7 January 2021Murat Volkan Dülger, Onur Özkan, Merve BakdurArticle

About this work

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

The study deals with mistake, one of the most disputed subjects in criminal law: it examines what criminal codes understand by mistake and which consequences are attached to which type of mistake. Mistake that excludes intent is distinguished from mistake that affects culpability; mistake as to the qualified forms of an offence and mistake as to the factual conditions of grounds of justification are treated as mistake that excludes intent. The differences between aberratio ictus and mistake as to the person are also discussed.

Keywords

  • mistake
  • intent
  • mistake excluding intent
  • culpability
  • mistake excluding culpability
  • mistake as to the factual conditions of grounds of justification
  • awareness of wrongfulness

Full text

This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

Article Type: Research

MISTAKE IN CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSEQUENCES ATTACHED TO MISTAKE

Error in Criminal Law and Consequences Related to Error

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER*- Onur ÖZKAN**- Merve BAKDUR ***

Received: 28.07.2020

SUMMARY

This study seeks to explain “mistake”, one of the most controversial subjects in criminal law. In examining mistake, particular regard has been had to what the criminal codes mean by mistake and to which kind of mistake they attach meaning and consequences. In connection with this, it has also been examined which consequence is attached to which mistake within the theory of the offence. Within the theory of the offence, mistake takes effect at the level of conformity with the statutory definition of the offence (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit), as mistake excluding intent, and within culpability, as mistake affecting culpability. These two types of mistake have been distinguished from one another. Likewise, at the moment the perpetrator carries out the conduct, he must have intent in respect of all the material (objective) elements of the offence.

Since a mistake as to one of these means that the condition required for the existence of the perpetrator’s intent is not met, intent will be affected and, consequently, the conduct will not conform to the statutory definition of the offence. In the case of a mistake as to the aggravated (qualified) forms of the offence and as to the material conditions of a ground of justification, too, what is at issue is likewise a mistake of fact, not of law, and it has been dealt with under mistake excluding intent. A mistake as to circumstances affecting culpability, on the other hand, would not, had there been no mistake, affect whether the statutory definition of the offence is fulfilled, and will affect only the blameworthiness of the perpetrator. It has therefore been accepted that such a mistake on the part of the perpetrator affects his blameworthiness, and the examination has been carried out under that heading. Following this important distinction within mistake, the differences between deviation from the target and mistake as to the person, which frequently arise under the heading of mistake, have also been examined.

Keywords: Mistake, Intent, Mistake excluding intent, Culpability, Mistake excluding culpability, Mistake as to the material conditions of grounds of justification, Awareness of wrongfulness

Accepted: 04.12.2020

ABSTRACT

With this article, one of the most controversial issues in criminal law “error” is tried to be explained. While examining of the error, it was taken into account especially what error means in criminal law and which type of error has the meaning and result in criminal law. At the same time, it was explained, in crime theory which error is connected to which results. The error has an effect in the crime theory, which the error that removes the intend and the error that affects the fault. These two types of errors are separated. Likewise, as soon as the perpetrator acts, he must have intent on all the definition elements of the crime. Error in one of these will affect the intent of the perpetrator, because the condition for the existence of the intent is not met. So, the crime will not be suitable for the definition of crime (in German, Tatbestand). The error made in the qualitative elements of the crime and the material conditions of the reason for legality criterias are also a de facto, not legal, errors, and is addressed under the error that effect the intent. Error in cases affecting the fault would not affect the formation of the typicality of the crime and it would only affect the culpability of the perpetrator. Consequently, it was accepted that this error affects the condemnability of the perpetrator and the examination was made under this heading. After this important distinction of the error, the differences between the deviation in the target, which often comes under the error, and the error in the person were also examined. Keywords: Error, Intent, Error that removes the intent, Culpability, Error that removes the culpability, Misconduct in the material conditions of legality criterias, Unfairness awareness

Istanbul Aydın University Faculty of Law, e-mail: volkan.dulger@dulger.av.tr, ORCID

TAAD, Year: 12, Issue: 45 (January 2021)

INTRODUCTION: The Meaning and Types of Mistake

In view of the consequences it produces when the liability of the perpetrator is assessed, mistake is regarded as one of the most difficult subjects of criminal law. For constructing the framework of mistake requires a command of the theory of the offence in its entirety. Under the heading of mistake, the act as the perpetrator perceived it and its legal consequences have to be compared with the legal consequences of the situation that actually existed, and questions have to be answered such as which element the mistake does or does not affect in this respect, and whether it belongs to conformity with the statutory definition or relates to a ground that excludes or reduces criminal liability. At the more advanced levels of the subject of mistake, moreover, matters such as reverse mistake and double mistake are discussed. Hence, in order to be able to identify mistake and the consequences relating to mistake, one must have a complete command of the theory of the offence1.

Mistake may be defined as the discrepancy between a person’s will and reality, which appears in the form of not knowing (Lat. ignorantia) or of knowing wrongly (Lat. error)2. Indeed, in everyday life too we come across many situations in which we fall into a mistake and the idea in our mind does not correspond to reality. Most of us have, for example, experienced situations in which the person we approached and tapped on the shoulder, believing that we had seen an old friend, turned out to be someone else whom we did not know, or in which, thinking that we had seen a famous person, we went up to that person and he turned out not to be the person we had supposed3. A mistake of just this kind may also appear in criminal law as a circumstance that excludes intent or culpability. Where the idea in the perpetrator’s mind does not coincide with reality in the external world, the perpetrator is said to be mistaken4. Mistake is regulated in Article 30 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK).

In legal scholarship, mistake was first examined by dividing it into two, as mistake of fact and mistake of law5. According to this distinction, a mistake may relate to the external world, and it may equally relate to the normative world (the realm of rules)6. In this second case one speaks of mistake of law, and the mistake is one as to the existence of a criminal norm or as to its interpretation. In this situation the perpetrator is mistaken as to the legal regulation that applies to his act. By the express provision in Article 4 of the TCK that “ignorance of the criminal laws shall not be deemed an excuse”, it is stated that, as a rule, a perpetrator who falls into a mistake of law cannot benefit from that mistake. This rule has, however, in reality been set aside and rendered inoperative by the rule on mistake as to the prohibition in Art. 30(4)7. To put it more accurately, in a system in which mistake as to the prohibition is recognised, it is not possible for ignorance of the laws not to be deemed an excuse; for mistake as to the prohibition is built precisely on the possibility that a provision of statute is not known. We should also point out that mistake as to the prohibition has not been regulated solely with regard to the case in which conduct defined as an offence in the normative sense is not known as a matter of statute. As will also be explained below, it refers to the absence in persons of the awareness of committing a wrong in general, rather than of committing an offence. This, however, is an overarching concept which also encompasses ignorance of the laws. Consequently, since ignorance of the laws, too, cannot be deemed an excuse either under Turkish law or under international criminal norms, there is no need for this article to have been regulated separately.

In mistake of fact, by contrast, the perpetrator makes a wrong assessment of the factual situation or circumstance8. This mistake may relate to the elements of the act, to grounds of justification, to the causal link, to the result or to aggravated (qualified) forms9. For example, C believes that a weapon is being pointed at him. He defends himself against the person (silhouette) whom he believes to be pointing a weapon at him and repels the presumed attack by striking with a stick. It later emerges that the person C injured was his flatmate E, who was holding his comb in his hand. Because the place where he was was dark, C was mistaken and took E for a person who had entered his home without permission. Here he acts in the belief that he is exercising self-defence. There is therefore a mistake on his part relating to a ground of justification. In order to be able to grasp the distinction between mistake of law and mistake of fact, it must be said that here the perpetrator has not, in essence, fallen into a mistake concerning a rule of law. In essence, C is mistaken about the factual situation. His error consists in believing that, in the factual situation, an attack was being made on him; it does not concern the place of a rule of law in the legal order or its scope of application. Whether or not this mistake is a mistake relating to grounds of justification can be established only by the normative assessment made after the act (ex post). Hence, when it is said that a mistake of fact relates to a ground of justification, this must not be confused with mistake of law10.

It must be said that today the distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law has been superseded and has by now been largely abandoned in legal scholarship11. In its place, a distinction is followed between mistake excluding intent and mistake affecting culpability.

The subject of mistake is regulated in Article 30 of the TCK in “four” paragraphs. The existence of a mistake affects either the perpetrator’s intent or his culpability. The subject of mistake therefore in fact needs to be examined under two main headings and in sub-headings. Accordingly, the scheme for examining mistake is as follows:

• Cases of mistake excluding intent o Mistake as to the elements of the statutory definition of the offence (Art. 30(1)) o Mistake as to the qualifying elements of the offence (Art. 30(2)) o Mistake as to the material conditions of grounds of justification (Art. 30(3))

• Cases of mistake affecting culpability o Mistake as to circumstances excluding or reducing culpability (Art. 30(3)) o Mistake as to awareness of unlawfulness (mistake as to the prohibition) (Art. 30(4))

As can be seen above, the method, mistaken in our view, of regulating the grounds of justification and the circumstances affecting culpability in the TCK together, without distinguishing between them, has been continued here as well. In paragraph 3 of Article 30 of the TCK, mistake as to the material conditions of grounds of justification and mistake as to grounds affecting culpability are regulated together without any distinction being drawn. What ought to be done is to regulate them separately. Even though the provision in the statute is framed in this way, from the standpoint of the law as it ought to be and of systematic consistency the distinction must be drawn in this manner. Indeed, there is near unanimity on this point in legal scholarship as well.

I. CASES OF MISTAKE EXCLUDING INTENT

Cases of mistake excluding intent may present themselves in the form of mistake as to the statutory definition of the offence or of mistake as to the material conditions of grounds of justification12.

Mistake as to the statutory definition of the offence means mistake as to the normative elements of the offence. This mistake may be a mistake relating to the object of the offence or to the victim, which constitute elements of the statutory definition, and it may equally be a mistake relating to the causal link or to the qualifying elements of the offence.

To explain by way of an example, the object of the offence of theft (Art. 141) is “a movable thing belonging to another”. Where the perpetrator is mistaken in that he believes the thing to be his own, it is apparent that this is a mistake relating to the object of the offence and hence to the material elements of the statutory definition. In cases of this kind, in which the perpetrator is mistaken as to the statutory definition, his intent is held to be excluded. For intent is required for the offence to come into being and, briefly defined, is the knowing and willing realisation of all the elements pertaining to the statutory definition (Art. 21(1)). Since a perpetrator who is mistaken as to any one of these elements, which constitute the wrong and must be covered by intent, will be in a state of ignorance, it will no longer be possible to speak of intent on his part either. Although intent is excluded, if a negligent form of the offence has been provided for and its conditions are met, the perpetrator’s liability for that form will arise. If we take the example given at the outset, no negligent form of the offence of theft has been provided for, and it will not be possible to hold liable the perpetrator whose intent is excluded on account of the mistake.

In legal scholarship, the distinction between essential mistake and non-essential mistake is used in explaining mistake. Intent, however, must cover all the material elements. Accordingly, a person’s mistake as to even one of the material elements of the statutory definition will exclude his intent. For a mistake of this type there will be no need to examine whether it is essential or non-essential. What is to be understood by mistake in the legal sense is in any event the mistake to which criminal law attaches importance; that is to say, an assessment of mistake is made if, had the mistake not occurred, a different offence would have come into being or no offence would have come into being at all. For this reason it is more accurate to make the assessment in terms of mistakes to which the law attaches importance and mistakes to which it does not.

Mistake as to the statutory definition is regulated in two paragraphs: in Art. 30(1) of the TCK as mistake as to the material elements of the statutory definition, and in Art. 30(2) as mistake as to the elements relating to an aggravated (qualified) form.

Because we accept that grounds of justification have a subjective side, that is, because the perpetrator will benefit from a ground of justification only if he is aware of it and his will is directed towards it, the perpetrator may be mistaken as to the objective elements of a ground of justification, and this mistake has an effect on the subjective side of the ground of justification. In other words, the perpetrator may act in the belief that a ground of justification exists when in reality it does not, and with that intent. In this situation too, since the perpetrator is taken to have acted lawfully, there is no intent to commit an offence. We shall therefore also examine mistake as to the material conditions of grounds of justification under this heading. Mistake as to whether or not a rule of law exists, by contrast, concerns awareness of wrongfulness and mistake as to wrongfulness, and will be examined under the heading of mistake affecting culpability.

