About this work
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
The article examines the offence of stalking in Article 123/A, which was added to the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (TCK) by Article 8 of Law No. 7406 of 12 May 2022. It discusses the need for the provision, the international instruments and the strengths and weaknesses of the provision; the offence is broken down into its elements and assessed from a normative point of view.
Keywords
- stalking
- cyberstalking
- cyberbullying
- violence against women
- sexual harassment
- Istanbul Convention
- gender-based discrimination
- social media
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
Research Article
THE OFFENCE OF PERSISTENT STALKING FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NORMATIVE REGULATION (ART. 123/A TCK)*
Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER**
Abstract
Acts of persistent stalking, which are regarded as the step preceding violence against women, have increased, in particular because of the widespread use of social media platforms and information systems. It can be seen that many incidents of violence against women which have come to public attention were preceded by acts of persistent stalking carried out either through information systems or physically. Punishing such acts has become a necessity in today’s society. It was precisely in order to ensure that such acts do not go unpunished and to meet a social need that Article 123/A, entitled “Persistent stalking”, was added to the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (“TCK”) by Article 8 of Law No. 7406 of 12.05.2022.
The subject of this article is the offence of persistent stalking. The need felt for this provision, similar provisions at the international level, the elements of the offence and its examination from a normative standpoint and, finally, its positive and negative aspects, especially in terms of the extent to which it will meet the social need, will be addressed in detail in this article. However, since violence against women is in itself of a scope and depth that makes it a subject for multidisciplinary studies, this article will examine only the normative provision in Article 123/A of the TCK, broken down into the elements of the offence.
Keywords: Persistent stalking, cyberstalking, cyberbullying, violence against women, sexual harassment, Istanbul Convention, gender-based discrimination, social media.
Crime of Stalking In The View of Normative Regulation (TPC 123/A)
Abstract
Persistent stalking actions, which are accepted as the previous step of violence against women, have increased especially due to the widespread use of social media and information systems. It is seen that before many incidents of violence against women reflected to the public, persistent stalkin actions were carried out either through information systems or physically. Punishment of such acts has become a necessity in today’s society. In order to prevent such acts from going unpunished and to meet a social need, Article 123/A, titled “Persistent pursuit”, was added to the Turkish Penal Code no. 5237 (“TPC”) with Article 8 of the Law No. 7406 dated 12.05.2022.
The subject of this article is the crime of persistent stalking. The need for this regulation, similar regulations in the international arena, the elements of the crime and its normative examination, and finally, the positive and negative aspects of it will be discussed in detail, especially in terms of how much it will respond to the social need. However, since violence against women has a scope and depth to be the subject of multidisciplinary studies on its own, in this article, the normative regulation in Article 123/A of the TPC will be examined by separating it into the elements of the crime.
Keywords: Stalking, cyberstalking, cyberbullying, violation of women, sexsual harresment, İstanbul Convention, gender-based discrimination, social media.
INTRODUCTION
The fact that emotions predominantly come to the fore in human relations also brings with it certain negative consequences. For the presence of emotions leads people away from an objective setting, and acting on emotion gives rise to certain dangers. In fact, emotions lie at the root of every human being and of every offence intentionally committed by a human being, in the form of “willing” the act that will bring about the offence; yet there are certain types of offence in which the emotional state within human relations plays a more decisive role. One person disturbing another, following that person, and being insistent towards that person beyond what is ordinary is the most basic and most widespread example of this. In everyday life, as interaction between people increases, in particular for reasons such as technology, population and social life, one frequently encounters situations in which one person follows and disturbs another. This disturbance is generally caused via social media. For one manifestation of the way in which social media has transformed every aspect of our lives is that people use these tools to follow and disturb, continuously, persons who have not consented, by means of the written, spoken or visual messages, emojis, likes and so on that they send them. It must also be underlined, however, that these examples are not confined to social media. These and similar acts may also be carried out physically or through the intermediary of third persons.
Since a physical attack is not a prerequisite for the commission of acts of this kind,
they do not, for the most part, conform to the statutory definitions of the offences of bodily injury and sexual harassment. Nevertheless, it is also clear that these acts involve a wrong and cause victimisation for the person against whom they are committed. Consequently, although victimisation has occurred, dangers arise such as the person who caused it not being punished and thus not being reformed, and for that reason being liable in future to commit offences with a higher degree of wrongfulness, as well as the victim’s sense of justice remaining unsatisfied. It was precisely in order to ensure that such acts do not go unpunished and also to meet a social need that Article 123/A, entitled “Persistent stalking”, was added to the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (“TCK”) by Article 8 of Law No. 7406 of 12.05.2022. The subject of this article is the offence of persistent stalking. The need felt for this provision, similar provisions at the international level, the elements of the offence and its examination from a normative standpoint and, finally, its positive and negative aspects, especially in terms of the extent to which it will meet the social need, will be addressed in detail in this article.
I. The Need for a Provision on Persistent Stalking
A. In General
There are certain acts in which the perpetrator neither insults nor threatens the victim, nor makes any physical or visual contact with, or attack on, the victim. Yet, by somehow showing his presence to the victim or making it known, the perpetrator causes the victim to be disturbed and not to feel safe. When a victim subjected to such acts filed a criminal complaint, the judicial authorities used to state that, by reason of the principle of legality of offences and penalties, they could take no action against the perpetrator, since these acts did not constitute any offence defined in the laws.1
This situation, in other words the “phenomenon of indifference and impunity in respect of victimisation”, was voiced by women who were themselves victims of this offence, in a survey conducted among women living in the 28 EU Member States and in the report prepared on that basis. The fact that fieldwork carried out in the fields of sociology and victimology has brought to light the phenomenon of indifference and impunity, particularly as regards acts of persistent stalking against women, is highly significant in that it demonstrates the need for these acts to be criminalised and punished.2
Since, as far as we know, no survey has been conducted on this subject in our country, we wish to set out here the main findings of the report in question by way of example, in order to show the gravity of acts of this kind:
• 18% of women living in the 28 EU Member States (EU-28) have been subjected to persistent stalking since the age of 15, and 5% of women were victims of this act in the 12 months preceding the survey interview on which this report is based. This rate corresponds to approximately 9 million women living in the EU-28 being subjected to persistent harassment within a period of 12 months.
• Approximately 14% of women have received repeated disturbing or threatening messages or telephone calls from the same person, and 8% have witnessed someone loitering outside their home or workplace or have been followed. 3% of all women surveyed have been subjected to stalking in which the same person repeatedly damaged their property.
• One in 10 women (9%) has been stalked by a previous partner.
• Cyberstalking – stalking by e-mail, text messages or the internet – is directed in particular at young women. 4% of women aged 18 to 29 were subjected to cyberstalking in the 12 months preceding the survey interview, whereas this rate is 0.3% among women aged 60 and over.
• More than one fifth (21%) of the female victims surveyed were subjected to persistent stalking lasting more than two years.
• One in five victims of persistent stalking (23%) had to change their telephone number or e-mail address as a result of the stalking incident.
• Around three quarters of stalking cases (74%), even the most serious cases mentioned by the respondents, did not come to the attention of the police.3 As is clear from these findings, persistent stalking is a serious problem, especially for women and, after them, for individuals in a disadvantaged position, LGBT individuals foremost among them.4 It must be underlined, however, that this finding should not be taken to mean that men are not victims of this offence. It should simply be known that, according to the studies carried out in this field and the incidents that have come to public attention, it is mostly women who are the victims5. Bearing in mind that the survey on which the report is based dates from 2014, it can safely be said that, with the growth in the use of social media since then, the rate at which these acts occur and victimisation increases is very high. The seriousness of the problem has made it necessary for this matter now to be regulated by criminal law as well. Indeed, Soygüt, emphasising this phenomenon of impunity, states very clearly why these acts must be regulated by criminal law and suppressed by the instruments of criminal law6:
“The act of stalking (persistent stalking) is a form of male violence against women. Combating it requires a holistic perspective. Unless the matter is approached from the angle of eliminating gender inequality, the preventive and repressive capacity of legal instruments – even where the instrument is criminal law, with its ultima ratio character – will be unable to produce more than a limited effect. Violence will come to an end only when all the political and social structures that expose women to violence, including the judiciary, have been transformed. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of impunity, and the perception of it in society, increases violence by emboldening perpetrators. So much so that ‘impunity’, even on its own, by leading women to withdraw from social life, carries the risk of turning into a form of violence. The instrument of ‘punishment’ must therefore come into play here”.
It is because acts of this kind, and hence the victimisation they cause, have greatly increased and become more frequent, because this has been widely voiced in public, and because such acts are, in particular, the preliminary stage of physical violence against women, that the legislature accepted that a legal interest had now emerged here which is important for society and needs to be protected by the norms of criminal law, and criminalised acts of this kind. To that end, by adding Article 123/A, entitled “Persistent stalking”, to the TCK by Article 8 of Law No. 7406 of 12.05.2022, the legislature made the acts whose details we shall examine below a criminal offence.
In the general explanatory memorandum of the Law, the following points were given as the reason for including this type of offence in the TCK7 :
“The acts characterised as persistent stalking are made an independent offence under the Turkish Criminal Code. Acts of persistent stalking are defined as acts which restrict the freedom of movement of victims and cause them unease and anxiety, and they have also been made subject to sanctions in many legal systems, foremost among them Germany, Austria, France, Belgium and Italy. The provision aims to make acts of persistent stalking, which occur before more serious and violent offences, particularly against women, are committed, subject to a proportionate sanction and to provide victims with the necessary safeguard.”
B. How the Acts Constituting the Offence of Persistent Stalking First Emerged
Persistent stalking was first made a criminal offence in the USA in 1990, after the American actress Rebecca Schaeffer was killed in 1989 by a fan who had persistently stalked her and, following this, murders were committed in the wake of persistent stalking8 . This legislation was followed, in turn, by Great Britain and Ireland in 1997, Belgium in 1998, the Netherlands in 2000, Austria in 2006 and Germany9 in 200710.
The concept of persistent stalking (ısrarlı takip) entered our language as the equivalent of the English word “stalking”. For it was in the Anglo-American legal system that it was first asserted that acts of this kind are criminal and must be punished. In this context, acts of this kind are regulated as offences in the USA, the United Kingdom, Australia and the great majority of EU countries. In particular, after the Istanbul Convention imposed on the contracting parties an obligation to make such acts criminal offences, the EU Member States criminalised these acts through legislation enacted in their domestic law.11
In our country this concept is known mostly among social media users, because attacks of this kind largely take place via social media12. It has also attracted attention because the murders of women and other acts of violence against women that have frequently come to public attention in our country in recent times were preceded by acts of persistent stalking of this kind.
For the variety of these acts carried out in cyberspace, the term “siber ısrarlı takip” is used in Turkish and the term “cyberstalking” in English13. Cyberstalking is one of the most common forms of the acts of cyber bullying (cyberbullying)14 which are very frequently encountered in the world of information technology15 .
What persistent stalking is was defined as follows in Article 34, entitled “pursuit for the purpose of harassment” (stalking), of the “Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention)”16, of which Türkiye was the first signatory but from which it subsequently withdrew, improperly, on the signature of a single person:
“Threatening conduct, intentionally repeated, which is directed at another person and is such as to frighten that person in a way that prevents him or her from feeling safe”.
What lies behind the acceptance of acts of persistent stalking as an offence in our legal order is the fact that acts of violence against women have recently featured very prominently in public debate, and that it has come to light that a great many of these acts of violence were preceded by acts of persistent stalking directed at the female victim, yet nothing was done about this by the State. In order to protect women against violence, however, it is not enough merely to make various amendments to the legislation; women must be actively protected by the State, in particular against violence originating from men. This is a positive obligation of the State towards individuals; this point was expressly stated in the 2009 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in “Opuz v. Türkiye” 17. Both this judgment and the Istanbul Convention referred to above constituted a driving force in making these acts a type of offence.
The concept of persistent stalking first entered our legal order through Article 1(1) of Law No. 6284 of 08.03.2012 “on the Protection of the Family and the Prevention of Violence against Women”18. By this provision, “victims of unilateral persistent stalking” were brought under the protective umbrella of that Law. In Article 3(1)(ş) of the Implementing Regulation of 201319, issued to set out how that Law is to be applied, this concept is defined as follows:
“Any attitude and behaviour of the perpetrator of violence towards the victim of violence, irrespective of whether or not there is a family tie or relationship between them, which, whatever its content, is carried out by deed, orally, in writing or by using any means of communication, in such a way as to cause feelings of fear and helplessness in physical or psychological terms such that the victim is concerned for his or her safety, and which keeps the victim under pressure”.
We consider the word “unilateral” in the heading of this definition to be mistaken, for there can be no question of persistent stalking being mutual. Indeed, this word does not appear in Article 123/A of the TCK; in that case, however, there is an inconsistency between Law No. 6284, the Implementing Regulation issued on the basis of it and the provision of the TCK20. This inconsistency needs to be removed.
