About this work
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
The study deals with the position of defence counsel in criminal procedure. It examines the normative framework governing the defence, identifies the problems encountered in practice and proposes solutions.
Keywords
- defence counsel
- criminal procedure
- fair trial
- defence
- accused
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
PEER-REVIEWED
The Position of Defence Counsel in Criminal Procedure and the Problems Encountered in Practice*
Asst. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER**
Ö Z
Criminal procedure law is the branch of law concerned with the performance of the State’s task of ensuring the justice and security of society by trying individuals suspected of an offence, that is, perpetrators, and punishing them where necessary. Criminal procedure is, as it were, the sharp sword of the State. In this field, in which the individual is extremely weak and defenceless, the person who is strong, who supports the individual and assists in the defence, and who does not leave the individual alone against the powerful State, is defence counsel. For this reason the rights and freedoms accorded to the defence and to defence counsel, and the way in which they are applied, reveal the true face of the regime in place. The real position of the defence and of the institution of defence counsel in criminal procedure serves as litmus paper for the political regime. This position must be regulated and put into practice in such a way that neither defence counsel, who performs the defence function, nor the individual defended feels like Don Quixote fighting against windmills. Our study examines the normative structure of the defence and of the institution of defence counsel in criminal procedure and also seeks to identify the problems arising in practice and to propose solutions to them.
Keywords: Defence counsel, criminal procedure, fair trial, defence, accused.
The Po si t ion Of The De fense L aw y er Unde r C rimina l Pr o sec u r e A nd The Pr a ct ic a l Pr obl e m s
A B S TR A CT
Criminal procedure law is the branch of law that deals with the charge of providing justice and security of the society by judging the offenders in other words judging the individuals who are under suspicion of crime and penalizing whenever necessary. Criminal procedure law is merely a sharp sword of the government. The individual remains absolutely weak, incapable and defenceless in this field. The one who is virtual, who supports and helps the individual to defense him/herself is the defender. Thus, the rights, liberties and their enforcement provided for the defence and defender shows the system’s real face exactly. The position of the defence and defender functions as litmus paper for the political regime. This position shall be enact and enforce prudent. Within this scope, both the individual being defensed and the defender shall not feel themselves as fighting against the windmills as Don Quixote. In this legal study, normative structure of the defence and the defender in the scope of criminal procedure law is analyzed. Furthermore the challenges that are being revealed in practice are ascertained and it is tried to offer solutions in this analysis.
Keywords: Defender, criminal procedure law, fair trail, defence, defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Criminal procedure law is the branch of law concerned with the performance of the State’s task of ensuring the justice and security of society by trying individuals suspected of an offence, that is, perpetrators, and punishing them where necessary. In the broadest sense this branch of law comprises the principles and rules governing the joint conduct of the activities of accusation, defence and adjudication1. In the course of this activity, however, State power is exercised in order to protect the social order on the one hand, while on the other restrictions are imposed on the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, or at least the restriction of those rights and freedoms is threatened. In this context criminal procedure seeks to resolve the conflict between the State’s right to punish and the right to liberty of the suspect or accused in accordance with the principles of criminal law2. In sum, criminal procedure law, by investigating the material truth in a manner compatible with human rights, inquires whether the individual suspected of an offence is in fact guilty, seeks to secure public order by punishing the individual found to be guilty and, in doing so, seeks to strike a balance between State power and the interests of society on the one hand and the individual fundamental rights and freedoms of the suspect/accused on the other3.
I. The Rights and Obligations Accorded to the Institution of Defence Counsel Are One of the Indicators of the Functioning of the Rule of Law and of the Exercise of Human Rights
It is in the interest of society that criminal proceedings be conducted in the best possible way, justly and in conformity with the law and human rights; this interest is secured by conducting the trial as speedily and fairly as possible4. Accordingly, the right to a fair trial is today recognised as a human right and a fundamental right both in supranational human rights instruments and in national constitutions5. The right to a fair trial takes its essential point of departure from the principle of fair trial / the “fair trial” principle. The term “fair hearing” or “fair trial”, for its part, originates in Anglo-American criminal procedure law6. This principle has also found explicit expression in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and in addition the benefit of the assistance of defence counsel has been recognised as a right of individuals in criminal proceedings. In brief, this principle means that individuals are able, with the necessary support, to conduct their defence and state their case before an impartial and independent judicial body. It was through the regulation of this principle as a right in various international instruments and in national legislation that the “right to a fair trial” took shape7. Within the right to a fair trial, for example in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, “being able to be represented by a lawyer” is also regulated as a separate right8.
The true yardstick of whether human rights and freedoms and human dignity are protected in a country is that country’s rules of criminal procedure law and the manner in which those rules are applied. For criminal procedure is the most important field in which individuals truly feel the power of the State and are left unprotected vis-à-vis the State. Criminal procedure is, as it were, the sharp sword of the State. In this field, in which the individual is extremely weak and defenceless, the person who is strong, who supports the individual and assists in the defence, and who does not leave the individual alone against the powerful State, is defence counsel. For this reason the rights and freedoms accorded to the defence and to defence counsel, and the way in which they are applied, reveal the true face of the regime in place. The real position of the defence and of the institution of defence counsel in criminal procedure serves as litmus paper for the political regime. This position must be regulated and put into practice in such a way that neither defence counsel, who performs the defence function, nor the individual defended feels like Don Quixote fighting against windmills.
As briefly stated above, it is the institution of the defence that guarantees that criminal proceedings are conducted in conformity with the right to a fair trial, without impairing human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms. Accordingly, the defence, and the “institution of defence counsel” which in practice fills the position of the defence, is truly one of the indispensable elements of criminal procedure. For in order for it to be accepted that a defence can genuinely be conducted in criminal proceedings, it is an absolute necessity that defence counsel act. To be defended by defence counsel means that the rights of the defence are genuinely exercised9. Consequently the institution of defence counsel, the symbol of the defence, is the defender of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in the face of the State’s power to punish and the public authority’s power of command.
In all systems of adjudication, defence counsel, who strives to give effect to the principles of democracy and human rights in criminal proceedings, has been given various rights, powers and obligations in order to be able to perform the function of defending the suspect or accused. The way in which these rights, powers and obligations are distributed in relation to the other two subjects of criminal proceedings, the prosecution and the court, is a fundamental yardstick showing where the regime of the State concerned stands on the spectrum between democracy and authoritarianism10. Consequently, the rights and freedoms accorded to defence counsel in connection with that function not only provide convenience and security for the individual whose defence has been undertaken, but also play an important role with regard to the confidence of society and the degree to which the political regime is democratic.
It is extremely important that defence counsel be present on the side of the defence in criminal proceedings and that counsel be given the powers and freedom needed to perform that function properly. For giving the accused the opportunity to defend himself is not sufficient for the proceedings to be conducted fully and flawlessly. The majority of persons tried as accused have no experience or knowledge whatsoever, particularly in legal matters. For this reason these persons are not in a position to know how to defend themselves, which matter is important and which unimportant in the proceedings, or which evidence may be used and which may not (in other words, whether or not the evidence has been unlawfully obtained). Moreover, even if the accused is a person who has received legal training, or has even personally acted as defence counsel, the accused may be unable to defend himself properly as a result of feelings such as the unease, fear and shame caused by being tried as an accused in a criminal court and of the loss of composure caused by the inability to view the events from the outside11. Accordingly, in order to be genuinely defended, every person tried in a criminal court needs defence counsel, whatever his education, status or office.
Defence counsel, by contrast, has received the same training as the prosecution and has similar professional experience, so that the presence of defence counsel during the trial will ensure that the accused is legally of equal strength in the proceedings. Moreover, since defence counsel has experience of criminal procedure and is not personally accused, counsel will be able, acting with composure, to conduct a far better defence “than the accused, whose situation is extremely difficult”. Indeed, society has an interest in the proceedings being conducted in conformity with the law and human rights, in the material truth being brought to light honestly and in a manner befitting human dignity, and in the accused, even if guilty, not receiving a heavier penalty than is deserved, and in this way the standing of the State is also preserved12. As a consequence, in order to underline the significance of a defence being conducted with defence counsel and to prevent the accused from being tried without defence counsel, the aim is to establish a rule to the effect that “there is no accused without defence counsel” (nullum reus sine advocato)13.
It should also be remembered that criminal procedure, as a generic concept, comprises both the investigation and the prosecution stages. Consequently, the individual who needs defence counsel when being tried as an accused has an even greater need of defence counsel when subjected to investigation as a suspect and when dealing with the public prosecutor, the police or the gendarmerie. For as a rule a person feels weaker and more unprotected at this stage. From another angle, the involvement of defence counsel at the investigation stage prevents prohibited methods of questioning and statement-taking such as possible torture, ill-treatment and the like, and also ensures that the other evidence is obtained in accordance with the proper procedure (for example, supervision of whether the operation of obtaining digital evidence from information systems, governed by Article 134 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK), is carried out in conformity with the statutory norm). In this way it is ensured that suspects are treated lawfully and in a manner befitting human dignity and, since the evidence will be obtained lawfully and defence counsel will take part in this, it will also be possible to prevent allegations that evidence was unlawfully obtained and that prohibited evidence was used, which might jeopardise the proceedings later on, from arising.
Taking the fundamental principles referred to above as our starting point, we too make the subject of our study the institution of defence counsel, which works in general for the benefit of humanity and in particular for criminal proceedings to be conducted in conformity with human rights and the law. The main emphasis of this examination, however, will lie not so much on normative regulations, judicial decisions and the views expressed in legal scholarship as on the position of the institution of defence counsel in criminal procedure law and, proceeding from there, on the problems that defence counsel encounter in practice.
II. The Legal and Normative Sources of the Institution of Defence Counsel and Their Effects on the Problems Encountered in Practice
The relations between the triad of prosecution, defence and adjudication in criminal procedure, the way in which these activities are normatively regulated and, most important of all, the manner in which these normative regulations are put into real life, that is, practice, are the most important indicator determining the relationship of the weak individual with the powerful State apparatus in the country concerned and the position of the individual. For in criminal procedure the State is the leading actor and, with its powerful position, plays a role vis-à-vis the individual that is dominant by comparison and very important. Consequently, the legal framework and the normative sources of the institution of defence counsel, which assists the defence in the face of this power and indeed takes it on in person, must be determined. Otherwise it will not be possible for the individual and his defence counsel to take their place as they should vis-à-vis the modern State, which is extremely powerful.
a. What Is the Defence?
In this context it must first be explained what the defence is. For unless the meaning of the defence and its normative sources and bases are set out, it will not be possible to understand this institution or to bring to light and criticise the positive and negative regulations and practices relating to it. Although this institution is shaped to a considerable extent in practice, its original source is normative regulation.
In the broadest sense, the defence is the totality of the procedural activities carried out by the accused in person or by his defence counsel, in response to the allegation that the accused is guilty, with the aim of showing that the State has no right to punish as far as the accused is concerned.