A. Mistake as to the Material Elements of the Statutory Definition of the Offence

The first of the cases of mistake as to the statutory definition is mistake as to the material elements of the statutory definition or, as it is otherwise called, mistake as to an element. This is a mistake relating to the normative elements of the offence. Mistake as to the material elements of the statutory definition is regulated in paragraph 1 of Article 30 of the TCK as follows:

“A person who, while carrying out the act, is unaware of the material elements in the statutory definition of the offence does not act intentionally.

Liability for negligence on account of this mistake is reserved.”13

Intent must cover the material elements of the statutory definition. Since knowing and willing that lacks the material element cannot be accepted, this ignorance excludes the mental (subjective) element of the offence, that is, intent. What is meant by the material elements of the statutory definition are the objective objects and facts that can be perceived from the outside. These may be elements which can be perceived by the sense organs and can be related directly to the physical existence of the object (for example, in the offence of theft, the fact that the thing is movable, or the fact that the person fired at is a human being), and they may equally be elements which can be related to the mental sphere (for example, the commission of the offence of killing against a person who is mentally incapable of defending himself)14. Likewise, mistake is also possible in relation to normative elements such as “personal data”, “official document” or “private life”, which cannot be perceived by the sense organs but can be conceived of through the existence of a norm15. For in order for the offence to come into being, the perpetrator’s intent must cover these elements as well.

A mistake concerning normative elements is in some situations not accepted as a valid mistake. Although the perpetrator knows the material content of the element contained in the statutory definition of the offence, he may fall into a “mistake of interpretation” (Ger. Subsumtionsirrtum) as to its characterisation in criminal law16. For example, the perpetrator may know that the thing he has stolen is a sheep or a free-flowing liquid substance, yet think that “movable property”, which constitutes the object of the offence of theft (Art. 141), does not cover it. A mistake in situations of this kind will not be taken into account in law. For a correct legal interpretation is not necessary for intent to be formed. The intent of a perpetrator who has knowledge of the material element of the statutory definition will not be excluded because he interprets that material element differently in law17. The reason given for this is the rule that “an average person is expected only to have knowledge of the core (nucleus, essence) of the criminal norm underlying the norm”18. It is nevertheless stated in legal scholarship that there are also cases in which a mistake of interpretation exceptionally excludes intent. If the perpetrator, although having correctly grasped the material element of the offence, has made a mistake of legal interpretation that is in line with the general conviction of society, this mistake may exclude his intent. For example, A has sold his car to B, but B has not performed in time the obligation under the contract of sale to pay the sale price. Since A thinks that ownership of his car passes upon payment of the sale price, he thinks that he is still the owner. With the second key in his possession he takes the car back from B. As will be seen, A is labouring under a mistake of legal interpretation as to the material element of the statutory definition, “a movable thing belonging to another”, and believes himself to be the owner of the car. In such an example, it is stated in German criminal law scholarship that this mistake is a mistake of interpretation in line with the conviction of society (Ger. Parallelwertung in der Laiensphäre) and that, on the ground that the members of society may in general fall into such a mistake, a mistake as to the material elements of the statutory definition is at issue and the perpetrator’s intent is excluded19. In our view, however, since the “prohibition of self-help” (the prohibition on enforcing one’s rights by one’s own action) is a prohibition that is more widely accepted by society, a mistake consisting in the perpetrator’s believing that the thing belongs to him should not exclude intent20. On the other hand, situations in which the perpetrator, owing to a mistake of interpretation, believes that his act is permitted (mistake as to permission) will, as we shall see in detail below, be assessed within the scope of mistake as to wrongfulness.

That said, the perpetrator’s being unsure and in doubt as to whether or not one of the material elements of the offence is present is not accepted as a mistake. For example, in the offence of sexual abuse of a child (Art. 103), the fact that the perpetrator was in doubt as to whether or not the victim was older than 15 years of age does not show that he was labouring under a mistake. The Court of Cassation, too, having regard to the circumstances of the specific case (such as the perpetrator and the victim having known each other for a long time, their living in the same house, and the victim’s family having opposed their marriage on account of the victim’s young age), has delivered decisions to the effect that the perpetrator’s having been in doubt will not exclude intent and that a defence of ignorance on this point is incompatible with the ordinary course of life21. Of course, the situation will be assessed differently where the perpetrator has been clearly misled by the victim on this point, or did not have the time and the opportunity to test, with the victim, the mistaken information or the doubt concerning the victim’s age. The conclusion to be drawn from this, however, is that it is not the perpetrator’s doubt as to the material element but his mistake that will exclude his intent.

It should also be noted that the perpetrator’s ignorance of matters that do not form part of the statutory definition of the offence – an objective condition of punishability, a personal ground of impunity, or personal grounds extinguishing or reducing the penalty – cannot be assessed within the scope of mistake and will have no effect on the perpetrator’s liability. The commission of the offence of theft to the detriment of “a lineal ascendant or descendant, or one of the relatives by marriage of that degree, or an adoptive parent or adopted child” is a personal ground of impunity (Art. 167). Even if the perpetrator believes that the property he has stolen belongs to another person and does not know that it belongs to his father, he will benefit from that personal ground of impunity. Since this element constituting the personal ground of impunity need not be covered by intent, his error with regard to it will not be assessed in terms of mistake either22.

1. Cases of Equivalent and Non-Equivalent Mistake

A problem of importance in relation to mistake as to the statutory definition is whether a mistake as to the material object of the offence will affect intent in every case. This problem, which in Turkish criminal law scholarship is frequently examined under the headings “mistake as to the individual” or “mistake as to the person” (Lat. error in persona), should not be treated as confined to the victim (the person) alone. What actually happens is that the perpetrator, as a result of a mistake, confuses the person or thing designated in the offence type as the object of the offence, and the result described in the statutory definition occurs in respect of an object other than the one at which his act was directed23.

A mistake as to the (material) object of the offence may arise in two ways: the condition which the perpetrator believes to exist and the condition which actually exists may be of the same nature (equivalent), or they may be regarded as conditions that differ from one another in nature24. The first situation is called an equivalent mistake, and in criminal law equivalent mistakes are disregarded as far as the perpetrator’s intent is concerned. The example given of an equivalent mistake is that of a perpetrator who, acting in order to kill a human being, fires in the belief that the person before him is his actual target but, owing to his erroneous information, kills another person whom he took for the person he was aiming at.

In a non-equivalent mistake, by contrast, the perpetrator fires in order to hunt an animal but in reality kills a human being who is in the forest. Whereas in the first example the perpetrator knows the fact that he is firing at a human being, in the second example he does not know this fact. He acts in the belief that he is firing at a game animal.

The act of a perpetrator who falls into an equivalent mistake as to the material object of the offence produces its result in respect of the person or thing at which the act is directed. As in the example, the perpetrator acts in order to kill the person he has targeted in his mind but kills another person instead (mistake as to the person). The perpetrator directs his act towards killing a person and, despite his mistake as to who that person is, his act still results in the killing of a human being. Accordingly, in the case of an equivalent mistake the perpetrator is seen to be mistaken not as to the nature of that person or thing (such as whether or not it is a human being) but as to its identity or characteristics25.

The consensus in legal scholarship and practice on equivalent mistake is that a mistake as to the material object of the offence is, as a rule, of no importance for intent and that the perpetrator is deemed to have committed the offence intentionally26. “For the law protects objects of the same nature in the same way”27. In the case of an equivalent mistake, the mistake made will be regarded as a mere mistake of motivation (motive) (Ger. Motivirrtum)28. Consequently, whomever he was motivated to kill, the perpetrator’s intent will not be excluded, since he has in any event acted intentionally towards killing a human being. From the standpoint of the statutory provision too, once the person killed has the quality of a human being, it is of no importance who that human being is29. For the decisive point of intent is the realisation of the act (the killing of a human being), not the aim or outcome sought to be achieved by the act30.

If, however, the mistake is non-equivalent, that is, if there is a difference in nature between the object in the perpetrator’s mind and the object actually affected, this mistake is taken into account. For in that case the perpetrator may, on the scenario in his mind, either be committing no offence at all or be committing a different offence. For example, in a situation such as the one examined above, in which the perpetrator kills a human being whom he takes for a game animal, his act would constitute no offence if the material circumstances had been as he imagined them. The perpetrator has fallen into an error as to the nature of the thing at which he fired. When the reality in the perpetrator’s mind is compared with objective reality, an animal and a human being are non-equivalent objects for the purposes of criminal law. The mistake concerning these non-equivalent objects will be taken into account, and the perpetrator’s intent with regard to the offence of killing will be excluded. Once the perpetrator’s intent is excluded, if a negligent form of the offence in question is provided for (as it is in the case of killing), it will be possible, where its conditions are met, to hold him liable for that offence (Art. 85)31.

When liability for negligence can apply must also be discussed. The end of paragraph 1 of Article 30 states: “Liability for negligence on account of this mistake is reserved.” The fact that the text is worded in this way should not lead to the conclusion that, where a negligent form of the offence exists, the perpetrator is automatically liable for negligence. The provision should be understood as a reference to the general provisions on negligence, and it must be examined whether the perpetrator was negligent in falling into this mistake. If the perpetrator fell into the mistake because he failed to exercise the required care and attention, he is deemed to have been negligent. Otherwise, since the perpetrator is not negligent either, it is accepted that no criminal liability arises. According to the classic example given in legal scholarship on this point, a physician who performs an autopsy without checking whether the patient is dead will be liable for the offence of negligent killing on account of the victim’s death. If, however, the person brought to the physician for autopsy has been exhumed from a grave, he can no longer be expected to check whether this person too is dead, and this cannot be regarded as a breach of the duty of care; this time, therefore, liability for negligence will not arise32.

The General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation, too, in a case brought before it in which the perpetrator perceived an object in front of the window of the house as a squirrel, fired at it and in fact caused the death of a person, examined the specific circumstances as well (such as the presence of a large number of squirrels in front of the perpetrator’s house and the absence of any enmity between the perpetrator and the victim), accepted that the perpetrator’s mistake excluded his intent and that his conduct constituted a breach of the duty of care and attention, and held that a judgment had to be given for the offence of negligent killing33. Accordingly,

33 “(…) Thus, the second problem to be resolved concerns “whether the accused fired at the deceased having seen him or without having seen him”.

In all his statements in defence the accused stated that a reddish object was moving in front of the window and making a noise, that he therefore assumed that the squirrels had come and pulled the trigger of the shotgun without thinking at all, because there were a great many squirrels around their house and they were damaging the walnuts in the house.

The on-site inspections carried out, for their part, established that, in the weather and light conditions in which the incident occurred, and whatever the degree of dirtiness of the plastic sheeting fitted to the window, it could be made out from inside that the object outside was a human being.

Since the pullover worn by the deceased was brown, it is highly probable that the “reddish thing” which the accused says he saw was the deceased. In other words, the accused saw the deceased in front of the window. Nor is there any defect in the accused’s eyesight. Under normal conditions, therefore, the accused would be expected also to perceive that what he saw was a human being. Nevertheless, he may indeed have seen an object there but, for some reason (for example, because of the dazzle likely to have affected his eyes on entering the dim interior from the bright outdoors), may not have fully perceived what it was.

In this situation, given that it has also not been proved that there was any enmity between them, in an incident to which there was no eyewitness, the contrary of the defence of the accused – who is understood to have been unable to concentrate sufficiently because he was experiencing serious problems in his personal life – that he “could not fully perceive what the object at the window was and fired taking it for a squirrel” cannot be established by the other evidence in the file with a clarity that leaves no room for doubt. Although the on-site inspections clearly established that a human being standing in front of the window and a squirrel could easily be told apart, since it cannot be said either that it was impossible for the accused to have misperceived “for a temporary reason such as having passed from a lit environment into an unlit one”, the defence must be given credence in accordance with the principle that “the accused benefits from doubt”.