C. The Importance of Normative Regulation
Persistent stalking is a form of psychological violence and generally constitutes the first step, in other words the preliminary stage, of offences which involve violence, particularly against women, and have a higher degree of wrongfulness21 . Making acts of this kind criminal offences is therefore of the utmost importance in protecting women against gender-based discrimination and violence. In this way, the right to live in peace and safety, particularly of women who are potential victims of violence, is protected, and at the same time the message is conveyed to potential perpetrators that acts of this kind will not go unsanctioned. Indeed, Soygüt, who in legal scholarship examines the subject (rightly) as a manifestation of violence against women, expressly states that persistent stalking is a manifestation that precedes violence22 :
“While the effects of persistent stalking, which extend to the woman’s psychological breakdown and withdrawal from social life, are not to be underestimated, the graver danger to which it may give rise is the potential of the stalking to turn into physical violence. This finding is not in fact new; the relationship between acts of stalking and violence against women was established by studies carried out at the end of the 1980s. According to these, the first stage is described as the process in which unresolved conflict or unexpressed anger accumulates and the relationship becomes strained (tension building stage); the second stage as the stage of eruption, in which emotional, verbal or physical violence occurs (explosion stage); and the third stage as the process in which the perpetrator apologises and seeks to persuade the victim that what happened will not be repeated (honeymoon period). Although the woman rejects the process or the continuation of the relationship, this cycle is continually repeated under the masculine mentality and the state of ‘persistence’ emerges. The acts of a perpetrator who cannot persuade the victim or establish dominance over her may turn into increasingly dangerous, threatening conduct, sexual harassment, sexual assault and sexual abuse. In some cases, the failure to achieve the desired dominance and control over the victim may end with the perpetrator killing, or attempting to kill, both the victim and himself.”
We should state that we consider this provision to be appropriate and positive: it was introduced in response to an important need that has arisen in society in general, it provides a sanction for many wrongful forms of conduct which violate a legal interest that needs to be protected by a criminal offence but which nevertheless went unsanctioned, and it is an instrument for the prevention of crime. We should, however, also note that certain aspects of the definition of the offence are open to criticism23.
Before this type of offence was included in the TCK, these acts either went unpunished or, through the extensive interpretation of the Court of Cassation, were punished, depending on the particular features of the specific case, as the offences of sexual harassment (Art. 105 TCK), violation of privacy (Art. 134 TCK) or disturbing the peace and tranquillity of persons (Art. 123 TCK). Moreover, particularly in the committee deliberations on Law No. 7406, which created this offence, it was stated that acts of this kind are in fact a form of torment and ought to be regarded as falling within the offence of torment regulated in Article 96 of the TCK, but that practitioners persistently refrained from doing so24.
We do not share this view, because the offence of torment regulated in Article 96 of the TCK is the form, capable of being committed by anyone, of the offence of torture, which is regulated as a special offence in Article 94 of the same Code. Consequently, in order to speak of torment within the meaning of Article 96, the acts constituting the offence must be of such a nature as to reach the level of torture defined in Article 94. It is justified and correct for victims of persistent stalking to describe what they have gone through, in everyday language, as “torture” or “torment”. That description, however, does not mean torture and torment in terms of criminal law. Accordingly, contrary to this view, the fact that the judicial authorities do not apply Art. 96 TCK in cases of this kind is a correct and appropriate choice from the standpoint of the theory of the offence.
II. The Protected Legal Interest
The offence of persistent stalking is regulated in Part Two of the TCK, entitled “Offences against persons”, in Chapter Seven, entitled “Offences against liberty”, after Article 123, entitled “Disturbing the peace and tranquillity of persons”. Accordingly, the legal interest protected by this offence is the liberty of individuals, and what is protected is the individual’s right to live in peace and safety25. In this context, the offence norm in question safeguards the individual’s right to life and to the inviolability of his material and spiritual existence (Art. 17 of the Constitution), the right to liberty and security of person (Art.
19 of the Constitution) and the right to respect for private life (Art. 20 of the Constitution). This type of offence therefore protects more than one legal interest; this also makes it more difficult to frame the offence in conformity with the principle of certainty26.
Having regard to the legal interests protected by the offence, we consider that the place in which the offence has been regulated is correct. During the work of the parliamentary committee on the offence, however, the place in which it was regulated, in the light of the legal interest it protects, was also made the subject of criticism27. We wish to state once again that we do not share this view28.
In the explanatory memorandum to the article of the Law, the following points were given as the reason for creating the offence29 :
“By this article, a new article is added to Law No. 5237, whereby the acts characterised as persistent stalking are made an independent offence. The aim is thus to make acts of persistent stalking subject to a proportionate sanction at the stage before more serious acts directed against the victim’s material and moral personality or bodily integrity occur. The provision aims at combating acts of persistent stalking effectively before offences involving violence, particularly against women, are committed, and at protecting victims.”
III. Conformity of the Offence with the Statutory Definition (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit) A. The Material (Objective) Elements of the Statutory Definition
1. The Perpetrator
Although the offence of persistent stalking emerged essentially as a response to violence perpetrated by men against women, no such limitation was adopted in the definition of the offence, and it is provided that anyone may be the perpetrator of this offence. This is an appropriate approach as far as the framing of the offence is concerned. For although this offence is generally committed by men against women, it may also be committed by a woman against a man, or between persons of the same sex, or by, against or among LGBT individuals. It was therefore right not to impose any limitation as to the sex of the perpetrator.
Sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2, in which the aggravated forms of the offence are regulated, is, by contrast, framed as a special offence. Since the provision relates only to an aggravated form, this is a non-genuine special offence. A non-genuine special offence has its effect in the context of participation in the offence. Thus, a perpetrator possessing the status required by the special offence and a perpetrator not possessing that status will be able to commit the offence as co-perpetrators. The former will be punished for the aggravated form of the offence and the latter for its basic form.
2. The Victim
What we have written above also applies to the victim of the offence. Anyone may be the victim of this offence. However, where the victim is one of the persons referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) or
(b) of paragraph 2 of the article, the aggravated form of the offence will be at issue. We shall return to this matter under the heading of the aggravated forms of the offence.
3. The Object of the Offence
The object of this offence is the human being whose liberty is restricted by being persistently stalked and who therefore feels uneasy. Since the legal interest protected by the offence is the liberty of the individual, the object on which the offence is committed is likewise the very person whose liberty is restricted and who is the victim of the offence.
4. The Conduct (Act)
Because of the – in our view unavoidable – uncertainties in the way the offence of persistent stalking is framed, the act, the result and the causal link in the definition of the offence need to be defined in detail in practice and in legal scholarship. During the committee work in parliament on the offence, the uncertainties in its definition were rightly made the subject of criticism. Indeed, the definition of the offence is such that it may give rise to problems in terms of the principle of certainty, which is a sub-principle of the principle of legality of offences and penalties. However, the fact that the acts which may be characterised as persistent stalking cover a wide spectrum, and the difficulties in determining where these acts end and begin, drove the legislature to adopt such a definition of the offence. Otherwise, a large number of acts that could be regarded as persistent stalking might remain outside the definition of the offence and go unpunished.
On the other hand, this definition needs to be limited at some point, and criminal liability must not be intolerably broad. It is precisely for this reason that the offence was framed as a result offence, and the mere performance of the act was not considered sufficient for the offence to be constituted. The framing of the offence as an offence of specified conduct, and the fact that, as regards the element of the act, no expression such as “and the like” was included after certain acts had been enumerated, were also chosen in order to ensure compliance with the principle of certainty in the interest of legal certainty; in comparative law, too, provisions to this effect have been adopted on the basis of similar reservations30.
a. The Nature of the Act
The offence of persistent stalking is an offence of alternative acts, of specified conduct and of combined acts31. For the act element of the offence to be fulfilled, the perpetrator must physically follow the victim or attempt to establish contact with the victim by using means of correspondence and communication, information systems or third persons. As can be seen, the offence has clearly been framed in such a way that it can be committed by different acts, and what those acts are has been indicated one by one. It is therefore both an offence of alternative acts and an offence of specified conduct. If one or several of the acts are performed in the manner indicated in the law, a single offence will be constituted; however, since the number of acts will have an effect on the wrongfulness of the conduct, this will be taken into account, pursuant to Art. 61 TCK, when the sanction for the offence is determined.
b. Persistence
As we have also stated above, this type of offence is at the same time an offence of combined acts. For the performance of the acts enumerated above is not, on its own, sufficient for the offence to be committed. As is also expressly stated in the definition of the offence, these acts must be continued or repeated in a persistent manner. If the acts are not performed persistently, the offence is not constituted32. In other words, where the act is performed once or a few times, depending on its nature in the specific case, or where a continuing act is brought to an end within a short time, and this does not reach the level of persistence, the act element of the offence is not fulfilled. Persistence means to dig in one’s heels, to insist, in a thought or in a course of conduct. What persistence is has not – as is proper – been expressly defined in the TCK; this task has been left to legal scholarship and practice. The act of persisting must be assessed by practitioners in each specific case, having regard to the particular features of that case. Accordingly, persistence may be accepted to exist where the victim has stated that he is disturbed and has warned the perpetrator not to perform the same or a similar act, and the perpetrator nevertheless repeats the same or similar conduct33.
In truth, persisting is a matter pertaining to a person’s inner world which becomes apparent by being reflected in the outside world through various acts. However, since, for the purposes of this offence, persistence manifests itself as the repetition of the alternative acts to an extent that causes unease, or as their uninterrupted continuation, this intensity or number of repetitions (frequency) of the acts must be treated as a separate act. This in turn leads us to the conclusion that the offence is one of combined acts, and that there must be present in the perpetrator both the will to persist, reflected in the outside world as repetition or continuity, and the act(s) performed in accordance with that will34. Of course, the perpetrator’s intent, which constitutes the mental element of the offence, must, just as it extends to all the elements, also encompass persisting. We shall return to this matter under the heading of the mental element.
Persistence may be realised through different alternative acts, or equally through the repeated performance of the same alternative act or, where the act lends itself to this, through the uninterrupted performance of a single act. This offence may therefore also display the characteristics of an uninterrupted (permanent) offence. On the other hand, since performing the alternative acts more than once, that is, persisting in them, is a feature required for the offence to be constituted, the existence of a large number of acts is not regarded as a continuing offence (successive offence); rather, they are regarded as a single act in the sense of the statutory definition, are absorbed into the act element of the offence and are treated as the existence of a single act. This is important both for the constitution of the offence and for the application of the rules on concurrence35.
The determination of the point from which the intensity and/or the number of repetitions of the acts, in quantitative and qualitative terms, will be regarded as the act of persisting has, however, been left to practice and legal scholarship. For the purposes of this offence, therefore, the acts must be assessed as a whole and it must be established whether or not the act of persisting has taken place36. For example, telephoning someone once37, writing a letter, going to an exhibition solely in order to see a particular person, trying to communicate directly or through a third person, trying to find out the person’s name, asking for the person’s address in order to find out where he lives, or watching the person for a short time in the street where he lives is not sufficient for the element of persistence required by the definition of the offence to be fulfilled38.
In our view this is a correct approach; otherwise the legislature would be obliged to enact casuistic provisions, which in modern criminal law is both contrary to legislative technique and makes it harder to achieve justice in the specific case. The matter that gives cause for reservation here is that, by reason of the amount of the penalty for this offence, the decisions concerned are not open to appeal on points of law and will become final at the stage of appeal on facts and law. Consequently, the fact that each regional court of appeal may set a separate criterion for persistence is liable to cause problems both for foreseeability (the principle of legal certainty) and for the achievement of justice in the specific case. In order to prevent this, the necessary measures must be taken by the judicial organisation, and the necessary training and information activities must be provided for the judges of the regional courts of appeal.
c. Physically Following
Physically following, the first of the alternative acts of the offence, means that the victim is followed by the perpetrator in person. To follow someone is to maintain visual or physical proximity to a person over a certain period of time39. This may take the form of going after the victim, but it may also be realised by frequently appearing before the victim or by the perpetrator in various ways making himself visible to the victim and making his presence physically felt. Indeed, this act is well explained by means of examples in the explanatory memorandum of the Law:
“This fact of following may be realised in the form of the victim being physically followed, and may equally arise in the form of attempts to establish contact with the victim by using means of correspondence and communication, information systems or third persons. Physical following need not necessarily take the form of going after the victim. In addition, the fact of following will also be realised where the perpetrator appears before the victim at different times and places, approaches the victim in the settings where the victim is present and thus tries to make himself or herself constantly visible to the victim. In this context, the immoderate repetition of acts such as frequently appearing before the victim at places such as the workplace, school, shopping street, market and the like, or making the victim feel that he or she is being followed, or waiting in front of the victim’s home or at the entrance to the victim’s street, may be regarded as physical following” 40.
