Introduction
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
What kind of legal instrument are presidential decrees? Can they be placed within any existing form of regulation, or are they a separate type of their own? More importantly, what is the nature of the rules introduced by these decrees? On which matters may the President introduce rules by issuing a decree? Is there a particular limit and scope, or may the President regulate in this way any field he or she wishes? Has any stage been provided for at which the decrees issued by the President are to be reviewed or approved by another body or authority before they enter into force, or is it sufficient for the President to issue and publish them for these instruments to enter into force and take effect?
Must the rules introduced by presidential decrees be complied with absolutely? May those who claim that their rights have been harmed, or the persons concerned, have recourse to the courts? Finally, is there any sanction where persons who are required to comply with the provisions of a decree fail to fulfil this obligation? As can be seen, although this new type of instrument was formally introduced by the constitutional amendment, the matter has in essence not been clarified; on the contrary, it has brought with it many question marks, points of uncertainty and subjects of debate. In this article, starting from the principles of constitutional law, I will try to offer explanations on the nature, scope and limits of presidential decrees and on whether there are legal remedies that can be used against them.
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger*
Türkiye’s formal acceptance, as a result of the referendum of 16 April 2017, of the amendments to be made to the Constitution has given rise to a new point of debate: presidential decrees. Those amendments conferred on the President of the Republic the power to issue decrees and thus provided for a new type of legal instrument in our national law. Presidential decrees denote the legal instruments embodying the power of the President of the Republic, who is the head of the executive, to regulate in the administrative sphere. Accordingly, the President, on whom executive power1 has been conferred by the 1982 Constitution, has the power to take decisions and to regulate in various fields without needing any further statutory provision.
It should be noted that this power was introduced for the first time by the constitutional amendments of 2017; from the standpoint of our national law it is a new legal instrument, in other words a new type of power2. In this way, it ceased to be the exception for the President to act alone, the principle of countersignature (as in the case of tripartite decrees) was abolished, and the President was made the head of the administration and an executive organ acting alone. For this reason, ever since it was provided for, it has also brought with it many subjects of debate, particularly as regards its nature, its scope and the mechanisms for its review. For this subject, which is highly topical for us, correspondingly involves many uncertainties as well.
What kind of legal instrument are presidential decrees; can they be subsumed under any existing form of regulation, or are they a separate type in their own right; and, more importantly, what is the nature of the rules introduced by these decrees? On which matters may the President introduce regulations by issuing decrees; is there a particular limit and scope, or may the President regulate in this way in any field at will? Has any stage been provided for at which the decrees issued by the President are to be reviewed or approved by another organ or authority before they enter into force, or is it sufficient, for these instruments to enter into force and produce effects, that the President issues and publishes them? Must the rules introduced by presidential decrees be complied with absolutely; may those who claim that their rights have been harmed, or the persons concerned, have recourse to the courts? Finally, is there any sanction where the persons who are required to comply with the provisions of a decree fail to fulfil that obligation?
As can be seen, although this new type of regulation was formally introduced by the constitutional amendment, the matter has in essence not been clarified; on the contrary, many question marks, points of uncertainty and subjects of debate have been introduced along with it. In this article, starting from the principles of constitutional law, I shall endeavour to offer explanations concerning the nature, the scope and limits of presidential decrees and whether there are legal avenues available against them. I shall also address the question, which is the important one for us, of whether regulation in the fields of criminal law and criminal procedure law may be effected by means of these decrees. After that, I shall try to answer whether failure to comply with the provisions of a decree may be subject to any sanction under criminal law and criminal procedure law.
It should be noted that, since presidential decrees are a new legal instrument in our national law, there are no answers to the questions set out above on which a consensus has been reached either in constitutional law or in criminal law. For this reason, although I shall also refer to the existing studies and explanations, it should be borne in mind that the article will predominantly contain my own assessments and views on the subject.
Presidential Decrees
1. The Process of Their Emergence
As stated above, presidential decrees entered our national law for the first time with the constitutional amendment of 16 April 2017. This innovation, however, reflects a process, and a better understanding of the subject requires a brief explanation of that process. In summary, the provision made for presidential decrees in law comprises the following stages3:
• On 10 August 2014 Türkiye went to the polls to elect the President of the Republic for the first time4. Thus, on that date a President was for the first time elected by popular vote.
• On 10 December 2016 a “Bill for a Law Amending the Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye”, bearing the signatures of 316 deputies, was submitted to the Office of the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM).
• On 21 January 2017 the bill, with various amendments, was adopted by the TBMM and became law.
• The “Law Amending the Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye” was approved by the President of the Republic on 10 February 2017.
• Subsequently, the Law was submitted to a referendum in accordance with the relevant articles of the Constitution.
• Since the “yes” votes constituted more than half in the referendum that was held, the Law in question was adopted and, consequently, the constitutional amendments were adopted.
It was by Article 8 of the “Law Amending the Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye5” No. 6771, adopted by this referendum – the article providing for the amendment of Article 104 of the Constitution – that presidential decrees were regulated for the first time and entered our legal order. As will also be explained below, this amendment has been the point most debated by lawyers and the public and the one that has attracted the most criticism.
2. Scope and Limits
The principal matters on which the constitutional amendment in question has conferred on the President the power to issue decrees on any subject, provided that the legal limits specified in the Constitution are observed, are as follows:
• The appointment of senior public administrators, the termination of their functions, and the regulation by presidential decree of the procedures and principles governing their appointment.
• The power of the President to issue presidential decrees on matters relating to executive power.
