2005Murat Volkan DülgerArticle

Abstract

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

In criminal law, one of the important subjects of study in the general theory of crime is complicity (participation in crime), which is one of the special forms in which an offence appears. This is because, in principle, when offence types are defined in criminal statutes, it is assumed that a single perpetrator carries out the acts constituting the offence, and offence types are drafted accordingly. However, some acts defined as offences can by their nature be committed with more than one perpetrator, while other acts, although not of this kind by nature, acquire the character of an offence, in accordance with the will of the legislature, when several perpetrators come together and carry out the act defined in the statute.

In many actual cases, too, it is seen that the perpetrator makes use of the help of others in carrying out the acts constituting the offence, so that the offence can be committed more easily and its aim achieved. In particular, the great increase in organised crime today, the fact that increasingly complex life relationships have made the ways of committing crime complex as well and, as a result, the need for a large number of persons in order to carry out offences greatly increase the importance of the subject.

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Murat Volkan Dülger∗∗∗

INTRODUCTION

In criminal law, one of the important subjects of study within the general theory of the offence is complicity (participation in the offence), which is one of the special forms in which an offence appears. For, as a rule, when offence types are defined in criminal codes, it is assumed that a single perpetrator carries out the acts constituting the offence, and the offence types are framed accordingly; some acts defined as offences, however, can by their nature be committed by more than one perpetrator, while other acts, although they are not of that nature, may, in accordance with the will of the legislature, acquire the character of an offence where several perpetrators come together and carry out the act defined in the code. In many cases that actually occur, too, it is seen that the perpetrator, in carrying out the acts constituting the offence, makes use of the help of other persons so that the offence may be committed more easily and its aim achieved. In particular, the great increase in organised crime in our day, the fact that increasingly complex relations of life have also given a complex structure to the ways in which offences are committed and the fact that, as a result, a large number of persons are needed in order to carry out offences greatly increase the importance of the subject.

Providing an explanation that covers all these situations and placing it on a sound theoretical footing is an important problem of the general theory of the offence. The reason why this is important is that determining the status of liability of individuals for acts which are defined as offences by the legal order and which they have carried out, or to whose commission they have contributed in some way, and ensuring that they are punished according to the contribution they have made to the act, can be achieved only if these liabilities are set out clearly and satisfactorily.

Thus complicity was regulated in Arts. 64, 65, 66 and 67 of the Turkish Criminal Code No. 765 (TCK). Through the practice that has developed over the years, this subject has many times been the subject of decisions of the Court of Cassation, and a degree of permanence and certainty has been achieved in practice. Likewise, this subject has been treated in detail in legal scholarship, and the theoretical structure of complicity and the practice of criminal law in this field have been explained by defending views similar to or different from the systematic view adopted by the code on this subject.

However, the efforts to amend the TCK, which had been under consideration for a long time, gained great importance and gathered pace on the road to accession to the European Union, and as a result a new criminal code was created by Law No. 5237, adopted on 26.09.2004. This new code differed to a great extent from the drafts that had preceded it and brought changes and innovations in many areas. One of the subjects that were amended and were regulated in line with a new view is “complicity”, which is regulated in Arts. 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of the New Turkish Criminal Code (YTCK).

The subject of this study is the explanation of the way in which complicity is regulated in the YTCK. In the first part of the study, the development of the YTCK and its structure in general will be set out briefly. In the second part, the subject of the plurality of offenders will be explained. After the types of perpetration have been examined in the third part, the theoretical structure of complicity will be explained in the fourth part, and in doing so particular emphasis will be placed on the problem of identifying the perpetrator and on the difference between complicity and multi-perpetrator offences. In the fifth part of the study, the way in which complicity was regulated in TCK No. 765 will be outlined, and then, in the sixth and final part, the way in which the subject of complicity is regulated in YTCK No. 5237, which forms the main subject of the study, will be examined together with the theoretical view on which it is based.

I. The Formation of the YTCK and Its Structure in General

A. The Formation of the YTCK

Since the 1960s, with the aim of making room for new and democratic developments in criminal law, the Ministry of Justice has set up various commissions composed of criminal law experts and has had draft texts of a criminal code prepared, and as a result of this work the 1989 Draft Turkish Criminal Code emerged.

The same commission was again asked to revise this draft; after the text had been given its final form, the 1997 Draft Turkish Criminal Code was produced and this text was sent to the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) for deliberation1. When elections were held anew in 1999, the 1997 Draft Turkish Criminal Code was withdrawn by the government for re-examination and a new committee was set up; this committee made amendments to the 1997 text and produced the 2000 Draft Turkish Criminal Code. Finally, the same text was taken up and revised, and the 2001 Draft Turkish Criminal Code emerged. Thereafter, work and deliberations on the draft in question continued in the TBMM, and on 12 May 2004 the parliamentary sub-committee responsible for this matter, having made changes to a great extent to the draft text before it, adopted an almost entirely new draft and submitted it to the public for discussion and comment.

The draft text adopted by the parliamentary sub-committee was this time taken up by the parliamentary justice committee, and after some changes had been made to this text as well, it was submitted to the plenary of the parliament. In the end, on 26.09.2004 the draft text was adopted by the parliament and became law as the New Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (YTCK). Pursuant to its Article 344, this code will enter into force on 01.04.2005.

B. The Structure of the YTCK in General

It is stated that, in drawing up the YTCK, an effort was made to observe the principles of modern criminal law; that, first of all, the State-protecting structure of the Turkish Criminal Code No. 765 (TCK) was abandoned and the protection of persons was brought to the fore; that, in order to emphasise this, the offence types in the special part, which forms the second book of the draft, were arranged beginning with the offences committed against persons; and that conformity in terms of system with the modern criminal codes in force in Europe was thereby achieved2.

When this form of arrangement is assessed from the standpoint of comparative law, it is indeed seen that, in terms of system, in many of the modern criminal codes in force in Europe today the offences in the special part are arranged beginning first with the offence types “directed against persons”3. The Swiss Criminal Code, the Austrian Criminal Code, the Spanish Criminal Code, the Swedish Criminal Code, the Russian Criminal Code and the Croatian Criminal Code may be given as examples of these codes4. By contrast, there are also codes which, continuing the old approach, deal first with offences against the State5. The German Criminal Code, the Italian Criminal Code, the Danish Criminal Code and the Polish Criminal Code may be given as examples of these6.

However, this criterion is not sufficient on its own to show whether a criminal code is modern. The essential yardstick in this regard is whether the content of the code conforms to modern theories and views and whether the code has secured a place that is in keeping with, and indeed ahead of, the age in which it was created7. It must be stated with regret that, although in this respect the YTCK tries to include some contemporary provisions, it does not in general conform to modern criminal codes. It may nevertheless be said that one of the respects in which the YTCK is in line with modern criminal codes is the system of the code, and that this is an appropriate method of arrangement8.

The YTCK has been prepared in two books; the books are divided into parts and the parts into chapters. In the first book, as in TCK No. 765, the general principles of criminal law are set out, and this book is divided into three parts entitled “fundamental principles, definitions and scope of application”, “principles of criminal responsibility” and “sanctions”. The second book is divided into four parts, namely “crimes against humanity”, “offences against persons”, “offences against society” and “offences against the nation and the State and final provisions”, and the offence types are arranged according to this division9.

Complicity is regulated in Chapter Four, entitled participation in the offence, of Part Two, entitled principles of criminal responsibility, of Book One of the YTCK.

II. The Distinction between Single-Perpetrator and Multi-Perpetrator Offences

For the subject of complicity to be properly understood and assessed, the distinction between single-perpetrator offences and multi-perpetrator offences must first be explained.

A. Single-Perpetrator Offences

Offence types for whose commission, as set out in the statutory definition, a single perpetrator is sufficient are called single-perpetrator offences. Thus, in many offence types the perpetrator is defined in this way, by the expression “whoever” or “who” in TCK No. 765 and by the expression “any person” or “person” in YTCK No. 5237. The reason for emphasising this type of perpetration is that, as will be seen below, it is of importance for complicity10.

B. Multi-Perpetrator Offences

Some offence types can be committed only with the participation of more than one perpetrator. In legal scholarship this is generally called “necessary participation”11. Some of the offence types in which there is necessary participation require, by their natural structure, the participation of at least two perpetrators, while others can, by virtue of their statutory definitions, be committed with more than one person; in legal scholarship the concept of “multi-perpetrator offence” is used for these offence types.

Multi-perpetrator offences are of particular importance, because they resemble complicity in certain respects and it is therefore necessary to bring out the respects in which they differ. In criminal law scholarship, multi-perpetrator offences were at first not dwelt upon as a separate concept; when it was noticed that they displayed different features, they were thought to be a type of “participation”. Today, however, multi-perpetrator offences are no longer regarded as a type of participation in the offence. For offence types in which more than one perpetrator must necessarily be present for the offence to come into being are not, like (necessary) participation in the offence, a special form in which the offence appears, but a feature required directly in the statutory definition for the offence to come into being12.

In legal scholarship multi-perpetrator offences are in turn divided into two, as “convergence offences” and “encounter offences”13. According to this distinction, in convergence offences the persons who contribute to the commission of the offence act in the same direction and act in order to bring about the same aim. Art. 304 TCK (the offence of mutiny by detainees and convicts), Art. 313 (the offence of forming an association in order to commit felonies), Art. 168 (the offence of forming an armed gang), Art. 403, sub-paras. 10/11 (the offence of trafficking in narcotics as an association) and Art. 236 (the offence of collective abandonment of duty by civil servants), and Art. 296 YTCK (the offence of mutiny by detainees and convicts) and Art. 220 (forming an organisation for the purpose of committing offences), may be given as examples of convergence offences. In encounter offences, by contrast, the persons who contribute to the commission of the offence again want the same aim to be realised, but this time they reach that aim by acting from different directions. The offence (of trafficking in narcotic substances) contained in Art. 403, sub-para. 5 TCK and in Art. 188(3) YTCK and the offence of adultery, which was formerly in force, may be cited as examples of this14.

Finally, it should be noted on this subject that offence types defined as multi-perpetrator offences, whether by their nature or by their statutory definition, may also be committed in complicity. For this to be so, however, persons other than the perpetrators who are necessary for the multi-perpetrator offence to be carried out must contribute to the offence15.

III. Types of Perpetration

A. Direct Perpetration

When acts of a particular kind are made offences in the criminal code, the person who carries out these acts is designated as the addressee, that is, as the perpetrator of the offence. It is this situation that is called “direct or independent perpetration”. In other words, the person who performs the act by which the offence defined in the code is directly committed is the direct perpetrator.

B. Co-perpetration

Another type of perpetration, besides direct perpetration and indirect perpetration, is co-perpetration. In this type of perpetration the persons contribute to a certain extent to the act constituting the offence and act on the same decision to commit the offence. Two criteria must be present for co-perpetration to arise: one of them is that joint control over the act is established by the perpetrators, and the other is that there is a decision to commit the offence together16. These criteria will be examined below when the YTCK is explained.

C. Indirect Perpetration

The acts constituting the offence may sometimes be carried out by using another person as an instrument. In this case the person in the background establishes superior control over the person who carries out the acts of execution constituting the offence and over that person’s conduct17. It is in this case that one speaks of indirect perpetration, or perpetration through another.

There are two situations that enable the person remaining in the background to establish control over the person in the foreground who performs the acts of execution of the offence. The first of these is that the person in the foreground is labouring under a mistake; the other is that force is used against this person or that this person is threatened18. In short, the influence of the person in the foreground on the event is either not intentional or he lacks the capacity to take a decision in the matter (as in the case of children and the mentally ill)19.

Two different views have been put forward to explain the basis of indirect perpetration. According to the view of classical criminal law, which adopts the principle of strict accessoriness requiring the main act to conform to the statutory definition of the offence, to be unlawful and to be culpable, it has been argued that, where the person used as an instrument is without culpability or the act is caused to be committed under force and threat, the person in the background who causes the offence to be committed cannot be an accessory and will therefore be held liable as an indirect perpetrator. According to the view which adopts the principle of limited accessoriness, and which regards it as sufficient that the main act conforms to the statutory definition of the offence and is unlawful, by contrast, it will be possible for each accomplice to be held liable on account of his own culpability, and the fact that the perpetrator who carries out the main act is without culpability will not bring about any change in the liability of the accessories. Consequently, participation in the act will be possible even where the perpetrator of the main act is not culpable. In that case, since perpetration takes precedence over accessoryship, there will be indirect perpetration if the instigator or the aider has control over the act20.