Where, however, a person happens to encounter another person several times by chance, or a person believes that he is being watched, there is no physical following. For here there is neither persistence nor following intentionally carried out by the perpetrator. Accordingly, before considering what the victim feels, the perpetrator’s acts must be looked at as a whole and, on that basis, it must be examined whether the perpetrator did this intentionally or by chance; this must without fail be established on the basis of evidence, and no conclusion should be reached solely on the basis of the victim’s statement.
For persistence to be accepted in the case of physical following, this act need not necessarily have taken place several times at different times. As we have also stated above, this offence may also be committed by an uninterrupted act41 . For example, where the victim is watched or kept under observation without interruption for long hours within the same day, the existence of persistent physical following must likewise be accepted42 .
As regards the first act constituting the offence, the following must be carried out physically. If there is no physical following, it must be examined whether the other alternative act has been performed. In legal scholarship, Özar states that the perpetrator’s following or watching the victim from where he sits, by using the possibilities of technology, will not constitute the offence of persistent stalking; that, for example, monitoring the victim over a digital network, tracking the victim by GPS or having the victim followed by an unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) “will not constitute this offence”; that such conduct can be assessed only in the context of the offences against private life and the secret sphere of life; that cyberstalking, which knows no geographical boundaries, is nevertheless more widespread today than physical following and has the same effect on victims as physical following; and that, for this reason, it is not right that the provision disregards the virtual environment and confines following to the physical sphere43.
We should state that we agree with the author’s views. Indeed, as the author also states, following carried out in the virtual sphere by means of information systems cannot be regarded as physical following. That would be a line of reasoning contrary first and foremost to logic, and then to the wording of the statutory text. On the other hand, all the acts which the author cites as examples above and states will not constitute the offence must be assessed from the standpoint of the use of information systems, which are listed as a means of the other alternative act of the offence. The “important but essential detail” here, which is difficult to grasp at first sight, vindicates the author’s view. For the other alternative act of the offence covers only the use of an information system for the purpose of establishing contact with the victim; the use of an information system in order to follow the victim is not covered by the definition of the offence! Since this type of offence is framed, as far as the act is concerned, as an offence of specified conduct, that is, since the acts are defined one by one, the use of information systems to follow the victim cannot be accepted, by way of interpretation, as an alternative act of the offence; following is conduct constituting an offence only when it is carried out persistently and “physically”. To accept and apply the contrary would be an extensive interpretation amounting to analogy, and this kind of interpretation is expressly prohibited by Art. 2(3) TCK. Yet it is a fact known to everyone that information systems are used to follow people44. In our view, when the article of the law is considered together with its explanatory memorandum, the legislature overlooked this important detail and left the provision incomplete. We do not think that the legislature, which created an offence with the aim of punishing acts of this kind, deliberately created a gap here. Consequently, in order to achieve the aim of general and special prevention sought through this offence, this legal gap should be filled as soon as possible by a legislative amendment. Otherwise, either these acts will go unpunished or the courts will be compelled to apply an extensive interpretation and, by accepting the act of using information systems for following as also falling within the definition of the offence, to engage in erroneous and unlawful practices. It is clear that this would be contrary both to the law and to the aim of achieving justice.
d. Attempting to Establish Contact with the Victim
The other act constituting this offence is attempting to establish contact with the victim by using means of correspondence and communication, information systems or third persons. The legislature has described how the act of establishing contact is to be performed. For this alternative act element of the offence to be fulfilled, the perpetrator need not establish contact, or in other words enter into communication, with the victim; it is sufficient that the perpetrator performs his act for that purpose and repeats or continues it in such a way as to amount to persistence. Accordingly, the act of persistence is realised where e-mails are sent to the victim over and over again even if the victim does not read them, where the victim is called over and over again even if he does not answer the telephone or hear it ring, where messages are left on the victim’s answering machine or voice-message application, or where friend requests are sent to the victim over and over again on social media platforms45.
• Using Means of Correspondence and Communication: The first method by which this act may be performed is the use of means of correspondence and communication. Every kind of hardware and software which, today and in the future, enables correspondence and communication between people must be regarded as falling within this scope. For present purposes, therefore, the telephone, e-mail, applications such as “Whatsapp”, “Signal”, “Telegram”, “FaceTime”, “Messenger” and the like, which we call instant messaging applications (over-the-top service providers), written letters, courier deliveries and so on fall within this scope. This definition is not exhaustive; we should say that, in the information age, in which technology develops almost every day and new applications appear at any moment, this non-exhaustive method of regulation is appropriate in order not to tie the hands of practitioners and to prevent similar wrongs from going unsanctioned46.
• Using Information Systems: The act of attempting to establish contact with the victim may also be performed by using information systems. Most of the communication technologies we mentioned in the preceding paragraph are used through information systems. In fact, an application launched for a specific purpose – for example Twitter, which was created for sharing information in short sentences, or Instagram, which was created for sharing images – came after a while to be used for sending instant messages as well. These pieces of software therefore generally perform several functions at once, and in order to use them one needs a smartphone or tablet computer, which we now readily define as an information system. Consequently, the offence will also have been committed where, without merely sending messages, the perpetrator in some way carries out the act of persistently following the victim through information systems, for example through social media platforms. An important point that needs to be discussed here is whether the offence will be constituted where the perpetrator persistently stalks the victim not directly himself but by using an artificial intelligence (AI) application which he has developed or which is already available. In our view, since general AI has not yet been developed and what will be used is a specialised AI acting in accordance with the perpetrator’s instructions, the person who uses the software in question and gives the instruction will be the perpetrator, and this act too will count as an act of persistent stalking by means of the use of information systems. For example, where a vehicle with an autonomous driving system and black-tinted windows, although there is no human being inside it, follows the victim continuously or intermittently but frequently, the perpetrator will be the person who gives the necessary commands to this vehicle equipped with specialised AI.
• Using Third Persons: Establishing contact by using third persons is to be understood as the perpetrator persistently attempting to establish contact with the victim not in person but by using a third person as an instrument. For example, sending an e-mail through a third person, sending a message by instant messaging, or having the third person go and speak to the victim in person47. We also count as falling within this act the perpetrator’s sending gifts by courier or sending flowers in a way that reveals his own presence48, for the courier company or the florist is used as a third person and an attempt is made, in one way or another, to establish contact persistently with the victim49.The point that requires attention as regards the use of a third person is whether or not the third person used to establish contact with the victim acts with the will to participate in this offence.
If the third person acts with the will to participate in this offence, he may, depending on the circumstances, be held liable as a co-perpetrator or as an aider. Where the perpetrator uses a different third person for each act, the criminal liability of the third persons will be set out under the heading of participation, while as far as the perpetrator is concerned the act element will have been fulfilled. In fact, this situation is regulated in Art. 37(2) TCK as indirect perpetration. This situation, which is regulated in the general provisions of the Code, has been repeated in this special norm as an alternative act. Where the third person used by the perpetrator in the commission of the offence lacks the capacity for culpability, the penalty for the offence will be imposed in increased form. In our view, even if only one of the numerous acts of establishing contact that make up the persistence is carried out through a person lacking the capacity for culpability, the perpetrator’s penalty must be increased pursuant to Art. 37(2), sentence 2, TCK.
When the acts of “using information systems in order to follow” and “using third persons for the purpose of establishing contact” discussed above are considered together, the following question needs to be answered: what will happen if the perpetrator himself comes into physical contact with the victim, or acts for that purpose? The definition of the offence covers the perpetrator’s physically following and the use of an intermediary for the purpose of establishing contact. What will happen where the perpetrator, without any injury, sexual assault or the like, and without physically following either, establishes contact physically – for example, waits every morning in front of the door of the victim’s home or workplace with a bunch of roses and showers rose petals over the victim’s head as he passes? Similarly, where the perpetrator comes every day in front of the victim’s workplace, says “I love you” through a megaphone and leaves, will this be treated as merely a matter of a “declaration of love”? Unfortunately the legislature did not think of this situation either and left it unregulated. Consequently, “the points we have made regarding following by means of information systems” apply here too. Here, too, there is a gap in the law and this gap needs to be filled. In fact, the easier course would be for the legislature, instead of creating an offence of specified conduct in this way, to create an offence of unspecified conduct, as indicated in the Istanbul Convention, and to leave the definition of the offence to practice and legal scholarship. As far as we understand, however, the legislature wished, in accordance with the principle of legality of offences and penalties and the principle of certainty, to enact a provision that would not extend criminal liability too far, and in so doing gave rise this time to legal gaps. If the legislature is still of the same mind as regards the creation of this type of offence, it should remedy the gaps in the law indicated above without delay.
e. The Result
Persistent stalking is a result offence. For the offence to be constituted, it is not enough that the acts enumerated above have been performed; as a result of these acts, serious unease must be caused to the victim, or the victim must fear for his own safety or that of one of the persons close to him. For the offence to be constituted, one of these results, or both together, must occur. Since the wrongfulness of the result will also increase according to its intensity, this must be taken into account, in accordance with Art. 61 TCK, at the stage of determining the penalty for the offence.
• Serious Unease Caused to the Victim
It is not sufficient for the result to remain at the level of mere unease; it must reach the level of serious unease. In daily life a person may at times become uneasy even at a single call from someone he dislikes or who always brings bad news. Such unease, however, is generally momentary, and this moment of unease is forgotten either with the passing of a short time or as other events and/or thoughts intervene. Consequently, punishing every state of unease without any limitation would be liable to extend criminal liability excessively. For this reason the legislature, rightly in our view, required the unease to be at a serious level50. We should state that we do not agree with the dissenting opinions51 and the views in legal scholarship52 which criticise the requirement that, as regards the result of unease, it be of a serious degree. Where this level is to be set has, correctly, been left to legal scholarship and practice; for the laying down of a specific criterion for this by statute is neither appropriate in terms of legislative technique nor possible. In each specific case the judge will determine the act performed by the perpetrator, the result that has occurred and the effect which that result has had on the victim, where necessary also drawing on an expert in order to determine the effect on the victim and its degree53.
Indeed, it is stated in legal scholarship in the following terms that the feature which gives this offence its characteristic nature is the state of unease54 :
“Today, by contrast, what gives the act its characteristic feature is that forms of conduct which in the past might have been regarded as discourtesy are repeated despite the absence of consent, become persistent by being spread over time and, as a result of the fear and anxiety they create in the victim, cause the victim to change her daily life. As a result of these acts the victim is exposed to various and grave consequences such as becoming uneasy, not going out into the street, not using public transport, being anxious about being sexually harassed, concealing her body and her sexuality, withdrawing from social and working life, abandoning her education, being unable to form a new emotional relationship and being unable to look after her children”.
• The Victim’s Fearing for His Own Safety or That of a Person Close to Him As regards the result consisting in the victim’s fearing for his own safety or that of a person close to him, no particular degree has been required; it has been considered sufficient, for the result to occur, that the victim is seized by this feeling. In our view, the degree of “seriousness” required in respect of unease ought also to have been required in respect of this result. However, even though no such degree is required in the definition of the offence, for the offence to be accepted as constituted in practice the result felt by the victim in terms of safety must be at a certain level, that is, the wrongfulness of the result must exceed the threshold of deserving punishment. For this reason the fear in question must reach a reasonable level, and this must be assessed by the judge in each specific case.
Who is to be understood by the expression “persons close” in this result has not been expressly defined in the definition of the offence. In our view this expression must be interpreted broadly, and the person or persons whom the victim regards as important to him, whom he values, and at whose misfortune he would feel a sorrow exceeding the sorrow, arising from being human, that is felt at harm befalling any person, must be accepted as falling within this expression55.
Since in this offence a result independent of the act is also required, the causal link between the act and the result must also be established. Accordingly, the victim’s state of anxiety and/or fear must have arisen as a result of the acts performed by the perpetrator. If, on the other hand, the victim is depressed, or in a constant state of fear and anxiety, for some other reason or because of his own mental condition, it can no longer be said that this result stems from the perpetrator’s act, and the offence is not constituted.
We should state that we do not consider the provision appropriate in this respect. This type of offence ought to have been framed not as an offence of harm but as a concrete endangerment offence56 . The acts performed by the perpetrator ought to be sufficient for the commission of the offence, while the requirement that these acts be capable of causing fear and anxiety in the victim ought to have been framed as an objective condition of punishability57. As it stands, the offence is virtually incapable of being committed against people who are already depressed or who are, mentally, more anxious and fearful than normal. If the perpetrator raises the defence that the victim was in such a state of mind and this is proved, the perpetrator cannot be punished, for the result, even though desired by the perpetrator, does not (cannot) come about. Yet in real life these acts are liable to have a greater effect on such persons than on persons of normal mental health, and perhaps to leave lasting damage. We therefore consider that the definition of the offence needs to be reviewed once again in this respect too.
f. The Aggravated Form of the Offence
Three different aggravated forms are provided for in respect of this offence, and it is laid down that the penalty for the offence is to be increased where any one of them is present. Accordingly, in addition to the basic elements of the offence, the following constitute the aggravated form of the offence: a) its commission against a child or against a spouse in respect of whom a judicial separation order has been issued or from whom the perpetrator is divorced, b) its causing the victim to change school, workplace or home or to leave school or work, c) its commission by a perpetrator in respect of whom a removal order or a measure prohibiting approach to the home, school or workplace has been ordered.