Under this provision, the President will, first, be able to regulate by decree the procedures and principles governing the appointment of senior public administrators. However, what is meant by the concept of “high-level public administrators” used in the amending provision, and consequently who falls within that concept, has not been fully explained. On the other hand, as regards the scope of this concept, it is stated in Presidential Decree No. 7036 that those in posts above the level of head of department will hold this title and that appointments to such posts may be made from the private and the public sector. Again, while that decree states that persons who are graduates of a 4-year university programme and can satisfy the requirement of 5 years of work may be appointed, there is as yet no definition of the concept in other laws. In legal scholarship, it has been thought that the explanation of this concept is a task left for later7.
Second, the President has the power to issue decrees on matters relating to executive power. Although this provision is in fact fraught with uncertainty from beginning to end, the debates on the subject will be addressed below and only the scope of the power will be explained at this point. Accordingly, the President’s power to make decrees has been regulated as being specific to the two matters mentioned above. On the other hand, by providing that decrees may not be issued on the following matters, the President’s power has been made subject to a limitation in terms of subject matter:
• The fundamental rights and the rights and duties of the individual set out in the first and second chapters of Part Two of the Constitution, and the political rights and duties set out in the fourth chapter, may not be regulated by presidential decree.
• No presidential decree may be issued on matters which are provided in the Constitution to be regulated exclusively by law.
• No presidential decree may be issued on matters expressly regulated by law.
• Where presidential decrees and laws contain differing provisions, the provisions of the laws apply.
• Where the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye enacts a law on the same matter, the presidential decree becomes null and void.
The fact that the matters on which presidential decrees may not be issued have been regulated in effect makes it clear that this power is not unlimited and absolute. While it is regarded as normal that such a power should be given to the President in the interest of making the executive effective and strong, and the matters of limitation are regarded as appropriate, there are serious concerns as to the application of the provision8. Indeed, the great majority of the criticisms directed at all the regulations and amendments made in Türkiye are not theoretical but relate to the practical application of those regulations. It is not surprising that, on this particular subject too, the concerns are directed towards practice.
3. Legal Nature
The President’s power to issue decrees has emerged as an element of governance peculiar to the presidential system. This natural power, which arises of itself when one looks at the nature of the system, concerns the field in which the executive organ, consisting of a single person, has a say. Moreover, the executive, on which wide and extensive powers are conferred by that system, demonstrates its own competence in this way9. The legal nature of this power must be examined under two heads: from the standpoint of the administrative act peculiar to administrative law, and from the standpoint of its place in the hierarchy of norms:
a. From the Standpoint of the Administrative Act
When one looks at the provisions of the Constitution on the matters on which presidential decrees may be issued, it is seen that, depending on their subject matter, some of these decrees are in the nature of individual-regulatory administrative acts, while others are in the nature of executive acts deriving directly from the Constitution. For example, a decree on the appointment or dismissal of high-level public administrators is in the nature of an individual-regulatory act. The regulation of the procedures and principles governing the appointment of such persons, on the other hand, is in the nature of an executive act10. For a decree of this kind has subjective and individual characteristics, in that it provides for a person to be placed in a particular status or removed from a particular status.
b. From the Standpoint of Its Place in the Hierarchy of Norms
One of the greatest uncertainties concerns what type of legal instrument this decree is to be regarded as and on which rung it will stand in the hierarchy of norms, which expresses the degree of conformity and the relationship of subordination and superiority among the written rules of law. In particular, attention is focused on whether they are of the same nature as decrees having the force of law and, beyond that, whether they can take their place. For in the new system decrees having the force of law in ordinary times have been abolished.
It should be noted that there is no clear and definite answer to this question. It is clear that presidential decrees do not fall within any type of legal instrument and are a type of legal instrument in their own right and sui generis. At this point, therefore, the presidential decree must first of all be distinguished from other legal instruments such as the decree having the force of law (KHK) and the by-law. For attempting to understand it by reference to the characteristics of those instruments will, particularly because of the differences in their scope and limits, bring with it many erroneous conclusions. A conclusion must be reached by treating it as a new institution11. I should also state that, since the Council of Ministers has been abolished in this system, the issuing of by-laws and KHKs has now come to an end as well.
While there is no doubt that the presidential decree is an instrument in its own right, it is disputed where it should rank hierarchically among the written sources of law. This must be examined by dividing decrees into two, state-of-emergency decrees and ordinary-period decrees:
• State-of-emergency presidential decrees
The Constitution expressly states that the presidential decrees issued in the states of emergency provided for in paragraphs 6 and 712 of Article 119 of the Constitution, entitled “Administration of the state of emergency”, have the force of law. There is therefore no doubt in this respect.
• Ordinary-period presidential decrees
The real point of doubt, however, is where the ordinary-period presidential decrees13, issued in periods other than the situations specified in the relevant paragraphs of the Constitution, will rank. Since laws cannot be amended by presidential decrees issued in ordinary times and, in the event of conflict, priority of application lies with the laws, it is not possible for this type of decree to have the force of law. For, as stated above, where presidential decrees and laws contain differing provisions, the provisions of the laws will apply (Art. 104(17) of the Constitution). Moreover, where the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye enacts a law on the same matter, the presidential decree will become null and void. It is therefore not possible for the provisions of these decrees to be regarded as being on the same level as the provisions of laws14.
Since the KHKs and by-laws issued by the Council of Ministers in the old system have been abolished, I shall not make an assessment in this respect. However, which of them is to apply where there is a conflict between the existing KHKs and by-laws and the provisions of presidential decrees is an important question that needs to be answered by constitutional lawyers.
In a comparison with regulations, since it is clear that the procedure for enacting presidential decrees cannot be regulated by the provisions of a regulation, it must be said that decrees are in a stronger position than regulations.