Of the different views put forward to explain the basis and scope of indirect perpetration, the principle of strict accessoriness was the one that applied under TCK No. 765. Since the dualist system was adopted in the provisions of that code as regards participation in the offence, the institution of indirect perpetration came into play in order to close the gap in that system. Under YTCK No. 5237, however, since the dualist system has been abandoned, the accessories can be held liable for their culpability even if the person who carries out the main act is not culpable. Accordingly, a person who, by deceiving another, causes him to commit an offence without intent will be held liable on account of his own culpable act. Indeed, whereas there was no provision on indirect perpetration in TCK No. 765, this situation is expressly regulated in Art. 37(2) of YTCK No. 5237.

In conclusion, in indirect perpetration the person who induces another to commit an offence in the manner described above is held liable for the act of the person used as an instrument as if he had committed the offence himself.

IV. Complicity from a Theoretical Point of View

A. The Subject Matter of Complicity

Offence types that fall outside the groups of single-perpetrator offences and multi-perpetrator offences described above may also be committed together with more than one person, even though this is not a necessity. When offence types are laid down in the special parts of criminal codes, they are, apart from exceptional cases, framed on the footing that they are carried out by one person. However, as also stated above, these offence types too are generally carried out not by one person but by several persons acting together or by their contributions in various forms21. In that case all the accomplices who have contributed to the bringing about of the act defined as an offence are liable, even if only to a certain extent, for their contributions to the act22.

It is the rules on complicity that regulate the liability of the persons who take part in the offence where an offence that can be committed by one person is committed with the participation of more than one person23.

B. The Legal Basis of Complicity

It was stated above that the subject matter of complicity (participation in the offence) is the determination of the status of liability, on account of that act, of the persons who take part in the wrongful act defined as an offence24.

The contributions of these accomplices towards the commission of an offence may take forms that differ from one another. While some of these contributions are indispensable for the offence to come into being, other contributions may facilitate the commission of the offence or strengthen the perpetrator’s resolve to commit it. The contributions in question must be subjected to an assessment for the purpose of determining the degree of liability of those who made them; the forms of complicity emerge as the result of this assessment.

In Turkish criminal law scholarship, attempts have been made to explain the subject of complicity on the basis of two different views. While some authors explain the subject on the basis of the distinction between principal perpetrator and secondary perpetrator, which is the classical view as regards participation in the offence25, authors who have dealt with this subject in recent years, and who have in particular been influenced by German legal scholarship, argue that the twofold distinction should be abandoned in this field, that there are two main categories in the form of “perpetrator and accessory” and that the contribution made to the offence must be discussed in terms of these two concepts26. As far as practice is concerned, the courts proceeded on the basis of the distinction between “principal participation and secondary participation” adopted in TCK No. 765, and participation in the offence was explained accordingly. In the provisions on complicity contained in YTCK No. 5237, however, this twofold distinction has been abandoned and those who take part in the offence have been classified solely as perpetrators and accessories, in the same way as in German law.

1. The Perpetrator

When acts of a particular kind are made offences in the criminal code, the person who carries out these acts is designated as the addressee, that is, as the perpetrator of the offence. In legal scholarship the perpetrator is defined as “the principal addressee of the norm of conduct, the main figure of the facts corresponding to the definition of the offence, of criminal law”. In short, the perpetrator is the person who carries out the wrongful act defined as an offence in the code27, who carries out the main act that causes the offence to come into being28, and who performs the act that is a “sine qua non” for the commission of the offence29.

The concept of perpetrator may itself take three different forms. Accordingly, where the main act defined in the code is carried out by the perpetrator alone, there is “direct or independent perpetration”; where this act is carried out by using an intermediary, there is “indirect perpetration”; and where the act is carried out together with more than one accomplice, there is “co-perpetration”30.

Various views have emerged, particularly in German criminal law scholarship, on the criteria that determine who is a perpetrator. Examples are “the view based on the causal link”, “the view that interprets the concept of perpetrator narrowly and broadly”, “the (subjective) view based on determining the penalty according to the perpetrator” and “the view based on the criterion of control over the act”. It is stated that in German scholarship today the theory “based on the criterion of control over the act” is accepted by a large majority among the views explaining the legal basis of complicity31. Within the confines of this study it is not possible to set out all of these views; however, since it is also the view adopted in the YTCK, the principle of “control over the act” will be touched upon briefly below.

2. The Accessory

A person who does not alone carry out in full the act contained in the statutory definition of the offence, but who contributes in some way to its being carried out, is defined as an accessory32.

Accordingly, the general provisions on accessoryship contained in the code extend the scope of liability33. In other words, the rules on accessoryship are rules that extend the article governing the main offence to persons other than the perpetrator. In this respect the rules on accessoryship are supplementary in nature; as a natural consequence, if the rules on accessoryship were not contained in the criminal code, it would not be possible to hold liable for the offence and to punish persons who contribute to the offence but cannot be regarded as perpetrators34.

Like perpetration, accessoryship is itself divided into types. Accordingly, instigation and aiding are the two types of accessoryship35. A detailed explanation of this will be given below when the system introduced by the YTCK is examined.

The last matter to be mentioned in connection with accessoryship is the “principle of accessoriness.” The reason for the existence of this principle is that, as regards the accessory, it takes the place of the conditions necessary for perpetration in cases where those conditions are absent, and thus makes it possible to hold the accessory liable for the offence36. This matter too will be examined in more detail below.

C. Systems for Determining Liability in Complicity

There are three systems for determining the liability of those who take part in offences committed in complicity and for punishing them. These are the system of equality, the dualist system and the system of determining the penalty according to the perpetrator.

1. The System of Equality

According to this system, no distinction can be drawn between the conditions that bring about the offence, and consequently the offence that arises when the intended result occurs cannot be divided into parts either. The contributions made to the occurrence of an offence by the persons who contribute to it therefore cannot be separated and punished on their own37. Accordingly, since the persons who contribute to the occurrence of an offence “have entered into a community of fate in committing the offence together”38 and have thus made another’s offence their own, they are punished with the full penalty for the offence whatever their contribution may be39. Because in this system no distinction is drawn between perpetrator and accessory and everyone who takes part in the offence receives the same penalty, this system is also called “objective unity of the offence”40.

The proponents of this system themselves hold various views, but in the end they agree that everyone who takes part in the offence is to be punished with the same penalty41. This system has, however, been criticised as being too rigid, and in practice the judge has been given discretion, with the possibility of increasing or mitigating the penalty according to the accomplices’ contributions to the commission of the offence.

The New French Criminal Code and the Canadian Criminal Code may be given as examples of codes in which this system has been adopted for the regulation of complicity42.

2. The Dualist System

This system is also called the “classical system”. Under it, a twofold distinction is drawn according to the roles played in the occurrence of the offence by those who take part in it: those who are effective in the commission of the offence and perform acts of a principal nature receive the full penalty for the offence and are called “principal perpetrators”. Those, on the other hand, who do not contribute to the occurrence of the offence by acts of a principal nature but perform acts of an auxiliary nature receive a lesser penalty than the full penalty for the offence and are called “secondary perpetrators”43.

Different views have also emerged as to the criterion by which the principal perpetrator is to be distinguished from the secondary perpetrator. According to those who proceed from a subjective basis, those who adopt the act constituting the offence as their own act are to be regarded as principal perpetrators, and those who take part in another’s act and regard that act as another’s as secondary perpetrators. According to those who proceed from an objective basis, those who perform the conduct conforming to the type set out in the statutory definition are to be regarded as principal perpetrators, and those who contribute otherwise than by that conduct as secondary perpetrators44.

The Italian Criminal Code of 1889 and TCK No. 765 may be given as examples of codes that adopt this system. In addition, the Anglo-Saxon legal system also accepts the dualist system, which developed by taking its roots from the customs and usages of the traditional English legal system and from the case law relating to those usages. In England and in many states of the United States of America the dualist system is applied in matters of complicity45.

3. The System of Determining the Penalty According to the Perpetrator

In legal scholarship the system of fixing the penalty according to the perpetrator is also called the “subjective system”46. The defining element of this system is that “a penalty for each according to the intensity of his own wickedness” must be imposed47. In this system too there is a distinction between principal perpetrator and secondary perpetrator; however, when the penalty is imposed, the personalities, mental states and pre-offence lives of those taking part in the offence should also have a bearing on the determination of the penalty, and the judge should be given discretion in this regard48. The modern criminal codes drawn up after the Second World War, however, have not provided for an examination of the person’s life before the offence for the purpose of determining the penalty. Nevertheless, it is stated that the positivist authors who advocate this view maintain that room should be given to inquiries that will bring out the perpetrator’s personality, and in particular to the examination of motives, and that each perpetrator should be punished with the penalty that suits his personality49.

The criminal codes of Italy and Switzerland may be cited as examples of codes in which the system of determining the penalty according to the perpetrator applies. In addition, the criminal codes of Germany and Austria were drafted under the influence of this system but depart from it on a few points50. It should be noted, however, that although under the system of these codes the perpetrator is punished in proportion to his wickedness, the perpetrators’ past lives and habits are not taken into account when the amount of the penalty is determined, and the examination is confined to the act constituting the offence.

D. The Conditions of Complicity

Certain conditions must be present for the cases of complicity explained below to arise. These conditions are valid for the application of the rules on complicity laid down both in TCK No. 765 and in YTCK No. 5237; indeed, they are derived by interpretation of those rules51. They are: that more than one person takes part in the offence, that the acts have causal value, that there is a will to take part in the offence, and that in complicity the act has at least reached the stage of attempt.

1. More Than One Person Taking Part in the Offence

For complicity to be spoken of, more than one person must first of all take part in the offence. These persons must not, however, be among the perpetrators who, in the multi-perpetrator offences explained above, are necessary for the offence to come into being. Apart from that, it has also been stated above that complicity may arise in respect of multi-perpetrator offences52.

Moreover, for an accessory to incur liability an act must be performed, because without an act there can be no liability either. This act may take various forms. The acts in question may be positive or negative, and they may also be material or moral53.

2. The Acts Having a Causal Link

The second condition necessary for complicity is that the material or moral act of the person participating in the offence should stand in a causal link with the realisation of the main act constituting the offence. If it can be said that without the accomplice’s contribution the result would not have occurred, or would not have occurred in the way it did, the act performed by the accomplice can be said to have a causal link with the realisation of the offence type54.

Whether an act has a causal link, and whether this allows the rules on complicity to be applied, will moreover be examined in each concrete case. In doing so, account will also be taken of the fact that accomplices need not know one another, that the contribution made to the occurrence of the offence may be material or moral in nature, and that the will relating to complicity and the contribution made must be present together55.

3. The Will to Take Part in the Offence

The third condition necessary for the rules on complicity to apply is that the accomplices have the will to take part in the offence. In addition to the act contributing to the offence having a causal link, it is essential that the person performing it also has the will to contribute to the offence. It follows that the accomplice must perform his act of taking part in the offence intentionally, that is, knowingly and willingly. The accomplice must know and will both the act by which he contributes and his contribution to the offence that the perpetrator intends to commit56.

An important matter to be addressed under this heading is whether complicity is possible in negligent offences. It should first be stated that it is not possible to participate by a negligent act in an offence committed intentionally, because, as stated above, the accomplice must perform his contributing act with intent. Where there is intentional participation in a negligent offence, what is at issue is no longer complicity but perpetration. Likewise, where there is negligent participation in a negligent offence, what is at issue is not complicity but perpetration57.

4. The Offence, Which Is the Same for All Perpetrators, Having at Least Reached the Stage of Attempt (the Accessoriness Rule)

The fourth and last condition necessary for complicity is the existence of the accessoriness rule and the requirement that the act in the statutory definition should have at least reached the degree of attempt. It is not possible to speak of complicity on account of acts that are still at the level of preparatory acts and have not reached the degree of an attempt to commit the offence58. This is a natural consequence of the accessoriness rule, which will be dealt with in detail below.

Since the accessoriness rule in question applies both to TCK No. 765 and to YTCK No. 5237, in the application of both codes it is not possible for complicity to arise where this rule is absent and on account of an offence that has not reached the stage of attempt.

