2020Murat Volkan Dülger, Onur ÖzkanArticle

Abstract

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

The European Union Data Protection Reform took place through two instruments adopted on 27 April 2016. The first of these had a major impact worldwide; it became the subject of numerous studies, proceedings, opinions and decisions and was met with great interest. The second instrument, by contrast, did not find much room for debate and study; it lost the attention to its “peer” and remained in the shadow of the first.

The first of these instruments comes to mind at once, even before its name is spoken: the European Union General Data Protection Regulation. The second, however, has, so to speak, been forgotten: Directive 2016/680. This “forgotten” instrument, which is the focus of our article, regulates the protection of personal data in the field of law enforcement and criminal proceedings. The aim of this study is to present the reader with a comprehensive and comparative analysis of the Directive and so to clarify the important matters it regulates.

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This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

Peer-Reviewed Article CHD - April 2020 - Year: 15 - Issue: 42 - pp.: 85-149

THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: A COMPREHENSIVE AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE “FORGOTTEN” DIRECTIVE*

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER** Trainee Attorney Onur ÖZKAN***

Abstract: The European Union Data Protection Reform was brought about by two instruments adopted on 27 April 2016. The first of these instruments had a major impact worldwide; it became the subject of numerous studies, operations, opinions and decisions and was met with great interest. The second instrument, by contrast, did not find much room for debate and study, lost the attention shown to its “peer” and remained in the shadow of the first instrument. The first of these instruments comes to mind at once, even before its name has been mentioned: the European Union General Data Protection Regulation. The second instrument, however, has, so to speak, been forgotten: Directive 2016/680. This “forgotten” instrument, which is at the focus of our article, regulates the protection of personal data in the field of law enforcement and criminal justice. What this study aims at is to present the reader with a comprehensive and comparative analysis of the Directive and thereby to clarify the important matters it regulates.

Keywords: Personal Data Protection Law, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Information Sharing, European Union Criminal Law, Police Directive.

DATA PROTECTION IN THE FIELD OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPREHENSIVE AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE “FORGOTTEN” DIRECTIVE

Abstract: The European Union Data Protection Reform took place on April 27, 2016 with two legal regulations. The first of these regulations has had a huge impact worldwide. It has been subject to many studies, process, opinions and decisions and received great interest. The second regulation did not find much discussion and research field and it has lost the all shown interest to its “peer”. In this sense, it can be said that it is overshadowed by first regulation. The first of these regulations comes to mind immediately without mentioning its name: European Union General Data Protection Regulation. However, the second regulation is “forgotten”: Directive 2016/680. This “forgotten” Directive, which is the focus of our article, regulates the protection of personal data in the field of law enforcement and criminal justice. The aim of this study is to present comprehensive and comparative analysis to the reader and to clarify the important issues regulated by the Directive.

Keywords: Data Protection Law, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Information Sharing, European Union Criminal Law, Police Directive.

Introduction

Today, one of the first concepts that come to mind when technology is mentioned is “human rights”. Yet in the first stages of its development technology advanced far removed from debates relating to human rights or to ethics, and not with anxieties about the future but, on the contrary, with great hopes for a bright future. The point which we today refer to as the Information Age (Informationszeitalter) has, on the one hand, brought with it many different forms of production and expression and possibilities for sharing; on the other hand, it has caused a great deal of data that define us or are related to us to be scattered abroad and has, in this respect, resulted in the emergence of a new field of control and surveillance.

The axis of knowledge with which Foucault begins the process of subjectivation does not today consist solely of modes of inquiry that try to attain the status of science.1 This wave of information that surrounds us on all sides carries out its “dividing practices”2 through the value judgments of many people, known and unknown to us, and lies at the very centre of the process of constituting us as subjects. In this intricate relationship between knowledge and the subject, and hence power, control is exercised over information and the means of information; power becomes part of the practices of everyday life and continues its monitoring activities to this end.3 In our day, when the means of information have been digitalised to a very great extent, these new means deepen our concerns about our privacy by increasing the reach, power and capacity of large-scale surveillance.4

The data held in criminal proceedings and by law enforcement agencies, which lie at the core of the subject of our study, are personal data that carry in the highest degree the danger of violating persons’ fundamental rights and freedoms and are therefore in need of protection. In particular, the aim pursued by state institutions of preventing the commission of offences and of detecting those that have been committed may, in a society in which security concerns come to the fore, result in everyone being turned into an object of control. In such a situation there is today no longer any place left to hide.5

It is this entire process that brought forth the right to the protection of personal data as a fundamental and independent human right.

Since the appearance of the first regulatory texts concerning it, the law of personal data protection can be counted among the few and relatively new fields of law that have been developed through the interaction of many countries with one another. Starting from the late 1960s, data protection laws applying similar approaches emerged in various countries of the world. This informal cross-border development was quickly followed by formal international instruments.6 Continental Europe, with the institutions it is home to, such as the European Union, the Council of Europe and the European Commission, is the creator of many legal texts in this field and determines the development of the right and the direction in which it will move. Although many regulations have been made to date concerning the processing of personal data by both the public and the private sector, until the adoption of the Directive there was no regulation on the data processed in criminal proceedings and in the field of law enforcement that was comprehensive and capable of providing individuals with adequate safeguards. This situation was very closely connected, in particular, with the politico-legal atmosphere that emerged after 11 September and with the period of the nations’ fight against the threat of global terrorism, which involved covert investigations and severe sanctions. Today, however, conditions have changed, and individuals, as a result of the frequent and serious interferences to which they have been exposed in their private sphere and privacy, have turned towards securing their rights to privacy. Fundamentally, these developments gave rise to the need for a new data protection reform within the framework of the European Union and, in particular, for an instrument capable of protecting more strongly the data processed in the field of law enforcement and criminal proceedings.

Three main factors play a role in the need felt for the Directive.7 The first of these is the great increase seen in offences committed over the internet or by means of the internet.8

In addition, the investigating authorities, too, have adopted many technological and new investigative techniques, big data analytics first and foremost, in particular in order to be able to follow the digital traces left by offenders. The second factor is therefore the intensive use of digital investigation systems in the field of law enforcement and criminal justice.9 Finally, the fact that the old instruments failed to achieve the expected effect in terms of harmonisation and enforceability gave rise to the need for a new legal text to be drawn up in this field.

§ I. On the Protection of Data in Criminal Proceedings and in Law Enforcement:

Directive 2016/680

A. In General

In European Union (EU) law, the primary legal text currently regulating the processing of personal data in the field of law enforcement and criminal justice is Directive 2016/680 (hereinafter referred to simply as the “Directive”).10 The Directive was adopted on 27 April 2016, together with the GDPR, as part of the data protection reform package. While the GDPR, which has been the focus of attention of the reform movement, has kept public institutions and the private sector extremely busy with the global impact it has created and has brought with it a great deal of debate and many studies in legal scholarship, the same cannot be

said of the Directive. Although this reform package, which formed the number one item on the agenda of the 2015 EU legislative year, contains two legal instruments, it can readily be said that Directive 2016/680 has remained in the shadow of the GDPR and has even been “forgotten”11.12 The GDPR replaces Directive 95/46/EC on “the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing and Free Movement of Personal Data”. Directive 2016/680, which forms the subject of our article, for its part takes the place of the Council Framework Decision of 2008 (2008/977/JHA). The instrument that forms the subject of our study thus has, unlike the old instrument, the status not of a framework decision but of a directive. As a result, where the essential points of the instrument are not transposed into the national legislation of the Member States, individuals may raise their complaints in this regard before their national courts. In this respect the Directive is important for ensuring normative harmonisation across the EU.13 It should be noted that the GDPR, too, will play a major role in our assessments, since it is directly applicable, is binding and sets out the basic criteria and principles with regard to the right to the protection of personal data.

The Directive concerns the processing of personal data by the authorities in law enforcement and criminal proceedings for the purposes of preventing the commission of offences, detecting offences, investigation, prosecution or the execution of criminal convictions, activities safeguarding public security and the prevention of situations that endanger public security (Art. 1 of the Directive). In addition, the Directive also applies where law enforcement processes data in the framework of its own activity without knowing whether the incident constitutes an “act” for the purposes of criminal law, and likewise where it processes data for the purpose of taking coercive measures at demonstrations, major sporting events and riots or of protecting public security.14 As was expected in legal scholarship,15 it is seen that the instrument does not apply to data processed for the purpose of safeguarding national security, that the activities of the intelligence services are in this sense kept outside its scope and that this matter is left to the discretionary sphere of the Member States.16 This point is also emphasised in recital 14 of the Directive.17

The data to which the Directive applies, for their part, are defined as data processed wholly or partly by automated means by the competent authorities. In fact, data processed by automated means have long been dealt with in European law. The first and still the only multilaterally binding legal text on personal data18 is the “Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data”, which was opened for signature by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 28 January 1981.19 In outline, Convention No. 108 aims to guarantee the data protection rights of natural persons in the member countries with regard to the automatic processing of their personal data in the public and private sectors.20

In addition, data that are not processed by automated means, that is, data processed manually, also fall within the scope of the Directive if they constitute a filing system.

What the instrument aims at, in turn, is to protect personal data in the functioning of public authorities and to ensure the transfer of personal data between the competent authorities of the Member States and, in this sense, as was also the case in the repealed Decision 2008/977/JHA, cooperation in the field of law enforcement and criminal proceedings (Art. 1(2) of the Directive). With regard to cooperation, the EU legislature aims not to interrupt this communication out of concerns relating to the right to the protection of personal data but, on the contrary, to draw a general framework for the flow of data.21 In conclusion, the Directive is essentially built on two main objectives: to provide stronger protection for the right to the protection of personal data in the fields of law enforcement and criminal justice, and to improve the flow of data and communication between the Member States.22

B. Examining the Directive Comparatively: The Old Regime, the Innovations and the GDPR

The right to respect for private life and the right to the protection of personal data are closely related to each other, but owing to their differences they constitute two fundamental rights and legal fields that are separate from each other. The right to privacy or, in the expression preferred in EU law, the right to respect for private life, constitutes one of the cornerstones of international human rights law, which emerged with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948 (the Declaration) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of 4 November 1950. However, the fact that both the Declaration and the ECHR were drafted long before modern information technologies and the information society gave rise to the need for specific and distinct legal instruments that would also protect individuals in the face of the processing of their data.23 The Council of Europe and the EU are the organisations that led the way in laying the foundations of the right and in drawing its framework.24 Alongside the above-mentioned Convention No. 108 of 1981 prepared by the Council of Europe and the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, which entered into force on 13 December 1995, the recognition of the right to the protection of personal data as a separate and fundamental right in Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000 and the inclusion of this right in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 are milestone developments that today make this subject “visible” and enable us to discuss it.25

Along with the development of the right to the protection of personal data, data processing activities in the law enforcement and criminal fields, in which this right is perhaps exposed to the most serious and most intensive interference, have also been placed on the EU legislative agenda at various times. Of importance for our subject are Recommendation No. R (87) 15 of 17 September 1987, supplementing Convention No. 108,26 and Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008, adopted in the period of Directive 95/46.27

1. The Regime Adopted in EU Law before the Directive

First, Convention No. 108 states in its Article 3: “The Parties undertake to apply this Convention to automated personal data files and to the automatic processing of personal data in the public sector and in the private sector.” At first sight, therefore, it is seen to be applicable and binding in the field of law enforcement and criminal justice.28 However, the fact that Article 9 of the Convention, headed “Exceptions and restrictions”, provided that the processing of data for the purposes of protecting State security, public security, protecting the financial interests of the State and preventing offences could be exempted by the States Parties raised question marks as to its applicability.29

By contrast, the Recommendation mentioned above directly concerns the personal data held by law enforcement agencies. The Recommendation lays down the basic principles for operations such as the collection and processing of data by law enforcement, the sharing of data in the framework of cooperation with foreign authorities and the exercise of the data subject’s

rights, and, in particular through the principle of purpose limitation, guides the EU instruments on this subject even today.30 The Recommendation consists of eight basic principles.

In its first principle the Recommendation recommends the creation of independent control and supervisory mechanisms to be set up outside the law enforcement agencies. This authority is positioned solely as an advisory authority. Even though it was merely advisory, the provision made for such an authority was an important development in that it pushed law enforcement agencies to take the measures necessary to ensure compliance with the “spirit” of data protection legislation and in view of the possibility of opening the new technologies developing in this field to public debate.31 By its second principle the Recommendation restricts the processing of data solely to purposes connected with a real danger or the commission of a specific offence.32 Personal data may not be processed by law enforcement agencies in order to “keep files on” individuals on the thinking that they “may be needed one day”. Under the conditions of that time, this principle can be regarded as a major achievement in terms of fundamental human and legal values. It serves the conception of democratic policing, which it was sought to spread at that time.33 The third principle of the Recommendation provides that data may be stored only to the extent that they are necessary and accurate; the fourth principle regulates purpose limitation, the fifth the rules on the movement of data, the sixth the rights of data subjects, the seventh data retention periods and the updating of data, and the eighth and final principle data security.34 The Recommendation, which is the Council of Europe's first legal instrument on this subject, sets out basic but highly important principles on data processing in the field of law enforcement. These principles are essentially still followed today. The provision made for an independent supervisory authority is, moreover, the most important means of ensuring compliance with these principles.35 In addition, the fact that the collection of data is strictly limited by purpose limitation and that this principle was also adopted with regard to the storage of data are extremely important achievements.

The second-generation instrument in the pre-Directive EU regime, which was repealed by the Directive, is Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. After 11 September, the development in particular of the doctrine of the “Global War on Terror” brought with it, around the security concerns of the period, an intensive movement of the personal data both of EU citizens and of nationals of third countries between the EU institutions and the Member States.36 On similar grounds, however, it was unable to provide adequate safeguards for the rights of individuals. Indeed, the Framework Decision was criticised by legal scholarship and even by the EU institutions, in particular because its scope was limited and it contained only provisions on the movement of data.37

When the draft of the Framework Decision was submitted in 2005, it introduced provisions similar to those of Directive 95/46/EC, the basic data protection instrument of its time, with regard to the rights of data subjects, the supervisory authority and the processing and movement of data. However, the amendments subsequently made turned the Decision, in a negative sense, into a different text from beginning to end.38

Although the Decision contains principles such as lawfulness, proportionality and purpose limitation in the processing of data and affords individuals, under certain conditions, the possibility of submitting requests for rectification, erasure and blocking, these provisions too could not be applied, since almost every principle also contained an exception allowing law enforcement to do the opposite and the rights of individuals to be restricted.39

A further point of criticism was that the Decision could be applied only to the movement of data between Member States, while the processing of personal data at the domestic level in criminal proceedings and by law enforcement authorities remained outside its scope.40 Moreover, even in the case of the cross-border transfers that it did regulate, the level of protection of personal data was quite inadequate and lacked the necessary safeguards.41 All of this made it extremely difficult to keep legal track of the network of international data transfers under the Decision and, as compared with such tracking, left no room at all for its control.42 Since the Framework Decision was based on voluntariness, it was unable to bring about normative harmonisation. What is more, because it provided that the measures to be taken would be determined by the domestic law of the Member States, it gave rise to a large number of practices, each differing from the others, and thereby made legal review considerably more difficult.43 Besides the scope being limited as indicated above, its lack of any clarity also meant that law enforcement agencies could not be sure when their data processing activity would be the subject of a purely domestic activity and when of a cross-border movement, and thus led to problems of applicability.44 A further ground of criticism is that the Decision displayed no consistency even with Directive 95/46, on which it was, so to speak, built or ought to have been built.45 Finally, and this is perhaps the most important problem, even all of these inadequate principles in the Decision could be abandoned on political grounds.46 At last, the Directive promises to change this whole situation.47

2. The Innovations Introduced by the Directive

The Directive contains advances with regard to the rights of data subjects48 and offers right-holders a two-dimensional protection.49 In the first dimension of that protection, data subjects are, as a rule, given the possibility of applying directly to controllers and exercising their rights. In the second dimension are the supervisory authorities, which are positioned as both regulatory and judicial authorities. Individuals will be able to raise their complaints before these authorities, assert their rights and claim compensation. Thus, unlike the Framework Decision, the Directive seeks to strike a fair and reasonable balance between the right to the protection of personal data and the interest of public security.50

The Directive also contains more detailed provisions in terms of principles and does not permit any derogation from those principles. A more extensive burden of responsibility has been placed on controllers, and the Directive carries that burden back to the very first stage of data processing activities. Authorities acting as controllers must comply with the principles of data protection by default and data protection by design, and must give priority to privacy.

The data protection impact assessment is also among the innovations introduced by the Directive. In this way, prior review is ensured for activities that carry a high risk to fundamental rights and freedoms. By providing for a control mechanism on the part of both the controller and the supervisory authorities, a provision favouring the rights of the individual has been introduced. In addition, by obliging Member States under Article 32 to designate a data protection officer, the Directive takes a further important step towards giving effect to the right to the protection of personal data in the field of law enforcement and criminal justice.

Furthermore, the categorisation of data subjects, which as a specific obligation51 is found neither in the 2008 Framework Decision nor in the GDPR, has been recognised for the first time by the Directive. Under Article 6 of the Directive, Member States are to categorise the personal data they collect on the basis of the roles of persons in the proceedings, such as suspect, accused, convicted person, victim and witness. By introducing this provision, the EU legislature requires data to be categorised according to the data subject’s connection with the offence and the degree of that connection.52 This distinction stems in particular from the idea that persons who have in no way been involved in the offence should suffer less harm from the severe measures and restrictions

that will arise from the processing of their data, too, in this context.53 Although such a distinction offers benefits in terms of the classification and organisation of data, it is also open to criticism on account of the possibility that, for persons connected with the offence, who are on the “dark” side of the categorisation, it may lead to discrimination, to arbitrariness in interferences with the right to the protection of personal data and to a weakening of the effort to protect that right.54 A further distinction must be drawn, under Article 7 of the Directive, between personal data based on facts and personal data based on assessments. This classification, too, may be understood as an extension of the principle requiring data to be accurate. The scope of application has also been widened by the Directive. Unlike the Framework Decision, the Directive applies not only to the movement of data between Member States but to all data processing activities, whether domestic or cross-border, carried out for the purposes provided for.