In the light of the explanations given, it may be said that the hierarchy of norms in the present system will be as follows15:
• Universal principles of law and the Constitution,
• International treaties concerning fundamental rights and freedoms,
• Laws – international treaties regulating fields other than fundamental rights and freedoms – state-of-emergency presidential decrees,
• Presidential decrees,
• Regulations,
• Regulatory acts16.
4. Can Norms Containing Offences and Penalties Be Regulated by Presidential Decrees?
Accordingly, the question to be discussed is whether norms containing offences and penalties may be amended by presidential decrees, and whether new offences may be created or existing offences abolished by these instruments.
I should first state that the conclusion to be drawn from interpreting the constitutional amendments together with the norms in force is that no presidential decree may be issued on matters which are provided in the Constitution to be regulated “exclusively” by law, but that the Assembly may make laws on matters which are stated to be regulated by presidential decree17.
Having established this, in order to be able to answer the question it is necessary to determine what the word “exclusively” in the sentence “No presidential decree may be issued on matters which are provided in the Constitution to be regulated exclusively by law” in paragraph 17 of the amended Article 104 of the Constitution, which regulates the duties and powers of the President, means in terms of constitutional law. In no provision of the Constitution is there a matter “provided to be regulated exclusively by law”. If what is to be understood by this word is the requirement that regulation be effected “only” or “solely” by statute, it may be said that, by virtue of Article 13 of the Constitution, no presidential decree may be issued on matters connected with fundamental rights and freedoms18.
To answer this question it is also necessary to look at Article 13 of the Constitution. This provision, which draws no qualitative distinction as regards the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms, regulates the limit of restrictions and, as to form, the requirement that they be made by statute. Accordingly, both positive status rights and negative and active status rights may be restricted only by statute, depending on the specific grounds stated in the relevant articles of the Constitution, and these restrictions may not be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution, to the requirements of the democratic order of society and of the secular Republic, or to the principle of proportionality. The relationship between this article and the provision contained in Article 104(17) of the Constitution, which draws the general framework of presidential decrees, must be determined; in particular, the first three sentences of the above-mentioned paragraph must be given a meaning within the unity of the Constitution19. These three sentences read, in order, as follows: “1. The President of the Republic may issue presidential decrees on matters relating to executive power. 2. The fundamental rights and the rights and duties of the individual set out in the first and second chapters of Part Two of the Constitution, and the political rights and duties set out in the fourth chapter, may not be regulated by presidential decree. 3. No presidential decree may be issued on matters which are provided in the Constitution to be regulated exclusively by law.”
The second sentence, while introducing a limit as to subject matter, essentially creates an area in which positive status rights may be regulated by presidential decrees. The other two sentences draw the boundaries of this area. Accordingly, the decrees in question may be issued only on matters relating to executive power and may not be issued on matters provided to be regulated exclusively by law. The following two points must also be taken into consideration before a conclusion is reached. The first is that the sentences that follow in the paragraph concerned expressly provide that presidential decrees are not a source of law equal to statute; the second is the difference between restriction and regulation. When all of these are considered together, the following conclusion may be reached:
By presidential decree, regulations may be made concerning positive status rights which the Constitution has not specifically provided are to be regulated by law, but no restriction may be imposed on them. For the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms does not fall within the scope of executive power; it lies within the competence of the legislature. By presidential decree, measures may be laid down relating to the positive duties imposed on the State for the realisation of the constitutional rights regulated in the chapter of the Constitution on social and economic rights and duties, but the enjoyment of those rights by individuals may not be curtailed, nor may obligations in the nature of duties be imposed. Since curtailments and obligations of this kind fall within the restriction of a fundamental right and freedom, they may be effected by the legislature by law, within the constitutional limits20.
In the light of these explanations, it is seen that, in respect of ordinary times, Article 104(17) of the Constitution confers on the President, in general, an original regulatory power on matters relating to executive power. Immediately after that provision, however, the limits of this power are determined. The first limit is found in the provision on the power itself. Accordingly, presidential decrees may be issued only on matters relating to executive power; it is not possible to issue them on matters relating to legislative and judicial power. The second limit is that the fundamental rights and the rights and duties of the individual set out in the first and second chapters of Part Two of the Constitution, and the political rights and duties set out in the fourth chapter, are subject to a prohibition on regulation. The third limit is the prohibition on regulating matters which are provided in the Constitution to be regulated exclusively by law21.
In conclusion, since norms containing offences and penalties also relate to the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms, it is not possible for them to be made by presidential decrees.
5. Can Norms of Criminal Procedure Be Regulated by Presidential Decrees?
Some of the norms of criminal procedure law regulate how the trial is to be conducted, while others contain the rights and obligations of the subjects taking part in the proceedings, others the legal remedies against the decisions given, and others still the coercive measures. Since it is clearly stated that no regulation relating to “judicial power” may be made by presidential decree, it follows from Article 104(17) of the Constitution that no regulation may be made in respect of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) or the other procedural laws or the regulations showing how they are to be applied. Moreover, and in particular, coercive measures are regulations which are compulsory, being applied against the will of the person to whom they are addressed, and which restrict certain fundamental rights and freedoms of those persons. Consequently, by virtue of “the prohibition on regulating the fundamental rights and the rights and duties of the individual set out in the first and second chapters of Part Two of the Constitution and the political rights and duties set out in the fourth chapter” as well, it is not possible to regulate this field by presidential decree.