V. The Regulation of Complicity in TCK No. 765

In TCK No. 765 the dualist system has been adopted and a distinction is drawn between principal and secondary participation. Accordingly, principal participation is regulated in Art. 64 TCK as the counterpart of perpetration, and secondary participation in Art. 65 TCK as the counterpart of accessoryship. Both types of complicity are in turn divided into material participation and moral participation. In the forms of principal participation the perpetrators receive the full penalty corresponding to the offence, whereas in the forms of secondary participation it is provided that the perpetrators are to receive a reduced penalty59.

A. Principal Participation

In the system of TCK No. 765 principal participation is itself divided into two. One of these is principal material participation, the other principal moral participation. Principal material participation covers the person who commits the act constituting the offence, who performs the conduct; principal moral participation covers instigation.

1. Principal Material Participation

Principal material participation, that is, perpetration, is regulated in Art. 64(1) TCK; accordingly, “those who perpetrate the act” and “those who directly commit the act together” are to be punished, as principal material perpetrators, with the full penalty prescribed for the offence. What is meant by the concept of the person who perpetrates the act is the person who directly performs the conduct defined in the offence type. Thus, in the offence of homicide the person who pulls the trigger of the weapon, and in bodily harm the person who throws the punch, is the person who perpetrates the act. It is possible for there to be more than one person perpetrating the act (co-perpetration), as where two persons set fire to the same forest at different places60.

The expression “directly committing the act together”, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which, although the conduct specified in the statutory definition for the occurrence of the offence is not performed directly, the person’s conduct takes place at the same time as the conduct necessary for the occurrence of the offence and is of great importance for its occurrence61. It is stated in legal scholarship that this is in fact a case of secondary participation but that, in view of the importance for the occurrence of the offence of a contribution made to it in this way, it is treated as principal participation62.

Examples of this type of participation are: in bodily harm, a person holding the arms of the opponent of his friend who is fighting, thereby enabling his friend to stab the opponent; in the offence of rape, a person holding the arms of the female victim, thereby enabling the perpetrator to achieve sexual intercourse; or, in the offence of theft, a person opening the safe but not taking the money and jewellery inside it.

2. Principal Moral Participation

Principal moral participation is regulated in Art. 64(2) TCK. What is meant by this is “instigation”; the article states that instigators too are to receive the full penalty for the offence. In instigation, the principal material perpetrator, who has no thought whatsoever of committing an offence in his mind, is caused to take the decision to commit an offence63.

The most important difference between instigation and the forms of secondary moral participation is that in instigation the principal material perpetrator has no prior thought of committing an offence in his mind. In secondary moral participation, by contrast, the principal material perpetrator already has a previously formed thought of committing an offence, but this thought is strengthened by the secondary moral perpetrator.

By providing, in Art. 64(2) TCK, which regulates instigation, that “however, if it is established that the person who carried out the act had a personal interest in committing it, the penalty of the instigator shall be 24 years instead of death and 20 years of heavy imprisonment instead of heavy life imprisonment; other penalties shall be reduced by one sixth.”, the case in which the principal material perpetrator has a personal interest in the offence he commits is laid down as a mitigating circumstance for the principal moral perpetrator. The reason for this is the idea that the instigator’s promptings were not on their own effective in the commission of the offence64.

B. Secondary Participation

In the system of TCK No. 765 secondary participation is itself divided into three. These are secondary material participation, secondary moral participation and necessary secondary participation. Secondary material participation covers the case in which the person taking part in the offence gives assistance by material acts, whereas secondary moral participation covers the case in which the person taking part in the offence gives moral support.

1. Secondary Material Participation

Secondary material participation is regulated in Art. 65(2) and (3) TCK. This type of participation is defined in two ways: accordingly, “those who procure the services and means that will serve the commission of the act” and “those who facilitate its execution by support and assistance before or during the commission of the offence” are to be regarded as secondary material perpetrators and, under the provision in paragraph 3, are to be punished with a lesser penalty than the full penalty prescribed for the offence.

The procurement of the services and means to be used in the commission of the act must take place before the offence is committed. For example, the weapon must be procured or the perpetrator must be taken to the scene. Where this act is simultaneous with the acts of execution of the offence, there will be either principal material participation in the form of directly committing the act together or, in the form of giving support and assistance, secondary material participation65. Furthermore, the service or means in question must be suitable for the commission of the offence and must be used in carrying it out. Otherwise there is no secondary material perpetration66.

What is meant by facilitating the act by support and assistance is help given to the perpetrator (support) and help given to the act (assistance)67. Every kind of help that facilitates the commission of the offence is included here. This help may be given before the offence is carried out or while it is being committed68. However, if the assistance and support given before the commission of the offence is in the nature of an act of execution, a case of principal participation arises, since this situation will then fall within the scope of preparatory acts. This distinction is to be drawn by the judge in each concrete case69. A bank security guard leaving the bank’s door open and going away so that the bank can be robbed, or the robbers being told when money is brought to the bank vault, may be given as examples of this situation.

2. Secondary Moral Participation

Secondary moral participation is regulated in Art. 65(1) and (2) TCK. Accordingly, “encouraging the commission of an offence”, “reinforcing the decision to perpetrate the offence”, “promising to give support and assistance after the act has been committed” and “giving instructions as to how the offence is to be committed” constitute the cases of secondary moral participation.

“Encouraging the commission of an offence”, which the code lists as one of the forms of secondary moral participation, denotes causing a perpetrator who has the thought of committing an offence but has not yet made up his mind to decide to commit it. “Reinforcing the decision to perpetrate the offence” means encouraging a perpetrator who has decided to commit an offence to carry out the acts constituting the material element of the offence. “Giving support and assistance after the act has been committed” refers to giving the perpetrator, before the offence is committed, a promise that he will be helped if he carries out the offence. “Giving instructions” means guiding the perpetrator before the acts of execution constituting the offence are begun, explaining the manner in which the offence is to be committed70.

3. Necessary Secondary Participation

The case in which a person takes part in the commission of the offence by one of the forms of secondary participation explained above, but the offence could not have been carried out without that contribution, is regulated in the last sentence of Art. 65(2) TCK. In legal scholarship this situation is called “necessary secondary participation”. Under the provision of the code, although in this case the person’s act is at the level of secondary participation, on account of the degree of his contribution to the occurrence of the offence his penalty is to be the full penalty prescribed for the offence, without reduction, as in the case of principal participation71.

An example is where the friend standing beside one of two persons who are fighting hands him the pistol he has drawn from his belt, and the person who takes the pistol fires it and kills the other person involved in the fight. As can be seen here, had the necessary secondary perpetrator not handed over the pistol, the offence of homicide could not have been carried out.

C. The Effect on Accomplices of Circumstances Affecting the Penalty

Another important matter in the field of complicity, on which many views have been put forward and various debates have taken place, is the effect on accomplices of circumstances affecting the penalty, in other words the question whether these circumstances pass to the accomplices (their communicability).

A circumstance affecting the penalty is defined as a factor which does not change the type (legal characterisation) of the offence but has a bearing on the nature of the offence, which is relevant to the offence being regarded as more or less serious, and which lies outside the elements of the offence72.

Since TCK No. 765 was drafted under the influence of the classical view of criminal law, this code makes provision for circumstances affecting the penalty outside the elements of the offence; TCK No. 765 therefore contains articles on both circumstances mitigating the penalty and circumstances aggravating it73. Although for certain offence types TCK No. 765 specifies, in the articles governing them, circumstances that remove or mitigate the penalty, there is no general provision as to their effect on accomplices. As regards the effect of aggravating circumstances on accomplices, however, general provisions are laid down in Articles 66 and 6774. These circumstances will be explained briefly below.

1. Personal Circumstances Affecting the Penalty

Personal circumstances affecting the penalty are divided into two: personal mitigating circumstances and personal aggravating circumstances.

a. Personal Mitigating Circumstances

Personal circumstances mitigating the penalty do not affect the penalty of the accomplices. They take effect only for the accomplice in whose person the personal mitigating circumstance is present (as, for example, in Art. 285(2) TCK and Art. 523 TCK); consequently TCK No. 765 contains no general provision on this matter75.

b. Personal Aggravating Circumstances

The effect on accomplices of personal circumstances aggravating the penalty is expressly regulated in Art. 66 TCK. Accordingly, where aggravating circumstances of a personal nature are known to those taking part in the offence, the aggravating circumstance is also to be applied to those who know of it76. This requirement of knowledge must have been fulfilled at the time when the accessories declared their will in respect of the complicity or acted with that will77. Moreover, as regards whether the personal aggravating circumstance is present in the principal or the secondary perpetrator, the code draws no distinction; in both cases the aggravating circumstance in question is to be applied to the accomplices who know of it78.

The acceptance that personal aggravating circumstances also affect the other accomplices has met with criticism in legal scholarship. On this point some authors, giving examples from comparative law, criticise the provision on the ground that only personal aggravating circumstances present in the principal perpetrator should also affect the other accomplices and that it is inappropriate for a personal aggravating circumstance present in the secondary perpetrator to have effect on the other accomplices; it is also stated that it is a deficiency for the TCK to content itself in this respect with the requirement of knowledge alone, and that the failure to require, as the source code does, that the circumstance should facilitate the commission of the offence makes the provision even more questionable79. Again, some authors state that it is a deficiency to be content with the requirement of knowledge alone and that, in addition, the requirement of facilitating the commission of the offence should also be imposed80. Other authors state that this provision is wrong from the standpoint of the principle of the general theory of the offence concerning complicity and that it should therefore be removed from the code81.

Indeed, it does not appear to be a just arrangement for personal aggravating circumstances to have effect on the other accomplices. As the name itself indicates, personal circumstances should take effect for the perpetrator to whom they apply. A person who helps another to kill his father does not act with the thought of “killing a father” but only with the thought of “killing some person”. Likewise, it is equally unnecessary for a personal aggravating circumstance that applies to the secondary perpetrator to pass to the other accomplices82.

Under Art. 66 TCK, where personal circumstances aggravating the penalty affect the other accomplices, provision is also made for a reduction by a certain proportion in the penalty of the accomplices whose penalty has been increased. That is to say, the penalty of the accomplices will first be increased on account of the personal aggravating circumstance, and then, under Art. 66(2), a reduction will be made in the case of aggravated life imprisonment and life imprisonment, while for other penalties the making of a reduction will be left to the discretion of the judge.

2. Act-Related Circumstances Affecting the Penalty

Act-related circumstances affecting the penalty are likewise divided into two: act-related mitigating circumstances and act-related aggravating circumstances.

a. Act-Related Mitigating Circumstances

There are differing views in legal scholarship on act-related circumstances mitigating the penalty. Some authors state that, since TCK No. 765 contains no general provision on act-related mitigating circumstances, these will not affect the penalty of the accomplices and will take effect only for the accomplice in whose person the act-related mitigating circumstance is present83. Other authors state that the rule for act-related mitigating circumstances is that they have effect on all accomplices, because these circumstances affect the material existence of the offence84. The authors who hold this second view further state that, although the TCK contains no express provision in this respect, act-related mitigating circumstances ought to have effect on all accomplices, but that it is debatable whether this is a matter of the effect on accomplices of circumstances affecting the penalty at all85.

In the light of the explanations given above, the conclusion reached is that, since the TCK contains no provision on act-related mitigating circumstances, the principle of legality of offences and penalties does not allow such an effect to be applied by way of interpretation86. For this reason act-related mitigating circumstances will be valid only for the person to whom they relate and will have no effect on the penalty of the other persons taking part in the offence.

b. Act-Related Aggravating Circumstances

The effect on accomplices of act-related circumstances aggravating the penalty is in turn regulated in Art. 67 TCK. Accordingly, these circumstances may relate solely to the nature of the act, or they may also be circumstances that change the legal characterisation of the offence87.

Act-related aggravating circumstances are generally circumstances that concern the means by which the offence is committed and that render the act more serious. Examples are committing an offence in disguise (Arts. 493(3), 497 TCK), using deceit and force in the commission of the offence (Arts. 175, 179, 495 TCK) and committing the offence with a weapon (Art. 457 TCK)88.

Where aggravating circumstances of an act-related nature are known to those taking part in the offence, the aggravating circumstance is also to be applied to those who know of it89; consequently, knowledge of the circumstance is essential for act-related aggravating circumstances to have effect on the accomplices as well. For the act-related circumstance to have effect on the other accomplices, it makes no difference whether it is present in the principal perpetrator or in the secondary perpetrator90.

Unlike the corresponding article of the source code and unlike Article 66, Art. 67 TCK requires that the knowledge exist at the time when the act is carried out. This provision concerning the moment of knowledge is rightly criticised in legal scholarship91.