A positive development in another direction is that, in contrast to our criticisms of the Decision, the Directive has, by the provisions it introduces, also succeeded in achieving the needed uniformity with the main data protection instrument.55 Finally, we are of the opinion that the Directive, with the comprehensive and forward-looking rules it contains and the high level of data protection it aims at, is capable of meeting the needs to which the Information Age has given rise; there are, however, certain shortcomings as well. In our assessments of the Directive we shall address both the positive and the negative aspects.

3. The Extent of the Legal Relationship between the GDPR and the Directive

The GDPR, whose scope of application is extremely broad, lays down the general rules for the processing of personal data. It is therefore a general instrument (lex generalis) from the standpoint of EU data protection law. The Directive, on the other hand, takes account of the specific nature of criminal proceedings and of the field of law enforcement. Accordingly, the Directive will apply as a special instrument (lex specialis) and as a complement to the GDPR.56

Indeed, this point is also addressed in recital 19 of the GDPR, which states: “The processing of the data of natural persons by competent authorities for the purposes of preventing the commission of offences, detecting offences, investigation, prosecution or the execution of the judgment, protective activities and the prevention of situations endangering public security, and the free movement of such data, is the subject of a specific and separate EU instrument (author’s note: Directive 2016/680). For this reason, the GDPR should not apply to data processing activities carried out for the purposes listed.”57

Drawing the line between the Directive and the GDPR can at times be quite complex. Thus, for example, in countries where irregular border crossing and migration movements are criminalised, the Directive applies where law enforcement processes personal data in order to detect such movements and prevent the offence. On the other hand, once the irregular migrant has lodged an application for asylum, the GDPR applies to the handling of that application and to the data processing activity carried out in that context, irrespective of the criminal proceedings that have been initiated.58

Of course, this example illustrates how complex it is to determine, in a concrete case, which of the GDPR and the Directive will apply. It also lays bare the confusion that was created, before the Directive, by Member States applying their own legislation. It is essentially for these reasons that the transition was made to an instrument having the status of a directive. In our view, the Directive we are discussing will in future, just like the GDPR, be enacted as a Regulation and thereby be made binding and directly applicable for EU law and for the Member States.

In addition, the recital cited above leads us to a further conclusion: where personal data are processed by the competent authorities within the meaning of the Directive for purposes other than those in question, Member States should not benefit from the flexible data processing umbrella provided by the Directive. This conclusion, which in fact follows a contrario (argumentum a contrario) from Article 1 of the Directive and recital 19 of the GDPR, is also set out in Article 9(2) of the Directive.

Accordingly, unless otherwise provided in EU or Member State law, the GDPR will apply where the competent authorities process personal data for purposes other than those of the Directive. Likewise, under paragraph 2 of the said Article, where data are archived by the competent authorities in the public interest or for scientific or historical research purposes or for statistical purposes, it is the GDPR, not the Directive, that should apply. Indeed, while Article 5 of the GDPR states that the archiving of personal data for those purposes is compatible with the purposes of processing, no provision to that effect is to be found in the Directive.

In conclusion, the EU legislature intends to limit the scope of the Directive. Not every item of personal data processed by judicial authorities or law enforcement authorities should fall within the scope of the Directive. The legislature aims to ensure that the GDPR is applied more widely and generally. For the GDPR affords individuals legal protection to a greater extent and approaches the fair and reasonable balance to be struck between the protection of personal data and the other fundamental rights and freedoms with which it may conflict from the standpoint of the right to the protection of personal data.

§ II. Principles Relating to the Processing of Personal Data

By Article 4 et seq., under the heading “Principles relating to the processing of personal data”, the Directive lays down the basic principles concerning the processing of data.

Before turning to the principles governing the processing of data, we shall explain the concepts of personal data and of the processing of such data, to which these principles will apply. Article 3 of the Directive contains the definitions. Under that Article, personal data means information relating to any identified or identifiable person. Accordingly, information revealing a person who can be found and identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to factors specific to the physical or physiological characteristics and to the genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that person, is deemed to be personal data.

The processing of personal data, for its part, means any kind of activity performed on personal data. As examples of this the Directive lists the collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration and retrieval of data; their use for the purpose of consultation, their disclosure by transmission, their dissemination or their alignment in other ways or being made suitable for combination; and the carrying out of restriction, erasure or destruction operations on the data.

These definitions do not differ in any way in meaning or wording from the GDPR. The EU legislature has ensured uniformity with regard to definitions. Accordingly, it is seen that the definitions article contains more detailed provisions than Decision 2008/977/JHA but again defines core concepts such as personal data and data processing in a similar manner.

A. Principles Governing the Processing of Data

The principles laid down by the Directive coincide at many points with the GDPR’s principles relating to the processing of data. However, since the particular position of the Directive and the purpose of its adoption have been taken into account, it also contains a number of differences. For the purposes of our subject, we shall endeavour under this heading to examine those principles, in particular with regard to the points on which they diverge from the GDPR and in that sense display differences, and to set out the “ratio legis” of the Directive.

- Personal data must be processed lawfully and fairly.

It must not be forgotten that personal data, even though they are processed for the purposes of ensuring public security, are the subject of an independent and fundamental human right.59 The principle of lawfulness and fairness must therefore be observed. In the specific context of the Directive, the principle of lawfulness means the processing of personal data for the purposes provided for. For where data are processed for other purposes, the GDPR will apply and the conditions for processing will have to be met in accordance with the relevant provisions of the GDPR.

When the provision in question is examined in comparison with the GDPR, it is seen that there is a difference here that is consistent with the purpose for which the Directive was introduced. Whereas the GDPR, alongside the principles of lawfulness and fairness, has also recognised the principle of “transparency” in relation to the processing of data and indeed attached great importance to it,60 this principle has not been included in the Directive. In outline, the principle of transparency means that the public or the data subject is to be provided with information about the processing and its purposes, and that such information must be concise, easily accessible and easy to understand and must use plain language.61

In our view, it is appropriate that this principle has not been included in the Directive. In some cases the application of the principle of transparency may be incompatible with the aim of ensuring public security. For instance, it is clear that if an offender wanted internationally were to be informed that his personal data were being processed by the prosecution authorities of various countries and were being circulated among those authorities, and were to be given access to those data, the apprehension and trial of that offender might become impossible, and that transparency could thus undermine this process.

As a consequence of this, it is stated in Article 13(3) of the Directive that the data subjects’ right to information, and in Article 15 that the data subjects’ right of access to data, may be restricted, wholly or partly, to the extent that and for as long as the requirements of a democratic society so demand.

- Personal data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes. This principle means that the objectives which the authorities competent to process personal data wish to attain must be specified and explicit, while legitimacy denotes a legal basis and conformity with the rule of good faith.62 In essence, this principle is the reflection in data protection law of the principle of “legal certainty”, one of the fundamental principles of law. As subjects of the legal system endowed with rights and obligations, individuals must know that the State displays rationality, stability and consistency when carrying on activities, such as data processing, that amount to an interference with their fundamental rights and freedoms. Only in this way do the provisions and consequences of a legal norm become foreseeable for the members of society and can the principle of the rule of law be applied.

This principle is of particular importance in the specific context of the Directive, since it requires that a data processing activity which falls within the field of law enforcement, is of such significance and may be detrimental to the security of individuals must in every case have a specified and legitimate purpose. For the continuous processing of individuals’ data for vague purposes, without being directed at specified, concrete and legitimate aims of public security, gives rise to a police state in which every member of society is regarded as a potential offender and everyone is made the subject of surveillance.63 Indeed, the judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the application lodged by the human rights organisation Liberty is to the same effect.64 According to the facts of the case, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, by means of the Electronic Test Facility which it operated for the purposes of large-scale and secret surveillance, intercepted the telephone calls made between human rights organisations between 1990 and 1997 and the information in their fax and e-mail communications.65 The Ministry of Defence argued in its defence that it had carried out this activity pursuant to the Interception of Communications Act 1985. The activity was based on section 3(2)(b) of the Act, which empowered the Ministry of Defence to issue a warrant for the interception of communications “for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime”. The same section also empowered the Ministry of Defence to issue a warrant for the interception of communications in the interests of national security or for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.66

The matter came to light in 1999, when a television programme reported on the Electronic Test Facility located at Capenhurst, Cheshire, and the human rights organisations took legal action against this activity.67

On that application, the ECtHR held that legislation permitting the secret monitoring of communications constituted a threat of surveillance for everyone and destroyed the privacy of individuals.68 According to the ECtHR, the law lacked certainty; it failed to afford individuals adequate safeguards in the event of abuse of the power thus conferred and gave State authorities a very wide discretion to monitor and intercept communications.69 In conclusion, the Court held that the United Kingdom had violated Article 8 of the ECHR.70 Lastly, unlike the GDPR, the Directive contains no provision on the archiving of data. As we noted above, the archiving, in the public interest or for scientific or historical research purposes or for statistical purposes, of data processed in accordance with the purposes of the Directive has not been brought within the scope of the Directive and has not been listed among the purposes of processing. In that case the GDPR, not the Directive, will apply.

- Personal data must not go beyond the purpose for which they are processed, and must be relevant to that purpose and proportionate.

This principle is also referred to as “data minimisation”.71 On this principle there is a difference as compared with the GDPR. Whereas the GDPR takes as its basis the principle of being limited to the purpose, the Directive takes as its basis the principle of not being excessive in relation to the purpose. While the GDPR limits the processing of new data which emerge subsequently and are not compatible with the purpose for which the data were collected, and requires all the conditions to be satisfied afresh for such data,72 the Directive accepts on this point a broader criterion, namely that of not being excessive.

The reason for this difference is that, for the sake of ensuring public security, it may become necessary to monitor and process certain new data that emerge. Such data may go beyond the limits of the purpose for which they are processed, but they must not be excessive in relation to that purpose. Given the purpose for which the Directive was introduced, it is natural that criteria different from those of the GDPR should have been adopted. Finally, it should be stated that where personal data initially collected for the purposes of the Directive are subsequently processed for another purpose, that activity will be subject to the provisions of the GDPR.73

- Data must be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.

This principle means that data must not contain misleading or inaccurate information of any kind; that where data have ceased to be up to date and no longer reflect the correct and actual situation they must be updated; and that competent authorities which become aware of the inaccuracy of data must take every step necessary, without delay, for the data to be rectified or erased.74 In this context, the competent authorities must identify the sources from which they obtained the data, test the accuracy of those sources and have taken reasonable measures and made reasonable preparations for assessing the requests that arise in relation to this principle.75 This principle is to be found in Article 5 of the GDPR, in Article 6 of the repealed Directive 95/46/EC and in Article 4 of the 2008 Framework Decision, which is no longer in force.

- Data must be kept for the period necessary for the purpose for which they are processed.

This principle provides that the competent authorities may not keep personal data for longer than is necessary for the purposes for which they collected and subsequently processed them. The purposes for which the Directive provides for data processing relate to criminal justice and the ensuring of public security. Therefore, if keeping the data does not serve those purposes, the data must now be erased.

As an extension of this principle, Article 5 of the Directive states that Member States must set reasonable time limits (time-limits for storage and review) for the erasure, or the periodic review, of the data they process under the Directive. The retention of personal data also entails many risks of data breach and may adversely affect data security.76 Developing policies on data security is at the discretion of the Member States. The problem here, however, will arise at the point of how this reasonable period is to be determined for data stored for the purpose of “the prevention of crime”. The Article 29 Working Party states that data may be stored for this purpose only where there are risk assessment reports relating to a specific data subject.77 Unlike data processed in the course of criminal prosecutions, where data are stored for preventive purposes there is no specific moment at which that activity must necessarily come to an end. However, the principle of necessity requires public authorities to review the initial assessment they made when processing the data, asking whether the processing of the data really serves this purpose or whether the data subject presents a danger to society. For data which no longer serve the purpose of preventing crime and cannot satisfy the principle of necessity must be erased immediately. The Working Party further recommends that a distinction be drawn between categories of personal data and that maximum storage periods be set specifically for each category of data.78

This principle is closely related to the “right to respect for private life” enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR. Under this sub-heading we shall examine the judgments of the ECtHR in which the right to respect for private life was found to have been violated on account of non-compliance with the principle of necessity.

In one application to the ECtHR, the applicants’ biometric data (fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profile) had been recorded by the law enforcement agencies because criminal investigations were being conducted against them. The case against one of the applicants was discontinued when the complainant withdrew the complaint following a reconciliation. In respect of the other applicant, the court acquitted the applicant.

Under section 82 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, which forms part of the law of the United Kingdom, a person’s data may be stored even in certain cases where that person has been acquitted. Relying on this provision of domestic law, the United Kingdom law enforcement authorities stored the biometric data in question permanently. The ECtHR held that, on account of this activity, the applicants’ right to respect for private life (Art. 8 ECHR) had been violated.79 According to the judgment, in the reasonable balance that must be struck between the right to the protection of personal data and the interest of public security, the member State had enacted legislation that overstepped the limits of its margin of appreciation. The Court took the view that such an interference with the applicants’ private life could not be reconciled with the requirements of a democratic society.80

In another application to the ECtHR, the applicant, a lawyer, had in 1946, while still a student, written two letters against the Communist regime in his country, Romania, protesting against the interferences with freedom of expression in his country. In the same year he was convicted on account of this act by the Vaslui People’s Court.

The Romanian Intelligence Service had created a secret file on the applicant, in which it was stated that the applicant was a member of an extreme right-wing and antisemitic group. The applicant learned that this information was still being kept

from the information provided by the Ministry of the Interior in the action for damages which he brought after the regime had been overthrown.81 In its judgment the ECtHR noted that the personal data in question had been systematically collected and stored for a very long time, and stated that information also falls within the scope of private life where it concerns not only a person’s recent but also his distant past.82 The Court further noted that domestic law contained no provision explaining what information could be recorded, who were the categories of persons against whom surveillance measures such as the gathering and keeping of information could be taken, in what circumstances such measures could be resorted to, or the procedure to be followed.83 Nor was there any explicit or detailed provision concerning the length of time for which the data would be kept, the persons authorised to have access, the nature of the files, the procedure to be followed or the use that could be made of the information thus obtained.84 For these reasons the Court, in a manner similar to the judgment it delivered in respect of the United Kingdom in the S. and Marper application, came to the conclusion that Romania had not indicated with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities.85 In conclusion, the competent authorities are under an obligation to process personal data lawfully. Data must be collected for specified and legitimate purposes, and must be accurate and reflect the actual situation. Data must be kept to the minimum necessary in terms of relevance and proportionality. It may be said that these principles laid down by the Directive, particularly in view of the special needs and characteristics of the field regulated, will have a positive effect on the striking of the balance between the rights of individuals and the requirements of the fields of law enforcement and criminal justice.86

B. Grounds of Lawfulness for the Processing of Personal Data

Article 8 of the Directive governs the grounds of lawfulness for the processing of data. Lawfulness, which is perhaps the most important subject of the GDPR and the one on which legal scholarship and practice have dwelt most, is dealt with in the Directive in an extremely brief and clear manner on account of the field it regulates and the characteristics it presents. For example, under the Directive the existence of consent cannot constitute a ground of lawfulness for the processing of personal data.87

Accordingly, data processing is lawful only if it is necessary for the purposes set out in Article 1 of the Directive, namely preventing the commission of offences, detecting offences, investigation, prosecution or the execution of the judgment, activities protecting public security and the prevention of situations endangering public security. Moreover, in the legislation they enact when transposing the Directive into their domestic law, Member States must make provision for the data to be processed, the purposes of the processing and the objectives sought to be attained by those activities, specifying their particular circumstances and scope. In short, for data processing to be lawful, the data must be processed by competent authorities (personal element) and the purposes provided for in the Directive (purpose element) must be observed.88

In addition, Article 9 of the Directive also lays down a number of specific processing conditions. The first paragraph of the provision provides that data collected by the competent authorities for the purposes of the Directive may not be processed for another purpose unless the domestic law of the Member State provides otherwise. In such a case, the instrument applicable to that processing under EU law will be the GDPR. Again, under the second paragraph, where Member States authorise their competent authorities to process data for purposes other than those of the Directive, the relevant provisions of the GDPR will likewise apply to that processing.

Furthermore, when a Member State transfers data which it has processed on the basis of its own domestic law to another Member State and competent authority, it must inform the recipient competent authority that the data are subject to specific processing conditions and of the requirements entailed by those specific conditions.

C. Processing of Special Categories of (Sensitive) Personal Data and Automated Decision-Making under the Directive

By Article 10, the Directive lays down the conditions for the processing of special categories of (sensitive) personal data. First of all, the Directive classifies sensitive data in the same way as the GDPR. Accordingly, a person’s racial and ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, genetic and biometric data, state of health, sex life and sexual orientation fall within the scope of sensitive personal data.

