2 November 2018Murat Volkan DülgerCommentary

Introduction

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

The Personal Data Protection Board’s Decision of Principle of 16 October 2018, No. 2018/119, on “preventing data controllers and data processors from directing advertising notifications/calls to data subjects’ e-mail addresses or, by SMS or call, to their mobile phones”, was published in the Official Gazette of 1 November 2018, No. 30582.

The Decision addresses a very wide audience, on the side of data controllers and data processors as well as on the side of data subjects, and the advertising notifications or calls it concerns have today reached an intensity that is almost impossible to avoid. As a result, the Decision has attracted great interest, particularly from those concerned with the subject. In parallel, many points of debate and uncertainty have also arisen with the publication of the Decision. In this article I will discuss the Decision published by the Board, taking into account Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK) first and foremost, as well as the other legislation related to the subject.

Full text

This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger*

Paragraph 6 of Article 15, entitled “Procedures and principles of examination upon complaint or ex officio”, of Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data (KVKK) has conferred on the Personal Data Protection Board, the decision-making body of the Personal Data Protection Authority, the duty and power to adopt “resolutions of principle”. Accordingly, if the Board establishes, as a result of an examination carried out upon complaint or ex officio, that the infringement is widespread, it adopts a resolution of principle on the matter and publishes that resolution. Before such a resolution is adopted it is also possible, where needed, to obtain the opinions of the relevant institutions and organisations. Thus the adoption of a resolution of principle on matters in which the infringement has been found to be widespread is not only a type of power conferred on the Board but also falls within the scope of the Board’s duties.

In line with this duty and power, the Resolution of Principle of the Personal Data Protection Board dated 16.10.2018 and numbered 2018/119 on “Preventing controllers and processors from directing advertising notifications/calls to data subjects’ e-mail addresses or, by SMS or call, to their mobile telephones” was published in the Official Gazette of 1 November 2018, No. 30582.

The fact that the audience addressed by the Decision is very broad, both on the side of controllers and processors and on the side of data subjects, and that the advertising notifications or calls which are the subject of the Decision have today become so frequent as to seem almost indispensable, has meant that the Decision has attracted great interest, especially from those concerned with the subject. In parallel, with the publication of the Decision a number of points of debate and uncertainty have also come to the fore.

In this paper I shall therefore examine the Decision published by the Board, taking into account first and foremost Law No. 6698 and also the other legislation related to the subject. I must point out in particular here that what controllers or processors must do, or what measures they must take, in line with the Decision is very important. In addition, what kind of rights data subjects have in the face of advertising notifications or calls is another important point that deserves attention. For this reason I shall try to dispel the question marks that arise in people’s minds as a result of the assessment of the Decision, and to explain, by reference to concrete examples, what controllers must do in the face of the Decision and what data subjects can do in the face of these notifications and calls.

The Process by which Electronic Means Came to Be Used for Advertising

Electronic means, which have entered our lives at the point now reached by information technologies, and, beyond that, the communication carried on by these means, have today become an indispensable element in every field. Today we use electronic means at almost every stage of everything from everyday activities to all professional activities, and we communicate or correspond by these means. This has also significantly affected the stages of production and consumption. The production that increased after the Industrial Revolution directed people towards consumption, and the two activities have advanced by constantly influencing each other. The producing side wanted what it produced to be consumed and, since very early times, has made great efforts to that end according to the conditions of the day.

This is exactly the same today: a person who, pursuing a certain profit, produces a good or provides a service strives, according to the conditions of the day, for the consumption – in other words the sale – of that good or service. In this era, which we also call the information age, the best way of advertising or marketing in order to sell a good is undoubtedly information technology tools and the communication carried out by means of them. Companies that are aware of this therefore send people e-mails, SMS messages or calls presenting and advertising their goods or services, so that their economic and commercial activities may continue in the best possible way. While no problem is in fact apparent up to this point, it must not be forgotten that communication is two-sided and that, in order to be able to advertise by these means, companies need the other party’s contact details, such as an e-mail address or telephone number. It is precisely at this point that the interest of companies in advertising for the sake of their economic and commercial expectations conflicts with individuals’ right to the protection and confidentiality of their personal data. This conflict must be resolved in favour of the right to the protection of personal data, which is undoubtedly a human right, but in an equitable manner, with the circumstances of the situation and the different eventualities also being taken into account.

The Resolution of Principle of the Personal Data Protection Board dated 16/10/2018 and numbered 2018/119

The fact that communication by electronic means has in this way become part of every moment of life has also led to a significant increase in the advertising and marketing messages and calls made by this route, to such an extent that individuals have come to be disturbed by it. People are exposed to an intensive flow of advertising messages from companies with which they have no connection whatsoever and from which they have never even made a purchase, or from which, although they have made a purchase, they do not wish to receive advertising. As a result of the assessment of the applications made to the Authority by persons so exposed, it was established that, with regard to advertising notifications/calls to people’s e-mail addresses or, by SMS or call, to their mobile telephones, there was a contravention of the provisions of the Law and that this infringement was very widespread, and a Resolution of Principle was adopted on the matter.