• Commission of the Offence against a Child
Of these aggravated forms, the child is defined in Article 6 of the TCK. According to it, everyone under the age of 18 (who has not entered the age of 19) is deemed to be a child. Even if the victim has been declared of age for the purposes of civil law on a ground such as marriage, he is regarded as a child for the purposes of criminal law if under the age of 18 on the date on which the offence was committed, and the aggravated form of the offence is applied to the perpetrator. Where, however, the perpetrator commits the offence believing the victim to be over 18 but the victim is in fact under 18, the provision on mistake as to the aggravated forms of the offence (Art. 30(2) TCK) may be applicable to the perpetrator.
• Commission of the Offence against a Spouse in Respect of Whom a Judicial Separation Order Has Been Issued or a Divorced Spouse The commission of the offence against a spouse in respect of whom a judicial separation order has been issued, or against a divorced spouse, is another aggravated form. In practice it is frequently seen that, particularly between persons with this legal status, violence of varying severity, extending as far as death, is inflicted by men on women. Taking this into account, the legislature has framed this as an aggravated form. This provision of the Law is restrictive in nature, because this aggravated form can be applied only where one of the persons in respect of whom a separation or divorce decree has been issued under the Civil Code commits this offence against the other.
It is known from practice and from the incidents reported in the news that, for the offence of persistent stalking to be committed in this way, there need not be a marital bond, even one that has ended, or a separation order between the perpetrator and the victim. Even where there is no marital bond between the parties, there may be an emotional and/or sexual relationship such as living together, being lovers, dating or being attracted to one another58 . In the incidents that come to public attention, especially in the murders of women, it is seen that in the acts in question, in which violence against women took place even though there was no marital bond between the parties, an act of persistent stalking was also present, either before matters reached the stage of violence or together with the violence, and these matters also enter the court records. Indeed, such acts of persistent stalking are at times also seen between persons who are still in the process of divorce but in respect of whom no separation order has been issued. If one of the aims sought to be achieved by this type of offence is the prevention of every kind of violence against women, this aggravated form should be drafted with every type of relationship in mind. Nor will there be any difficulty of proof as to the existence of the relationship, for witnesses, or correspondence or images exchanged between the parties, will be sufficient to prove the existence of a relationship. Consequently, it was not appropriate to limit this aggravated form to a spouse in respect of whom a separation order has been issued by a court or who is divorced59.
• Where the Offence Causes the Victim to Change School, Workplace or Home or
to Leave School or Work
Another aggravated form provided for in the definition of the offence is where, as a result of the offence committed by the perpetrator, the victim is caused to change school, workplace or home or to leave school or work. As can be seen, these are additional results affecting the victim over and above the serious unease and fear for safety that are required for the offence to be constituted60. They are important in that they show that the victim has really been affected by the result of the offence, and proof of these matters is also easy. It was therefore appropriate to include these effects or additional results as an aggravating element of the offence.
• Commission of the Offence by a Perpetrator in Respect of Whom a Removal Order or a Measure Prohibiting Approach to the Home, School or
Workplace Has Been Ordered
Where the perpetrator commits the offence of persistent stalking even though the judge has, pursuant to Article 5(1)(b) and (c) of Law No. 6284 on the Protection of the Family and the Prevention of Violence against Women, ordered the perpetrator’s removal or prohibited him from approaching the home, school or workplace, the perpetrator’s penalty is increased. Özar, who is a practitioner and has written an article on this subject, states that the protective orders issued under Law No. 6284 number in the hundreds of thousands, and that the aggravated form regulated in this sub-paragraph is therefore the aggravated form of the offence of persistent stalking that will be applied most frequently61. Özar also criticises the fact that the commission of the offence of persistent stalking despite the ordering of the other measures regulated in Article 5 of Law No. 6284 has not been framed as an aggravated form of the offence. We too share this view of the author.
• The Missing Aggravating Element: The Motive of Hatred
The offence of persistent stalking is also frequently committed because the victim belongs to a particular group. The failure to include this in the law is a significant shortcoming. Although the regulation of these acts as a type of offence in the criminal code rests in particular on the ground that they are the preliminary stage of violence against women, it is a known fact that in the societies of many countries, including our own, offences of this kind are committed out of a motive of hatred against persons who are in some way weak or different compared with the rest of society.
After women, those most exposed to acts of this kind are LGBT individuals. Yet the commission of the act against these persons has not been framed as an aggravated form of the offence. Similarly, the commission of this offence against individuals who are seen to be in a disadvantaged position because they belong to a group defined by, for instance, sex, sexual orientation, disability, ethnicity, religion, or political or philosophical belief should be framed as an aggravated form of the offence. Indeed, this aggravated form has been included for this offence, which is regulated in Art. 612 bis(2) of the Italian Criminal Code62. This is also a good method of suppressing hate speech.
The fact that this aggravated form was not included in the TCK is a political and deliberate choice. In our country it has still not been understood, either by a large part of society or in politics and the bureaucracy, that differences are a source of richness, that people may live and think as they wish, and that these differences may manifest themselves in politics, religion, philosophical thought, sexual life and everyday life. In political discourse in particular, “homophobic thinking” is brought to the fore and a language of hatred is used against these people. Yet no one is obliged to live as we, someone else or the political power would wish. Nor, moreover, is anyone obliged to disclose or to conceal his thoughts and way of life. A person’s reflecting to the outside world what he thinks, his manner of dress and what he feels in his inner world falls within that person’s freedom of expression and is protected. The protection of the freedom of expression of these individuals is, in turn, a positive obligation for a secular, democratic State governed by the rule of law. Accordingly, for our country too, whose Constitution expressly states that it has these characteristics, the commission of the offence of persistent stalking out of a motive of hatred against disadvantaged groups or individuals should be framed as an aggravated form of the offence, so that the State fulfils the positive obligation incumbent on it in this regard.
B. The Mental (Subjective) Element of the Statutory Definition
The mental element of this offence is intent. The legislature has not required, for the offence to be constituted, any particular purpose or motive with which the offence of persistent stalking is committed63.This is, in our view too, a correct provision. For the constitution of this offence, what matters is not the perpetrator’s purpose or motive but the harm suffered by the victim. Requiring an element of purpose and motive in addition to the intent to commit the offence, in order for the basic form of the offence to be realised, makes it more difficult for the statutory definition of the offence to be fulfilled. Since requiring such an element for this particular offence would also make the constitution of the offence more difficult, it would be liable to harm, in particular, the aim of protecting women; the fact that the mental element has been framed in this way was therefore an appropriate choice. Furthermore, it is not possible for this offence to be committed negligently, both by reason of the provision of the law and as a matter of legal logic.
IV. The Element of Unlawfulness
This offence presents no particular feature as regards the element of unlawfulness. Where a person is followed, in particular on account of a criminal investigation, no offence will be constituted. For example, where a person is persistently followed by law enforcement officers on the basis of the authority conferred by law, or where persistent attempts are made to establish contact with a person for the purpose of apprehending him, no offence is constituted, owing to the existence of a ground of justification arising from the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK).
V. Special Forms of Appearance of the Offence A. Attempt
Since the offence of persistent stalking is a result offence, it is capable of being attempted. Where the act is completed but the result does not occur, or where the act remains incomplete, the offence is deemed to have remained at the stage of attempt.
For this type of offence, the first of these is both possible and easy to prove. For example, where the perpetrator persistently follows the victim physically or attempts to make contact with the victim by the methods enumerated in the statutory definition, but the victim does not become uneasy or fearful as a result, the offence is deemed to have remained at the stage of attempt. For example, where the perpetrator carries out his acts reaching the degree of persistence and, although the victim is made uneasy by this, the unease does not reach a serious level, the result will not have occurred and the offence will therefore have remained at the stage of attempt64.
The point that really requires attention here is the case in which the act remains incomplete. As we have also stated above, for the act element of this offence to be fulfilled, the acts indicated in the definition of the offence must be performed persistently. If the frequency or duration of the acts has not reached the level of persistence, the act element of the offence will not be constituted in any event, so that there will be no conformity with the statutory definition and, consequently, no attempt either. Acts performed from the moment the element of persistence has been fulfilled, on the other hand, will have no effect on the constitution of the offence; they will be taken into account in determining the actual penalty on account of the increase in the degree of wrongfulness. Accordingly, once persistence has been realised, it is of no importance for the constitution of the offence that the subsequent acts planned by the perpetrator do not take place and remain incomplete. The only possibility for this offence to be regarded as having remained at the stage of attempt is therefore the case in which the act is completed but the result does not occur.
B. Participation
Every form of participation may arise in the commission of this offence. The offence may be committed by a sole perpetrator, and may equally be committed by co-perpetrators. It is also possible to take part in the offence as an instigator or as an aider.
Where the perpetrator commits the offence in the form of establishing contact by using third persons, which is the second alternative act of the offence, the third person must “not know” that he is being used as an instrument in the commission of an offence. If the third person knows that acts of persistent stalking are being carried out and that he is being used as an instrument for establishing contact, this now requires it to be accepted that the third person too has the will to participate in the offence. In that case the third person must be regarded as a co-perpetrator or as an aider, having regard to the nature of the acts he has performed and the level of his contribution to the offence. Since, under the rule of accessoriness (Art.
40 TCK), the liability of those participating in the offence is determined by reference to the perpetrator, a participant can be punished only if the perpetrator’s acts also include the act of persistence. Consequently, even if the accomplice has performed only a single act with the aim of participating in the offence, he must, by virtue of the rule of accessoriness, be regarded as having participated in the offence where the perpetrator’s acts as a whole fulfil the element of persistence. Indeed, Article 40 of the TCK also states that the existence of an intentional and unlawful act is sufficient for participation in an offence. For the purposes of this offence, where the perpetrator’s conduct is intentional and unlawful and conforms to the statutory definition, the accomplice too will be liable for it. Otherwise, where the perpetrator uses a different person for each act of establishing contact and the person used has the will to participate in the offence, it would not be possible to hold the accomplice liable, on the argument that the element of persistence is not fulfilled in the accomplice’s case. That would be contrary both to the rule of accessoriness in participation and to the sense of justice.
The basic form of the offence may be committed by anyone. In the case of the aggravated forms of the offence consisting in its “commission against a spouse in respect of whom a judicial separation order has been issued or a divorced spouse”, as regards the spouse to whom the decision is addressed, and in the case of its “commission by a perpetrator in respect of whom a removal order or a measure prohibiting approach to the home, school or workplace has been ordered”, where the offence is committed by the person to whom that order is addressed, a non-genuine special offence is at issue. Accordingly, where the offence is committed in the form of co-perpetration, the perpetrator possessing the characteristics mentioned above will be liable for the aggravated form of the offence, while the perpetrator to whom these decisions are not addressed will be liable for its basic form.
In the case of participation in the offence, on the other hand, the liability of the accomplices will be determined, in accordance with the rule of accessoriness, by reference to the liability of the perpetrator.
C. Concurrence of Offences
Although it may be thought at first sight that a relationship of concurrence may arise between the offence of persistent stalking and other offences, once the matter is examined it becomes apparent that problems of concurrence will not readily arise.
First of all, it is difficult for a continuing offence (successive offence) to arise in respect of persistent stalking. For the commission of the same offence more than once against the same victim, which features in the definition of the continuing offence, is itself the very act of “persisting” in persistent stalking. Consequently, where persistence takes the form not of an uninterrupted act but of the same or different alternative acts being performed persistently, that is, more than once at different times, this will in any case constitute the material element of the offence. There is therefore no need additionally to increase the penalty by applying Art. 43(1) TCK to the perpetrator. However, where the perpetrator resumes his acts against the same victim after a fairly long time has elapsed and a complaint is lodged against the perpetrator for this offence in the meantime, the new acts will now constitute a separate offence, and it may therefore be considered that a continuing offence has arisen. Where, on the other hand, similar acts are performed again after a conviction has been handed down against the perpetrator, these are now regarded as entirely separate offences and the provision on the continuing offence is not applied65. In that case a separate penalty is imposed for each offence.
Where, while committing the offence of persistent stalking, the perpetrator at the same time also commits other offences such as insult, threat or deprivation of liberty, each of these is assessed separately, since they are the result of different acts and violate different offence norms66. Accordingly, the provision on notional concurrence of offences of different kinds (Art. 44 TCK) finds no application here.
On the other hand, where the perpetrator commits the offence against more than one person at the same time by a single act of persistent stalking – for example, in cases such as twin siblings being physically followed, or persistent attempts being made to establish contact with two flatmates through the same person – notional concurrence of offences of the same kind (Art. 43(2) TCK) may arise.