Sensitive personal data may be processed only where there is provision to that effect in Member State or EU law, where the data have been made public by the data subject concerned, or where the processing is strictly necessary89 in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject, and on condition that

safeguards for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject are also ensured. It is recommended that, when sensitive personal data are processed, Member States provide for the necessary safeguards in their national law in order to reduce the risks of discrimination that may arise.90 Among sensitive data, an extraordinary increase has been observed over the last quarter of a century in the use by law enforcement agencies of biometric data, in particular DNA samples and fingerprints, and it is thought that this upward trend will continue to rise in the future.91 In view of the risks which the greatly increasing variety and prevalence of biometric data, brought about by technology, create for the privacy and data protection rights of individuals, the interest in security and personality rights must be brought into a reasonable balance.92 Article 11 of the Directive is one of its debatable and noteworthy provisions. According to that Article, which contains the rules on automated decision-making mechanisms, the competent authorities may not, solely on the basis of information obtained by automated processing, take decisions affecting data subjects or engage in profiling93 if this may produce “an adverse legal effect” concerning the data subject.94 However, by regulating this matter in their domestic law, providing safeguards for the fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects and at least also recognising the right to request human intervention in the processing of the data, Member States will be able to take automatically processed data into consideration in their decision-making processes.

Even though the rights of data subjects have been strengthened extensively through the Directive, it is seen that the provision in question responds to the needs of the field regulated but does not afford individuals sufficient safeguards.95 First of all, it has not been made clear what is to be understood by an adverse legal effect.96 For this reason, it is possible for the uncertainty created by the concept to be abused. We consider that, in order to forestall this possibility, there is a need for a provision defining adverse legal effect. For, while the overwhelming majority of data are processed automatically, it should be clearly laid down which decisions capable of producing adverse legal effects may not be taken on the basis of such data.

The Directive does, however, explain in recital 38 what is to be understood by the expression “appropriate measures”. Accordingly, individuals will be able to request specific information about these operations carried out in respect of them, including the right to request the reasons for the decision, and will in addition be granted the right to challenge the decision. However, since recitals are not binding, the enforceability of these rights is open to debate.97

Finally, giving rise to discrimination through automated profiling when processing sensitive personal data is prohibited by the last paragraph of Article 11.98 In addition, decisions to be taken by means of the automated processing of sensitive data may be taken only if, besides the conditions set out above, the measures necessary to safeguard the legitimate interests and the fundamental rights of the data subject are taken.

§ III. Rights of Data Subjects

The Directive sets out the rights of data subjects in Articles 12 to 18. As will be examined in detail below, the rights of data subjects are the right to information, the right of access, and the right to request rectification and to request erasure.

As regards the enforceability of these rights, however, and to touch upon the legal remedies in Chapter 8 of the Directive: where these rights of data subjects are not recognised or where controllers act in breach of their obligations, data subjects may, under Article 52,

lodge their complaints with the supervisory authorities. Following a complaint, data subjects have the right to seek effective legal remedies both from the supervisory authorities and from the controller and processors. Finally, under Article 56 data subjects may also claim compensation for the damage arising from the infringement of their rights.

A. Right to Information about Data Processing

Under Article 12 of the Directive, Member States must, in the information and communications they provide to data subjects, be concise, easily accessible and easy to understand, and must use plain language.

The first point that strikes the eye, by contrast with the provision on the right to information in the GDPR, is that the term “transparency” is not used here. In parallel with this, attention was drawn above to the fact that the term transparency is not used in the principles governing data processing either.

On the other hand, recital 26 of the Directive expressly states that any processing of data must be lawful, fair and transparent.99 In the face of this, it must be accepted that the principle of transparency and the right to information, in which that principle takes concrete form, have found a place in the Directive and that the explanations given under the GDPR will be valid here too, albeit with minor differences.100 Within the scope of the right to information, the first information that must be provided to the data subject is the identity and contact details of the controller. The contact details of the data protection officer, if any, must also be communicated. The data subject must also be informed of the purpose of the processing. Here, however, unlike the GDPR, the Directive contains no provision requiring that the initial information to be provided include the legal basis for the processing and information on the legitimate interest pursued by the processing.

Again, in the information provided to the data subject, it must be stated that he has the right to lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority. The data subject must also be reminded of his rights.

In paragraph 2 of the said Article, the Directive provides that in certain cases a number of further items of information are to be given to the data subject. This information is to comprise: the legal basis for the processing; the period for which the personal data will be stored or, where it is not possible to provide that information, the criteria to be used to determine that period; where the data are transferred to third parties, including a third country and international organisations, the categories of recipients of the data; and, where necessary, certain further additional information in cases where data are collected without the knowledge of the data subject. Attention must be drawn to a further point: unlike the GDPR, the Directive has not included within the scope of the right to information the provision of meaningful and explanatory information about the profiles created during the processing of data and the logic underlying decisions taken by automated means.101

By means of the right to information, the EU legislature aims to provide a safeguard in respect of the fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects that are interfered with by the processing of data and to strike a reasonable balance between these two interests. In addition, as regards the recognition of this right and the ensuring of transparency, profiling, data mining102 and numerous technological developments of this kind, which greatly facilitate the movement of personal data, make it all the more important that data subjects be made aware of by whom, on what basis, where and for what purposes and by what means their data are processed.103

Individuals must of course be made aware of the risks entailed by the processing of their data and of the rules in this regard. Everyone must be informed about the safeguards and rights they enjoy, and must be given sufficient information on how to exercise those rights. The protection of individuals’ privacy depends on controllers carrying on their activities transparently.104 Only in this way will accountability be ensured and arbitrariness in the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms be prevented.

There are, however, also cases in which an exception to the right to information is allowed. Art. 13(3) of the Directive provides that in certain cases Member States may delay or omit the fulfilment of the obligation to inform and may restrict the exercise of the right to information. Under that provision, if informing data subjects is liable to obstruct official and legal inquiries, investigations or procedures, or the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences and the execution of penalties, or would make it more difficult to protect public and national security and the rights and freedoms of others, Member States may, by the legislation they enact, restrict the exercise of the rights in question wholly or partly.

In striking the balance between the right to the protection of personal data and the interest of ensuring public security, the EU legislature has treated this matter, in cases where granting data subjects the rights in question could harm the interests sought to be attained, as one falling within the margin of discretion of the Member States. Under the last paragraph of that Article, Member States may also regulate these data processing activities in their domestic law by specifying them by way of enumeration. Consequently, by the provisions they introduce in their national law, Member States will be able to restrict this right wholly or partly in respect of certain data processing activities. What matters here is that, when the provision is transposed into domestic law, the conditions under which Member States will exercise this power are determined in accordance with objective criteria.105

B. Right of Access to Data

Art. 14 of the Directive governs the right of access to data. Accordingly, data subjects may request from the controller information as to whether or not their personal data are being processed. If their data are being processed, they have the right to access information on what those data are and certain other information. Member States must take the steps necessary for the exercise of this right.

In outline, the right of access, by complementing the right to information, aims to enable data subjects to be informed of the manner in which their personal data are processed and to exercise their rights.106 It is a very significant development that the right of access can, as a rule, be exercised directly against the controller.107 In addition to access to the data, Member States must provide data subjects with certain information. This is: the purposes of and legal basis for the processing; the categories of personal data concerned; the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed; where possible, the period for which the personal data will be stored or, if that is not possible, the criteria by which that period will be determined; the rights which the data subject has vis-à-vis the controller and the supervisory authority; and information on the source of the data. The information must of course be presented “in an intelligible form”. The Council of Europe states that, in order to ensure the fair exercise of the right of access, the requirement of communication in an intelligible form applies to the form as much as to the content, that is to say, also to a standardised digital communication language.108

Nevertheless, profiling and decisions taken by automated processing, which form, so to speak, the core of the right, and information about them, do not fall within the scope of the right of access. The fact that these matters are not included within the scope of the right of access is a subject of criticism in legal scholarship.109

In fact, while the provision is almost identical to that of the GDPR, it also contains a further rule which departs from it and affects the content of the right. Like the right to information, the right of access is relative: its exercise may, under the same conditions, be restricted wholly or partly by the Member States. It is thus seen that the right of access is not an absolute right either. Even so, it must be said that the provision introduced by the Directive, although there are still steps to be taken in this area, is an important initiative that brings accountability and transparency to the fore in the data processing activities of the Member States.110

C. Right to Request the Rectification and Erasure of Data

Perhaps the most important and effective right of data subjects whose personal data are processed under the Directive is the right to request from the Member States and their competent authorities the rectification (the right to rectification) and the erasure (the right to erasure) of the data.

Where the data they have obtained from the competent authorities contain inaccurate information about the data subject, Member States must without delay recognise the person’s right to rectification (Art. 16(1) of the Directive). In such a case, Member States are obliged to offer data subjects the means of having their own data completed and rectified, including, where necessary, by having them supplemented by means of an additional statement.

Paragraph 2 of the same Article provides for the right of data subjects to request from the Member States the erasure of their data that have been unlawfully processed. According to the Article, where data are processed in breach of Articles 4, 8 or 10 of the Directive, Member States are under an obligation to grant individuals the right to request the erasure of their data and to ensure that the competent authorities erase the data. Accordingly, in order to be able to speak of a right to erasure, these instances of non-compliance must be established.

First of all, while Article 4 of the Directive sets out the principles governing the processing of personal data, Article 8 governs the lawfulness of the data and Article 10 the conditions to be observed in the processing of sensitive personal data. Thus, for example, a breach that may arise under Article 4 may take the form of data being processed for unspecified purposes and with the thought that they “may be needed one day”, or of the storage of the data no longer serving the purpose for which the data were obtained. Likewise, under Article 8, obtaining data without regard to the purposes specified in the Directive will also render the data unlawful. Finally, the processing of sensitive personal data must protect the vital interests of the data subject. Otherwise, the processing of such data is also unlawful and the competent authorities are under an obligation to erase those data without delay.

Under paragraph 3 of the said Article, Member States may in certain cases restrict the processing of data instead of erasing them. If the data subject has a complaint regarding the accuracy of the personal data and this has given rise to uncertainty as to the accuracy of the data, their processing may be restricted instead of the data being erased. In that case, the Member State must inform the data subject before lifting the restriction. In the second case, if the data whose erasure is requested must be kept as evidence, the Member State may resort to the measure of restriction instead of erasure.

It must be pointed out here that, whereas in the GDPR the right to restriction of processing is framed as a separate right which the data subject may claim, in the Directive it has found a place as an alternative measure to which Member States may in certain cases resort instead of erasing the data. Furthermore, in the event of rectification, erasure or restriction of processing alike, those operations must also be communicated to the recipients to whom the data were transferred, and the recipients must carry out those operations on the data under their own responsibility. As a further difference, the right to object to data processing provided for in the GDPR has, naturally, not been included in the Directive.

Under paragraph 4 of the said Article, where Member States refuse requests for the rectification or erasure of data, they are obliged to provide information on the data processing and a statement of reasons for the refusal of the request. It is stated, however, that this obligation may, just as in the case of the rights to information and of access and on the basis of the same conditions, be lifted wholly or partly by the Member States. By contrast, the right of individuals to lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority, and the obligation of Member States to inform individuals of the legal remedies available to data subjects, remain in place.

In sum, the rights which the data subject has under the Directive may be listed as the right to information, the right of access, the right to request rectification and the right to request erasure. The data subjects’ rights to information and of access are not absolute in nature and may be restricted by the Member States.111 The same does not, however, hold true for the rights to rectification and erasure. If inaccurate information was included when the data were processed, the data must be corrected with the accurate information, and where there are instances of unlawfulness in the processing of the data and the necessary conditions are met, the data must be erased.

§ IV. Provisions on the Controller and the Processor under the Directive

As in the GDPR, the Directive contains detailed provisions on the controller and the processor, who are among the actors in data processing. Before going into the detail of these provisions, we shall define the controller and the processor.

Article 3 of the Directive is a definitions article. Since under the Directive the controller must necessarily be a competent authority, it is first necessary to define competent authority. A competent authority means a public authority responsible for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of offences, the execution of criminal judgments handed down by the courts and the prevention of threats to public and national security, or any other body or legal person authorised by a Member State in these matters and exercising public authority.

The controller, for its part, is the competent authority which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. Since it is thus accepted that controllership may be shared, the principle of joint responsibility (joint controller) may also come into play.

The processor, as the other actor in data processing, is defined as a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller.

One of the important institutions to be examined under this heading is the supervisory authority. For Article 26 of the Directive imposes, as an obligation, that the controller and the processor work in cooperation with the supervisory authorities, a third actor in these activities. The authority assumes an important role in the legal disputes that may arise both during and after the processing of personal data. The supervisory authority may be defined as the independent administrative authority which, by means of its investigative and corrective powers, monitors the application of data protection rules.112 The supervisory authority is both a judicial body, in that it deals with individual complaints concerning infringements of the GDPR, the Directive and

the relevant national laws, and a regulatory body, in that it is expert in the matters within its competence and is able to adopt resolutions of principle.

Under Article 41 of the Directive, each Member State must have at least one supervisory authority. By way of example, the national data protection authority is The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in the United Kingdom, Die Bundesbeauftragte für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit (BFDI) in Germany and the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) in France. In our country, too, this task is performed by the Personal Data Protection Authority, which was established by the Law on the Protection of Personal Data, has administrative and financial autonomy and possesses public legal personality.

Finally, it must be underlined once again that the introduction of provisions on the controller and the processor is one of the important innovations of the Directive. By including in the Directive provisions which it had not introduced in the 2008 Framework Decision, the EU legislature aims to have controller and processor authorities throughout the EU carry on their activities on a defined plane and under a common roof of obligations. This is of particular importance for achieving uniformity across the continent and raising the bar of accountability.

A. Obligations Laid Down

1. Obligation to Take Measures and Joint Controllership

Article 19 of the Directive, introducing a provision parallel to that of the GDPR, recognises the controller’s obligation to take measures. Accordingly, in order to ensure that data processing activities are carried out in conformity with the Directive, Member States are obliged to ensure that the competent authority acting as controller takes appropriate technical and organisational measures, taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing and the existing risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. In addition, those measures must be reviewed and updated where necessary. Member States must furthermore put in place an appropriate data protection policy comprising the relevant measures.

Under Article 20 of the Directive, the controller must make those measures a part of the data processing activity. The controller is obliged to plan the processing activity with the protection of personal data as its aim (data protection by design). Data protection by design may be defined as the controller always having privacy in mind, and following a systematic approach to that end, from the design stage of any system (mostly a data recording system) or technology to be used in the data processing activity.113

Member States must also ensure that the competent authority acting as controller respects individuals’ rights to privacy and complies with its legal obligations from the outset in every data processing activity. It is stated that this obligation (data protection by default) relates to the amount of personal data collected, to the processing only of the data that are necessary for the purposes of the processing activity, to the extent to which data will be processed and to the period for which the data will be stored. These measures must ensure in particular that personal data are not made accessible to an indefinite number of persons of indefinite status.114

Article 21 of the Directive, for its part, introduces provisions on joint controllership. Since it is provided that the competent authority acting as controller may determine the purposes and means of data processing jointly with other institutions and bodies, the concept of joint controller finds a place in the Directive as it does in the GDPR.

Under the said Article, joint controllers must, in a transparent manner, conclude an arrangement determining their obligations, in particular as regards the exercise of the rights of data subjects. Member States must also, without fail, designate a contact point which data subjects may contact when necessary. In this respect, Member States may also specify that joint controllers may act as a single contact point.

2. Obligations Relating to the Processor

Under Article 22, Member States must work with processors that are able to fulfil the requirements of the Directive and to take the technical and organisational measures that will ensure the protection of the rights of individuals.

The processor may act only on the instructions of the controller. The persons authorised to process the personal data shall comply with the duty of confidentiality. The processor

must also contribute to the controller’s measures directed at the exercise of the data subjects’ rights.

In addition, unless there is a provision in EU or domestic law on the storage of data, the processor must, at the decision of the competent authority, erase all the personal data or return them to the controller after the provision of the processing services has ended. The processor must be able to make available to the controller all the information necessary to demonstrate that the requirements of the Directive are complied with in the conduct of its activities.

Finally, in order to engage another processor to carry out processing on behalf of the controller, the processor must make sure that all of the obligations listed above are met. In addition, this must be based on a specific or general authorisation on the matter from the Member State.

3. Record-Keeping Obligation and Logging

Under Article 24 of the Directive, Member States must record certain information in all data processing activities of their competent authorities acting as controllers. Controllers and processors, too, must keep these records for the activities within their own areas of responsibility in order to comply with the Directive. In this context, the controller and the processor are required to cooperate with the supervisory authorities and to make these records available on request.115 The controller’s records must contain all of the information listed below:

a) the identity and contact details of the controller and, where applicable, of the joint controller and of the data protection officer,

b) the purposes of the processing,

c) the categories of recipients to whom the data have been or will be transferred, including third countries or international organisations,

d) a description of the categories of data subject and of the categories to which the personal data belong,

e) where applicable, information on the use of profiling,

f) where applicable, the categories of transfers of data to a third country and international organisations,

g) an indication of the legal basis for the data processing activity, including data transfers and the purpose for which the data are processed,

h) where possible, the time limits envisaged for the erasure of the different categories of data,

i) where possible, a general description of the technical and organisational measures taken under Article 29(1).

Records of the following information must be kept for the activities carried out by processors on behalf of the controller:

a) the identity and contact details of the processor or processors, of the controller on whose behalf those processors are acting and, where applicable, of the data protection officer,

b) the categories of processing activity carried out on behalf of each controller,

c) where relevant, information on the transfer of personal data to a third country or international organisation on the explicit instructions of the controller and on the identification of the recipients,

d) where possible, a general description of the technical and organisational measures taken under Article 29(1).

All of the information listed must be in writing. It is also possible, in addition, for the information to be presented in digital format. The keeping of these records by the controller and the processor in their activities is, first of all, very important in order to ensure that they process data subject to the rules of law and the provisions of the Directive. The records must, in addition, be kept in order to ensure accountability.

Article 25, for its part, contains the provision on “logging”. Logging means the recording of the events and operations that take place in the course of the activities carried out. It is important in particular for ensuring integrity, confidentiality and availability within information management systems.

