Introduction
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
The internet is without doubt one of the greatest innovations that technological developments have brought into our lives today. In this sphere, people can easily reach every kind of content to an extent never seen before, and can share that content and even content they have produced themselves. Moreover, in recent years in particular, it has become very common for people to produce and share written, visual and other kinds of content of their own. The internet is therefore a communication network, which may also be thought of as a large pool of information, in which people both easily reach and use existing content and share the content they produce. Alongside this individual use, the internet also has the character of a means of mass communication. Mass communication is distinguished from personal communication by its public character.
Personal communication is individual in nature, whereas mass communication, which covers broadcasts made in media such as television, radio and the internet, is public in nature and can easily reach very large audiences. Today people chat with one another over the internet, and every kind of written and visual content can be shared on various websites, social media platforms in particular, between two people, within a group or in the public sphere. Through such posts, individuals can state their opinion on any subject, comment on existing posts or describe themselves by creating a blog. The examples of the activities that people carry out on the internet could be multiplied without limit.
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger*
One of the greatest innovations that technological developments have brought into our lives today is undoubtedly the internet. In this sphere people can easily reach every kind of content to an extent never seen before, and can share that content and even content they have produced themselves. In addition, particularly in recent years, it has become very common for people to produce and share content of their own making, whether written, visual or of other kinds. The internet is thus a communication network, which may also be thought of as a vast pool of information, in which people both easily reach and use existing content and share the content they produce.
Alongside this individual use, the internet also has the character of a medium of mass communication. Mass communication is distinguished from personal communication by its public character. Whereas personal communication is individual in nature, mass communication, which covers broadcasts made in fields such as television, radio and the internet, is public in nature and can easily reach very large audiences. Today people converse with one another via the internet, and every kind of written and visual content can be shared on various websites, above all on social media platforms, between two parties, within a group or in the public sphere. Through such posts individuals can state their opinion on any subject, comment on existing posts or present themselves by creating a blog.
The examples of the activities that people carry out on the internet could be multiplied without limit. What these examples have in common is that, in whatever form and manner, they essentially amount to individuals exercising their freedom of expression, which is counted among the fundamental human rights at national and international level. Moreover, the fact that these activities may relate to many different subjects has brought the internet into close contact with many other fundamental rights and freedoms as well.
Being a technology through which individuals exercise their freedom of expression directly and most easily, and a boundless space that everyone can reach, the internet has on the other hand also given rise to unease. For an unlimited and absolute freedom means that anyone who so wishes can reach and disseminate any kind of information, and this may lead to malicious uses or, irrespective of whether there is bad faith or not, to the violation of other persons’ rights. It may thus be said that the fact that the internet can be used for any social, economic or political purpose, and that its areas of use are steadily growing, also increases the possible violations of rights and freedoms.
At this point the internet, which has the quality of being the most important instrument for realising freedom of expression, at the same time increases to the same degree the violations that may be committed against freedom of expression and the other fundamental rights and freedoms. There is no doubt that, in order to prevent such violations, the use of the internet must be regulated by law and restricted in various respects. These restrictions must, however, be made without losing sight of the fact that they constitute an interference with fundamental rights and freedoms.
In Türkiye there exists the “Law on the Regulation of Publications Made on the Internet and on Combating Offences Committed by Means of Such Publications” No. 5651 of 04/05/2007, which was enacted with the aim of restricting the activities carried out on the internet and preventing offences. The purpose of the Law is explained in its explanatory memorandum as follows: it had become imperative to enact a special law that would make possible an effective and proper structure for combating offences committed by abusing the opportunities offered by the rapidly developing internet. It may therefore be said that the Law pursues the aim of restricting, and bringing under regulation, the freedom of expression that exists without limits on the internet.
In this study I shall explain in detail the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 15/11/2017, E. 2015/76 and K. 2017/153, which concerned certain phrases contained in the provision of Law No. 5651 on the blocking of access; I shall address the subject within the framework of freedom of the press and of expression and the other fundamental rights and freedoms, and set out my own views and assessments1.