Accordingly, the defence may be conducted by the accused or by defence counsel. Today, however, given that legal texts, and hence the definitions of offences, are extremely detailed and that, in parallel, the rules of procedure are detailed and complex, the unassisted self-defence of accused persons who, as we have stated above, have no training or experience in this area does not amount to a real and good defence. Consequently, in most criminal cases today, especially where the penalties for the offences the accused is alleged to have committed are heavy, the defence is conducted by defence counsel, and even the defence put forward by the accused themselves is prepared, or at least guided, by defence counsel. The importance and necessity of the institution of defence counsel are therefore beyond dispute.
b. Defence Counsel, Who Performs the Defence Function, Is, Unlike an Attorney, a Sui Generis Subject of Criminal
Procedure Law Who Is Independent Even of the Person Defended
The relationship between defence counsel and the suspect/accused must likewise be explained in this context from the standpoint both of the law of obligations and of criminal procedure law, for the nature of this relationship is necessary for determining the legal position and the public importance of defence counsel.
“Defence counsel” (müdafi), unlike an “attorney” (vekil), is not the representative of the suspect/accused14 but a separate organ/subject of criminal procedure independent of the suspect/accused. What must “primarily” be protected in criminal law is not the private interests of individuals (which should not be taken to mean that the private interests of individuals are not to be protected or that this is unimportant) but the interest of the public, that is, of society; consequently the public character of the criminal case and the obligation to seek the truth in that case are incompatible with the relationship of representation in its private-law sense, that is, with the contract of mandate. In this context the relationship between the accused and defence counsel should not be regarded as a relationship of representation. Defence counsel is not always the representative and/or assistant of the accused; defence counsel has a position that is independent of the accused15, and has separate powers and responsibilities. Consequently defence counsel, who performs the public function of defence, is in a position that is independent of the suspect/accused whose defence has been undertaken, free and not bound by instructions16. Defence counsel may act contrary to the wishes of the accused, provided that it is to the accused’s advantage. For example, counsel may apply for the release of a detained accused without consulting the accused, and may submit evidence in the accused’s favour or request the accused’s acquittal even if the accused does not wish it17.
The institution of defence counsel is an institution of public law; consequently it is not possible to explain the institution of defence counsel and defence counsel’s relationship with the accused by means of the relationship of mandate, which arises from a different logic and need and is an institution of private law. In criminal procedure defence counsel does not represent the person defended but, as a public office within the proceedings, provides support for that person’s defence; accordingly it is not possible to explain the relationship between the suspect/accused and defence counsel by the concept of representation.
The relationship between defence counsel and the suspect/accused is, as a rule, not a relationship of representation but an independent relationship of office whose functioning is governed by rules of public law18. Indeed, according to the Court of Cassation too, defence counsel is an organ performing a public service, charged with the duty of acting in the name of the law, and has a status distinct from that of an attorney19. For this status confers on defence counsel duties, responsibilities and privileges that differ from those of an attorney (for example, while the institution of mandatory defence counsel, which is both a right and an obligation, is normatively regulated and applied, there is no such concept, regulation or practice as mandatory representation by an attorney)20.
Accordingly, even if defence counsel has been chosen by the person defended and has received a power of attorney from that person, it is not possible to explain the relationship between them as a pure relationship of mandate. This power of attorney is not so much a contract of mandate under the law of obligations as a document showing that defence counsel may act on behalf of the suspect/accused, a document in the nature of the “power of the lawyer”, as in the expression “power of attorney” used in English for such an instrument.
It should not, however, be inferred from this explanation that defence counsel may take any step to the detriment of the person whose defence has been undertaken. Defence counsel will of course perform this function with the aim of protecting the rights of the person whose defence has been undertaken; but where the defence conflicts with counsel’s own personal and/or professional principles, defence counsel should withdraw from the function undertaken rather than act to the detriment of the person being defended. For defence counsel/the lawyer always has the right to refuse the work that comes to him, and this also applies to mandatory or optional defence counsel. In a matter that does not suit him, defence counsel may, as a last resort, refuse the defence work offered without having to give any explanation for doing so. In conclusion, defence counsel is an independent organ of justice who seeks, in the defence, to protect the interests both of the accused and of society21.
As a consequence of this independence, the suspect/accused and defence counsel are each given the floor separately under Articles 215 and 216 of the CMK. Likewise, defence counsel has the right to carry out certain procedural acts in which the accused cannot take part; for example, under Article 201(1) of the CMK the right to put questions directly belongs not to the accused but to defence counsel22.
Nor is this merely a relationship of assistance23, as some authors state in legal scholarship. For even though, in situations where all the evidence is plain to see and the guilt of the accused has been proved, it is not possible for defence counsel to render the accused any assistance, by being present while the trial is conducted counsel in fact watches over the fair and lawful conduct of the trial and thereby ensures that the decision is formed in proper form and quality. Accordingly, to explain the function of defence counsel solely as assistance is to overlook the part it plays in the proper conduct of the trial. In our view, the institution of defence counsel is an organ peculiar to criminal procedure which, by standing opposite the prosecution and the court in criminal proceedings and thus genuinely constituting the defence, ensures the dialectic.
The term defence counsel (müdafi) can also be seen to have a special meaning in criminal procedure law. Defence counsel is the name given solely to the lawyer of the suspect/accused, who occupies the position of the defence in criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the lawyer of the intervening party is not defence counsel but an attorney (vekil). Likewise, in the other branches of procedure lawyers are called attorneys, not defence counsel, even where they are on the side of the defence24. This too supports our view that the institution of defence counsel is a sui generis institution.
c. Defence Counsel in Normative Regulations
After the French Revolution of 1789, democratic regimes began to rise on the foundation of human rights. In particular in the countries that experienced and witnessed the full devastation of the Second World War and the trampling underfoot of human dignity, human rights were included in the constitutions restructured after 1945 and efforts were made to guarantee them; in addition, in order to prevent such devastation from ever occurring again, the Council of Europe was established and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was produced by that body25. In parallel with this development in human rights, the rights of the defence too took their place both in that international convention and in national constitutions26. While the ECHR expressly states that individuals may have the benefit of the assistance of defence counsel, it can be seen that in constitutions the provisions on the rights of the defence take into account the necessary logical connection between the rights of the defence and freedom of expression, or the need to protect the individual vis-à-vis the judicial organs, or the State’s obligation to hear the citizen27.
In this context mention must first be made of sub-paragraph “c” of paragraph 3 of Article 6 of the ECHR, the article which governs the “right to a fair trial” and which is also directly applicable in our domestic law. This sub-paragraph provides, as a right, that the accused has the right to defend himself in person and, in addition, that the accused may have the benefit of the assistance of defence counsel of his own choosing or, where necessary, appointed by the court. It is beyond dispute that both ways of exercising the rights of the defence are fundamental elements that render the trial fair28. As in other countries that have adopted the democratic order, in our country too the rights of the defence have been included in the constitutions. The rights of the defence were first regulated in Article 83 of the Constitution of 1876 (Kanuni Esasi) and Article 59 of the Constitution of 1924 (Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu). Subsequently, Article 31 of the 1961 Constitution regulated this right by providing that “everyone has the right, by making use of all legitimate means and procedures, to assert claims and to defend himself or herself before the judicial authorities as plaintiff or defendant”. Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution, which is currently in force, enshrines this right in terms similar to Article 31 of the 1961 Constitution, providing that “everyone has the right, by making use of legitimate means and procedures, to assert claims and to defend himself or herself before the judicial authorities as plaintiff or defendant”.
In the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 (CMK), the defence and, within it, the institution of defence counsel are regulated in Articles 149 – 156, in Chapter Six, entitled “defence”. These articles contain provisions on the choice of defence counsel by the suspect or accused (Art. 149 CMK), the appointment of defence counsel (Art. 150 CMK), the steps to be taken where defence counsel fails to perform his duties and the prohibition from acting as defence counsel (Art. 151 CMK), the defence where there is more than one suspect or accused (Art. 152 CMK), defence counsel’s power to inspect the file (Art. 153 CMK), consultation with defence counsel (Art. 154 CMK), the presence of the legal representative or spouse at the hearing (Art. 155 CMK) and the procedure to be followed in the appointment of defence counsel (Art. 156 CMK). Apart from these articles, the rights and powers of defence counsel during the investigation, the prosecution and legal remedies are also provided for in many other articles of the law.
In addition, defence counsel is defined in Article 2(1)(c) of the CMK, according to which defence counsel is “the lawyer who conducts the defence of the suspect or accused in criminal proceedings”. By contrast, under Article 2(1)(d) of the CMK the lawyer who represents the intervening party, the person harmed by the offence or the person with pecuniary liability in criminal proceedings is called an “attorney” (vekil). Two conclusions follow from this: first, the CMK attaches particular importance to defence counsel and uses this concept deliberately. Secondly, it is not possible for persons other than lawyers to act as defence counsel29.
Article 1 of Law No. 1136 on the Legal Profession, for its part, expressly states that the practice of law is a public service and a liberal profession and that the lawyer freely represents the independent defence, which is one of the constituent elements of the judiciary. In addition, many articles of this law, such as Articles 12, 13, 14 and 38, contain provisions relating to the institution of defence counsel.
d. Types of Defence Counsel
It can be seen that in our country there are three types of defence counsel deriving from the CMK. The first of these is the defence counsel whom the suspect/accused chooses of his own free will and whom he wishes to undertake the defence in the investigation/prosecution.
The second is the situation governed by Article 150(1) of the CMK in which, although there is no obligation, the suspect/accused states that he wishes to have the assistance of defence counsel but is not in a position to choose one. In this case defence counsel is assigned to the suspect/accused at his request. This too is optional defence counsel; it differs from the first in that defence counsel’s fee is met by the bar association and the choice/appointment is made by the bar association.
The third is mandatory defence counsel. Here too, mandatory defence counsel is appointed in two situations. Under Article 150(2) of the CMK, “if the suspect or accused who has no defence counsel is a child, is disabled to such a degree as to be unable to defend himself or herself, or is deaf and mute, defence counsel shall be appointed without his or her request being required.” Under Article 150(3) of the CMK, defence counsel is likewise appointed without a request being required, where the accused or suspect has no defence counsel, “in investigations and prosecutions concerning offences punishable by imprisonment with a lower limit of more than five years”. Moreover, apart from these cases, various articles of the CMK regulate procedural acts at which defence counsel must be present30.