VI. The Regulation of Complicity in YTCK No. 5237

A. The System Provided For

The systems for determining liability in complicity were pointed out above, and it was noted that of these the dualist system was adopted by TCK No. 765.

As for YTCK No. 5237, the explanatory memorandum to Article 37, in which complicity is regulated in the code, states that this system and its twofold distinction have been abandoned. The reasons given for this are that “the most significant drawback of this system is that the person’s contribution to the commission of the offence is considered not within the totality of the offence carried out but independently of it” and that the distinction between “principal participation” and “secondary participation” “results in punishment that is neither just nor equal and gives rise to difficulties and hesitations in practice”92. However, as will be seen from the detailed explanations given below, although the system has changed from a theoretical point of view, the provisions contained in the TCK have been continued, in particular through the provisions made under the headings of instigation and aiding93.

It should also be noted that the legislature, as it also stated in its explanatory memorandum, spoke of the drawbacks of the dualist system but did not create any marked difference between the provisions of the dualist system and the new system. In addition, the explanatory memorandum that seeks to explain the change of system is itself inadequate, and why it was necessary to make a change from a theoretical point of view has, again, not been explained in theoretical terms.

The explanatory memorandum to Art. 37 YTCK states that the principle of “control established over the act” was taken as the basis for determining the perpetrator and, depending on that, for determining the forms of participation, that is, the accessories. The explanatory memorandum to the article states that complicity consists of the rules concerning the determination of the liability of those who contribute to the offence and that, under the new system introduced, the forms of taking part in the offence are “perpetration, instigation and aiding”94.

It will give a better result to offer an explanation as to which system the code has adopted for determining the liability of those taking part in the offence after the provisions on complicity in the YTCK have been examined.

B. Perpetration

It was stated above that the dualist system has been abandoned in YTCK No. 5237. As a result, there are two main categories in the YTCK, “perpetrator” and “accessory”, and beyond this these forms of taking part in the offence are not divided into “principal” and “secondary”. The perpetrator is the person who directly commits the offence, and the accessory is the person who gives assistance in the commission of the offence or who instigates it.

In Art. 37 YTCK, under the heading of perpetration, paragraph 1 regulates “direct perpetration” and paragraph 2 “indirect perpetration”.

1. The Direct Perpetrator

According to Art. 37(1) YTCK, “each of the persons who jointly carry out the act contained in the statutory definition of the offence shall be liable as a perpetrator”. The person who personally performs the act that brings about the offence, the acts of execution, is the direct perpetrator95. This article was drafted to take the place of the “principal material perpetrator” regulated in Art. 64(1) TCK. Since under the new system introduced by the YTCK instigation is not regarded as perpetration, instigation is not included in this article.

In legal scholarship some authors criticise as mistaken the requirement, for the purposes of complicity, that the acts defined in the code be performed, arguing that in that case complicity can be applied only in an extremely narrow field96. Indeed, although it would have been a more appropriate provision not to use this expression and to speak instead of “those who commit the offence” jointly, the use of this expression is not very detrimental either; for the perpetrator is the person who carries out the act in the statutory definition of the offence, and that is what the expression in question states.

It is stated in legal scholarship that the provision on perpetration in Art. 37(1) YTCK was taken from Art. 25 of the German Criminal Code, but that the provision defining the perpetrator in Art. 25(1) of the German Criminal Code, according to which “whoever commits the offence himself or through another person shall be punished as a perpetrator”, was not carried over into the YTCK, that the reason for this cannot be understood and that it creates a gap in the code97.

In fact there is no need for the code to contain a definition of the perpetrator in such express terms; for who the perpetrator is, and in which cases an individual is regarded as a perpetrator and held liable for the acts he has carried out, is clearly set out in legal scholarship and in practice. Defining every concept in criminal codes may lead to a casuistic method and may also narrow the code’s field of application in a negative way that conflicts with the criminal policy pursued. However, given the method adopted in this code, it is a significant deficiency that co-perpetration and indirect perpetration are defined under the heading of the perpetrator while the perpetrator, who is the main subject and the heading of the section, is not defined.

2. The Co-perpetrator

Art. 37(1) YTCK regulates not only the case of a single person being the perpetrator but also co-perpetration. It was stated above that, when the subject of complicity was regulated in the YTCK, the drafters were influenced by the current doctrines of German criminal law. One concrete example of this is seen in the regulation of the institution of co-perpetration in Article 37 and, in particular, in the explanatory memorandum to the article on this point. The explanatory memorandum states that two conditions must be present for co-perpetration to arise, one being “the requirement that the perpetrators establish joint control over the act” and the other “the existence of a decision to commit the offence together”. Where these two criteria are present, co-perpetration will have arisen and all the perpetrators will receive the full penalty prescribed for the offence. The criteria in question are as follows:

a. Establishing Control over the Commission of the Offence

Establishing control over the commission of the offence means establishing control over a part of the act constituting the offence in accordance with the division of labour between the perpetrators. In co-perpetration the basis of liability does not rest on the accessoriness rule, as it does in accessoryship; the perpetrators are liable for the act that they themselves have carried out in accordance with the division of labour98.

Whether control over the act has been established is determined by having regard to the tasks that the accomplices have assumed in the commission of the offence and to the importance and necessity of that task for the occurrence of the offence. This will not, however, be an assessment made retrospectively, after the act has been completed and the offence has come into being, along the lines of “would the offence have occurred had it not been for the act carried out by one of the perpetrators”. Without regard to the result that has occurred, the conduct performed by the perpetrator – which is a part of the act – and the importance of that conduct for the coming into being of the concrete act will be assessed, and the decision will be made accordingly. Indeed, this is clearly expressed in the explanatory memorandum to the article as well99.

For example, in the robbery of a jeweller’s shop, the person who gathers up the gold and the money and puts them in a bag, the person who points a gun at the jeweller’s employees and ensures that they remain passive, and even the person who waits at the door of the shop and, by preventing anyone from entering, prevents the police from being alerted, have control over the act of robbery carried out to the same degree. Gathering up the gold and the money, keeping the employees neutralised and preventing the police from being alerted are equally important and effective for carrying out the act of robbery successfully. For this reason, in the example in question everyone who contributes to the occurrence of the offence is in the position of a co-perpetrator as referred to in Art. 37(1) YTCK.

However, it may not be the case in every incident, as it is in the example above, that the acts of the perpetrators contributing to the offence complement one another. An example is where five persons come together and agree to lay an ambush on the road along which their common enemy will pass, and when the person regarded as an enemy passes that spot all five fire at once, some of the bullets hitting the victim and others missing, but with the result that they bring about the death of their common enemy.

Here each perpetrator performs the same act of execution with the same intent to commit the offence, and through the participation of more persons they make the occurrence of the result they aim at a stronger probability. Here it no longer matters from whose gun the bullet that caused the death came. In pointing their guns and firing at their common enemy, the perpetrators manifest the same resolve to commit the offence and violate the legal interest protected by the same offence. And in the end they bring about the result they aimed at. For this reason, in the situation in question all the perpetrators must receive the full penalty prescribed for the offence100.

Particularly in the offences of intentional homicide and intentional bodily harm, where in examples similar to the one given above there are co-perpetrators and it is not clear whose weapon caused the death or the bodily harm, there is a view in legal scholarship101 and in the decisions of the Court of Cassation102 that the penalty should be reduced under Art. 463 TCK, and in the face of the article of the code this practice and view is a necessity. In addition, there are also views in legal scholarship that criticise this view and show that it is not appropriate from the standpoint of the general theory of the offence103.

In the face of the express provision of Art. 37 YTCK and of the explanatory memorandum to the article on this point104, it will no longer be possible to apply a reduction to acts of this kind. Indeed, in keeping with the legislature’s view on this matter, the YTCK contains no similar provision corresponding to Art. 463 TCK. Consequently, of the views found in legal scholarship, the one mentioned above that criticises the provision has also been adopted by the legislature, and the intention has been to put an end to the unjust practices in this area.

Another matter that needs to be considered here is contribution to preparatory acts. It must be said at once that co-perpetration does not arise where a contribution has been made merely to preparatory acts and there has been no participation in the acts of execution, or where the offence has remained at the degree of attempt without the acts of execution having been embarked upon. For in that case there is no establishment of control over the act. A person who performs acts of this kind will be regarded as an accessory (aider)105.

b. The Decision to Commit the Offence Together

A further condition necessary for co-perpetration is that there should be a decision between the perpetrators to commit the offence together. This must take the form of a will and knowledge on the part of all the perpetrators directed at carrying out an act together and thereby attaining a result. The explanatory memorandum to the article says that this resolve must be thought of within the concept of intent106; but this is a mistaken explanation, because intent is an element necessary for the offence, whereas the decision is broader than intent and is, rather, the will relating to the commission of that offence together with others.

Moreover, for complicity to be spoken of, where the offence type requires, beyond the general intent to commit the offence, a motive, that is, specific intent, this specific intent too must be shared by all the perpetrators107. Otherwise one cannot speak of a decision to commit the offence together or, consequently, of co-perpetration.

The fact that the accomplices carry out their acts under different types of intent, such as direct intent or conditional intent (dolus eventualis), does not, on the other hand, affect co-perpetration. For example, where two persons place a bomb in front of a shopping centre in order to carry out a terrorist act, one of the perpetrators wants several people to die as well after the bomb explodes, while the other foresees this but remains indifferent. As a result of the act of homicide that occurs after the bomb explodes, both perpetrators will be regarded as co-perpetrators under Art. 37(1) YTCK and will receive the penalty prescribed for the offence committed. This is also stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article108.

For a decision to commit the offence together to be spoken of, it must exist before the offence is committed or while the acts of execution are being performed. Otherwise, where one of the perpetrators is carrying out the acts of execution of the offence and the other perpetrator comes along and contributes to the offence, one can no longer speak of a decision to commit the offence together; here the situation of the person who contributes to the offence without the other’s knowledge corresponds to accessoryship (a person aiding the offence)109. Indeed, this is also stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article110.

If, during the commission of the offence, one of the co-perpetrators goes beyond the limits of the offence they decided to commit and commits a more serious offence, there will be co-perpetration in respect of the offence type they decided upon and sole perpetration in respect of the offence type carried out in excess of those limits. For example, in a theft carried out by pickpocketing, where the victim notices the act and one of the perpetrators thereupon draws a weapon and, using force, commits the offence of robbery regulated in Art. 148 YTCK, the perpetrator who does not take part in the offence of robbery will be punished for the offence type decided upon, namely the offence of aggravated theft regulated in Art. 142 YTCK, while the perpetrator who points the weapon and uses force will be punished alone for the offence of robbery regulated in Art. 148 YTCK.

As for the liability of co-perpetrators for offences aggravated by their result111, the perpetrators between whom there is a decision to commit the offence together will be held liable as co-perpetrators for the act they have carried out in respect of the basic form of the offence. As regards the serious result that has occurred, the perpetrator or perpetrators among the co-perpetrators who caused that serious result at least by negligent conduct will be liable for it; perpetrators who are not culpable even to the degree of negligence in respect of the serious result that has occurred cannot be held liable for it112.

Under the provisions of TCK No. 765, by contrast, in the case of an aggravated result co-perpetrators are held liable for the result that has occurred whether they have acted negligently or are entirely without culpability. Since Art. 23 of YTCK No. 5237, by stating that “where an act causes a result that is more serious than or different from the one intended, the person must have acted at least negligently with regard to that result in order to be held liable for it”, requires that the perpetrator has acted at least negligently in order to be held liable for offences aggravated by their result, for co-perpetration to arise these perpetrators will have to have acted at least negligently with regard to the aggravated result; persons who are not culpable even to the degree of negligence cannot be held liable for the result that has occurred and therefore cannot be regarded as co-perpetrators either. As can be seen, Art. 23 YTCK, referred to above, has made a positive provision as regards liability for offences aggravated by their result.

3. The Indirect Perpetrator

In the provisions of TCK No. 765 the institution of indirect perpetration is not regulated in general, nor is there any provision on the subject for particular cases. The legislature took into account the criticism made in legal scholarship that this created a gap in the criminal code, and indirect perpetration, hitherto accepted by scholarship and practice, has been turned into an article of the code by the YTCK113.

In Art. 37(2) YTCK indirect perpetration is regulated as follows: “a person who uses another as an instrument in the commission of the offence shall also be held liable as a perpetrator”. As is clear from the express wording of the code and as is also stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article114, in indirect perpetration the person in the background establishes a superior control over the person who carries out the acts of execution constituting the offence and over that person’s conduct.