The offence of persistent stalking regulated in Art. 123/A TCK is in the nature of a primary norm in relation to the offence of disturbing the peace and tranquillity of persons regulated in Art. 123. Indeed, this is also expressly stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article, in the words: “The offence of persistent stalking constitutes a special form of the offence set out in Article 123. Thus, in cases where this offence is constituted, no action may be taken under Article 123” 67. Accordingly, where an act falls within both Art. 123 and Art. 123/A TCK, then, in accordance with the principle of the priority of the primary norm over the subsidiary norm, Art. 123/A will be applied first, and Art. 123 will be applied in cases where that article cannot be applied.
VI. Sanction, Investigation and Prosecution
For the basic form of this offence, imprisonment from six months to two years is prescribed, and for the aggravated form, imprisonment from one year to three years. The penalties were much criticised in the relevant committees during the drafting of the law on the ground that they are relatively low68. We regard the setting of the penalty as lying within the discretion of the legislature, on condition that it gauges how the wrong is perceived in society, takes society’s demands into account and acts on the findings of the science of penology (punishment/sanctions). In the light of the theory of sanctions that we espouse, we consider that what is effective and deterrent is not the leniency or severity of the penalty but whether or not it is actually enforced; that penalties which, whatever their amount, are genuinely and invariably enforced have an effect on society; and that only then will punishment serve the aims of general and special prevention. Accordingly, having regard to the laws on the execution of sentences in force in our country and the execution regime, we consider that these penalties lack a deterrent character not because they are low but “because they are not (cannot be) enforced”69.
The investigation and prosecution of both the basic form and the aggravated form of this offence are subject to complaint70. Accordingly, the victim and/or the person harmed
provision appears far from offering an effective solution in practice.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 48 During the parliamentary deliberations on Law No. 7406, the amount of the penalty for the offence in question was criticised as follows by the Members of Parliament Jale Nur Süllü, Suzan Şahin, Candan Yüceer, Aysu Bankoğlu, Gamze Taşçıer and Neslihan Hancıoğlu, who appended a dissenting opinion to the report prepared as a result of the work of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: “… The fact that Articles 96 and 123 of the TCK have not been applied effectively to date, and that the lower limit laid down by the new article is set lower than the lower limit laid down in TCK 96 and 123, makes the provision on persistent stalking unrealistic.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 75. The same Members of Parliament: “The penalty envisaged in the Bill for the offence of persistent stalking is from 6 months to 2 years. In the aggravated form of the offence the penalties rise to from 1 year to 3 years. These terms, which fall within the scope of suspension of the sentence, are terms that will result in the perpetrator continuing to stalk persistently and to commit offences without even entering prison. This is another danger which, far from being deterrent, will reinforce the public perception of impunity. On the other hand, taking into account the provisions of Article 34, entitled ‘pursuit for the purpose of harassment’, a similar concept in the Istanbul Convention, and of Article 45, the necessary legislative or other measures must be taken to ensure that it is punished by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 81, 82.
This point was also raised in the dissenting opinion written against the Report of the Justice Committee by the Members of Parliament Süleyman Bülbül, Rafet Zeybek, Alpay Antmen, Turan Aydoğan and Tufan Köse: “… The limitation of the lower limit envisaged in the Bill to six months is far below the amount of the penalty specified in the Turkish Criminal Code and in its Articles 96 and 123, which have been applied to date in respect of the act of persistent stalking, and is also very far from being deterrent. For this reason the penalty range should read ‘shall be sentenced to imprisonment from 4 years to 6 years.’” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 121. by the offence must lodge a complaint within the preclusive period of six months from the time they learn or come to know of the perpetrator and the act (Art. 73(2) TCK). Where the offence is committed without interruption, this period begins to run from the moment the interruption occurs. Where the complaint is waived after the act has taken place, or the complaint is withdrawn after it has been lodged, a decision that there is no need for investigation or a decision not to prosecute is given at the investigation stage, and a decision to discontinue the case at the prosecution stage. It is not possible to retract a waiver or a withdrawal that has been duly made. In accordance with the principle of the indivisibility of the complaint, where a complaint is lodged against a single perpetrator it extends to all perpetrators and accomplices; for this reason it is not possible to lodge a complaint against one person alone. We consider that making the offence, and in particular its aggravated forms, dependent on complaint is not consistent with the outcome sought in terms of criminal policy (in Art. 612 bis(4) of the Italian Criminal Code the aggravated forms are subject to investigation and prosecution ex officio), and that, as a better method, public prosecutors should be given discretion in this matter as to whether or not to conduct the investigation ex officio, as in the example of Germany (§ 238(VI) of the German Criminal Code)71.
The offence of persistent stalking falls outside the scope of victim–offender mediation (Art. 253(3) CMK). Although the commencement of proceedings has been made dependent on complaint, the legislature deliberately did not make this offence subject to victim–offender mediation72. This provision is also consistent with Article 48 of the Istanbul Convention. Where a complaint is lodged for the offence of persistent stalking, it is possible, if the conditions are met, for the public prosecutor to decide to defer the filing of the public prosecution (Art. 171 CMK).
The basic form of the offence is, by reason of the amount of the penalty, subject to the prohibition of pre-trial detention (Art. 100(4) CMK). Where a penalty is imposed for the basic form of the offence, or where the penalty imposed for the aggravated form of the offence is less than two years, deferment of the pronouncement of the judgment (Art. 231(5) CMK) and suspension of the sentence (Art. 51(1) TCK) may be ordered. Where the final penalty is imprisonment for one year or less, it may be converted into an alternative sanction (Art. 50(1) TCK).
Pursuant to Art. 286(2) CMK, whether the penalty is imposed for the basic form or for the aggravated form of the offence of persistent stalking, the decision of the criminal court of first instance which will conduct the trial can, having regard to the amount of the penalty laid down in the law, be challenged only by way of appeal on facts and law. Since appeal on points of law is not available for this offence, the decision given by the regional court of appeal has the character of a final judgment. By the amendment made to Article 234 of the CMK by Article 10 of Law No. 7406, a person who is the victim of the offence of persistent stalking was enabled to benefit from free legal assistance from a lawyer provided by the bar associations73. We should note that this is a positive and appropriate provision in terms of victims’ rights74.
CONCLUSION
Although there are certain shortcomings in the way the offence of persistent stalking in Art. 123/A TCK is framed in the law, we consider that, all in all, it is positive and a step forward in combating violence against women. By contrast, we are of the view that the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, which prohibits violence against women and sets out the means of combating it, is a complete regression in terms of fundamental rights and freedoms.
We wish to state that making a normative provision of this kind is a step forward, but that violence against women cannot be prevented by normative provisions alone. The principal field for preventing this violence is education. As long as people are not educated in this respect, criminal norms will always remain powerless. This education begins first in the family and then continues at school. Accordingly, children must be educated and sensitised on this subject from primary school onwards.
Turning to certain shortcomings in the structure of the offence, we regard, first of all, the failure to mention among the elements of the offence the following of the victim by means of information systems as a major shortcoming. Similarly, situations in which the perpetrator establishes contact physically without physically following the victim – for example, waiting every morning in front of the door of the victim’s home or workplace with a bunch of roses and showering rose petals over the victim’s head as he passes, or coming every day in front of the victim’s workplace, saying “I love you” through a megaphone and leaving – are likewise not covered by the definition of the offence. Remedying these and similar shortcomings is essential in order to achieve the aim expected from the creation of the offence.
We are of the view that framing as an aggravated form only the commission of this offence against persons in respect of whom a separation or divorce decree has been issued is discrimination based on people’s marital status. What matters is not a decision given by a court but whether or not there is a relationship in the background of the persistent stalking. How the relationship is characterised or named is, and should be, of no importance for criminal law.
We also count among the negatives the fact that individuals who are in some way weak and disadvantaged compared with the rest of society are not mentioned among the aggravated forms of the offence, and in particular that LGBT individuals, who are frequently exposed to offences of this kind, are ignored.
In conclusion, despite these shortcomings, we consider the provision enacted to be valuable in terms of combating violence against women. We hope that the necessary sensitivity will also be shown in practice and that persons who commit acts of this kind will be punished as they deserve.
Bibliography
[1] Bostancı Bozbayındır, Gülşah, “Cyberbullying and Criminal Law”, İHFM, C. 77, S.1, 2019.
[2] Dülger, Murat Volkan, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, Hukuk Akademisi, 2021.
[3] Ekici Şahin, Meral, “Kişilerin Huzur ve Sükununu Bozma Suçu (TCK m. 123)”, CHD, Y. 8, S. 23, Aralık 2013.
[4] European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EUAFR), Violence against Women: An EU-wide Survey: Main Results, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015.
[5] Kaygısız, Esra Gökçen, “Şiddetin E-Hali: Siber Zorbalık”, Türkiye İnsan Hakları ve Eşitlik Kurumu Akademik Dergisi, Şiddetin Önlenmesi Özel Sayısı, S. 4-5, 2020.
[6] Kjaerum, Morten, “Foreword”, in: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EUAFR), Violence against Women: An EU-wide Survey: Main Results, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015.
[7] Özar, Süleyman, “Israrlı Takip Suçu (TCK m. 123/A)”, AÜHFD, C. 71, S. 3, 2022.
[8] Ruth, W. Leemis/Norah Friar/Srijana Khatiwada/May S. Chen/Marcie-jo Kresnow/Sharon G. Smith/Sharon Caslin/Kathleen C. Basile, The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey: 2016/2017 Report on Intimate Partner Violence, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta Georgia, 2022.
[9] Selçuk, Sami, Suç Hukuku Dogmatiği ve/ya Grameri: I. Kitap Giriş, Ankara-İstanbul, İmge Kitabevi, 2022.
[10] Soygüt, M. Buket, “Kadına Yönelik Erkek Şiddetinin Önlenmesi Bağlamında Stalking (Israrlı Takip) ve Cezasızlık Sorunu”, Çankaya Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, C. 5, S. 1, Nisan 2020.
[11] Taşkın, Şaban Cankat, “Stalking (Siber Gözetleme) Eyleminin Ceza Hukukundaki Yaptırımının Değerlendirilmesi”, Uluslararası Bilişim ve Teknoloji Hukuku Sempozyumu Tebliğler Kitabı, Ed: Şerafettin Ekici/ Ekrem Solak/Muhammed Emre Avşar, İstanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi / Bilişim ve Teknoloji Hukuku Derneği, Ankara, Adalet Yayınevi, 2021.
[12] Türkmen, Ahmet, “Yeni Bir Hukuki Olgu Olarak Israrlı Takip ve Taciz (Stalking) ve Bunun Türk Medeni Hukuku Bakımından Değerlendirilmesi”, DEÜHFD, C: 11, Özel Sayı 2009, Y. 2010.
[13] Türkoğlu, Selin, Ceza Hukuku Açısından Israrlı Takip, İstanbul, On İki Levha, 2020.
[14] Van Der Aa, Susan, “New Trends in the Criminalization of Stalking in the EU Member States”, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 24, 2018.
[15] Van der Aa, Susan, ‘‘International (Cyber) Stalking: Impediments to Investigation and Prosecution’’, Studies in Global Justice, No. 8, 2011.
[16] Vasiu, Ioana/Lucian Vasiu, “Light My Fire: A Roentgenogram of Cyberstalking Cases”, American Journal of Trial Advocacy, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2016.
