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The Cybercrime Provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK):
My Criticisms
1. It must first be noted that the types of offence regarded as cybercrime offences are regulated, in view of the legal interest protected by the offence, in the chapters to which they relate, that is, according to the legal interest they protect. Types of offence whose protected legal interest is of a mixed nature, on the other hand, are placed in a separate chapter on the basis of their common element, the information system. However, although the offence of misuse of bank or credit cards ought, given the legal interest it protects, to be placed in the chapter on offences against property, this has not been done and it is regulated in the chapter on offences in the field of information technology. This should be corrected and the offence should be placed in the chapter to which it relates.
2. Both the former TCK No. 765 and the draft of TCK No. 5237 submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) provided for an "offence of fraud in data". However, this type of offence was not included in the text of the draft as amended and adopted by the parliamentary sub-committee, and hence it is absent from the law now in force. From the standpoint of criminal policy, since documents of this kind can be drawn up and used by means of an information system and public trust can thereby be violated, this type of offence should be regulated in the TCK and placed in the chapter on offences against public trust. It should either be regulated as an independent offence or be provided for separately within the offences of forgery of official and private documents. Particularly after the entry into force of the Electronic Signature Law, an increase in forgery offences committed with such virtual documents is inevitable. Today, for instance, many customs procedures are already carried out in the virtual environment; in the future, a great many transactions will be carried out by producing virtual documents and certifying them with electronic signatures. Since TCK No. 5237 does not provide for the "offence of fraud in data", such acts will go unsanctioned and a legal gap will arise. For this reason, the act referred to above must be regulated as a type of offence.
3. Placing the type of offence that may be termed "computer theft" in Art. 142 of the TCK as one of the aggravated forms of theft was not a sound choice. This is because Art. 141 of the Code defines the basic form of the offence of theft, and in this definition tangible objects are specified as the subject matter of the offence. Although paragraph 2 of the same article states that electrical energy may also constitute the subject matter of this offence, the data that form the subject matter of computer theft are neither a tangible object nor electrical energy.
Art. 142 is therefore in conflict with Art. 141. For this reason, this type of offence should again be regulated in the chapter on offences against property, but as an independent offence.
Nor can it be understood from this provision which kinds of theft committed by means of an information system are meant to constitute this offence. Was this type of offence intended to cover the theft of tangible objects through the use of an information system, or the theft of data? How can a tangible object be stolen by using an information system? If it is data rather than tangible objects that is meant, then the way the offence is framed is flawed, because the basic form of the offence, in which the offence is defined, states clearly that the subject matter of the offence consists of tangible objects. On this basis, one could say that the offence is committed where, without the consent of the person concerned, the perpetrator, acting with the aim of obtaining a benefit for himself or another, brings to an end, by means of an information system, the person's control over a thing. Yet this, at least for the present, appears to be a situation rarely encountered in practice.
It must also be noted that regulating this offence as an independent type of offence, and stating clearly what its subject matter is and which acts are meant to be punished, will prevent errors and confusion in application and interpretation that may arise in the future.
It should further be noted that acts of obtaining an unlawful benefit by means of an information system are generally committed through "acts of manipulation" carried out on information systems, and such deceitful conduct is assessed as falling within the scope of the "offence of fraud". For this reason, and taking into account the explanations given above, it can be seen that, for the present, the offence of theft committed by means of an information system will be applied in only a small number of cases. However, since the ways in which such acts are committed are likely to multiply as technology develops, it would be appropriate for a provision of this kind to be included in the Code in the manner we have explained above; but the present framing of the offence is definitely flawed.
4. Paragraph 2 of the "offence of unlawfully accessing or remaining in an information system", regulated in Art. 243 of TCK No. 5237, provides for a mitigating circumstance. This was not a sound provision. Neither the text of the Code nor its explanatory memorandum contains any explanation of the systems to which this paragraph is to apply. Nor does it say anything about whether or not the fee has been paid; in any event, whether the fee has been paid or not, the perpetrator will, in order to make use of the system, both breach the system's security and access it unlawfully, and harm the financial interests of the owner of the system or of the person concerned. In short, there is no reduction either in the perpetrator's intent or in the resulting harm that would justify mitigating the penalty.
Making use of the system without paying the fee, on the other hand, should be regulated as an aggravating circumstance, since it causes harm both to the security of the system and to financial interests.
5. The amendment of Art. 245 of the TCK by Law No. 5377 was a positive step. In this way, every form of misuse of bank or credit cards has been made an offence, and an attempt has been made to punish their misuse from the outset. However, by inserting the words "by associating them with bank accounts belonging to others" at the beginning of Art. 245(2), a precondition for the commission of the offence has been introduced. Suppose, however, that the perpetrator accesses the information system of a card-issuing financial institution or bank and unlawfully opens a new account in his own name or in the name of an imaginary person who does not in fact exist, keeps money in this account through likewise fictitious transfers, and further produces a credit card linked to this account and uses or sells that card: will the perpetrator have committed the offence defined in Art. 245(2)? Because of this precondition, it is not possible to hold the perpetrator liable under this article; for in this example the perpetrator has not created a card by associating it with an account belonging to another, but by associating it with an account that is entirely fictitious and does not belong to anyone else. In this case, by first unlawfully accessing the information system, opening a fictitious account and transferring money into it, the perpetrator will have committed the aggravated offence of fraud defined in Art. 158(1)(f) of the TCK, committed "by using information systems, banks or credit institutions as instruments". If the perpetrator uses the counterfeit card produced in this way, he may additionally be held liable under Art. 245(3). However, if the perpetrator does not use the counterfeit card so produced but sells or transfers it, he cannot be punished under Art. 245(2), since in that case the precondition defined in the paragraph will not have been fulfilled, that is, no link will have been established with an account belonging to another.