Legal assessment: Intent, which in the period of Law No. 765 meant, for every felony, knowing the conduct defined or specified in the pattern of that offence and the result of that conduct and deciding upon and willing it, or the will directed at carrying out an act that is provided for and constitutes an offence, denotes in the system of Law No. 5237 the psychological link between a person and the material elements of the offence he commits. In this system, the existence of intent requires that not only the act and the result but all the material elements in the statutory definition of the offence be realised knowingly and willingly. Where a person commits the act although he foresees that the elements in the statutory definition of the offence may be realised, one may speak of conditional intent (dolus eventualis). As a rule, offences can be committed only intentionally. By contrast, the provision in paragraph 1 of Article 30 of Law No. 5237, which reads “A person who, while carrying out the act, is unaware of the material elements in the statutory definition of the offence does not act intentionally. Liability for negligence on account of this mistake is reserved.”, refers to ignorance of, or incomplete or incorrect knowledge of, the material elements of the offence. The perpetrator must know all the material elements in the definition of the offence. If there is a contradiction, a discrepancy, between what the perpetrator knows and reality, there is a mistake here. This mistake excludes the intent relating to the offence. However, if it can be concluded that such a result would not have been encountered had this person exercised the necessary care and attention, there is a wrong committed by negligence. If this wrong is defined as an offence in the law, the perpetrator is punished on the basis of his liability for negligence. In the present it was rightly examined first whether mistake could be applied at all and then whether a case of liability for negligence had arisen.

That said, according to one view in legal scholarship which assesses intent under culpability, a mistake as to the statutory definition will, only if it can be regarded as “essential”,

case, the accused fired at his sibling, taking him for a squirrel, and killed him. In this situation, since the object of the offence of intentional killing is a human being, the “criminal intent” of the accused, who was mistaken as to the “object of the offence”, which is one of the material elements of the offence, has been excluded. He therefore cannot be punished for the offences of “intentional killing” or “killing with conditional intent”.

It was stated above that, as a rule, offences can be committed only with intent. In the cases expressly indicated in the law, however, an offence may also be committed by negligence. If the definition of an offence does not indicate that it may be committed intentionally or negligently, that offence can be committed only intentionally.

Both in Law No. 765 and in Law No. 5237 the offence of “killing” is regulated among the offences that can be committed by negligence. This offence, which appeared in Article 455 of Law No. 765 in the form “causing the death of a person through imprudence or carelessness or inexperience in a profession or craft or non-observance of regulations, orders and instructions…”, is regulated in Article 85 of Law No. 5237, while negligence is defined in Article 22(2) of the same Law. According to that provision, “Negligence is the carrying out of conduct, owing to a breach of the duty of care and attention, without foreseeing the result specified in the statutory definition of the offence.” Accordingly, in the wrongs realised in negligent offences too the perpetrator acts voluntarily; however, while foreseeing a result of no legal significance, he causes another result that is legally significant to occur. The occurrence of this unforeseen result is caused by the perpetrator’s conduct in breach of the objective duty of care. In other words, the element of wrong in a negligent offence consists in the breach of the duty of care and attention. In the system introduced by Law No. 5237, for there to be liability for a negligent wrong the perpetrator must, given his own abilities, powers of perception, experience, level of knowledge and the conditions in which he finds himself, be in a position to foresee and fulfil the objectively existing duty of care and attention. A person who, although possessing all these abilities, acts in breach of this duty will, if he causes the result specified in the definition of the offence to occur, be deemed culpable and held liable for the negligent offence. Here, an average person or the like is not taken as the yardstick. The situation in which the perpetrator himself finds himself and his personal characteristics must be taken into account. In a negligent wrong the perpetrator has not foreseen the realisation of the result in the statutory definition of the offence. However, where we reach a judgment to the effect that “had he not acted in breach of the duty of care and attention, he could have foreseen this result”, we arrive at the conclusion that the perpetrator is culpable.

Turning to the specific case: it cannot be said that the accused, who is accepted to have fired in the belief that the object moving in front of the window was a squirrel, acted at the time of his act with “direct intent”, because he was mistaken as to the “object of the offence”, nor that he acted with “conditional intent” or “conscious negligence”, since the conviction has been formed that he did not foresee that there was a human being there.

By contrast, had the accused exercised the necessary care and attention or, in other words, had he not acted in breach of the duty of care and attention, he could have foreseen the result that occurred in the form of his sibling’s death.

Accordingly, since the act of the accused – who came home tired and passed from the bright outdoor environment into the dark interior of the house and who, influenced also by the earlier incidents involving squirrels, took the living creature moving in front of the window for a squirrel and, without exercising the necessary care and attention, fired a shotgun and thereby shot his sibling who was in front of the window – will constitute the offence of “negligent killing” under both Law No. 765 and Law No. 5237, the Local Court’s decision to persist in its judgment is not well founded.” YCGK, E. 2008/1-150 K. 2008/192 T. 15.7.2008. exclude culpability. In distinguishing between an essential and a non-essential mistake, the criterion adopted is that “the mistake will be regarded as essential if the act would not constitute an offence had the event which the perpetrator thought of, had in mind and pictured to himself corresponded to reality”34. The perpetrator is given the benefit of this essential mistake and his culpability is excluded. In the case of a non-essential mistake, on the other hand, either the perpetrator’s belief may make no legal difference to his act (it still constitutes the same offence type), or, had his mistaken belief been true, it might constitute a different offence. If the non-essential mistake is one that would constitute another offence, the perpetrator will be held liable not for the offence he actually committed but for the offence he intended in his will to commit; in other words, a solution in favour of the will is adopted. For example, if the perpetrator acts without knowing that the person he insults is the President of the Republic, then, although he in fact commits the offence of insulting the President of the Republic (Art. 299), this non-essential mistake too will be taken into account and he will be held liable for the basic form of the offence of insult, which can be committed against anyone (Art. 125). In another example, although the perpetrator, believing that the public prosecutor who summons him to the courthouse is a fraudster, commits the offence of insulting a public official on account of his duties (Art. 125(3)(a)), this non-essential mistake too may be taken into account and he will be held liable for the basic form of the offence of insult, which can be committed against anyone (Art. 125).

It should be noted that the distinction between essential and non-essential mistake, although it coincides in its practical results, has not been adopted in the system of the TCK No. 5237. The TCK follows only a distinction between avoidability and unavoidability, and no other distinction has any normative basis. We should also point out that, in a distinction between essential and non-essential, the criterion of essentiality would create uncertainty and relativity. Moreover, such a distinction serves no function. For we must also state that what is “essential” is that the perpetrator does not know the elements in the statutory definition of the offence; that there is no relationship of subordination and superiority, or any other hierarchy, such as essential or non-essential, among the elements in the statutory definition of the offence; and that, bearing in mind that intent must encompass all the elements in the statutory definition, a mistake as to any one of these elements leads to ignorance and will exclude the perpetrator’s intent.

2. Mistake in Relation to Offence Types with Alternative Acts

In another situation, it must be explained how mistake is to be applied where alternative acts are provided for in the offence the perpetrator intends to commit. If the perpetrator, while carrying out one of the alternative acts, acts in the belief that the material elements of the offence are not being realised, there is no problem here. For the provisions on mistake as to the statutory definition are applied to the perpetrator and the conclusion is reached that his intent is excluded. In a more complex problem, however, the perpetrator may at the same time, as a result of a “reverse mistake”, have acted in the belief that an alternative act different from the one he actually committed was present in the case. That is to say, while acting with the intent to commit one alternative act he may have realised another alternative act of the same offence35. It must be determined what conclusion is to be reached in this situation.

The older view on this matter is that alternative acts are in fact formed by the combination of different offence types and that, where the perpetrator is mistaken as to the presence of the alternative act he intended and realises another alternative act, there will be an attempt in respect of the alternative act that was intended but as to whose presence he was mistaken, and liability for negligence in respect of the act that was not intended but was realised36.

The view that prevails today, by contrast, accepts that not all offences with alternative acts can be assessed in the same way, and that most of them are in reality forms of conduct which the legislature has treated as equivalent to one another in order to specify different ways of committing the same offence type37. On this view, if two alternative acts can, having regard also to the protected legal interest, be brought under a single overarching heading and assessed as a single norm of conduct, they are equivalent, and mistakes between them are therefore disregarded; that is, the conclusion is reached that the perpetrator has committed the offence he intended. Since there is no change in terms of “the offence type he believed he was realising” either, his mistake will in any case be a mistake of no legal significance38.

There are two basic reasons for regulating an offence as one with alternative acts: the first is that the offence may be delimited by enumerating its material object; alternatively – and this is what is generally preferred – a limitation is introduced relating to the manner in which the offence is committed. When these two reasons are examined, a mistake between alternative acts under the same offence type amounts either to a non-essential mistake as to the material object of the offence or to a deviation in the manner of commission of the offence, that is, in the causal link. In both cases, when the general rules are applied, the conclusion is reached that the perpetrator’s intent is not affected39. The example given in legal scholarship is the provision of alternative acts relating to the object of the offence in the offence of violation of the inviolability of the home (Art. 116)40. In this example, the perpetrator believes that he is entering a dwelling without the owner’s knowledge but is in fact entering an appurtenance. Since the perpetrator’s mistake on this point is a mistake as to the object of the offence, it will be regarded as immaterial and the perpetrator will be held liable for the offence of violating the inviolability of the home. For in the offence of violating the inviolability of the home the legislature in reality aims, with both elements, to protect the same legal interest, namely – as also stated in the explanatory memorandum to the law – “the peace and quiet proper to the individual and the feeling of security that must exist in order for life in one’s home to proceed in peace and safety”. The commission of either act will infringe this interest in the same way.

3. Cases of Reverse Mistake as to an Element, Double Reverse Mistake and Impossible Offence (Inept Attempt)

The perpetrator’s mistake may consist in an act which in his mind does not constitute an offence in fact constituting one; conversely, it may consist in the perpetrator believing that he is committing an offence whereas in reality his act does not correspond to the offence type and therefore does not constitute an offence. In the latter case, although the perpetrator thinks he is committing an offence, in reality he is not. For example, the perpetrator acts in the belief that he has taken someone else’s bag and committed the offence of theft, but some time later realises that the bag is his own. Such cases are called “reverse mistake as to an element” in legal scholarship41.

Such cases of reverse mistake are assessed under the provisions on inept attempt (impossible offence), and no penalty is imposed on the perpetrator. Since by this act the perpetrator infringes no offence type and no legal interest, it is not possible to punish him on account of the thought in his mind either.

Double reverse mistake, by contrast, presents a more complicated problem. Here the perpetrator believes in his mind that he is committing a certain offence, whereas in reality he is not committing the offence he supposes but is committing a different one. It will not be possible for the perpetrator to benefit from this mistake. For even if what he pictured in his mind had been true, his act would still constitute an offence42. In the case of a double reverse mistake, the perpetrator may, depending on the circumstances, be held liable either for the offence he intended to commit or for the offence he actually committed. For example, the perpetrator picks up from the ground an item belonging to another in the belief that he is committing the “offence of theft” (Art. 141), but because the property in reality has no owner, his act falls within the scope of the “offence of disposing of property that has been lost or obtained as a result of a mistake” (Art. 160). In this situation there is an impossible offence as far as theft is concerned. For although the perpetrator’s perception is that he is committing theft, it is not possible for him to commit that offence because the item has no owner. On the other hand, the perpetrator in any event acts in the knowledge that the item does not belong to him. This knowledge also accords with the objective reality that he is committing the offence of disposing of property that has been lost or obtained as a result of a mistake. In this example, therefore, he must be held liable for the offence in question, regulated in Art. 16043. If we construct the example the other way round: the perpetrator believes in his mind that he is taking a lost item (Art.

160), whereas in reality he is taking an item belonging to another (Art. 141). In this case the perpetrator must be punished for the offence at which his will was directed, namely disposing of property that has been lost or obtained as a result of a mistake (Art. 160), and should bear no liability for the offence of theft (Art. 141)44.