Footnotes
- Date of receipt by the Editorial Board: 15.04.2023 - Date of acceptance: 11.05.2023 ↑
- Istanbul Aydın University Faculty of Law, Department of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, muratdulger@aydin.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0002-1574-1755. ↑
- For the same view see: Şaban Cankat Taşkın, “Stalking (Siber Gözetleme) Eyleminin Ceza Hukukundaki Yaptırımının Değerlendirilmesi”, Uluslararası Bilişim ve Teknoloji Hukuku Sempozyumu Tebliğler Kitabı, Ed: Şerafettin Ekici/ Ekrem Solak/Muhammed Emre Avşar, İstanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi / Bilişim ve Teknoloji Hukuku Derneği, Ankara, Adalet Yayınevi, 2021, s. 291. ↑
- European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EUAFR), Violence against Women: An EU-wide Survey: Main Results, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015, s. 81, 82. ↑
- EUAFR, An EU-wide Survey, s. 81. ↑
- Indeed, these points are stated clearly in the foreword to the report: “This report is based on interviews with 42,000 women in the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU). The report shows that violence against women, and in particular gender-based violence that disproportionately affects women, is an extensive human rights violation that the EU cannot afford to overlook. In the survey, women were asked about their experiences of physical, sexual and psychological violence, including intimate partner violence (domestic violence), and questions were also asked about stalking, sexual harassment and the role played by new technologies in women’s experiences of abuse. In addition, women were asked about their experiences of violence in childhood. What emerges is a picture of widespread abuse that affects the lives of many women but is systematically under-reported to the authorities. For example, one in 10 women has been subjected to some form of sexual violence since the age of 15, and one in 20 women has been raped (sexual assault). Just over one in five women has been subjected to physical and/or sexual violence by a current or previous partner, and just over one in 10 women states that she was subjected to some form of sexual violence by an adult before the age of 15. Yet, by way of example, only 14% of women reported the most serious incident of partner violence to the police, and 13% reported the most serious incident of non-partner violence to the police. For several years, repeated calls for the collection of comprehensive data on violence against women have been made from different quarters; these include various Presidencies of the Council of the EU, monitoring bodies such as the United Nations (UN) Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, as well as the United Nations and the Council of Europe. With the publication of these results, it is clear that the time has come to address violence against women on the basis of the evidence which the survey provides for 28 countries. Future EU strategies on equality between women and men may draw on the findings of the survey in order to address the main areas of concern relating to women’s experiences of violence. The survey results also provide ample support for EU Member States to ratify the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) and for the EU to explore the possibility of acceding to the convention. The findings further reinforce the need to ensure the implementation of existing EU measures for victims of crime, in particular through the EU Victims’ Directive. They also serve to underline the importance of targeted EU legislation and policies on violence against women, such as the European Protection Order and the Directive on Mutual Recognition of Protection Measures in Civil Matters, which must be applied in practice if they are to be effective. Alongside the responses given to violence against women at the level of the EU institutions and the Member States, action to combat violence against women needs to come from different quarters, including, for example, employers, health professionals and internet service providers. This is particularly important because many women do not report their experiences of abuse to the authorities, so that a large part of violence against women continues to be hidden and, as a result, perpetrators are not confronted. Different ways of bringing violence against women to the fore and of combating violence against women therefore need to be explored further. With the publication of the survey and the taking of the necessary follow-up measures by politicians and policy makers, women who are victims of violence and have remained silent can be encouraged to speak out. This is of great importance in countries, and among certain groups, where it is not yet common to talk openly about personal experiences of violence, where the reporting of incidents to the authorities is low and where violence against women is not treated as a mainstream policy issue. In sum, this report presents the first results of the most comprehensive survey conducted to date at EU level (and worldwide) on women’s diverse experiences of violence. It is hoped that the findings of the report, read together with the online data explorer (browser) tool, will be taken up by those women and men who can advocate and initiate change in order to address violence against women.” Morten Kjaerum, “Foreword”, in: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EUAFR), Violence against Women: An EU-wide Survey: Main Results, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015, s. 3. ↑
- A study conducted on this subject shows that 13.5% (16.9 million) of women living in the United States have been stalked by an intimate partner at least once in their lifetime, and that 2.5% of women (3 million) were stalked by an intimate partner in the last 12 months before the survey. The same study shows that one in 20 men in the United States (5.2%, or 6.2 million) has been stalked by an intimate partner at least once in his lifetime, and that 1.2% of men (1.4 million) were stalked by an intimate partner in the 12 months before the survey. See: Ruth W. Leemis/Norah Friar/Srijana Khatiwada/May S. Chen/Marcie-jo Kresnow/Sharon G. Smith/Sharon Caslin/Kathleen C. Basile, The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey: 2016/2017 Report on Intimate Partner Violence, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta Georgia, 2022. ↑
- M. Buket Soygüt, “Kadına Yönelik Erkek Şiddetinin Önlenmesi Bağlamında Stalking (Israrlı Takip) ve Cezasızlık Sorunu”, Çankaya Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, C. 5, S. 1, Nisan 2020, s. 2810. ↑
- TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 10. ↑
- Soygüt, s. 2782. ↑
- The offence regulated in § 238 of the German Criminal Code under the heading “Harassment by persistent following” reads as follows: “(1) Whoever, by following another person without authorisation, persistently 1. goes to places in that person’s vicinity, 2. makes attempts to establish contact with that person by using means of telecommunication or other means of communication or third persons, 3. by misusing data relating to that person, orders goods or services in that person’s name or causes third persons to make contact with that person, 4. threatens that person or a person close to him or her with a violation of life, physical integrity, health or liberty, or 5. commits another similar act, and thereby seriously impairs the way in which that person shapes the life he or she leads, shall be punished with imprisonment of up to three years or with a judicial fine. (2) If, by the act committed, the perpetrator places the victim, a member of the victim’s family or one of the persons close to the victim in danger of death or of serious damage to health, a penalty of from three months to five years shall be imposed. (3) If, by the act committed, the perpetrator causes the death of the victim, of a member of the victim’s family or of one of the persons close to the victim, the penalty shall be imprisonment of from one year to ten years. (4) In the cases falling under paragraph 1, the act shall be investigated and prosecuted only upon complaint; however, where the investigating and prosecuting authorities consider it necessary to act of their own motion on account of the special public interest in criminal prosecution, the right to prosecute ex officio is reserved.” ↑
- Taşkın, Stalking, s. 295. ↑
- Susan Van Der Aa, “New Trends in the Criminalization of Stalking in the EU Member States”, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 24, 2018, s. 315-333; Soygüt, s. 2782; Süleyman Özar, “Israrlı Takip Suçu (TCK m. 123/A)”, AÜHFD, C. 71, S. 3, 2022, s. 1402. This is also expressly stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article: “The offence of persistent stalking is regulated in a number of legal systems, notably Germany, Austria, France, Belgium and Italy; the definition of this offence differs markedly from country to country, and the social and cultural structure of the country concerned, together with its criminal and penal policy, is influential in determining the elements of this offence and its sanction.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 12-14. ↑
- Özar, s. 1400. ↑
- For details on the concepts of stalking and cyberstalking and their application in the United States see: Ioana Vasiu/ Lucian Vasiu, “Light My Fire: A Roentgenogram of Cyberstalking Cases”, American Journal of Trial Advocacy, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2016, s. 41-68. ↑
- “Cyberbullying may be described as hurting, threatening or harassing, disturbing, degrading, insulting or humiliating a person, or disclosing that person’s personal information, by using the internet or internet-connected applications with the aim of causing that person harm. Unlike bullying in the classical sense, in cyberbullying the perpetrator can conceal himself or herself, or can disturb the victim by means of pseudonyms or accounts”. Taşkın, Stalking, s. 292. See also: Esra Gökçen Kaygısız, “Şiddetin E-Hali: Siber Zorbalık”, Türkiye İnsan Hakları ve Eşitlik Kurumu Akademik Dergisi, Şiddetin Önlenmesi Özel Sayısı, S. 4-5, 2020, s. 164; Gülşah Bostancı Bozbayındır, “Cyberbullying and Criminal Law”, İHFM, C. 77, S.1, 2019, s. 429. ↑
- “… These methods, referred to as ‘cyberstalking or cyberbullying’, occur mostly among young people, among whom the use of social media is intensive, and take the form of opening a fake account, website or social media profile or creating a profile, accessing the victim’s accounts without permission, publishing degrading information and/or comments about the person on those accounts, sending e-mails, making threats, sharing a partner’s private photographs or images, disseminating the victim’s identity and contact details or personal information, tagging the victim in irrelevant or degrading photographs, tracking a person’s every movement by placing a GPS device in his or her car, and threatening the victim and/or the victim’s family by e-mail”. Soygüt, s. 2787. ↑
- Both the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, to which we too attach great importance for the protection of women against violence, and the procedure by which it was effected were criticised as follows, during the parliamentary deliberations on Law No. 7406, by the Members of Parliament Jale Nur Süllü, Suzan Şahin, Candan Yüceer, Aysu Bankoğlu, Gamze Taşçıer and Neslihan Hancıoğlu, who appended a dissenting opinion to the report prepared as a result of the work of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: “The fact that, on 19 March 2021, it was decided by a decision of the President of the Republic alone to withdraw from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention), of which Türkiye was the first signatory and which was approved on 24 November 2011 by the votes of 246 of the 247 deputies present in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, is a concrete indication of the government’s outlook on the increasing violence against women and femicides. The overnight decision to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention, which aims to prevent violence by empowering women and ensuring gender equality, means the loss of a great gain for women. The withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, a great gain for women, by the decision of a single person and without any social consensus having been reached, has been met with protest by broad sections of society, democratic mass organisations, civil society organisations fighting in the field of women’s rights, and women.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 62. ↑
- AİHM, Opuz v. Türkiye, 33401/02, 09.06.2009. “In the incident which ended in the death of the applicant’s mother, the perpetrator repeatedly threatened the applicant and her mother with death, prowled around the house with a pistol and a knife and swore on the telephone; although, after these incidents, his statement was taken for the offence of threat and an investigation was opened, he was released. Notwithstanding the Government’s submission that pre-trial detention would have been disproportionate on the available evidence, the Court pointed out that in cases of violence against women the rights of the suspect do not prevail over the victim’s mental and physical integrity and right to life, and in this connection also referred to the decisions of the CEDAW Committee in Fatma Yıldırım v. Austria and A.T. v. Hungary. In the light of its case law in Osman v. the United Kingdom and Bevacqua & S. v. Bulgaria, the ECtHR found that, since the perpetrator had not been detained and no other preventive measures had been taken against him despite the complaints of the applicant’s mother and despite his criminal record for incidents of violence, the State had acted in breach of its positive obligation to protect the life of the victim at risk. Having regard to the fact that the judicial authorities had in general failed to show the requisite sensitivity to violence against women and had remained indifferent, and that the violent acts of the accused had not been subjected to a deterrent criminal sanction, the ECtHR found in its judgment that Nahide Opuz and her mother had been subjected to gender-based violence and hence to discrimination as regards protection from violence, and that what had happened was contrary to Articles 2, 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, thereby establishing an important standard in this field”. Soygüt, s. 2791. AİHM, Opuz v. Türkiye, pr. 47-49, 147. To the same effect see: AİHM, Volodina v. Rusya, No. 41261/17, 04.11.2019. ↑
- RG. 20.03.2012, 28239. ↑
- RG. 18.01.2013, 28532. ↑
- Özar, s. 1402. ↑
- Özar, s. 1398, 1399. ↑
- Soygüt, s. 2788. ↑
- Indeed, even before turning to the substance of the matter, Sami Selçuk criticised the provision from the standpoint of grammar: “In paragraph 123/A, added to Article 123 of the Turkish Criminal Code by Article 8 of Law No. 7407 of 12.5.2022, instead of ‘following bodily’ (bedenen izlemek) the text speaks of ‘following physically’ (fiziken takip etmek), a kind of ‘-en’ suffix that can combine with Arabic words having been attached to a word of Latin origin, so that a kind of pseudo-adverb has been derived. Thus our mother tongue, Turkish, far from being enriched, has been distorted and paralysed. Indeed, that in the twenty-first century such a lack of mother-tongue awareness and such a distortion should have escaped the notice of nearly six hundred literate people sitting in the legislature is a striking example of an insensitivity to language and grammar that is shameful, saddening and unforgivable as far as our Turkish is concerned.” Sami Selçuk, Suç Hukuku Dogmatiği ve/ya Grameri: I. Kitap Giriş, Ankara-İstanbul, İmge Kitabevi, 2022, s. 83. ↑
- This view was expressed in the general assessment section by the Members of Parliament Jale Nur Süllü, Suzan Şahin, Candan Yüceer, Aysu Bankoğlu, Gamze Taşçıer and Neslihan Hancıoğlu, who appended a dissenting opinion to the report prepared as a result of the work of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: “Although the express regulation of persistent stalking as an offence may be regarded as positive, it is an offence that can be punished under the TCK as it stands as well; yet for years the relevant Article 96 has been ignored by the judiciary. Although it is asserted in the explanatory memorandum to the article that ‘the aim is to attach a sanction to acts at the stage before more serious acts directed against the victim’s material and moral personality or bodily integrity occur’, its connection with the article on torment in TCK 96 is not touched upon in any way. This disconnection is yet another indication that the objective stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article, namely ‘effectively combating acts of persistent stalking and protecting victims before offences involving violence against women are committed’, will remain on paper… Persistent stalking is a state of constant harassment and control, of pestering, that is to say systematic violence, and it is torture/torment. The offence of torment is already regulated in Article 96 of the TCK, and although this article has been in force for years it is not applied. It is obvious that the problem cannot be solved by not applying the penalty of 2-5 years’ imprisonment in Article 96 to persistent stalking and writing a new article with a lower penalty instead.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 81, 82. ↑