The important point to be noted here is the difference between the indirect perpetrator and the instigator. The indirect perpetrator keeps events under his own control from beginning to end. The person who carries out the acts of execution of the offence merely does what he is told, like a robot, and merely serves as an intermediary for the act carried out, without willing it; that is to say, in indirect perpetration one of the persons becomes the instrument of the other. In instigation, by contrast, a person causes someone who has no decision to commit an offence to take such a decision and persuades the perpetrator to that effect, but thereafter the instigated person commits the offence of his own will, also using his own initiative115.

In indirect perpetration it is not the person who performs the actual acts of execution but the person who is in the background and brings about the offence by using the person serving as an instrument who is liable and is punished with the sanction prescribed for the offence.

The second sentence of Art. 37(2) YTCK, in which indirect perpetration is regulated, lays down a general aggravating circumstance and provides that the penalty to be imposed is to be increased by one third to one half where persons lacking capacity for culpability are used by the indirect perpetrator as instruments in the commission of the offence116. There are two reasons for providing for this aggravating circumstance. One is, as also stated in the explanatory memorandum to the code, the exploitation of persons lacking capacity for culpability; the other is that it is easier to persuade such persons lacking capacity for culpability and to steer them towards committing an offence117.

However, the provision in question is so structured as to be capable of causing confusion. As stated above, the second paragraph, in which the aggravating circumstance is laid down, speaks of “the cases that remove capacity for culpability” but does not indicate which cases these are. In Arts. 24-34 YTCK, under the heading “cases removing and reducing criminal responsibility”, the cases removing culpability and the cases removing criminal responsibility are, mistakenly, regulated in the same place. In legal scholarship too there are debates as to which responsibility these remove; the manner in which this paragraph is drafted is therefore contrary to the principle of definiteness. Accordingly, where persons lacking capacity for culpability are used by the indirect perpetrator, his penalty will be increased.

As explained above, persons who secure control over the act, whether directly or indirectly, and whose contribution to the offence is substantial will, under the provisions of the YTCK, be regarded as perpetrators and punished with the full sanction prescribed for the offence.

As a natural consequence of the abandonment of the dualist system in the YTCK, there is no longer any need for a provision on necessary secondary participation either. Indeed, the reason given for including that provision was the wish to overcome certain problems created by the dualist system. In the new system, in which the perpetrator is determined according to the criterion of establishing control over the act explained above, persons who were formerly characterised as necessary secondary accessories but were punished with the full penalty prescribed for the offence will henceforth be correctly characterised as perpetrators and will be punished accordingly as co-perpetrators of the offence.

C. Accessoryship

It was stated above that the YTCK introduced the distinction between perpetrator and accessory. The accessory is the person who has no control over the act constituting the offence and whose act is not as important as that of the person executing the offence, but who nevertheless contributes to the commission of the offence and thereby shows the will to take part in it.

When accessoryship was explained above from a theoretical point of view, it was stated that “the rules on accessoryship are rules that extend the article governing the main offence to persons other than the perpetrator, that in this respect the rules on accessoryship are supplementary in nature, and that, as a natural consequence, if the rules on accessoryship are not contained in the criminal code, it is not possible to hold liable for the offence and to punish persons who contribute to the offence but cannot be regarded as perpetrators”. It is for this reason that accessoryship is expressly regulated in Arts. 38 and 39 YTCK.

As the types of accessoryship, Art. 38 YTCK regulates the cases of “instigation” and Art. 39 those of “aiding”.

However, there is a principle, called the “accessoriness rule”, which is necessary for accessories to be held liable for another’s act. This principle, whose existence has hitherto been accepted in legal scholarship, has been turned into an article of the code by Art. 40 of YTCK No. 5237. Here, however, an important criticism of the code must be made.

There is no need for the accessoriness rule to be expressly regulated in Art. 40 YTCK. This is a rule that has already been debated and resolved in legal scholarship and whose existence is accepted. In this way the field of work of scholarship, which is one of the important sources ensuring the development of the law, has been restricted and its hands have been tied by the provision in the code. This in turn will prevent new theories on the subject that may emerge in the future from being applied to it.

In addition, in the article in question, under the heading of the accessoriness rule, paragraph 2 contains the “provision on complicity in special offences” and paragraph 3 the “provision to the effect that, for complicity to arise, the act must at least have remained at the degree of attempt”, neither of which has anything to do with the accessoriness rule. While it was unnecessary to regulate the accessoriness rule in the code at all, the further regulation of unrelated matters under this heading has made Art. 40 YTCK wholly defective. It should be stated that the most appropriate solution would be for this article not to be included in the text of the code.

For a better understanding of accessoryship, the accessoriness rule will first be explained below, followed by instigation and aiding, which are the types of accessoryship.

1. The Accessoriness Rule

For participation in an offence as an accessory to be spoken of, there must be an act committed by another person which conforms to the statutory definition and constitutes an offence. For the accessories (the instigator or the aider) to be held liable for this act carried out by another, a legal link is needed; in legal scholarship this is called the accessoriness rule118.

The accessoriness rule takes the place of the conditions that are indispensable for perpetration where those conditions are absent, and in this way ensures the liability of the accessories for the offence committed. Thus an accomplice who cannot establish control over the act or who does not possess the special quality required of the perpetrator, and who for that reason cannot be regarded as a perpetrator, is held liable for the offence committed by virtue of the accessoriness rule119.

By virtue of the accessoriness rule, for the instigator or the aider to be held liable for the offence committed, the perpetrator must have committed the offence intentionally and the act must be unlawful. In other words, there can be no accessoryship in respect of an offence committed negligently. Likewise, where there is a ground of justification in respect of the act carried out by the perpetrator, the act will not constitute an offence, and so there can be no instigation of, or aiding in, an offence that has not come into being.

Under the accessoriness rule, for the accessories to be held liable for the offence it is not necessary that the perpetrator who carries out the act constituting the offence should have capacity for culpability. For example, where a mentally ill person lacking capacity for culpability is instigated to kill someone and is provided with a weapon, and the mentally ill person thereupon kills the person indicated with the weapon, although the mentally ill person lacking capacity for culpability cannot be punished for the offence he has committed, this lack of capacity for culpability will not, by virtue of the accessoriness rule, pass to the person who instigated him and aided him by providing the weapon, and this person (or these persons) will be held liable for the offence committed and punished in the manner laid down for them in the code.

Likewise, by virtue of the accessoriness rule, personal circumstances that mitigate or remove the penalty will produce effects only for the accomplice concerned. For example, a person who instigates someone who, because of hunger of a degree that endangers human health, is in a state of necessity to enter a bakery and steal bread will be punished for instigation to the offence of theft, whereas the person who carries out the act will not be punished, pursuant to Art. 24(2) YTCK.

As a natural consequence of the accessoriness rule, YTCK No. 5237 does not include the articles on the application of “personal and act-related aggravating circumstances” to accessories that were contained in TCK No. 765 and in the government draft. For once the dualist system had been abandoned and a kind of system of determining the penalty according to the perpetrator adopted, and the accessoriness rule consequently given express recognition, there was no longer any need to divide aggravating circumstances into personal and act-related ones or to specify them separately in the text of the code. Indeed, there are views in legal scholarship to the effect that the inclusion of provisions of this kind in an article of the code is inappropriate because it is incompatible with the general theory of the offence120.

2. Instigation

Art. 38 YTCK regulates instigation, which is one type of accessoryship, by stating that “a person who instigates another to commit an offence shall be punished with the penalty for the offence committed”. The fact that no definition of instigation is given in the article of the code has been criticised in legal scholarship121; indeed, it is a significant deficiency that such a detailed provision on instigation has been introduced without the concept of instigation being defined. Either instigation should not have been regulated in such detail and the explanation of the subject should have been left to scholarship and practice, or a definition of instigation should also have been included within so detailed a provision.

As a result of the YTCK’s not accepting the dualist system for determining liability in complicity, instigation has ceased to be principal moral participation and has been treated as a type of accessoryship.

In the assessment of the provisions of TCK No. 765, instigation was explained, under the influence of the dualist system as well, “as principal perpetration on account of the penalty prescribed”. This, however, cannot fully explain the effect of instigation, because in instigation there is no direct contribution to the act constituting the material element of the offence. With the abandonment of the dualist system in the field of complicity by YTCK No. 5237 and the adoption of the principle of “control over the act” for determining the criminal responsibility of the perpetrators in complicity, instigation has been regulated not as a type of perpetration but, consistently with that principle, as a type of accessoryship; for in instigation the instigator has no control over the act constituting the offence. This is an appropriate provision; although it is provided that the instigator is to receive, like the perpetrator, the full penalty for the offence, this is a result of the importance the legislature attaches to instigation and not because instigation is, from a theoretical point of view, a type of perpetration.

In instigation, the principal material perpetrator, who has no thought whatsoever of committing an offence in his mind, is caused to take the decision to commit an offence122. Consequently, instigation can arise only in respect of an offence type that can be committed intentionally. Since instigation is the deliberate creation of a moral influence directed at the carrying out of the act, it is not possible for instigation to be effected by an omission; instigation is a type of positive conduct123.

The act of instigation itself must also be performed intentionally by the person doing it. In doing so, the perpetrator must be influenced in the direction of whichever offence it is desired that he commit, and the person against whom the act is to be directed must also be determined; apart from this, however, it is not necessary for instigation that the place and time at which the act is to be carried out be indicated. Moreover, the instigated person, that is, the perpetrator who is to carry out the offence, must also be identified. Acts directed at instigation that are performed without this being determined will – provided the other conditions are also fulfilled – amount to the offence of “incitement to commit an offence” regulated in Art. 214 YTCK, which replaces Art. 311 TCK124.

For instigation to arise, by virtue of the accessoriness rule the instigated act must be carried out by the perpetrator or at least remain at the degree of attempt; otherwise this is called “unsuccessful instigation”, and in that case no penalty is imposed on the instigator125.

The most important difference between instigation and the act of “encouraging the commission of an offence or strengthening the decision to commit an offence” provided for in aiding, the other type of accessoryship, is that in instigation the perpetrator has no prior thought of committing an offence in his mind. In aiding, the other type of accessoryship, by contrast, the perpetrator already has a previously formed thought of committing an offence, but this thought is strengthened by the aider126.

Art. 38(2) YTCK, in which instigation is regulated, lays down a general aggravating circumstance for instigation. Accordingly, where instigation is effected by using the influence arising from the relationship between ascendants and descendants, the instigator’s penalty is to be increased by one third to one half. Where children are instigated to commit an offence, the existence of a relationship between ascendant and descendant will not even be required. The reason for introducing this general aggravating circumstance was the “honour killings” which, particularly in recent times, have provoked public reaction in our country. In these acts of homicide, families living within a feudal structure take advantage of the relationship between ascendants and descendants, at times bring pressure to bear on a perpetrator of child age and, by instigating him to the offence, bring about the act of homicide. The same social situation and necessity also hold for acts of homicide committed in pursuit of blood feuds, which continue today in diminishing numbers. It was with these and similar offence types and purposes in mind that the legislature made the general aggravating circumstance in question for instigation the subject of regulation.

However, a mistaken reasoning has been given as the ground for regulating this aggravating circumstance for instigation. According to it, the legal basis of this aggravating circumstance is that “the fact of instigation in itself expresses a wrong.” This is a mistaken reasoning, because, while it is true that instigation in itself expresses a wrong and reveals a will to commit an offence, this could be the reasoning for a provision under which the instigator is punished even though the offence has not been carried out; and where the instigator is punished despite the offence not having been committed, it can be said that “instigation in itself is the expression of a wrong” and that for this reason this conduct is punished although no offence has been committed. But making the instigation of children an aggravating circumstance has nothing to do with this reasoning; the reason for this aggravating circumstance is as explained above.

In a code that is claimed to have been drafted by moving away from the theory of the offence and in accordance with the findings of modern criminal policy, the inclusion of a general aggravating circumstance with a particular region and a limited number of incidents in mind is wholly incompatible with the contemporary principles that are said to prevail throughout the code127.

Paragraph 3 of the same article, in which instigation is regulated, this time lays down a general mitigating circumstance for instigation. Accordingly, “where the instigator is unknown, in respect of the perpetrator or other accomplice who enables his identity to be established” the penalty may be reduced. The reason given for this is to facilitate prosecution128.