I. Matters Introduced by the Resolution of Principle

1. Immediate cessation of messages with advertising content sent unlawfully

The Decision published by the Board states, first, that controllers and processors who direct messages with advertising content unlawfully must immediately cease the data processing activities in question:

“…that controllers who direct messages with advertising content by sending SMS to telephone numbers, making calls or sending mail to e-mail addresses, without obtaining the consent of the data subjects and without fulfilling the conditions for processing laid down in Article 5 of the Law, and processors who use such data, without the explicit consent of the data subjects, for the purpose of sending messages/e-mails with advertising content or making calls on behalf of controllers, must immediately cease the data processing activities in question pursuant to paragraph (7) of Article 15 of the Law…”

As a consequence of this first provision of the Decision, attention should be paid to the following points:

a. Calls or notifications with advertising content that must be ceased immediately

i. The first version of the Decision, in which the word “and” appeared in the text

The Decision stated that the calls or notifications with advertising content which are the subject of the personal data processing activity that must be ceased immediately are messages directed without obtaining the consent of the data subjects and without fulfilling the exceptional cases regulated in Article 5 of the Law, entitled “Conditions for the processing of personal data”.

Accordingly, messages with advertising content sent without the consent of the data subjects and without the conditions for processing being fulfilled must be stopped. The first point that attracts attention here is that, through the use of the conjunction “and”, the presence of both situations at once is required. In other words, there must be no explicit consent of the data subject and, at the same time, the conditions for processing must not have been fulfilled. Read conversely, it can be seen to be accepted that, in the course of a personal data processing activity, the controller or processor may also have obtained the consent of the data subject even though one of the conditions for processing is present. In other words, the meaning that emerges is that it is accepted that the existence of explicit consent and the grounds of justification set out in Art. 5(2) may coexist.

This, however, is contrary to all the guides published and all the statements made so far by the Board and by officials of the Authority. For, as I have also stated in my earlier writings on the subject, while the Law was the subject of debate on many points as from the date of its entry into force, the relationship between explicit consent and the other conditions for processing was dwelt upon in particular. It was unclear whether, in parallel with Directive 95/46/EC, which was taken into account to a large extent in the enactment of the Law, explicit consent and the conditions for processing were on the same level, or whether, contrary to the Directive, explicit consent was the rule and the other conditions for processing came after it, that is, whether they were – in the words of the Law – exceptions.

In response to the questions we put to the Board on the matter, it was made clear that the Board’s point of view is the same as that of the Directive. Accordingly, it was stated on various occasions that there is no precedence of any kind between explicit consent and the other conditions for processing. In addition, a decision was given to the effect that, where the controller is able to base the personal data processing activity on any of the conditions for processing, obtaining explicit consent from the data subject as well is unlawful. The first reason for this is that the controller is in any event under a duty or entitled to process the personal data in question even without the consent of the data subject. The second reason is that it creates in a data subject from whom explicit consent has been obtained despite the existence of conditions for processing the impression that the processing activity will be brought to an end if he withdraws that explicit consent. In fact, even if the data subject withdraws explicit consent, the controller will continue to process those personal data.

In addition, there is also an infringement decision given by the Board on the matter. According to it, it is contrary to law for the controller to have obtained explicit consent despite the existence of conditions for processing. The word “and” in the text therefore plainly contradicts all the statements made and decisions given up to now.

I think that what was meant here is in line with the statements that have been made, that the conjunction that ought to have been used was in fact “or”, but that the conjunction “and” was used in the sentence as a result of an error or oversight. This mistake is liable to have very dangerous consequences, in that it contains a very plain contradiction and states that controllers who obtain the explicit consent of data subjects must also fulfil the conditions listed in Article 5 of the Law; for that reason it should be corrected and clarified as soon as possible.

ii. The final version of the Decision, in which the word “or” appears in the text

Indeed, taking these criticisms into account within a very short time, the Board made the correction by a “Corrigendum” published in the Official Gazette of 07.11.2018, No. 30588, which states: “The phrase “Without obtaining the consent of the data subjects and without fulfilling the conditions for processing laid down in Article 5 of the Law,” contained in the decision of the Personal Data Protection Board dated 16/10/2018 and numbered 2018/119, published in conformity with its original in the Official Gazette dated 01/11/2018 and numbered 30582, has, on the basis of the letter of the Personal Data Protection Authority dated 05/11/2018 and numbered 19462324/050.01.04/2967, been amended to read “Without obtaining the consent of the data subjects or without fulfilling the conditions for processing laid down in paragraph

(2) of Article 5 of the Law,” and has thereby been corrected.”