6. Procedure for Review
Has the possibility of speaking of the soundness of the claim that presidential decrees are lawful been made subject to any condition? What characteristics must a decree possess, or what stages must it pass through, for it to be possible to speak of its lawfulness? Or is the fact that it has been drawn up and put into force by the President sufficient for it to be lawful? It is precisely at this point that the law as it is must be compared with the law as it ought to be.
The review of the lawfulness of decrees must be divided into two periods, before and after their entry into force:
a. No Filtering Method Has Been Provided for in Respect of This Power Conferred on the President
In order for it to be possible to speak of the lawfulness of a legal instrument, provision may be made for it to be subject to various conditions to that end before it enters into force. Review or approval by another authority or organ after the instrument has been drawn up by the person holding the regulatory power is the most common way of doing so. In this way, the formation of the rules of law is not left to the will of a single person or authority, and their conformity with the universal principles of law is secured.
In almost all the countries of the world whose regimes operate under a presidential system, the president is given the power to appoint his own staff, with whom he will work in performing the executive and governing function. Likewise, it is seen that, although they differ from one another, the power to regulate many matters relating to the executive sphere is also conferred. This power is in essence normal and, when the nature of the system itself is taken into account, necessary as well. Nevertheless, these appointments are in most cases subject to the approval or review of another institution or organ. For example, in the USA, where the presidential system is applied most intensively, the approval of the Senate is required for the president’s appointments of high-ranking public officials such as ministers (secretary) or ambassadors22. In such a case, the president who is to issue a decree will also take the will of that organ into account and will endeavour to issue a lawful decree in order to be able to obtain its approval.
From the standpoint of our national law, however, the provisions on presidential decrees do not provide for an organ whose approval must be obtained or for an approval stage. In issuing decrees the President has been placed in the position of sole authority and vested with an almost absolute discretion. This situation is capable of creating dangers, particularly for the balance between the legislature and the executive.
b. May Recourse Be Had to the Courts against Presidential Decrees?
It may be provided that, for legal instruments to enter into force and produce their effects, no stage is required other than the acts of the person or authority holding the power. Particularly in such cases, the question arises whether recourse to the courts is open against these instruments. The fact that the President has been vested with very wide powers, particularly after the constitutional amendments, gives rise to concern as to the fate of these decrees as well. Indeed, it is even argued that the President’s powers are unlimited and vague, and this point is criticised.
Presidential decrees are a legal instrument which may contain regulations in the executive sphere and by which certain rights and obligations concerning social and economic rights and the organisation and functioning of the administration may be laid down. Consequently, just as it is possible for a right to be conferred on persons by such a decree, so too may those persons be placed under a responsibility. Is it possible, then, for the persons on whom a right is conferred or a responsibility imposed to have recourse to the courts against these provisions? This is the most contentious point of the regulation. For a State that aspires to be a State governed by the rule of law must give persons the right to have recourse to the courts against every decision or legal instrument. Even if the regulation has been made by the head of the executive, the persons concerned must always be able to exercise their rights of application or complaint against it.
Who, then, will be able to assert that these decrees are unconstitutional, within what period, and before which authority?
The clearest provision on the subject is found in Article 148 of the Constitution; under it, the power of judicial review of presidential decrees belongs to the Constitutional Court: “The Constitutional Court shall review the conformity with the Constitution, as to form and substance, of laws, presidential decrees and the Rules of Procedure of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, and shall decide on individual applications.” The review of the constitutionality of presidential decrees will be ensured by way of the “Action for Annulment (Abstract Review of Norms)” and the “Objection Procedure (Concrete Review of Norms)” referred to in Articles 150 and 152 of the Constitution.
i. Action for Annulment (Abstract Review of Norms)
Within the framework of the provisions of Article 150 of the Constitution, the right to bring an action for annulment directly before the Constitutional Court on the ground that presidential decrees are unconstitutional as to form and substance belongs to the President of the Republic, to the two political party groups with the largest number of members in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye and to members numbering at least one fifth of the total number of members. Under Article 151, which regulates the time-limit for bringing an action for annulment, the right to bring an action for annulment directly before the Constitutional Court lapses sixty days after the publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential decree whose annulment is sought.
ii. Objection Procedure (Concrete Review of Norms)
Under Article 152 of the Constitution, if a court hearing a case considers the provisions of a law or presidential decree to be applied to be unconstitutional, or if it is convinced of the seriousness of a claim of unconstitutionality raised by one of the parties, it stays the proceedings until the Constitutional Court gives its decision on the matter.
Starting from the constitutional provisions mentioned above, two different interpretations may be made: the first is that presidential decrees are subject to review by the Constitutional Court on the ground of unconstitutionality as to form and substance. The second is that, since what is at issue is the review of constitutionality, the Court has the power to review only those decrees which concern matters falling within its own jurisdiction, which are equal to laws and which are “in the nature of general regulatory acts”.
Although, because no distinction is drawn in Article 148 of the Constitution, it might be understood as though all decrees could be reviewed by the Constitutional Court, in my view it appears more reasonable for presidential decisions that are in the nature of general regulatory acts to be subjected to judicial review by the Council of State. Otherwise, the conclusion would follow that the Constitutional Court may also review decrees that are in the nature of administrative acts, whereas the Court has no such duty or function. Another important subject of criticism here is that the avenue of judicial review is closed in respect of presidential decrees issued in a period of emergency. Whatever the justification, in a State governed by the rule of law every kind of administrative act and action must be subject to review by the judiciary, even where it is performed by the person at the very top of the administration.