Under the said Article, Member States must keep logs for certain of their activities. These are, where data are processed by automated means, the activities of the collection, recording and alteration of personal data, their use for the purpose of consultation, their disclosure in any manner, including transfers, their combination with other data and their erasure. Where personal data are consulted or disclosed, the logs must contain information making it possible to establish the justification, date and time of such operations and, where possible, the identity of the person who consulted or disclosed the personal data and the identity of the recipients of those personal data. The Article 29 Working Party recommends that the identification of the person carrying out the activity should apply not only within a limited scope such as consultation and disclosure but also to all the other activities listed.116

Logs may be kept solely for the purposes of verifying the lawfulness of processing, self-monitoring by the competent authorities and ensuring the integrity and security of personal data, and only for criminal investigations and prosecutions. The logs must be kept available so as to be submitted to the supervisory authorities on request.

“Logging” is an extremely important tool for data protection monitoring and for the control of data processing activities, in that it enables abuses in those activities to be detected.117 According to the Article 29 Working Party, Member States should, in their domestic law, lay down rules on the requirements for logs, for example on the content of logs, technical measures, self-monitoring and compliance.118 In addition, since the Directive does not prescribe a specific storage period for the retention of logs, Member States must set, as the storage period, a reasonable period necessary for the logs to be reviewed by the supervisory authorities and erased.119 It is noteworthy that the EU legislature has included in the Directive the matter of “logging”, which it did not regulate in the GDPR.120 The reason for the provision is that automated data processing systems are used intensively in the course of criminal proceedings and in the fields of law enforcement, whereas records of the operations are not kept to a sufficient degree. These records are important, in order to establish the lawfulness of data processing in criminal investigations and to act as a deterrent against unauthorised data processing,121 both for ensuring the competent authority’s self-monitoring and for meeting the supervisory authorities’ need for the records. For instance, where a law enforcement officer enters the automated data processing system and carries out a search on family members or neighbours, the keeping of logs will enable the competent authority, in its internal review, or the supervisory authority to identify the person responsible.122 It is pointed out, however, that the keeping of logs is costly and involves technical difficulties, especially for older automated data processing systems.123 It is nevertheless apparent that, in view of the significant contribution which these records will make to legal review, a provision requiring them to be kept has been included.

4. Data Protection Impact Assessment and Prior Consultation (Prior Review)

By Article 27, the Directive, as in the GDPR, introduces provisions on the data protection impact assessment and, by Article 28, on prior consultation of the supervisory authority. The data protection impact assessment in particular, or, as it is otherwise known, the privacy impact assessment, although a new concept from the standpoint of EU law, has been in use elsewhere in the world for a considerable time.124

In outline, the data protection impact assessment consists in the controller reviewing, in situations where the processing of individuals’ data carries a high risk of infringing their fundamental rights and freedoms, whether the activity meets the legal requirements, and in the necessary measures being taken.125 In law enforcement activities carried out for preventive purposes or in criminal investigations, data are processed on a very large scale and of a sensitive nature. For this reason, the data protection impact assessment has a particular importance and value in the specific context of the Directive. The institutions of the data protection impact assessment and prior consultation, which we shall examine under this sub-heading, are, having regard to the sensitive position of the Directive and the subject-matter with which it is concerned, among the topics of the Directive that call for attention, in that they erect a barrier against the serious risks of data breach in the activities carried out within its scope and ensure “prior review”.

It should be noted that a similar mechanism was also provided for in Directive 95/46/EC and in the 2008 Framework Decision. It had, however, been the subject of various criticisms by the Member States on the ground that it gave rise to an excessive administrative burden and cost.126 By providing for the institutions of the data protection impact assessment and, thereafter, prior consultation, the EU legislature aims to eliminate the disadvantages of the old system. It may be said that the new provision has indeed been favourably received in this respect.127

The data protection assessment may be examined by breaking it down into its elements: 1. Risk Element: The likelihood and severity of the risk must be determined by taking into account the nature, scope, content and purposes of the processing. If the data processing activity carries a high degree of risk of infringing the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, the controller must have recourse to a data impact assessment. In the assessment, particular account must be taken of the origin, nature, particularity and

severity of the risk.128 Risks may present themselves in many different forms: for example, giving rise to discrimination, identity theft, financial loss, damage to reputation, the disclosure of professional secrets, and the economic and social disadvantages that may arise where individuals’ sensitive data are processed may be counted among the undesirable consequences.129 2. Time Element: The data protection impact assessment must be carried out prior to the processing of the data. The assessment must be begun from the first moment at which the risks emerge. It must be said that this element runs parallel to the controllers’ obligations of data protection by design and data protection by default.130 3. Personal Element: The assessment must be carried out by the competent authority acting as controller (Art. 27 of the Directive). Here it is particularly striking that the provision in the GDPR on seeking the advice of the data protection officer is not found in the Directive. It may be thought that this provision was not included in order to meet the need for practicality in practice in the field with which the Directive is concerned. However, for the sake of securing the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, Member States should set a higher standard. We are of the opinion that Member States should ensure that the data protection officer they designate also takes part in the assessment process. 4. Content Element: The data protection impact assessment must without fail contain the information listed in Article 27. This information consists of a general description of the envisaged activity, an assessment of the risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject, the measures envisaged to address the risks, and the mechanisms envisaged to ensure and demonstrate data protection.

Article 28 of the Directive, for its part, governs the institution of prior consultation. Under that Article, Member States must ensure that the controller or the processor consults the supervisory authority prior to a data processing activity that will create a new filing system. The situations listed as capable of giving rise to a new filing system are: where the data protection impact assessment reports that the processing would involve a high degree of risk if the measures necessary to reduce the risk are not taken; and where the technologies, mechanisms or procedures used in the processing activity, in particular new ones, involve a high risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals. In such cases, controllers must submit to the supervisory authority, so that it can review whether the data processing activity complies with the legal requirements, their own data protection impact assessment report and, on request, certain additional information necessary for the authority to be able to carry out its own assessment. In this respect, it is seen that the scope of the information to be submitted to the supervisory authority is kept more limited than under the GDPR.

Where, as a result of the prior consultation, the supervisory authority expresses the opinion that the data processing would constitute a breach of the Directive, and in particular in cases where the controller has been unable to identify the risk or has fallen short as regards the measures it will take, the supervisory authority will communicate its written advice to the controller and, where applicable, the processor. In addition to written advice, the supervisory authority may also exercise the powers conferred on it by Article 47 of the Directive. Accordingly, the supervisory authority may issue a warning to the controller and the processor, order the rectification or erasure of personal data or the restriction of the processing of the data or, lastly, prohibit the processing for a specific and temporary period.

As a provision addressed to the domestic law and legislative activities of the Member States, the said Article states that the supervisory authorities must again be consulted and their opinion obtained during the preparation of any legislative measure relating to data processing activities. This stems from the fact that the supervisory authorities have the character of a regulatory and independent authority of the countries in these matters.

In this sense, it may be said that the authority, with the severe sanctions at its disposal, will push controllers and processors to remain on the plane of legality. By means of the institutions of the data protection impact assessment and prior consultation examined under this sub-heading, the controller will first carry out self-monitoring internally and draw up a report, and subsequently, if certain risks still persist, a prior review in the full sense will take place through the consultation of the supervisory authority. In that the prior review has two stages and carries the threat of sanctions at the second stage, it is apparent both that the needs of practice have been taken into account and that it has also been considered that, on account of the field regulated by the Directive, there is a high likelihood that the processing of individuals’ data will lead to infringements of fundamental rights and freedoms. In conclusion, we agree with the favourable assessments made of the new provision and consider it to be an apt and necessary one.

B. Security of Processing and the Notification Obligation

Security of processing is one of the provisions of the Directive that is dealt with in very great detail as compared with the GDPR and by which it is intended that Member States, under extremely strict conditions, carry out numerous risk analyses and status checks. The concept, which aims to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data processing systems and for which, to that end, an approach based on risk assessment has been adopted, may be defined as an area of responsibility of controllers and processors

towards data subjects.131 When the data to be processed under the Directive and the risks that the processing activity may create are taken into account, the importance that must be attached to security of processing becomes apparent.

It must not be forgotten that security of processing runs parallel to many of the obligations we have listed under this heading and complements them. In this context, particularly in cases where sensitive personal data are processed, the controller must make sure that adequate technical and organisational measures that will ensure the necessary security have been taken. Under Article 29 of the Directive, the risk analyses listed below must be carried out, including for automated data processing activities:

a) that unauthorised persons have no access to the equipment used for the processing of personal data (equipment access control),

b) that the reading, copying, modification or removal of data media by unauthorised persons is prevented (data media control),

c) that the input of personal data into the system by unauthorised persons and the inspection, modification and erasure of stored personal data by unauthorised persons are prevented (storage control),

d) that the use of automated processing systems by unauthorised persons using data communication equipment is prevented (user control),

e) that persons authorised to use the automated processing system are able to access only the personal data covered by their access authorisation (data access control),

f) that it is possible to verify and establish the bodies to which personal data have been or may be transmitted using data communication equipment (communication control),

g) that it is possible to verify and establish which personal data have been input into automated processing systems and when and by whom the personal data were input (input control),

h) that the reading, copying, modification or erasure of personal data by unauthorised persons during transfers of personal data or during the transportation of data media is prevented (transport control),

i) that installed systems can be restored in the event of interruption (recovery),

j) that the system performs its functions and that faults in its functions are reported (reliability), and that the personal data collected are not corrupted as a result of a malfunctioning of the system (integrity).

In situations where security of processing cannot be ensured, the obligations of the controller and of processors turn into an obligation of notification. Under the Directive, a data breach (personal data breach) is defined as causing the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, disclosure or acquisition of data that are transmitted, stored or otherwise processed.

Article 30 of the Directive governs notification to the supervisory authority, while Article 31 governs notification to the data subject. No differently from the GDPR, the controller has been placed under an obligation to notify the breach to the supervisory authority immediately, unless it poses a low risk to the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. The breach notification must be made within 72 hours of becoming aware of the existence of the breach. Furthermore, if the controller has received the information from, or has itself transferred it to, the competent authority of another country acting as controller, the notification must also be made to that competent authority. Likewise, the processor must inform the controller of the breach as soon as it becomes aware of it.

It is stated that the notification to be made to the supervisory authority and, where relevant, to the competent authority of a third country must contain, as a minimum, information on: the nature of the breach including, where possible, the categories of data subjects concerned and the approximate numbers of data records; the identity and contact details of the data protection officer or other contact point; the likely consequences of the breach; and the measures taken or proposed to be taken, including measures taken to mitigate its adverse effects.

In cases where the breach carries a high risk of leading to an infringement of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, the controller must, under Article 31 of the Directive, notify the breach to the data subject without delay. Clear and plain language must be used in the notification, which must contain the nature of the breach and the information listed above concerning the identity and contact details of the data protection officer, the likely consequences of the breach and the measures.

It is seen, however, that an exception to this obligation has been introduced. If appropriate technological and organisational preventive measures, such as data encryption, have been taken that will render the data unintelligible to those who access them without authorisation, the obligation to notify the data subject need not be fulfilled. Likewise, the obligation need not be fulfilled if measures have been taken after the breach that will prevent the high risk from materialising, or if there is an excessive disproportion between the difficulties of making the notification and the interests that would be served by it. In the last case, the controller must make a public communication of the matter or take a similar measure by which data subjects can be informed to an equal degree.

C. Data Protection Officer

The concept of the data protection officer is one of the most important innovations of the reform package of 15 December 2015.132 Indeed, the Article 29 Working Party also states that the data protection officer lies at the heart of the new framework.133 To give a short and concise definition: the data protection officer is an independent employee, expert in his field, who informs and advises the controller and monitors the lawfulness of the processing of personal data.134 The data protection officer (hereinafter “DPO”) is made mandatory in certain cases in the GDPR. Of these cases, the one relevant to the subject of our study is where the processing is carried out by public bodies and institutions, with the exception of judicial authorities in criminal proceedings. Where data are processed by public bodies, there must be a DPO. Accordingly, under Article 32 of the Directive, it has been made mandatory for Member States to designate a data protection officer. Moreover, a single data protection officer may also be designated jointly for several competent authorities, taking account of their organisational structure and size, for example by reason of the large amount of resources shared between competent authorities.135 Under Article 34 of the Directive, informing and advising the controller and its employees with regard to their data protection obligations, monitoring the compliance of ongoing data processing activities with the controller’s personal data protection policies and with the legislation, and also raising the awareness of and training the employees involved in those activities, may be counted among the principal tasks of the DPO. In addition, the data protection officer must, on request, provide advice on the data protection impact assessment and monitor the work in that regard, cooperate with the supervisory authority, act as the contact point for the supervisory authority, including in the prior consultation mechanism, and consult the authority where necessary.

It must be stated that the DPO bears no personal responsibility for compliance with data protection rules. In this context, the responsibilities of the controller and the processor continue and the Member States’ obligations to comply with the Directive remain in place. Nevertheless, the DPO plays an extremely important role in the fulfilment of this set of obligations.136

Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK), for its part, in line with its source, Directive 95/46/EC, does not provide for the concept of the DPO. On the other hand, Provisional Article 1(5) of the KVKK makes it mandatory for a senior manager to be designated in public bodies and institutions, within one year of the publication of the Law, in order to ensure coordination in relation to the implementation of the Law.

§ V. Principles Governing the Movement of Data

The first part of the Directive consisted of the realisation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and, in particular, of the right to the protection of personal data, and, in that sense, of the rights of individuals and the duties of those engaged in data processing. This part, which was not within the scope of the earlier Framework Decision, constitutes one of the principal subjects of the new instrument, in particular as a result of the awareness gained both by national and international public opinion and by States regarding the dimension of personal data and personality rights. On the other hand, the second dimension of the Directive, expressly stated in its first article, is to ensure the movement of data between competent authorities within the EU and to increase cooperation in criminal proceedings and in the fields of law enforcement. Accordingly, the “Transfers of Data to Third Countries137 or International Organisations” regulated in Chapter 5 of this two-part instrument, in Articles 35 et seq., is one of the cornerstones of the subject of our study.

Article 35 of the Directive lays down the principles governing data transfers. For a transfer to take place, all of the conditions listed below must be met:

a) the data transfer must be necessary for the purposes of the Directive,

b) the data must be transferred to a competent authority acting as controller in the third country or to an international organisation,

c) where data transferred from one Member State are subsequently made the subject of a further international data transfer, that Member State must also authorise this activity in accordance with the provisions of its own domestic law, save where this is necessary for the prevention of immediate and serious threats to public security. For example, in the event that data transferred by the German competent authority to the American competent authority are subsequently to be transferred to the Brazilian competent authority, the German authority, being that of the Member State from which the first transfer took place, must permit that activity.

d) the European Commission must have adopted an adequacy decision, or the other situations listed under the Directive must be applicable,

e) in onward transfers, the competent authority that carried out the first data transfer, or another competent authority in that country, must have given its approval to the transfer in question, taking into account in particular the seriousness of the act. When compared with the similar provision in the GDPR, it is seen that the Directive additionally requires the data transfer to be necessary for the purposes listed and the transfer to take place between competent authorities.138 However, the mere existence of the conditions listed will not in itself be sufficient for data transfers to a third country or international organisation to be carried out. In addition to these conditions, the country or organisation to which the data are to be transferred is required to be “safe”. For the main rule in the EU data protection model is that cross-border movement of data cannot take place freely.139 At this point we encounter the concepts of an adequate level of data protection and of adequacy decisions, familiar from Directive 95/46/EC and the GDPR. At the first stage, under Article 36 of the Directive, the third country or international organisation to which the transfer is to be made must have obtained an “adequacy decision”. For a long time, what was to be understood by the concept of adequacy could not be made out either at the level of the EU Commission or at that of the Member States, no concrete criteria could be laid down in this regard and, as a result, only a small number of States were able to obtain an adequacy decision.140 Finally, it is seen that the concept of an adequate level of protection has been clarified by the Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner judgment141 of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court).142 According to the Court, a level of protection as high as that guaranteed in the EU legal order should of course not be expected of the third country. Nevertheless, the term “adequate level of protection” must be understood as requiring the third country, by reason of its domestic law or its international commitments, to ensure a protection of fundamental rights and freedoms that is in essence equivalent to the level guaranteed in EU law by Directive 95/46.143

In this context, it must be said that, in the first part of the assessment of the adequate level of protection, the right to the protection of personal data will play an important role within the framework of the right to respect for private life. Secondly, it must be assessed whether the rights of a large number of persons would be infringed if an adequate level of protection could not be ensured. According to the Court, since in that case the provision on an adequate level of protection must be interpreted strictly, the European Commission’s discretion in this matter must also be limited.144 Furthermore, according to the Directive, in addition to international commitments, the Commission, when assessing the adequate level of protection, must take into account in particular whether the third country is a party to the 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data and whether it has transposed the obligations in question into its domestic law. On these matters the opinion of the European Data Protection Board145 may also be sought.146 As regards adequacy decisions, the Directive requires the Commission to provide for a mechanism of periodic review. This periodic review must be carried out in consultation with the third country or international organisation in question, and all relevant developments in the third country or international organisation must be taken into account.147

That said, in certain situations in which no adequacy decision can be adopted it may nevertheless be possible to ensure the movement of data to third countries or international organisations. In order to increase the flexibility and practicability of the Directive, the EU legislature adopts a three-tier scheme.148

The first tier consists of data transfers that contain appropriate safeguards with regard to personality rights. If the third country or international organisation has legally binding instruments with regard to the right to the protection of personal data,149 or if the competent authority acting as controller, having assessed all the circumstances surrounding the transfer, concludes that appropriate safeguards

exist, the data transfer may take place (Art. 37 of the Directive). Of course, such decisions, which may amount to an interference with personality rights, must not be left solely to the personal assessment of the controller. In this respect, the Directive first of all obliges the controller to inform the supervisory authority of the transfer in question, and further provides that this operation must be documented, including the date and time, the reasons for the transfer and information about the receiving competent authority, and that the documentation must be made available to the supervisory authority on request. Through this provision the aim is that the information needed for a potential legal review by the supervisory authority be made available150 and that, in this way, the rights of individuals be protected more robustly. It is equally clear, however, that where personal data are the subject of cross-border transfers, it becomes extremely difficult for individuals to protect their rights in the event of unlawful use or disclosure of their data. In such situations, pursuing complaints and conducting investigations may also fall outside the powers of the supervisory authorities. Indeed, the EU legislature itself acknowledges the absence of sufficient preventive and remedial powers and the fact that consistency across the Union could not be achieved with regard to the protection of personal data in criminal proceedings and law enforcement.151 What needs to be done is to increase the exchange of information between the supervisory authorities in the Member States and their counterparts in third countries, and the level of cooperation within that framework.152 In the second tier, data transfer may be possible where the specific situations set out in Article 38 of the Directive exist. The data transfer must be necessary for one of the cases listed below:

a) the protection of the vital interests of the data subject or of another person,

b) the protection of the legitimate interests of the data subject, where the law of the Member State permits the transfer,

c) the prevention of an immediate and serious threat to the public security of a Member State or a third country,

d) in certain specific cases, for the core purpose laid down by the Directive (Art. 1(1) of the Directive),

e) the data transfer must be necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims in relation to the core purposes laid down by the Directive. It must be pointed out here that, in the application of sub-paragraphs (d) and (e), the data transfer will not take place if the competent authority decides that the pursuit of the public interest would create an imbalance with regard to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.

