2004Murat Volkan DülgerArticle

Abstract

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

The struggle to possess the means of production has been the cause of all conflicts of interest and wars on earth and of the socio-economic structure that has come down to the present day. Particularly when one starts from the fact that the base determines the superstructure to a significant extent, the effects of this struggle appear before us in all their starkness. An important factor which goes hand in hand with this struggle and must not be forgotten is the concept of “freedom of thought” and “the obstacles placed in the way of freedom of thought”. When one recalls how many people lost their lives for the sake of their ideas in the emergence of today’s civilisation and culture, the meaning of “freedom of thought” and the relentless struggles waged for it can be better understood.

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Murat Volkan Dülger∗∗∗

INTRODUCTION

The struggle for possession of the means of production has been the cause of all conflicts of interest on earth, of wars and of the socio-economic structure that has come down to our day. The effects of this struggle confront us in all their starkness, especially when one proceeds from the fact that the base determines the superstructure to a significant extent1. An important factor that goes hand in hand with this struggle and must not be forgotten is the concept of “freedom of thought” and “the obstacles placed in the way of freedom of thought”. And when one recalls how many people have lost their lives for their ideas in the emergence of today’s civilisation and culture, the meaning of “freedom of thought” and the relentless struggles waged for its sake can be better grasped.

This study will seek to examine, in the light of the text of the European Convention on Human Rights and the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, the stage that “freedom of thought” has reached in the common legal culture which was created by the European countries – the source of most of the struggles mentioned above – and of which Türkiye too is a part, and to draw the concrete legal framework of this abstract concept for whose sake so many lives have been given.

I. The Concept

Many definitions of the concept of freedom of thought have been offered to date, and just as many views have been advanced both for and against it. Rather than giving a new definition, it will be more appropriate for the purposes of this study to explain why the concept of “freedom of thought” has been preferred to the concepts of “freedom of expression” or “freedom to express thought”. If a definition must nevertheless be given, it is appropriate to cite Çetin Özek’s definition, since it also explains the concept of “freedom of expression”:

“Freedom of thought essentially encompasses the right to express a particular thought and to bring people together around that thought. In reality, pure thought is a phenomenon relating to a person’s inner world. A person’s capacity and opportunity to think cannot in any case be restricted or impeded. It is for this reason that ‘freedom of thought’ also includes the right to express thought. It is for this reason that, from the standpoint of political science, since freedom of thought in reality also encompasses the right to disseminate thought and to unite people around it, the opportunities to express thought and to conduct propaganda for it also

fall within the framework of freedom of thought. This is why some authors use the term ‘freedom of expression’ to designate freedom of thought.”2

Two of the most important elements that make a human being human are the ability to think and the ability to speak. A living being thus comes within the concept of the human by virtue of thinking and being able to express what it thinks. And ideologies emerge when thoughts are brought together in an orderly way. “Ideology is the way in which a group of people, wide or narrow in compass – a nation, a society, a social class – interprets the universe as a whole; it is its attitude in giving order to the whole of living.”3 It follows that it is not possible to think, and to express one’s thoughts, without an ideological approach, whether conscious or unconscious. Nor are ideologies a mere heap of words. “Every ideology, by its very meaning, entails action. There is no ideology that does not want ultimately to result in action, that does not aim to impel individuals and communities to particular actions. Logically, ‘ideology’ is a programme of action; even if it is woven of words from beginning to end, an ideology that has nothing to do with initiating, shaping, accumulating and steering particular actions is inconceivable...”.4 In short, “theory and action” as an overarching concept, and the concepts of “thinking and voicing thought” determined accordingly, can never be conceived of separately from one another.

The concepts of “freedom of expression” or “freedom to express thought”, by contrast, separate the voicing of thought from the act of thinking in an abstract manner. For in the past and today, in our country and abroad, the mentalities that seek to curb the progressive, scientifically thinking mind have subjected these two inseparable concepts to an abstract distinction and had the audacity to say “you have freedom to think, but you do not have freedom to express what you think”. Indeed, Bülent Tanör has put this point plainly:

“The view which divides freedom of thought into freedom to think and freedom to express thought, which maintains that the former is fully protected whereas the latter is limited, and which thus reduces this fundamental freedom to the freedom to think to oneself or to confide in one’s family and friends, ...has found adherents. The essence of all these views consists in splitting freedom of thought down the middle into freedom to think (?) and freedom of expression, thereby reducing the essence of freedom of thought to a mere prohibition of prior control, that is, to the problem of censorship; in regarding freedom of expression as bound by a number of arbitrary restrictions; and in legitimising crimes of opinion.5”

For this reason, in this study the concept of “freedom of thought” has, as a matter of principle and in the light of the explanations above, been preferred as the title of the study, so as not to be placed in the same category as those who draw an artificial distinction of this kind in order to curb thought.

It must also be said at once, however, that in the ECHR, which constitutes the main element of the subject under examination, the “right to freedom of thought” and the “right to freedom of expression” are regulated as separate rights. The provision corresponding exactly to the words “freedom of thought” is Art. 9 ECHR, which regulates “freedom of thought, conscience and religion”, as it is worded in the original text. For the purposes of the ECHR, freedom of thought has gone beyond its traditional limits and has also come to cover all kinds of political, religious and philosophical discourse6. “The freedom of ‘thought’ or ‘thinking’ (pensée, thought) at issue in Article 9 means, as is also apparent from the terms ‘conscience’ or ‘faith’ (conscience) and ‘religion’, ‘conviction’, ‘belief’ (conviction, belief), a belief possessing the coherence of a philosophical doctrine. In Article 10, by contrast, what is at issue is ‘opinion’ or ‘view’, ‘judgment’ (opinion, opinions), whose meaning and scope are broader – that is, the personal conviction acquired as a result of being informed, a manner of thinking and of arriving at a value judgment – and the holding of an ‘idea’ (idée, idea).”7 Thus the concept of “freedom of thought” in Art. 9 ECHR has been given a content different from the subject that this study seeks to examine. The reason for this does not lie in the mentality just mentioned, which is encountered particularly often in our country; on the contrary, the separation was made in this way because, in the course of historical development, freedom of expression was thought of mainly together with freedom of the press.