B. Mistake as to the Qualifying Elements of the Offence

Qualified forms too are, in essence, assessed under the statutory definition of the offence when they are realised. However, alongside mistake as to the basic form of the offence type, the legislature has devoted a separate paragraph to mistake as to the elements of the qualified forms:

“A person who is mistaken as to whether the qualified forms of an offence that entail a heavier or a lighter penalty have been realised shall benefit from this mistake.”

The perpetrator’s ignorance of aggravating or mitigating circumstances arising from the person of the victim, although it is the consequence of a mistake as to the material object of the offence, has been treated as a different kind of mistake. The perpetrator benefits from this mistake, which affects his intent45. It must be said that this mistake will only have the consequence that the provisions on the qualifying element are not applied to the perpetrator, while his liability for the basic form of the offence continues. A mistake as to qualifying elements may relate to a qualified form that increases the penalty or to one that reduces it. Here the perpetrator will benefit from the mistake he has made and, by way of exception to the principle that the discrepancy between the perpetrator’s will and objective reality must be resolved according to the perpetrator’s subjective position, the solution favourable to the perpetrator will be applied in both situations. For example, the perpetrator acts in the belief that he is killing his father but kills a person who is not his father. The commission of the offence of killing against a lineal ascendant is an aggravated (qualified) form (Art. 82(1)(d)). Although the perpetrator acts with the will to realise this aggravated form, he falls into a mistake as to the person and ends the life of someone who is not his father. The perpetrator will benefit from his mistake as to the qualifying element and will not be punished for aggravated killing. Nevertheless, since his mistake as to the person is an equivalent mistake, his liability for the offence of killing (Art. 81) will continue. If we construct the example the other way round, where the perpetrator, wishing to kill another person who is his enemy, kills his father, the provisions on aggravated killing committed against a lineal ascendant will likewise not be applied to him and he will be held liable only for the basic form of the offence of killing.

In another example, in which the perpetrator acts in the belief that he is killing his father and in fact causes the death of his mother, a “two-sided mistake” is involved. What solution is to be followed in this situation is disputed46. In our view, the perpetrator should benefit from his mistake and the aggravated form relating to lineal ascendants should not be applied. For the perpetrator’s intent was directed at killing his father, and this did not occur. As regards the fact that his act was carried out against his mother, he was in ignorance. The perpetrator should benefit from this ignorance, that is, from his mistake. He should be held liable for the basic form of the offence of killing. Weight should be given to what the perpetrator pictured in his mind47. Otherwise, the perpetrator will have been punished once more for having killed his mother, whom he perhaps never wished to kill at all, and criminal liability will thereby have been extended.

Finally in this section, we must note that, since offences aggravated by their result are not a qualified form, no consequence attaches to whether or not the perpetrator knows of them. Accordingly, mistake in relation to offences aggravated by their result is a problem to be resolved not under Article 30 but under Article 23. Since for such an offence aggravated by its result the perpetrator must have acted “at least negligently”, it may be examined whether the mistake has had any effect on that negligence48. In addition, it should be noted that, since the basic form of an offence aggravated by its result can be committed intentionally, a mistake as to the basic form may also affect the aggravated result. In a situation where the perpetrator’s intent as to the statutory definition of the basic offence is excluded by reason of mistake and no negligent form of the offence is provided for either, the basic offence falls away and it will therefore not be possible to hold the perpetrator separately liable for the aggravated offence. Indeed, the special aggravating result occurs in dependence on the basic offence type49.

C. Mistake as to the Material Conditions of Grounds of Justification50

Mistake as to grounds of justification is regulated, under the heading of grounds excluding or reducing criminal liability, in Art. 30(3) of the TCK as follows:

“A person who falls into an unavoidable mistake as to whether the conditions of the grounds excluding or reducing criminal liability have been fulfilled shall benefit from this mistake.”

In order for the provisions on mistake concerning the grounds excluding or reducing criminal liability to be applied, it must first be determined in which cases criminal liability is excluded or reduced. The grounds excluding or reducing criminal liability are regulated in Book One, Part Two, Chapter Two of the TCK, in Articles 24 to 34. These articles regulate together grounds of justification, circumstances affecting culpability and grounds of excuse. Although grounds of justification in essence result not in the exclusion of criminal liability but in the act emerging as lawful, and an acquittal must accordingly be given under Art. 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK), they are regulated under this heading in the system of the TCK. This is a flawed method of regulation. We therefore follow the distinction that we consider theoretically correct and find it appropriate to deal with mistake as to the material conditions of grounds of justification under the heading “mistake excluding intent”51.

In the case of a mistake as to the material conditions of grounds of justification, the perpetrator forms a positive belief that the conditions of a ground of justification are fulfilled in a specific case52. By falling into such a mistake, the perpetrator acts in the belief that the material conditions that would render his act lawful really exist. As with mistake as to the statutory definition, what is involved is a mistake not of law but of fact53. For example, a householder whose home is regularly broken into by thieves and in whose street such incidents have also occurred before is woken at night by a noise and, from the sound of footsteps, thinks that the thief has come to his house again. He thereupon strikes the thief on the head with a wooden stick he has picked up and injures him. It later turns out that the person whom the householder took for a thief was his son, who was going to the kitchen to drink water during the night. As will be seen here, the perpetrator (the householder) believes that the offences of theft and violation of the inviolability of the home are being committed against him and commits the offence of intentional injury in the belief that the conditions of self-defence are met. As will be seen, the perpetrator here acts under a mistake as to whether a ground of justification is present.

Art. 30(3) expressly provides that, in order for the perpetrator to benefit from his mistake as to the material conditions of grounds of justification, this mistake must be “unavoidable”. It must therefore be determined when a mistake is avoidable and when it is unavoidable. Making mistake dependent on a concept as vague as unavoidability has rightly been criticised in legal scholarship54. What is to be understood by the concept of unavoidability can only be determined by means of the concept of avoidability. In this sense avoidability may be understood, using a criterion borrowed from negligence, as the possibility of saying that “had the perpetrator exercised the required care and attention, he would not have fallen into this mistake”. The required care and attention, in turn, can be understood by reference to the concept of negligence. Accordingly, whether a mistake is avoidable and, if it is unavoidable, whether the perpetrator can benefit from his mistake depends on an assessment to be made in parallel with the perpetrator’s negligence. This is in fact a result that is also in line with the regulation in the TCK, because under Art. 30(1) a perpetrator who is mistaken as to the statutory definition and whose mistake is avoidable will likewise face liability for the negligent form. In conclusion, the assessment of avoidability is the assessment to be made with regard to negligence.

Having explained that the perpetrator will benefit from his unavoidable mistake and when a mistake is to be regarded as avoidable or unavoidable, it must be examined whether the finding that a mistake was avoidable produces any legal consequence. One view in legal scholarship, which we share, states that in cases where the mistake is avoidable the perpetrator’s intent must be excluded55. Indeed, the assessment made as to avoidability concerns whether or not the perpetrator was negligent. Again, where the perpetrator has acted under a misapprehension, the existence of his mistake should exclude his intent, while the way in which the mistake was made should play a role in whether he can be held liable to the extent of negligence. Accordingly, if the perpetrator’s mistake is an avoidable one, he should be held liable only for the negligent form and should not be liable for the intentional form of the offence. The Court of Cassation has not yet adopted this view and rules, as stated in the explanatory memorandum to the law, that the perpetrator may benefit from his mistake only if it is unavoidable and that, where it is avoidable, this may be taken into account at the stage of determining the penalty56.

Finally, we wish to mention the concepts of the exclusion of intent and of intent deriving from culpability, and the doctrine of the dual function of intent. When it is recalled that intent is the knowing and willing realisation of the elements belonging to the statutory definition, it may occur to one that there is in fact no mistake here as to an element of the statutory definition and that, in this sense, intent may not have been excluded. Indeed, the perpetrator is not mistaken as to an element belonging to the statutory definition, for example as to the object of the offence or the victim. His knowledge of the elements belonging to the statutory definition – such as against whom he commits the offence, in what manner he carries out his act and what object is harmed by the offence – is complete, and he has intent with regard to the material elements of the statutory definition. His mistake relates to a condition of the ground of justification, and in fact this mistake lies, methodologically and systematically too, not in the statutory definition but in the field of the ground of justification. Nevertheless, it is accepted that the perpetrator’s intent is excluded. The reason for accepting in this situation that the perpetrator’s intent is excluded is explained by the idea of the “dual position of intent” (Ger. Doppelstellung des Vorsatzes) or the “dual function of intent” (Ger. Doppelfunktion des Vorsatzes)57.

According to the doctrine of the dual function of intent, intent has its effect both at the level of the statutory definition and at the level of culpability. The perpetrator’s knowledge of and will towards the elements belonging to the statutory definition constitute his intent at the level of the statutory definition, while his culpable attitude of mind in his inner world constitutes his intent at the level of culpability. The intent of a perpetrator who is mistaken as to a ground of justification is excluded on the basis that he acts in the belief that the conditions of justification are met and, in this respect, does not act on the basis of a culpable attitude of mind. For, having regard to the factual circumstances, the perpetrator believes that he is acting on lawful ground. That intent in the sense of the statutory definition is present here whereas the intent that operates at the level of culpability is absent should not be thought of as a contradiction. While intent operates in two positions, and although these two mostly yield the same result (intent is present – absent), they are also determined according to different criteria and assessments. Accordingly, in some areas where the dual function takes effect, as in mistake as to the material condition of grounds of justification, the perpetrator may, even though intent in the sense of the statutory definition has been realised, not have acted with a culpable attitude of mind. The dual function of intent has by now come to be widely accepted in German and Turkish criminal law scholarship58.

II. MISTAKE AS TO GROUNDS AFFECTING CULPABILITY

A. Mistake as to the Material Elements of Grounds Excluding or Reducing Culpability

Where there is a mistake as to grounds excluding or reducing culpability, this mistake must be assessed at the level of culpability and, if it is unavoidable, the perpetrator must benefit from it and no penalty should be imposed on him59. The perpetrator will benefit from this mistake only when it is unavoidable, and no culpability can be attributed to him by reason of his unavoidable mistake. If, on the other hand, his mistake is avoidable, this will have no effect on his culpability and his liability for his act will continue.

Among the grounds excluding or reducing culpability we wish to dwell in particular on unjust provocation (Art. 29), whose likelihood of application60 is greater, and on mistake as to the conditions of unjust provocation. Let us illustrate mistake as to the conditions of unjust provocation with an example. A and B are walking along the street joking with each other. When they stop and begin to laugh together in the direction of C, C thinks that they are insulting him and making him the butt of a joke. Enraged by this, C cannot restrain himself and deals A a punch. It later turns out that A and B were not insulting him and were joking with their friend D, who was standing behind C. C believes that a wrongful act has been committed against him and, under the influence of the rage arising from it, commits the offence of intentional injury by way of reaction. If this mistake of C, who is mistaken as to the conditions of unjust provocation, is regarded as unavoidable, he cannot be found culpable for his act and no penalty can be imposed on him. If his mistake is avoidable, that is, if he would not have fallen into it had he exercised the required care and attention, the mistake will have no effect on his culpability. The Court of Cassation, too, examined whether a mistake in unjust provocation was unavoidable in a case in which persons who were together keeping watch for a possible thief in order to prevent the thefts occurring in their neighbourhood later separated and searched for the thief, and the perpetrator, who had a gun in his hand, killed the friend with whom he had been keeping watch for the thief, taking him for the thief; it held that the provisions on mistake in unjust provocation could not be applied, since, had the perpetrator exercised the required care and attention, he could have realised that the deceased was not a thief61.

The other case that comes to mind within the scope of mistake as to the material elements of grounds excluding or reducing culpability is mistake arising in relation to grounds of excuse. In fact, in this case of mistake concerning grounds of excuse, a technique similar to that in the mistake as to the material conditions of grounds of justification discussed above is at work. Here too, for instance, there is a mistake about material elements which, had they really existed, would have brought about the fulfilment of the conditions of a ground of excuse recognised by the legal order in respect of the perpetrator62. However, unlike mistake as to the material conditions of grounds of justification, this type of mistake will take effect at the level of culpability, in relation to a wrong that has been realised. The assessment must therefore be made under avoidability, in line also with what has been said about unjust provocation. A perpetrator whose mistake is unavoidable is deemed to be without culpability. The essential basis for this is the idea that there is no difference between the case where the danger in the compelling situation that affects the perpetrator psychologically has really arisen and the case where it exists only in his mind. If this situation of danger is recognised as a circumstance affecting culpability, the culpability of a perpetrator in this psychological state – in other words, his ability to direct his will and conduct – is affected in the same way. The result must therefore be the same63.