The third and final tier envisaged for a transfer to take place where no adequacy decision can be adopted is the arrangement on “asymmetrical data transfer” contained in Article 39, one of the most innovative provisions of the Directive.153 Under that Article, in certain individual and specific cases, data transfers by the competent authority of a Member State may be made not to the competent authority of the third country but directly to a recipient established in the third country. The EU legislature thereby departs from the principle laid down in Art. 35(1)(b): “The data must be transferred to a controller in a third country, or to an international organisation, having the status of a competent authority.”

For an asymmetrical data transfer to take place, the transfer must be strictly necessary for the core purposes laid down by the Directive; the competent authority carrying out the transfer must have determined that there is a reasonable balance between the public interest and fundamental rights and freedoms; there must be a situation in which the delay involved in a transfer to the competent authority in the third country would be prejudicial; the competent authority of the third country must be informed of the transfer without delay; and the competent authority carrying out the transfer must have informed the recipient of the purposes to which the processing is restricted. In addition to all of these conditions being satisfied, the other provisions of the Directive must also be complied with in the transfer operation.

These exceptions, set out in three tiers, must be interpreted restrictively; they must not allow frequent, massive and structural transfers of personal data or large-scale transfers of data, and must be limited to data that are strictly necessary. Such data transfers must without fail be documented, and the necessary information must be made available to the supervisory authority on request so that the lawfulness of the transfers can be monitored.154 Only in this way can the right to the protection of personal data be secured in practice where data are transferred on a significant scale.

§ VI. Steps Taken in the National Law of the Member States to Implement the Directive

Since the instrument that forms the focal point of our research takes the form of a directive, it is not directly applicable in the Member States and must be transposed into domestic law. It is therefore necessary to examine the legislation of the individual countries as well and to share our views on it. We should note that the Member States’ record in this respect is not particularly bright: we observe that the Member States other than Germany and Austria did not comply with May 2018, the deadline granted to them for transposing the Directive into domestic law, and that they adopted the relevant legislation either after that period had expired or only towards the end of it.155

Under this heading we shall deal with the legislation introduced by two of the EU’s major countries, Germany and France, and by the United Kingdom, whose legal relations with the EU have become extremely complex because it is in the Brexit process and which therefore calls for assessment.

A. The United Kingdom

1. The House of Lords Report on the Directive

The EU select committee of the House of Lords (Lords Select Committees) assessed, in a report published on 18 July 2017, the EU data protection reform package, how the United Kingdom’s movement of data would take place after Brexit, and the data protection policies that need to be determined in this regard.156 The United Kingdom first of all wishes to continue the movement of data with the EU unhindered and uninterrupted after Brexit as well. The report emphasises the statement, in the document in which the United Kingdom Government addressed Brexit and the new partnership to be established with the EU (the White Paper), that it would in particular seek to maintain the stability of data transfer between the EU, the Member States and the United Kingdom. For the United Kingdom’s international movement of data has reached a very considerable scale.157 In its assessment of the Directive, the House of Lords states that, in contrast to the limited scope of the 2008 Framework Decision, which concerned the movement of data between the Member States, the new instrument also covers data processing activities at both the international and the national level. This, it is stated, confirms the committee’s earlier assessment that the problems arising from the inability of law enforcement agencies and competent authorities to foresee which data would be the subject of a national or international movement of data were due to the limited scope of the Framework Decision.158 The committee then draws attention to the scope of application of the Directive. Accordingly, the Directive will not apply to data processing activities outside the bounds of EU law, in particular to activities affecting national security and security policies. It is also stated that data processed in the course of carrying out activities relating to the common foreign and security policy, governed by Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union, will likewise fall outside the scope of the Directive.159 Finally, the committee addresses the innovations and developments introduced by the Directive. In this part it states that, as noted above, not only the international movement of data but also national data processing activities have been brought within its scope, and that data subjects have been granted updated rights to information and of access to data. It is further stated that controllers are obliged to take appropriate technical and organisational measures in order to ensure an appropriate level of security and to make sure that processing complies with the Directive, and that data processing must be carried out in this way ex ante (data protection by design). Lastly, the committee states that data subjects may request the erasure of their data directly from the competent authorities and that controllers are under a notification obligation in the event of breaches of the right to the protection of personal data, and it also counts among the innovations of the Directive the fact that an obligation to designate a data protection officer has been imposed on the Member States.160

In the conclusions and recommendations part of its assessment, the committee stated that the most effective way of ensuring the uninterrupted movement of data is the adoption of adequacy decisions under Article 36 of the Directive, and that the United Kingdom must thereby confirm that it has data protection standards equivalent to those of the EU. The view of the representative of the ICO (Information Commissioner’s Office) on this matter is likewise that the movement of data between the EU and the United Kingdom is highly integrated and that an adequacy decision is therefore indispensable.161

However, since adequacy decisions can be obtained only by third countries, certain problems may arise in obtaining such decisions during the process of withdrawal from the EU. The committee’s proposal at this point is that transitional arrangements be made which will ensure the continuity of data sharing and the movement of data during the withdrawal process. For, in the absence of such transitional arrangements, the fact that there is no previously applied option for data sharing in the field of law enforcement causes the United Kingdom Government concern about maintaining cooperation in criminal proceedings and law enforcement among the EU Member States.162

2. The Data Protection Act 2018

The United Kingdom adopted the Data Protection Act (DPA), which contains the provisions relating to the GDPR and the Directive, with Royal Assent of 23 May 2018.163 In the first part of the DPA, which is the United Kingdom’s third-generation principal data protection legislation, an introduction is given to personal data and the right to the protection of personal data. The second part contains the provisions applicable where personal data are processed by the public and private sectors, the third part those applicable where they are processed for the purposes of criminal proceedings and law enforcement, and the fourth part those applicable where they are processed by the intelligence services. The sixth part of the DPA

lays down the role, function, duties and powers of the supervisory authority, the ICO, and its seventh and final part contains the supplementary and final provisions.

For the purposes of our subject, the part of importance is of course the one contained in the third part of the Act, which governs data processing activities in law enforcement and criminal proceedings. That part consists of 6 chapters and 53 provisions in total. In parallel with the Directive, the first chapter consists of provisions on scope and definitions. The second chapter sets out the principles. The third chapter governs the rights of data subjects, the fourth chapter the provisions on the controller and the processor, the fifth chapter data transfers, and the final chapter the supplementary provisions.

The DPA, which lays down six basic principles relating to personal data, also lists fifty-six bodies as competent authorities empowered to process data in compliance with these principles.164 The principles do not differ in any way from the Directive. That said, the principle of transparency contained in the GDPR appears neither in the Directive nor in the DPA. It has been stated that this principle could cause difficulties with regard to investigations that must be conducted covertly and the techniques used in such investigations. Attention has been drawn here in particular to data processing activities to be carried out under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) or the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA).165 As regards the processing of sensitive data, it is noted that the activities to be carried out under the legislation will to a large extent concern data of this nature,166 and processing requires that one of the conditions set out in Schedule 8 be met or that the data subject consent. It may be thought that data processing based on consent will arise largely where data are processed for the purpose of protecting the data subject from harm that might be caused to him.

The legislation, which contains no fundamental difference from the GDPR as regards the rights of data subjects and the obligations of controllers, sets at one month the period required for the erasure or periodic review of data, which Article 5 of the Directive leaves to the discretion of the Member States.167 The DPA, which through the principle of data security aims to prevent unauthorised operations that might be carried out in the course of activities,168 also contains the provision on communication between the actors in activities in which data security has been breached.169

Attention has also been drawn to the fact that the concept of the data protection officer is one of the innovations introduced by the Directive.170 It has been stated here in particular that controllers may designate a single joint DPO,171 and that, for example, a DPO who will serve across an entire region may be designated for law enforcement agencies.172 As regards the movement of data, bearing in mind that the Directive aims in particular to establish harmonised rules in all Member States, it can be seen that no fundamental difference has been provided for.

Finally, under the arrangement contained in the supplementary provisions, it is provided that a Minister of the Crown may, where this is necessary for safeguarding national security, restrict the fundamental rights of data subjects, such as the rights to be informed, of access, to erasure, to rectification and to learn of a data breach, and may confer the power to impose restrictions in this respect.173 Even though the exercise of this power is subject to extremely strict conditions, it also carries the risk of sweeping aside fundamental gains at a stroke. It should be recalled that the United Kingdom’s past record on this matter is not particularly bright and that a similar situation was experienced with RIPA after 11 September, and attention should be drawn to this danger.

B. Germany – Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz)

As we also noted above, Germany is one of the first countries to have legislated in its domestic law with regard to both the GDPR and the Directive and to have moved to new data protection legislation. The new legislation of 30 June 2017 is Germany’s second-generation principal data protection legislation (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) and was adopted 20 years after its predecessor.174

The Act consists of four parts: the first part lays down the general provisions applicable to all data processing activities; the second part contains the provisions transposing the GDPR, and the third part those transposing the Directive, into domestic law (Datenschutz-Anpassungs- und Umsetzungsgesetz EU). In the final part, the German legislature has laid down the provisions applicable to data protection activities that fall outside the scope of the GDPR and the Directive.

The third part, whose first chapter contains the provisions on scope, definitions and principles, governs in the first provision thereafter the conditions for the processing of sensitive personal data. Under that provision, sensitive data may be made the subject of processing only if this is strictly necessary and appropriate measures have been taken.175

In addition, the BDSG, in line with the Directive’s provision on security of processing, also lists the measures that may qualify as appropriate: the introduction of specific requirements for data security or data protection monitoring; the setting of special time limits within which data must be reviewed as to their relevance and for erasure; measures to increase awareness among staff involved in processing operations; restrictions on access to personal data; the separate processing of such data; the masking of personal data (pseudonymization); data encryption; and, lastly, the introduction of specific codes of conduct to ensure lawful processing where data are transferred or processed for other purposes. Given that neither the Directive nor the GDPR contains such a provision, we take the view that the measures listed may serve as guidance for the processing of sensitive data by public bodies.

In Section 51, the BDSG provides that data may be processed with the consent of the data subject and that, if the data are of a sensitive nature, explicit consent is required. Yet, as we stated in our earlier assessments, consent cannot constitute a ground of lawfulness for the processing of personal data in the course of law enforcement activities and in criminal proceedings; it cannot be relied on as the basis of data processing. For the existence of consent must not do away with the concrete, specific and subjective criteria and purposes of data processing, such as the prevention of crime, the execution of penalties and the safeguarding of public security. The essential element must be that such situations are specified in statute and that the conformity of activities with that purpose is ensured. A ground of lawfulness such as consent, which can subsequently be withdrawn and whose existence creates the possibility that institutions will disregard the purposes of the legislation and the principle of certainty, should not be accepted.

On the subject of the rights of data subjects and the obligations of controllers, the legislation runs very largely parallel to the Directive and contains no fundamental difference. The BDSG, which we have examined in outline, may be regarded as a legal text that is a pioneer at national level, particularly in that it is Germany’s first legislation on data processing activities in law enforcement and criminal proceedings, and that has, in general terms, succeeded in achieving uniformity with the Directive.

C. France – Data Protection Act (Loi Informatique et Libertés)

With its first data protection act, the Loi Informatique et Libertés (LIL), which entered into force in 1978, France was one of the countries that produced the first national legislation in this field in the world.176 However, it missed May 2018, the deadline granted to the Member States for transposition into domestic law; it was able to complete its principal data protection legislation only on 20 June 2018, the decree concerning the French data protection authority, the CNIL, on 1 August 2018, and the regulation aimed at bringing French legislation into line with the GDPR on 12 December 2018, and, contrary to its successful past record in this area, it was late to act.

The LIL consists of 14 chapters and 72 provisions in total and deals with the Directive in its thirteenth chapter.177 Before turning to the relevant chapter of the Act, mention must be made of the procedures, contained in the fourth chapter of the legislation, that have to be carried out prior to automated data processing.

Under Article 26 of the Act, data may be processed in connection with safeguarding the security of the State, defence or public security, or for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal sentences or security measures, by order of the competent minister or ministers, following a reasoned and published opinion of the CNIL.178 Accordingly, this “principle of prior authorisation” also applies to the provisions by which the Directive was transposed into domestic law. However, Article 70-3, contained in the chapter of the LIL relating to the Directive, introduced an exception in this respect and provided that the relevant condition in Article 26 will be met where personal data are processed by the competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention and detection of criminal offences, the investigation and prosecution of the matter, or the execution of criminal sanctions, including protection against threats to public security and the prevention of such threats. It is a matter of concern that the Article, without making any distinction even with regard to sensitive data in particular, has removed this protection which French law had long afforded to individuals. In addition, the Act does not give the CNIL the possibility of withdrawing the presumed authorisation, nor does it confer on it the power to impose administrative fines.179 On the other hand, it has been argued that the legislation preserves the distinctive nature of the Directive.180

At the same time, by enacting in provision 70-4 the rule that the data protection impact assessment to be carried out for data processing activities involving a high degree of risk to fundamental rights and freedoms must be submitted to the CNIL and its opinion obtained, the French legislature also includes a positive and progressive provision on this point. As the examination of the relevant provisions of the LIL continues, it can be seen that the Act contains no fundamental difference with regard to the rights of data subjects and the obligations of the controller, which form the core of the Directive. That said, the fact that individuals’ rights to information and of access have a wider scope and can be exercised directly

must be regarded as an advance in terms of national law and Union law. Moreover, the fact that, under the newly introduced provision 70-23, it has been laid down that, in connection with individuals’ rights to information, access, rectification and erasure, the related information communicated to the individual is to be provided in an appropriate form and free of charge, unless the request is made in abuse of the right or is unfounded, is likewise a positive development for the rights of individuals.181 As regards the obligations of the controller, in parallel with our remarks on the German legislation, the appropriate measures to be taken where sensitive (special-category) personal data are processed are listed by way of example. These are: preventing unauthorised persons from gaining access to the equipment used for processing, to automated data processing systems and to data files, and preventing the unauthorised reading, copying, modification or erasure of data media; being able to establish which personal data were entered into automated processing systems, when and by whom, and at what stage personal data were made the subject of a transfer; being able to restore the system in the event of interruption; and ensuring that the functions of the system perform, that operating faults are reported and that stored personal data are not corrupted by a system malfunction.182 In addition, log records will be kept so that the CNIL can establish the justification for the data processing, the date and time at which it was carried out and the persons consulted in the data processing activity.

As regards the scope of application, it should be noted that, pursuant to the final provision of the thirteenth chapter, where personal data are contained in the decisions of the judicial authorities or in a case file, it is not the relevant provisions of the LIL but the provisions of the French Code of Criminal Procedure that apply.183 It will be appropriate to conclude our assessment of this legislation, which in fact contains certain advances but also has fundamental shortcomings, by setting out the criticisms of the CNIL. In the opinion it submitted on the bill, the CNIL considers that, given that the principle of security of processing has not been established among the conditions for the lawfulness of data processing, the bill is deficient in certain respects. In its report the CNIL identified the status of the controller, the absence of the concept of joint controller, the failure to lay down any condition for the processing of sensitive data, and the failure to enact the obligation to facilitate the exercise of the data subject’s rights and the data protection principles as extremely important shortcomings that need to be remedied as a matter of urgency.184 The fact that, from 30 November 2017, when the CNIL published its report, to the present day the steps on this matter have still not been taken leaves the legislation incomplete. In this sense it may unfortunately be said that the LIL, at least as it stands, is far from providing adequate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of individuals.

§ VII. Provisions Applicable in Turkish Law to Personal Data Processed in Criminal Proceedings and by Law Enforcement Agencies

In our country there is as yet no specific legislation on this subject. When the KVKK is examined, too, it can be seen that the Law expressly leaves this field outside its scope.185 Article 28 of the KVKK excludes from the scope of the KVKK the cases in which personal data are processed (i) within the framework of preventive, protective and intelligence activities carried out by public institutions and organisations that are assigned duties and powers by law to ensure public security, public order or economic security, and (ii) by the judicial authorities or the authorities responsible for the execution of sentences in relation to investigation, prosecution, trial or execution proceedings.