Accordingly, the calls or notifications with advertising content which must be ceased immediately and which are the subject of the personal data processing activity are messages directed without obtaining the consent of the data subjects or without fulfilling the exceptional cases regulated in paragraph 2 of Article 5 of the Law, entitled “Conditions for the processing of personal data”.

b. The relationship between messages with advertising content and commercial electronic messages

By the Decision, directing “messages with advertising content” unlawfully by sending SMS to telephone numbers, making calls or sending mail to e-mail addresses, and the processing of personal data in the context of these activities, were prohibited, and it was stated that, where such a situation exists, the sending of the messages and the processing of the personal data must cease immediately. However, what is to be understood by the message with advertising content referred to here involves great uncertainty.

Although the expression “message with advertising content” is comprehensible in its literal sense, it is not a concept defined in law. In the Current Turkish Dictionary of the Turkish Language Association the word “advertisement” is defined as “any means tried in order to introduce something to the public, to make it liked and thereby to secure its sale”, and the word “message” as “information, message given or sent in writing or orally”. It may therefore be said that the message with advertising content referred to in the Decision means “information, a message sent by electronic means in order to introduce any product or service to a person, to make it liked and thereby to secure its sale”.

This concept first attracts attention by its similarity to the concept of the commercial electronic message regulated by the “Law on the Regulation of Electronic Commerce” No. 6563. In that Law a commercial electronic message is defined as “messages containing data, sound and images which are carried out in the electronic environment using means such as telephone, call centres, fax, automatic dialling machines, intelligent voice recording systems, electronic mail and short message service and which are sent for commercial purposes”.

When the two definitions are compared, a great similarity is seen as regards the means used. As regards purpose, however, the message with advertising content has the purpose of introducing any product or service to a person, making it liked and thereby securing its sale, whereas the commercial electronic message has a commercial purpose. Accordingly, the commercial purpose is broader in scope and, while it includes the advertising purpose, it need not always be an advertising purpose. For example, mail sent to the e-mail address of a person who has placed an order on an online shopping site, in order to inform him about the order and enable him to track the shipment, constitutes messages with a commercial purpose but cannot be regarded as messages with an advertising purpose. By contrast, where the person has at the same time given explicit consent to the effect that he wishes to be informed of products and discounts by e-mail and, within the scope of that explicit consent, mail presenting the new season’s products is sent to him, this must be regarded as a message with a commercial purpose and at the same time with an advertising purpose.

The commercial purpose therefore encompasses the advertising purpose. Various questions arise in this situation:

• Does the Decision also cover commercial electronic messages?

The Decision uses the expressions directing messages with advertising content unlawfully and for the purpose of sending messages/e-mails with advertising content or making calls. When the expressions contained in the Decision are taken into account, it is therefore understood that only messages with advertising content have been prohibited and that commercial electronic messages have not been included within this scope. For it is not possible to extend the Decision further than intended by bringing commercial electronic messages too within this scope, although they are not expressly mentioned in the Decision, on the ground that the definition of the message with an advertising purpose is not precisely determined. The Decision has thus brought within its scope commercial electronic messages that have an advertising purpose, while leaving outside its scope the commercial electronic messages that fall outside this. It must not be forgotten, however, that every message with an advertising purpose is at the same time a commercial electronic message.

At this point one may wonder why the Board did not opt for the concept of the commercial electronic message. In my view the reason is that it was foreseen that, if the sending of commercial electronic messages were prohibited by such a decision, this would be apt to serve to harm economic activities and commercial life rather than to protect personal data. Moreover, it is inevitable that the Decision, which even in its present form causes quite enough confusion, would give rise to greater debate if it covered all commercial electronic messages. On the other hand, since commercial electronic messages are regulated by the Law on the Regulation of Electronic Commerce (ETDHK), it is clear that introducing provisions to the contrary by a decision of the Board would be incompatible with the system of the law.

In conclusion, when commercial electronic messages are divided into two, those that have an advertising purpose and the others, the provisions of this Decision will apply to those that have an advertising purpose, while the others will remain outside its application. It should be pointed out that, since the concept of the commercial electronic message intended by the ETDHK has also brought within its scope messages with an advertising purpose, does this not also mean that a matter regulated by Law is being altered by a decision of the Board? This would lead us to the risk of a conflict of competence between institutions. In accordance with the principle of the unity of the administration, such a situation ought not to occur. Moreover, this is liable in practice to lead to confusion as to which provision is to be complied with, to unlawful practices and to unjust sanctions.