When the subject matter of the dispute is assessed in the light of these explanations;

In the specific case, in which – on account of thefts that had previously occurred in their neighbourhood – the accused and the deceased gathered with their relatives on the night of the incident to keep watch in order to catch the thief should one come; when the deceased’s wife telephoned and said that a noise was coming from the roof of their house, they all set off together towards the deceased’s house; the accused meanwhile fired two shots into the air with the rifle in his hand in order to frighten; the deceased and the accused parted beside the house; the accused waited at the rear of the deceased’s house; and some time later, as the deceased entered the stepped street where the accused was, the accused fired one shot with the rifle, in adequate visibility and from a distance of about three metres, at the deceased, whom he thought to be a thief, and the deceased, hit in the head, lost his life: when the facts that no theft was established on the night of the incident in the neighbourhood where the accused lived, that there was a large street lamp alight at the place where the incident occurred, and that the accused fired the rifle towards the deceased without saying anything, in adequate visibility and from a distance of three metres, are assessed together, the accused could, had he acted with greater care and attention, have realised that the person at whom he fired was the deceased ...; for this reason, since the accused’s mistake is not a mistake of an unavoidable nature, he cannot benefit from the provisions on mistake; moreover, since there was also no word or conduct emanating from the deceased that would constitute unjust provocation, the local court’s application of the provision on unjust provocation to the accused is not well founded. On the other hand, the accused acted with the intent to kill a human being, even if a thief, and there is nothing unlawful either in holding him liable for the offence of intentional killing even though he was mistaken as to the identity of the victim.

Accordingly, the Special Chamber’s decision to quash is well founded and, since the accused’s mistake is not a mistake of an unavoidable nature and it is therefore not possible for the accused to benefit from the provisions on mistake, it must be decided to quash the local court’s judgment persisting in its decision, which applied the provisions on unjust provocation to the accused.” YCGK, E. 2014/336, K. 2015/352, 27.10.2015.

B. Mistake as to Wrongfulness (Mistake as to the Prohibition)

1. In General

Mistake as to wrongfulness is regulated in Art. 30(4) of the TCK as follows:

“A person who falls into an unavoidable mistake as to whether the act he commits constitutes a wrong shall not be punished.”

With the provision on mistake as to wrongfulness, the rule laid down in Article 4 of the Code that “ignorance of the criminal laws shall not be deemed an excuse” has in fact been rendered inoperative; there is no longer any need to retain Article 4, because where certain conditions are present ignorance of the law will be deemed an excuse. However, it should not be thought that the two matters fully overlap here. A perpetrator who does not know the criminal laws and whose ignorance is not accepted as a ground of excuse (Art. 4) nevertheless knows that his act constitutes a wrong; at the very least, he thinks that he is doing something “wrong”. He merely lacks precise knowledge as to which law and which article his act will be assessed under, how his legal position will be determined and the binding force of the provision. A perpetrator in this position need not have full command of the way his act is regulated in the legislation or know the relevant law and article. Even if he does not know “the criminal laws”, he can be punished for this act. In short, knowing or not knowing the law does not form part of culpability64.

In mistake as to wrongfulness, on the other hand, the perpetrator does not, in terms of his own socio-cultural values, think that his act constitutes a wrong. In his culture, in his system of social values, there is no prohibition on performing the act in question; performing this act does not infringe values belonging to another and, in this sense, no wrong occurs. In his world of thought, in the culture or environment in which he was raised, there is no question of his being blamed for this act. It is precisely such a perception regarding the judgment of blame that forms part of culpability; a perpetrator who falls into an unavoidable mistake as to whether the act constitutes a wrong is not found culpable for this act and no penalty is imposed on him65.

The legal nature of mistake as to wrongfulness can be explained in particular by comparison with mistake as to the statutory definition. In mistake as to wrongfulness the perpetrator, although he has full knowledge of the material facts constituting the wrong, does not know that the act he performs is prohibited66. Thus, whereas in mistake as to the statutory definition the perpetrator is mistaken about the material facts relating to the objective elements of the offence type, in mistake as to wrongfulness the perpetrator, although he possesses all knowledge relating to the offence type, is unaware that his act constitutes a wrong67.

In order to establish the legal nature of mistake as to wrongfulness and to determine in which cases it may be applied, the concept of awareness of wrongfulness must first be defined, and then it must be determined what the object of awareness of wrongfulness is. Without determining what the wrong is, it is not possible to determine where a mistake has been made and to attach consequences to that mistake.

2. The Concept of Awareness of Wrongfulness and Its Relationship with Mistake as to Wrongfulness

Mistake as to wrongfulness and awareness of wrongfulness are concepts that can be understood and given meaning in relation to one another. Indeed, in order to accept that the perpetrator has fallen into a mistake as to wrongfulness, he must have acted without awareness of wrongfulness (Ger. Unrechtsbewusstsein) when carrying out his act. For if the perpetrator had awareness of wrongfulness with regard to his act, he would not carry it out or, if he did carry it out, one could no longer speak of a mistake on his part as to whether this act constituted a wrong.

Awareness of wrongfulness is, in short, the perpetrator’s knowledge that his act constitutes a wrong. The perpetrator need not know whether his act constitutes an offence, under which article he will be punished if it does, or how binding this rule of law is. The German Federal Court of Justice, too, has defined awareness of wrongfulness as “the perpetrator’s knowing that the conduct he engages in is not legally permitted but a prohibited act”68. Again, the fact that the perpetrator carries out his act because of his moral, religious or political views and, because of this way of life, feels obliged to carry it out will not release him from liability. For it to be accepted that awareness of wrongfulness is lacking, the perpetrator must think that his act is permitted by the legal order. No order, paradigm or body of rules other than the legal order can be regarded as a justification for the act being permitted69.

It is possible to establish a direct organic link between awareness of wrongfulness and the capacity for culpability. The element of will underlying the capacity for culpability requires the perpetrator’s ability freely to determine and direct his will as between rightful and wrongful conduct. Freedom of will necessarily also includes the ability to comprehend the meaning of one’s conduct from the standpoint of the legal order. The will, and hence the conduct, of a perpetrator who is and of one who is not aware of the wrong is affected by this awareness. For example, the perpetrator of the offence of theft, aware that his act constitutes a wrong, will act more carefully and may take various precautions, such as concealing his face so as not to be caught or moving slowly so as not to wake the people in the house he has entered70. By the same token, it is not possible for a person who is not aware that his act constitutes a wrong to direct his conduct in this way. If he had this awareness, he would be able to form a will not to commit this wrong. In this sense the perpetrator lacks the awareness – which forms the basis of the idea of culpability – of assessing right and wrong, good and evil, and of choosing by his act conduct that is blameworthy under criminal law. A perpetrator who lacks such awareness of choice is likewise not found culpable if this mistake is unavoidable. Accordingly, awareness of wrongfulness can be directly linked to the volitional capacity that forms part of the capacity for culpability, and awareness of wrongfulness cannot be determined independently of these elements. The reason for this is to enable a holistic assessment of the perpetrator’s blameworthiness71. Likewise, in a person who lacks volitional capacity, since there will be no wrongful result towards which he could direct his act by his free will, it will not be possible for awareness of wrongfulness to form either. For instance, on the basis that an individual over the age of 18 whose physical and psychological development is healthy has the capacity of perception and of will, the separate assessment of whether awareness of wrongfulness exists is examined under circumstances affecting culpability such as mistake as to wrongfulness. In a person who has no capacity for culpability because he lacks the capacity of perception and of will, however, we naturally regard awareness of wrongfulness as absent as well.

Finally, mention must be made of the fact that awareness of wrongfulness is act-related and divisible72. Accordingly, the perpetrator must in every case perceive the specific wrongful content of the concrete act. Where more than one criminal norm is affected by one and the same conduct of the perpetrator, the assessment of avoidability will be made in respect of each norm violation, even if the perpetrator regards his own conduct as a whole as unlawful. For culpability is always the culpability of the offence whose statutory definition has been fulfilled. Culpability is therefore directly tied to the offence in question; a person is found culpable in respect of a specific offence. One cannot speak in general of a culpability for the conduct of one’s life. Indeed, the notion of “culpability for the conduct of one’s life” can only arise in authoritarian or totalitarian conceptions of the state.

3. Mistake as to the Existence of a Ground of Justification

A mistake relating to a ground of justification may arise as to whether such a ground of justification exists at all. This mistake as to the existence of a ground of justification is also called “mistake as to permission” (error as to the permissive norm, Ger. Erlaubnisirrtum)73. In addition, this mistake as to the existence of a ground of justification is also termed in legal scholarship “indirect mistake as to wrongfulness”74.

In this scenario the perpetrator acts as if a ground of justification existed although no such ground exists. For example, a young physician, believing that euthanasia is a ground of justification, has discontinued the life support of a patient who has no prospect of returning to life and has caused the patient’s death75. In another example, the perpetrator thinks that he may beat the person he has married and that this will not be punished by law, and assumes that there is a ground of justification for his act.

The perpetrator’s mistake here is not a mistake of fact concerning material circumstances; rather, he is under a mistake of law to the effect that the legal order “permits” his act. The mistake here should therefore not be confused with mistake as to the material conditions of a ground of justification. In his mistake as to the existence of a ground of justification (indirect mistake as to wrongfulness), the perpetrator falls into a legal error. In his mistake as to the material conditions of grounds of justification, on the other hand, he is mistaken about the factual situation and thinks that the conditions of the ground of justification are present in the case, and in this respect falls into a mistake of fact.

Mistake as to the existence of grounds of justification is not regulated in the TCK. A number of solutions have been developed on this matter in legal scholarship, and under the strict theory of culpability, put forward in German criminal law by Welzel and adopted by us as well, this mistake of the perpetrator must be assessed as a mistake as to wrongfulness (Art. 30(4))76. For here the perpetrator acts in the awareness that his act is lawful and, in this sense, does not constitute a wrong. Yet, contrary to what the perpetrator pictures in his mind, his act is not approved by the legal order and is not regarded as lawful.

Accordingly, when the physician who performs euthanasia and the spouse who uses violence in the home are considered, the matter will be assessed in terms of mistake as to wrongfulness; if the physician’s conception of euthanasia as a ground of justification is an unavoidable mistake, he will benefit from this mistake and no penalty can be imposed on him for the offence of intentional killing, whereas if this mistake is avoidable he will not be able to benefit from it and will be held liable for the offence of intentional killing. On the other hand, we can say that, since all physicians today are informed in the medical faculties of our country that euthanasia is an offence, it is hardly possible for a defence that they lacked awareness of wrongfulness in this respect to be valid. As for the spouse who uses violence in the home, considering that the perpetrator has a social awareness, stemming from human nature, that his act constitutes a wrong, his belief that the law permits him to use violence against his spouse once he is married will not be taken into account; the perpetrator will not be able to benefit from this avoidable mistake and his criminal liability for his act will continue.