In this study, however, since the examination is one of technical law, the concept of “freedom of expression” will be used in the explanations that follow, in order to remain faithful to the text of the ECHR.

II. The Content of Freedom of Thought

It is a mistake to perceive the concept of “freedom of thought” as an abstract, purely individual freedom. Although the concept comprises the freedom of a single individual to think and to convey what he thinks, the areas in which this freedom is most needed in our daily lives are “mass communication” and “political activities”.

Mass communication takes place through the principal mass media, namely the press, radio and television, cinema films, video tapes, records, audio tapes and the internet. It is a characteristic of the mass media that they have functions such as enlightening and educating the public8. The part of political activities most closely related to the subject is propaganda work, the dissemination of political ideas (ideologies) and the use of the mass media for both of these activities.

In today’s complex social structure, in which people are increasingly becoming cogs in machines, the freedom of thought of individuals is losing its importance, while the freedom of thought of those who form public opinion, in particular civil society organisations and press organs, is coming to the fore. Among these, the freedom of the press in particular, which provides mass communication, is of great importance. The press plays an extremely important role not only in the expression of thoughts but also in bringing those thoughts into being9.

As can be seen, freedom of thought holds complete sway over the way people look at life and interpret events, and over whether or not they determine political power by making political choices. For this freedom can be destroyed by placing the mass media in the grip of censorship and even by creating meaningless press offences10, and by inventing crimes of thought for political activities too and imposing heavy penalties on their perpetrators. As a result, society can be controlled as desired by taking the tools necessary for thinking out of people’s hands. For this reason the content of the concept of freedom of expression must be thoroughly determined, and not merely the print press but every means of communication and every form of expressing thought must be brought within the scope of protection of this freedom.

In the theory and practice of the ECHR, which forms the subject of this study, an attempt has likewise been made to keep this area wide, and violations of this freedom have been made subject to sanction, save for restrictions that are strictly necessary and imposed according to specific criteria.

III. The ECHR and Freedom of Expression

1. The Birth of the ECHR and Its Entry into the Turkish Legal Order

Before examining the structure of freedom of expression in the ECHR, it is useful to give brief information on how this instrument came into being and came to be applied in our country. The ECHR was produced by the Council of Europe, which was created after the Second World War as part of the project to unite Western Europe militarily and economically and was designed in particular as its basic political structure. The Convention was signed on 04.09.1950 by twelve countries, including Türkiye. The Convention entered into force on 03.09.1953, and the date on which Türkiye completed the necessary procedures and became a party to the Convention is 18.05.1954.

Together with the ECHR, two important institutions were established to carry out adjudicatory functions. These are the European Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to briefly as the Commission), which ceased to exist upon the entry into force of Protocol No. 1111, and the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to briefly as the Court), which continues its adjudicatory activity as a single and permanent court.

In Turkish domestic law the ECHR has been placed on the same footing as statutes; however, under Article 90 of the 1982 Constitution, an action for annulment cannot be brought before the Constitutional Court against international treaties duly put into force, as it can against other laws, and this places international treaties in a position different from that of other laws12.

Türkiye accepted the competence of the European Commission of Human Rights (AİHK) by recognising the right of individual application on 28 January 1987, and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR on 22 January 199013. By accepting the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, Türkiye fully entered this legal system; the Convention became fully operative with regard to Türkiye, and Türkiye was suddenly confronted with a large number of applications lodged against it14. As a result of more than ten years of practice, some of our domestic legal norms that conflict with the ECHR are today gradually being recast in the light of the text of the ECHR and the judgments of the ECtHR. Two important matters at the head of those requiring regulation are the complete removal of crimes of thought from our legislation and the enactment of a more democratic press law. In addition, the Copenhagen criteria, laid down as a precondition for accession to the European Union, also require that freedom of thought be fully secured.15

2. Freedom of Expression in the ECHR

a. The Concept of Freedom of Expression in the ECHR

In the ECHR, freedom of expression is regulated in Article 1016 of the Convention. In the original text of the Convention it is expressed by the term “freedom of expression”17. Its literal equivalent is “freedom of statement”, that is, in the appropriate words of our language, “freedom of expression”. However, since in the countries of Western Europe there is no distinction of the kind described in the section on the concept, and no crimes of thought created on the basis of such a distinction, what the Convention means by the concept of “freedom of expression” has the same meaning as what is meant by the concept of “freedom of thought” in the conceptual section of this study; there is therefore no contradiction.

b. The Content of Freedom of Expression in the ECHR

In Article 10, paragraph 1, of the Convention, the content of this freedom is determined by the statement, following the words “everyone has the right to freedom of expression”, that it “shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas”. It is further stated that, as regards the exercise of this freedom, there shall be no interference by public authorities and no regard to national frontiers. The last sentence of the first paragraph states that making radio, television and cinema enterprises subject to licensing is permissible under the Convention.

Freedom of expression consists of two elements: the freedom to receive news and information and the freedom to impart them. All kinds of information thus enjoy the freedom to be imparted without restriction by any public authority and regardless of any national frontier. According to the ECtHR, “freedom of expression” is an autonomous concept. This definition broadens the concept, and all kinds of means of communication, such as advertisements and pieces of music, are brought within it18.