On the other hand, alongside the presidential decrees that are reviewed by the Constitutional Court, the issuing of a decision by the President is in the nature of an administrative act; and it is also a fact that, on that basis and in accordance with Article 125 of the Constitution, entitled “Judicial recourse”, under which recourse to the courts is available against all actions and acts of the administration, these decisions must be open to review by the Council of State within the administrative jurisdiction. It should be noted that, in the specific case of the presidential decree as regulated in the Constitution, there is no express provision as to whether the administrative courts are open. Consequently, while there were authors23 who maintained that, since the presidential decisions given in relation to decrees and published in the Official Gazette are in the nature of administrative acts, they must be open to review by the administrative courts, there were also authors who maintained that, in the absence of an express provision on the subject, no such review could be carried out by the administrative courts24.
Here, by a systematic and teleological interpretation of the Constitution, a distinction must be drawn among the acts performed under the general heading of decree. In views with which I entirely agree, Ülgen sets out the matter systematically as follows:
“The acts of the President of the Republic of an individual or general regulatory nature are in general called decrees. In the new constitutional order all these acts and the like will be performed by the President, who constitutes the single-headed executive. Consequently, the presidential decrees falling within the scope of the original regulatory power under the Constitution must be distinguished from decrees in the nature of individual acts and from decrees of a derivative nature. For, unlike the special regime of presidential decrees provided for by the Constitution, the other acts of the Presidency must be reviewed by the administrative courts, the branch of the judiciary for executive/administrative acts… Seen from this angle, it is apparent that the Constitutional Court is the organ of review for statutes and equivalent acts, whereas executive acts not equivalent to statute remain within the field of review of the administrative courts. Accordingly, since presidential decrees issued in a period of emergency have the force of law, they ought to be subject to review by the Constitutional Court. The Constitution, however, expressly prohibits this review. Presidential decrees issued in ordinary times, for their part, although they do not have the force of law, may be regarded as acts equivalent to statute in that they are an exercise of original power… The presidential decrees specially regulated in the Constitution fit this definition, and accordingly the review of these acts is entrusted to the Constitutional Court, which is charged with the review of norms in respect of statutes and equivalent acts. Acts of an individual administrative nature and other regulatory acts, by contrast, are set apart from this structure as an exercise of derivative power”25.
In my view, the said article of the Constitution is quite clear and sufficient for presidential decisions, which are beyond any doubt in the nature of administrative acts and are subject to review by the Council of State, to be reviewable in the administrative courts. No special provision relating to presidential decrees is needed for this.
However, express provisions on this matter were made in Articles 184 and 185 of Decree Having the Force of Law (KHK) No. 703, published in the 3rd Repeated Issue of the Official Gazette of 9.7.2018. By these provisions, which have escaped the notice of many lawyers in theory and in practice26, an attempt was made to determine the judicial avenue relating to presidential decrees through the amendments made, by Article 184, to paragraph 1 of Article 24 of Law No. 2575 on the Council of State and, by Article 185, to paragraph 2 of Article 2 of Law No. 2577 on the Procedure of Administrative Justice (İYUK).
The first point I wish to make on this subject is that sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 1 of Article 24 of the Law on the Council of State confers the power to issue a “presidential decision”, although this is not found in Article 104 of the Constitution, by which executive power is vested in the President. Although this has no constitutional basis, it is normal that a President who is the head of the executive and will exercise executive power should be able to take decisions on matters relating to the executive. This provision, however, prompts the question whether the principle that “the administration is in essence without power and may exercise only the powers conferred on it by legal norms” is no longer valid. Nevertheless, I must say that, just as I regard it as normal that an executive holding the power to issue decrees should also be able to take decisions, I also find the regulation of the judicial avenue in this respect positive within these limits.
As regards the presidential decrees that form our subject, one must first look at the İYUK. Under Art. 2(2) of the İYUK, entitled “Types of administrative action and the limit of the administrative judicial power” , “The administrative judicial power is limited to the review of the lawfulness of administrative actions and acts. The administrative courts may not carry out a review of expediency, nor may they give judicial decisions which would restrict the performance of the executive function in accordance with the forms and principles laid down in laws and presidential decrees, which are in the nature of an administrative action or act, or which would remove the discretion of the administration.”
According to this provision, the administrative judicial avenue is open in respect of presidential decrees, but, as in the case of laws, the administrative court “may not carry out a review of expediency”. Consequently, it follows from this provision that, in line with the distinction drawn above according to the nature of the decree, recourse may again be had to the administrative courts in respect of presidential decrees that are not in the nature of general regulatory acts as well.
Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of Article 24 of the Law on the Council of State, entitled “Cases to be heard by the Council of State as a court of first instance”, provide: “The Council of State, as a court of first instance, shall decide actions for annulment and full remedy actions brought against: a) decisions of the President of the Republic, b) regulatory acts other than presidential decrees issued by the President of the Republic, …, as well as administrative actions arising from concession specifications and contracts relating to public services for which arbitration is not provided.”
It follows from this provision, first, that the President may also perform other regulatory acts, apart from presidential decisions, which are not found in the Constitution. On the other hand, presidential decrees have been regulated as an exception to the actions for annulment that the Council of State will hear as a court of first instance. Does this mean, then, that presidential decrees have been removed from the sphere of the administrative courts?
There is no doubt that the provisions in question were made with that aim. In my view, however, this is a provision to the effect that the Council of State may not hear presidential decrees as a court of first instance. There is no norm of positive law prohibiting the bringing of an action before the administrative courts of first instance (administrative courts and regional administrative courts). Moreover, having regard to the interests of individuals, it is entirely natural for an action to be brought before the first-instance administrative judicial authorities against regulatory acts that bring about a change in their social and legal status. Consequently, in accordance with the distinction I have drawn above, it may be said that recourse may be had to the administrative courts in respect of them. On a purposive interpretation, however, to say that, while the Council of State hears claims for the annulment of presidential decisions as a court of first instance, the administrative courts may hear presidential decrees, which have a constitutional basis, is not consistent with the establishment and structure of the courts. Indeed, I think that, when an action for annulment of this kind concerning presidential decrees comes before the Council of State, it will decide, citing Art. 24 of the Law on the Council of State, that it does not have jurisdiction27.