- To similar effect see: Soygüt, s. 2801. In legal scholarship, Özar states in his article that this offence additionally protects sexual freedom and, at the final stage, the right to life, but we do not share this view. See: Özar, s. 1406. For where the act has reached the level of a violation of sexual freedom or of the right to life, the offences of intentional killing (Art. 81 TCK) and sexual assault (Art. 102 TCK) must come into play independently of this offence. This offence regulates the stage before the perpetrator’s acts have yet reached that point. ↑
- Soygüt, s. 2800. ↑
- This view was expressed in the general assessment section by the Members of Parliament Jale Nur Süllü, Suzan Şahin, Candan Yüceer, Aysu Bankoğlu, Gamze Taşçıer and Neslihan Hancıoğlu, who appended a dissenting opinion to the report prepared as a result of the work of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: “The offence of persistent stalking is a systematic and serious offence which, going beyond the disturbance of peace and tranquillity and the restriction of liberty, gives rise to serious concerns for the safety of life and sometimes ends in murder. In many cases it also constitutes a serious offence of torment. Despite this, regulating it in the chapter on offences against liberty is a legally mistaken approach. For women who are subjected to persistent stalking fear not only for their liberty but for their right to life; they are afraid not merely of going out, but even of going to work, of staying in their homes and of going to their schools. Persistent stalking must therefore be regulated under the heading ‘Offences against Physical Integrity’”. TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 80, 81. ↑
- Some of the criticisms raised during the parliamentary deliberations on Law No. 7406 were answered as follows in the report prepared by the Justice Committee: “Although it is debated whether the acts falling within the scope of the offence of persistent stalking could be punished in the context of the offence of ‘disturbing the peace and tranquillity of persons’ regulated in Article 123 of Law No. 5237, the expression ‘engaging in any other unlawful conduct’ contained in that provision is restrictive in nature, since it requires the act to be unlawful. At this point it would be necessary to debate when establishing contact with a person becomes unlawful, and a situation might arise in which the law interferes seriously with the rules of social conduct. In this sense the provision introduced meets a need. Since the disturbance of inner peace is at issue in both offences, the place in which the article has been regulated in the Turkish Criminal Code is also appropriate. The possibility that the next stage of persistent stalking may constitute more serious offences in fact holds true for other offences as well, such as threat. Moreover, as in the example of the offence of robbery, which, considering that it also involves force directed against the person and disturbs the person’s peace and tranquillity, could equally have been regulated among the offences committed against persons, it is possible for the provisions introduced to protect more than one legal interest rather than a single legal interest. The place in which the offence of persistent stalking has been regulated is therefore appropriate.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 93, 94. ↑
- TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 12-14. ↑
- Soygüt, s. 2804. ↑
- In offences of combined acts, the performance of more than one act is a requirement laid down in the statutory definition of the offence; for this reason, if even one of these acts is not performed, the act element and hence conformity with the statutory definition of the offence (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit) will not be realised, and the offence does not arise either; see: Murat Volkan Dülger, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, Hukuk Akademisi, 2021, s. 284. ↑
- Persistence is important in that it shows that this offence punishes a manifestation of violence against women. Indeed, this point is also emphasised in legal scholarship: “… Although it is the subject of a separate study, we must point out, for the sake of a holistic approach, that the reason for the ‘persistence’ has to be sought in the concept of gender. Indeed, when we look at the profile of the perpetrator and at the aim sought to be achieved by the act, we see that in 70-80% of the cases there was a prior emotional or personal relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, that the acts are committed by a former spouse, friend or lover, and that the victims are women. In this type of violence, referred to as intimate partner violence, the basic aim is to establish domination over the woman by taking revenge because no relationship could be established with the victim being stalked, or by restarting a relationship that has ended.” Soygüt, s. 2787. ↑
- Meral Ekici Şahin, “Kişilerin Huzur ve Sükununu Bozma Suçu (TCK m. 123)”, CHD, Y. 8, S. 23, Aralık 2013, s. 39. ↑
- The explanatory memorandum to the Law explains persistence, but does not expressly state to which element of the offence it belongs: “For the offence to be constituted, the alternative acts specified in the article must be carried out persistently. Persistence is a word meaning to dig in one’s heels, to insist, in a thought or in a course of conduct, and denotes the repeated performance of the acts specified in the article. Persistence is a criterion expressing that the act, in terms of its content of wrongfulness, has reached a level that makes punishment necessary. Where the act constituting the wrong is carried out to an extent that may be regarded as reasonable, this offence will not be constituted. For persistence to exist, it is not essential that the same act be repeated on numerous occasions. The perpetrator may persistently repeat one of the alternative acts specified in the article, and may equally display the will to persist by repeating different alternative acts at different places and times. The judge will determine, within the framework of the circumstances of the specific case, whether or not the element of persistence has been realised.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 12-14. ↑
- Indeed, in a decision concerning Art. 123 TCK, the 4th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation assessed the element of persistence in exactly this way: “Given that the accused’s acts, in the form of sending messages to the intervening party at different times, constitute the ‘persistence’ component of the offence of disturbing the peace and tranquillity of persons regulated in Article 123 of the TCK, the application of Article 43(1) of the same Code, without regard to the fact that the conditions for applying the provisions on the continuing offence are not met, is erroneous.” 4. CD. 15.10.2020, E. 2016/15269, K. 2020/12115. ↑
- In another decision concerning Art. 123 TCK, the 4th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation found the fact that the victim had been called four times sufficient for the element of persistence: “In the specific case under review; in view of the accused’s defence amounting to a confession and the intervening party’s consistent statements at the various stages, the delivery of a judgment of acquittal on grounds that are not considered appropriate, without regard to the fact that, in the accused’s acts, which took the form of calling the intervening party and asking whether the intervening party was “Gülcin” and then, although the intervening party said that the name was not “Gülcin”, sending 4 separate messages on 02/09/2014 – 03/09/2014 according to the TİB records submitted to the file, it must be accepted that the element of persistence was realised and that the accused acted with the motive of disturbing the intervening party psychologically and mentally, in other words that this act amounted to a violation of the legal interest protected by Article 123 of the TCK and that the offence of disturbing the peace and tranquillity of persons was therefore constituted,… being contrary to law, and the grounds of appeal on points of law of the superior and local public prosecutors being considered well-founded, it is decided, contrary to the written opinion of the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, that THE JUDGMENT BE QUASHED,…” 4. CD. 28.04.2022, E. 2020/14707, K. 2022/11583. ↑
- “…In the specific case that is the subject of the proceedings, considering that the protective order issued under Law No. 6284 on account of the intervening party’s complaint against the accused did not impose any prohibition on the accused calling the intervening party, that the incident mentioned in the statement of ..., who was heard as a witness, relates to the file of the same court with docket no. 2014/383, and that the HTS record in the file shows only 1 call; the conviction of the accused, instead of his acquittal, of the offence of disturbing the peace and tranquillity of persons, the elements of which are not made out because the component of persistence is absent in the specific case,… Since this requires the judgment to be quashed…”. 4. CD. 20.10.2020, E. 2020/20839, K. 2020/12721. ↑
- Soygüt, s. 2786. ↑
- Selin Türkoğlu, Ceza Hukuku Açısından Israrlı Takip, İstanbul, On İki Levha, 2020, s. 84; Özar, s. 1409. ↑
- TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 12-14. ↑
- “Since the court accepted, in conformity with the course of events, that while the complainant was going to the health centre with her child the suspect followed her in the vehicle he was in, that when she came out after staying at the health centre for about 20 minutes she saw him waiting in front of the door and he again came after her in the vehicle, that although the complainant headed for her spouse’s workplace in order to report the situation the suspect continued to follow her and, when she entered the workplace, the suspect too parked his vehicle, and that when, after she had told her spouse of the situation and at her spouse’s request, she went out into the street and walked, the suspect started his vehicle again and resumed following her; and since it is understood that the characterisation of the act described as constituting the offence of disturbing the peace and tranquillity of persons is correct, and since the evidence has been analysed and assessed having regard to the allegation and the defence and the act found to be proven has been characterised and the law applied in conformity with its elements, … it is decided that the appeal objections of the accused’s defence counsel, which are not considered well-founded, be dismissed and that the judgment be UPHELD…” 14. CD. 28.1.2014, E. 2012/8472, K. 2014/1008. ↑
- Özar, s. 1409. ↑
- Özar, s. 1410. ↑
- Susan Van der Aa, ‘‘International (Cyber) Stalking: Impediments to Investigation and Prosecution’’, Studies in Global Justice, No. 8, 2011, s. 194. ↑
- Türkoğlu, s. 87; Özar, s. 1411. ↑
- Indeed, similar points are also made in the explanatory memorandum to the article: “Rapid developments in technology and the very intensive and widespread use of means of correspondence and communication and of information systems have made it easier for individuals to connect with one another and to follow one another through these means. These means are, however, also frequently used in acts of persistent stalking. The new tools produced in the field of information systems in particular are increasing with every passing day the opportunities and methods available to perpetrators for getting in touch with the victim. Thus, in addition to sending letters, faxes, text messages or e-mails or making telephone calls, perpetrators can easily establish such communication through programs, applications and social platforms created on the internet.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 12-14. ↑
- Indeed, similar points are also made in the explanatory memorandum to the article: “On the other hand, perpetrators of persistent stalking from time to time also make use of third persons in order to get in touch with the victim. Where the perpetrator does not or cannot communicate with the victim in person, he or she tries to reach the victim by using persons in the victim’s close circle. Indeed, the perpetrator may sometimes use for this purpose even persons whom the victim does not know at all. When using third persons, the perpetrator may arrange for these persons to meet the victim face to face in person, and may equally try to ensure that contact is made with the victim through the use, by these persons in his or her stead, of means of communication and correspondence or of information systems.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 12-14. ↑
- For the same view see: Taşkın, s. 293; Ahmet Türkmen, “Yeni Bir Hukuki Olgu Olarak Israrlı Takip ve Taciz (Stalking) ve Bunun Türk Medeni Hukuku Bakımından Değerlendirilmesi”, DEÜHFD, C: 11, Özel Sayı 2009, Y. 2010, s. 1391. ↑
- Contra, see: Özar, s. 1407. ↑
- This point was addressed in the reply given, in the report prepared by the Justice Committee, to some of the criticisms raised during the parliamentary deliberations on Law No. 7406: “Since the offence is not merely a conduct offence, the offence will not be constituted by persistently following a person physically or by establishing contact by means of correspondence, communication and information systems. The act will, as its result, have to cause serious unease in the victim or cause the victim to fear for his or her own safety or for that of a person close to him or her. Were this result to be removed from the provision, a situation of uncertainty in criminal law could arise. And at the point where there is uncertainty, criminal law begins to be used as an instrument of threat and freedoms come to be under threat at all times”. TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 93, 94. ↑
- The concept of “serious unease” was criticised, on the ground that it is not definite and may lead to arbitrariness in practice, by the Members of Parliament Jale Nur Süllü, Suzan Şahin, Candan Yüceer, Aysu Bankoğlu, Gamze Taşçıer and Neslihan Hancıoğlu, who appended a dissenting opinion to the report prepared as a result of the work of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: “In the explanatory memorandum to the Bill, the fact that the act of persistent stalking ‘causes serious unease’ in the victim is indicated as one of the elements of this offence. It is apparent that what is to be understood by the concept of the act of persistence ‘causing serious unease’ in the victim, in terms of its quantity and quality, has been left to the discretion of the judge, without any criterion being given in the explanatory memorandum or in the article of the Bill. As regards what may cause ‘unease’, why and how, and by what criteria and in what manner the degrees of this unease can be determined, this may lead to arbitrary practices and also affords the judge a very wide margin of discretion on the matter. The same problem applies to ‘causing the victim to fear for his or her own safety or for that of a person close to him or her’, which is indicated as the second criterion of the offence of persistent stalking. As it stands, the provision appears open to arbitrary interpretations.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 81. During the parliamentary deliberations on Law No. 7406, this provision was criticised to similar effect by the Member of Parliament Filiz Kerestecioğlu Demir, who appended a dissenting opinion to the report prepared as a result of the work of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: “Although the explanatory memorandum to the Bill indicates, as one of the criteria for this offence to be constituted, that the act of persistent stalking should ‘cause serious unease’ in the victim, what is to be understood by the concept of ‘causing serious unease’ is left to the discretion of the judge, because no criterion is laid down in the explanatory memorandum or in the article of the Bill. As it stands, the provision appears open to arbitrary interpretations.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 93, 94. ↑
- “In our opinion, the addition of the adjective ‘serious’ to unease in the text of the article was not appropriate. Since the dangerousness of the act is not regarded as sufficient and a harmful result is required as well, a reasonable level of unease and anxiety should have been considered sufficient for the offence to be constituted. Apart from the fact that the criterion of ‘serious unease’ narrows the scope of application of the offence, establishing this criterion is a separate point of doubt. The doubt lies here: is this to be established by a physician’s/forensic medical report, or by the conviction which the judge reaches from the contents of the file? In our view, the victim’s statement and the conclusion which the judge reaches on the basis of his or her general, ordinary experience of life should be sufficient. It is likely, however, that differences in practice and procedures not intended by the law will arise in the process.” Özar, s. 1413. ↑