The following, as has also been shown in practice, will constitute a violation of Article 10 of the Convention: the prohibition of a radio or television broadcasting licence, or the refusal or withdrawal of a request for authorisation; the imposition of a criminal sanction or disciplinary penalty for the publication or expression of certain news or ideas; the restriction of the publication of certain information by a court order, or a court order to pay over part of the profit obtained from the publication of confidential or secret news; the withdrawal from the market or seizure of copies of a publication or film, or the confiscation of works of art; a ban on publication; the conviction of those who publish, sell or rent out pornographic publications or video films (with the exception of child pornography)19; the prohibition of an interview; the restriction of access to news; a court order requiring a member of the press to disclose his source20.

An important point to be noted here is that the Court constantly emphasises that the duty of the press to impart news and information of concern to society without overstepping the bounds of reporting, the role of the press in this regard and, accordingly, freedom of expression are among the essential foundations of a democratic society21.

In addition, in its Sunday Times22 judgment of 1980 the Court made a very important finding, stating that ideas which run counter to the policies of the States Parties to the Convention, or which are unwelcome to certain sections of society, also fall within this right. The course of the events giving rise to this leading judgment was, in brief, as follows:

Towards the end of the 1950s the pharmaceutical company Distillers placed on the market a drug containing the substance “thalidomide”. Research carried out at the beginning of the 1960s revealed that this drug containing “thalidomide” caused various deformities in the children of pregnant women who took it. The company thereupon withdrew the drug from the market. Subsequently, actions were brought on behalf of the children alleged to have been harmed by the drug, on the ground that the company had neglected the test results. By 1968 a settlement had been reached in 70 actions. In the other actions, numbering several hundred, negotiations continued between the claimants’ lawyers and the company. In 1972 the Sunday Times newspaper published an article criticising the law applicable to the liability of pharmaceutical companies and, with the words “think again”, the compensation that Distillers was to pay to the “thalidomide” victims. Distillers asked the Attorney General to bring proceedings against the Sunday Times for contempt of court, but this request was refused by the Attorney General’s office. Following these developments, the editor of the newspaper sent the Attorney General a new article on the subject which it was intended to publish. This article contained evidence and documents proving that Distillers had not carried out the necessary safety tests before marketing the drug. Accordingly, relying on the “law of contempt of court”, the Attorney General’s office issued an injunction to prevent publication of the article in question. The Divisional Court upheld this decision, whereas the Court of Appeal set it aside. In the House of Lords, to which the matter was then taken, the injunction was restored. The publisher, the editor and a group of journalists of the newspaper thereupon applied to the Commission, alleging a violation of Art. 10 ECHR. The Commission decided by eight votes to five that the injunction in question had violated the applicants’ freedom of expression; the case then came before the European Court of Human Rights23, which gave the following judgment:

or to a section of the population, or that shock or disturb it.”

The Court thus emphasised that democracy is a regime in which, alongside those of the majority, the ideas of the minority too can be defended and freely published, even if they are of a kind that disturbs others.

Another important judgment on this subject, which examines freedoms from the standpoint of individuals’ political stance, is the Incal v. Türkiye25 judgment of 1998. A leaflet which İbrahim Incal, a lawyer from İzmir and the İzmir provincial chairman of the People’s Labour Party – later dissolved by the Constitutional Court – had had published on behalf of the party, and which contained criticism of the treatment that he alleged was being meted out to citizens of Kurdish origin in İzmir, was seized by the competent authorities before it was distributed, and criminal proceedings were brought before the State Security Court against the applicant and the other members of the party’s executive committee. At the end of the trial the accused, including the applicant, were punished on the ground that they had infringed Art. 312(2) of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK). The applicant was sentenced, in addition to other accessory penalties, to 6 months’ imprisonment, and this was not commuted to a fine. An application was thereupon lodged with the AİHK; having passed through the Commission, the application came before the Court.

Here the Court reached the view that Article 10 had been violated. In reaching this conclusion the Court described the freedom to defend and express political ideas as follows:

“As the Court has frequently stated, freedom of expression, as enshrined in Article 10, constitutes one of the most important foundations of a democratic society; it is the basic condition for the development of that democratic society and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Within the limits of the second paragraph of Article 10, freedom of expression is applicable not only to ‘information’ and ‘ideas’ that are regarded as favourable or as inoffensive or as not worth attention, but also to ‘information’ and ‘ideas’ that are unfavourable, shock or disturb; such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, which are indispensable elements of a ‘democratic society’.

While freedom of expression is important for everyone, it is especially important for political parties and their active members. Political parties represent their electorate, draw attention to their problems and defend their interests. Accordingly, an interference with the freedom of expression of a politician who, like the applicant, is a member of an opposition party requires the Court to examine the matter very carefully.”

As can be seen, the Court attached particular importance to the fact that the applicant belonged to an opposition party and regarded this as a reason for examining the matter in greater detail. The Court underlined that the ideas of the minority are important alongside those of the majority and that they too – indeed first and foremost – are to benefit from freedom of expression.

While every kind of idea thus enjoys such broad protection under the ECHR, anti-democratic ideas cannot benefit from this protection. In its Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek decision the Commission emphasised that ideas and information inciting racial discrimination do not fall within the scope of protection of Article 1026.

c. Art. 10(2) ECHR: Circumstances in Which Freedom of Expression May Be Restricted

The first point to be made here is that the ECHR contains no general limitation clause of the kind found in Article 13 of the 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye as it stood before the amendment made in 2001. An anti-democratic form of regulation of this kind is incompatible with the general scheme of the Convention. At last this anti-democratic article of the Constitution, which had for years been criticised very frequently and severely by constitutional law specialists in particular, was amended by Law No. 4709 of 03.10.2002, and it was expressly stated that a restriction may be imposed in the manner found in the ECHR. This must surely be a clear and very positive effect of the judgments of the ECtHR and of the Convention system on our domestic law.