In conclusion, although in the face of these provisions the administrative judicial avenue appears in theory to have been closed as regards the judicial review of presidential decrees and decisions, in practice this avenue has not been closed.
It should be noted that the fact that the administrative judicial avenue is also open against presidential decrees has its benefits, particularly in certain respects. The first of these relates to the advantages of administrative justice in comparison with constitutional justice. As I stated earlier, recourse to constitutional review is possible by way of the abstract and concrete review of norms, and the right to have such recourse is not granted to everyone. The ability to bring an action for annulment before the Constitutional Court is a right granted to the President of the Republic, to the two political party groups with the largest number of members in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) and to members corresponding to at least one fifth of the total number of members28. Recourse to constitutional justice is also possible by way of the concrete review of norms. Accordingly, where a court hearing a case considers the provisions of a law or presidential decree to be applied to be unconstitutional, or is convinced of the seriousness of a claim of unconstitutionality raised by one of the parties, the decision to be given on the matter by the Constitutional Court is awaited. In that case, however, a lengthy process ensues and serious harm may arise from the delay29. In the administrative judicial avenue, by contrast, there are no such drawbacks.
Second, as also stated above, the constitutional review, by way of the Constitutional Court, of presidential decrees that are in the nature of administrative acts is unlawful. For the Court has no such function.
In the light of all these explanations, it may be said that, on a distinction drawn according to the subject matter and nature of presidential decrees, the administrative courts are open in respect of those decrees of the President which can be counted as falling within the executive function, and constitutional justice in respect of those decrees which can be counted as general regulatory acts30. On that basis, the administrative judicial avenue is open in respect of a decree regulating the appointments of high-level public administrators. By contrast, since decrees laying down the principles and procedures governing appointments, or concerning the establishment or abolition of ministries, are in the nature of a general regulation equal to laws, they will be subject to review by constitutional justice. For the President makes decrees of this kind directly on the basis of powers deriving from the Constitution, without needing any statutory basis, and, since one cannot speak of the conformity with statute of an act made under a constitutional power, one can speak of its conformity with the Constitution31. I must also state that, despite these theoretical explanations, I do not think that, after the amendments made to the Law on the Council of State and the İYUK, the courts will be able to give bold, law-creating decisions to this effect.
Although a solution has been reached to the effect that presidential decrees, which in terms of constitutional review are expressly provided to come under the Constitutional Court, will be subject to the administrative courts in matters not falling within the Court’s jurisdiction, I think that this is not a definitive conclusion, that judicial review therefore needs to be expressly regulated by statute, and that the provisions made in the Law on the Council of State and the İYUK have not filled the legal gap in this sense either. For it is a disputed point, and not always a conclusion definitively reached, that the practices of administrative organs are the subject of administrative law and will therefore fall within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. For this reason, the judicial avenues available against presidential decrees must be expressly regulated by statute, by means of a distinction drawn in particular with regard to the subject matter and nature of these decrees32.
7. Procedure for Sanctions
One of the most contentious issues on the subject is what the consequence will be of failure to comply with the provisions introduced by these decrees. This situation may arise in two ways: first, a person may be placed under an obligation by the provisions of a decree but may fail to perform those obligations fully or properly. Second, a certain right is established for a particular person or group by the provisions of a decree, but those persons are not allowed to benefit from that right. Will there be sanctions for acts of “non-compliance” or “failure to perform properly” occurring in this way and, if so, according to which legal discipline will the type and amount of the sanction be determined?
a. From the Standpoint of Criminal Law
The sanctions of criminal law are always the first thing that comes to mind as the sanction for failure to comply with the procedures and principles introduced by legal instruments. Yet, in accordance with the principle that criminal law is the last resort (ultima ratio), it ought to be the last remedy that comes to mind. The sanctions of criminal law are imprisonment and/or a judicial fine. In addition, in certain cases security measures may also be ordered.
It might be thought that failure to comply with the provisions of presidential decrees would likewise be subject, in the first place, to imprisonment and/or a judicial fine. However, the principle of “the legality of offences and penalties” or “no offence and no penalty without law (nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege)”, which is found in the criminal law of almost all the countries of the world, is also valid in our national law. Accordingly, in the most general terms, no one may be punished for an act that is not expressly regarded as an offence in the Turkish Criminal Code, first and foremost, or in other laws. Offences and the penalties corresponding to them may be created, amended and abolished only by law. Even if a regulatory act has the force of law, and even if it is regarded as equal or indeed superior to statute in the hierarchy of norms, it is not possible to create, abolish or amend offences and penalties by it unless it has the form and nature of a “law” in the technical sense.
It is clear that failure to comply with presidential decrees has not been regulated as an offence. It is therefore not possible for this act to be subjected to any sanction under the discipline of criminal law, in other words for imprisonment or a judicial fine to be imposed on a person who commits it. Otherwise the principle of the legality of offences and penalties would be manifestly violated. As I stated above, it is also not possible to create offences and penalties by presidential decrees. As is also set out in the introductory chapters of the textbooks on the general part of criminal law, this cannot be done by the regulatory acts of the administration.
b. From the Standpoint of the Law of Misdemeanours
A misdemeanour means a wrong for which the law provides for the imposition of an administrative sanction. The definition of the act committed by a person as a misdemeanour thus shows that the act will be subject to an administrative fine. Since presidential decrees are also regarded as administrative acts, the sanction for failure to comply with the provisions introduced by these decrees can only be an administrative fine. What is to constitute a contravention of the administrative order, that is, a misdemeanour, may be determined by law or by other administrative regulatory acts. It is therefore also possible to create a misdemeanour by presidential decree. However, the sanction corresponding to it may be regulated only by law. Accordingly, since it may be said, with regard to misdemeanours, that there is no sanction for a misdemeanour without law, this must be taken into account, alongside the other restrictions in the Constitution, where it is sought to create a misdemeanour by presidential decree.