It can thus be seen that mandatory defence counsel has been adopted, albeit in part, in the CMK No. 5271, and that it is regulated more broadly than under the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 1412 (CMUK)31. In proceedings in which mandatory defence counsel is required, the conduct of the trial or of a procedural act without defence counsel is regarded by the Court of Cassation as a restriction of the rights of the defence and treated as an absolute ground for quashing, and this rule is applied strictly.
e. Assessment of the Normative Regulations
We consider that the regulations made for defence counsel in our country’s legislation are in general at almost the same level as those in the laws of other foreign countries and are, moreover, compatible with the ECHR. However, again looking at the overall picture without going into detail, we think that the regulation is deficient in this respect as regards making defence counsel mandatory for all criminal cases (general mandatory defence counsel), and that the regulation making it compulsory to submit a power of attorney in order to obtain copies of documents from the investigation/case file is mistaken, because this is incompatible with the performance of the function of defence counsel.
III. Problems Encountered in Practice
Having determined above the framework of the legal regulations concerning defence counsel and set out our assessment on this subject, we now wish to show how these rules are reflected in practice and, in parallel, to set out some detailed rules concerning the performance of the function of defence counsel and their application, and, by assessing the practice, to open the conclusion we have reached to discussion.
a. A Belief Left Over from the Past Persists that Defence Counsel Are, as It Were,
Unwanted Persons in Criminal Proceedings
We must say with regret that the institution of defence counsel, which is in keeping with human rights, is a safeguard for fundamental rights and freedoms and at the same time forms one of the three legs of the tripod of criminal procedure law, is, as it were, in the position of an unwanted person in criminal proceedings.
In civil proceedings the entire proceedings, from the bringing of the action to the gathering of evidence and the submission of claims, are conducted by the parties’ attorneys. In other words, the proceedings cannot go forward without the parties and in particular their attorneys; consequently, under this method of adjudication, lawyers occupy the positions of claim and defence, save in exceptional cases, and the action is brought and conducted by those lawyers. As a result, the lawyers involved in civil proceedings are an essential element of this method of adjudication and are perceived as such by judges/courts as well32. By the way criminal procedure operates, however, the evidence is gathered by the public prosecutor’s office at the investigation stage and by the court itself at the prosecution stage; this makes criminal procedure considerably different from civil procedure and, in particular, does not place defence counsel under an obligation to adduce evidence; in many situations, moreover, since the evidence is of a kind that the law enforcement forces are able to gather, defence counsel cannot do so even if they wished.
It is this situation that gives rise, on the part of judges and public prosecutors, to a perception along the lines of “what need is there for defence counsel” and to conduct in keeping with it. In many criminal proceedings the presence of defence counsel, or counsel’s joining the investigation or prosecution at a later stage, is perceived as “what need was there”, and defence counsel are received as an unwanted element. Although this is never said directly to defence counsel, it is voiced in settings where defence counsel are not present, even to the suspects or accused themselves, or is expressed through the attitude and practices adopted towards defence counsel. At its simplest, it is said in passing and with good intentions that “there is nothing a lawyer can do in this case”. Indeed, in some trials, judges who have become accustomed to conducting trials without defence counsel, despite the presence of defence counsel, dictate certain basic/ordinary requests into the record as coming from defence counsel, purely in order to speed up the trial, without defence counsel even having made a request on the matter.
This situation and this conduct indicate that the perception in our system of adjudication needs to change. For even if, owing to the nature of the specific investigation and/or case, defence counsel does not directly influence the proceedings by such means as adducing evidence or requesting that it be obtained, counsel reviews the lawfulness of the acts carried out from the standpoint of the accused person or persons defended; this reason alone means that the presence of defence counsel, “in a legal order in which, for the sake of security, form is as important as content”, renders the investigation and the trial formally lawful and reliable. Otherwise the fate of individuals is abandoned to the hands of persons who have no duty or obligation to defend the suspect/accused. Consequently, the presence of defence counsel makes the decision given a reliable and objective one. Otherwise the dialectic of the proceedings will not be achieved and, as a result, no correct and reliable decision will emerge (although it does not directly form the subject of this article, we must state that the fact that the prosecution is given no place at the hearings held before the criminal courts of first instance is also a negative arrangement that prevents the dialectic of the proceedings from being realised).
Indeed, the institution of defence counsel is one of the three legs of the tripod of criminal justice and one of its constituent elements. The decision is formed from the assessment of the accusation and the defence. Accusation and defence are therefore like the two sides of the coin that is the decision. This dialectical relationship between defence and accusation requires that a balance be established between defence and accusation. It is for these reasons that the defence features as a right in supranational human rights instruments and in constitutions33. A person against whom an indictment has been drawn up as an accused may in fact be guilty, just as he may be innocent. That is precisely why the accused (sanık) is, as the word itself indicates, a person who is not yet known to be guilty but is supposed (sanılan), strongly suspected, to be guilty. For this suspicion to be overcome and for a decision, favourable or unfavourable, to be reached concerning the accused, the existence of the defence is essential. Consequently, in order that this task may be duly performed, the functioning of the defence must be facilitated. Moreover, the defence, that is, the antithesis, also performs a very important function in ensuring that the decision is correct. This in turn ensures that criminal justice is administered equitably and – since justice is the foundation of the State – that the State itself is protected34.
In order for trials that are genuinely in conformity with the law and human rights to be held in our country, this perception, which still exists, must first of all completely change and it must be accepted that defence counsel, like the judge and the public prosecutor, is an indispensable element of criminal procedure. This change cannot be brought about by legislation; what matters is a change of mentality; this point should therefore be emphasised and clearly explained in our faculties of law and in the in-service training given to judges and public prosecutors.
b. In Order to Ensure Equality Between Prosecution and Defence, Even if Only in Appearance,
the Seating Arrangement in the Courts Must Be Changed
The way in which hearings are conducted in criminal proceedings and the seating arrangement of the parties are also extremely flawed and unlawful. To begin with, the seating arrangement during the trial which results from the public prosecutors, who constitute the prosecution, sitting on the bench beside the judges and at the same level as them, and which has been applied to this day, must definitely change.
In practice lawyers say among themselves on this subject that “the prosecutors sit up there because of a carpenter’s error”. This is of course a half-joking complaint; prosecutors sit in this way not because of a carpenter’s error but because of the influence of a particular mindset. Proceeding from the idea that the “sacred State” must be strong vis-à-vis the individual in every respect, the public prosecutor, as the representative of the State, also takes his place on the bench, up above, while opposite the prosecutor the accused, playing the role of Gulliver in the land of the giants, and in particular the accused’s defence counsel, stand down below in an ordinary place, and at the very outset of the trial the accused and defence counsel are given notice of their situation and position.
In the countries we have so far been able to visit and observe, even in those whose place on the spectrum of democracy is debatable, only the judges sit on the bench in courtrooms, while all the other subjects of the proceedings are placed at the same level, opposite or beside one another, and public prosecutors are in no way accorded any special importance beyond that accorded to defence counsel. This is the case, for example, in the courts of the Republic of Azerbaijan, where we were present a short time ago for an academic meeting. Defence counsel and accused, on the one hand, and public prosecutors, on the other, are placed opposite one another and at an equal level. In all methods of adjudication, those who should sit on the bench are the judges, both because they conduct the trial and give the decision in the name of the nation and because they keep order in the court and are, as it were, the president, the head, of the court. This is also the position in the judicial systems of all countries that have adopted Western-style democracy.
In our country, however, the seating arrangement in court has been like this ever since the first years in which the Republic was proclaimed and the judicial institutions were formed, and, as far as we are aware, this practice is not based on any written rule either. When this matter is raised by our fellow lawyers, it is brushed aside and swept under the carpet with answers, given in a somewhat condescending manner, such as “is everything else settled and this the only problem left? Of course the State’s prosecutor will sit on the bench”. Yet the demand in question is the sign of a real problem; it is one of the indispensable conditions for a lawful, independent and impartial trial to be applied correctly both in substance and in form.
In our country, where a “judicial reform package!” is constantly being issued in order to remedy the shortcomings observed in the judiciary, extremely fine and modern courthouses are also being built and opened for service along with these packages, but unfortunately the same seating arrangement continues in the courtrooms of these new buildings too. This clearly shows us that the outward appearance has changed but the content or, in other words, the mentality has still not changed.
Moreover, the institution of the public prosecutor’s office conducts the activity of investigation or prosecution on behalf of the public, that is, it carries out its acts on behalf of all the individuals who make up society. The public prosecutor is not the State’s side against the individual, or is at least expected not to be a party. In practice, however, this does not seem to be much observed. Cases are brought on insufficient evidence; prosecutors act with the attitude “let me bring the case and let the judge decide”; evidence in favour of the suspect or accused is not included in the file unless it is very obvious; and what emerges is, as it were, a “defence counsel for the State” who takes the State’s side against the individual. And the fact that this defence counsel for the State does not sit at the same level as the individual’s defence counsel but sits up above, beside the judges, places the public prosecutor in a wholly unequal position vis-à-vis the individual on trial; moreover, from a psychological point of view, the State’s defence counsel becomes stronger in the individual’s eyes than the individual’s own defence counsel. Unfortunately, in practice this perception based on form becomes entirely real where defence counsel adopts a passive attitude.
In order for this perception to change and for equality to be ensured, even if only in appearance, the existing seating arrangement must first be changed and everyone other than the judge/judges of the court must be placed opposite the bench and at an equal level.
c. While Deliberations on the Decision and on Interlocutory Decisions Are Being Held, the Prosecution Should of Its Own Accord
Leave the Courtroom
Another real and important problem in this regard is that, when courts adjourn the proceedings in order to give an interlocutory decision or a judgment on any matter, everyone present in the courtroom, “including the accused and defence counsel”, is sent out, whereas the prosecutors remain in the courtroom, on the bench and beside the judge or judges. This is a manifestly unlawful situation; it damages the proceedings and gives rise to doubts about the decisions rendered. For the institution of the public prosecutor’s office, which carries out the activity of public accusation, is a party to the criminal case just as the defence is. When a decision is being reached, either both parties should be present together in the courtroom or, as is correct, both should leave the room and leave the adjudicating authority alone with the evidence and its conscience.
When this point is raised by defence counsel during the proceedings and the prosecutors are also asked to leave the courtroom, the courts state that “the prosecutors do not speak while the interlocutory decision is being given”. It is impossible for the defence or the accused to know whether or not the prosecutors speak while the decision or interlocutory decision is being deliberated and taken. Even if it is accepted that the prosecutors do indeed not speak at that time, in a legal order in which, as we have been stating above, form is very important for trustworthiness, this practice and this image leave an extremely bad impression and create the impression that the prosecution, which is a party to the proceedings, and the court, which ought to be impartial, are acting as if they were on the same side. (For although the institution of the public prosecutor’s office must act impartially in performing its duty, as a subject of the proceedings it represents the interests of society vis-à-vis the accused and, as an office, is a party to the case.) Unfortunately, this impression arises not only in defence counsel, who practise this profession professionally, but also in the individuals who make up society and who in one way or another take part in the proceedings, such as the accused, witnesses, intervening parties or spectators. This in turn shakes society’s confidence in justice. Consequently, this problem is not a needless whim of lawyers but a serious problem concerning confidence in justice.