We see that certain situations in which personal data may be collected in the pre-offence sphere, such as the taking of fingerprints and photographs (Art. 5 of the Law on Police Duties and Powers (PVSK)) and the recording of sound and images at meetings and demonstration marches (Art. 11 of the Law on Meetings and Demonstration Marches), are specifically provided for in statute, and that the general intelligence power of the police is provided for in Additional Art. 7 of the PVSK.186 While there are provisions on the situations in which law enforcement may process personal data – situations which, as in Additional Article 7, may moreover be very broad and vague – the principles, rules and standards governing the processing of such data are not laid down in any legislation. The gap in this field, which is precisely the subject matter of the Directive, which is left outside the scope of the KVKK and in which public bodies violate the principles of data processing on a wide scale every day through applications such as MOBESE (Mobile Electronic System Integration), must be closed as soon as possible.

Again, among the current debates on this subject, it should be recalled that the MOBESE application has no statutory basis whatsoever. Consequently, the processing and storage of personal data obtained through MOBESE and their use as evidence in any investigation or prosecution will be unlawful, and the evidence obtained from it will have to be classified as unlawfully obtained evidence and not be used in the proceedings. If MOBESE has been envisaged as a deterrent, preventive measure, it must be used only for that purpose and must not be accepted as a means of proof in trials in the post-offence sphere.187

As far as we know, work on this subject is under way within the Ministry of the Interior. However, it is not right for this information, which does not go beyond hearsay, to appear in an article that claims to be scholarly. What is to be expected, by contrast (and what in recent years we have scarcely seen happen in our country), is that such work be carried out by commissions to which the experts in the field and all stakeholders are invited, that it be presented to the public, and that, after favourable and unfavourable opinions have been received, the text be given its final form and submitted to the legislative assembly. This is the technique of making law that is expected and required in a democratic country.

The entry into force of the KVKK and the other relevant legislation in our country is an extremely positive, important and progressive step. But it is insufficient; for unless the principles and rules on the protection of personal data are embraced and applied by institutions and individuals, legislating will on its own remain inadequate. These institutions include the law enforcement agencies and the judicial organisation, where the scale of possible violations may perhaps be at its highest. That these structures are not subject to the KVKK is understandable in view of their structure and functions, but this must not mean an absence of rules, because that brings lawlessness in its wake. Accordingly, the keeping and processing of personal data by these institutions too must be bound by legal norms. For these norms, the developments in EU law and the Directive that we have sought to examine above should be taken as a model and a basis, and a law should be enacted along these lines without loss of time.

Conclusion

The difficulty of predicting future socio-political developments and the uncertainty as to how technology will develop make our concerns about our personality and the security of our personal data impossible to allay. Given that modern societies are becoming ever more dependent on borderless and decentralised information technologies, cyberspace, which occupies a significant part of our lives, is becoming an easy target for organised criminals, hackers, illegal activities and the formation and continuity of terrorist networks.188 Of course, it is not only cybercrime but also “traditional” offences committed in the physical sphere that form the subject of data processing files. In this sense, the personal data of all the participants in the proceedings – whether their status is that of suspect, accused or offender, of victim or person harmed by the offence, or of witness – are made the subject of criminal proceedings and law enforcement activity, and each and every member of society may be exposed to interferences with his fundamental rights and freedoms.

The Directive takes as its basis the two fundamental values that emerge in this field, personality rights and public security, and aims to strike a fair and reasonable balance between them. Compared with the Framework Decision, the fact that the Directive has a much wider scope through the inclusion of domestic data processing activities, that it contains a detailed set of rules on the principles of data processing, that it provides for strong mechanisms through which individuals can assert their rights, and that the competent authorities acting as controllers are subjected to a broader burden of responsibility are changes in line with this aim. In this respect the Directive contains a clear, comprehensive and forward-looking set of rules for criminal proceedings and law enforcement activities in the Information Age.

On the other hand, the instrument also has certain problematic areas: the fact that some of the safeguards granted are accompanied by wide exceptions that the Member States may introduce in their domestic law, and the use of general and vague terms regarding their application; the fact that only data processing in line with the purposes is given as the ground of lawfulness for data processing; the legal uncertainty that may arise in criminal proceedings and among law enforcement authorities because the GDPR will apply to data processing activities carried out outside those purposes; and, because the matter has been regulated by a normative instrument in the form of a directive, the significant differences between the data protection regimes of the various countries that are still highly likely to arise, even if not to the same extent as in the period of the Framework Decision – all these may be counted among the aspects of the Directive that are open to criticism. In the light of all these findings, the purpose for which Directive 2016/680 was introduced may be summarised as follows: on the one hand, to attain high standards of privacy and data protection while ensuring flexible data processing and movement of data in these activities, taking into account the needs of criminal proceedings and of the field of law enforcement, and, on the other, to ensure the consistency of the Member States’ data protection legislation relating to this field.

Our basic motivation in writing this article and examining the Directive was the absence of any legislation in this field in our country. While the authorities in law enforcement and criminal proceedings in our country process individuals’ data intensively, there is unfortunately no legislation whatsoever on the processing of these personal data. In our country too, steps must be taken on this matter as soon as possible, by the method and within the scope that we have indicated above; the legal gap in this field must be closed and unlawful acts and operations must be brought to an end without delay.

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Documents, Opinions, Studies and Reports

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Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), “Délibération n° 2017- 299 du 30 novembre 2017 portant avis sur un projet de loi d’adaptation au droit de l’Union européenne de la loi n°78-17 du janvier 1978”

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Council Framework Decision on the Protection of Personal Data Processed in the Framework of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, (Çevrimiçi) https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008F0977, (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019).

Danezis George/Domingo-Ferrer Josep/Hansen Marit/Hoepman Jaap-Henk/Le Métayer Daniel/Tirtea, Rodica/Schiffner, Stefan, Privacy and Data Protection by Design - from policy to engineering, European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) 2015. de Hert Paul/Bellanova Rocco, Data Protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A System Still to be Fully Developed?, European Parliament, (Çevrimiçi) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2009/410692/IPOL LIBE_ NT(2009)410692_EN.pdf, Mart 2009.

Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) / Home Office, Data Protection Bill: Explanatory Notes (Çevrimiçi) https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/ cbill/2017-2019/0153/en/18153-EN.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019).

Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and on the Free Movement of such Data (Çevrimiçi) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriser v%3AOJ.L_.2016.119.01.0089.01.ENG (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019).

European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Overview of Information Management in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, (Çevrimiçi) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0385&from=EN, 20/7/2010, (Erişim Tarihi:

European Commission, “Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World a European Data Protection Framework for the 21st Century”, (Çevrimiçi) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0009:FIN:EN:PDF, 25/1/2012, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019).

European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individual with regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and the Free Movement of such Data, (Çevrimiçi) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0010:FIN:EN:PDF, (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019) (Avrupa Komisyonu Tasarısı).

European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the European Investigation Order in Criminal Matters”, (Çevrimiçi) https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX: 52010XX1229(01), 29/12/2010, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019).

European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), Handbook on Security of Personal Data Processing, 2018.

House of Lords, The European Union Committee, Brexit: the EU data protection package, (Çevrimiçi) https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/7/7. pdf, Authority of the House of Lords18/07/2017, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019).

Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurumu, Kişisel Verilerin İşlenmesine İlişkin Temel İlkeler, (Çevrimiçi) https://www.kvkk.gov.tr/Icerik/4189/Kisisel-Verilerin-Islenmesine-Iliskin-Temel-Ilkeler, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019).

Recommendation R (87) 15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States Regulating the use of Personal Data in the Police Sector, (Çevrimiçi) https://rm.coe. int/168062dfd4, (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019).

Statewatch, Implementing the “principle of availability”: The European Criminal Records Information System, The European Police Records Index System, The Information Exchange Platform for Law Enforcement Authorities, (Çevrimiçi) http://www. statewatch.org/analyses/no-145-ecris-epris-ixp.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). Statewatch, The Directive on Data Protection and Law Enforcement: A Missed Opportunity?, (Çevrimiçi) https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-176-leas-data%20protection.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019).

TBMM Başkanlığı, “Kişisel Verilerin Otomatik İşlenme Tabi Tutulması Karşısında Bireylerin Korunması Sözleşmesinin Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun Tasarısı”, (Çevrimiçi) https://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/1/1-0966.pdf, 1/8/2014, (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019).

The Article 29 Working Party, “Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679”, (Çevrimiçi) https://ec.europa. eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=612053, 06/02/2018, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019).

The Article 29 Working Party, “Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)”, (Çevrimiçi), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail. cfm?item_id=611236, 04/04/2017, s. 19, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019).

The Article 29 Working Party, “Guidelines on Data Protection Officers (‘DPOs’)”, (Çevrimiçi), https://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-51/ wp243_en_40855.pdf, 13/12/2016, s. 4, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019).

The Article 29 Working Party, “Guidelines on Transparency Under Regulation 2016/679”, (Çevrimiçi), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_ id=622227, 22/08/2018, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019).

The Article 29 Working Party, “Opinion 01/2014 on the Application of Necessity and Proportionality Concepts and Data Protection within the Law Enforcement Sector”, (Çevrimiçi) https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/88168.pdf, 27/02/2014, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019).

The Article 29 Working Party, “Opinion on Some Key Issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680)”, (Çevrimiçi) https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/ item-detail.cfm?item_id=610178, 29/11/2017, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019).

The Article 29 Working Party, “The Future of Privacy”, (Çevrimiçi) https://ec.europa.eu/ justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2009/wp168_en.pdf,

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Guidebook on Democratic Policing, (Çevrimiçi) https://www.osce.org/secretariat/23804?download=true (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019).

UK Government Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) / University of Portsmouth, “Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2019”, (Çevrimiçi) https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/791940/Cyber_Security_Breaches_Survey_2019_-_Main_Report.PDF (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019).

UK Legislation, Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA”) (Çevrimiçi) http://www.legislation. gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/pdfs/ukpga_20180012_en.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019).

Judgments

ABAD, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner and Digital Rights Ireland Ltd., C-362/14, 6 Ekim 2015.

AİHM, Liberty ve Diğerleri v. Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru no: 58243/00, 1 Ekim 2008. AİHM, Rotaru v. Romanya, Başvuru no: 28341/95, 4 Mayıs 2000.

AİHM, S. ve Marper v. Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru no: 30562/04, 30566/04, 4 Aralık 2008.

