Introduction
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), the principal legislation in the field of personal data protection, entered into force on 7 April 2016. Legislative work on the subject had been undertaken before, but for many years, mainly for political and administrative reasons, it did not reach a successful conclusion. The Law was finally enacted within the framework of harmonisation with the EU, drawing largely on Directive 95/46/EC, but it has been criticised in several respects. The main points of criticism are that, at the time the Law was enacted, the European Parliament had already approved a regulation replacing the Directive, and that the Law was both drafted on the basis of the old Directive and failed to conform fully to it. Even so, the absence of any basic legislation on the protection of personal data had been a serious deficiency.
For this reason, although I too criticise the Law in several respects, I regard its publication as a positive development, because it is the clearest and most concrete step taken with regard to personal data and the first and fundamental stage in the formation of personal data protection law. Indeed, in the period that followed, various regulations were issued on matters not explained in detail in the Law, in an effort to make the subject better understood. In this study, the annulment application made to the Constitutional Court by certain members of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM), who claimed that various provisions of the KVKK were unlawful and sought their annulment, and the decision given on that application by the Constitutional Court on 28 September 2017, 2016/125 E., 2017/143 K. …
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Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger*
Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data, the principal piece of legislation in the field of the protection of personal data, entered into force on 7 April 2016. Legislative work on this subject had been undertaken before, but for many years, chiefly for political and administrative reasons, that work had failed to reach a successful conclusion. The Law was finally enacted within the framework of harmonisation with the EU, with Directive 95/46/EC being taken as its basis to a large extent, but it has been criticised in various respects. The main points of criticism are that, at the time the Law was enacted, the European Parliament had already given its approval to a regulation replacing the Directive, and that the Law was both drafted on the basis of the old Directive and failed to achieve full conformity with that Directive. Nevertheless, the absence of any basic legislation on the protection of personal data was a major deficiency. For this reason, although I too criticise the Law in various respects, I regard its publication as a positive development, because the Law is the clearest and most concrete step taken with regard to personal data and the first and fundamental stage in the formation of the law of personal data protection. Indeed, in the period that followed, various regulations were issued on matters not explained in detail in the Law, in an effort to ensure that the subject is better understood.
In this study I shall examine the application for annulment lodged with the Constitutional Court by certain members of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM), who alleged that various provisions of Law No. 6698 were unlawful and sought their annulment, and the judgment which the Constitutional Court delivered on that application, dated 28.9.2017 and numbered 2016/125 E., 2017/143 K. I shall set out under separate headings the provisions whose annulment was sought and shall state the grounds of the request for their annulment, the Constitutional Court’s decision on the provisions together with its reasoning and, finally, my own view1.
The Provisions Subject to the Action for Annulment
1. The phrase “…or necessary for the purpose for which they are processed…” in Article 4(2)(d) of the Law
The annulment of this phrase, which appears in the article setting out the fundamental principles to be observed in the processing of personal data, was sought on the grounds that it causes uncertainty as to the retention period of data, which is the fundamental safeguard for personal data, and that it is subjective, broad and liable to vary according to the person interpreting it.
Referring to Article 2 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court was in agreement that the principle of certainty prevails within the principle of the rule of law, and explained that this principle affords the individual legal security and that, by virtue of it, the individual is able to know which legal sanction or consequence will attach to which concrete act and fact. Nevertheless, the provision whose annulment was sought was held not to be contrary to the principle of certainty, because under it it is provided that controllers are to comply with the period prescribed for the retention of data in the relevant legislation, if there is one; that, if there is none, they may retain the data only for as long as is necessary for the purpose for which they are processed; and, lastly, that where no reason for retaining the data remains, those data may no longer be retained.
It was explained that the principle whose annulment was sought is in fact an important principle for personal data, that data may be used within the specified purpose, that the principle prohibits the use of the data once that purpose has ceased to exist, and that it thus aims to give persons the assurance that data cannot be retained indefinitely. It was also mentioned that persons may, under the conditions prescribed, request the erasure, destruction or anonymisation of their personal data. For these reasons the Court reached the conclusion that the article whose annulment was sought is not contrary to the Constitution and rejected the request for annulment.