The only solution to this is for the prosecutors to leave the courtroom of their own accord, without the need for any reminder, while an interlocutory decision or judgment is being given; and, for this to be put into practice, for the Ministry of Justice to issue a circular or, although in our view it is unnecessary, for an article on this matter to be inserted in the CMK. In conclusion, this situation must change as soon as possible, and adversarial proceedings must, in this respect too, be brought into the state in which they ought to be.
A further problem connected with this matter is that, during the proceedings, when a legal issue arises or when a decision is to be formed without it being considered necessary to clear the courtroom, the judge leans towards the prosecutor and speaks with the prosecutor in such a way that others cannot hear. Some courts, on the ground that they are under a heavy workload, obtain support from prosecutors almost as if they were assistant judges. Although, for a temporary period, prosecutors are at present not taking part in trials before the criminal courts of first instance, in the period when they did attend hearings this was generally how things worked; consequently we do not think that this situation will change when prosecutors begin to attend hearings again, for this is a situation that has arisen in practice.
As we explained in the paragraph above, this situation casts a shadow over the impartiality of the proceedings and also constitutes an insult to the defence. The court must be completely impartial in the proceedings; just as judges do not lean over to the ear of defence counsel during the trial and talk or consult about any matter, they must not do so with the prosecutor either. Just as the defence constitutes one of the parties before the court, the other party is constituted by the prosecution, that is, the public prosecutor’s office. The fact that prosecutors receive their salaries from the State and carry out the activity of prosecution on behalf of society does not place them in the same position as judges in terms of function, independence and impartiality. Consequently, the court must be at an equal distance from both parties and must show this in its practice.
Where a court that speaks with the prosecutor during the hearing, before everyone’s eyes, in such a way that others cannot hear, sends everyone except the prosecutor out of the courtroom in order to reach its decision, the statement that it does not speak with the prosecutor and that the prosecutor has no influence on the taking of the decision is, at least as a matter of form, not realistic. In this situation, to ask that the impartiality of the criminal court be believed in would be an overly well-meaning expectation.
The first step towards remedying these problems can be taken by changing the seating arrangement in courtrooms, bringing the prosecutors down from the bench and ensuring that they are at the same level and in the same position as defence counsel. Secondly, judges must abandon these practices and must maintain towards prosecutors too the distance which exists between them and defence counsel and which stems from the function performed35.
d. Defence Counsel and the Accused Should Sit Together and Side by Side in the Courtroom,
and Should Be Able to Communicate Continuously During the Hearing
Another of the problems encountered in practice is that, during trials before the criminal courts, defence lawyers in particular and the accused sit in separate places and are prevented from communicating during the hearing.
Save in exceptional cases, the accused are seated directly opposite the bench where the judge sits and far from the defence, which is located on the left-hand side from the judge’s point of view. Especially where the accused is in pre-trial detention, the defence lawyer and the accused speaking to each other, making signs to each other or even making eye contact causes a problem, and they are prevented from communicating with each other. In some cases a defence lawyer who wishes to communicate in some way with the accused he is defending is warned by the gendarme on guard duty or by the judge, and such attempts are, at the very least, not looked on kindly.
Yet, according to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), what the ECHR seeks to achieve, particularly in view of the important role which the right to a fair trial plays in a democratic society, is that the defence be secured not in a theoretical and illusory but in a concrete and real manner. In this context, the accused’s right to the assistance of defence counsel includes the rights to have defence counsel present and to consult and confer with defence counsel36.
One of the important moments at which an accused needs the support of defence counsel is the hearing stage. Under the courtroom seating arrangement currently in place in our country, however, there is no possibility for the defence lawyer to assist the person being defended or to perform the advisory function. Yet there is no provision, either in the CMK or in any other statute or regulation, requiring the seating arrangement to be as it is. Despite this, a defence lawyer’s wish to sit next to the person being defended causes major problems; indeed, because defence lawyers have come to take this arrangement for granted, they do not even make an effort to change it. As far as we know, to date one lawyer colleague of ours has insisted on this point and has ultimately been successful, and sat during the hearing next to the accused whose defence he had undertaken37. Yet, as things ought to be,
the right to a fair trial is eliminated, the judgment to be given would be far from convincing and could not be directed at the aim of establishing justice; and, declaring that I challenged the President and the members of the Court, who, by continuing a wrongful practice which does not derive its source from the Constitution, statute, the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, were restricting my rights of defence and depriving me of my right to a fair trial, I requested that the earlier interlocutory decision be reversed.
Public Prosecutor Osman Çakır, for his part, said ‘we repeat our previous opinion’.
By item 1 of its interlocutory decision, the Court panel held that there was no ground for reversing the interlocutory decision it had given at that session and, granting us time to submit our petition of challenge, adjourned the hearing to 20.03.2008. 2. The hearing held on 20.03.2008 before the Beyoğlu 3rd Assize Court was attended, in the name of professional solidarity, by Advocate Berrin Adıyaman, member of the Board and treasurer of the Istanbul Bar Association, Advocate Muammer Aydın, member of the Board, Advocate Ufuk Özkap, Advocate Kemal Aytaç, Advocate Ömer Kavili, Advocate Muhittin Köylüoğlu, Advocate Ayşe Eren, Advocate Sevgi Akbenlioğlu, Advocate Hasan Kılıç and Advocate Ömer Yasa in the capacity of attorneys, and by Advocate Mehmet Durakoğlu, Vice-President of the Istanbul Bar Association, in the capacity of observer.
After the hearing had begun, I took the floor:
Judges and prosecutors do not exercise a power that does not derive its source from the Constitution and the statutes (from the European Convention on Human Rights, which we have signed and which is now also in force in our domestic law, and from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights). If they attempt to exercise it (as in our case), the rights of the defence are restricted and the right to a fair trial is violated. The accused has the right to benefit without interruption from the rights of the defence through a defence counsel. If, in accordance with the Court’s interlocutory decision, I stand inside the wooden enclosure built as the place of the accused, there is a distance of 3 – 5 metres between my lawyer and me, and if I wish to consult my defence counsel, each time either I shall have to go to my defence counsel or my defence counsel will have to come to me, and this situation will plainly eliminate my right to benefit without interruption from the rights of the defence. Can you imagine such a practice? Is that conceivable at all? In its first interlocutory decision of 13.11.2007, the Court panel rejected my request on a non-legal ground, namely ‘as required by practice and custom’. Your Court has placed the concept of ‘practice and custom’ above the Constitution, statute, the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which is a very grave legal error. Whereas in the system of adjudication applied in the contemporary world the suspect/accused has, at every stage and without interruption, the rights of the defence and the right to be together with the defence counsel who will conduct his defence, in our country (despite all the legislative amendments) the rights of the defence are restricted already at the investigation stage (I could cite many examples, such as by a confidentiality order, or defence counsel being unable to intervene in the statement once the suspect has begun to give it, or evidence in favour of the suspect not being collected), and this restriction continues at the prosecution stage as well. For these reasons, the cases brought against the Republic of Türkiye before the European Court of Human Rights always end against the Republic of Türkiye on grounds such as that the rights of the defence were restricted and the right to a fair trial was violated. Turkish justice and the Turkish judge (and public prosecutors) must now abandon their old habits and conduct a trial such that the judgment given at its end creates, both in the public conscience and on the accused, the victim and the intervening party, the effect that ‘justice has been done’. As the accused, I wish to benefit from the same rights as the intervening party, and just as the intervening party can stand side by side with his attorney/lawyer, I too wish to stand side by side with my attorney; this is what I said.
My attorneys too each took the floor separately, explained the drawbacks of the accused and his attorney standing in separate places, and requested that the interlocutory decision of 13.11.2007 be reversed.
The Beyoğlu 3rd Assize Court, composed of President Münevver Duygulu Aksünger, member Mustafa Tok and member Pınar Şafat: in terms of the law and the seating arrangement, the place of defence counsel is at the side of the person whose defence has been undertaken, even if that person is in pre-trial detention. Only in this way is it possible for counsel to establish uninterrupted and direct communication with the accused and to provide assistance. Moreover, the physical presence of defence counsel at the side of an individual who feels extremely powerless before the judge and the prosecutor representing the State will also provide that individual with very great support in psychological terms.
e. Whether Mandatory or Optional, Lawyers Performing the Defence Function Should Be Entered as “Defence Counsel”
in the Hearing Records of Criminal Cases
One of the formal aspects of the difficulties in practice is that lawyers performing the defence function are entered in the records as “attorney”. In many courts, lawyers performing the defence function are, without distinction, described as attorneys and are entered in the hearing records as “advocate ……, attorney of the accused …..”. In some courts, on the other hand, lawyers appointed by the CMK services of the bar associations pursuant to Articles 147(1)(c), 150 and 156 of the CMK are called defence counsel, whereas lawyers who undertake the defence function under a power of attorney obtained from the accused are called attorneys. Both of these are entirely erroneous practices. Whether holding a power of attorney obtained from the accused or appointed under the CMK, the lawyer who conducts the defence in criminal proceedings bears the title of defence counsel. For, whatever the manner of appointment, the function of defence counsel is one and the same38. Consequently, this erroneous practice too must be changed as soon as possible.
The definition of the function of defence counsel is misperceived by the Court of Cassation itself as well. In the decision of the General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation of 9.12.1974 referred to above, the function of defence counsel is defined as “an organ performing a public service, charged with the duty of acting in the name of the law on the matters of the accused’s acquittal or punishment with a light penalty”.
Yet the function of defence counsel is not solely, and at whatever cost, to secure the acquittal of the persons they defend and/or to ensure that they receive a lesser penalty. In our view, the essential function is to ensure that the proceedings are conducted fairly and in a manner consistent with the universal principles of law and with human rights, to
Having regard to the need for the rights of the defence to be exercised as a whole without restriction, for the accused to benefit without interruption from the assistance of defence counsel, for the right to a fair trial to be established in people’s consciences and for the accused likewise to benefit equally from the rights of the victim, it was unanimously decided to reverse the interlocutory decision of our court of 13.11.2007 on this matter; with these words it put its signature to a historic decision on behalf of the defence…” For the full text of the petition in question, the decision of the Beyoğlu 3rd Assize Court and the letters written by the Presidency of the Istanbul Bar Association to the institutions concerned, see: İstanbul Barosu Yönetim Kurulu Çalışma Raporu 2006 – 2008, s.193 – 206. watch over this and, where necessary, to intervene against wrongful practices. Consequently, defence counsel are the guarantee of securing a fair trial and of preventing human rights violations. At the end of the proceedings, however much effort and skill defence counsel may display, there is always a possibility that the person defended will be convicted. For this generally depends not only on the effort and skill of defence counsel but also on the evidence in the file. In such a case, if the Court of Cassation’s definition is taken as the basis, a defence counsel who has been unable to secure the acquittal of the person defended, or a lesser penalty for that person, will be deemed unsuccessful. Yet even with this outcome, if defence counsel has been present at every stage of the proceedings, has informed the person defended about the possible outcomes and has done everything possible to ensure that the proceedings are conducted in accordance with the law and human rights, counsel has performed the function successfully.