A restriction on a right regulated in the Convention is set out within the article regulating that right, and an attempt has thus been made to avoid creating abstract grounds for restriction that can be stretched in any direction. Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Convention sets out the grounds on which the right to “freedom of expression” may be restricted.

These grounds for restriction are listed, in the words of the Convention, as follows: “in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation and rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of confidential information that has been obtained, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judicial organs”.

The first paragraph of Article 10 regulates the content of freedom of expression. The second paragraph of the same Article contains the restrictions. Although at first sight such a limitation clause might be thought very broad and vague, these restrictions have been circumscribed by the criteria in the text of the Convention and by the case law developed by the ECtHR itself. The first point to be made here is that, in its Sunday Times judgment of 1980, the ECtHR held that freedom of thought is not unlimited but that a “narrow interpretation” is required when it is restricted. In the judgment, with reference to the Klass and Others27 judgment,

it was stated that “the Court ... is faced with a principle of freedom of expression that is subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly

interpreted”, and this principle was thereby clearly expressed. Thus the first finding we obtain from the judgments of the ECtHR is that the grounds for restricting freedom of expression are subject to narrow interpretation28.

Again in the Sunday Times judgment, referring to the Handyside judgment, the Court stated in the following terms that it is primarily for the Contracting States to protect the rights recognised in the Convention and that a margin of manoeuvre is left to them for that purpose, but that at the final stage the Court in any event has the power to review them:

is empowered to give the final ruling on whether it is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by the Article; this supervision covers not only the basic legislation but also the court decisions applying that legislation, even those given by an independent court.”

Another important point clearly stated in this judgment is that the review conducted by the Court is not limited to legislation alone; decisions given by independent courts that restrict freedom of expression also fall within its scope.

We have noted that the concept of “freedom of expression” in the ECHR also covers, in particular, freedom of the press. A further point to be dwelt on here is that, whereas until recent years one spoke constantly of “the freedom of the press to impart news”, this has now turned into “the right of individuals to receive news”29. In the same judgment mentioned above, the Court, this time referring to the Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen judgment30 of 1976, set out this change and the expectation on the part of society. According to the Court:

“These principles (the grounds for restriction in paragraph 2 of Article 10)31 are of particular importance where the press is concerned. They are equally applicable to the field of the administration of justice, which serves the interests of the community to a significant extent and requires the co-operation of an enlightened public..., the media, while not encroaching upon the proper administration of justice, are under a duty to impart information and ideas concerning matters that come before the courts, just as in other areas of public interest. Not only do the media have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them.”

The same judgment also contains the following statement:

“As the Court has already stated, Article 10 guarantees not only the freedom of the press to inform the public but also the right of the public to be properly informed.”

Of the two other important criteria for restriction that need to be addressed here, the first is that “the aim pursued by the restriction on freedom of expression must be legitimate” and the other is that it must be “prescribed by law”. On this subject the case of Zana v. Türkiye32 is a good example, because it is recent, because it examines both criteria explicitly and because it concerns our country.

In that case it was examined, on the individual application lodged by Mehdi Zana, former mayor of Diyarbakır, whether the Turkish State had violated, alongside many other articles of the Convention, Art. 10 ECHR. Zana, a former politician, while being held as a convicted prisoner in Diyarbakır Military Prison, made statements in an interview given to journalists in August 1987 praising the activities of the organisation which pursues a separatist policy in the south-eastern region of Türkiye, where intense terrorist acts were taking place until recently – “the PKK, regarded as a separatist terrorist organisation” by the respondent Türkiye in the first place and also by the other member States of the Council of Europe – and saying, with regard to the civilians killed as a result of the terrorist acts carried out, that “a mistake had been made”. The public prosecutor’s office, acting on this statement, brought a public prosecution against Zana, and at the end of lengthy proceedings it was accepted that Zana’s statement constituted the offence laid down in Art. 312 TCK, and he was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment. The Court of Cassation, the final judicial authority in Türkiye, upheld this judgment. As we noted above, Zana thereupon applied to the AİHK against Türkiye, alleging a violation of Art. 6(1) and (3) and Articles 9 and 10 of the ECHR.

In determining the merits of the application lodged by Zana, the ECtHR applied to the specific case the “criteria capable of restricting freedom of expression” that we are examining. Accordingly, the Court first accepted that the applicant’s being tried and sentenced to imprisonment on account of the statements he had made to journalists constituted “a restriction of freedom of expression”. It then underlined that the restriction would contravene Article 10 if it was “not prescribed by law” or was “not directed towards one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 10”.

Accordingly, in the case before it the Court reached its conclusion, and thereby confirmed these criteria once more, by using the following criteria: whether the restriction on freedom of expression was prescribed by law, in other words whether a “law” relating to this situation existed; if there was a law, on the basis of which legitimate aim the restriction had been imposed; and finally, by examining whether the interference was necessary notwithstanding the fulfilment of all these conditions, whether the restriction on freedom of expression “arose from a pressing social need”33.

In paragraph 47 of the judgment the Court, stating that “the Court notes that the applicant’s conviction and sentence were based on Articles 168 and 312 of the Turkish Criminal Code... and accepts that the impugned interference was prescribed by law”, established that the first of these criteria,

lawfulness, was met in the specific case.