For the reason explained above, the precondition "by associating them with bank accounts belonging to others", added at the beginning of the paragraph, creates a gap in the definition of the offence, as the example given above shows. Defining the offence without this wording is therefore necessary in order to cover all acts, such as those in the example given above and similar cases. If such wording is to be retained at all costs, the phrase "by associating them with any bank account" should be preferred.
6. In view of the phenomenon of cyberterrorism, the commission of terrorist acts by making use of data transmission networks should be treated as an aggravating circumstance. This is because, whereas those carrying out terrorist acts put even their own lives at risk in the case of conventional types of offence, committing these acts by means of information systems reduces both the risk they take and the risk of being detected and caught, and makes the commission of the offence easier.
In the same way, the acts of organised criminal groups in communicating with their members and in using and transferring their financial resources should also be regulated separately and treated as an aggravating circumstance; the explanations given above on this point apply here as well. The absence of any provision on this matter in the Code is regarded as a significant shortcoming.
7. Art. 525a(1) of the TCK currently in force makes the act of obtaining data an offence, but does not make it an offence to access an information system without authorisation and learn the information it contains without obtaining it. It must be said, by way of positive criticism, that this has been remedied in Art. 243 of the new Code. The acts of computer intruders described by the term "hacker" have thereby been brought within the scope of regulation.
8. "All acts relating to child pornography", in particular those committed over the internet, should be made offences. These acts are listed one by one in the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. Although making these acts offences is a matter of great urgency, Art. 226, the provision of the Code on this subject, is extremely inadequate in this respect. For this reason, a broad and detailed provision on this matter needs to be adopted, taking into account the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.
9. The act of organising gambling and gambling over data transmission networks must be regulated as a type of offence. There is a large legal gap in this respect. Whereas even physical casinos, to which not everyone has access, are prohibited in our country, anyone who so wishes can today gamble in virtual casinos. Although Art. 228 of the Code uses broad wording, namely "providing a place and opportunity for gambling", it would be appropriate, in order to avoid problems of interpretation and not to give rise to confusion in practice, for "organising gambling by means of information systems in the virtual sphere" also to be mentioned in the text of the article.
10. In the USA and Australia in particular, acts of sending unsolicited electronic mail (spam) are made offences. This is a genuinely disturbing phenomenon that increases the volume of traffic on data transmission networks and takes up a very large share of the electronic mailboxes of organisations and individuals, thereby hampering international trade. This act, too, should be regulated in the Code as a type of offence.
11. Today, even many conventional types of offence, such as homicide, can be committed by means of an information system over data transmission networks (for example, killing a patient by accessing a hospital's computer network and shutting down a life-support unit connected to the system). In such acts, the use of information systems and data transmission networks makes it harder to identify both the offence and the perpetrator; at the same time, it makes the commission of the offence extremely easy for the perpetrator and reduces the risks he takes and the likelihood of his being caught. For this reason, in respect of those types of offence that can be committed by means of information systems, the use of such systems should be provided for as an aggravating circumstance of the offences concerned.
12. The problems of concurrence that may arise between cybercrime offences and other types of offence, and among cybercrime offences themselves, should be regulated by express provisions.
13. In combating cybercrime, results can be achieved only by addressing substantive criminal law and the law of criminal procedure together. Owing to their nature, cybercrime offences are international in character; this gives rise to problems concerning the place where the offence was committed, which in turn raises the question of where the offence is to be prosecuted. These problems can be overcome only by making international cooperation work effectively. The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime contains detailed provisions on this matter. This problem can be overcome if our country also becomes a party to this Convention and if the necessary amendments, in line with the Convention, are made to the provisions of the TCK concerning the place where the offence was committed.
14. Finally, it must be stated that all provisions to be adopted should be drafted with a positive and constructive approach, on the basis that freedom is the rule and restriction the exception; no concession should be made with regard to the rule of law, the principle of the legality of offences and penalties, the principle of the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms set out in our Constitution, or the criterion of necessity in a democratic society laid down in the ECHR and in the judgments of the ECtHR.
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “The Use of Crypto Assets in the Laundering of Proceeds of Crime and the Measures to Be Taken” (Kripto Varlıkların Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasında Kullanılması ve Alınması Gereken Önlemler), Istanbul Aydın University Faculty of Law Journal (İstanbul Aydın Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi), Vol. 10, No. 1, 2024, pp. 41-94.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “The Legal Regime of Social Network Providers, Internet News Sites and Over-the-Top Service Providers, and a Critique” (Sosyal Ağ Sağlayıcıların İnternet Haber Sitelerinin ve Şebekeler Üstü Hizmet Sağlayıcıların Hukuki Rejimi ve Eleştirisi), Dülger Law Office, 1 June 2023.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “The Electronic Document as the Object of Document Forgery Offences” (Belgede Sahtecilik Suçlarının Konusu Olarak Elektronik Belge), Symposium on Forgery of Documents and Tax Offences (Belgede Sahtecilik ve Vergi Suçları Sempozyumu), 21–24 October 2019, Publication of the Presidency of the Court of Cassation / TOBB ETÜ Faculty of Law, Ankara, 2020.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “What Does WhatsApp's Privacy Change Mean? Will Our Data Be Shared?” (WhatsApp Güvenlik Değişikliği Ne Anlama Geliyor? Verilerimiz Paylaşılacak mı?), Dülger Law Office, 5 January 2021.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Commercial Electronic Messages and the Message Management System” (Ticari Elektronik İleti ve İleti Yönetim Sistemi), Dülger Law Office, 15 November 2020.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, Cybercrime and Internet Communication Law (Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku), 11th ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2025.