Indeed, it is an undeniable fact that the struggles of those who act as defence counsel and of all other lawyers have had a share in the reduction of certain human rights violations experienced in our country today, particularly in the course of criminal proceedings. This shows that, in spite of everything, defence counsel in our country perform their functions well.
f. Defence Counsel Should Not Be Held Liable for Any Word or
Statement They Use Within the Scope of the Defence Function
The rights of the defence are a form in which freedom of thought is exercised. The free articulation of the words used and the thoughts expressed before the judicial authorities for a specific purpose, namely to be cleared of an accusation, is one of the elements constituting the rights of the defence. In a liberal and democratic conception of politics, the rights of the individual are as broad and as respected as possible. The rights of the defence also benefit from these possibilities. Indeed, it is striking that, in the course of history, there has been a close connection between the development of the rights of the defence and the development of the democratic movement. Authoritarian regimes, by contrast, tend to limit the rights of the defence39. This observation shows that the degree of the rights and freedoms accorded to the defence, and the manner in which they are applied, reveal the true nature of the regime in force in a country, whatever the high-flown rhetoric may be.
The freedom to seek one’s rights is not merely a rule of procedure but, beyond that, a subjective fundamental right. A subjective right, in turn, confers on the person a power to demand. The claim to seek one’s rights means, for those who have taken part in the proceedings, the opportunity to state their views and have them heard on all the factual and legal issues of the specific case40. In order for this right to be exercised properly and genuinely, those conducting the defence, that is, the suspect/accused or defence counsel, must not be held liable for the statements or views they have used, in writing or orally, in the course of the defence. This is called the immunity of the defence.
The essential element of the immunity of the defence is that those who use them are not punished on account of the words, statements and views voiced in the performance of this function. For if the person performing the defence function acts under the apprehension that the statements used will be deemed an offence and punished, that person will come to refrain from certain statements and views that would otherwise be used in the defence, and in that case it cannot be said that the defence function has been duly performed41.
However, the immunity of the defence has generally been accepted in statutes with respect to certain offences, persons and conditions. This results in the immunity being limited and sometimes eliminated altogether. Thus, Article 128 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) accepts the immunity of the defence with respect to offences of insult and requires that the allegations and assessments be connected with the dispute42. In order for the defence function to be performed in full, especially in cases concerning political offences, defence counsel must in no way be held liable for the words they voice and for their views. For in many political cases what is defended, rather than (or together with) defences relating to the acts of the accused or to the breach of procedural rules, is the accused’s views, statements or world view, their scientific character and their capacity to be expressed in a democratic society. This becomes more apparent particularly in offences relating to the expression of thought. In order for the rights of the defence to be exercised in these cases fully and as they ought to be, defence counsel must enjoy an immunity of the defence without exception. Indeed, the rights of the defence regulated in Article 36 of the Constitution are regulated as a right that cannot be limited.
Despite these explanations, it is seen in practice that those conducting a defence and defence counsel are subjected to investigation and prosecution on account of the statements and thoughts they use in their defences. Even if these statements or the views put forward disturb a large part of society and even the other subjects of the proceedings, they must be tolerated and granted unconditional immunity so that the proceedings are conducted fairly and the rights of the defence are not interfered with. A fearless, independent and free defence can be secured only in this way.
g. The Legal and De Facto Obstacles to Defence Counsel Examining Investigation
Files and Taking Copies Should Be Removed
Another practice that confronts us as a restriction of the rights of the defence, and that renders the performance of the function of defence counsel almost impossible and leads to wholly unlawful results, is preventing defence counsel from examining investigation files and/or taking photocopies of documents, or requiring a copy of the power of attorney for photocopies of documents to be taken. Because of this practice, defence counsel very often take their place beside the suspect during the taking of the statement without having any information about the investigation and, naturally, cannot perform the defence function properly.
Although Article 153 of the CMK contains no provision to this effect, defence counsel are required to produce a power of attorney in order to take photocopies from the file; a provision of a regulation is cited as the ground for this, contrary to the hierarchy of norms; and during the investigation, when steps proceed very quickly, the rights of the defence and the performance by defence counsel of their functions are restricted and thus obstructed. Article 45 of the Regulation on the Registries of Chief Public Prosecutors’ Offices, which is cited as the ground for this situation and which requires a power of attorney to be submitted for defence counsel to be able to examine the investigation documents and take copies, is not in keeping with the philosophy underlying the CMK. It is a meaningless and contradictory situation for a statute that permits defence counsel and the suspect to meet without a power of attorney to require a power of attorney from defence counsel, who needs to examine the file before the meeting43.
Consequently, this regulation and practice are contrary to the CMK. This situation must be corrected as soon as possible, and in particular the practice of requiring a power of attorney for copies of documents to be taken from the file during the investigation must be abandoned. After all, the function of defence counsel is to review whether or not the material truth is being investigated in a lawful manner. In order to be able to perform this function, defence counsel must know, be able to check and be able to steer the acts carried out by the investigating and prosecuting bodies44. Otherwise it will not be possible for defence counsel to perform this function, nor will it be possible for the proceedings to be conducted fairly and honestly.
h. Imposing a Confidentiality Order under Article 153(2) of the CMK Entirely Obstructs the Rights of the Defence, and This Provision Is Abused in Practice
in a Manner Exceeding Its Purpose
Article 153(2) of the CMK contains the provision: “If the examination by defence counsel of the contents of the file or the taking of copies of documents may jeopardise the purpose of the investigation, this power may be restricted by decision of the criminal judge of peace upon the request of the public prosecutor”. This article, which in practice is called a “confidentiality order”, is abused; although it is unnecessary, this provision is invoked in a great many investigations and a great many documents and items of information in the investigation file are concealed from the defence. The defence can gain access to this information and these documents only after the indictment has been accepted (Art. 153(3) CMK), but until that stage the rights of the defence are restricted and many acts to their detriment will already have been carried out by then.
This article, which is in fact a provision introduced as a special measure in the fight against organised crime, is unlawful and flawed in terms both of its normative structure and of its application; it eliminates the rights of the defence and renders defence counsel unable to perform their function. When Art. 153(2) CMK is examined, it is seen that the restriction here is imposed only with respect to the defence counsel of the suspect or accused, and does not apply to the other persons involved in criminal proceedings, namely the complainant, the intervening party, the person with pecuniary liability, or the suspect or accused in person. For the paragraph mentions only defence counsel. Yet, as we also explained above, defence counsel is a sui generis subject in criminal proceedings and does not encompass the other subjects of the proceedings. Moreover, given the principle that provisions limiting fundamental rights and freedoms cannot be interpreted broadly or applied by analogy in criminal procedure law either, it is not possible, by reason both of the theoretical structure of criminal procedure law and of the wording of the article, to apply this restriction to persons other than defence counsel. Consequently, the accused, the complainant, the person with pecuniary liability, the suspect, and the attorney of the complainant or of the intervening party may examine the whole of the file and take a copy of it45. That the viewing of the documents in the investigation file and the taking of copies of them should be restricted for defence counsel alone is indisputably an exercise in futility and, moreover, will have no practical meaning. In conclusion, this article is flawed in the way it is drafted.
This article and the practice arising from it produce two erroneous results. First, the imposition of this restriction on defence counsel, when it has not been imposed on the other persons, upsets the principle of equality. On the other hand, in practice the restriction is, contrary to the statute and therefore to the law, applied to those persons as well. The fact that the right of access to the file, in other words to the evidence, which is not forbidden to the other persons involved in criminal proceedings, is not granted to defence counsel, who has the greatest need of that file and that evidence in order to perform the function of the defence, and that it is forbidden to counsel, is contrary to the Constitution, to the ECHR and, most importantly of all, to the universal principles of law and the requirements of being a State governed by the rule of law46. The allegations, statements, records of interception of communications and recordings of technical surveillance contained in the investigation file, that is, all the evidence which defence counsel cannot obtain where a restriction is in place, prevent defence counsel from conducting a defence; this manifestly violates the prohibition on infringing the essence of fundamental rights and freedoms expressed in Article 13 of the Constitution and destroys the rights of the defence, which are one of the most basic foundations of fundamental rights and freedoms47. This situation is contrary, in particular, to the right to liberty and security regulated in Article 5 of the ECHR and to the right to a fair trial regulated in Article 6 thereof, and also clearly contravenes the right to personal liberty and security regulated in Article 19 of the Constitution48.
On the other hand, it is clear and beyond dispute, by virtue both of the statutory provisions and of the settled case law of the Court of Cassation, that in our country unlawfully obtained evidence cannot be used in any proceedings, and in particular in criminal proceedings, and that evidence obtained on the basis of evidence obtained in this way will also be deemed unlawful.
There are extremely clear provisions directly regulating this matter: Article 38(6) of the Constitution provides that “Findings obtained in violation of the law cannot be accepted as evidence.”; Article 217(2) of the CMK that “The offence charged may be proved by any kind of evidence obtained in a lawful manner.”; Article 206(2) of the CMK that “If an item of evidence whose presentation is requested has been obtained in violation of the law, it shall be rejected.”; Article 230(1)(b) of the CMK that “The reasoning of a judgment of conviction must contain the discussion and assessment of the evidence, an indication of the evidence relied on for the judgment and of the evidence rejected and, in this context, a separate and explicit indication of the evidence contained in the file that was obtained by unlawful methods.”; and Article 289(1) of the CMK that “The restriction of the rights of the defence by a court decision on matters important for the judgment, and the judgment being based on evidence obtained by unlawful methods, constitute absolute violations of the law”. In addition, in its decision of 17.11.2009, E. 2009/7-160, K. 2009/264, on the matter, the General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation once again emphatically stated that neither unlawfully obtained evidence nor the evidence that is its extension, that is, the fruit of the poisonous tree, may be relied on for the judgment and that, if there is no other evidence, the acquittal of the accused must be ordered.
Accordingly, all restriction orders which, because they destroy the rights of the defence, are unlawfully issued and likewise unlawfully applied, and all other acts carried out following such orders, are unlawful. These and similar practices each separately violate the above-mentioned articles of the ECHR, of the Constitution and of the CMK49. This important obstacle in the way of the defence and of the institution of defence counsel must be removed as soon as possible; the relevant legislation must be amended so that it can be applied only where strictly necessary, in investigations concerning a limited range of offences (for example, drug offences committed in an organised manner); and those who apply the law must be given training on this subject.
i. The Obstacles to Mandatory Defence Counsel Should Be Removed and the Financial Problems Resolved; No Decision Should Be Given Without Defence Counsel and
Hearing Times Should Be Observed
There are serious difficulties in the practice of mandatory defence counsel as well. Mandatory defence counsel is essentially regulated in Articles 147(1)(c), 150 and 156 of the CMK. This function is a serious public service and is sustained through the efforts and endeavours of the bar associations and lawyers. However, the fact that the fees paid for the function of mandatory defence counsel are kept extremely low, and that they are paid only after a long time or not at all, has brought the system to the point of collapse and has turned this function into a drudgery for lawyers50.