It must be stated plainly here that the inclusion in criminal codes of an expression that lacks certainty conflicts with the principle of definiteness that applies in criminal law. Indeed, the inclusion in paragraph 3 of Article 38, in which instigation is regulated, of an open-ended expression such as “may be imposed” conflicts with the principle of definiteness. For this reason the drafting of the paragraph under examination is defective; either this paragraph should not be included at all, or a definite expression such as “shall be imposed” should be used.

This provision is interesting in particular in that it shows the importance the legislature attaches to instigation. Where the perpetrator, or in complicity the perpetrators, disclose the instigator, their penalties may be reduced by the proportion specified in the code; this reduction is not mandatory, however, and discretion in the matter is left to the judge. The condition for the exercise of this discretion is that the information given about the instigator should enable the material truth to be established. By contrast, disclosure of the instigator by the aider, as one of the accessories, has not been provided for as a mitigating circumstance for the aider. This provision is rightly criticised in legal scholarship on the grounds that it creates “the esteemed citizen informer”129, that perpetrators may mislead the courts by giving the names of persons towards whom they harbour ill feelings130, and that it is contradictory to grant a reduction to the person who reveals the instigator while granting none to the person who reveals the perpetrator131.

The provision in question is not appropriate, because, as the authors who criticise it also point out, it asks people to act as informers. Moreover, the fact that such a ground for reduction has been provided for revealing the instigator while no such ground for reduction has been provided for revealing the perpetrator or the aider is not explained in the explanatory memorandum to the code, nor does it seem possible to explain it logically.

In conclusion, as regards instigation, when the provisions of TCK No. 765 are compared with those of YTCK No. 5237, no great difference is to be seen, particularly from the standpoint of practice, apart from the general aggravating and mitigating circumstances provided for instigation in the YTCK. The difference has been made at the theoretical level, and instigation has been taken out of principal perpetration and regulated as a type of accessoryship.

However, this provision is not such as to invalidate practice or the decisions of the Court of Cassation delivered on this matter before the entry into force of the YTCK. Yet it does not seem possible to understand the need for a theoretical change that has no effect whatsoever on practice. Apart from this, the conditions necessary for instigation, which are explained in detail in legal scholarship, will also hold for instigation as regulated in Art. 38 YTCK.

3. Aiding

Art. 39 YTCK regulates “aiding”132, the other form of accessoryship133. The explanatory memorandum to the code states that this article was drafted by adhering to the article on “secondary participation” in the government draft. Indeed, when the article is examined, it is seen to be largely similar to the article in the government draft, and it is also largely similar to Article 65, in which secondary participation is regulated in TCK No. 765.

Art. 39(2) YTCK sets out one by one what the cases of aiding an offence are. Accordingly, aiding, which is one type of accessoryship, arises where one or several of the following acts are performed: “encouraging the commission of an offence or strengthening the decision to commit an offence or promising to give assistance after the act has been committed, giving guidance as to how the offence is to be committed or providing the means used in the commission of the act, facilitating its execution by giving assistance before or during the commission of the offence”134.

“Encouraging the commission of an offence”, which the code lists as one of the forms of aiding, denotes causing a perpetrator who has the thought of committing an offence but has not yet made up his mind to decide to commit it. “Strengthening the decision to commit an offence”, for its part, means supporting the decision of a perpetrator who has decided to commit an offence to carry out the acts constituting the material element of the offence, reinforcing his decision in that direction.

“Promising to give assistance after the act has been committed” refers to giving the perpetrator, before the offence is committed, a promise that he will be helped if he carries out the offence. “Giving guidance”, for its part, means explaining to the perpetrator, before the acts of execution constituting the offence are begun, the manner in which the offence is to be committed, in such a way as to guide him in its commission135.

Another of the forms of aiding listed in the code is providing the means used in the commission of the act. These means to be used in the commission of the act must be provided before the offence is committed. For example, the weapon to be used in the offence must be brought and handed over to the perpetrator beforehand. Furthermore, the means provided must be suitable for the commission of the offence and must be used in carrying it out. Otherwise there will be no aiding and hence no accessoryship136.

The last case regulated in Art. 39 YTCK with regard to aiding is set out in sub-paragraph “c” of paragraph 2. Accordingly, facilitating the execution of the offence by giving assistance before or during its commission is also a case of accessoryship in the form of aiding. Every kind of help that facilitates the commission of the offence is included here. As is also apparent from the express wording of the article, this help may be given before the offence is carried out or while it is being committed137. However, if the help given before the commission of the offence is in the nature of an act of execution constituting the material element of the offence, a case of perpetration arises, since this situation will then fall within the scope of a preparatory act. This distinction is to be drawn by the judge in each concrete case138.

For aiding to arise, by virtue of the accessoriness rule the act that is aided must be carried out by the perpetrator or at least remain at the degree of attempt; otherwise accessoryship in the form of aiding does not arise.

Furthermore, aiding an offence must be done intentionally; negligent aiding is not punished. Likewise, the offence type aided must be an offence committed intentionally. As a consequence of aiding being intentional, the offence aided must be a concrete, identifiable offence. For this reason, aiding organisations formed to commit offences is regulated in criminal codes as a separate offence type139.

As is clearly seen from the explanations given above and from a comparison of Art. 65 TCK with Art. 39 YTCK, there is no difference between the two articles. All the cases of secondary material and secondary moral participation regulated in Art. 65 TCK have been regulated within the case of “aiding”, which the YTCK accepts as a type of accessoryship, and the provision made corresponds to them one to one140. This will mean that no difference arises in practice and that the judicial decisions delivered on this subject to date remain valid as they stand.

D. The Stage the Act Must Have Reached in Complicity

Paragraph 3 of Article 40, in which the accessoriness rule in complicity is regulated, specifies the stage that the offence must have reached for a person to be held liable for complicity. As stated above, it was entirely mistaken to regulate, and moreover under an unrelated heading, a matter that ought to have been left to scholarship and that had in any case been resolved at the theoretical level.

By reason of the quantitative effect of the accessoriness rule and as a condition of complicity, in order for a person to be held liable as an accessory in the form of an instigator or an aider, the offence instigated or aided must have been completed or must at least have remained at the degree of attempt. There can be no accessoryship on account of an act that has as yet remained at the stage of preparatory acts and has not reached the degree of attempt. This is also clearly stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article141.

E. Complicity in Special Offences

Another situation regulated within the accessoriness rule is the subject of participation in special offences, which is dealt with in paragraph 2 of Article 40. It should be said at once that, as stated above, it was a mistake both to regulate this subject too in the code and to regulate it under an unrelated heading.

Special offences concern a characteristic which, in offence types contained in the special parts of criminal codes, is required in the perpetrator for the offence to be capable of being committed. Thus in these offence types characteristics attaching to the person are required, such as that the perpetrator be a public official (the offence of embezzlement) or, according to the general view in legal scholarship, a man (rape).

By virtue of the accessoriness rule and Art. 40(2) YTCK, in special offences only a person who has the special quality of perpetrator is liable for the offence as a perpetrator. The other persons taking part in offences of this kind can only be accessories, as instigators or aiders. However, where, as for example in the offence of embezzlement, the perpetrator is used under the influence of force and threat by way of indirect perpetration, the persons in the background who use this person must be punished for the offence of embezzlement exactly as if they were public officials142.

Complicity is possible in these offence types. It is also possible for persons who do not have the perpetrator characteristic specific to these offences to participate in them. In that case, however, the accomplice must know of this characteristic of the perpetrator143.

Participation in a special offence in multi-perpetrator offences, however, presents particular features. For the offence of taking a bribe regulated in Art. 212 of TCK No. 765 to be committed, there must be a person who takes the bribe and also a person who gives it, but the act carried out by each of these perpetrators constitutes an offence in its own right, and for that reason there is no question of their participating in one another’s act. Where there was participation in this offence, it was a problem to determine according to which perpetrator’s offence the accomplices were to be punished. For this reason, by the amendment made to Art. 216 TCK, the principle was laid down that accomplices are to be punished under the article under which the perpetrator whose act they aided is punished144.

In the YTCK, the offence of taking a bribe is regulated in Art. 252(1), and the following paragraph 2 of the same article states that the person who gives the bribe is also to be held liable for this offence like a public official. In this way the problem of participation in a special offence has also been resolved for this offence. Accordingly, it is possible to participate in this offence on condition of knowing that the perpetrator is a public official.

If one wishes to proceed from here to a general conclusion, the rule accepted for TCK No. 765 is sound. Accordingly, in the application of YTCK No. 5237 too, where in multi-perpetrator offences one or several of the perpetrators have a particular quality, persons who aid or instigate knowing this characteristic of the perpetrator will be punished for participation in the offence committed by that perpetrator.

F. Voluntary Abandonment in Complicity

Art. 41 YTCK regulates the effect of voluntary abandonment in complicity. While no such provision was contained in TCK No. 765, the matter is regulated expressly and in detail in the new criminal code; it should be said at once, however, that although it is voluntary abandonment in complicity that is being regulated, it would have been more appropriate from a systematic point of view for this article to be placed in the chapter on “attempt”.

Art. 36 YTCK regulates voluntary abandonment and active repentance (effective remorse) together. It provides that “if the perpetrator voluntarily abandons the acts of execution of the offence …, he shall not be punished for the attempt; however, if the part completed in itself constitutes an offence, he shall be punished only with the penalty for that offence”. As can be seen, the only difference between this article and Art. 61(2) TCK, in which voluntary abandonment is regulated, is that Article 36 at the same time also regulates the case of effective remorse145.

Art. 41 YTCK, for its part, states that in offences involving complicity only the accomplice who voluntarily abandons will benefit from voluntary abandonment, while the other accomplices will be punished to the extent of the completed part of the offence.

It should first be noted that where the perpetrator abandons the acts of execution of the offence, if there is no attempt, the corresponding condition of complicity will not be fulfilled and there will therefore be no liability on the part of the accomplices.

Where the aider ceases the acts of aiding specified in Article 39, there will be voluntary abandonment on the part of the aider.

For voluntary abandonment to arise on the part of the instigator, he must persuade the instigated person not to commit the offence, and the instigated person, having been persuaded, must cease the acts of execution of the offence. If, despite all the instigator’s efforts to prevent the commission of the offence, the instigated person continues with his act, there will be voluntary abandonment on the part of the instigator pursuant to Art. 41(2)146.

Art. 41(2) YTCK, for its part, states that voluntary abandonment will also be applied to these persons where the offence is not carried out owing to a factor other than the efforts made by the person voluntarily abandoning to prevent its commission, and where it is committed despite all the endeavours of the person voluntarily abandoning.

CONCLUSION

It is stated that YTCK No. 5237 has introduced a new system in the field of complicity. In one respect this is true; indeed, the dualist system that had been accepted for complicity in TCK No. 765 has not been accepted in the new criminal code. Accordingly, the “principal–secondary” distinction has been abolished as regards accomplices and only perpetration and accessoryship have been regulated. “Instigation”, which was accepted as principal moral perpetration under the TCK, has also, rightly, been regulated as a type of accessoryship under the new distinction provided for.

In another respect, however, and particularly with regard to practice, there has been no great change compared with the provisions of the TCK. For, on account of the importance the legislature attaches to instigation, in YTCK No. 5237, as in TCK No. 765, it is provided that the instigator is to receive the full penalty for the offence, as does the perpetrator who carries out the offence. In addition, secondary material perpetration and secondary moral perpetration have been combined under the heading of aiding and, with the language used simplified, preserved exactly as in TCK No. 765.

It is not possible to say that this system, which the legislature describes as new, conforms entirely to any one of the systems proposed for determining the liability of those taking part in the offence. Although the explanatory memorandum says that the dualist system has been abolished, as explained above there is little difference from the articles contained in TCK No. 765.

In fact it is true, in one respect and in relative terms, that the dualist system has been abandoned and a different system adopted. Indeed, the code provides only for perpetration and accessoryship, and the accessoriness rule, which is necessary for accessoryship to arise, has been expressly regulated. However, this difference has been one of placing complicity on a different footing from a theoretical point of view and has not brought any great difference in practice. Only necessary secondary participation, which is stated to have been regulated in order to eliminate the drawbacks of the dualist system, has been brought within perpetration, as it ought to be, and there is no longer any need for a separate provision on this matter.

Accordingly, since the system adopted is neither the system of equality nor the dualist system, it may be regarded as a variant of the subjective system. In conclusion, it can be said that this new regulation resembles the old system and for that reason does not render ineffective the earlier judicial decisions delivered on this subject, but that it places the subject of complicity on a rather different footing from a theoretical point of view.