4. Consequences Attached to Mistake as to Wrongfulness

The perpetrator can benefit from a mistake as to wrongfulness only if it can be found to be unavoidable. Where he has fallen into an avoidable mistake, the perpetrator’s liability will continue. The assessment of unavoidability and avoidability is, as we stated above, carried out by the standard of care and attention applied in relation to negligence. Certain criteria developed specifically for mistake as to wrongfulness also play a role here. In determining whether a mistake as to wrongfulness is avoidable, the moment at which the act is carried out (ex ante) is taken as the basis, as in the assessment to be made with regard to culpability. Three conditions must be fulfilled for a mistake as to wrongfulness to be avoidable. The first is that the perpetrator had the possibility of comprehending the unlawfulness of his conduct. In examining the possibility of comprehension, two assessments are made, one subjective and one objective. In the subjective assessment, conditions such as the family in which the perpetrator was raised and environmental factors, his education, occupation and social position are examined, and the perpetrator’s mental state and social values are established. A further examination under the possibility of comprehension concerns whether the perpetrator objectively had the possibility of obtaining information about the unlawfulness of his act. It is assessed whether he could have obtained information about the unlawfulness of his act by consulting experts. Secondly, it is examined whether there was an occasion for the perpetrator, at the stage of carrying out his act, to question his act and to have doubts about his position vis-à-vis the legal order, so that he might become aware of the wrong he was committing. An occasion is the reason that would prompt the perpetrator to stop and think during his act. When, on some occasion, the perpetrator finds himself having to question his act, he must fulfil his obligation to ascertain the legal status of his act. Otherwise the mistake as to wrongfulness will be avoidable. Lastly, it must be possible to expect the perpetrator to use the available means in order to comprehend his wrong. If the perpetrator, using all the means at his disposal, has made an effort to obtain information about his act but has still been unable to obtain reliable information as to whether his act constitutes a wrong, it must be concluded that he could no longer be expected to comprehend it, and he must be given the benefit of this mistake77.

The criteria mentioned above also play a role in the Court of Cassation’s assessments of unavoidable mistake as to wrongfulness. According to the facts of a Court of Cassation decision, the accused had been working as a security guard in the United States for twelve years and brought four firearms with him when coming to Türkiye. He fulfilled his obligation to declare these firearms incompletely and declared only one firearm. In its assessment of the offence of bringing prohibited firearms into the country, the Court of Cassation stated that the perpetrator was not in a state of unavoidable mistake as to wrongfulness; as its reason it pointed out that the accused, who had lived in Türkiye until the age of 18 and had received higher education, could not benefit from this mistake78. As will be seen, in its assessment the Court of Cassation evaluated the perpetrator’s subjective situation and based its decision on the fact that the perpetrator had the possibility of comprehending the wrong.

III. THE EFFECT OF MISTAKE ON OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF PUNISHABILITY

Objective conditions of punishability, which are located within the offence type and thus appear to be elements of the offence, are in fact elements that have no bearing on the wrongful content of the act and that are determined by the legislature according to the requirements of criminal policy and used to limit punishability79. Since whether or not these elements are realised in a specific case has no effect on the wrongful content of the act, these conditions do not conflict with the principle of culpability either80.

Objective conditions of punishability in fact form a sub-category of the grounds of impunity. Just as the perpetrator’s intent need not cover the punishability of the act, so a mistake about them has no effect on intent81. As regards an objective condition of punishability, it makes no difference whether or not the perpetrator was mistaken. If the element (condition) is fulfilled the perpetrator will be punished; if it is not fulfilled he will not be punished (even though the act retains its character as an offence)82. For example, for the offence of insult in Article 125 to be punishable when committed in the victim’s absence, it must be communicated to three persons83. Since this is an objective condition of punishability, whether or not the perpetrator knows that he has communicated it to three persons is of no importance for the fulfilment of the condition. Thus, for example, if a speaker at a conference, not knowing that the microphone is on, leans towards the ear of the speaker beside him and uses insulting expressions about a third person who is not in the hall at the time, and these words are also heard by the audience listening to the conference, the objective condition of punishability is fulfilled together with the offence. In this case it cannot be said that the perpetrator was mistaken as to the material elements of the offence because he did not know that the microphone was on84, and the perpetrator is punished85.

Proceeding from the same example, if the perpetrator, again not knowing that his microphone is on, this time says the same words to the speaker beside him about a third person who is present in the hall, and the words are heard by the whole audience in the hall, then – since there is no objective condition of punishability for the offence of insult in the victim’s presence and the words would have to be addressed directly to the person concerned – the perpetrator’s mistake relates to the elements of the offence, and since he has no intent this offence is not committed. However, since the element of communication to three persons other than the victim will nevertheless have been fulfilled, the perpetrator is this time punished for the offence of insult in the victim’s absence86.

Conditions for prosecution such as authorisation, complaint and decision, on the other hand, are entirely independent of the realisation of the offence type and of the wrong, and a mistake as to their existence or absence therefore in no way gives rise to a mistake as to the statutory definition or a mistake as to the prohibition87.

IV. DEVIATION FROM THE TARGET

Deviation from the target (Lat. aberratio ictus) is not, in essence, a case of mistake. For in the case of deviation it is not the perpetrator’s ignorance (not knowing at all or knowing wrongly) but his lack of skill that plays a role. What distinguishes it from mistake as to the person or as to the object of the offence (Lat. error in persona vel objecto) is that, rather than merely being mistaken about the person or object harmed, the perpetrator envisaged a different causal link between his act and the result, which did not materialise, the harm being caused to another object or person88. To explain deviation from the target by an example: the perpetrator fires at A, whom he wishes to kill, but deviates from his target (for example because his hand trembles) and hits and kills B, who is passing along the street at that moment. In this situation there are two different results. The first is the attempt to commit the offence of killing against A, because the perpetrator began the act of killing directed at A with suitable means but was unable to bring about the result for reasons beyond his control; the second is the result of killing B. The perpetrator’s criminal liability must be determined by applying the provisions on concurrence of offences (notional concurrence) between these two results.

As the example shows, in the case of deviation there is no discrepancy between what the perpetrator pictures in his mind and reality. Since, therefore, there is no ignorance on the part of the perpetrator, deviation from the target is not a case of mistake. For the deviation itself occurs not between the reality in the perpetrator’s mind and objective reality but in the perpetrator’s act.

In this respect deviation from the target must not be confused with mistake and with mistake as to the person, which is a special case of mistake. Whereas in mistake as to the person the perpetrator confuses the person on whom he is to carry out his act, in deviation from the target there is no such confusion; owing to the deviation that occurs, the perpetrator kills or injures a person other than the one he targeted, or another person in addition to the one he targeted89. Another point to be noted when deviation from the target and mistake as to the person are compared is that, whereas in mistake as to the person there is always a single result, in deviation from the target there may be more than one such result. Indeed, in deviation from the target the perpetrator may have brought about the result he was aiming at and, in bringing about that result, may also have brought about, through deviation, another result he was not aiming at. This is the case, for example, where the perpetrator aims to injure A and fires for that purpose, and the bullet that passes through A’s arm also hits B, who is beside him at that moment, and injures him too.

For all these reasons, deviation from the target, which is not a case of mistake, has not been included in Article 30 of the TCK on mistake either, and the matter is explained in the explanatory memorandum to the law as follows: “(…) It was not considered necessary to make provision within the scope of this article for the case of deviation from the target. For in the case of deviation from the target there is no mistake. In this situation there is a problem that must be assessed within the scope of the provisions on concurrence of offences. Indeed, in practice too, deviation from the target is dealt with in the context of concurrence of offences and, in particular, notional concurrence.”

In the first scenario of deviation from the target, the object the perpetrator aimed at and the object on which the result occurred as a consequence of the deviation may be the same as one another. For example, the perpetrator aims to kill A but, being unable to take aim as he wished, kills or injures B. In this scenario the perpetrator attempts intentional killing as regards A. As regards B, depending on his mental element, he may have committed the offences of killing/injury by negligence or with conditional intent. In determining the perpetrator’s mental element, the general rules on the matter will be taken into account. For instance, where the perpetrator plants a bomb in a very crowded place in order to kill the person he is targeting, it must be accepted that he has intent with regard to endangering the life of everyone who might be in the vicinity as a result of the bomb’s explosion. It is not possible to accept the contrary, that is, to deny that the perpetrator has also separately accepted these results90. Accordingly, while the results affecting persons in the immediate vicinity of the bomb will be regarded as falling within the perpetrator’s intent, an assessment as between conditional intent and direct intent may be made as regards the type of that intent. At this stage we must note that, if the perpetrator’s direct intent is accepted, to speak of deviation from the target will not be possible. For the perpetrator cannot be said to have deviated in respect of a result that he directly intended. Deviation from the target can arise only in cases of conditional intent and negligence.

In the second scenario of deviation, the objects of the offence the perpetrator aimed at and of the offence realised as a result of the deviation differ from one another. For example, the perpetrator throws a stone in order to injure A, but the stone does not hit A and breaks the window of B’s house (offence of damage to property, Art. 151). Once it has been established that the perpetrator was in a situation of deviation and what his mental element was with regard to the act he realised as a result of the deviation, the matter will be dealt with under the concurrence of offences. Here, however, the matter must be examined under three heads: a) the perpetrator, in carrying out his act, may have foreseen that a deviation might occur and accepted this, saying “come what may” (conditional intent); b) he may have foreseen the results that might occur as a consequence of deviation, yet the result occurred although he made the necessary effort to prevent it (conscious negligence); c) he may not have foreseen in the specific case a result which he was expected to foresee (ordinary negligence). The answers to be given to these questions lead to great differences in that they affect the solution of the problem, the offence provisions to be applied to the perpetrator and the amount of the penalty.

If the situation is one in which the perpetrator acts with the aim of killing, foresees while carrying out his act that others may also be affected by it and nevertheless continues his act accepting that outcome, but as a consequence of deviation kills with conditional intent a person other than the one he was targeting, the provisions on mistake are not applied, because there is no difference between what the perpetrator pictured and reality. On the other hand, even though one is realised intentionally and the other with conditional intent, more than one offence is realised by the perpetrator’s single act (attempted intentional killing and killing with conditional intent). However, although their mental elements differ and although one is completed and the other has remained at the stage of attempt, the offence committed is basically “intentional killing”. Thus, by the perpetrator’s single act, the same offence is committed more than once against more than one victim. As we shall explain later in connection with concurrence of offences, in this situation “notional concurrence of the same kind”, regulated in paragraph 2 of Article 43 of the TCK, applies. Since paragraph 3 of the same article states, however, that this article shall not apply to offences of intentional killing, real concurrence must be applied. In conclusion, in this situation the perpetrator must be given separate penalties both for the offence of intentional killing that remained at the stage of attempt and for the completed offence of killing with conditional intent.

In the other two possibilities, despite the existence of an intentional offence which the perpetrator aimed to bring about, the intentional offence is not realised (it remains at the stage of attempt), while there is also another offence which the perpetrator has realised by conscious negligence or by simple negligence. In this situation more than one different offence is committed by the perpetrator’s single act, and the rule on notional concurrence of different kinds applies (Art. 44). Since the perpetrator has infringed more than one offence provision by a single act, he is punished under Article 44 for the most serious of them.

In deviation from the target, mention is also made of the assessment of a borderline case. In this case the perpetrator fails to hit the object of the offence that he sees and harms someone else, but the person he actually wanted to harm is precisely the person he has in fact harmed. For example, A wants to shoot B. He has lain in ambush and is waiting. Meanwhile C, another person who closely resembles B, arrives. A takes aim at C, taking him for B, but misses, and the bullet, bypassing C, at that moment hits B, and B dies. Here a combination of mistake as to the person and deviation has occurred. If the bullet had hit another person passing by, for example D, one could have spoken of a case of deviation here. For A took aim at someone but failed to hit the person at whom he aimed. Even though A has achieved his original aim, intent is the mental element that must always be present in respect of all the material elements at the moment the event takes place. Criminal law should not extend the case by attaching such broad significance to a person’s inner world. Accordingly, in this case A will in fact be punished for attempting to kill C and for the negligent killing of B91.

As can be seen, none of these involves a case of mistake; what is at issue is deviation from the target. The manner in which deviation from the target materialises in terms of both the objective and the subjective elements determines which of the rules on concurrence of offences is to be applied, and this ultimately produces great differences in the statutory provisions to be applied to the perpetrator and the penalties to be imposed.

CONCLUSION

Mistake in criminal law, it is clear, cannot be resolved without a complete command of the position and function of each element in the theory of the offence. For the reality in each specific case in which the perpetrator falls into a mistake because it does not match what he pictured in his own mind affects a different element within the theory of the offence and therefore produces different consequences in terms of criminal law.