I should say at the outset that I agree with the Constitutional Court’s decision. On this point, it is known first of all that the processing of personal data must be directed to a specific purpose and that data must be processed in accordance with the specified purpose. If the legislation prescribes a period for that purpose, the controller will be able to process and retain the data in question for that period. It is also possible, however, that the relevant laws prescribe no period at all. For personal data are a very wide-ranging subject, and it is not possible for a definite period to have been specified in advance for every concrete case. For such situations, the solution of retaining the data for as long as is necessary for the purpose for which they are processed and then erasing, destroying or anonymising them is both appropriate and unavoidable. Moreover, under Article 16 of the Law, controllers must state, in their application for registration in the Data Controllers’ Registry, the period necessary for the purpose for which they process the data they process. Hence, although the period may be thought to be uncertain, it will in fact be determined according to each concrete situation. In addition, Article 11 of the Law gives persons the right to apply to the controller to learn the purposes for which their data are processed. Besides these, as is stated in the relevant regulations and as has become the practice, the Personal Data Inventory drawn up by controllers determines which data set will be kept and processed for what reason and for how long. This, too, constitutes a separate safeguard for the persons whose data are recorded and processed. It is not possible for this Law to determine one by one how long the periods for which personal data are to be recorded and processed will be; that would be contrary to the nature of the subject. I therefore think that, contrary to the grounds of the application, the phrase whose annulment was sought provides an assurance that data cannot be processed indefinitely. For the reasons I have explained, I am of the opinion that the provision is not contrary to the principle of certainty and is not subjective in nature, and I agree with the Constitutional Court’s decision to reject the request.
2. Sub-paragraphs (c), (ç), (e) and (f) of Article 5(2) of the Law
Article 5(2) of the Law, which contains the sub-paragraphs whose annulment was sought, concerns the exceptions to the conditions for the processing of personal data. The request for annulment rests on the grounds that exceptions ought to be enumerated with their limits defined, whereas by these rules the exceptions have been turned into the principal rule and there is almost no longer any need to seek explicit consent; that these provisions are not clear and comprehensible and, in particular, that it is not clear what is to be understood by the concept of “legitimate interest” appearing in the provisions; and that these sub-paragraphs therefore impair the essence of the right and are contrary to the principles of public interest and equity.
The Constitutional Court first explained the concept of public interest. Accordingly, public interest denotes the benefit of society, which is distinct from and superior to private interests. While the State may lay down various rules with the public interest in view, rules laid down in pursuit of private interests without any consideration of the public interest are contrary to this principle. It was further stated that fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only within the conditions laid down in the Constitution and that restrictions which would impair the essence of the right and make its exercise difficult are not permissible. The Court considers that it is clear that the contested rules impose a restriction on the protection of personal data, but that this restriction does not relate to every kind of data of the person and can arise only where the conditions specified in the contested rules are present, and that there is therefore no question of the exceptions having been turned into the principal rule. It was stated that these rules were introduced in order to prevent losses of rights and interests, and the Court underlined that avenues of complaint and application are open in the event of their breach and abuse. The Court also explained the concept of legitimate interest, which was specifically raised in the application instituting the action, and clarified that this concept is to be understood as a balance that must be assessed with regard to the balance of interests between the controller and the data subject. For all these reasons it reached the opinion and conclusion that the sub-paragraphs alleged to be unconstitutional do not involve any unconstitutionality and that this request should therefore be rejected.
First of all, the provisions on exceptions whose annulment was sought are, in order, as follows:
• The processing of personal data belonging to the parties to a contract is necessary, provided that it is directly related to the conclusion or performance of the contract,
• It is indispensable for the controller to be able to fulfil its legal obligation,
• Data processing is indispensable for the establishment, exercise or protection of a right,
• Data processing is indispensable for the legitimate interests of the controller, provided that the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject are not harmed.
The basic rule in the processing of personal data is that the explicit consent of the data subject, that is, of the person to whom the data belong, is obtained. When the Law, the case law and Directive 95/46/EC are considered together, the concept of explicit consent is an act of giving informed approval, specific to the data in question, by which the data subject, through an explicit statement or an act that clearly signifies approval, agrees that the data may be processed. However, all national and international legislation on the protection of personal data provides that in certain cases data may be processed without this consent being obtained.
The first exception alleged to be unconstitutional concerns the case in which the personal data are directly related to the conclusion or performance of a contract. An example is where, under a contract of service, the person performing the work becomes the creditor of a sum of money and that person’s account number may be obtained by the party providing the service for the purpose of paying the fee for the service. Here we see that there is an exception which is in the interest not only of the party using the data but also of the person to whom those data belong.
Secondly, the case in which processing is indispensable for the controller to be able to fulfil its legal obligations is listed among the exceptions under which data may be processed without the explicit consent of the data subject. The aim pursued here is not to make it more difficult for the controller to fulfil its obligations. Today, for controllers to have constantly to obtain explicit consent in order effectively to carry on their activities would create problems in practice. For this reason a provision has been introduced to the effect that explicit consent is not needed in this case either.