However, since, as has been seen above, little difference has been introduced apart from the theoretical basis, there is no satisfactory explanation of why such a change was made and why a system that had been applied for years and whose problems had been resolved by both scholarship and practice was abandoned. What is more, in doing so certain mistakes were made and subjects and concepts that belong in scholarship were included in the statutory provisions. For this reason too it has become a regulation open to criticism.

In conclusion, although it can be said that the provisions made in the field of complicity do not bring any very great change in practice, it can also be said that a change has been made from a theoretical point of view and that defective provisions of a kind that should not be found in a new code have been included, and that for this reason it is a regulation open to criticism.

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Yarsuvat, Duygun /Köksal Bayraktar/Necmi Yüzbaşıoğlu/Erdoğan Bülbül/Ümit Kocasakal/E. Eylem Aksoy/Pınar Memiş/Gülşah Kurt/Çağla Tansuğ/Didem Yılmaz, “Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı Hakkında Galatasaray Üniversitesinin Görüşü”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı: Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Temmuz 2004): İstanbul Barosu-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Eylül 2004): Kurumsal Raporlar-Toplantılara Sunulan Raporlar-Bilimsel Raporlar, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu-Galatasaray Üniversitesi- Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Ortak Yayını, 2004, s.117-149.

Yıldız, Ali Kemal, “Dolayısıyla Faillik”, Ceza Hukuku Günleri: 70. Yılında Türk Ceza Kanunu-Genel Hükümler (26-27 Mart 1997-İstanbul), İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1998, s.235-244.

Yurtcan, Erdener, “Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısına İlişkin Genel İnceleme”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı: Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Temmuz 2004): İstanbul Barosu-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Eylül 2004): Kurumsal Raporlar- Toplantılara Sunulan Raporlar-Bilimsel Raporlar, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu-Galatasaray Üniversitesi-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Ortak Yayını, 2004, s.71-76.