• Are approvals obtained in conformity with the ETDHK valid for the purposes of the Decision, and should they be?

Under Article 6 of the ETDHK, entitled “Condition for sending commercial electronic messages”, commercial electronic messages may be sent only on condition that the prior approval of the person to whom the message is sent has been obtained. Although there are also cases in which it is not necessary to obtain approval, these will not be dwelt upon, since under Law No. 6698 they count among the conditions for processing. What will be considered here is solely whether, for a personal data processing activity in which the conditions for processing are absent and which requires the explicit consent of the data subject, approvals duly obtained under the ETDHK are also valid approvals under the Decision.

As stated above, every message with an advertising purpose must at the same time be regarded as falling within the category of commercial electronic messages. The provisions of the ETDHK therefore also apply to messages with an advertising purpose. In that case, what should a controller who has obtained approval from the recipient in conformity with the ETDHK in order to send commercial electronic messages with an advertising purpose do in the face of the Decision at issue? Has it failed to obtain a consent that conforms to the Decision, and must it immediately put an end to these messages? Or is it entitled to continue sending these messages on the ground that it has obtained approval in conformity with the Law?

To answer these questions, what needs to be done is to compare the conditions which Law No. 6698 requires for the existence of explicit consent with the conditions laid down by the ETDHK for obtaining approval from the recipient, and to determine whether the conditions of approval laid down by the ETDHK already satisfy the conditions for the existence of explicit consent. For if an approval obtained under the ETDHK satisfies the conditions which Law No. 6698 requires in order to accept the existence of explicit consent, there is no problem in any event. To that end, the provisions of the ETDHK and of the “Regulation on Commercial Communication and Commercial Electronic Messages” published in the Official Gazette of 15.07.2015, No. 29417, must be compared with the provisions of Law No. 6698.

When the provisions of the ETDHK and of the said Regulation are assessed together and one looks at the conditions for obtaining approval from the recipient so that a commercial electronic message can be sent, it is understood, first, that this approval must be obtained before the message is sent. Since it is not expressly stated that an approval obtained after the message has been sent will be valid, a commercial electronic message sent without approval having been obtained is therefore unlawful. This coincides with the explicit consent of the data subject provided for by Law No. 6698 for the processing of personal data.

Approval may be obtained in writing or by using any means of electronic communication. The declaration of approval must contain a positive declaration of intent to the effect that the person accepts that commercial electronic messages be sent to him, the forename and surname of the person giving approval and his electronic contact address. In addition, an approval obtained in physical form must bear the signature of the person giving approval. What first strikes the eye at this point is that an oral declaration of approval has not been accepted. By contrast, the explicit consent provided for by Law No. 6698 may be obtained orally, although our first preference is the method of obtaining it in writing. It may therefore be said that commercial electronic messages have in this respect been made subject to a stricter condition. As for the requirement of a positive declaration of intent to the effect that the person accepts that messages be sent to him, the two are in part consistent with each other as regards the requirement that consent be explicit.

A person from whom approval to send commercial electronic messages has been obtained is informed, at his electronic contact address and within the same day, that this approval has been obtained, and is at the same time given the opportunity to refuse. Here the right of the person giving approval to refuse comes into play. It should be pointed out that no obligation has been laid down to the effect that the person giving approval must be told of the right to refuse before the approval is obtained. It is, however, provided that the information on the right to refuse is to be given on the day on which the approval is obtained. In the case of explicit consent, by contrast, the information to be given under the obligation to inform before the data subject’s consent is obtained must also include the information that explicit consent may be withdrawn at any time. Thus, although a difference appears in this respect, it is debatable whether it will be of any practical importance. For it cannot be expected that a person who would give approval knowing that there will be no right to refuse would not give approval after learning of the right to refuse; on the contrary, in that case the person, knowing that he will have the right to refuse at any time, approaches the giving of approval with fewer reservations. I therefore do not think that the fact that the right to refuse is not stated before the approval will create a difference between approval and explicit consent. Besides, on the day on which the approval is obtained the information on the right to refuse must be communicated to the person giving approval. However, although I make this interpretation on account of the requirements of commercial life, I must also say that it does not coincide with the wording of Law No. 6698. For under this Law the condition for explicit consent to be obtained is that the data subject is informed at the same time. This is an operation that must be performed simultaneously. Accordingly, sending the information relating to the approval only afterwards does not fully meet the requirements of Law No. 6698. At this point it must also be considered whether, as between the person giving approval and the data subject, there is any difference in terms of ease between the right to refuse and the withdrawal of explicit consent. It should be pointed out that both the right to refuse and the withdrawal of explicit consent may be communicated by the person to the controller at any time without being tied to any reason, and the controller receiving this request must put an end to the personal data processing activity. Accordingly, as far as electronic commerce is concerned, a provision making the right to refuse simultaneous with the approval as well needs to be enacted as a matter of urgency.