Footnotes

  1. Date of submission of the article: 24.03.2020; date of acceptance by the first referee: 29.03.2020; date of acceptance by the second referee: 06.04.2020. ↑
  2. Istanbul Aydın University, Faculty of Law, Department of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, e-mail: volkan.dulger@dulger.av.tr; ORCID no.: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4034-5436. ↑
  3. Istanbul Bar Association; Istanbul University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Public Law, master’s student, e-mail: onur.ozkan@dulger.av.tr; ORCID no.: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3391-4728. ↑
  4. Michel Foucault, Özne ve İktidar, Seçme Yazılar 2, (Çev: Işık Ergüden/Osman Akınhay), 4. Bası, Ayrıntı, İstanbul, 2014, s. 58. ↑
  5. Dividing practices may be explained as value judgments which constitute the person between interlinked opposites and which, in Foucault’s words, create the space suited to “normalisation” by power. As examples the author cites the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, criminals and the “good boys”. These are dialectical instruments of objectification that confine us and our experiences to particular spheres, define us by those spheres and give rise to social sorting. ↑
  6. Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985, s. 309. ↑
  7. David Lyon, “Surveillance, Power, and Everyday Life”, in: Danny Quah/Chrisanthi Avgerou/Robin Mansell/Roger Silverstone (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Information and Communication Technologies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, s. 451. ↑
  8. The interviews conducted by the journalist and lawyer Glenn Greenwald with Edward Snowden, the former National Security Agency (NSA) employee who came to public attention through the disclosures he made in 2013, show the scale that surveillance has reached today and that we no longer have anywhere left to hide from it. See: Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide, Penguin Books, London, 2014. ↑
  9. Paul de Hert/Vagelis Papakonstantinou, “Three Scenarios for International Governance of Data Privacy: Towards an International Data Privacy Organization, Preferably a UN Agency”, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, V. 9., I. 2, s. 272, (Three Scenarios). ↑
  10. Juraj Sajfert/Teresa Quintel, “Data Protection Directive (EU) 2016/680 for Police and Criminal Justice Authorities”, in: Mark Cole/Franziska Boehm (eds.), GDPR Commentary, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2019, Forthcoming, s. 2 (Çevrimiçi) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3285873, (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019). ↑
  11. In our view, the offences committed over or by means of the internet – in other words, cybercrimes – serve to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information systems and digital data. In addition to the right of personality, the confidence of individuals that information systems will function properly and without interruption also falls within the scope of protection. To the same effect see: Thomas Weigend, “Information Society and Penal Law: General Report”, Revue Internationale de Droit Penal, Vol. 84, 2013/1-2, s. 53. In direct proportion to the growing place of the internet in our lives, significant increases are being observed in the rates at which these offences are committed. According to the Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2019 published by the United Kingdom Government’s Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, around one third of businesses (32%) and two in ten charities (22%) reported that their cyber security had been breached or that they had suffered a cyber security attack in the last 12 months. While each business suffers an annual loss of £4,180 as a result of breaches, the figure for charities is £9,470. For the statistics see: UK Government Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) / University of Portsmouth, “Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2019”, (Çevrimiçi) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/791940/Cyber_Security_Breaches_Survey_2019_-_Main_Report.PDF (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019). In a similar study, the Unifying the Global Response To Cybercrime reports published in 2018 by the British Anti-Phishing Working Group identified more than one and a half million cyber security attacks. APWG, “Unifying the Global Response To Cybercrime”, (Çevrimiçi) https://www.antiphishing.org/resources/apwg-reports/ (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019). ↑
  12. Computer crimes or, in other words, cybercrimes are, unlike traditional physical offences, characterised by mass victimisation, global reach, the territorial disconnect between act and result, and gaps in criminal legislation which arise, and cannot be closed, owing to the continuous nature of technological developments. Procedural problems lead to the under-reporting of cybercrime; they manifest themselves in the form of difficulties in identifying offenders and collecting digital evidence, judicial dilemmas and a lack of technical knowledge on the part of the participants in the proceedings. It is therefore clear that, despite all efforts to combat cybercrime, we shall not be able to obtain satisfactory results as long as we use old tools in the new cyber environment. For a study which also addresses this subject from the standpoint of the fundamental principles of criminal law and criminal procedure law see: Vanja Bajovic, “Criminal Proceedings in Cyberspace: The Challenge of Digital Era”, in: Emilio C. Viano (ed.), Cybercrime, Organized Crime, and Societal Responses: International Approaches, Springer, Heidelberg, 2017, s. 87-103. ↑
  13. Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and on the Free Movement of such Data (Çevrimiçi) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2016.119.01.0089.01.ENG (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019). ↑
  14. Marc Leiser, “The Law Enforcement Directive: The ‘Forgotten Directive’s Delicate Interplay with the GDPR”, Avrupa ve Türk Hukukunda Kişisel Verilerin Korunmasına İlişkin Güncel Sorunlar Sempozyumu, Yeditepe Üniversitesi, 9 Aralık 2018. ↑
  15. To this effect see: Paul de Hert/Vagelis Papakonstantinou, “The New Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive: A First Analysis”, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Intersentia, 2016, V. 7., I. 1, s. 7 (A First Analysis); Sajfert/Quintel, s. 2. ↑
  16. Paul de Hert/Juraj Sajfert, “Police, Privacy and Data Protection from a Comparative Legal Perspective” in: Monica den Boer (ed.), Comparative Policing from a Legal Perspective, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2018, s. 323; Cf. also Viviane Reding, “Privacy Matters - Why the EU Needs New Personal Data Protection Rules”, EU Commission, (Çevrimiçi) http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_SPEECH-10-700_en.htm?locale=en (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019). ↑
  17. Directive 2016/680 Recital 12. ↑
  18. de Hert/Papakonstantinou, A First Analysis, s. 10. ↑
  19. To this effect see: Gülşah Bostancı Bozbayındır, “Avrupa Birliği Ceza Hukuku’nda Polis ve Ceza Adaleti Otoritelerine Yönelik 2018/680 Sayılı Direktif: Kişisel Verilerin Ceza Adalet Mekanizmalarında Korunmasına Getirilen Standartlar ve Direktife Yönelik Eleştiriler”, GSÜHFD, Beta, İstanbul, 2018/2, s. 72. ↑
  20. Directive 2016/680 Rec. 14: “The processing of personal data for an activity which falls outside the scope of EU law, activities concerning national security, the activities of agencies or units connected with national security and the processing of personal data in the course of carrying out activities relating to the common foreign and security policy in Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union should not be regarded as activities falling within the scope of this Directive.” In addition to national security, the institutions, bodies and organs of the EU have also been excluded from the scope by Article 2(3) of the Directive. Under this arrangement, EU bodies such as Europol and Eurojust remain outside the scope of the Directive and, in this sense, the EU legislature does not, with the Directive, take the opportunity to lay down minimum rules and criteria applying across the whole of the EU. See also: Cristina Blasi Casagran, Global Data Protection in the Field of Law Enforcement: An EU Perspective, Routledge Research in EU Law, Routledge, Oxford, 2016, s. 46. ↑
  21. de Hert/Papakonstantinou, Three Scenarios, s. 278; Elif Küzeci, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması, 3. Bası, Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara, 2019, s. 126. ↑
  22. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. (Çevrimiçi) https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/108, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). The Convention, which entered into force on 1 October 1985, was signed by Türkiye on 28 January 1981 but became binding on our country only thirty-five years later, by the approval law published in Official Gazette No. 29656 of 17 March 2016. The explanatory memorandum to the bill for the approval law drew attention to the fact that the Convention had been signed by forty-seven countries and that Türkiye, although a party, was the only country that had not completed the approval procedures and put the Convention into force. The reason given for this state of affairs was the preference for first following the relevant instruments in international law and regulating the right to the protection of personal data in national law, and only thereafter bringing the Convention into force in domestic law. The safeguarding of the right to the protection of personal data as a constitutional right by the Constitutional Amendment of 2010, and the developments concerning Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK) during the process of approval of the Convention, made it necessary for the Convention to be approved and to enter into force in domestic law. TBMM Başkanlığı, “Kişisel Verilerin Otomatik İşlenme Tabi Tutulması Karşısında Bireylerin Korunması Sözleşmesinin Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun Tasarısı”, (Çevrimiçi) https://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/1/1-0966.pdf, 1/8/2014, (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019). ↑
  23. Sylvia Kierkegaard/Nigel Waters/Graham Greenleaf/Lee A. Bygrave/Ian Lloyd/Stephen Saxby, “30 Years on - The Review of the Council of Europe Data Protection Convention 108”, Computer Law & Security Review: The International Journal of Technology Law and Practice, Elsevier, London, 2011, V. 27, I. 3, s. 223 vd.; Handbook on European Data Protection Law: 2018 Edition, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2018, s. 24-26; Murat Volkan Dülger, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku, Hukuk Akademisi, İstanbul, 2019, s. 55; Hüseyin Murat Develioğlu, 6698 sayılı Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Kanunu ile Karşılaştırmalı Olarak Avrupa Birliği Genel Veri Koruma Tüzüğü Uyarınca Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku, On İki Levha, İstanbul, 2017, s. 9; Küzeci, (3), s. 126; A. Çiğdem Ayözger Öngün, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku: Elektronik Haberleşme Sektörüne İlişkin Düzenlemeler Dahil, 2. Bası, Beta, İstanbul, 2019, s. 74. ↑
  24. de Hert/Papakonstantinou, A First Analysis, s. 11. ↑
  25. Cf. Sajfert/Quintel, s. 3; Handbook on European Data Protection Law, 2018 Edition, s. 32; European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individual with regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and the Free Movement of such Data, s. 4, (Çevrimiçi) https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0010:FIN:EN:PDF, (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019) (Avrupa Komisyonu Tasarısı); Directive 2016/680 Rec. 8, 10. ↑
  26. Handbook on European Data Protection Law: 2018 Edition, s. 18. ↑
  27. It should in fact be noted that the first legislation in the field of data protection was introduced by the German State of Hesse in 1970 (Datenschutz). However, the scope of application of that legislation was limited to the State of Hesse. The first data protection act of national scope (Datalag), on the other hand, entered into force in Sweden in 1973. In our finding as to the pioneering role of the Council of Europe and the EU, account has been taken both of the effects of the legal texts they have prepared on this subject, which extend beyond their own borders (extra-territorial) and shape the legal policy of a great many countries, and of the fact that those texts contain detailed first-hand rules. ↑
  28. Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU, Law, Governance and Technology Series 16, Springer, Heidelberg, 2014, s. 1-15; Orla Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law, Oxford Studies in European Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, s. 3-45. ↑
  29. Recommendation R (87) 15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States Regulating the use of Personal Data in the Police Sector, (Çevrimiçi) https://rm.coe.int/168062dfd4, (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019). ↑
  30. Council Framework Decision on the Protection of Personal Data Processed in the Framework of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, (Çevrimiçi) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= celex%3A32008F0977, (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019). ↑
  31. Diana Alonso Blas, “First Pillar and Third Pillar: Need for a Common Approach on Data Protection?”, in: Serge Gutwirth/Yves Poullet/Paul de Hert/Cecile de Terwangne/Sjaak Nouwt (eds.), Reinventing Data Protection?, Springer, Heidelberg, 2009, s. 226; Bostancı Bozbayındır, s. 60. ↑
  32. Joseph Cannataci/Mireille Caruana, Report: Recommendation R (87) 15 - Twenty-Five Years Down the Line, Council of Europe, 2013, s. 5. ↑
  33. Franziska Boehm, Information Sharing and Data Protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Towards Harmonised Data Protection Principles for Information Exchange at EU-Level, Springer, Heidelberg, 2011, s. 96; Cannataci/Caruana, s. 5; Bostancı Bozbayındır, s. 60; Lauri Pajunoja, The Data Protection Directive on Police Matters 2016/680 Protects Privacy - The Evolution of EU´s Data Protection Law and Its Compatibility with the Right to Privacy, Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, 2017, s. 15. ↑
  34. To this effect see: Boehm, s. 97; Cannataci/Caruana, s. 12-14; Recommendation R (87) 15 para. 31-35. ↑
  35. Boehm, s. 97-98; Cannataci/Caruana, s. 15-17; Recommendation R (87) 15 para. 43-48. ↑
  36. To this effect see: Cannataci/Caruana, s. 5; The concept of democratic policing denotes that law enforcement agencies, in performing their duties, have an outlook that is democratic, lawful and respectful of human rights, and that they deliver their service promptly, equally and impartially, in a manner responsive to the whole of society. For a detailed study and guide on “democratic policing” see: The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Guidebook on Democratic Policing, (Çevrimiçi) https://www.osce.org/secretariat/23804?download=true (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019). ↑
  37. Recommendation R (87) 15 para. 49-100. ↑
  38. To this effect see: Boehm, s. 101-102. ↑
  39. The European Commission identifies the global acts of terrorism across Europe and America as the trigger for the Framework Decision and for the Prüm Decision of 2005, which governs the cross-border movement of, and cooperation concerning, personal data such as, in particular, DNA profiles, fingerprints and vehicle registration data for the purposes of combating terrorism. See: European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Overview of Information Management in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, (Çevrimiçi) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF /?uri=CELEX:52010DC0385&from=EN, 20/7/2010, s. 2-3, (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019). ↑
  40. Blasi Casagran, s. 42; Paul de Hert/Vagelis Papakonstantinou, “The Data Protection Framework Decision of 27 November 2008 regarding Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters - A Modest Achievement However not the Improvement Some Have Hoped for”, Computer Law & Security Review: The International Journal of Technology Law and Practice, Elsevier, London, 2009, V. 25, I. 5, s. 403-404 (Not the Improvement Some Have Hoped For); Hielke Hijmans, The European Union as Guardian of Internet Privacy: The Story of Art 16 TFEU, Springer, Heidelberg, 2016, s. 133; Boehm, s. 114; Sajfert/Quintel, s. 3; de Hert/Papakonstantinou, A First Analysis, s. 8; Ángeles Gutiérrez Zarza, Exchange of Information and Data Protection in Cross-border Criminal Proceedings in Europe, Springer, Heidelberg, 2015, s. 23; Bostancı Bozbayındır, s. 67; Michele Nino, “The Protection of Personal Data in the Fight Against Terrorism: New Perspectives of Pnr European Union Instruments in the Light of the Treaty of Lisbon” Utrecht Law Review, Utrecht, 2010, V. 6, No. 1, s. 69; Avrupa Komisyonu Tasarısı, s. 2; Pajunoja, s. 22; European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the European Investigation Order in Criminal Matters”, (Çevrimiçi) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=CELEX:52010XX1229(01), 29/12/2010, para. 52, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  41. Blasi Casagran, s. 42; de Hert/Papakonstantinou, Not the Improvement Some Have Hoped For, s. 407; González Fuster, s. 221. ↑
  42. de Hert/Papakonstantinou, Not the Improvement Some Have Hoped For, s. 411. ↑
  43. Paul de Hert/Rocco Bellanova, Data Protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A System Still to be Fully Developed?, European Parliament, (Çevrimiçi), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2009/410692/IPOL LIBE_NT(2009)410692_EN.pdf, Mart 2009, s. 6, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  44. Thomas Marquenie, “The Police and Criminal Justice Authorities Directive: Data Protection Standarts and Impact on the Legal Framework”, Computer Law and Security Review: The International Journal of Technology Law and Practice, Elsevier, London, 2017, V. 33, I. 3, s. 325. ↑
  45. de Hert/Papakonstantinou, Not the Improvement Some Have Hoped For, s. 412. ↑
  46. Boehm, s. 171; Viviane Reding, “The European Data Protection Framework for the Twenty-First Century”, International Data Privacy Law, Oxford Academic, Oxford, 2012, V. 2, I. 3, s. 122; Bostancı Bozbayındır, s. 68. ↑
  47. European Commission, “Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World a European Data Protection Framework for the 21st Century”, (Çevrimiçi) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri= COM:2012:0009:FIN:EN:PDF, 25/1/2012, s. 10, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  48. de Hert/Papakonstantinou, Not the Improvement Some Have Hoped For, s. 407; de Hert/Bellanova, s. 7; Boehm, s. 138-144; Nino, s. 67-69. ↑
  49. Statewatch, Implementing the “principle of availability”: The European Criminal Records Information System, The European Police Records Index System, The Information Exchange Platform for Law Enforcement Authorities, (Çevrimiçi) http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-145-ecris-epris-ixp.pdf s. 21, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  50. de Hert/Papakonstantinou, A First Analysis, s. 8. ↑
  51. Statewatch, The Directive on Data Protection and Law Enforcement: A Missed Opportunity?, (Çevrimiçi) https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-176-leas-data%20protection.pdf, s. 5, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  52. Sajfert/Quintel, s. 13. ↑
  53. de Hert/Papakonstantinou, A First Analysis, s. 12. ↑
  54. Sajfert/Quintel, s. 6. ↑
  55. Bostancı Bozbayındır, s. 76. ↑
  56. The Article 29 Working Party, “The Future of Privacy”, (Çevrimiçi) https://ec.europa.eu/justice/ article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2009/wp168_en.pdf, 01/12/2009, s. 26, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  57. To this effect see: Emmanuel Salami, “The Impact of Directive (EU) 2016/680 on the Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties and on the Free Movement of Such Data on the Existing Privacy Regime” (Çevrimiçi) http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.2912449, s. 4, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  58. de Hert/Papakonstantinou, A First Analysis, s. 10. ↑
  59. To this effect see: Bart Custers/Alan M. Sears/Francien Dechesne/Ilina Georgieva/ Tommaso Tani/ Simone van der Hof, EU Personal Data Protection in Policy and Practice, Information Technology and Law Series Volume 29, Springer, Heidelberg, 2019, s. 217; Paolo Balboni, “Personal Data Protection and the Use of Information to Fight Online Terrorist Propaganda Recruitment and Radicalization: Part III”, (Çevrimiçi), https://www.paolobalboni.eu/index.php/2019/02/10/personaldata-protection-and-the-use-of-information-to-fight-online-terrorist-propaganda-recruitment-andradicalization-part-iii/ (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019). ↑
  60. GDPR Recital 19, see: (Çevrimiçi) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= celex%3A32016R0679 (Erişim Tarihi: 01.04.2019). ↑
  61. For an example see Sajfert/Quintel, s. 4. ↑
  62. Dülger, s. 45; Küzeci, (3), s. 65. The right to the protection of personal data is a fundamental and autonomous human right, distinct from the right to respect for private life, which covers a very wide field and whose regulation and legal enforcement are carried out by independent administrative authorities dedicated to that field. For detailed information on the right to the protection of personal data being a human right see: Eşref Barış Börekçi, Kişisel Verileri Verme, Yayma veya Ele Geçirme Suçu, Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Yeditepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul, 2019, s. 19 vd. ↑
  63. Develioğlu, s. 45. ↑
  64. Dülger, s. 115; Develioğlu, s. 45; Estelle Dehon/Peter Carey, “Fair, Lawful and Transparent Processing”, in: Peter Carey (ed.), Data Protection: A Practical Guide to UK and EU Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, s. 44; The Article 29 Working Party, “Guidelines on Transparency Under Regulation 2016/679”, (Çevrimiçi), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail. cfm?item_id=622227, 22/08/2018, s. 7-9, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  65. Dülger, s. 117-123; Küzeci, (3), s. 200; Develioğlu, s. 46; Nilgün Başalp, Kişisel Verilerin Korunması ve Saklanması, Yetkin, Ankara, 2004, s. 37; Ayözger Öngün, s. 134; Peter Carey, “Data Protection Principles”, in: Peter Carey (ed.), Data Protection: A Practical Guide to UK and EU Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, s. 34. ↑
  66. To this effect see: Küzeci, (3), s. 203. ↑
  67. AİHM, Liberty ve Diğerleri v. Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru no: 58243/00, K. T. 1 Ekim 2008. ↑
  68. Liberty ve Diğerleri v. Birleşik Krallık, para. 5 ↑
  69. Liberty ve Diğerleri v. Birleşik Krallık, para. 16-19. ↑
  70. Liberty ve Diğerleri v. Birleşik Krallık, para. 6. ↑
  71. Liberty ve Diğerleri v. Birleşik Krallık, para. 56. ↑
  72. Liberty ve Diğerleri v. Birleşik Krallık, para. 69. ↑
  73. Liberty ve Diğerleri v. Birleşik Krallık, para. 70. ↑
  74. Paul Voigt/Axel von dem Bussche, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Practical Guide, Springer, Heidelberg, 2017, s. 90; Carey, s. 35; Dülger, s. 124; Küzeci, (3), s. 208. ↑
  75. Dülger, s. 126; Ayözger Öngün, (2), s. 138. ↑
  76. Directive 2016/680 Rec. 12; de Hert/Papakonstantinou, A First Analysis, s. 9. ↑
  77. Dülger, s. 130; The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Guide to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), (Çevrimiçi) https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-to-thegeneral-data-protection-regulation-gdpr-1-0.pdf, s. 33-34, 36 (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  78. Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurumu, Kişisel Verilerin İşlenmesine İlişkin Temel İlkeler, (Çevrimiçi) https://www.kvkk.gov.tr/Icerik/4189/Kisisel-Verilerin-Islenmesine-Iliskin-Temel-Ilkeler, s. 6, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  79. Küzeci, (3), s. 215; Ayözger Öngün, (2), s. 146. ↑
  80. The Article 29 Working Party (WP29), “Opinion on Some Key Issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680)”, (Çevrimiçi) https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail. cfm?item_id=610178, 29/11/2017, s. 10, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  81. WP29, Opinion on Some Key Issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680), s. 5. ↑