The other exception whose annulment was sought is the case in which data processing is indispensable for the establishment, exercise or protection of a right. The best example of this, and the one most frequently encountered in practice, is that employers may keep data belonging to their employees for a certain time even after the employee has left. The reason for this is that these data will be used as a means of proof should the employee bring an action against the employer. Where this exception is used in cases of compulsion in which the establishment, exercise or protection of the right could not be secured in any way without the data being processed, it can be said to be an equitable provision, since the interests of both parties are taken into account. However, the sub-paragraph must not be interpreted more broadly than its purpose. Otherwise infringements will arise from the data subject’s point of view.
Where the controller has a legitimate interest, too, a person’s data may be processed without his explicit consent, on condition that the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject are not harmed. The intention here was to have regard to the controller’s interest as well, without harming the freedoms of the data subject. Although there is a danger that the concept of legitimate interest will be interpreted broadly, it is clear, when the Law in question and the other rules are considered together, that this phrase must not be interpreted broadly. Besides, legitimate interest is of no significance where the rights of the data subject are harmed. In the event of a breach, avenues of application and complaint are also open. Indeed, in its judgment the Constitutional Court explained what is to be understood by the concept of legitimate interest and stated that it relates to the balance of interests between the controller and the data subject. Where concepts are uncertain, it is possible for them to be clarified by case law. For it is not possible for every phrase used in the text of the Law to be explained one by one. The confusion of meaning surrounding legitimate interest has thus been prevented.
I do not think that the sub-paragraphs whose annulment was sought on the ground that the said exceptions have ceased to be exceptions and have been turned into the principal rule are contrary to the Constitution. As I have explained one by one above, these exceptions apply to cases of necessity and compulsion and have been provided for in order to meet needs. Otherwise the continuation of everyday life and the conduct of economic activities would become impossible. For this reason, relaxing the requirement of explicit consent in unavoidable cases, without infringing the rights of the data subject and without making it more difficult for him to exercise those rights, is necessary and appropriate. Moreover, these exceptions are intended to protect not only the party processing the data but, depending on the concrete situation, the data subject as well. I therefore consider the Constitutional Court right to have rejected the request for annulment of the sub-paragraphs on exceptions.
3. The words “sect” and “attire” in Article 6(1) of the Law, and paragraph 3 of the same article
Article 6, which contains the words alleged to be unconstitutional, concerns special categories of data and sets out the conditions for processing such data. Their annulment was sought on the grounds that these concepts are incompatible with the OECD Guidelines, the Directive and the relevant international conventions, are contrary to the principle of equality and are liable to harm the rights to freedom of religion and conscience and to freedom of thought.
The Constitutional Court rejected this request for annulment on the grounds that the words are listed among the special categories of personal data and that, contrary to what was alleged, this affords stricter protection over these rights of persons . At the same time, it underlined that rules permitting the processing of data relating to persons’ sect and attire must not touch the essence of the rights provided for in the Constitution. It stated, however, that there can be no question of unconstitutionality in the legislature’s mere recognition of data relating to persons’ sect and attire as special categories of personal data.
By the contested provision, a person’s sect and attire are listed among the special categories of data. The scope of protection of data of this kind is wider, and their processing is subject to more specific conditions. The words whose annulment was sought are therefore not in fact intended to facilitate the processing of these data; quite the contrary, they place these data under special protection on account of their sensitive nature. It therefore cannot be said that there is an unconstitutional provision on this point.
Paragraph 3 of the same article, which governs the conditions for processing special categories of personal data without explicit consent, was also made the subject of the action for annulment. Under it, personal data relating to health and sexual life may be processed, without the explicit consent of the data subject being sought, only for the purposes of the protection of public health, preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of treatment and care services, and the planning and management of health services and their financing, by persons under an obligation of confidentiality or by authorised institutions and organisations. The grounds put forward for the request for annulment were that this paragraph would prevent persons from having access to the right to health, is incompatible with the principle of a State that respects human rights and is far from providing effective protection.
The Constitutional Court accepted that the rule providing that data relating to health and sexual life may, in the cases in question, be processed without the explicit consent of the data subject being sought constitutes an interference with the rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data. It stated, however, that, bearing in mind that the rule limits the processing of personal data in terms of purpose, it cannot be said that the restriction imposed has been made subject to conditions which make the exercise of the right extremely difficult or render it unusable, and, since the essence of the right is not touched, it reached the conclusion that the paragraphs whose annulment was sought are not contrary to the Constitution.
Although explicit consent is the basic rule in the processing of personal data, exceptions under which such data may be processed without explicit consent have also been accepted. The situation is, however, somewhat different as regards special categories of data. Since these data are of such a nature that, if violated, they may cause greater harm to the person to whom they belong and may give rise to discrimination, considerable care must be taken over the exceptional cases in which they may be processed without explicit consent. Otherwise it is not possible to achieve the aim of the right to the protection of personal data, which is to give persons a safeguard over their data.