Subject of the Objection Lodged with the Constitutional Court and the Statutory Provision Whose Annulment Is Sought
In a dispute pending before it, the 13th Chamber of the Council of State applied to the Constitutional Court, requesting the annulment of the paragraph concerned and a stay of execution, on the ground that paragraph 4 of Article 8 of Law No. 5651, entitled “Decision to block access and its execution”, as amended by Article 92 of Law No. 6518 of 06/02/2014, was contrary to Article 22 of the Constitution, which governs the “Freedom of communication”.
According to Article 8, which contains the paragraph at issue: “A decision to block access shall be issued in respect of publications made on the internet where there are sufficient grounds for suspicion that their content constitutes the following offences:
a) The following offences set out in the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 of 26/9/2004:
1) Inducement to suicide (Article 84),
2) Sexual abuse of children (Article 103, first paragraph),
3) Facilitating the use of narcotic or stimulant substances (Article 190),
4) Supply of substances dangerous to health (Article 194),
5) Obscenity (Article 226),
6) Prostitution (Article 227),
7) Providing a place and facilities for gambling (Article 228).”
Paragraph 4 of the article, whose annulment was sought, reads: “Where the content provider or hosting provider of content constituting the offences specified in the first paragraph is located abroad, or, even where the content provider or hosting provider is located within the country, where the content constitutes the offences set out in items (2), (5) and (6) of sub-paragraph (a) of the first paragraph, the decision to block access in respect of the publications concerned shall be issued ex officio by the Presidency. This decision shall be notified to the access provider with the request that it be carried out.”
Grounds of the Objection
The application to the Constitutional Court first pointed out that the internet is a very effective and widespread means of gaining access to information. For that reason the internet is indispensable for people to express, exchange and disseminate their information and thoughts. There is no doubt that the internet, which gives individuals the opportunity to share information and express thoughts, is of great importance for the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms precisely because of these qualities. Blocking access to the internet will therefore be directly connected, in particular, with the freedom of communication and with the freedom of expression and dissemination of thought.
It was argued that the provision which, where internet content – which, as stated, is of such importance for the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals – constitutes certain offences, allows the administration to issue a decision to block access ex officio without the approval of a judge was contrary to Article 22 of the Constitution.
Scope of the Review to Be Carried Out by the Constitutional Court
During the examination on the merits, the rule at issue underwent various amendments by Decree-Law (KHK) No. 671 of 15/08/2016. Accordingly, the Telecommunications Communication Presidency (TİB) was closed down and the term Presidency in the paragraph was changed to President. What is to be understood by the term President is the President of the Information and Communication Technologies Authority. However, since the former version of the paragraph was applicable to the pending case, the review of constitutionality was carried out on that version.
Where courts consider the statutory provisions to be applied in the cases before them to be contrary to the Constitution, they may apply to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the provisions which they claim to be unconstitutional. The review must, however, as a rule be confined to the concrete case. Provisions unrelated to the concrete case will not form the subject of such proceedings.
The case pending before the court concerns a request for the annulment of a decision to block access issued by the TİB, on grounds of obscenity, against a hosting provider located abroad. The review to be carried out by the Court therefore relates to the phrases “Where the content provider or hosting provider of content constituting the offences specified in the first paragraph is located abroad” and “the decision to block access in respect of the publications concerned shall be issued ex officio by the Presidency.” contained in the paragraph. In paragraph 1 of the same article, in which the offence of obscenity is specified,
item (5) likewise falls within the scope of the review. Furthermore, since the issuing of the decision by the Presidency is a rule common to two different situations, it was stated that the rule in question would be examined with regard to the phrase indicated.
The Question of Unconstitutionality and Its Examination
The Court examined the constitutionality of the rule at issue in the light of Article 13 of the Constitution, entitled “Restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms”, Article 22, entitled “Freedom of communication”, and Article 26, entitled “Freedom of expression and dissemination of thought”. For the Constitutional Court is not bound by the article of the Constitution cited in the application; it may also carry out its review on the basis of other articles.