  82. AİHM, S. ve Marper v. Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru no: 30562/04, 30566/04, K. T. 4 Aralık 2008, para. 129. ↑
  83. S. ve Marper v. Birleşik Krallık, para. 125. For detailed information on the judgment see: Ragıp Barış Erman, “Adli Yargı Sisteminde DNA Örnekleri ve Profilleri - S. ve Marper - Birleşik Krallık Davası”, Fasikül Hukuk Dergisi, Seçkin, Ankara, 2010, C. 2, S. 10, s. 20-23. ↑
  84. AİHM, Rotaru v. Romanya, Başvuru no: 28341/95, K. T. 4 Mayıs 2000, para. 7-14. ↑
  85. Rotaru v. Romanya, para. 43-45. ↑
  86. Rotaru v. Romanya, para. 50. ↑
  87. Rotaru v. Romanya, para. 57. ↑
  88. Rotaru v. Romanya, para. 60. ↑
  89. de Hert/Papakonstantinou, A First Analysis, s. 11. ↑
  90. Bostancı Bozbayındır, s. 70. ↑
  91. Cf. Sajfert/Quintel, s. 3. ↑
  92. It should be noted that it is not clear what is to be understood by the expression strictly necessary. To this effect see: WP29, “Opinion on Some Key Issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680)”, s. 7. It is stated, however, that necessity should not be interpreted too broadly, since this could impede the exercise of fundamental rights. On the other hand, it is observed that, if it is understood extremely narrowly, recourse to it will become difficult and it will therefore make data processing excessively difficult for legitimate activities as well. See: WP29, “Opinion 01/2014 on the Application of Necessity and Proportionality Concepts and Data Protection within the Law Enforcement Sector”, (Çevrimiçi) https:// www.pdpjournals.com/docs/88168.pdf, 27/02/2014, s. 6, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). In this respect we take the view that the requirement of “strict” necessity should be interpreted by giving greater weight to the former in the balance between fundamental rights and legitimate interests. ↑
  93. WP29, Opinion on Some Key Issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680), s. 10. ↑
  94. Simon Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification, Harvard University Press, Cambrigde, 2002, s. 292-295. ↑
  95. Erik Zouave/Jessica Schroers, “You’ve been Measured, You’ve been Weighed and You’ve been Found Suspicious: Biometrics and Data Protection in Criminal Justice Processing” in: Ronald Leenes/Rosamunde van Brakel/Serge Gutwirth/Paul De Hert (eds.), Data Protection and Privacy: The Internet of Bodies, Computers, Privacy and Data Protection Series, V. 11, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2018, s. 2-3. ↑
  96. Profiling is an automated data processing technique which aims at an increase in knowledge by identifying the correlations between data, with a view to its use in decisions to be taken subsequently. In this sense, while a profile is a set of correlated data representing a person or a group, profiling may be described as the process of discovering unknown patterns between data in large data sets. See also: Francesca Bosco/Niklas Creemers/Valeria Ferraris/Daniel Guagnin/Bert- Jaap Koops, “Profiling Technologies and Fundamental Rights and Values: Regulatory Challenges and Perspectives from European Data Protection Authorities”, in: Serge Gutwirth/Ronald Leenes/ Paul de Hert (eds.), Reforming European Data Protection Law, Law, Governance and Technology Series 20, Springer, Heidelberg, 2015, s. 8-12. ↑
  97. The mechanism of automated decision-making denotes decisions taken without any human involvement whatsoever. See: The Article 29 Working Party, “Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679”, (Çevrimiçi) https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/ article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id= 612053, 06/02/2018, s. 20, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  98. Sajfert/Quintel, s. 8. ↑
  99. In legal scholarship, Bygrave defines legal effect as an effect that alters or determines a person’s rights or obligations. See: Lee A. Bygrave, “Automated Profiling: Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive and Automated Profiling”, Computer Law & Security Review: The International Journal of Technology Law and Practice, Elsevier, London, 2001, V. 17, I. 1, s. 17. It is clear that, if adverse legal effect is determined on the basis of this definition, the scope will be enormously wide. An express provision is therefore needed. ↑
  100. To this effect see: Sajfert/Quintel, s. 10. ↑
  101. According to the Article 29 Working Party, in order to eliminate the evident risks of discrimination to which the nature of sensitive data and automated decision-making mechanisms give rise, the Member States must take strict measures in this regard when transposing the Directive into their domestic law, WP29, “Opinion on Some Key Issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680)”, s. 13. ↑
  102. Directive 2016/680 Recital 26: “Personal data must be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the natural persons concerned, and only for specific purposes laid down by law. This provision does not in itself prevent the law enforcement agencies from carrying out activities such as covert investigations or video surveillance. Such activities may be carried out by the Member States – including for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, the execution of the criminal sentences imposed by the courts and, under the conditions laid down by law, the prevention of threats to public and national security – as long as they have a legal basis and, with due regard also for the legitimate interests of the person concerned, constitute a necessary and reasonable measure in a democratic society (...)”. ↑
  103. To this effect see: WP29, “Guidelines on Transparency Under Regulation 2016/679”, s. 4. ↑
  104. Zouave/Schroers, s. 17. ↑
  105. Data mining is the process of identifying patterns among a large quantity of data, analysing those data and drawing a conclusion. ↑
  106. WP29, “The Future of Privacy”, s. 16. ↑
  107. Roger Taylor, “No Privacy without Transparency” in: Ronald Leenes/Rosamunde van Brakel/Serge Gutwirth/ Paul De Hert (eds.), Data Protection and Privacy: The Age of Intelligent Machines, Computers, Privacy and Data Protection Series, V. 10, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2017, s. 85. ↑
  108. WP29, “Opinion on Some Key Issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680)”, s. 18. ↑
  109. Develioğlu, s. 87. ↑
  110. Paul de Hert/Diana Dimitrova, “The Right of Access Under the Police Directive: Small Steps Forward”, in: Manel Medina/Andreas Mitrakas/Kai Rannenberg/Erich Schweighofer/Nikolaos Tsouroulas (eds.), Privacy Technologies and Policy, 6th Annual Privacy Forum, APF 2018, Barcelona, Spain, June 13-14, 2018, Revised Selected Papers, Springer, Heidelberg, 2018, s. 123. ↑
  111. The Council of Europe (CoE), Practical Guide on the use of Personal Data in the Police Sector (Çevrimiçi) https://rm.coe.int/t-pd-201-01-practical-guide-on-the-use-of-personal-data-in-the-police-/16807927d5, s. 7, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  112. de Hert/Dimitrova, s. 127. ↑
  113. de Hert/Dimitrova, s. 125; The principles of accountability and transparency or, in other words, “openness” first found a place in the OECD’s “Privacy Framework Decision” of 1980. See: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “The OECD Privacy Framework” s. 15-16, (Çevrimiçi) https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). These principles, which have found a place in legal texts ever since the OECD principles, have both an ethical and a practical dimension. Neither the instruments nor the principles are merely normative in character. They also form the ground for the cultural change needed for data protection law to develop and to take clearer shape in people’s minds. They serve to raise public awareness. Cf. Hielke Hijmans/Charles D. Raab, “Ethical Dimensions of the GDPR” in: Mark Cole/Franziska Boehm (eds.), Commentary on the General Data Protection Regulation, Edward Elgar 2019, Forthcoming, s. 2-3 (Çevrimiçi) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3222677 (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  114. By contrast, the restriction of these rights is possible only if the Member States document this and give reasons for it, see: WP29, Opinion on Some Key Issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680), s. 25. ↑
  115. It should be noted at this point that Peter Hustinx, who served as European Data Protection Supervisor between 2004 and 2014, states that supervisory authorities can meet the needs as effective institutions only if they have a legal framework that enables them to be effective, a strategic approach and the ability to make a difference, see: Peter Hustinx, “The Role of Data Protection Authorities”, in: Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul de Hert, Cecile de Terwangne, Sjaak Nouwt (eds.), Reinventing Data Protection?, Springer, Heidelberg, 2009, s. 131. ↑
  116. Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection by Design and by Default: Deciphering the EU’s Legislative Requirements Oslo Law Review, Oslo, 2017, V. 4, No. 2, s. 114-116; Maria Grazia Porcedda, “‘Privacy by Design’ in EU Law: Matching Privacy Protection Goals with the Essence of the Rights to Private Life and Data Protection”, in: Manel Medina/Andreas Mitrakas/Kai Rannenberg/Erich Schweighofer/Nikolaos Tsouroulas (eds.), Privacy Technologies and Policy, 6th Annual Privacy Forum, APF 2018, Barcelona, Spain, June 13-14, 2018, Revised Selected Papers, Springer, Heidelberg, 2018, s. 183 vd.; Ann Bevitt/Peter Carey, “Data Security and Breach Notifications”, in: Peter Carey (ed.), Data Protection: A Practical Guide to UK and EU Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, s. 95; Daniel Le Métayer, “Privacy by Design: A Matter of Choice”, in: Serge Gutwirth/Yves Poullet/Paul de Hert (eds.), Data Protection in a Profiled World, Springer 2010, s. 323-324; George Danezis/Josep Domingo-Ferrer/Marit Hansen/Jaap-Henk Hoepman/Daniel Le Métayer/Rodica Tirtea/Stefan Schiffner, Privacy and Data Protection by Design - from policy to engineering, European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) 2015, s. 5-7; Paolo Balboni, “Let’s not Forget about Data Protection by Design”, (Çevrimiçi) https://www.paolobalboni.eu/index.php/2018/07/11/lets-not-forget-about-data-protection-by-design/ (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019); GDPR Rec. 78; Directive 2016/680 Rec. 53. ↑
  117. Bevitt/Carey, s. 95; Carey, s. 41; Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 242; Piotr Foitzik, “Privacy by Default in Online Services”, (Çevrimiçi) https://iapp.org/news/a/privacy-by-default-in-online-services/, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019); Aurelia Tamò-Larrieux, Designing for Privacy and its Legal Framework: Data Protection by Design and Default for the Internet of Things, Law, Governance and Technology Series 40, Springer, Heidelberg, 2018, s. 185. ↑
  118. Directive 2016/680 Rec. 56. ↑
  119. WP29, Opinion on Some Key Issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680), s. 28 ↑
  120. To this effect see: Sajfert/Quintel, s. 5. ↑
  121. WP29, Opinion on Some Key Issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680), s. 28. ↑
  122. WP29, Opinion on Some Key Issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680), s. 27-28. ↑
  123. To this effect see: Sajfert/Quintel, s. 15. ↑
  124. WP29, Opinion on Some Key Issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680), s. 26. ↑
  125. The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Guide Law Enforcement Processing (Part III of the Bill), (Çevrimiçi) https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/887918.pdf, 05/04/2018, s. 33 (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  126. Sajfert/Quintel, s. 15. ↑
  127. David Wright/Paul de Hert, “Introduction to Privacy Assessment”, in: David Wright/Paul de Hert (eds.), Privacy Impact Assessment, Law, Governance and Technology Series 6, Springer, Heidelberg, 2012, s. 8. ↑
  128. Paul de Hert, “A Human Rights Perspective on Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessments”, in: David Wright/Paul de Hert (eds.), Privacy Impact Assessment, Law, Governance and Technology Series 6, Springer, Heidelberg 2012, s. 34; The Article 29 Working Party, “Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)”, (Çevrimiçi), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=611236, 04/04/2017, s. 19, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019); The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Accountability and Governance: Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) (Çevrimiçi) https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/887901.pdf, 22/03/2018, s. 19 (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  129. Francoise Gilbert, “EU General Data Protection Regulation: What Impact for Business Established Outside the European Union”, Journal of Internet Law, Mayıs 2016, s. 4 (cited by: Develioğlu, s. 110). ↑
  130. Gerrit Hornung, “A General Data Protection Regulation for Europe: Light and Shade in the Commission’s Draft of 25 January 2012”, SCRIPTed, 9, 2012, s. 77 (cited by: Develioğlu, s. 110). ↑
  131. GDPR Rec. 84. ↑
  132. Directive 2016/680 Rec. 51; ICO, Accountability and Governance: Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs), s. 39-41. ↑
  133. WP29, “Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA), s. 14. ↑
  134. Paul Lambert, Understanding the New European Data Protection Rules, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2017, s. 271; Handbook on European Data Protection Law: 2018 Edition, s. 131; European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), Handbook on Security of Personal Data Processing, 2018, s. 6; GDPR Rec. 83. ↑
  135. To this effect see Jenai Nissim, “Accountability and the Role of the Data Protection Officer”, in: Peter Carey (ed.), Data Protection: A Practical Guide to UK and EU Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, s. 226. ↑
  136. The Article 29 Working Party, “Guidelines on Data Protection Officers (‘DPOs’)”, (Çevrimiçi), https:// ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-51/wp243_en_40855.pdf, 13/12/2016, s. 4, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  137. Paul Lambert, The Data Protection Officer: Profession, Rules and Role, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2017, s. 42-45; Nissim, s. 223; Voigt/von dem Bussche, s. 53. ↑
  138. Directive 2016/680 Rec. 63. ↑
  139. The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Data Protection Officers (Çevrimiçi) https://ico.org. uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulationgdpr/accountability-and-governance/data-protection-officers/ (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019); WP29, “Guidelines on Data Protection Officers (‘DPOs’)”, s. 24. ↑
  140. Although the Directive has not clarified this point, the expression “third country” must be understood as meaning countries that are not members of the EU. To this effect see also Salami, s. 13. ↑
  141. Sajfert/Quintel, s. 18. ↑
  142. de Hert/Papakonstantinou, A First Analysis, s. 14. ↑
  143. To this effect see de Hert/Papakonstantinou, A First Analysis, s. 14. ↑
  144. ABAD, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner and Digital Rights Ireland Ltd., C-362/14, 6 Ekim 2015. ↑
  145. To this effect see Sajfert/Quintel, s. 18; Costanza Di Francesco Maesa, “Balance between Security and Fundamental Rights Protection: An Analysis of the Directive 2016/680 for Data Protection in the Police and Justice Sectors and the Directive 2016/681 on the Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR)”, (Çevrimiçi) http://rivista.eurojus.it/balance-between-security-and-fundamental-rights-protection-an-analysis-of-the-directive-2016680-for-data-protection-in-the-police-and-justice-sectors-and-the-directive-2016681-on-the-use-of-passen/, Eurojus, 24/05/2016, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019); Salami, s. 13; Pajunoja, s. 63. ↑
  146. Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, para. 73. ↑
  147. Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, para. 78. ↑
  148. The European Data Protection Board is an independent EU body established under Articles 68 et seq. of the GDPR, which contributes to the consistent application of data protection rules throughout the European Union and promotes cooperation between the EU’s data protection authorities. The Board is composed of the head of the supervisory authority of each Member State and the European Data Protection Supervisor, or their representatives. The Board, which replaces the Article 29 Working Party set up on the basis of Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC, will be at the centre of the EU data protection system. ↑
  149. Directive 2016/680 Rec. 68. ↑
  150. Directive 2016/680 Rec. 69. ↑
  151. Sajfert/Quintel, s. 18-19; de Hert/Papakonstantinou, A First Analysis, s. 15. ↑
  152. An example of such a legal instrument is the international agreement which covers all personal data exchanged between the police and criminal justice authorities of the EU Member States and the federal authorities of the USA for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, including terrorism, and which, because it lays down the general principles on this matter and because of the breadth of its scope, is referred to as the “Umbrella Agreement”, see: “Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the Protection of Personal Information Relating to the Prevention, Investigation, Detection, and Prosecution of Criminal Offences”, (Çevrimiçi) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ .L_.2016.336.01.0003.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:336:TOC 10/12/2016, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  153. Sajfert/Quintel, s. 19. ↑
  154. Directive 2016/680 Rec. 74; In addition, Article 40 of the Directive provides, with a view to the effective application of the instrument, that the Member States, the EU Commission, third countries and international organisations are to introduce international cooperation mechanisms and must provide mutual assistance. ↑
  155. To this effect see: Pajunoja, s. 62. ↑
  156. To this effect see: Sajfert/Quintel, s. 19. ↑
  157. Directive 2016/680 Rec. 72. ↑
  158. Custers/Sears/Dechesne/Georgieva/Tani/van der Hof, s. 219. ↑
  159. House of Lords, The European Union Committee, Brexit: the EU data protection package, (Çevrimiçi) https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/7/7.pdf, Authority of the House of Lords18/07/2017, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  160. House of Lords, s. 3. ↑
  161. House of Lords, s. 14. ↑
  162. House of Lords, s. 15. ↑
  163. House of Lords, s. 16. ↑
  164. House of Lords, s. 50. ↑
  165. House of Lords, s. 51. ↑
  166. UK Legislation, Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA”) (Çevrimiçi) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/pdfs/ukpga_20180012_en.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  167. DPA, Schedule 7; Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)/Home Office, Data Protection Bill: Explanatory Notes (Çevrimiçi) https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/ cbill/2017-2019/0153/en/18153-EN.pdf, para. 175 (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  168. DCMS/Home Office, para. 183. ↑
  169. The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Guide to Law Enforcement Processing (Part 3 of the Bill) (Çevrimiçi) https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/887918.pdf, s. 5, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  170. DPA Art. 54; ICO, Guide to Law Enforcement Processing, s. 22. ↑
  171. DPA Art. 66; DCMS/Home Office, para. 224-225. ↑
  172. DPA Art. 67-68; ICO, Guide to Law Enforcement Processing, s. 42-45. ↑
  173. Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)/Home Office, para. 227-228. ↑
  174. DPA Art. 69; ICO, Guide to Law Enforcement Processing, s. 40. ↑
  175. DCMS/Home Office, para. 227 ↑
  176. DPA Art. 79. ↑
  177. Christian Ludwig Geminn, “The New Federal Data Protection Act - Implementation of the GDPR in Germany”, Blog Droit Européen, E-conférence: National Adaptations of the GDPR, Haziran 2018, (Çevrimiçi) https://blogdroiteuropeen.files.wordpress.com/2018/06/christian-1.pdf, s. 1, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑
  178. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG-neu), Art. 48. ↑
  179. Custers/Sears/Dechesne/Georgieva/Tani/van der Hof, s. 137. ↑
  180. Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés (“LIL”), (Çevrimiçi) https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000886460#LEGIA RTI000037088717, (Erişim Tarihi: 18.04.2019). ↑
  181. It should be noted, however, that the CNIL is of the view that it is unclear, in particular, what the concept of “public security” covers. See: Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), “Délibération n° 2017-299 du 30 novembre 2017 portant avis sur un projet de loi d’adaptation au droit de l’Union européenne de la loi n°78-17 du janvier 1978”, (Çevrimiçi) https:// www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ projet_davis_cnil.pdf, s. 31, (Erişim Tarihi: 18.04.2019). ↑
  182. LIL, Art. 45. ↑
  183. Olivia Tambou, “Que retenir du projet de loi relative à la protection des données personnelles ? Partie II: L’amélioration relative du régime des traitements pénaux par la transposition de la directive n°2016/680” (Çevrimiçi) https://www.village-justice.com/articles/que-retenir-projet-loi-relatifprotection-des-donnees-personnelles-partie,28175.html, (Erişim Tarihi: 18.04.2019). ↑
  184. To this effect see: Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), “Délibération n° 2017-299 du 30 novembre 2017 portant avis sur un projet de loi d’adaptation au droit de l’Union européenne de la loi n°78-17 du janvier 1978”, s. 37; Tambou, “Que retenir du projet de loi relative à la protection des données personnelles ? Partie II: L’amélioration relative du régime des traitements pénaux par la transposition de la directive n°2016/680”. ↑
  185. LIL, Art. 70-13. ↑
  186. LIL, Art. 70-24. ↑
  187. CNIL, “Délibération n° 2017-299 du 30 novembre 2017 portant avis sur un projet de loi d’adaptation au droit de l’Union européenne de la loi n°78-17 du janvier 1978”, s. 32. ↑
  188. Börekçi, s. 103. ↑
  189. Baran Kızılırmak, Önleyici Amaçla Elde Edilen Verilerin Ceza Muhakemesinde Kullanılabilirliği, Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul, 2018, s. 98 - 148. ↑
  190. To this effect see Kızılırmak, s. 269 vd. ↑
  191. Anthony Minnaar, “Cybercrime, Cyberattacks, and Problems of Implementing Organizational Cybersecurity”, in: John A. Eterno/Arvind Verma/Aiedeo Mintie Das/Dilip K. Das, (eds.), Global Issues in Contemporary Policing, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2017, s. 122. 01.04.2019). 01/12/2009, s. 26, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). The Council of Europe (CoE), Practical Guide on the use of Personal Data in the Police Sector (Çevrimiçi) https://rm.coe.int/t-pd-201-01-practical-guide-on-the-use-ofpersonal-data-in-the-police-/16807927d5, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Accountability and Governance: Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) (Çevrimiçi) https://www.pdpjournals.com/ docs/887901.pdf, 22/03/2018, s. 19 (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Data Protection Officers (Çevrimiçi) https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-generaldata-protection-regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/data-protection-officers/ (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Guide Law Enforcement Processing (Part III of the Bill), (Çevrimiçi) https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/887918.pdf, 05/04/2018, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Guide to Law Enforcement Processing (Part 3 of the Bill) (Çevrimiçi) https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/887918.pdf, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Guide to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), (Çevrimiçi) https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-tothe-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr-1-0.pdf, (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “The OECD Privacy Framework” s. 15-16, (Çevrimiçi) https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/ oecd_privacy_framework.pdf (Erişim Tarihi: 10.04.2019). ↑

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