The Court then examined the application “concerning freedom of expression” in paragraphs 51–62 of the judgment. In paragraph 51 it first delineated the framework of the subject by referring to the leading judgments mentioned above and confirmed the validity of those principles. It also underlined, in the following terms, that each specific case must be assessed in its own circumstances:

In the subsequent paragraphs the Court briefly set out the stages in the development of the events and stated, in the terms below, that the restriction in question had been imposed in order to attain the legitimate aim of “necessity in a democratic society” (which is one of the criteria for the limit of restriction to be examined in the next section) and that this did not constitute a violation as a situation contrary to the Convention:

“The Court will take as its basis the applicant’s statement as published in the national daily newspaper Cumhuriyet on 30 August 1987..., which the applicant himself did not in substance contest. The statement comprises two sentences. In the first sentence the applicant states that he supports the PKK national liberation movement, while saying that he is not in favour of massacres. In the second sentence he says: ‘anyone can make mistakes; the PKK kill women and children by mistake’.

These words can be interpreted in various ways. In any event, however, they are contradictory and ambiguous. They are contradictory because it seems difficult simultaneously to support the PKK, a terrorist organisation which uses violence to achieve its ends, and to declare oneself opposed to massacres. They are ambiguous because, while Zana disapproves of the massacre of women and children, he at the same time describes it as a mistake that anyone could make.

This statement must not, however, be looked at in isolation. It had a special significance in the concrete circumstances of the case, of which the applicant must also have been aware. As the Court noted earlier (...), this interview coincided with the PKK’s bloody attacks on civilians in the south-eastern region of Türkiye, where tension was at its height at that time.

In those circumstances, it may be considered that the support given to the PKK – described as a national liberation movement – by the former mayor of Diyarbakır, the most important city in the south-east, in an interview published in a major national daily newspaper, would further aggravate the explosive atmosphere in that region.

The Court therefore considers that it is appropriate to accept that the penalty imposed on the applicant answered a pressing social need and that the reasons adduced by the national authorities are relevant and sufficient; in any event, the applicant served only one-fifth of his sentence in prison.(...)

Having regard to all these factors and to the limits of the margin of appreciation that national authorities have in such a case, the Court considers that the interference under examination was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.

In conclusion, Article 10 of the Convention has not been violated.”

The conclusion to be drawn from these explanations is that, for freedom of expression to be restricted, the conditions set out in three important criteria must be met:

1. The restriction must have been imposed by a legal rule in the form of a law (prescribed by law), that is, it must be “prescribed by law”. These laws must be accessible to all citizens, and the consequence of conduct contrary to the law must be clear. Moreover, this law need not be a formal statute in the classical sense; it may also be formed by other sources of law such as custom, usage or established practice. Even certain rules of ethics are regarded as falling within this field.

2. The restriction must be based on a legitimate ground, that is, on one of the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of Article 10. These grounds are as follows:

i) National security, territorial integrity, public safety;

ii) Maintaining the authority and independence of the judiciary;

iii) Preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence;

iv) Protection of order, prevention of crime;

v) Protection of public morals and health;

vi) Protection of the honour, reputation and rights of third parties.34

3. The grounds for restriction must be interpreted narrowly, and it must not be forgotten that freedom is the rule.

These criteria, as can be understood from the text of the Convention, are also stated in the Court’s Barthold35 judgment of 1986 and its Sunday Times36 judgment of 1991.

d. Art. 10(2) ECHR: The Limit of Restriction

The grounds set out in Article 10, paragraph 2, of the ECHR that justify the restriction of freedom of expression also have a limit. This limit has been established in the judgments of the ECtHR and is twofold: “necessity in a democratic country” and “proportionality”. Although in other judgments of the Court on the subject certain different criteria have been introduced depending on the circumstances, these two criteria are taken into account in all judgments concerning restriction37.

As to the first of these criteria, the Court examines whether the restriction imposed in relation to the matter before it is necessary in a democratic country, and looks for a “social need” for the restriction imposed38.

In its Observer and Guardian judgment of 199139, the Court held that a temporary restraint on publication was foreseeable in law, but that it would constitute a violation of the right if it became permanent. It must be noted at once, however, that the interim restraint on publication under domestic law had been ordered, in the course of the action brought by the prosecutor for a complete ban on publication, in order to delay the publication in the newspaper of information contained in a book. In other words, neither was publication of the newspaper as a whole stopped nor was recourse had to a measure such as seizure of the newspaper; only the publication of one article was prevented. Although the matter was approached with such sensitivity in English domestic law, the Court characterised the decision to restrain publication of the article on a continuing basis as a violation of the right. This does not, however, show us that the Court considers every interim measure restraining publication to be compatible with the provisions of the Convention; for it must not be forgotten that the Court interprets the provisions of the Convention and gives its ruling having regard to the specific case before it.

Again in the same judgment the Court held that, in respect of material that had lost its confidentiality, a restraint on publication would constitute a violation of the right even if imposed by way of an interim measure. The Court expressed the view that seeking to preserve confidentiality after the information has become public cannot be an interference necessary in a democratic society. In its judgment of 1991 concerning the Sunday Times newspaper, which had brought the matter before the European organs on the ground that the restraint on publication of the same information in the newspaper would affect it too, the Court likewise held, on the grounds set out above, that Article 10 of the Convention had been violated.

Under the second criterion taken into account in the review, the Court looks for proportionality between the decision restricting freedom of expression taken in domestic law and the aim sought to be achieved. This is a principle that holds good in every field of law. In every legal discipline a reasonable relationship is always sought between the measures taken and the aim achieved.

The Incal judgment mentioned above is also a good example of the criteria of “necessity in a democratic country” and “proportionality”, which form the limit of restriction.

In that case the Court first examined whether grounds for restriction existed and confirmed their existence. It then considered the two criteria forming the limit of restriction and, holding that both had been exceeded, reached the view that Article 10 had been violated. The following passages, in which the Court points to the disproportionate nature of the measures taken, are particularly important:

“The limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the Government than in relation to an ordinary citizen or even a politician. In a democratic system the acts and omissions of the Government must be subject to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but also of public opinion. Furthermore, the dominant position which the Government occupies requires it to resort to criminal proceedings only in limited cases, particularly where it can use other means to answer the unjustified attacks and criticisms of its opponents.... The Court notes the radical nature of the interference in issue...”