Footnotes

  1. This article was published in Yeditepe Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, C. I, S. 2, Ocak 2005, s.85–137. • Attorney-at-law; doctoral student in the Department of Public Law, Institute of Social Sciences, Istanbul University. ↑
  2. On the general structure of the government draft submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) for debate and on the criticisms levelled at it, see: Çetin Özek, “1997 Türk Ceza Yasası Tasarısı’na İlişkin Düşünceler”, İÜHFM Prof. Dr. Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu’na Armağan Sayısı, C:LVI, S:1-4, İstanbul, 1998, s.21-68. ↑
  3. Mustafa Avcı, “Türk Ceza Kanunu, TCK Tasarıları ve Özellikle 2004 TCK Tasarısı’nın Genel Olarak Değerlendirilmesi”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Reformu: İkinci Kitap: Makaleler, Görüşler, Raporlar, Der: Teoman Ergül, Ankara, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, 2004, s.211. Contra: “Moreover, contrary to the impression conveyed to the public that the sub-committee draft gives priority to the human being, it is found that penalties have been made as severe as possible, that offences and penalties aggravated by their result are provided for at every turn, and that a repressive logic has been followed.” Ümit Kocasakal/Fehmi Demir/Mehmet İpek, “Kişilere Karşı Suçlar”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı: Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Temmuz 2004): İstanbul Barosu-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Eylül 2004): Kurumsal Raporlar-Toplantılara Sunulan Raporlar-Bilimsel Raporlar, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu-Galatasaray Üniversitesi-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Ortak Yayını, 2004, s.48. ↑
  4. Yener Ünver, Ceza Hukukuyla Korunması Amaçlanan Hukuksal Değer, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2003, s.823. ↑
  5. Yener Ünver, “Çeşitli Ülkelerdeki Güncel Ceza Hukuku Gelişmeleri”, Prof. Dr. Çetin Özek Armağanı, İstanbul, Galatasaray Üniversitesi Yayını, 2004, s.907-1012; Ünver, Hukuksal Değer, s.815-818 ↑
  6. Ünver, Hukuksal Değer, s.824. ↑
  7. Ünver, Hukuksal Değer, s.815-818 ↑
  8. Ünver, Hukuksal Değer, s.824. ↑
  9. Ünver, Hukuksal Değer, s.830. ↑
  10. For a criticism of this arrangement, see: Erdener Yurtcan, “Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısına İlişkin Genel İnceleme”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı: Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Temmuz 2004): İstanbul Barosu-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Eylül 2004): Kurumsal Raporlar-Toplantılara Sunulan Raporlar-Bilimsel Raporlar, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu-Galatasaray Üniversitesi-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Ortak Yayını, 2004, s.75. ↑
  11. Timur Demirbaş, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2002, s.411. ↑
  12. Kayıhan İçel/Füsun Sokullu Akıncı/İzzet Özgenç/Adem Sözüer/Fatih Mahmutoğlu/Yener Ünver, Suç Teorisi, 2. Kitap, Yeniden Gözden Geçirilmiş İkinci Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2000, s.367. ↑
  13. Türkan Yalçın Sancar, Çok Failli Suçlar, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 1998, s.36. ↑
  14. Mehmet Emin Artuk/Ahmet Gökçen/Caner Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler I, Üçüncü Baskı, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2002, s.801,802; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.368. ↑
  15. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.368. ↑
  16. Artuk/Gökçen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.804. ↑
  17. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.371. ↑
  18. Ali Kemal Yıldız, “Dolayısıyla Faillik”, Ceza Hukuku Günleri: 70. Yılında Türk Ceza Kanunu-Genel Hükümler (26-27 Mart 1997-İstanbul), İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1998, s.235; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.399; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.424. ↑
  19. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.400. ↑
  20. Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.424. ↑
  21. İzzet Özgenç, Suça İştirakin Hukuki Esası ve Faillik, İstanbul, İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Hukuk Müşavirliği Yayını, 1996, s.199; Yıldız, a.g.y., s.236. ↑
  22. Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.411. ↑
  23. Faruk Erem/Ahmet Danışman/Mehmet Emin Artuk, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, Tümüyle Gözden Geçirilmiş Ondördüncü Baskı, Ankara, Seçkin Yayınevi, 1997, s.357; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.369. ↑
  24. Ayhan Önder, Ceza Hukuku Dersleri, İstanbul, Filiz Kitapevi, 1992, s.414; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.411. ↑
  25. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.369; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.369; Önder, a.g.e., s.414. ↑
  26. Sulhi Dönmezer/Sahir Erman, Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku, C.II, Yeniden Gözden Geçirilmiş Onbirinci Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1997 s.464; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.361,362; Önder, a.g.e., s.434 vd. ↑
  27. Özgenç, a.g.e., s.139 vd.; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.370. ↑
  28. Özgenç, a.g.e., s.139. ↑
  29. John Kaplan/Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law Cases and Materials, Canada, Little, Brown & Company (Canada) Limited, 1986, s.577. ↑
  30. Michael J. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, London, Blackstone Press Limited, 1999, s.190. ↑
  31. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.370. ↑
  32. For a detailed explanation of this matter, see: Özgenç, a.g.e., s.41-126. ↑
  33. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.370; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.141. ↑
  34. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.370. ↑
  35. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.448; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.412. ↑
  36. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.370. ↑
  37. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.371. ↑
  38. Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.413. ↑
  39. Serap Keskin, “Suç Ortaklığı (Suça İştirak)”, Ceza Hukuku Günleri: 70. Yılında Türk Ceza Kanunu-Genel Hükümler (26-27 Mart 1997-İstanbul), İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1998, s.228; Artuk/Gökçen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.806; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.413; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.453-455; Önder, a.g.e., s.415,416. ↑
  40. Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.359. ↑
  41. Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.413. ↑
  42. For these views, see: Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.453-455; Keskin, a.g.y., s.227,228. ↑
  43. Keskin, a.g.y., s.228,229. ↑
  44. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.456; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.359; Artuk/Gökçen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.806; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.413,414; Keskin, a.g.y., s.229. ↑
  45. Keskin, a.g.y., s.229. ↑
  46. Kaplan/Weisberg, a.g.e., s.577; Allen, a.g.e., s.190. ↑
  47. Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.359; Önder, a.g.e., s.417,418. ↑
  48. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.460; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.359; Artuk/Gökçen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.806; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.414; Keskin, a.g.y., s.229. ↑
  49. Keskin, a.g.y., s.230. ↑
  50. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.463. ↑
  51. Keskin, a.g.y., s.230-231; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.414. ↑
  52. However, since explaining them would exceed the limits of this study, the rules will be explained under headings, in one paragraph each; a detailed explanation of these conditions can be found in the sources cited. ↑
  53. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.466. ↑
  54. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.468. ↑
  55. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.465, Önder, a.g.e., s.420. ↑
  56. Önder, a.g.e., s.420. ↑
  57. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.483; Önder, a.g.e., s.425. ↑
  58. Önder, a.g.e., s.422,423. Dönmezer/Erman, while stating that participation in negligent offences is possible in principle, observe that it is more appropriate to regard this as the joint commission of negligent offences rather than as participation in negligent offences, and state that, for participation in negligent offences to be accepted, it must be expressly regulated in the code so as to put an end to all hesitation and theoretical debate. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.496. ↑
  59. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.478; Önder, a.g.e., s.421. ↑
  60. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.371; Artuk/Gökçen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.807. ↑
  61. Bahri Öztürk/Mustafa Ruhan Erdem/Veli Özer Özbek, Uygulamalı Ceza Hukuku ve Emniyet Tedbirleri Hukuku, Gözden Geçirilmiş ve Genişletilmiş Beşinci Baskı, Ankara, Seçkin Yayınevi, 2001, s.269,270. ↑
  62. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.520; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.391; Artuk/Gökçen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.821; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.431. ↑
  63. Artuk/Gökçen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.821; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.431. ↑
  64. Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.432. ↑
  65. Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.397; Artuk/Gökçen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.823. ↑
  66. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.529. ↑
  67. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.529; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.432. ↑
  68. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.530. ↑
  69. Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.433. ↑
  70. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.530. ↑
  71. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.531,532; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.436. ↑
  72. Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.437. ↑
  73. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.512. ↑
  74. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.407. ↑
  75. Önder, a.g.e., s.444. ↑
  76. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.514; Önder, a.g.e., s.444; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.409. ↑
  77. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.408; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.514; Önder, a.g.e., s.444. ↑
  78. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.535; Önder, a.g.e., s.444. İçel et al., for their part, state that this knowledge must exist at the moment of taking part in the offence and say that Dönmezer/Erman interpret the matter restrictively; however, what is meant by the moment of taking part in the offence is not clearly shown, and in the following paragraph it is stated that the moment of taking part in the offence is not the moment at which the act is carried out but the moment at which this will is formed. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.408 dn.121. It must be noted, however, that Dönmezer/Erman, by using in their explanations the expression “knowledge of the existence of the personal aggravating circumstance must be present before the acts having causal value are performed or, at the very least, while those acts are being performed”, show that they do not interpret the matter restrictively. ↑
  79. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.409; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.536; Önder, a.g.e., s.444. ↑
  80. Önder, a.g.e., s.444,445. ↑
  81. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.515. ↑
  82. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.409. ↑
  83. Indeed, Dönmezer/Erman too point out, in the following terms, that this is a drawback brought about by the dualist system: “In fact, where the system of determining the penalty according to the perpetrator is adopted, the problem of communicability disappears of itself, and personal aggravating circumstances are taken into account separately for each accessory. Where, however, the dualist system is adopted, it would not be right to let an aggravating circumstance that has no causal value whatsoever in the commission of the offence pass to the other accessories as well, merely on the consideration that they were aware of it” Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.515. ↑
  84. Önder, a.g.e., s.444; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.410. ↑
  85. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.517. ↑
  86. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.517 dn.328. ↑
  87. Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.410. ↑
  88. Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.414. ↑
  89. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.518; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.414. ↑
  90. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.408; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.514; Önder, a.g.e., s.444; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.414. ↑
  91. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.537; Önder, a.g.e., s.445. ↑
  92. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.409; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.537; Önder, a.g.e., s.445. ↑
  93. The following reasoning is given, in respect of Art. 37 YTCK, as the reason for abandoning the dualist system: “The most significant drawback of this system is that the person’s contribution to the commission of the offence is considered not within the totality of the offence carried out but independently of it. For example, in an armed robbery committed at a workplace, the act of the person keeping watch outside is assessed independently of the robbery as a whole. For this reason, the person keeping watch is in practice held liable sometimes as a “principal perpetrator” and sometimes as a “secondary perpetrator”. Under this system, it often cannot be determined beyond doubt whether the persons participating in the commission of the offence incur liability as “principal perpetrators” or as “secondary perpetrators”. Yet when, in the example, the effect of the act of keeping watch on the realisation of the robbery committed together with the other persons is assessed as a whole, the conclusion is reached that the person keeping watch, too, establishes joint control over the commission of the offence together with the other accomplices. In that case the person keeping watch must also be held liable as a perpetrator. Since the distinction between “principal participation” and “secondary participation”, which was also adopted in the Government Draft, results in punishment that is neither just nor equal and gives rise to difficulties and hesitations in practice, the provision based on this distinction has been removed from the draft.” ↑
  94. Köksal Bayraktar/Önder Öztürel/Pınar Memiş, “Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı Genel Hükümleri”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı: Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Temmuz 2004): İstanbul Barosu-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Eylül 2004): Kurumsal Raporlar-Toplantılara Sunulan Raporlar-Bilimsel Raporlar, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu-Galatasaray Üniversitesi-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Ortak Yayını, 2004, s.35. These authors, while stating that the new arrangement resembles the old system, point out that unnecessary detail has been included as regards perpetration, instigation and aiding. The system said to have been newly introduced has indeed gone into unnecessary detail. For example, there is no need for indirect perpetration and the accessoriness rule to be expressly regulated; moreover, it is unnecessary for instigation to be given such prominence, in a manner that is hard to understand, and to be regulated in such detail. ↑
  95. “Under the new provision, the forms of participation will be determined by taking as the criterion the control established over the commission of the act. The forms of participation provided for in this system, each as a status of liability, consist of perpetration, instigation and aiding.” ↑
  96. In the Anglo-Saxon legal system the direct perpetrator is called the “principal”, that is, the principal perpetrator in the first degree. Kaplan/Weisberg, a.g.e., s.577. ↑
  97. Duygun Yarsuvat/Köksal Bayraktar/Necmi Yüzbaşıoğlu/Erdoğan Bülbül/Ümit Kocasakal/E. Eylem Aksoy/Pınar Memiş/Gülşah Kurt/Çağla Tansuğ/Didem Yılmaz, “Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı Hakkında Galatasaray Üniversitesinin Görüşü”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı: Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Temmuz 2004): İstanbul Barosu-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Eylül 2004): Kurumsal Raporlar-Toplantılara Sunulan Raporlar-Bilimsel Raporlar, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu-Galatasaray Üniversitesi-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Ortak Yayını, 2004, s.130,131. ↑
  98. Durmuş Tezcan/Mustafa Ruhan Erdem, “Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi’nin TCK Tasarısı Hakkındaki Raporu”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Reformu: İkinci Kitap: Makaleler, Görüşler, Raporlar, Der: Teoman Ergül, Ankara, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, 2004, s.346,347. ↑
  99. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.372; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.261. ↑
  100. “In co-perpetration, since, in addition to the decision to commit the offence together, joint control is established over the act, each accomplice has the status of perpetrator. In determining whether joint control has been established, the roles of the accomplices in the execution of the offence and the importance of their contributions are taken into account. In this case, whether the act is executed or remains without result lies in the hands of each of the co-perpetrators. For example, in a robbery in which one of the accomplices renders the victim helpless by using force or threats and the other takes the money and other valuables the victim has on him, the contributions made by the two accomplices to the commission of the offence complement each other as regards the execution of the offence. Accordingly, both accomplices establish joint control over the commission of the offence.” ↑
  101. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.377,378. ↑
  102. Sulhi Dönmezer, Kişilere ve Mala Karşı Cürümler, 14. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1995, s.147-154. ↑
  103. “The complainant stated that one of the stones thrown by the accused had hit him; since it could not be established which accused threw the stone that injured him, the penalties imposed must be reduced pursuant to Art. 463 TCK.” 2. CD. Kt. 15.06.1983, E.83/4212 K.83/4359; cited in: İçel vd., a.g.e., s.379 dn.33. ↑
  104. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.379,380. ↑
  105. “Co-perpetration is also possible where the accomplices’ contributions do not mutually complement one another. In some cases the perpetrators may reach an agreement under which each of them is to realise, alone, all the elements in the statutory definition of the offence. For example, five persons who have agreed among themselves to kill someone fire at the victim at the same time in order to increase still further the likelihood of achieving their aim. Some of the bullets fired hit the victim and some do not. In this example all the accomplices act together on the basis of a joint decision to commit the offence. Even if only one of the bullets fired by these five accomplices hits the victim and causes his death, each of these persons will be held liable as a co-perpetrator for the completed offence of intentional homicide.” ↑
  106. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.383. ↑
  107. “Another indispensable condition for co-perpetration is the existence, among the perpetrators, of a decision to commit the offence together. The decision to commit the offence together, which relates to the performance of a particular act and to the occurrence of the result, must be considered within the scope of intent.” ↑
  108. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.384,385. ↑
  109. “The fact that the accomplices’ intent as to the commission of the offence differs, being for instance direct intent or conditional intent (dolus eventualis), has no effect on their liability as co-perpetrators.” ↑
  110. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.386,387. ↑
  111. “Where the perpetrator of an offence is assisted, without his knowledge and by unilateral will, before the commission of the offence has begun or during its execution, the person concerned must be held liable not as a co-perpetrator but as an aider.” ↑
  112. Although in legal scholarship this situation is generally called a “case of objective liability”, it is pointed out in the scholarship, on sound grounds, that this is a mistaken view and that “negligence, the exceeding of intent and offences aggravated by their result” are cases of subjective liability. See: Yener Ünver, “Ceza Hukukunda Objektif Sorumluluk”, Ceza Hukuku Günleri: 70. Yılında Türk Ceza Kanunu-Genel Hükümler (26-27 Mart 1997-İstanbul), İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1998, s.111,112. ↑
  113. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.389. ↑
  114. It is stated that the fact that indirect perpetration has been made the subject of a separate provision in the YTCK is proof that this code gives a place to the modern institutions of criminal law. See: Avcı, a.g.y., s.216. However, indirect perpetration is an institution whose existence has long been accepted in the theory of the offence, and defining in the code an institution whose existence is in any case accepted, and which is applied, in scholarship and practice does not make the code modern. ↑
  115. “In indirect perpetration, the person in the background establishes control over the person who carries out the acts of execution of the offence and over that person’s act, and is held liable as a perpetrator by reason of this control.” ↑
  116. Yıldız, a.g.y., s.236; Özgenç, a.g.e., s.200. ↑
  117. It is stated in legal scholarship that it would be more appropriate to provide for an increase of the penalty also in respect of deaf-mutes and of persons addicted to alcohol or narcotic substances who are not mentally ill. Fatih Selami Mahmutoğlu, “TBMM Adalet Komisyonu’nda Kabul Edilen Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı Hakkında Görüş”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Reformu: İkinci Kitap: Makaleler, Görüşler, Raporlar, Der: Teoman Ergül, Ankara, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, 2004, s.367. ↑
  118. For the criticisms levelled at this provision on the grounds that no such aggravating circumstance exists in comparative law and that there is no special situation here requiring the penalty to be increased, see: Tezcan/Erdem, a.g.y., s.347. ↑
  119. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.410; Önder, a.g.e., s.424. ↑
  120. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.370. ↑
  121. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.409. For the contrary view, see: Tezcan/Erdem, a.g.y., s.347. ↑
  122. Mehmet Emin Artuk/Ali Rıza Çınar, “Yeni Bir Ceza Kanunu Arayışları ve Adalet Alt Komisyonu Tasarısı Üzerine Düşünceler”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Reformu: İkinci Kitap: Makaleler, Görüşler, Raporlar, Der: Teoman Ergül, Ankara, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, 2004, s.77. ↑
  123. Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.432. ↑
  124. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.389. ↑
  125. Köksal Bayraktar, Suç İşlemeğe Tahrik Cürmü, İstanbul, İÜHF Yayını, 1977, s.16; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.402; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.432. ↑
  126. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.464,476,477. ↑
  127. Yıldız, a.g.y., s.237. ↑
  128. To the same effect, and for the criticisms levelled at this provision on the grounds that no such aggravating circumstance exists in comparative law and that there is no special situation here requiring the penalty to be increased, see: Tezcan/Erdem, a.g.y., s.347. ↑
  129. “The third paragraph contains a provision that serves the purpose of criminal investigation and prosecution.” ↑
  130. Köksal Bayraktar, “Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı’na İlişkin Genel Bir Değerlendirme ve Genel Hükümler Üzerine Birkaç Eleştiri”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Reformu: İkinci Kitap: Makaleler, Görüşler, Raporlar, Der: Teoman Ergül, Ankara, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, 2004, s.33; Yarsuvat vd., a.g.y., s.131. ↑
  131. Mehmet Alagöz, “Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Reformu: İkinci Kitap: Makaleler, Görüşler, Raporlar, Der: Teoman Ergül, Ankara, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, 2004, s.251; Mahmutoğlu, a.g.y., s.367. ↑
  132. Mahmutoğlu, a.g.y., s.367. ↑
  133. In the Anglo-Saxon legal system, aiding is regulated as the counterpart of the concept of the “accessory”, the perpetrator in the second degree. Under this system, the perpetrator in the second degree is used in place of the secondary perpetrator found in the dualist system. Kaplan/Weisberg, a.g.e., s.577. ↑
  134. It is stated in legal scholarship that aiding and secondary participation are very different from each other, that aiding is not a legal concept in the full sense, and that the use of this concept may be interpreted broadly in the future. Yarsuvat, a.g.y., s.131. It must be noted, however, that although aiding covers all the acts constituting secondary participation under the TCK, from a theoretical point of view it was not regulated in order to take the place of secondary participation. As explained above, this concept appears as a consequence of the distinction between perpetrator and accessory and constitutes one type of accessoryship. ↑
  135. In the Anglo-Saxon legal system too, the same situations are treated as falling within principal perpetration in the second degree, which corresponds to aiding. Allen, a.g.e., s.193. ↑
  136. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.531,532; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.436. ↑
  137. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.529; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.432. ↑
  138. Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.433. ↑
  139. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., s.530. ↑
  140. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.406. ↑
  141. It is stated in legal scholarship that this provision is inappropriate because it is more casuistic than the former one. See: Artuk/Çınar, a.g.y., s.77. However, as explained in detail above, there is no difference, apart from the simplicity of the language, between the article governing secondary perpetration in TCK No. 765 and Art. 39 of YTCK No. 5237, which governs aiding. ↑
  142. “For liability as an instigator or as an aider, the offence must have been completed or must at least have reached the stage of attempt. This conclusion is derived from the quantitative effect of the accessoriness rule.” ↑
  143. Sahir Erman, Kamu İdaresine Karşı İşlenen Suçlar, İstanbul, Dünya Yayıncılık, 1992, s.39. ↑
  144. Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.379,380; Ayhan Önder, Türk Ceza Hukuku Özel Hükümler, İstanbul, Filiz Kitabevi, 1994, s.217. ↑
  145. Mehmet Emin Artuk/Ahmet Gökcen/A. Caner Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Özel Hükümler, 4. Baskı, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 2003, s.410,411. ↑
  146. In the explanatory memorandum to the code, by contrast, it is stated, by way of the statement that the distinction between complete and incomplete attempt has been abandoned, that the case of effective remorse has not been regulated either, that voluntary abandonment has been regulated so as to cover all acts of execution, and that this is one of the basic instruments of modern criminal policy. Although a different name is given to it, where the perpetrator does not content himself with abandoning the acts of execution but makes an effort, after the acts of execution have been completed, to ensure that the offence does not materialise, this constitutes effective remorse. That no penalty is imposed on the perpetrator in either of these two situations is a choice of criminal policy. It should also be noted here that, for effective remorse, which, although the explanatory memorandum to the article states that it does not exist, is in reality regulated in the article, to materialise, it is possible not only for the occurrence of the result to be prevented by the perpetrator himself but also for the perpetrator to prevent the occurrence of the result by using another person. For example, as in the case where the perpetrator, after starting a fire, has another person use the fire extinguisher and thereby has the fire put out. ↑
  147. With regard to TCK No. 765, it is stated that in the same situation voluntary abandonment may come into play where the instigator informs the competent authorities and, through their intervention, the offence is prevented from being completed. Önder, a.g.e., s.406. ↑

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