Conclusion
The main conclusions and solutions reached in the light of the explanations given concerning presidential decrees are as follows:
• Presidential decrees were regulated for the first time by Article 8 of the “Law Amending the Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye” No. 6771, the article providing for the amendment of Article 104 of the Constitution, and entered our national law as a new type of legal instrument and of power.
• Presidential decrees denote the legal instruments embodying the power of the President of the Republic, who is the head of the executive, to regulate in the administrative sphere.
• In terms of subject matter, presidential decrees may be issued on the appointment of senior public administrators, the termination of their functions and the determination of the procedures and principles governing their appointment, and on matters relating to the executive.
• By providing for matters on which the President may not issue decrees, this power has in effect been prevented from being absolute and unlimited.
• By presidential decree, regulations may be made concerning positive status rights which the Constitution has not specifically provided are to be regulated by law, but no restriction may be imposed on them. Since norms containing offences and penalties also relate to the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms, it is not possible for them to be made by presidential decrees.
• When one looks at the provisions of the Constitution on the matters on which presidential decrees may be issued, it is seen that, depending on their subject matter, some of these decrees are in the nature of individual-regulatory administrative acts, while others are in the nature of executive acts deriving directly from the Constitution.
• Whereas state-of-emergency presidential decrees have the force of law in the hierarchy of norms, ordinary presidential decrees come after these and before regulations. It should be noted that the constitutional amendments put an end to the practice of decrees having the force of law (KHK) and by-laws.
• Unlike many countries governed by a presidential system, in our national law the provisions on presidential decrees do not provide for an organ whose approval must be obtained or for an approval stage. Consequently, there is no filtering method in respect of this power conferred on the President.
• It may be said that, on a distinction drawn according to the subject matter and nature of presidential decrees, the administrative courts are open in respect of those decrees of the President which can be counted as falling within the administrative function, and constitutional justice in respect of those decrees which can be counted as executive acts.
• Although a solution has been reached to the effect that presidential decrees, which in terms of their constitutional review are expressly provided to come under the Constitutional Court, will be subject to the administrative courts in matters not falling within the Court’s jurisdiction, it must not be forgotten that this is not a definitive conclusion and that judicial review therefore needs to be expressly regulated by statute.
• Although it may be said that the amendments made to the Law on the Council of State and the Law on the Procedure of Administrative Justice (İYUK) have closed the administrative judicial avenue for presidential decrees while keeping it open for presidential decisions, this is not exactly the meaning that emerges from this regulation. Institutionally, it has been provided only that the Council of State may not act as a court of first instance in respect of presidential decrees. In the İYUK, for its part, it has been provided that, as in the case of laws, no review of expediency may be carried out in respect of them. It may therefore be said that the administrative judicial avenue is open against them. In practice, however, I think that the Council of State and the administrative courts will, citing Art. 24 of the Law on the Council of State, give a decision dismissing the action for annulment on the ground that they lack jurisdiction.
• It is not possible for the act of failing to comply fully or properly with the provisions of a decree to be subjected to any sanction under the discipline of criminal law, in other words for imprisonment or a judicial fine to be imposed on a person who commits this act. Otherwise the principle of the legality of offences and penalties would be manifestly violated. However, it is possible for this to be regulated as a misdemeanour, on condition that its sanction is regulated by a law.
• Since presidential decrees are also regarded as administrative acts, the sanction for failure to comply with the provisions introduced by these decrees can only be an administrative fine. It must not be forgotten, however, that administrative fines too are regulated by law.
As can be seen, the “presidential system of government”, a sui generis system which emerged with the change of political and administrative system undertaken in our country, has also brought many points of debate with it. In particular, the new regulations made by the constitutional amendments are criticised at times on the ground that absolute power has been given to the Presidency, at times on the ground that they contain great uncertainties and at times on the ground that no mechanisms of review and sanction have been provided for. Presidential decrees have been one of the legal instruments on which these criticisms have largely concentrated. As explained in detail above, the scope of these decrees in terms of subject matter and their nature involve various uncertainties. In particular, there are significant doubts as to whether recourse may be had to the courts against the provisions of a decree and, if so, by which avenue of judicial review this may be done. Likewise, it has not been regulated what the sanctions will be under criminal law or the law of misdemeanours where the provisions of a decree are not complied with.
For these reasons, although presidential decrees have been formally incorporated into our national law by the constitutional amendments, and indeed have already been issued, these uncertainties must be removed by statute as soon as possible. Otherwise, decrees, which are in any event a contested type of power, are likely to produce grave consequences, particularly for fundamental rights and freedoms.