It has been laid down that, where the approval is included in the content of a contract, it is to be obtained at the end of the contract concerned, before the positive declaration of intent or the signature, under the marginal heading “commercial electronic message”, written in at least twelve-point type and with the opportunity to refuse also being afforded. The intention here was to prevent the request for approval from being overlooked within the text of the contract and to ensure that the approval is based on the knowledge of the person giving it and is given explicitly.

Finally, it is not possible for the service provider to put forward the recipient’s giving of approval to commercial electronic messages as a precondition for the supply of the goods and services offered; there can be no question of the approval being tied to a condition. The aim is thus to ensure that the person who is to give approval does so of his own free will, without being bound by a condition. Here it can be seen that the requirement that explicit consent be given of one’s free will is present.

When the provisions of the ETDHK and of the above-mentioned Regulation on the subject are considered together, it may be said that the approval obtained in this context and the explicit consent that must be obtained from the data subject for the processing of personal data under Law No. 6698 are to a large extent similar but do not coincide completely. However, since 7 April 2016, the date on which Law No. 6698 entered into force, an “obligation to inform” has applied to the processing of personal data; and while consents or approvals obtained before that date are subject to the transitional provisions which will be examined in detail below, consents obtained thereafter are dependent on the controller’s fulfilment of the obligation to inform. Accordingly, in order to be able to speak of a valid approval for the purposes of the Law, informing the data subject is an unavoidable obligation. It will therefore be possible to speak of an approval that also complies with Law No. 6698 where an approval obtained in conformity with the ETDHK contains the minimum particulars1 that must be included in the information to be given under the obligation to inform as specified by the “Communiqué on the Procedures and Principles to be Followed in Fulfilling the Obligation to Inform”. For in that case the conditions which the Law requires for the existence of explicit consent will have been fulfilled.

• Will the Decision be applied to tradesmen and merchants?

There is a major and important difference between Law No. 6698 and the ETDHK as regards tradesmen and merchants. Under the ETDHK, where the person to whom a commercial electronic message is to be sent is a tradesman or merchant, the service provider may send commercial electronic messages to such persons without needing the approval referred to above. Accordingly, no approval is needed under the ETDHK in order to send commercial electronic messages to persons who are tradesmen or merchants. These persons can escape the sending of messages only if they exercise their right to refuse. In Law No. 6698, by contrast, the obtaining of explicit consent has not been made subject to any distinction as regards tradesmen and merchants. On the other hand, being “expressly provided for by the laws” constitutes an exceptional case for the purposes of the KVKK. That being so, can the fact that it is expressly laid down that commercial electronic messages may be sent to tradesmen and merchants without their approval being obtained be accepted as a valid condition for processing for the purposes of the KVKK, and can the contact data of these persons be processed on that basis?

Frankly, I see that we are confronted here with the reality that a theoretical provision may produce inequitable results in practice. It has been expressly provided that commercial electronic messages may be sent to tradesmen or merchants without their approval being obtained, and one of the conditions for the processing of personal data laid down by Law No. 6698 has thus been fulfilled. The contact data of these persons may therefore be processed on the basis of this condition. However, it must be discussed how far it is compatible with the principles and rules of data protection law that the electronic messages with advertising content at issue here are, without their approval being obtained, sent to tradesmen or merchants. In my view, because of the danger that it may produce inequitable results in practice, this situation constitutes another point awaiting clarification.

• Where the provisions on the approval that must be obtained under the ETDHK and the provisions on the explicit consent that must be obtained under Law No. 6698 conflict, which provisions must be applied?

I must point out that the fact that the Decision involves great uncertainty, particularly as regards the nature of the messages, shows that the provisions of the Law and of the ETDHK may conflict on many points. Besides, even before the Decision at issue it was unclear how Law No. 6698 and the provisions on commercial electronic messages would be applied together and, in particular, which provisions would be applied in the event of a conflict. Yet whereas this Decision could have dispelled that uncertainty to some extent and at least shown which provisions must be applied in respect of messages with an advertising purpose, the uncertainty has been raised to even higher levels.

In order to determine which statutory provisions must be applied, recourse must be had to the distinction between special and general provisions. On this point there are views to the effect that, since the ETDHK is regarded as a special law and the KVKK as a general law, the provisions of the ETDHK must be applied first and that, besides, Article 102 of that Law, entitled “Protection of personal data”, already provides the protection required by the KVKK.