When taking measures to maintain public order, the Contracting States must without fail take the judgments of the Court and the Convention into account and must strike the balance between the measure taken and the benefit secured very carefully, in such a way as not to impair freedom of expression. In addition, it must be borne in mind that criminal law – as one of the general principles of law, and as the Court also stated in the paragraph above – is subsidiary in nature and should not be brought into play at the very first stage. Otherwise this will lead to new judgments finding a violation; for, as the Incal judgment shows, the Court’s stance on this matter is clear.

In the Zana case, too, which was discussed in detail above and from which extensive passages were quoted, these criteria were clearly set out and, the criteria for the limit of restriction also having been applied, it was held that there was no violation of Art. 10 ECHR, that is, that these criteria had not been exceeded.

CONCLUSION

The most important finding to emerge from this study is that, according to the ECtHR, which regards itself as having the power to interpret the ECHR and to create law in relation to it, the general principle with regard to freedom of thought is in favour of freedom. This freedom has been given such a structure that the grounds for restriction contained in the text of the Convention are subjected to the narrowest interpretation; indeed, even this is not considered enough, and the Court itself additionally creates new criteria that constitute the limit of restriction, such as “necessity in a democratic country” and “proportionality”, and carries out its review according to them.

In addition, the Court assesses each specific case in its own circumstances and reaches its conclusion accordingly. Whereas restrictions introduced in a particular part of a country may not constitute a violation of the right to freedom of expression, the same restrictions in another part of the same country may constitute a violation of that right.

Furthermore, in the case law that has taken shape over the years, the Court has been very sensitive in the fields of the freedom of expression of the press and of political freedom of expression. Where these two are concerned, the Court has interpreted the concept of freedom of expression much more broadly and has stated that they are indispensable elements of democracy.

In conclusion, the States party to the ECHR must act with great care when adopting rules that concern “freedom of expression” and must also train their administrative apparatus in this regard; otherwise, it appears inevitable that the State concerned will face judgments finding a violation before the ECtHR.

When the rules of our country on the subject are examined, however, after it had been said that “freedom is the rule”, numerous grounds for restriction were listed under each “freedom” and, as if these were not enough, general grounds for restriction were introduced as well; but as a result of the above-mentioned amendments made in 2001 to Article 13 of the 1982 Constitution, at least the general ground for restriction has been abolished. Now the turn has come to amend, one by one, the anti-democratic provisions in the articles of the Constitution and in various laws.

The following examples, which may be given specifically for press law in particular, are striking: as regards the liability of persons, as in Article 16 of the Press Law, third persons who have no connection with the act constituting the offence can be held liable for the unlawful acts of others40; senselessly disproportionate closure penalties and fines are introduced for press, radio and television organisations; and yet it is still possible to speak of freedom of thought. Regrettably, the obstacles to freedom of thought which two great and esteemed jurists who took a close interest in press law in our country voiced in 1953 in the preface to the first edition of their work are expressed in exactly the same way, 47 years later, in the preface of 2000, the year in which the last edition of the work was published41. This shows that our country, although it is part of the Council of Europe and of European human rights law and is, in the process of integration with Europe, on the way to taking important steps, has, despite various impositions, not advanced an inch in this matter.

The full meaning and content of the “democratisation package” amendments made in recent months in order not to miss the European Union train will be seen only in practice; this means that we are faced with the reality that time is still needed for democratisation.

Despite this pessimistic picture, the necessary moves towards democratisation in domestic law must be undertaken without loss of time in the light of the text of the ECHR and the judgments of the ECtHR; and, without these remaining feeble reform moves, by putting them into practice as well and by raising the awareness of both individuals and the administration to that end, the obstacles to freedom of thought must cease to be the destiny of the people of our country. Only in this way can generations free in thought and free in conscience be brought into being.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alpaslan, M. Şükrü, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Uygulamasında Düşünce ve Basın Özgürlüğü”, Prof. Dr. Sahir Erman’a Armağan, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Eğitim, Öğretim ve Yardımlaşma Vakfı Yayını, 1999.

Batum, Süheyl, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Türk Anayasal Sistemine Etkileri, İstanbul, İÜHF Yayını, 1993.

Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights – As Amended By Protocol No.11, European Treaty Series, No.5, Strasbourg.

Doğru, Osman, İnsan Hakları Uluslararası Mevzuatı – International Human Rights Instruments, İstanbul, Beta Yayınevi, 1998.

Doğru, Osman, (ed.), İnsan Hakları Kararlar Derlemesi, C.I, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 1998.

Doğru, Osman, (ed.), İnsan Hakları Kararlar Derlemesi, C.II, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 1998.

Gemalmaz, M. Semih, İnsan Hakları Belgeleri (Bölgesel Sistemler), İstanbul, Alkım Kitapevi, 1999.

Gölcüklü, A. Feyyaz/Gözübüyük, A. Şeref, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Uygulaması, 2. Bası, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 1998.

İçel, Kayıhan, Kitle Haberleşme Hukuku, 5. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayınevi, 2001.

İlkiz, Fikret, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve İfade Özgürlüğü”, T.C. Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, basım tarihi ve yeri belli değil.

Kaboğlu, İbrahim Ö.(ed), Kopenhag Kriterleri-Avrupa Konseyi ve Avrupa Birliği’nin Ortak Paydası Mı?, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu İnsan Hakları Merkezi Yayını, 2001.