The Court stated that in modern democracies the internet is indisputably important for the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms, first and foremost the freedom of communication and freedom of expression. It also underlined that there is no doubt that the internet, which is widely used as a means of mass correspondence and communication and is increasingly preferred, falls within the scope of the freedom of communication. At the same time, by stating that the internet does not serve correspondence and communication alone and, being used for other purposes too, is connected with many other fundamental rights and freedoms, it sought to explain the relationship between the internet and fundamental rights and freedoms.
According to the Court, Law No. 5651 introduced the institution of the blocking of access as a measure against activities that may be carried out with the aim of committing offences via the internet or facilitating their commission. The explanatory memorandum of the Law states that this measure is also intended to give effect to Article 41 of the Constitution, entitled “Protection of the family”, and Article 58, entitled “Protection of youth”. According to the Court, considering the speed at which publications on the internet spread and the fact that everyone, including vulnerable individuals such as children, can easily reach them, there is certainly a public interest in a decision to block access that may be issued by the TİB without the approval of a judge.
Looking at the matter from the standpoint of Article 22 of the Constitution, the Court states that this provision safeguards internet content or applications that have the character and purpose of providing correspondence and communication and are used for that purpose. It underlined, however, that publications falling outside this, and all the more so those aimed at committing an offence or facilitating its commission, cannot benefit from this protection. The Court considers that the safeguard of judicial approval, which Article 22 provides by requiring the decision of the competent authority to be submitted to a judge for approval, cannot be extended to internet publications which cannot be regarded as falling within the freedom of communication or which are aimed at committing an offence or facilitating its commission. It thus did not regard as unconstitutional the possibility for the President to issue ex officio, without a judge’s decision, a decision to block access in respect of the publications mentioned.
By contrast, it stated that means of mass communication which, while carrying publications whose content constitutes an offence, have the character or purpose of correspondence and communication must also benefit from the safeguard of judicial approval provided for by Article 26 of the Constitution. For, since platforms such as social media in particular can be used by everyone, publications constituting an offence are frequently encountered on them. However, with regard to sites whose essential purpose is not the commission of offences and which pursue only the purposes of correspondence, sharing information and providing communication, it was concluded that, on account of such publications, the issuing of a decision blocking access to them in their entirety is unconstitutional.
It also explained the relationship between publications made on the internet, particularly via social media, and freedom of expression. Again, according to Article 26 of the Constitution, the freedom of communication covers, together with the holding of thoughts and opinions, the right to express and disseminate those thoughts and opinions. Considering that the instrument which best serves the purpose of disseminating thoughts and views is the internet, regulations made in this field will directly affect freedom of expression. For this reason, care and sensitivity are required in this matter. Otherwise, fundamental rights and freedoms will be violated.
There is no doubt that regulations made in order to curb the unlimited and absolute nature of the internet restrict freedom of expression and thus constitute an interference with fundamental rights and freedoms. These regulations must therefore comply with the criteria laid down in Article 13 of the Constitution, which governs the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms. Accordingly, restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms may be imposed only by law; these restrictions must not be contrary to the requirements of the democratic order of society and to the principle of proportionality; and, moreover, the essence of the restricted right must not be infringed.
It is important that regulations which restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals comply with the conditions stated. For these conditions prevent arbitrary interference with those rights and freedoms. They are also indispensable for ensuring the principles of legal security and certainty.
The Court underlined that the contested rule merely provides that a decision to block access may be issued by the TİB, whereas the scope and procedures of this power are not laid down. For a rule whose scope and procedures are not determined may result in an unlimited power being conferred on the administration. Having reached the conclusion that the rule fails to meet the requirement of being clear and precise and is therefore contrary to the principle of certainty and to Article 13 of the Constitution, the Court ruled that the rule in question be annulled.
The Court’s annulment relates only to the phrases that were made the subject of the review. Since the remaining parts of the articles containing the phrases were not reviewed, there is no question of their annulment. It was also provided that the annulment of the phrases ruled upon is to enter into force one year after its publication in the Official Gazette. In this way the legislature was given the opportunity to re-enact this article so that no legal vacuum arises.