The Directive, which was taken into account to a large extent when the Law on the Protection of Personal Data was being drafted, and other international legislation also accept that in exceptional cases special categories of personal data may be processed without the explicit consent of the data subject. This is because requiring explicit consent alone and allowing no exception whatever would not serve to protect persons and would, moreover, cause the interests of those persons to be harmed. Providing for exceptions is therefore a necessity. However, since these exceptions concern in particular persons’ health information and sexual life, they are in the nature of a restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms and carry the possibility of damaging those freedoms. For this reason, when the restriction is made, the requirements of the democratic order of society and the principle of proportionality, which the Constitution lays down under the heading Restriction of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in its Article 13, must not be infringed. A rule to the contrary would be an unconstitutional restriction.
When we look at the exceptions provided for in Article 6(3) of the Law, we see that they are to a large extent directed to the aim of protecting public health. For the data listed in the article to be processed without explicit consent, the processing of these data must be indispensable for carrying out the activities listed in the paragraph, and the protection of public health must not be possible without these data. Although this aim appears to be a legitimate aim for processing without explicit consent, considerable care must be taken in this matter. What emerges from the spirit and essence of the Law is that the data must not be used outside this purpose or in a manner exceeding it. Although the paragraph whose annulment was requested is not unconstitutional, the need for this provision to be interpreted in the manner I have indicated and not to exceed its purpose should be clearly established by decisions to be given by the Board or by other courts.
4. Article 7(2), Article 8(3) and Article 9(6) of the Law
I shall deal under a single heading with these three paragraphs, whose annulment was sought on the allegation that they are unconstitutional, since their subject matter is the same. The paragraphs in question are as follows:
• Art. 7(2): “The provisions of other laws concerning the erasure, destruction or anonymisation of personal data are reserved.”
• Art. 8(3): “The provisions of other laws concerning the transfer of personal data are reserved.”
• Art. 9(6): “The provisions of other laws concerning the transfer of personal data abroad are reserved.”
These paragraphs reserve the provisions of other laws concerning the erasure, destruction and anonymisation of personal data and their transfer within the country and abroad.
It was alleged that the provisions in question are unconstitutional because, whereas in matters falling within the scope of the Law on the Protection of Personal Data that Law ought to be taken as the basis, a rule reserving the provisions of other laws is very wide in scope, it becomes uncertain under which laws and rules individuals are to act in these matters, and the principles of public interest and proportionality have therefore not been observed.
In response, the Constitutional Court stated that it is not possible for every special situation to be specified in the Law and that there is no uncertainty in having recourse, in each special situation, to the Law relating to it. Furthermore, having reached the conclusion that these rules, enacted within the margin of discretion, are in conformity with the principles of suitability, necessity and proportionality in the narrow sense, it rejected the request for annulment relating to these provisions.
Although the Law on the Protection of Personal Data is the principal legislation on the right to the protection of personal data, it cannot deal separately with the matters peculiar to each branch of law; otherwise a casuistic method, which is flawed from the standpoint of legislative technique, would have been followed. What should be expected of the Law is that it regulate the right to the protection of personal data in general terms and determine the framework of the subject. In concrete cases connected with a particular branch of law, the legislation on that subject will be consulted, but conduct will have to conform to the procedures and principles laid down by Law No. 6698 . For the erasure of an employee’s personal data within the relationship between employee and employer, Labour Law and the Law of Obligations; for the transfer of personal data within the country or abroad on account of commercial relations, Commercial Law; and for the processing of personal data on account of contracts in general, the Law of Obligations, and hence the statutes and other sources of law pertaining to these legal disciplines, will be taken as the basis. Such examples could be multiplied. It is not possible for the Law on the Protection of Personal Data to deal with all these legal disciplines one by one; what needs to be done is to refer to those statutory provisions. I therefore agree with the Constitutional Court’s decision to reject the request in respect of these provisions.
5. The second sentence of Article 13(2) of the Law
The sentence whose annulment was sought in Article 13 of the Law, which governs the procedure and principles for applying to the controller, provides that, where the application additionally requires an operation, the fee in the tariff set by the Board may be charged to the data subject. The applicants alleged that the charging of this fee would prevent the person from effectively enjoying the right to respect for private life, which is one of his fundamental rights, and would restrict this right in a manner incompatible with the principles of the social State governed by the rule of law and of justice.