A further, separate problem is that, by the amendment made by Law No. 5560 to Article 13 of Law No. 5320 on the Entry into Force and Manner of Application of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the fee paid to defence counsel appointed by the bar association at the request of the investigating and prosecuting authorities pursuant to the CMK is counted among the costs of the proceedings. For it is unlawful, and incompatible with the freedom of the defence, for the fee paid to mandatory defence counsel, which is the consequence of an obligation imposed by statute, to be recovered from the convicted accused as “costs of the proceedings”. Just as the State, which by reason of its very raison d’être undertakes the provision of the services of justice, costly by their nature, does not claim back from the convicted person the salary of the judge, the prosecutor or the law enforcement officers, so it should not claim the fee of defence counsel either, who is appointed pursuant to the CMK and performs a public function. Moreover, this obligation also stems from Article 6 of the ECHR51. For where mandatory defence counsel is appointed, it is meaningless to place the financial burden of this obligation on the accused; and, in addition, a suspect who, lacking the financial means, cannot choose a defence counsel but wishes to benefit from one and requests the appointment of defence counsel by the bar association may, in the belief of being found in the wrong in the future and of being unable to bear this cost, forgo this assistance despite wishing to receive it. This amounts to an indirect restriction of the rights of the defence.
Another problem encountered from time to time in practice is that, where defence counsel appointed by the bar association pursuant to Article 150 of the CMK is not present at the hearing, withdraws from the hearing at an inopportune time or refrains from performing the function, the courts give a decision without defence counsel52. Yet this eventuality is expressly regulated in Article 151 of the CMK, which provides that in such a case the court or judge must immediately take the necessary steps for another defence counsel to be appointed and that, in that situation, the sitting may be interrupted or it may be decided to adjourn it. Indeed, the Court of Cassation also quashes decisions given without defence counsel in disregard of Article 151. According to the Court of Cassation, “notwithstanding the provision in Article 151 of the CMK that, if defence counsel is not present at the hearing, the court may immediately appoint a defence counsel and may decide to adjourn the hearing, the delivery of judgment at a session at which the defence counsel of the accused were not present, without this being observed, restricts the rights of the defence”53.
The failure of courts to keep to hearing times, and in particular the scheduling of a hundred hearings at five-minute intervals or of all hearings for the same time, is in practice a problem for all lawyers who attend hearings. Just as courts have a large number of hearings in one day, lawyers too generally have a large number of hearings in one day. Moreover, even if lawyers have only one hearing in a day, they have many other professional activities besides. Yet a lawyer who has been notified that the hearing is at nine o’clock, on arriving in front of the courtroom and looking at the list, sees that a hundred hearings have been scheduled for the same time, with his own case eightieth in line, and rightly protests. Courts should pay attention to this point and, taking into account their workload and how long it takes them to finish a hearing, should adjust the intervals between hearings accordingly and try to schedule hearings for realistic times. In addition, where it becomes apparent that, for whatever reason, the hearing will not be held on the day and/or at the time fixed in advance, this should be notified by e-mail and SMS, before the day of the hearing, to all parties who act or have a capacity in the case, and in particular lawyers should be spared learning that there is no hearing only when they arrive in front of the courtroom. This is required by the respect that is due to the service of justice, to individuals and to lawyers.
j. Whatever Their Name and the Statute Regulating Them, in Courts Having Special Powers to Try Certain Offences the Rights of the Defence of the Accused Are Restricted and, in Particular, Defence Counsel Are Prevented from
Performing Their Functions
Article 250 of the CMK, which regulated the specially authorised courts, was repealed by paragraph 6 of Article 105 of Law No. 6352 of 2.7.2012. Provisional Article 2 of the same Law contains the provision: “References made in the legislation to the assize courts established under the first paragraph of Article 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall be deemed to have been made to the assize courts specified in the first paragraph of Article 10 of the Anti-Terror Law.” Article 10 of the Anti-Terror Law No. 3713 was, in turn, entirely amended by Article 75 of the same Law No. 6352 (the Third Reform Package Law). According to this provision, “Cases brought on account of offences falling within the scope of this Law shall be heard by the assize courts to be assigned, upon the proposal of the Ministry of Justice, by the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors in provinces to be determined in such a way that their judicial district may cover more than one province. The presidents and members of these courts may not be assigned by the justice commission of the ordinary judiciary to courts or duties other than these courts…”.
Consequently, although the assize courts authorised under Article 250 have been abolished (and these courts will continue to exist until they conclude the cases they are currently trying), this time “Anti-Terror Courts”, which again have special powers, have been established by Article 10 of the Anti-Terror Law (TMK) (although no such name appears in the Law, it is used by us for the sake of convenience). How practice will take shape in these courts is not yet clear. However, the bad legacy of the State Security Courts and the Specially Authorised Assize Courts has obliged us to examine the example of bad regulation and practice set out below. For, if it is well understood, a bad example also constitutes a “good” example in terms of drawing lessons from the past and moving towards the better. Our wish is that in these new courts there will be no practices that restrict, or even eliminate, the rights of the defence and the right to a fair trial.
The courts authorised under Article 250 of the CMK have, as in many other respects, been heavily criticised for their attitude towards defence counsel. The waiting in front of the courtrooms of these courts has reached unbelievable proportions. A hearing is scheduled for nine o’clock, but even at three o’clock it has not been possible to enter the hearing. When the reason for this is asked, incomprehensible answers may be given, such as that “if it is written in the record that the hearing is at three o’clock, the detained accused are not brought from the prison on time”. Yet for the court to send a letter to the prison administration so that action is taken against the officials who fail to bring the detained accused and, where necessary, to file a criminal complaint against the officials concerned for neglect of duty is sufficient to solve this problem, or ought to be sufficient in a State governed by the rule of law. For conduct of this kind not only makes it extremely difficult for defence counsel to do their work but also causes them to gain the impression that they are not respected by the court. At the very least, individuals who see lawyers waiting for hours in front of the court for their hearing to be called think that the defence is not respected by the judicial power, and say so.
Moreover, in the trials conducted before these courts, when the hearing is interrupted in order to give an interlocutory decision, everyone in the courtroom is sent out, and the hearing records, which also contain the interlocutory decision, are thrust into the hands of the defence counsel waiting in front of the courtroom. The formation of the interlocutory decision in the absence of defence counsel and the accused is unlawful; it restricts the rights of the defence by preventing possible interventions that the defence might make to have the decision corrected or its requests met. Furthermore, since the interlocutory decisions of these hearings are not dictated in the presence of defence counsel , defence counsel are not asked, even as a matter of courtesy, whether the hearing dates are convenient. Yet at the stage when the interlocutory decision is being formed, the prosecutors do not leave the courtroom.
The greatest problem in the trial procedure of the courts authorised under Article 250 of the CMK, however, lay in sub-paragraph (f) of paragraph 1 of the repealed Article 252. Under this paragraph, the presiding judge could remove from the courtroom an accused or defence counsel who disturbed the order of the hearing, with exclusion from the whole of that day’s sitting. If it was understood that the accused and/or defence counsel would persist, at the following sitting too, in conduct that would significantly disrupt the hearing, and if their presence was not considered necessary, the court could decide to continue the hearing in their absence. This decision could not be applied in such a way as to prevent the making of the accusation and the defence on the merits, and the accused would be allowed to be represented by another defence counsel. If the accused or defence counsel removed from the courtroom persisted in disturbing the order of the hearing at subsequent sittings as well, it could also be decided that the person concerned should no longer attend all or some of the sittings relating to the same case. Indeed, throughout the period in which Articles 250 and 252 were in force, this article was seen to be applied frequently.
Yet this provision and its application amount to an open disregard of the rights of the defence, which we try to exalt, protect and keep untouched with epithets such as “most inviolable, sacred, etc.”. What is grave is that this is done by a court before which a trial is being conducted; what is graver still is that both the individual defence (the accused) and the public defence (defence counsel) are lumped together and treated as of no account. There are numerous examples of how this article was abused in trials conducted before the specially authorised courts. While this is a power that should not be granted to any court or authority, it is unacceptable that it was given to courts in which extremely important trials are conducted. For the defence, by its very structure, at times takes on the court as its opposing party (because the court too bears a burden of proof and has the power/obligation to collect evidence), and the defence counsel who occupy the position of the defence may press hard on the court panel.
It is extremely easy to characterise certain statements used, views put forward or attitudes and conduct displayed in the course of the defence as “disturbing the order of the hearing”. In this way it becomes extremely easy, and normatively grounded, for courts to exclude de facto from the proceedings an accused and/or defence counsel whose style and method of defence they dislike and/or are wary of. This is, quite plainly, depriving the person of the rights of the defence. Giving the accused the right to appoint another defence counsel in order to soften this situation is, for its part, a cosmetic provision. For the accused may lack the financial means to choose and appoint another defence counsel ; and moreover (especially bearing in mind that the cases before these courts consist of a great many binders and the difficulty of knowing fully and mastering these files of thousands of pages), when one considers the difficulty a new defence counsel who takes over the defence in the middle or at the end of the trial would have in conducting a proper defence with full knowledge of the case, it is seen that this is not a provision compatible with reality.
Consequently, practices of this kind should not be resorted to and provisions of this kind should not be included in statutes. As for ensuring discipline at the hearing, lodging a complaint against defence counsel with the bar association, which is the relevant professional organisation, and ensuring that an administrative investigation is conducted and, for the accused, not applying the discretionary grounds for mitigation could be effective solutions. But, whatever the reason, the rights of the defence must not be restricted and the decisions given by the courts must not be tainted.
k. The Restriction, by Article 10 of the TMK, of the Right of a Suspect in Police Custody to Meet with Defence Counsel Is a Manifest Obstruction and
Disregard of the Rights of the Defence
As we stated above, Article 10 of the Anti-Terror Law No. 3713, as amended by Article 75 of Law No. 6352, provides in sub-paragraph (ç): “The period of police custody of twenty-four hours in the first paragraph of Article 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall be applied as forty-eight hours.”; in sub-paragraph (d): “If the purpose of the investigation may be jeopardised, only one relative shall be informed, by order of the public prosecutor, of the situation of the person who has been apprehended or taken into police custody or whose period of police custody has been extended.”; and in sub-paragraph (e): “The right of a suspect in police custody to meet with defence counsel may be restricted for a period of twenty-four hours by decision of a judge upon the request of the public prosecutor; no statement may be taken during this time.”