Kaboğlu, İbrahim, “Pozitif Anayasa Hukukunda Düşünce Özgürlüğünün Sınırları”, İstanbul, Düşünce Özgürlüğü, Afa Yayıncılık, 1998.

Karakuş, Hakan, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Kararları ve Karşıoylarında Türkiye, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 2001.

Leach, Philip, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, London, Blackstone Press Limited, 2001.

Mowbray, Alastair, Cases And Materials On The European Convention On Human Rights, London Edinburgh Dublin, Butterworths Publishing, 2001.

Nicol, Andrew/Millar, Gavin/Sharland, Andrew, Media Law & Human Rights, London, Blackstone Press Limited, 2001

Özek, Çetin/Erman, Sahir, Açıklamalı Basın Kanunu ve İlgili Mevzuat, İstanbul, Alfa Yayınevi, 2000 Özek, Çetin, Basın Özgürlüğünden Bilgilenme Hakkına, İstanbul, Alfa Yayınevi, 1999.

Özek, Çetin, Türk Basın Hukuku, İstanbul, İÜHF Yayını, 1978.

Özek, Çetin, Basın Suçlarında Ceza Sorumluluğu, İstanbul, İÜHF Yayını, 1972.

Tanilli, Server, Uygarlık Tarihi, İstanbul, Say Kitapçılık, 5. Bası, 1981.

Tanör, Bülent, TCK. 142. Madde Düşünce Özgürlüğü ve Uygulama, İstanbul, Forum Yayınları, 1979.

Toroslu, Nevzat, “Basın Özgürlüğü ve Sınırları”, T.C. Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, basım tarihi ve yeri belli değil.

Uygur, Nermi, Kuram-Eylem Bağlamı Çözümleyici Bir Felsefe Denemesi, İstanbul Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1996.

http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/CandreListeTraites.htm, 06.05.2002.

http://www.c4group.net/ivhp, 15.04.2002.

www.echr.coe.int 20.05.2002.

ECtHR Judgments Examined

Barthold v. Almanya; Seri A, No. 98; E.H.R.R. c.13, s 431.

Incal v. Türkiye; Karar sıra no. 933, Karar tarihi 09.06.1998,

Handyside v. Birleşik Krallık; Seri A, No. 24; E.H.R.R. c.1, s. 737,

Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen ve Pedersen v. Danimarka; Seri A, No. 23; E.H.R.R. c.1, s. 711,

Klass ve diğerleri v. Almanya; Seri A, No. 28; E.H.R.R. c.2, s 214,

Observer ve Guardian v. Birleşik Krallık; Seri A, No. 216; E.H.R.R. c.14, s 153,

Sunday Times v. Birleşik Krallık (I); Seri A, No. 38; E.H.R.R. c.3, s 317,

Sunday Times v. Birleşik Krallık (I); Seri A, No. 217; E.H.R.R. c.14, s 229,

Zana v. Türkiye; Karar sıra no. 854, Karar tarihi 25.11.1997.