Mistake, on the one hand, by affecting the perpetrator’s intent in the mental element, prevents the offence from arising and the wrong from being realised, or raises the question of the offence having been committed by negligence, which is a different form of appearance of the offence; on the other hand, it excludes or reduces the perpetrator’s blameworthiness for the wrong he has realised. The case of mistake as to the material conditions of the statutory definition examined above is resolved by assessing whether the perpetrator’s mistake is equivalent. This equivalence will be an ex ante assessment, between the situation in the perpetrator’s mind and the situation that actually occurred, in terms both of the object or victim of the offence and of the manner in which the wrong is committed. Where intent is excluded, the perpetrator’s liability continues only if the criminal laws also attach a consequence to the negligent realisation of the wrong. Likewise, a mistake as to the material conditions of grounds of justification, being a false conception on the perpetrator’s part of the factual situation, excludes his will directed at the wrong, in other words his intent. By contrast, as examined under the cases of mistake affecting culpability, a mistake as to the existence of a ground of justification does not sever the link between what the perpetrator pictures and his will, and requires an assessment of blameworthiness in respect of the wrong he has intentionally realised. In the same way, a mistake as to the material conditions of circumstances affecting culpability and a mistake as to wrongfulness do not concern the person’s realisation of the wrong and his will directed towards it. The perpetrator directs his will towards the result in the awareness that his conduct constitutes an offence, but thinks that it will not be legally blamed. The assessment is resolved, as in mistake as to the material conditions of grounds excluding or reducing culpability and in mistake as to wrongfulness, by an assessment of avoidability. Avoidability, in turn, requires an assessment of avoidability like that in the statutory definition of negligent offences.

In conclusion, it is clear that the mistake must without fail be correctly identified in the specific case, and that this discrepancy between what the perpetrator pictured and reality must be correctly identified. For criminal liability and the consequence attached to it will change completely. In order to determine the legal nature of the difference (the mistake) between what takes place in the perpetrator’s mind and the situation that actually exists, and which element of the offence the mistake affects, to reach correct results in terms of criminal law and to assess the perpetrator’s criminal liability accurately, one must have a command of the theoretical side of mistake and of the entire theory of the offence.