- The explanatory memorandum to the article also clearly states that this is to be determined by the judge: “In addition, for this offence to be constituted, the act of persistent stalking must cause serious unease in the victim or cause the victim to fear for his or her own safety or for that of a person close to him or her. This will be determined by the judge in the specific case. In making this determination, regard will be had to whether the act of persistence is, in terms of its quantity and quality, capable of causing serious unease in the victim or of causing the victim to fear for his or her own safety or for that of a person close to him or her. On the other hand, in the act of persistent stalking the victim may fear for his or her own safety and may equally, because of this persistently repeated conduct of the perpetrator, fear for the safety of a person close to him or her. Because of the pressure which the perpetrator seeks to exert on the victim, the perpetrator sometimes also acts by targeting persons close to the victim. An example of this is where the perpetrator, in order to give the impression of following the victim or to persuade the victim to meet him or her, takes photographs of the workplace of the victim’s father and sends them to the victim.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 12-14. ↑
- Soygüt, s. 2786. ↑
- To similar effect see: Özar, s. 1413. ↑
- To the same effect: Soygüt, s. 2804. ↑
- Although he gives no explanation as to whether the offence should be framed as an abstract endangerment offence or as a concrete endangerment offence, Özar too sets out a similar view in his article: “The result required in the offence also makes it necessary to inquire whether or not the victim felt anxiety or fear on account of the perpetrator’s acts. In that case, conduct which, in a sense, is objectively capable of constituting persistent stalking may go unpunished merely because the victim did not feel unease or fear as a result of these acts. We are of the opinion that, for the legislature, which in the offence of threat regards the mere making of a threat as sufficient and is content with the objective existence of a danger of harm, to require, when it comes to persistent stalking, serious unease or fear for safety in the victim also runs counter to the teleological, historical and systematic foundation of the offences against liberty. Comparative law, too, confirms this opinion of ours. In the legislation of many countries, such as Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Italy and the United States, this offence appears as an endangerment offence, and it is not required that the act create actual fear in the victim.” Özar, s. 1412. ↑
- To the same effect see: Özar, s. 1418. ↑
- This aggravated form was criticised, on grounds similar to ours, by the Members of Parliament Jale Nur Süllü, Suzan Şahin, Candan Yüceer, Aysu Bankoğlu, Gamze Taşçıer and Neslihan Hancıoğlu, who appended a dissenting opinion to the report prepared as a result of the work of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: “Moreover, limiting the subjects of this offence solely to the spouse in respect of whom a judicial separation order has been issued and the divorced spouse also leads to discrimination on grounds of marital status among the women who are victimised in this respect… Restricting the aggravated forms exhaustively in this way also creates a further problem, because no aggravated form has been contemplated for situations such as the commission of the offence by means of electronic communication or on account of a relationship formed outside the bond of marriage… In addition, in persistent stalking the aggravated forms of the offence are listed exhaustively. This will give rise to new problems, because it provides for a different minimum penalty where, for example, the stalking is committed against a spouse in respect of whom a judicial separation order has been issued or a divorced spouse, as opposed to the cases not listed among the aggravated forms. In this respect, the exhaustive enumeration of the aggravated forms of persistent stalking is not a correct approach, since it may amount to discrimination on grounds of marital status. For this reason, the scope of the provision to be enacted should be framed as ‘against a child or against a woman, irrespective of whether or not there is a family tie or a relationship between them’”. TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 75, 81, 82. This aggravated form was also criticised, in a manner similar to the above, by the Member of Parliament Filiz Kerestecioğlu Demir, who appended a dissenting opinion to the report prepared as a result of the work of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: “Again, according to the Bill, the fact that the Offence of Persistent Stalking is regulated as an aggravated form only where it is committed against a child or against a spouse in respect of whom a judicial separation order has been issued or a divorced spouse makes for a deficient provision, because it leaves outside its scope the violence which women suffer at the hands of partners to whom they are not officially married, of family members, or of persons whom they have never known or encountered before. In the Offence of Persistent Stalking committed against women, determining the aggravated forms by reference to women’s traditional roles will victimise once more those women who do not conform to traditional roles but are nevertheless subjected to the Offence of Persistent Stalking, and this discriminatory attitude will give rise to new problems.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 93, 94. This point was also raised in the dissenting opinion written against the Report of the Justice Committee by the Members of Parliament Süleyman Bülbül, Rafet Zeybek, Alpay Antmen, Turan Aydoğan and Tufan Köse: “…Confining the scope of the offence solely to the spouse in respect of whom a judicial separation order has been issued or the divorced spouse also discriminates among women. For this reason, it would be appropriate for the relevant part of the article to be worded ‘against a woman, irrespective of whether or not there is a family tie or a relationship,’”. TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 121. ↑
- Indeed, this aggravated form is explained as follows in the explanatory memorandum to the article: “In addition, the fact that the victim, because of the difficulty he or she has in meeting the customary, recurring requirements of daily life as a result of the repetition of the acts constituting persistent stalking, is compelled to make serious changes to his or her ordinary life, and in this context changes school, workplace or home or leaves school or work, is accepted as a form of the offence that aggravates the penalty.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 12-14. ↑
- Özar, s. 1419. ↑
- Soygüt, s. 2807. ↑
- This point is also stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article: “Unlike the offence of “disturbing the peace and tranquillity of persons” regulated in Article 123 of the Law, the offence of persistent stalking does not require the perpetrator to act “solely with the purpose of disturbing peace and tranquillity”. For the offence of persistent stalking to be constituted, it is sufficient that the perpetrator acts intentionally. The purpose for which the perpetrator carries out the act of persistent stalking is of no relevance to whether the offence is constituted. The perpetrator’s effort to make contact with the victim or to make his or her presence felt may stem from emotional reasons, and may equally, again owing to emotional reasons, be made with the aim of frightening the victim or putting the victim under pressure.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 12-14. ↑
- Özar, s. 1413. ↑
- To similar effect see: Özar, s. 1420, 1421. ↑
- This point is also stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article: “It should be noted that, where the acts carried out against the victim in the course of committing the offence of persistent stalking constitute another offence, the perpetrator may also be punished for those acts constituting an offence. For example, where one or more of the acts carried out against the victim within the scope of the act of persistent stalking constitute the offence of insult or threat, the perpetrator may also be punished separately for those offences, in addition to the offence of persistent stalking.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 12-14. ↑
- That these two offences also differ in terms of their result is stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article: “Again, since the offence of persistent stalking is framed as an offence of harm, it differs from the offence in Article 123, which is framed as an endangerment offence.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 12-14. ↑
- During the parliamentary deliberations on Law No. 7406, the following criticisms were made by the Members of Parliament Habip Eksik and Serpil Kemalbay Pekgözegü, who appended a dissenting opinion to the report prepared as a result of the work of the Committee on Health, Family, Labour and Social Affairs: “The terms of imprisonment provided for in the Bill for the offence of persistent stalking, set at from 6 months to 2 years and, in its aggravated form, at from 1 year to 3 years, are not deterrent. These terms, which in practice are subject to suspension, mean that the perpetrator does not even go to prison and that impunity continues. What exists on paper as a statutory ↑
- Indeed, during the parliamentary deliberations on Law No. 7406, a criticism to similar effect was also made by the Member of Parliament Filiz Kerestecioğlu Demir, who appended a dissenting opinion to the report prepared as a result of the work of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: “Moreover, the proposed increases in penalties are insufficient on account of the existing rules on the execution of sentences and still do not change the fact that the offence will end in impunity… The Offence of Persistent Stalking, together with its basic form and its aggravated forms, should be defined more inclusively, the penalties should be increased in such a way as not to allow suspension of execution, and, where it is committed, it should be made a matter of public prosecution”. TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 93, 94. ↑
- The framing of the offence as one whose prosecution depends on a complaint was criticised as follows, during the parliamentary deliberations on Law No. 7406, by the Members of Parliament Jale Nur Süllü, Suzan Şahin, Candan Yüceer, Aysu Bankoğlu, Gamze Taşçıer and Neslihan Hancıoğlu, who appended a dissenting opinion to the report prepared as a result of the work of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: “On the other hand, it is also a serious problem that not even the aggravated forms of the offence of persistent stalking, including the case where the offence is committed against children, have been made a matter of public prosecution. For example, even where the offence causes the victim to change school, workplace or home or to leave school or work, or where it is committed by a perpetrator in respect of whom a removal order or a measure prohibiting approach to the home, school or workplace has been ordered, the investigation and prosecution of the offence will depend on a complaint. A violent offence such as persistent stalking, which is repetitive and has become systematic, must without question be a matter of public prosecution, and it must be possible to investigate it ex officio without its being subject to a complaint”. TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 81. This criticism, raised during the parliamentary deliberations on Law No. 7406, was answered as follows in the report prepared by the Justice Committee: “Considering that, depending on the circumstances of the specific case, ex officio prosecution too may create problems in some situations, and that making the offence subject to a complaint amounts in a sense to recognising the victim’s control over the process, making the investigation and prosecution of the offence dependent on a complaint will not pose a problem.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 93, 94. ↑
- “Such a model will perform a highly effective function in preventing impunity in countries where there is no gender equality. As far as our law is concerned too, the prosecutor should be given discretion in the provision on persistent stalking by means of the criterion of public interest; at the same time, prosecutors should be given training on the investigation of violence against women in general”. Soygüt, s. 2809. ↑
- This point is expressly stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article: “By the third paragraph of the article, having regard to the general practice in comparative law, it is accepted that the investigation and prosecution of the offence depend on the complaint of the victim. However, the offence regulated in the article is excluded from the scope of the institution of victim–offender mediation by the amendment which the Bill envisages making to Article 253 of Law No. 5271.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 12-14. ↑
- Explanatory memorandum to the article: “The article amends Article 234 of Law No. 5271. By this provision, the offences of sexual abuse of children (Article 103) and persistent stalking (Article 123/A) contained in the Turkish Criminal Code, and the offences of intentional injury (Article 86), torture (Article 94) and torment (Article 96) committed against women, are brought within the scope of the article. In this way, by ensuring that, at the investigation and prosecution stages, women who are victims of violence in particular may, if they so request, benefit free of charge from the legal assistance and support of a lawyer to be appointed by the bar association, they are enabled to make effective use of the avenues for asserting their rights. Article 11- The article aims, by amending Article 239 of Law No. 5271, to ensure consistency with the amendment made to Article 234.” TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 15. ↑
- During the parliamentary deliberations on Law No. 7406, the Members of Parliament Jale Nur Süllü, Suzan Şahin, Candan Yüceer, Aysu Bankoğlu, Gamze Taşçıer and Neslihan Hancıoğlu, who appended a dissenting opinion to the report prepared as a result of the work of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, stated that this provision was positive but insufficient: “In the Bill, the provision of a lawyer free of charge by the bar association in the offences of persistent stalking, sexual abuse of a child or persistent stalking, only in offences requiring imprisonment with a minimum term of more than five years, is a positive but incomplete arrangement. Moreover, although the bar associations already carry out devoted work in providing lawyers free of charge, removing the limit as to the term and making the provision of a lawyer mandatory in any regulation to be made on this matter would be an important and meaningful arrangement for the access to justice of all women who are victims of violence. In addition, provision needs to be made concerning the requests of women’s organisations, lawyers and bar associations to intervene in cases of violence against women”. TBMM, Yasama Dönemi 27, Yasama Yılı 5, Sıra Sayısı 323, s. 75. ↑
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Imprisonment in Defiance of the Law: Enemy Criminal Law in Türkiye in the Light of the European Court of Human Rights Judgments in Osman Kavala and Can Atalay” (Hukuka Rağmen Hapis: Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesinin Osman Kavala ve Can Atalay Kararları Işığında Türkiye’de Düşman Ceza Hukuku), Dülger Law Office, 20 November 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Demanding Accountability Is Not a Crime: On the Investigation Initiated Against Av. Prof. Dr. Osman Korkut Kanadoğlu” (Hesap Sormak Suç Değildir: Av. Prof. Dr. Osman Korkut Kanadoğlu Hakkında Başlatılan Soruşturma Üzerine), Dülger Law Office, 27 October 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “On the Events Known to the Public as the ‘Fund Scandal’: An Assessment in Terms of Criminal Liability, Investor Rights and Supervisory Liability” (Kamuoyunda “Fon Skandalı” Olarak Anılan Olaylar Hakkında: Ceza Sorumluluğu, Yatırımcı Hakları ve Denetim Sorumluluğu Bakımından Bir Değerlendirme), Academia.edu, 1 October 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Delayed Occurrence of the Result (Dolus Generalis / Weber's Intent)” (Gecikmiş Neticenin Gerçekleşmesi (Dolus Generalis / Weber Kastı)), Essays in Honour of Asst. Prof. Dr. Sesim Soyer Güleç (Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Sesim Soyer Güleç’e Armağan), eds. Koray Doğan / Behiye Eker Kazancı, Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2025, pp. 223–288.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Assessment of the Constitutional Court's Decision on the Provisions Governing the Simplified Trial Procedure” (Anayasa Mahkemesinin Basit Yargılama Usulü Hükümlerine İlişkin Kararının Değerlendirilmesi), Dülger Law Office, 12 October 2023.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, Offences and Sanctions Relating to the Laundering of Proceeds of Crime (The Offence of Money Laundering) (Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasına İlişkin Suçlar ve Yaptırımlar (Kara Paranın Aklanması Suçu)), 3rd ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2026.