Footnotes

  1. This article was awarded second prize in the 2000 Kapani Savcı Human Rights Law Research Award organised by the Aybay Law Foundation, and was published in Prof. Dr. Çetin Özek Armağanı, İstanbul, Galatasaray Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004, s.283- 298. • Attorney-at-law; doctoral student in the Department of Public Law, Institute of Social Sciences, Istanbul University. ↑
  2. Server Tanilli, Uygarlık Tarihi, 5. Bası, İstanbul, Say Kitapçılık, 1981, s.99. ↑
  3. Çetin Özek, Türk Basın Hukuku, , İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1978, s.27. ↑
  4. Nermi Uygur, Kuram - Eylem Bağlamı Çözümleyici Bir Felsefe Denemesi, İstanbul Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1996, s.89. ↑
  5. Uygur, a.g.e., s.94. ↑
  6. Bülent Tanör, TCK. 142. Madde Düşünce Özgürlüğü ve Uygulama, , İstanbul, Forum Yayınları, 1979, s.82,83. ↑
  7. İbrahim Kaboğlu, “Pozitif Anayasa Hukukunda Düşünce Özgürlüğünün Sınırları”, Düşünce Özgürlüğü, İstanbul, Afa Yayıncılık, 1998, s.208. ↑
  8. A. Feyyaz Gölcüklü/A. Şeref Gözübüyük, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Uygulaması, 2. Bası, Ankara, Turhan Kitapevi, 1998, s.317. ↑
  9. Kayıhan İçel, Kitle Haberleşme Hukuku, 5. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayınevi 2001, s.11. ↑
  10. Nevzat Toroslu, “Basın Özgürlüğü ve Sınırları”, T.C. Başbakanlık Basın – Yayın Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, basım tarihi ve yeri belli değil, s.4. ↑
  11. For a detailed explanation on this subject see: Çetin Özek, Basın Suçlarında Ceza Sorumluluğu, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1972, s.7-18; Özek, Türk Basın Hukuku, s.521 vd. ↑
  12. The date of entry into force of this protocol is 01.11.1998. By it, the structure of the ECtHR was completely changed and it was turned into a court working on a full-time basis. ↑
  13. Süheyl Batum, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Türk Anayasal Sistemine Etkileri, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1993, s.55–58. ↑
  14. Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.VI. ↑
  15. Hakan Karakuş, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Kararları ve Karşıoylarında Türkiye, , İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 2001, s.2-5. ↑
  16. For a detailed explanation on this subject see: İbrahim Ö. Kaboğlu (Ed), Kopenhag Kriterleri - Avrupa Konseyi ve Avrupa Birliği’nin Ortak Paydası Mı?, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu İnsan Hakları Merkezi Yayını, 2001. ↑
  17. For the Turkish translation of the Convention and its additional protocols see: M. Semih Gemalmaz, İnsan Hakları Belgeleri (Bölgesel Sistemler), İstanbul, Alkım Kitapevi 1999. For the comparative English-Turkish text see: Osman Doğru, İnsan Hakları Uluslararası Mevzuatı – International Human Rights Instruments, İstanbul Beta Yayınevi, 1998. In addition, for the original English and French texts of the Convention instruments, the website of the ECtHR at www.echr.coe.int may be consulted. ↑
  18. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights – As Amended By Protocol No.11, European Treaty Series, No.5, Strasbourg. ↑
  19. Kaboğlu, Düşünce Özgürlüğünün Sınırları, s.209. ↑
  20. The production and transmission of child pornography is defined as an offence in the “Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime”, which was signed and entered into force on 23 November 2001 in Budapest, the capital of Hungary. For this reason, since the source that produced both conventions is the Council of Europe, the taking of the measures set out in that convention against the acts set out in it will not constitute a violation from the standpoint of the ECHR and its application. For the original English text of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime see http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/CandreListeTraites.htm 06.05.2002; for its Turkish translation see http://www.c4group.net/ivhp 15.04.2002. “As the Court said in its Handyside judgment24, freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society; within the limits of paragraph 2 of Article 10, freedom of thought applies not only to information and ideas that are regarded as favourable, inoffensive or not worth attention, but also to information and ideas that are unfavourable to the State ↑
  21. M. Şükrü Alpaslan, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Uygulamasında Düşünce ve Basın Özgürlüğü”, Prof. Dr. Sahir Erman’a Armağan, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Eğitim, Öğretim ve Yardımlaşma Vakfı Yayını, 1999, s 29. ↑
  22. Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, London, Blackstone Press Limited, 2001, s 166. ↑
  23. Sunday Times v. Birleşik Krallık; Seri A, No. 38; E.H.R.R. c.3, s 317. For the Turkish translation of the judgment see: Osman Doğru (ed.), İnsan Hakları Kararlar Derlemesi, C.I, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 1998, s 341-385. ↑
  24. Alastair Mowbray, Cases And Materials On The European Convention On Human Rights, London Edinburgh Dublin, Butterworths, 2001, s 453. ↑
  25. Handyside v. Birleşik Krallık; Seri A, No. 24; E.H.R.R. c.1, s 737. For the Turkish translation of the judgment see: Doğru, Kararlar Derlemesi, C.I, s 221–244.
  26. Incal v. Türkiye; Karar sıra no. 933, Karar tarihi 09.06.1998, for the Turkish translation of the judgment see: Doğru, Kararlar Derlemesi, C.II, s 395-418. ↑
  27. Alpaslan, a.g. m., s 32. “The Court ... has emphasised that the responsibility for protecting the rights and freedoms recognised in the Convention lies in the first place with the Contracting States themselves. In this respect, paragraph 2 of Article 10 leaves a margin of appreciation to the Contracting States. This margin is left both to the national legislature ... and to the bodies, among them independent judicial bodies, that are entrusted with interpreting and applying the law in force. Nevertheless, paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention does not confer on the Contracting States an unlimited power of appreciation; the Court ... a prohibition with Article 10 ↑
  28. Klass ve diğerleri v. Almanya; Seri A, No. 28; E.H.R.R. c.2, s 214. For the Turkish translation of the judgment see Doğru, Kararlar Derlemesi, C.I, s 303-328. ↑
  29. Andrew Nicol/Gavin Millar/Andrew Sharland, London, Media Law & Human Rights, Blackstone Press Limited, 2001, s 12. ↑
  30. Çetin Özek, Basın Özgürlüğünden Bilgilenme Hakkına, Alfa Yayınevi, İstanbul 1999, s XIX. ↑
  31. Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Danimarka; Seri A, No. 23; E.H.R.R. c.1, s 711. For the Turkish translation of the judgment see: Doğru, Kararlar Derlemesi, C.I, s 206-220. ↑
  32. Added to the text. ↑
  33. Zana v. Türkiye; Karar sıra no. 854, Karar tarihi 25.11.1997, for the Turkish translation of the judgment see Doğru, Kararlar Derlemesi, C.II, s 304-326. “The Court considers that the principles set out in paragraph 51 above also apply to measures taken to maintain national security and public safety in the fight against terrorism. In this context the Court must, having careful regard to the particular circumstances of each case and to the State’s margin of appreciation, examine whether a fair balance has been struck between individuals’ fundamental rights relating to freedom of expression and the legitimate right of a democratic society to protect itself against the acts of terrorist organisations. Consequently, in the case before it, the Court must assess whether Zana’s conviction and sentence answered a pressing social need and whether they were proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. To that end, the Court is of the opinion that it is important to analyse the content of the applicant’s words in the light of the situation prevailing at that time in the south-eastern region of Türkiye.” ↑
  34. Fikret İlkiz, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve İfade Özgürlüğü”, T.C. Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, basım tarihi ve yeri belli değil, s 57. ↑
  35. Alpaslan, a.g.m., s 30. ↑
  36. Barthold v. Almanya; Seri A, No. 98; E.H.R.R. c.13, s 431. ↑
  37. Sunday Times v. Birleşik Krallık; Seri A, No. 217; E.H.R.R. c.14, s 229. ↑
  38. Alpaslan, a.g.m., s 30; Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s 328,329. ↑
  39. Alpaslan, a.g.m., s 30. ↑
  40. Observer ve Guardian v. Birleşik Krallık; Seri A, No. 216; E.H.R.R. c.14, s 153. ↑
  41. On this subject see: Çetin Özek/Sahir Erman, Açıklamalı Basın Kanunu ve İlgili Mevzuat, İstanbul, Alfa Yayınevi, 2000, s 114– 162. ↑
  42. Özek/Erman, a.g.e., s I-III. ↑

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