While accepting that the contested rule imposes a restriction on the right to the protection of personal data, the Constitutional Court considers that, because this restriction arises only where the operation entails an additional cost, it does not impair the essence of the right and there is therefore no breach of Article 13 of the Constitution. Being of the opinion that it would not be equitable to hold the controller liable for this cost and, moreover, that, since this fee is not indeterminate but is to be set by the Board, there is no conflict with the fundamental human rights laid down in the Constitution, the Court rejected the request for annulment of the sentence in question.
Whether a fee is to be charged when the data subject applies to the controller, or whether such a fee is necessary and in which cases it will be necessary, is a big question mark. What emerges from the Law and from the reasoning of the Constitutional Court’s judgment is that, only where the operation entails an additional cost, the data subject is to bear this fee, since it would be unjust to impose that cost on the controller. The sole exception to this is that, where the application arises from an error of the controller, this fee is refunded to the data subject.
I consider it justified and necessary for the data subject to pay a certain sum in order to apply to the controller, for the following reason: although the basic aim of the Law on the Protection of Personal Data is to protect the individual against possible unlawful infringements of his personal data, it does not pursue the aim of wholly disregarding the controller’s interest as well. For this reason, it should not be accepted that acts which are incompatible with the principle of equity from the controller’s point of view be regarded as lawful for the sake of protecting the interests of the data subject. From this we arrive at the conclusion that the right to apply to the controller must also be limited in various respects. Otherwise there arises a danger that this right of application will be abused by the data subject who, although not genuinely wishing to obtain information about his personal data or having no interest in obtaining that information, acts merely on the basis that he has the right. Such a danger is in fact contrary to the purpose of the Law as well. For this reason it is possible to charge a minimal fee in return for an application to the controller even if it does not additionally require an operation. Nevertheless, once the controller has replied to this application, this fee may be refunded if it becomes apparent that this application was made by the data subject on a justified ground. Whether or not the controller is at fault should also be discussed at this point.
6. The phrase excepting “information and documents constituting State secrets” in Article 15(3) of the Law
Article 15, which contains the phrase alleged to be unconstitutional, lays down the procedure and principles of the examination to be carried out by the Personal Data Protection Board. Under it, the controller cannot send information and documents constituting State secrets to the Board and cannot have them examined. It was argued that this provision is unlawful on the grounds that it is neither certain nor proportionate and is liable to give rise to arbitrary practices on the part of the administration.
The Constitutional Court accepted that fundamental rights and freedoms are not unlimited in an absolute sense but have certain limits arising from the nature of the freedom in question. What is to be understood by information and documents constituting State secrets is information and documents which serve to secure the internal and external security and the national defence of the State and to protect its constitutional order. Accepting that, for these reasons, the restriction imposed is also a restriction in conformity with Article 13 of the Constitution, the Court rejected the request for annulment of the phrase in question.
The concept of State secret is defined in Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) as information the disclosure of which could harm the foreign relations, national defence and national security of the State and which is of such a nature as to create a danger to the constitutional order and in its foreign relations. The Law on the Protection of Personal Data provides that information and documents falling within this meaning cannot be examined by the Board. It is clear that, by this provision, the right to the protection of personal data is restricted at the point where the question whether the personal data of a data subject who has applied to the Board by way of complaint have been violated makes it necessary to examine information and documents of this nature. This restriction, however, is based on the grounds of ensuring the security of the State and public order and of preventing the commission of offences. It is therefore possible to say that there is a restriction in conformity with the conditions set out in Article 13 of the Constitution. Indeed, Article 9 of Convention No. 108 also states that the right to the protection of personal data may be restricted for reasons such as State and public security and the protection of the interests of the State.
Although documents constituting State secrets cannot, under Article 125 CMK, be kept secret from the Court, this provision applies in the case of offences for which the lower limit of the term of imprisonment is five years or more. By contrast, the terms of imprisonment prescribed for the offences laid down in respect of personal data are shorter. Accordingly, if establishing whether an offence involving the violation of personal data has been committed makes it necessary to examine information and documents constituting State secrets, this will not be possible. And that means a disproportionate restriction of the person’s right to the protection of his data. For in that case the person’s right has been rendered unusable and the essence of the right has been impaired. For this reason, although I am of the same opinion as the Constitutional Court on the point that documents of this nature cannot be examined by the Board and find the rejection of the request for annulment in question appropriate, the courts ought to be able to examine this information and these documents for the purpose of establishing whether the violation of personal data constitutes an offence. This amendment, however, should be made not in the KVKK, Law No. 6698, but in Article 125 CMK.
7. The second sentence of Article 16(2) of the Law;
Article 16 of the Law, headed Data Controllers’ Registry, provides that natural and legal persons who process data are obliged to register in the Data Controllers’ Registry before starting to process data. The sentence whose annulment was sought states that exceptions to this registration obligation may be introduced by the Board on the basis of various objective criteria. This discretion conferred on the Board was, however, made the subject of the action for annulment by the applicants on the grounds that it would leave the data subject unprotected and is incompatible with the principle of the rule of law.