It is seen that these provisions are special procedural measures introduced for the fight against terrorist offences. It is a fact that providing for and applying special procedural measures is unavoidable in order to be able to combat terrorism or organised criminal groups. However, past practice in our country shows that provisions introduced as exceptions are generally applied as the rule. For example, in the application of the repealed Article 250, companies, associations and even sports clubs whose managers or employees were suspected of having committed an offence were characterised as a “criminal organisation”, special procedural measures were used in the investigations conducted against these persons, and the law was thereby circumvented.
When the provisions in Article 10 of the TMK are examined in the light of this legacy and this reservation, we consider that they are not positive provisions. It appears that in investigations conducted under this Law a longer period of police custody will be applied, only one relative of the suspect will be informed (and it is extremely easy for that relative to inform everyone else) and, most importantly, if necessary, the suspect will be prevented from meeting with defence counsel during the first twenty-four hours. This provision is anti-democratic and also shows the distrust felt towards the institution of defence counsel. Moreover, having regard to legal practice in our country, it is open to abuse. For just as, at the time when Article 250 of the CMK was in force, even lawful organisations were treated as illegal organisations, this time the same lawful organisations will be characterised as terrorist organisations and the application of these provisions will be secured. Furthermore, bearing in mind that this Law may be applied to many economic offences besides terrorist offences, the repeal of Article 250 will in fact not mean very much.
On the other hand, not allowing the suspect to meet with defence counsel during the first twenty-four hours in police custody is a complete step backwards. What kind of treatment is the suspect to be subjected to during this period, that the meeting is prevented? For a suspect in police custody to meet with defence counsel is an eminently humane right. For it is beyond dispute that a person under suspicion has, a fortiori, need of a lawyer’s assistance. For a person who is in an unfamiliar environment, whose freedoms are restricted and who does not yet know exactly what the accusation is, defence counsel is the only link with the outside world and the only support. Before any legal reasons, this humanitarian reason alone shows that restricting the right to meet with defence counsel during the first twenty-four hours is contrary to basic human values. The objection to this view will be that the operations relating to the investigation in which the suspect is also involved are continuing and that, if there is a meeting with defence counsel, the other suspects may flee. This is an objection with some truth in it. However, since the suspect’s statement cannot be taken during this period either, twenty-four hours spent without knowing what the real accusation is and what fate awaits will turn into psychological torture. Moreover, having regard to previous practice, it will not take long for this provision, introduced as an exception, to become a principle used very frequently in practice. But this provision is grave in that it shows the legislature’s view of the defence. Consequently, the provision concerning meetings with defence counsel should be repealed as soon as possible; and, on the other hand, law faculties and bar associations should provide serious training on what the profession of lawyer and the function of defence counsel are and on the ethical values and rules of the profession.
l. For the Defence to Receive Due Respect and Treatment, Important Duties Fall to Bar Associations and Law Faculties
in the Training of Lawyers
In the explanations we have given up to this point, we have tried to convey, by giving examples, how the adjudicating and prosecuting authorities in general view the defence and defence counsel, and to criticise the aspects we find negative. We are bound to say that, in the end, the picture that emerges is not a positive one. It must not be forgotten, however, that where there is something negative in any matter, all the stakeholders in that matter bear responsibility for it in varying degrees . Consequently, defence counsel themselves are also the cause of this negative attitude adopted towards the institution of the defence and towards defence counsel, and of some of the negative aspects in practice. These negative aspects range from inappropriate dress, through attending hearings without knowledge of the file or even without the file, to failing during the hearing to behave in a manner befitting the institution of defence counsel and to the negative relations established with the client. Of course, since the human element is involved, it is not possible to eliminate these negative aspects entirely. It is possible, however, to reduce them to the lowest level. It is in this effort to reduce them to the lowest level that great duties fall to the bar associations and law faculties.
First of all, while abstract, theoretical education in legal doctrine is given in law faculties, the fact that this knowledge will be applied by the students to concrete disputes a few years later is overlooked. It is not possible to overcome this problem by practical classes alone. Taking concrete cases as the starting point in theoretical lectures as well could ensure that the knowledge acquired is put to better use; in addition, the hours of practical exercises must be increased. Furthermore, bearing in mind that a large proportion of law faculty graduates practise as lawyers, it would be extremely useful to teach the law of the legal profession as an elective course. Indeed, it would be extremely beneficial for lawyers who have experience in the profession and have reached a certain stage to come to law faculties and give presentations on the profession at regular intervals.
The main burden in this regard, however, rests on the bar associations. The traineeship training centres which at present operate in the bar associations of the large cities should be extended to the other provinces, and bar associations that have an established system in place should support the bar associations in other cities. The traineeship training centres should be made more efficient, and the classes there should, rather than the theoretical subjects already taught in law faculties, cover subjects such as how to find solutions to concrete problems as a lawyer, the importance and necessity of the legal profession and of the defence, professional bearing and respect, the lawful collection of evidence and combating unlawfully obtained evidence. In this way the defence too, by taking concrete initiatives itself rather than criticising, will be able to become an important part of the solution to this problem.
CONCLUSION
In order for a trial that is equitable, just and fair to be conducted, defence counsel must perform the functions set out above and must be able actually to exercise the powers relating to this function54. For that, the problems we have set out above must be resolved as soon as possible. Otherwise a system of criminal procedure that appears complete on paper but is deficient in practice will continue to operate.
In our system of criminal procedure we have identified, in outline, the following points concerning the defence and the institution of defence counsel and, connected with them, the following problems: First, the rights and obligations accorded to the institution of defence counsel are one of the indicators of the functioning of the rule of law and of the exercise of human rights. Consequently, regulations and practices relating to this institution must be made with this point in mind. Secondly, it must be accepted that defence counsel performing the defence function is, unlike an attorney, a sui generis subject of criminal procedure law who is independent even of the person defended. Accepting this could cause many of the problems arising in practice to disappear of their own accord.
There is a belief, left over from the past, that defence counsel are, as it were, unwanted persons in criminal proceedings; this belief must now be abandoned and the fact that the defence is an indispensable constitutive element of criminal proceedings must be accepted. In order to ensure equality between prosecution and defence, even if only in appearance, the seating arrangement in the courts must be changed; the prosecution and the defence must be placed at the same level in the courtroom. While deliberations on the decision and on interlocutory decisions are being held, the prosecution should of its own accord leave the courtroom. Defence counsel and the accused should sit together and side by side in the courtroom and should be able to communicate continuously during the hearing. These are erroneous practices which stem from the way the hearing is conducted but which affect the substance of the proceedings.
Defence counsel should not be held liable for any word or statement they use within the scope of the defence function. Otherwise it will not be possible to conduct a defence fearlessly and freely, and a defence function in the true sense will not be able to be performed. Imposing a confidentiality order under Article 153(2) of the CMK entirely obstructs the rights of the defence, and this provision is abused in practice in a manner exceeding its purpose. The legal and de facto obstacles to defence counsel examining investigation files and taking copies should be removed. Whatever their name and the statute regulating them, in courts having special powers to hear certain offences the rights of the defence of the accused are restricted and, in particular, defence counsel are prevented from performing their functions. In particular, we regard the provisions introduced in Article 10 of the TMK by Law No. 6352 as a step backwards with regard to the exercise of the rights of the defence and the ability of defence counsel to perform their function properly. Our hope is that these exceptional sub-paragraphs will not be turned into the rule and will not be applied in every case, whether necessary or not. In our view, however, the best solution in this matter is the repeal of these provisions.
Finally, in order for due respect to be shown to the defence and to the institution of defence counsel and for these negative aspects to be eliminated, the fundamental task to be undertaken is education. In law faculties and subsequently in the traineeship training centres of the bar associations, it must be taught that the defence and defence counsel are an indispensable element of the proceedings and that, in return for this power and function, those who perform the defence function bear great responsibilities in many respects.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Centel, Nur, “Müdafi ile Savunma Hakkı ve Adalet Kunter, Nurullah/Feridun Yenisey/Ayşe Nuhoğlu, Bakanlığı Genelgesi”, İstanbul Barosu dergisi, C.76, Muhakeme Hukuku Dalı Olarak Ceza Muhakemesi S.2, 2002, s.315–332. Hukuku, 18. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2010.
Centel, Nur, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukukunda Müdafi, Kocaoğlu, Sinan, Müdafi, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1984. 2011.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleş- Mahmutoğlu, Fatih Selami/Selman Dursun, Türk mesi ile Düzenlenen Yargısal Koruma Mekanizması ve Hukuku’nda Müdafiin Yasaklılık Halleri, Ankara, Seç- 14 Nolu Ek Protokolle Öngörülen Değişiklikler”, Uğur kin Yayıncılık, 2004.
Alacakaptan’a Armağan, C.I, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi
Schroeder, Friedrich Christian /Feridun Yenisey/Wolf- Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008, s.237 – 328.
gang Peukert, Ceza Muhakemesinde ‘Fair Trial’ İlkesi, Erem, Faruk, Diyalektik Açıdan Ceza Yargılaması İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu CMUK Uygulama Servisi Hukuku, 6. Bası, Ankara, Işın Yayıncılık, 1986. Yayınları, 1999.
Gölcüklü, Feyyaz/Şeref Gözübüyük, Avrupa İnsan Tosun, Öztekin, Türk Suç Muhakemesi Hukuku Dersleri, Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Uygulaması, 4. Bası, Ankara, C.I, Genel Kısım, 4. Bası, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Turhan Kitabevi, 2003. Fakültesi Yayını, 1984.
Harris, D. J./M. O’Boyle/E. P. Bates/C. M. Buckley, Law Tumlukçuoğlu, Sinan, “Gizlilik/Kısıtlama Kararlarının of the European Convention on Human Rights, Second Anayasa ve AİHS Karşısında Hukuksal Konumu”, Gün- Edition, Oxford University Press, 2009. cel Hukuk Aylık Hukuk Dergisi, S.96/12, Aralık 2011, s.48–51.
İnceoğlu, Sibel, İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi Kararlarında Adil Yargılanma Hakkı, İstanbul, Beta Ünver, Yener /Hakan Hakeri, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku, Yayıncılık, 2002. 5. Bası, Ankara, Adalet Yayınevi, 2012.
Zafer, Hamide, Faile Yardım Suçu ve Müdafiin Bu Suçtan Sorumluluğu, İstanbul, Beta Yayınları, 2004.
Footnotes
- This article is the version, expanded, revised and converted into an article, of the paper presented at the II Turkic World Law Congress, 14–16 November 2011, Istanbul.
- This article has been peer-reviewed and is indexed in the TÜBİTAK–ULAKBİM Database.
- Faculty Member in Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, Istanbul Medipol University Faculty of Law.