First of all I must say that I do not share this view. The sending of messages with an advertising purpose to persons by electronic means and the processing of the recipient’s contact details in the context of this activity must be treated as a personal data processing activity. And although the subject of this personal data processing activity is commercial electronic messages, it must be carried out in compliance with the legislation on the processing of personal data. Otherwise, in our day, when statutory provisions have to be enacted specifically for many subjects, the KVKK would be left with no meaning or importance whatsoever if it were argued that each subject must be governed by its own provisions. Moreover, while the KVKK reserves the provisions of other laws in various of its provisions, it has made no reference whatsoever to other laws as regards the general principles relating to the processing of personal data and the conditions for the processing of personal data.

On the other hand, it is not possible to say that Article 10 of the ETDHK provides the protection required by the KVKK. Apart from the fact that the KVKK is a more recent Law, many regulations, communiqués and decisions have been published since then, and the principles and procedures for the processing of personal data have thereby been determined. It is not possible for a provision that existed before all of these to provide the safeguards relating to the protection of personal data and data security that are required by the KVKK.

In conclusion, I think that, whatever its subject and purpose may be, when a personal data processing activity is carried out, action must be taken in compliance with the provisions of the KVKK, first and foremost and in particular the provisions on the general principles relating to the processing of personal data and the conditions for the processing of personal data. For it should not be accepted that, where an electronic message with an advertising purpose is sent to a person whose personal data have been placed under protection by the KVKK, that person is denied the benefit of the said protection on the ground that commercial electronic messages have been regulated by a separate Law.

While this is my personal opinion, I must point out that the fact that there is great uncertainty here should not be overlooked and that this uncertainty needs to be dispelled as soon as possible by decisions to be published by the Board.

c. Are messages with advertising content sent on the basis of consents obtained before

the entry into force of the Law within the scope of the Decision?

What is a controller who obtained consent to the sending of messages with advertising content before the publication of the Law, and who has continued to send messages on the basis of that consent after the publication of the Law, to understand from this Decision? Will it immediately stop sending messages in accordance with the Decision, or will it be able to continue sending messages on the ground that it obtained consent lawfully before the publication of the Law?

These questions find their answer in Provisional Article 1 of the Law, entitled “Transitional provisions”. Under it, consents lawfully obtained before the publication of the Law are deemed to comply with Law No. 6698 as well, unless a declaration of intent to the contrary is made within one year. Accordingly, a consent lawfully obtained before 7 April 2016 with regard to the sending of messages with advertising content is deemed lawful for the purposes of Law No. 6698, and messages with advertising content may continue to be sent on the basis of that consent, provided that it was not withdrawn by 7 April 2017 and no declaration contrary to that consent was made.

Since the one-year period in question has already expired, there is no unlawfulness whatsoever in respect of messages with advertising content sent to persons who did not withdraw their consent within that period. A controller may, on the basis of a consent obtained before 7 April 2016, continue to send messages with advertising content thereafter as well, on the ground that this consent had not been withdrawn by 7 April 2017. It must not be forgotten, however, that under Law No. 6698 the data subject may withdraw consent at any time without giving reasons. What matters here is that the messages which the controller has sent up to that moment are not unlawful.

2. The controller’s obligations relating to data security and its joint liability with the processor

The second paragraph of the Decision states that the controller is responsible under Article 12 of the Law, entitled “Obligations relating to data security”, and that in this respect it bears joint liability with the processor.

Within the scope of its obligations relating to data security, the controller is obliged, in order to prevent the unlawful processing of personal data, to prevent unlawful access to personal data and to ensure the safekeeping of personal data, and with a view to ensuring an appropriate level of security, to take all necessary technical and administrative measures. Where personal data are processed by another natural or legal person on behalf of the controller, the controller and the processor are jointly liable for the taking of those measures.

This point of the Decision has not gone beyond repeating Article 12 of the Law and reproduces that article word for word.

3. Application of Article 18 of the Law, entitled “Misdemeanours”

Thirdly, the Decision states that action will be taken, within the framework of the provisions of Article 18 of the Law – which bears the heading “Misdemeanours” and provides for administrative fines in respect of the misdemeanours specified – against controllers who engage in activities in the ways described in the first and second paragraphs.

The Law has provided for administrative fines for those who fail to fulfil the obligation to inform, the obligations relating to data security or the decisions given by the Board, and for those who act in breach of the obligation to register with and notify the Data Controllers’ Registry. On this point the Decision, in stating that action will be taken under the relevant provision of the Law, is devoid of any meaning. For there is no need for a separate Board decision to state that a provision of the Law will be applied. A provision of the Law is in any event enacted in order to be applied. It should be said, however, that for the purposes of this Decision the administrative fines provided for those who fail to fulfil the obligations relating to data security and the decisions given by the Board may come into play. In my view the Board, instead of imposing an administrative fine straight away, wished to warn the controllers and processors carrying out the operations specified in the Decision to put an end to those operations, and to give them time to do so. If those concerned continue their operations after this Decision, it is highly probable that a serious administrative fine will be imposed.