In response, the Court found it compatible with the Constitution, since there is proportion between the end and the means, that the Board may, by a decision taken with regard to the differences relating to the data processed, introduce exceptions to the registration obligation in cases where it does not consider registration necessary. It further stated that controllers covered by the exception must also fulfil the obligations laid down by the Law.
Exceptions have been made in various cases for controllers who are required to register in the Data Controllers’ Registry, and these exceptions are listed one by one in Article 28 of the Law. These cases are also set out in Article 15 of the Regulation on the Data Controllers’ Registry, published after the Law. Apart from these cases there is, in addition, a discretion conferred on the Board. Under it, the Board will be able, having regard to the principles relating to the data, to grant controllers exceptions with respect to the registration obligation. The point to be underlined here is that this exception relates solely to the Data Controllers’ Registry and has nothing to do with Article 12 of the Law, which governs the obligations of the controller. This means that controllers who are not required to register must also perform the duties assigned to them in the Law. Directive 95/46/EC, too, provided that national data protection authorities may waive or simplify the notification obligation, while stating that the other obligations laid down do not cease to apply.
Even though the cases in which exceptions to the registration obligation are to be made are separately listed one by one in the Law, it is not possible for the Law to foresee in advance all the cases that do not require registration. It is therefore appropriate that the Board should be given discretion on this point. This discretion must, however, be subject to review and supervision, and judicial avenues such as application or complaint must be open against its exercise. A situation to the contrary is liable to lead to arbitrary practices on the part of the administration.
8. The phrase “those deemed necessary by the Board” in Article 24(3)(b) of the Law
The relevant phrase of Article 24, which sets out the duties of the President of the Personal Data Protection Board, was challenged by the applicants on the grounds that it creates uncertainty for the person applying to the Board and for the public, and that a distinction is drawn among the applications made to the Board without the criteria for this distinction having been determined.
Although the Court, stating that the rule is not uncertain, that the objective criteria can be understood once the working procedures and principles of the Board are determined and that the rule in question falls within the margin of discretion, did not find the phrase in question unconstitutional and rejected the request for annulment, it was unable to give clear reasons for this decision and failed to provide an adequate explanation.
The Personal Data Protection Board must decide the complaints submitted to it alleging that personal data have been violated. It has the discretion conferred on it by the Law to make public those of these decisions that it deems necessary. It has not been explained, however, on what basis this deeming necessary is to proceed. There is uncertainty as to which one or more of such matters as the type of subject, the nature and volume of the data or the degree of the violation will be taken as the basis for making an announcement to the public. In my opinion, it would be right to take the degree of the violation as the basis here. While publication is not required in the case of a minor first violation, I think that there is a public interest in the public being informed of major violations. Moreover, since the Board’s decisions have the character of case law and guidance for the law of personal data protection, they should be published even in cases of minor violations, with the names and/or titles of the complainant and of the controller concealed.
The principle of certainty, which is one of the requirements of the rule of law, does not of course mean that everything must be determined solely by the Law. What this principle requires is not statutory certainty but legal certainty. It is therefore possible for a matter for which the Law draws the general framework to be explained and determined by case law or regulatory acts as well. Yet no rules whatever have been made on the subject. For this reason, even though the presentation to the public of those of the decisions given that the Board deems necessary has been left to the Board’s discretion, it is essential, in order to ensure legal security and foreseeability, that it be determined how this power is to be exercised and by what criteria it is to be established whether the presentation of decisions is necessary. In this respect I consider the application justified.
9. Sub-paragraphs (a) and (ç) of Article 28(1) of the Law;
Article 28 of the Law, headed Exceptions, lists the cases in which its provisions are not to apply. Sub-paragraph (a), which is the subject of the action for annulment, reads: “the processing of personal data by natural persons within the scope of activities relating entirely to themselves or to family members living in the same dwelling, provided that the data are not given to third parties and the obligations concerning data security are complied with” . In this case the provisions of the Law are not to apply.
The applicants alleged unconstitutionality on the grounds that merely living in the same dwelling does not mean that the personal sphere may be interfered with and that personal autonomy is an important principle. The Court, for its part, takes the view that the contested rule is intended to make living together easier, does not render this right unusable and therefore does not touch the essence of the right. Having reached the conclusion that the exception thus introduced is in conformity with the principle of proportionality, the Court rejected the request for annulment.