- Nurullah Kunter/Feridun Yenisey/Ayşe Nuhoğlu, Muhakeme Hukuku Dalı Olarak Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku, 18. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2010, s.13. ↑
- Faruk Erem, Diyalektik Açıdan Ceza Yargılaması Hukuku, 6. Bası, Ankara, Işın Yayıncılık, 1986, s.40. ↑
- Hamide Zafer, Faile Yardım Suçu ve Müdafiin Bu Suçtan Sorumluluğu, İstanbul, Beta Yayınları, 2004, s.255. ↑
- Erem, a.g.e., s.57. ↑
- Sinan Kocaoğlu, Müdafi, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2011, s.30. ↑
- For extensive information on this principle see: Friedrich Christian Schroeder/Feridun Yenisey/ Wolfgang Peukert, Ceza Muhakemesinde ‘Fair Trial’ İlkesi, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu CMUK Uygulama Servisi Yayınları, 1999, s.1 vd. ↑
- For summary information on the right to a fair trial see: Sibel İnceoğlu, İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi Kararlarında Adil Yargılanma Hakkı, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2002, s.1 – 8; for the scope of protection of this right see: İnceoğlu, a.g.e., s.11 vd. ↑
- D. J. Harris/M. O’Boyle/E. P. Bates/C. M. Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2009, s.310 – 322; İnceoğlu, a.g.e., s.317–319. ↑
- Centel, Müdafi ile Savunma Hakkı, s.320. ↑
- Kocaoğlu, a.g.e., s.23. ↑
- Centel, Müdafi ile Savunma Hakkı, s.319, 320. ↑
- Centel, Müdafi ile Savunma Hakkı, s.321. ↑
- Öztekin Tosun, Türk Suç Muhakemesi Hukuku Dersleri, C.I, Genel Kısım, 4. Bası, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1984, s.596. ↑
- Yener Ünver/Hakan Hakeri, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku, 5. Bası, Ankara, Adalet Yayınevi, 2012, s.230. ↑
- Ünver/Hakeri, a.g.e., s.231. ↑
- Kunter/Yenisey/Nuhoğlu, a.g.e., s.408. ↑
- Ünver/Hakeri, a.g.e., s.231. ↑
- Nur Centel, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukukunda Müdafi, İstanbul, 1984, s.48 vd.; Centel, Müdafi ile Savunma Hakkı, s.331. ↑
- YCGK, 9.12.1974, 272/447, YKD, S.7, Temmuz 1975, s.34. ↑
- Mahmutoğlu/Dursun, on the other hand, take the view that defence counsel represents not the accused defended but the office of the defence. However, they give no explanation of the position of the institution of defence counsel in relation to the accused. See Fatih Selami Mahmutoğlu/Selman Dursun, Türk Hukuku’nda Müdafiin Yasaklılık Halleri, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004, s.20. ↑
- Nur Centel, “Müdafi ile Savunma Hakkı ve Adalet Bakanlığı Genelgesi”, İstanbul Barosu Dergisi, C.76, S.2, 2002, s.331; Kunter/Yenisey/Nuhoğlu, a.g.e., s.408. ↑
- Ünver/Hakeri, a.g.e., s.231. ↑
- For the authors who hold this view see: Centel, Müdafi ile Savunma Hakkı, s.331; Ünver/ Hakeri, a.g.e., s. 230. ↑
- Kunter/Yenisey/Nuhoğlu, a.g.e., s.409. ↑
- Murat Volkan Dülger, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ile Düzenlenen Yargısal Koruma Mekanizması ve 14 Nolu Ek Protokolle Öngörülen Değişiklikler”, Uğur Alacakaptan’a Armağan, C.I, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008, s.243 – 245. ↑
- Centel, Müdafi ile Savunma Hakkı, s.316. ↑
- Centel, Müdafi ile Savunma Hakkı, s.317. ↑
- For a detailed explanation and the ECtHR judgments on this subject see: Feyyaz Gölcüklü/Şeref Gözübüyük, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Uygulaması, 4. Bası, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 2003, kn. 541. ↑
- Ünver/Hakeri, a.g.e., s.230, 231. ↑
- For these situations see: Ünver/Hakeri, a.g.e., s.231–236. ↑
- Ünver/Hakeri, a.g.e., s.231. ↑
- Although it is formally possible for a case to be conducted in person by the right-holders themselves or by the persons against whom the action has been brought, in view of the growing complexity of commercial and everyday life and, accordingly, of the fact that legal processes are extensive and legislation is very wide-ranging, the conduct of a case without attorneys whose profession is that of lawyer is a rarely seen occurrence. ↑
- Kunter/Yenisey/Nuhoğlu, a.g.e., s.400. ↑
- Kunter/Yenisey/Nuhoğlu, a.g.e., s.400. ↑
- Another, and fundamental, criticism of ours on this subject is that prosecutors and courts/judges should work in separate buildings and that their offices too should be in different buildings. Indeed, particularly in the USA and Western Europe, the system of accommodation and work is run in this way. ↑
- Centel, Müdafi ile Savunma Hakkı, s.322. ↑
- Because the subject is extremely important, and in order to show the success of Mr Uğur Poyraz, Advocate, in this matter and to provide an example, we wish, on the basis of the permission obtained from him, to reproduce here verbatim the petition dated 1.4.2008 which he wrote on the subject, addressed to the Presidency of the Istanbul Bar Association: “1. I attended, together with my defence counsel Advocate Ömer Kavili, the hearing held on 13.11.2007 in the public prosecution brought against me before the Beyoğlu 2nd Assize Court under file number 2005/246 E. on the allegation that I had committed the offence of ‘assaulting and insulting, by word and deed, a judge on duty during a hearing’. Asking for the floor, I said: - that in our practice the intervening party/victim and his attorney stand side by side,–that the accused, however, (in many courtrooms) has to stand in a place separate from his defence counsel/attorney,– that this situation eliminates the accused’s right to benefit continuously from his defence counsel/attorney and creates a weakness in the defence,–that even if the accused is in detention, the task of the law enforcement officers is to prevent the accused from escaping, but that in our practice the accused and his attorney/defence counsel are prevented from standing side by side and even from talking,–that this situation, which does not derive from the Constitution and the statutes, constitutes, because it restricts the rights of the defence, a violation of the right to a fair trial in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and I requested that a decision be given allowing me to sit together with my defence counsel. In his opinion on this request of mine, the Public Prosecutor, stating that in practice intervening parties have their defence counsel beside them, whereas the accused sits in a section separate from his lawyer, but that this state of affairs might give rise to a restriction of the accused’s rights of defence, said ‘it is our opinion that, if the accused wishes to sit together with his defence counsel, this should be permitted’. Upon my request and the opinion of the Public Prosecutor, the court decided to reject my request on the ground that it had reached the conclusion that the place where the accused is to be in the courtroom has been determined in accordance with practice and custom, that the accused has the opportunity to confer with his defence counsel at any time, that, if he so requests, a meeting with his defence counsel will be arranged, and that this situation would not restrict the rights of the defence. Upon this interlocutory decision of the court I took the floor again and said: that courts are obliged to conduct trials in a manner consistent with the Constitution and the statutes; that it is not possible for them to continue trials on the basis of a wrongful practice which does not derive its source from the Constitution, statute, the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights; that, where, through the restriction of the rights of the defence, ↑
- Kunter/Yenisey/Nuhoğlu, a.g.e., s.409. ↑
- Centel, Müdafi ile Savunma Hakkı, s.316. ↑
- Centel, Müdafi ile Savunma Hakkı, s.319. ↑
- Kunter/Yenisey/Nuhoğlu, a.g.e., s.401. ↑
- Kunter/Yenisey/Nuhoğlu, a.g.e., s.401. ↑
- Kunter/Yenisey/Nuhoğlu, a.g.e., s.411. ↑
- Kunter/Yenisey/Nuhoğlu, a.g.e., s.403. ↑
- Sinan Tumlukçuoğlu, “Gizlilik/Kısıtlama Kararlarının Anayasa ve AİHS Karşısında Hukuksal Konumu”, Güncel Hukuk Aylık Hukuk Dergisi, S.96/12, Aralık 2011, s.48. ↑
- Tumlukçuoğlu, a.g.y., s.49. ↑
- Tumlukçuoğlu, a.g.y., s.49. ↑
- Tumlukçuoğlu, a.g.y., s.50. ↑
- Tumlukçuoğlu, a.g.y., s.50, 51. ↑
- Kunter/Yenisey/Nuhoğlu, a.g.e., s.412. ↑
- Kunter/Yenisey/Nuhoğlu, a.g.e., s.412. ↑
- Ünver/Hakeri, a.g.e., s.246. ↑
- 10. CD. 26.12.2005, 24359/19605. Cited in: Ünver/Hakeri, a.g.e., s.246. ↑
- Kunter/Yenisey/Nuhoğlu, a.g.e., s.404. ↑
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Imprisonment in Defiance of the Law: Enemy Criminal Law in Türkiye in the Light of the European Court of Human Rights Judgments in Osman Kavala and Can Atalay” (Hukuka Rağmen Hapis: Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesinin Osman Kavala ve Can Atalay Kararları Işığında Türkiye’de Düşman Ceza Hukuku), Dülger Law Office, 20 November 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Demanding Accountability Is Not a Crime: On the Investigation Initiated Against Av. Prof. Dr. Osman Korkut Kanadoğlu” (Hesap Sormak Suç Değildir: Av. Prof. Dr. Osman Korkut Kanadoğlu Hakkında Başlatılan Soruşturma Üzerine), Dülger Law Office, 27 October 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “On the Events Known to the Public as the ‘Fund Scandal’: An Assessment in Terms of Criminal Liability, Investor Rights and Supervisory Liability” (Kamuoyunda “Fon Skandalı” Olarak Anılan Olaylar Hakkında: Ceza Sorumluluğu, Yatırımcı Hakları ve Denetim Sorumluluğu Bakımından Bir Değerlendirme), Academia.edu, 1 October 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Delayed Occurrence of the Result (Dolus Generalis / Weber's Intent)” (Gecikmiş Neticenin Gerçekleşmesi (Dolus Generalis / Weber Kastı)), Essays in Honour of Asst. Prof. Dr. Sesim Soyer Güleç (Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Sesim Soyer Güleç’e Armağan), eds. Koray Doğan / Behiye Eker Kazancı, Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2025, pp. 223–288.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Assessment of the Constitutional Court's Decision on the Provisions Governing the Simplified Trial Procedure” (Anayasa Mahkemesinin Basit Yargılama Usulü Hükümlerine İlişkin Kararının Değerlendirilmesi), Dülger Law Office, 12 October 2023.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, Offences and Sanctions Relating to the Laundering of Proceeds of Crime (The Offence of Money Laundering) (Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasına İlişkin Suçlar ve Yaptırımlar (Kara Paranın Aklanması Suçu)), 3rd ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2026.