4. Notification of the competent Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office where offences contained in the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) are detected

First of all, I must say that this is the point of the Decision which I regard as a thoroughly appropriate and correct step, in that it contains no hesitation or uncertainty whatsoever and plainly states what ought to be. Accordingly, it has been laid down that, considering that personal data processed in the form of the sending of unlawful messages with advertising content and of acting in breach of the obligations relating to data security may have been obtained unlawfully, the matter will be notified to the competent Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office so that action may be taken within the framework of Article 136 of the Turkish Criminal Code, entitled “Unlawfully disclosing or obtaining data”.

I should point out that one of the questions most frequently put to me by controllers concerns what will happen if the Board, as a result of an examination carried out ex officio or upon complaint, establishes that, in addition to a data breach for the purposes of the KVKK, an offence regulated in the TCK has been committed. How should the members of the Board act if, in the examination they carry out, they suspect that data have been unlawfully disclosed or obtained?

My answer to this question is as follows: Imagine that a public prosecutor, in a manner wholly unconnected with his duties, goes on holiday to a hotel outside his area of jurisdiction. Let us suppose that an intentional killing, an injury or a theft takes place at the hotel and that the prosecutor is there at the time. A prosecutor who sees any of these acts must immediately report the matter to the competent authorities. Otherwise Article 279 of the TCK, entitled “Failure of a public official to report an offence”, may become applicable. The position of the Board is exactly the same. For the members of the Board also have the status of public officials. Where the Board, as a result of an examination carried out ex officio or upon complaint, establishes an infringement of the provisions of the KVKK, it may impose an administrative fine under Article 18 of the Law. In addition, where it establishes the existence of the offences regulated in the TCK in relation to personal data, or suspects this, it is also obliged to report the matter to the competent Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. Otherwise it commits an offence.

Although I have answered this question, which has caused confusion ever since the Law entered into force, in this way from the very beginning, the fact that the position has now been stated expressly in a decision of the Board is, in my view, the most welcome development brought by the Decision.

Conclusion

The main conclusions reached in the assessment of the Resolution of Principle of the Personal Data Protection Board on “Preventing controllers and processors from directing advertising notifications/calls to data subjects’ e-mail addresses or, by SMS or call, to their mobile telephones” are as follows:

• Where, as a result of an examination carried out upon complaint or ex officio, the Board establishes that the infringement is widespread, it has the duty and the power to adopt a resolution of principle on the matter and to publish that resolution.

• A large number of applications have been lodged with the Authority concerning advertising notifications/calls received, in breach of the provisions of the Law, at e-mail addresses or, by SMS or call, on mobile telephones, and this volume made it necessary to adopt a resolution of principle.

• In our day, which we call the information age, the best way of advertising or marketing in order to promote and sell a good is undoubtedly information technology tools and the communication carried out by means of those tools.

• At this point, the interest of companies in advertising in pursuit of their economic and commercial expectations conflicts with the right of individuals to the protection and confidentiality of their personal data.

• The Decision has absolutely prohibited the sending of messages with advertising content without obtaining the consent of the data subjects and without fulfilling the other conditions for processing. Personal data processing activities carried out in this way must be stopped immediately.

• At this point, first of all, the use of the conjunction “and” created the impression that explicit consent could be obtained even though the conditions for the processing of personal data were present.

Yet, for the reasons explained above, this is contrary to the statements made and the decisions given by the Board up to now. This mistake, which I believe to be the result of an error or oversight, must be remedied as soon as possible and the conjunction “and” replaced by “or”.

• The Decision was subsequently corrected: the conjunction “and” was changed to “or”, and the statutory provision was expressly indicated as paragraph 2 of Article 5. In this way, as ought to be the case, the messages that are the subject of the Decision have been indicated as messages for which explicit consent has not been obtained from the data subject or for which the other grounds of justification relating to processing are absent.

• Although the concept of a message with advertising content used in the text can, as I stated above, be understood by starting from the literal meaning of the words, it needs a legal definition so that it can be distinguished from similar concepts.

• Although the message with advertising content that is the subject of the Decision resembles the commercial electronic message regulated by the ETDHK, the two concepts must not be confused.

• The message with advertising content has the purpose of introducing any product or service to a person, making it liked and thereby securing its sale, whereas the commercial electronic message has a commercial purpose. Accordingly, the commercial purpose is broader in scope and, while it includes the advertising purpose, it need not always be an advertising purpose.

• Nevertheless, the fact that the commercial message is such as to encompass the message with advertising content as well sets the legislation on commercial electronic messages and Law No. 6698 against each other at many points.

• While the Decision has brought within its scope, by prohibiting them, commercial electronic messages that have an advertising purpose, it has left the remaining commercial electronic messages outside its scope.