I agree with the Constitutional Court’s decision and reasoning in respect of the provision which leaves outside the Law the processing of personal data within the scope of an activity relating entirely to oneself or to family members living in the same dwelling. For this exception has regard to the interests of both the data subject and the person processing the data. This situation is, moreover, a natural consequence of living together in the same home. In everyday life, family members living in the same dwelling may need to process data relating to the other members in order to be able to carry out their activities. A requirement of explicit consent on every such occasion would make everyday life more difficult and would bring no advantage to the data subject either. As the Court also stated in its judgment, this matter is aimed entirely at simplifying the data-processing procedure. Besides, although the processing of these data is left outside the scope of the Law, the text of the article prohibits the data from being given to third parties and underlines that the obligations concerning data security must be complied with. I therefore do not think that the provision, enacted by the legislature with a reasonable balance in view for the purpose of making everyday life easier, is in any respect unconstitutional.
Under sub-paragraph (ç) of the same article, which is alleged to be unconstitutional, the provisions of the Law are not to apply in the case of “the processing of personal data within the scope of preventive, protective and intelligence activities carried out by public institutions and organisations assigned duties and powers by law for the purpose of ensuring national defence, national security, public security, public order or economic security”.
The applicants alleged that the rule is contrary to the principle of certainty and is liable to lead to arbitrary practices on the part of the administration. While accepting that this provision restricts the right to the protection of personal data, the Court reached the conclusion that this restriction is based on legitimate grounds and is compatible with the principle of proportionality. According to the Court, national security is a legitimate ground for the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms.
Another exception in which the provisions of the Law are not to apply is laid down as “preventive, protective and intelligence activities” carried out by public institutions and organisations for the purposes of “national defence”, “national security”, “public security”, “public order” and “economic security”. The processing of personal data within this scope will not be subject to Law No. 6698.
Fundamental rights and freedoms are not absolute and unlimited; they are subject to certain limitations arising either from the Law or from the nature of the right. These limits must, however, be compatible with the principles of the democratic order of society and the rule of law. Limitations imposed on fundamental rights and freedoms with the aims of ensuring national security and public order and of preventing the commission of offences are also common in international legislation. In the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in particular, we see that interferences, within the scope of intelligence activities, with rights such as the right to respect for private life and the protection of personal data are accepted as lawful. For, in the absence of such interference, worse consequences are likely to arise for public order and national security. It is precisely at this point that a reasonable balance of interests must be struck between the processing of a person’s data and public and national security. While I think that the contested rule strikes a reasonable balance, I must state that it would be useful to determine what is to be understood by the concepts contained in the provision and that, if these concepts are interpreted broadly, the resulting violations will be unlawful.
10. Article 47 of Decree-Law No. 663 (KHK), as amended by Article 30(7) of the Law
Decree-Law No. 663, which contains the provision that is the subject of the action for annulment, governs the organisation, duties, powers and responsibilities of the Ministry of Health and its affiliated institutions. In its Article 47, headed Power to Collect, Process and Share Information;
• that the Ministry and its affiliated institutions are authorised, in order to be able to perform the duties assigned to them by law, to obtain from all public and private health institutions and organisations the personal information which recipients of health services are obliged to give to the relevant health institution or organisation as a requirement of the health service they receive
and the information on the service provided to those persons, and to collect, process and share such information by any means,
• that the Ministry and its affiliated institutions may share the personal health data they process with the relevant third parties and with public institutions and organisations only where those persons and institutions are authorised by law to have access to such data, and to the extent sufficient for them to perform their duties,
• that the Ministry and its affiliated institutions are authorised to request, from all relevant public and private persons and organisations, the information required in order to be able to perform the duties determined by law,
as is laid down therein.
The applicants requested the annulment of the article in question, alleging that it amounts to an interference with the right to health and to life, that persons have the right to require that information concerning their health be kept secret even from the State save in certain situations regarded as being in the public interest, but that the purposes listed in the rule are framed so broadly as to go beyond the public interest.
The Court rejected this request for annulment as well, giving as its reasons that the provision serves the purpose of the delivery of health services, the proper functioning of the patient monitoring system and the best possible enjoyment of health services by patients, and that under Article 5 of the Constitution the State is charged with providing the conditions necessary for the development of the material and spiritual conditions of the human being.