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Footnotes

  1. ID: 0000-0003-4034-5436. ↑
  2. Attorney-at-law, LL.M. in Public Law, Istanbul University Institute of Social Sciences, e-mail: onur.ozkan@dulger.av.tr, ORCID ID: 0000-0002-3391-4728. ↑
  3. Attorney-at-law, Istanbul Bar Association, doctoral student at the Department of Public Law, Istanbul University Institute of Social Sciences, LL.M., Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn, e-mail: merve.bakdur@dulger.av.tr, ORCID: 0000-0003-0150-916X. ↑
  4. Heinrich, C. II, kn. 1062. ↑
  5. Önder, Genel Hükümler, C. II-III, s. 311. ↑
  6. Koca, Hata, s. 81. ↑
  7. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 4. ↑
  8. S. Erman, Hata, s. 510, 511; Önder, C. II-III, s. 311; Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10) s. 417; Hakeri, Genel Hükümler, (22), s. 449; Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, Türk Ceza Hukukuna Giriş, (10), s. 430. ↑
  9. Koca, Hata, s. 82. ↑
  10. Göktürk, s. 99, 100. ↑
  11. Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, Türk Ceza Hukukuna Giriş, (10), s. 430 ↑
  12. Soyer Güleç, s. 60. ↑
  13. Heinrich, C. II, § 30, kn. 1120-1124. ↑
  14. See: B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 10 vd. ↑
  15. In legal scholarship, however, Koca also counts the case of exceeding the limits of the grounds of justification among the mistakes excluding intent, Koca, Hata, s. 84. We, for our part, regard the institution of exceeding the limits (through negligence) as a provision that resembles mistake as to the conditions of the grounds of justification (Art. 30(3)) but is different from it and more specific. For here, by contrast, the person is not mistaken as to whether a ground of justification exists; rather, he engages in mistaken conduct, attributable to negligence, in relation to a condition that does exist. In this respect it was correct for the TCK to provide for the negligent exceeding of the limits separately from mistake as to the conditions of the grounds of justification. For although these two institutions resemble each other, they have different features. Nevertheless we must note, as Koca also accepts, that in German criminal law too the institution of exceeding the limits is not directly regulated, but that where the limits of the grounds of justification are exceeded without intent, solutions are provided within the framework of the provisions on mistake excluding intent (Art. 16 of the German Criminal Code) if the excess relates to the conditions of the grounds of justification, and on mistake as to wrongfulness (Art. 17) if it relates to the limits permitted by the grounds of justification, see Ersan, s. 67 vd. ↑
  16. In legal scholarship, Ünver criticises the wording of the article in question on the ground that it does not state that the lack of knowledge must stem from a mistake. On this view, the article is a superfluous provision which shows not a case of mistake but when intent is excluded. Ünver, Kusurluluk, s. 47. Yet this is not a correct finding. In criminal law, mistake and lack of knowledge mean the same thing. Likewise, this situation is indicated in the second sentence of the provision by the words “liability for negligence on account of this mistake is reserved”. Moreover, the mistake is made not at the point of not knowing but during the commission of the offence. ↑
  17. Öztürk/Erdem, (18), § 5, kn. 579. ↑
  18. Koca, Hata, s. 85. ↑
  19. Kindhäuser has stated that an auxiliary question may be used in order to distinguish the mistake of interpretation from the other case of mistake concerning the elements of the statutory definition. Accordingly, one looks at the answer to the question of what the perpetrator would have had to do in order to correct his mistake. For example, where a person empties the gas tank of another person’s vehicle believing it to be his own, he would have been able to notice the number plate had he acted more carefully and would not have made this mistake. This is not a mistake of interpretation. In a mistake of interpretation, by contrast, what the perpetrator has to do in order to correct his mistake is to acquire more knowledge of legal language. For instance, in the example given, the person’s belief that no offence is committed because he does not regard gas as a corporeal thing capable of being damaged within the meaning of damage to property is a mistake of interpretation, because what is at issue is the perpetrator’s misinterpretation of “damage to property”. To correct such a mistake the perpetrator would have had to know legal terminology. It is in this way, by means of a distinction based on the answer to this question, that a mistake of interpretation can be identified. See: Kindhäuser, AT, § 27, kn. 19-20. ↑
  20. Koca/Üzülmez, (12), s. 258. ↑
  21. Yerdelen, Yorum Hatası, s. 88; Roxin, AT/I, § 12, kn. 101. ↑
  22. Heinrich, C. II, § 30, kn. 1084-1086; Kühl, § 13, kn. 11, § 5, kn. 93; Rengier, § 15, kn. 4, 8 vd.; Jescheck/Weigend, AT, s. 295. ↑
  23. For a view that does not share this opinion, see also: Kindhäuser, AT, § 27, kn. 28; according to Kindhäuser too, this assessment can easily give rise to misunderstandings. It should be regarded as sufficient that the essence and purpose of the law have been understood: for example, it should be regarded as sufficient that the person knows that a thing does not belong to him, that he knows that someone else has or may have a say over the right of ownership. Likewise, for intent to exist the person need not know the rules of civil law on the transfer of ownership. A mistake as to whether the person has been given a right to seize property belonging to another should not affect his intent. To the same effect see: Stratenwerth/Kuhlen, AT, s. 94. ↑
  24. “In the specific case, in which the accused and the victim had been friends for 2-3 months before the incident and the families opposed their marriage because the victim was under age; it is not consistent with the ordinary course of life that the accused, who was in his 29th year at the date of the offence, did not know that the victim was under 15 years of age; moreover, even his defence is not based on mistake but is in the nature of an objection to the victim’s registered age and a request for the determination of her real age; and since it is understood that the victim was born in a hospital and that, even according to the date of birth altered as a result of the civil proceedings conducted before the criminal case had become final and without the hospital records being examined, the victim was under 15 years of age at the date of the offence, it is not possible to give credence to this defence.” YCGK, E. 2013/14-462, K. 2014/13, 21.01.2014. “In the specific case, in which it is established that the accused and the victim had had a romantic relationship lasting two years and had lived in the same house for a time, it is not consistent with the ordinary course of life that the accused did not know that the victim, who stayed in the same house with him for a time, was under 15 years of age; moreover, as the accused did not at any stage put forward a defence to the effect that he thought the victim was over fifteen or that the victim had told him so, there is no matter which the court is required to investigate of its own motion. Consequently, the conditions for the application of the case of mistake regulated in Article 30 of the TCK No. 5237 are not met in the specific case either.” YCGK, E. 2014/14- 88, K. 2014/334, 17.06.2014. ↑
  25. Koca/Üzülmez, Genel Hükümler, (12), s. 91, 92. ↑
  26. Koca/Üzülmez, Genel Hükümler, (12), s. 257; Heinrich, C. II, § 30, kn. 1099; Jescheck/ Weigend, AT, s. 311. ↑
  27. Jescheck/Weigend, AT, s. 295. ↑
  28. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 82, 83. ↑
  29. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 83. ↑
  30. Önder, C. II-III, s. 352. ↑
  31. Jescheck/Weigend, AT, s. 295. ↑
  32. Koca, Hata, s. 89. ↑
  33. See: Heinrich, C. II, § 30, kn. 1102; Kühl, § 13, kn. 23, 25. ↑
  34. Sokullu-Akıncı, s. 102 vd. ↑
  35. Dönmezer/Erman, C. II, (12), kn. 1043; Demirbaş, Genel Hükümler, (14), s. 437. ↑
  36. Dönmezer/Erman, C. II, (12), kn. 1042; Önder, C. II-III, s. 313; Demirbaş, Genel Hükümler, (14), s. 434 vd.; B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 26. ↑
  37. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 113. ↑
  38. Authors holding this view: Binding and Kuhlen; for details see: B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 112. ↑
  39. Roxin, AT/I, § 12, kn. 123. ↑
  40. It has been described as irrelevant, immaterial (Ger. unbeachtlich). See: Kindhäuser, AT, § 27, kn. 34. ↑
  41. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 114. ↑
  42. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 114. ↑
  43. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 102. ↑
  44. Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10) s. 422. ↑
  45. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 105. ↑
  46. Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10) s. 422. ↑
  47. Centel/Zafer/Çakmut, Türk Ceza Hukukuna Giriş (7), s. 424, 425; B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 83. ↑
  48. For the debates, which have for the most part taken shape within the framework of German criminal law scholarship, see: B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 119-121. ↑
  49. To this effect see: Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10) s. 423; Artuk/Gökcen/ Alşahin/Çakır, Genel Hükümler, (13), s. 652; Hakeri, Genel Hükümler, (22), s. 457. ↑
  50. Koca, Hata, s. 93. ↑
  51. For extensive information on offences aggravated by their result, mistake and deviation from the target, see: Doğan, Neticesi Sebebiyle Ağırlaşmış Suçlar, (2), s. 249 – 252. ↑
  52. In German it has also been termed “Erlaubnistatbestandsirrtum”, that is, mistake as to permission. See: Heinrich, C II, kn. 1120. ↑
  53. It should be noted that where a mistake as to the material conditions of a ground of justification coincides with a mistake as to the prohibition, the mistake as to the prohibition, which is subject to a legal assessment, will come to the fore. It will be examined whether the perpetrator’s culpability is affected, and an assessment of avoidability will therefore be made. See Heinrich, C. II, kn. 1148; Kühl, AT, § 13 kn. 80. ↑
  54. Kühl, AT, § 13 kn. 68; Rengier, AT, § 29, kn. 2. ↑
  55. Heinrich, C II, kn. 1124; B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 277; It is also possible for the perpetrator, although he has acted intentionally, to be mistaken about certain matters relating to the unlawfulness of his conduct. For this reason, a mistake as to the material conditions must be distinguished from a mistake as to wrongfulness consisting in the belief that a ground of justification exists. Likewise, intent and awareness of wrongfulness must be separated from each other by clear lines. See: Welzel, (11), s. 167 vd. ↑
  56. Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 428. According to Koca/Üzülmez, the unavoidability or avoidability referred to in the paragraph is a criterion that relates not to the wrongfulness of the act but to the assessment of the perpetrator’s personal culpability in falling into the mistake, see: Koca/Üzülmez, Genel Hükümler, s. 300. ↑
  57. Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 426. ↑
  58. “(…) Given that the accused, who lived with his wife and two children, was with his wife, the deceased, in the bedroom on the first floor of his 3-storey detached house in a housing estate surrounded by walls when a noise came from the window; and that, although he was in a position to understand that there was no attack directed against him had he shown simple attention or careful conduct such as checking whether his wife, the deceased, who was lying beside him, was in the bed, lighting up the room by switching on the light or calling out in the direction from which the noise he said he had heard came, he, without giving any warning, in the bedroom which was in semi-darkness owing to the light filtering in from outside, took in his hand the semi-automatic pistol he kept under his pillow, fired it 13 times and killed the deceased, who was at a distance of about 4 metres, by wounding her with 3 hits each of which was fatal; it must be accepted that, had the accused acted with greater care and attention, he could have understood that the person at whom he fired was not a burglar engaged in an unjust attack directed against him which was taking place or whose occurrence or repetition was certain, that this mistake of the accused was therefore not an unavoidable mistake, and that the accused cannot benefit from the provision on mistake as to the fulfilment of the conditions of the grounds excluding or reducing criminal liability, regulated in paragraph 3 of Article 30 of the TCK.” YCGK, E. 2018/1-27 K. 2019/644 T. 7.11.2019. ↑
  59. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 351. ↑
  60. On the dual function of intent see: Jescheck/Weigend, s. 243; Satzger, s. 695-706; Artuk/Gökcen/Alşahin/Çakır, Genel Hükümler, (13), s. 388; Öztürk/Erdem, (18), s. 297; Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 253; Akbulut, Genel Hükümler, (5), s. 384; Doğan, (2), s. 197; B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 351. ↑
  61. It is nevertheless stated in legal scholarship that there can be no mistake whatsoever concerning the grounds affecting or excluding the capacity for culpability, since these have no material content. Nor should it be possible to apply mistake to grounds excluding or reducing culpability which thus have no material content, which cannot have any effect on the existence or absence of the thought in the perpetrator’s inner world and which therefore do not form part of the perpetrator’s intent. For example, an 11-year-old child who believes the age of criminal capacity to be 12 will, irrespective of his mistake, be held liable for his unlawful and culpable act. Likewise, a mistake as to whether one has fallen into a mistake has neither meaning nor application. In this respect, mistake will be possible only with regard to those grounds of excuse that have a material content, B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 290, 291. ↑
  62. In German scholarship, by contrast, the point on which there is consensus is that a mistake as to the grounds excluding culpability is not an essential (legally relevant) mistake. Bachmann, JA, s. 513. Likewise, it would not be an appropriate approach to expect the perpetrator to have knowledge of his own age or psychological condition. For example, a perpetrator who is mentally ill at the time of the incident is in any event not blameworthy from the standpoint of criminal law. It is not possible for him to draw a distinction as to whether he is entitled to commit an offence on the supposition that he is mentally ill. This could only create a situation of abuse. Consequently, under this heading, mistake in fact arises in the assessment of situations that affect culpability, such as grounds of excuse and unjust provocation. See also: Heinrich, C II, kn. 1152. ↑
  63. “For the application of the third and fourth paragraphs it is required that the person has fallen into an unavoidable mistake; where the mistake is avoidable the person will be deemed culpable, in other words will be held liable for his act, but this mistake will be taken into account in determining the basic penalty. At this stage it is useful to examine the third paragraph of the article in greater detail in so far as it concerns the dispute. The third paragraph of Article 30 of the TCK No. 5237 contains the provision “A person who falls into an unavoidable mistake as to whether the conditions of the grounds excluding or reducing criminal liability have been fulfilled shall benefit from this mistake”. The paragraph regulates both mistake as to the material conditions of a ground of justification and the cases of mistake affecting culpability. Where the mistake is unavoidable, the perpetrator will benefit from this mistake. In assessing unavoidability, it must be determined whether the perpetrator would have fallen into this mistake had he exercised the required care and attention. A mistake may also be made as to the existence of unjust provocation, which is one of the grounds reducing criminal liability. A perpetrator who falls into an unavoidable mistake as to the existence of unjust provocation will benefit from the provision on unjust provocation. Here, however, the mistake must be unavoidable. If, on the other hand, the mistake is an avoidable one, that is, if, having regard to the personal characteristics of the perpetrator, the mistake could have been avoided had he acted with greater care and attention, in other words if the mistake would not have occurred, he will no longer be able to benefit from the provisions on unjust provocation. In legal scholarship the following views have been expressed on this subject: “... for example, he waits on the road along which B, who swore at him in the village coffee house, will pass, in order to beat him as he leaves the coffee house. If, owing also to the darkness of the night, he does not notice that the passer-by is C, who closely resembles B in appearance, and strikes him several times with a stick, A will be able to benefit from the provision on unjust provocation if it can be accepted that he was in an unavoidable mistake. But if, had he shown the necessary care, he could have noticed that the passer-by was C even though it was night, he can no longer benefit from provocation” (Veli Özer Özbek, Ceza Hukuku Dergisi, sayı 7, Türk Ceza Hukukunda Hata, s. 93), “If a mistake has been made as to the material conditions of a ground reducing culpability (for example, unjust provocation, Art. 29 of the TCK), the person benefits from it if his mistake is unavoidable and enjoys the relevant ground reducing culpability. If, however, his mistake is avoidable, he can no longer benefit from the ground reducing culpability” (M.Emin Artuk-Ahmet Gökcen-A.Caner Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 7. Baskı, s. 531). ↑
  64. Bachmann, JA, s. 510; Kühl, AT, § 13 kn. 83. ↑
  65. Wesels/Beulke/Satzger, AT, kn. 487. ↑
  66. Even being aware that the conduct in question may violate some law will be sufficient. See: Heinrich, C II, kn. 1114. However, if the perpetrator has the slightest doubt as to the legality of his conduct, he will be obliged to inform himself on the matter. See: Heinrich, C II, kn. 1118; Heinrich, C I, kn. 547. ↑
  67. Soyer Güleç, s. 74 vd. ↑
  68. Roxin, AT/I, § 21, kn. 1. ↑
  69. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 122. ↑
  70. BGH, 18 Mart 1952 tarih ve GSSt 2/51 sayılı kararı, BGHSt 2, s. 194 vd., s. 196; see: B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 123. ↑
  71. Soyer Güleç, s. 74. ↑
  72. Roxin, Yasağa İlişkin Yanılma, s. 256; Soyer Güleç, s. 75. ↑
  73. Göktürk, Haksızlık Yanılgısı, s. 27. ↑
  74. Roxin, AT/I, § 21, kn. 16; Kühl, AT, § 11, kn. 32. ↑
  75. Heinrich, C. II, kn. 1142; B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 278. ↑
  76. Koca, Hata, s. 101; Jescheck/Weigend, s. 456; Roxin, § 21, kn. 22; Heinrich, C. II, kn. 1144. ↑
  77. For an example see: Özbek/Doğan/Bacaksız, Genel Hükümler, (10), s. 425. ↑
  78. Welzel, (11), s. 164 vd. ↑
  79. Göktürk, Haksızlık Yanılgısı, s. 149, 150 vd. ↑
  80. “(…) When the matter in dispute is assessed in the light of these explanations; in the incident in which the accused, who was 30 years old at the date of the incident and a citizen of the Republic of Türkiye, stayed in the United States of America, where he had gone for his education, obtained a permanent residence permit and began to work for a private security company; the accused, who stated that he had a special interest in weapons, decided to come to Türkiye for a short holiday from the United States of America, where he had resided for about 12 years; on 04.03.2011, the day of his journey, the accused bought two Smith-Wesson pistols from the business named Gander MTN in the USA, and on the same day bought and took over one Ruger pistol and one Beretta pistol from the person named Z.J.H. in the USA; the accused, who arrived at Chicago O’Hare Airport with the bag containing these four weapons he had bought and two suitcases, while carrying out the boarding formalities at the Turkish Airlines office, declared to the official only one of the pistols he had with him, a Smith-Wesson pistol of 9 mm calibre, and drew up a delivery report for this weapon, but made no declaration in the weapon delivery report concerning the other three pistols; and, upon the THY staff in Chicago notifying the THY staff at Istanbul Atatürk Airport by message that the accused was bringing a weapon with him, the staff who received the message established that there was no permit of any kind for the weapons and drew up a report on the accused; in view of the fact that the accused is a citizen of the Republic of Türkiye and lived in Türkiye until the age of 18, received higher education, bought all four pistols forming the subject of the offence immediately before coming to Türkiye and declared only one of the weapons to the airport officials, and stated that he worked for a security company and had a special interest in weapons, it must be accepted that, having regard to the accused’s level of knowledge, the education he received and the conditions of the social and cultural environment in which he lived, the defences to the effect that the accused did not know that it was prohibited to bring weapons into Türkiye are not credible, that for this reason the offence charged was constituted with all its elements and that it cannot be said that he fell into an unavoidable mistake as to the wrongfulness of his act.” YCGK, E. 2014/8-321 K. 2017/412 T. 17.10.2017. ↑
  81. See: Önder, Genel Hükümler, C. II-III, s. 316, 317. ↑
  82. Gropp, AT, § 5, kn. 80. ↑
  83. Önder, C. II-III, s. 317; Kühl, AT, § 5, kn. 18. ↑
  84. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 80, 81; Dönmezer/Erman, II, kn. 1049. ↑
  85. That this is an objective condition of punishability is expressly stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article: “For insult in the absence of the victim to be punishable, the act must be committed in the absence of the victim but by communicating with at least three persons. (...) The victim may also be insulted by communicating with one or two persons. In such cases too a wrong is in fact committed. However, in accordance with the criminal policy pursued, it has been required as a condition, for insult in the absence of the victim to be punishable, that the insult be made in the absence of the victim by communicating with at least three persons, that is, by addressing at least three persons”. ↑
  86. In the same example, however, the perpetrator’s penalty cannot be increased on the ground that he “insulted publicly”, for this is an aggravated form of the offence of insult and requires the perpetrator’s intent. Here, however, the perpetrator did not act with the intent to commit the insult “publicly”. ↑
  87. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 81. ↑
  88. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 81 ↑
  89. Roxin, AT/I, § 12, kn. 139; B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 82. ↑
  90. Kindhäuser, AT, § 27, kn. 53. ↑
  91. Heinrich, C II, kn. 1105. Attempts have been made to explain the reason for this difference by means of different theories. According to Welzel, on the view that may be called the equivalence theory, deviation from the target is disregarded where the objects constituting the subject-matter of the offence are equivalent. The perpetrator wanted to harm the legal object of the offence and has done so. Concretisation of intent is not required, see: Welzel, (11), s. 73 vd. According to Welzel, where there is no equivalence the problem will be resolved in the field of concurrence, within the scope of the provisions on attempt and on the negligent offence. If, in the case of such equivalence, there is a foreseeable deviation, the deviation will be disregarded. For example, if, while A and B are together attacking C, C, in order to protect himself, takes aim at B with a weapon he has got hold of and, intending to wound him, shoots A because his hand trembles, and B flees from the scene, the deviation in this situation may be regarded as an equivalent deviation which C could foresee and which is no longer of importance, see: Welzel, (11), s. 73. Opposed to this equivalence theory is the concretisation theory, which has found support among a larger majority. According to this theory, one examines whether the perpetrator has concretised his inner world, his will and his knowledge, through his acts in the specific case. If a person, while wishing to fire at a vase, has by the conduct he concretised fired at a human being, it will no longer be possible to speak of his intent. For this view see: Roxin, AT/I, § 12, kn.160, 161; Stratenwerth/Kuhlen, AT, s. 101. ↑
  92. B. Erman, Yanılma, s. 100. ↑
  93. Heinrich, C II, kn. 1111. Baumann/Weber/Mitsch/Eisele have treated this situation as a double mistake and have reached the solution in the same way as we have. In order to reach the correct solution here, an assessment must be made on the basis of the causal process, see: Baumann/Weber/Mitsch/Eisele, AT, s. § 11, kn. 96, 97. It should be noted that this borderline case must not be confused with Weber’s intent. For Weber’s intent comes into play as a solution where there is a deviation in the causal process directed against the same person. In the present case, however, what is at issue is not the same person but different persons in a combination. ↑

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