• In order to determine whether a consent obtained in conformity with the provisions of the ETDHK is valid for the purposes of Law No. 6698, the conditions for explicit consent required by the KVKK must be compared with the conditions laid down by the ETDHK for obtaining the recipient’s approval.

• The detailed comparison made above shows that, although the conditions for approval required by the ETDHK are to a large extent similar to the conditions for explicit consent laid down by the KVKK, they differ from explicit consent on points such as, in particular, the obligation to inform.

• Whereas under the ETDHK no approval is needed in order to send commercial electronic messages to persons who are tradesmen or merchants, no such distinction exists under the KVKK. Nevertheless, by relying on the exceptional case of being expressly provided for by the laws, it is possible to process personal data by sending commercial electronic messages to tradesmen or merchants without obtaining their approval. However, since inequitable results may arise here too, this situation must be clarified.

• The question of which provisions are to apply in the event of a conflict between the ETDHK and Law No. 6698 was a source of confusion even before the Decision; yet, whereas this situation could have been resolved by the Decision, it has been rendered still more uncertain.

• Although there are differing views as to which provisions are to apply in the event of a conflict, I am of the opinion that, whatever its subject matter and its means, a personal data processing activity must be carried out in compliance with the provisions of the KVKK, first and foremost the provisions on the general principles relating to the processing of personal data and on the conditions for the processing of personal data.

• A consent lawfully obtained before 7 April 2016 for the sending of messages with advertising content is deemed lawful for the purposes of Law No. 6698, provided that it was not withdrawn by 7 April 2017 and that no declaration to the contrary of that consent was made, and messages with advertising content may continue to be sent on the basis of that consent. It must not be forgotten, however, that under Law No. 6698 the data subject may withdraw his consent at any time without giving reasons.

• The second paragraph of the Decision states that the controller is responsible within the framework of the obligations relating to data security laid down by the Law and that, in this respect, it bears joint liability with the processor. In essence, Article 12 of the Law is repeated here.

• Third, it is stated that, in respect of controllers engaging in activities in the ways indicated in the first and second paragraphs, action will be taken under the provisions of Article 18 of the Law, which prescribes administrative fines for the misdemeanours laid down by the Law.

• In the final part of the Decision, it is laid down that, having regard to the possibility that the personal data processed may have been obtained unlawfully, the matter will be notified to the competent Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office so that action may be taken under Article 136 of the Turkish Criminal Code. It must not be forgotten that, otherwise, should the members of the Board fail to report an act constituting an offence relating to a personal data breach of which they have become aware, they themselves will have committed an offence.

While these are the conclusions I have reached in assessing the Resolution of Principle of the Personal Data Protection Board dated 16.10.2018 and numbered 2018/119 in terms of its scope and content, I must point out that the regulations made, the guides published and the decisions given by the Board are of great importance in the law of personal data protection and play a decisive role. For this reason, great care and diligence must be exercised when these regulations are made; the utmost attention must be paid to points such as avoiding contradictory and erroneous wording, ensuring that they contain no uncertainties or doubts, that they are, in particular, capable of answering the questions asked by those concerned with the subject and, beyond that, that they do not introduce new uncertainties.

As for the Resolution of Principle under assessment, I must state that, as I have also indicated above, it contains uncertainty on many different points and creates new points of doubt. It must not be forgotten, however, that legal developments must always be open to debate and will be improved through debate. This will be done within the framework of the judgments reached as a result of discussing and assessing the developments that occur. My expectation, therefore, is that the uncertainties concerning the Decision in question that I have indicated above will be removed and the Decision improved, and that the decisions published from now on will contain clearer and more definite wording and thus bring about positive developments in the field of personal data protection.

Footnotes

  1. Member of the teaching staff in Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and IT Law, Yeditepe University Faculty of Law / Attorney-at-law. ↑
  2. Article 4 – Scope of the obligation to inform: (1) Under Article 10 of the Law, data subjects must be informed by controllers or the persons authorised by them at the time when personal data are obtained. The information to be given by controllers or the persons authorised by them in fulfilling this obligation must contain at least the following: a) the identity of the controller and of its representative, if any, b) the purpose for which the personal data will be processed, c) to whom and for what purpose the personal data may be transferred, ç) the method of and the legal ground for collecting personal data, d) the other rights of the data subject listed in Article 11 of the Law. ↑
  3. Article 10 – Protection of personal data: (1) The service provider and the intermediary service provider: a) are responsible for the storage and the security of the personal data they obtain by reason of the transactions they carry out within the framework of this Law. b) may not transmit personal data to third parties or use them for other purposes without the approval of the data subject. ↑

Download PDF (in Turkish)

More publications on this topic