It is abundantly clear that the contested rule gives the Ministry of Health and its affiliated institutions a broad power to process health data, which count as special categories of data. I should say first that, even though the aim of the rule is the improvement of public health, I do not consider it right for so broad a power to be regulated by decree-law. Whereas Law No. 6698 defines the conditions for processing special categories of data as the protection of public health, preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of treatment and care services, and the planning and management of health services and their financing, the Decree-Law has considerably widened these conditions. Yet, just as it is not possible to render ineffective a provision contained in the Constitution and the statutes, so it is not legally possible to introduce new provisions and new rules that are not found there. Seen from this angle, before proceeding to examine the content and nature of the contested rule, it should be recognised that, in the form in which it has been enacted, it is unlawful in that it provides for matters not provided for by the Law. Indeed,
| such an approach is also incompatible with Article 91 of the Constitution. According to it; | as regards Part Two of the Constitution, |
|---|---|
| the fundamental rights and the rights and duties of the individual contained in its Chapters One and Two cannot be regulated by decree-laws issued in ordinary | |
| times. Accordingly, paragraph 3 of Article 20 of the Constitution, | |
| on the protection of personal data, which was added by the amendment made in 2010, cannot be regulated by decree-law | |
| either. The unconstitutional aspect of the rule is plainly evident. | |
I think that, even if this broad power conferred on the Ministry of Health and its affiliated institutions had been regulated not by a decree-law of ordinary times but by statute, it would still be unlawful in terms of its content. For, in a matter in which such points as whether an avenue of review is open and, if so, how it is to operate have not been determined, it is unavoidable that such an open-ended power will lead to arbitrary practices on the part of the administration. For this reason I do not find sufficient the reasons given by the Court for the rejection of the request for annulment of the provision in question, and I am of the opinion that the provision is unconstitutional.
Conclusion
Above I have explained in detail the action for annulment brought before the Constitutional Court on the allegation that various articles, paragraphs and phrases of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data are unconstitutional: the grounds of the request for annulment, the decision and reasoning of the Constitutional Court and, finally, my own view and assessment.
We see that the subject matter of the action for annulment generally consists of provisions which restrict, or are liable to restrict, the right to the protection of personal data. For the protection of personal data is one of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the person, and care must be taken with regard to restrictions imposed on this right. For this reason I regard the Constitutional Court judgment in question as important for the development of the law of personal data protection.
Since awareness of the protection of personal data has not yet fully taken root and the rules on the subject are very new, it is natural that these rules should be criticised, that their minuses and pluses should be identified or that they should be found wanting on certain points. What matters here is to take account of the criticisms or applications made and to try to improve the legislation. For the law must always renew itself and keep pace with a developing world. All the more so, the renewal of the rules on the protection of personal data, which is so closely bound up with technology, is inevitable.
It must be assessed how the provisions made the subject of the action will be reflected in practice, not only as regards individuals but also in terms of their effect on controllers in various sectors. Making the processing of every kind of personal data conditional on the existence of explicit consent, or providing for no exception at all in this regard, is not a realistic approach in today’s wholly digitalised world. In a world in which the economy, security, health, education and even justice have been digitalised and in which personal data are intensively recorded, processed and shared, introducing excessively restrictive provisions, and trying to do so by means of legislation, is not only unrealistic but tantamount to reversing the current. Yet the current cannot be reversed; one must go with the current, but make steady headway in the river without striking against things to right and left. And ensuring that the boat we are on makes steady headway with the current is the task of individuals, controllers, the Board and the courts rather than of Law No. 6698.
Footnotes
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Right to Be Forgotten” (Unutulma Hakkı), Essays in Honour of Prof. Dr. Yadigar İzmirli (Prof. Dr. Yadigar İzmirli’ye Armağan), Savaş Publishing, Ankara, 2024, pp. 1019–1141.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Assessment of the Amendments to the KVK Law on the Processing of Special Categories of Personal Data and the Transfer of Data Abroad” (KVK Kanunu’nda Özel Nitelikli Kişisel Verilerin İşlenmesi ve Yurt Dışına Veri Aktarımı Kapsamında Yapılan Değişikliklere İlişkin Değerlendirmeler), Academia.edu, 25 March 2024.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Our Assessment of the Decision Summaries Published by the Personal Data Protection Board on 18 July 2022” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulunun 18 Temmuz 2022 Tarihinde Yayınlanan Karar Özetlerine İlişkin Değerlendirmelerimiz), Dülger Law Office, 1 September 2022.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Use of Personal Health Data as Evidence in Divorce Proceedings” (Kişisel Sağlık Verilerinin Boşanma Davasında Delil Olarak Kullanılması), Hukuk ve Daha Fazlası Dergisi (Law and More), No. 9, June 2022, pp. 76–84.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “A Very Important Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board on Lawyers' Access to Enforcement Files Without a Power of Attorney” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulu’ndan Avukatların İcra Takip Dosyalarına Vekaletname Olmaksızın Erişebilmesine İlişkin Çok Önemli Bir Karar), Dülger Law Office, 15 August 2021.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, Personal Data Protection Law (Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku), 4th ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2026.