Assessment of the Constitutional Court’s Judgment and My View
I have referred above to the development of internet technology, to the importance for individuals of the publications made in this sphere, and to the need for statutory regulation of publications made on the internet. At this point, for a better understanding of the subject, I would first like to speak of the relationship between internet publications and the concepts of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of communication.
The concept of freedom of expression denotes that individuals may not only hold whatever thoughts and views they wish but may also disseminate those thoughts and views freely; for many years it has been counted among the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons in national and in many international legislative instruments and conventions. When we look at the case law of the Constitutional Court, we see that freedom of expression is regarded as one of the foundations of a democratic society and is accepted as indispensable for the development of society and of the individual. In many of its judgments the Court has emphasised that a democratic society and pluralism can flourish only in a society in which every kind of idea can be freely expressed, and that freedom of expression is therefore imperative and necessary for securing the individual’s distinctive personality and social and political pluralism.
The concept of freedom of expression has also been the subject of many judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The ECtHR has held that individuals must be able to comment on events as they wish, whether positively or negatively, and to voice their thoughts freely. It has also been stated that freedom of expression must afford individuals the assurance that they will not be subjected to any sanction on account of their statements. By linking it with the concepts of pluralism, tolerance, broadmindedness and democratic society, it has set out the importance of freedom of expression clearly and unequivocally.
There is no doubt that the internet, whose use is steadily increasing and spreading in comparison with traditional methods, is the most important and most effective instrument for realising people’s freedom to receive and impart news or information. For today the most actively used methods of communication, such as news sites, chat applications and the sending of e-mail, are internet-based. For this reason, people’s freedom in using the internet is directly related to the right to receive and impart information or to disseminate it, and to the right to communicate.
Nor can the relationship between publications made on the internet and freedom of the press be overlooked. Freedom of the press, which we also encounter in many disputes, denotes the freedom to report news and the freedom of persons to receive that news. Considering that today a large part of the press organs, meaning publications whose aim is to report news, operate on the internet, the relationship between internet publications and freedom of the press will be plain to see.
Proceeding from these explanations, it may be said that every kind of activity carried out on the internet is very closely related to the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. On the other hand, the fact that the internet is so easily accessible and offers many opportunities to persons acting with the aim of committing offences has given rise to the view that this use should not be unlimited and absolute. Indeed, with the internet many new offences have emerged today, existing offences have begun to be committed by means of information technology, or the commission of existing offences has been facilitated in this way. Restricting the use of the internet is therefore an unavoidable necessity. In imposing such restrictions, however, the connection with rights and freedoms must be taken into account, and it must be borne in mind that rights and freedoms will be infringed to the same extent as the restriction is imposed.
At this point, while dangers such as publications on the internet being used to commit offences or facilitating their commission are being prevented, the basic principles of a democratic society must not be harmed. A reasonable balance of interests must be struck between the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms and the prevention of cybercrime committed via the internet.
The institution of the blocking of access has been provided for in order to prevent possible unlawful acts by way of internet communication. Accordingly, where there is a suspicion that an unlawful situation has been brought about by means of internet communication, or where this has been proved by a court decision, access to the website concerned in the offence is blocked. The rule at issue also regulated the decision to block access, but provided that in certain cases this decision could be issued by the TİB without being submitted to a judge for approval.
The TİB is an administrative body, and the President of the TİB is moreover directly attached to the highest political organ. Since it is a power conferred on the administration, the possibility afforded by the regulation in question has been termed an administrative measure. However, the administration has no duty or power to extend by way of interpretation matters not provided for by law or to take decisions in the nature of a measure. I regard as an unlawful regulation the conferral on administrative authorities of a power that is so unlimited and so extraordinarily far removed from review, and that is capable of giving rise to interference with the most fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals on vague and boundless grounds such as national security and public order.
Even before the provisions of Law No. 5651, the view existed in practice that such a decision could not be issued without being submitted to a judge. Whereas the regulation introduced thereafter, since it was to be laid down by statute, was expected to provide greater safeguards for individuals, it has on the contrary restricted the rights of individuals by way of statutory regulation.
