.e., s.253,254. ↑
- Donay, Meslek Sırrının Açıklanması Suçu, s.106. ↑
- Donay, Meslek Sırrının Açıklanması Suçu, s.107. ↑
- Sulhi Dönmezer/Sahir Erman, Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku, C.I, 12. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1997, s.363,364; Donay, Meslek Sırrının Açıklanması Suçu, s.108. ↑
- İzzet Özgenç, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, Ankara, Seçkin yayıncılık, 2006, s.375,376. Some authors, on the other hand, call this situation “essential mistake as to the elements of the offence” and state that an essential mistake relating to the elements of the offence removes the culpability of the perpetrator and that the perpetrator therefore cannot be punished; see: Nur Centel/Hamide Zafer/Özlem Çakmut, Türk Ceza Hukukuna Giriş, 3. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2005, s.440. ↑
- Donay, Bankacılık Ceza Hukuku, s.100. ↑
- Yiğit, a.g.e., s.423. ↑
- Yiğit, a.g.e., s.426. ↑
- Donay, Bankacılık Ceza Hukuku, s.94. ↑
- Kostakoğlu, a.g.e., s.2. ↑
- Sahir Erman, Bankacılık Suçları: Ticari Ceza Hukuku V, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Döner Sermaye İşletmesi, 1984, s.318,319; Yiğit, a.g.e., s.423,424; Taşdelen, a.g.e., s.656. ↑
- Erman, a.g.e., s.318,319. ↑
- Reisoğlu, a.g.e., s.835. ↑
- Baki Kuru, İcra ve İflas Hukuku, 2. Bası, İstanbul, Türkmen Kitabevi, 2006, s.405,406. ↑
- “Where the debtor has not declared his deposit at the bank when making his declaration of assets, or has made no declaration of assets at all, it is possible to attach the deposit at the bank at which the creditor states that the debtor has a deposit. Because of the bank secret (Art. 22(7), (8) and (9) of the Banks Law) it is not possible for the creditor to know at which bank there is an account belonging to the debtor. For this reason the Enforcement Office, at the request of the creditor, attaches the deposit at the bank at which the creditor states (supposes) that the debtor has a deposit. Whether the debtor really has a deposit at that bank will become clear only after the first notice of attachment. (Prof. Dr. Baki Kuru İcra İflas Hukuku, 2004 Baskı, Sf:405) Third parties who have been served with a notice of attachment or notified of an attachment of wages may not refuse to reply by relying on the professional secret or the bank secret; they are obliged to reply and to hand over the debtor’s assets (his money, his wages, his property) to the Enforcement Office. (Prof. Dr. Baki Kuru, adı geçen eser Sf:436) In the present case, the complainant bank has performed the duty determined in the explanations set out above. Beyond this, its notifying matters falling within the bank secret is not necessary and indispensable for the conclusion of the matter as far as these proceedings are concerned...” Yargıtay 12. Hukuk Dairesi, 2005/4949 E. 2005/7737 K. 11.04.2005 T. Kazancı otomasyon yazılımı, 19.06.2007. ↑
- Erman, a.g.e., s.319. ↑
- Reisoğlu, a.g.e., s.836. ↑
- Reisoğlu, a.g.e., s.837. ↑
- Donay, Meslek Sırrının Açıklanması Suçu, s.135. ↑
- Yiğit, a.g.e., s.405,425. ↑
- Battal, Bankacılık Kanunu Şerhi, s.277. ↑
- Donay, Bankacılık Ceza Hukuku, s.101. ↑
- Yiğit, a.g.e., s.418, 428. ↑
- Yiğit, a.g.e., s.470; Donay, Bankacılık Ceza Hukuku, s.122; Battal, Bankacılık Kanunu Şerhi, s.426. ↑
- Donay, Bankacılık Ceza Hukuku, s.124. ↑
- “…upon the appeal on points of law lodged by counsel for the accused, the judgment was quashed by the Sixth Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, which examined the file, by its decision of 7.12.2001 No. 13761/15101, on account of the error consisting in ‘deciding to punish the accused by continuing the trial without this requirement having been fulfilled, although Article 24 of the Banks Law No. 4389 provides that an investigation and prosecution may be conducted subject to the condition that the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board makes an application’. The Local Court, however, by its decision of 13.3.2002 No. 27/31, persisted in its first judgment on the following grounds: ‘Article 24(3) of Law No. 4389 states that the right of the institutions concerned to bring an action on account of the offences set out in paragraphs 3, 6, 8 and 9 of Article 22 is reserved. The general directorate of the intervening bank lodged a complaint against the accused and intervened in the public prosecution that was brought. In this situation there is no need additionally to require an application by the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board.’ … In the case in which it was decided to punish the accused pursuant to the 2nd sentence of paragraph 3 of Article 22 of the Banks Law No. 4389, the disagreement between the Special Chamber and the Local Court centres on the point whether, in order for the accused to be prosecuted, an application by the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency is mandatory pursuant to Article 24 of the same Law… Since banks are directly harmed by the offence of embezzlement by bank staff provided for in this paragraph and by the offences regulated in paragraphs (6), (8) and (9), it has not been considered necessary to require an application by the ‘Agency’ in order for a prosecution to be conducted on account of these offences… Indeed, this point was explained in the explanatory memorandum of Law No. 4491 of 17.12.1999, which amended paragraph (3) of Article 24 of the Banks Law, in the following terms: ‘Having regard to the fact that banks may at present institute proceedings, pursuant to Articles 503, 504, 508 and 510 of the Turkish Criminal Code, which lay down the provisions on breach of trust and fraud, against their staff and the persons concerned who commit the acts specified in those articles, it has been made possible, in parallel with the said articles, for banks to exercise the right to lodge a complaint with the Public Prosecutor’s Offices against their staff and the persons concerned, in connection with the provisions made in Article 12 of this Law, without this being dependent on a complaint by the Agency.’ … Accordingly, the decision to persist is correct as regards procedure, and it should be decided that the file be sent to its Special Chamber for examination of the merits of the judgment. For the reasons explained; it was decided unanimously, at the deliberations held on 17.9.2002, that the decision of the Local Court to persist is correct as regards procedure and that the file be sent to the Sixth Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation for examination of the merits.” Yargıtay Ceza Genel Kurulu, Kt. 17.09.2002, E.2002/6-204, K.2002/309, Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi, C.29, S.1, Ocak 2003, s.94-96. ↑
- Donay, Bankacılık Ceza Hukuku, s.101. ↑
- Adem Sözüer, s.168; Yiğit, a.g.e., s.412,413. ↑
- For detailed information on Art. 239 of TCK No. 5237 see: Necati Meran, Sahtecilik Malvarlığı Bilişim Suçları ile Ekonomi ve Ticaret Alanında Suçlar, Ankara, Seçkin yayıncılık, 2005, s.338-348. ↑
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