Indeed, I had also set out my criticisms of the rule at issue in detail in the 6th edition of my book “Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku”. I referred there to my reservations about possible violations of the rights of individuals on account of the wide power which the rule confers on the administration, and stated my view that the regulation in question, which is unlawful, had to be changed2.
The power conferred on administrative authorities by Law No. 5651 has also been found unlawful in judgments of the Constitutional Court and of the ECtHR. In the judgment “Yıldırım v. Türkiye”3 it was stated that the regulation in question conferred a wide power on the administrative authorities and that this interference was contrary to the principle of foreseeability required by the Convention. The Court reached the conclusion that the adequate protection required by the rule of law in a democratic society was lacking.
It is a natural, unavoidable and necessary requirement that various interferences be provided for in this boundless sphere against the violations that may arise from malicious and unlawful uses of publications made on the internet. Since, however, these interferences will be directed against the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, the regulations to be made must be carried out in conformity, in particular, with the conditions laid down in Article 13 of the Constitution. At the same time, the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, in particular the freedoms of expression, of the press and of communication, must not be restricted disproportionately, to the point where they can no longer be exercised. For otherwise the requirements of being a state governed by the rule of law and a democratic society cannot be met, and the law cannot provide individuals with adequate protection and safeguards.
For the reasons I have explained, I agree with the Constitutional Court’s judgment annulling the power conferred on administrative authorities to issue decisions blocking access. I must state, however, that I differ from the Court as regards the reasoning of the judgment. For the Court based its annulment on Article 13 of the Constitution and took the principle of certainty as its basis. Referring to the characteristic speed of administrative authorities, it reached the conclusion that the power conferred to issue decisions blocking access was not contrary to the Constitution.
By contrast, I do not share the view that the regulation in question is unconstitutional solely as regards the method of restriction. Even if the manner of exercise and the scope of the power conferred on the administration had been regulated, this power ought to have been regarded as an unconstitutional regulation. For, particularly in a country such as Türkiye, where arbitrary practices of administrative authorities that use the concepts of public order and national security virtually as a pretext are frequently encountered, such a regulation is highly dangerous for individuals. For the sake of preventing the commission of offences through publications made on the internet, the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals must not be exposed to even greater dangers that are so boundless, extraordinary and open to arbitrary use.
Footnotes
- Academic/Attorney-at-Law ↑
- For the full text of the judgment see: http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www. resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/02/20180207.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/20 18/02/20180207.htm ↑
- Murat Volkan Dülger, Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku, 6. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2015, s. 906-980. ↑
- For detailed information on the judgment see: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["002-7328"]} ↑
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “The Use of Crypto Assets in the Laundering of Proceeds of Crime and the Measures to Be Taken” (Kripto Varlıkların Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasında Kullanılması ve Alınması Gereken Önlemler), Istanbul Aydın University Faculty of Law Journal (İstanbul Aydın Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi), Vol. 10, No. 1, 2024, pp. 41-94.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “The Legal Regime of Social Network Providers, Internet News Sites and Over-the-Top Service Providers, and a Critique” (Sosyal Ağ Sağlayıcıların İnternet Haber Sitelerinin ve Şebekeler Üstü Hizmet Sağlayıcıların Hukuki Rejimi ve Eleştirisi), Dülger Law Office, 1 June 2023.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “The Electronic Document as the Object of Document Forgery Offences” (Belgede Sahtecilik Suçlarının Konusu Olarak Elektronik Belge), Symposium on Forgery of Documents and Tax Offences (Belgede Sahtecilik ve Vergi Suçları Sempozyumu), 21–24 October 2019, Publication of the Presidency of the Court of Cassation / TOBB ETÜ Faculty of Law, Ankara, 2020.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “What Does WhatsApp's Privacy Change Mean? Will Our Data Be Shared?” (WhatsApp Güvenlik Değişikliği Ne Anlama Geliyor? Verilerimiz Paylaşılacak mı?), Dülger Law Office, 5 January 2021.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Commercial Electronic Messages and the Message Management System” (Ticari Elektronik İleti ve İleti Yönetim Sistemi), Dülger Law Office, 15 November 2020.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, Cybercrime and Internet Communication Law (Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku), 11th ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2025.