Footnotes
- Member of the teaching staff in Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and IT Law, Yeditepe University Faculty of Law / Attorney-at-law. ↑
- 1982 Constitution, Article 104 – Duties and powers: “The President of the Republic is the head of the State. Executive power belongs to the President of the Republic.” ↑
- For extensive and detailed information on this subject see: Özen Ülgen, “Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnamelerinin Niteliği ve Türleri”, Galatasaray Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, S. 1, 2018, s. 3-39. ↑
- For more detailed information on the process see: Vahap Coşkun, “16 Nisan 2017 Tarihinde Kabul Edilen Anayasa Değişikliklerinin Değerlendirilmesi”, Dicle Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, C. 22, S. 36, 2017, s. 4-7. ↑
- In 2007, the “Law Amending Certain Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye” No. 5678 provided that the President of the Republic would be elected by the people. ↑
- For the full text of the Law see: http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2017/02/20170211-1.htm. ↑
- http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/07 /20180709m3.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/07/20180709m3.htm ↑
- Coşkun, Anayasa Değişikliklerinin Değerlendirilmesi, s. 17. ↑
- Coşkun, Anayasa Değişikliklerinin Değerlendirilmesi, s. 19. ↑
- Muharrem Kılıç, Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnamesi, 2017; see: http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/yazarlar/prof-dr-muharrem-kilic/595941.aspx. ↑
- Turan Yıldırım, Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnameleri, Marmara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, C. 23, S. 2, s. 15, 16. ↑
- M. Artuk Ardıçoğlu, “Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnamesi”, Ankara Barosu Dergisi, Y. 75, S. 3, 2017, s. 49. ↑
- Constitution – Administration of the state of emergency – Article 119: “(6) In states of emergency the President of the Republic may issue presidential decrees on matters necessitated by the state of emergency, without being subject to the limitations set out in the second sentence of the seventeenth paragraph of Article 104. These decrees, which have the force of law, shall be published in the Official Gazette and submitted to the Assembly for approval on the same day. (7) Except where the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye is unable to convene owing to war or force majeure, presidential decrees issued during a state of emergency shall be debated and decided upon in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye within three months. Otherwise, a presidential decree issued in a state of emergency shall automatically cease to be in force.” ↑
- Since the main subject of the study is presidential decrees issued in ordinary times, the concept of “decree” used in the text should be understood as referring only to this type. ↑
- Ardıçoğlu, s. 49. ↑
- Ardıçoğlu, s. 49 ↑
- It should be noted that comparisons are also made with the decisions of administrative courts as regards whether judicial recourse is open against decrees. According to some authors, since the provisions of decrees can be annulled by the decisions of administrative courts, they must rank below the decisions of administrative courts. See: Salih Taşdöğen, “Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnameleri”, Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, C. 65, S.3, 2016, s. 963. ↑
- Ardıçoğlu, s. 38. ↑
- Ardıçoğlu, s. 38. ↑
- Ardıçoğlu, s. 40. ↑
- Ardıçoğlu, s. 40, 41. ↑
- Ülgen, s. 27. ↑
- Coşkun, s. 17. ↑
- Ülgen, s. 6. ↑
- Mehmet Kahraman/Ali Balkan, “Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnameleri ve Denetimi”, International Journal of Academic Value Studies, Vol: 4, Issue: 19, 2018, s. 244. ↑
- Ülgen, s. 7. ↑
- I am one of those lawyers myself! I am most grateful to Ms Nida Malbeleği, Research Assistant in the Department of Administrative Law of the Faculty of Law of the Turkish-German University, who alerted me to this matter and thereby enabled me to bring my article and my views into line with the positive norms and to correct them, and who did so with the utmost courtesy, both for her professional solidarity and for her kindness. ↑
- The views of Ms Malbeleği on the subject, which are to similar effect, are as follows: “By Decree Having the Force of Law (KHK) No. 703, Art. 2 of the Law on the Procedure of Administrative Justice and Art. 24 of the Law on the Council of State were amended and presidential decrees were removed from review by the administrative courts. The administrative judicial avenue has remained open only against presidential decisions. In this situation, in my opinion, in order not to leave them outside judicial activity, there is for the present no option other than to take presidential decrees to the Constitutional Court. Of course, as long as the provision in the Constitution that recourse to the courts is open against all actions and acts of the administration stands, it is not reasonable to seek to remove this matter from the administrative courts by the amendment made to the İYUK and the Law on the Council of State. For this reason, however, presidential decrees are perhaps regulatory acts of the administration in the organic sense, but in my opinion they should not be regarded as administrative acts in the material sense. Of course, it may not be possible for us to call them directly legislative acts or equal to legislative acts either, but, as you too have stated, they are acts that are sui generis, in some cases equivalent to statute and in some cases below statute. After KHK No. 703, if anyone were to bring an action against presidential decrees in the administrative courts, the action would be dismissed on the basis of the İYUK and the Law on the Council of State. Presidential decisions, however, have not been removed from Art. 24 of the Law on the Council of State. For that reason, the right to bring an action in the administrative courts against them, or against individual acts made directly in respect of individuals, remains.” ↑
- Constitution – Action for annulment – Article 150: “The right to bring an action for annulment directly before the Constitutional Court on the ground that laws, presidential decrees, the Rules of Procedure of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, or particular articles and provisions thereof, are unconstitutional as to form and substance belongs to the President of the Republic, to the two political party groups with the largest number of members in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye and to members numbering at least one fifth of the total number of members.” ↑
- Kahraman/Balkan, s. 244. ↑
- Ardıçoğlu, s. 31, 32. ↑
- Yıldırım, s. 17. ↑
- Yıldırım, s. 18. ↑
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Imprisonment in Defiance of the Law: Enemy Criminal Law in Türkiye in the Light of the European Court of Human Rights Judgments in Osman Kavala and Can Atalay” (Hukuka Rağmen Hapis: Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesinin Osman Kavala ve Can Atalay Kararları Işığında Türkiye’de Düşman Ceza Hukuku), Dülger Law Office, 20 November 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Demanding Accountability Is Not a Crime: On the Investigation Initiated Against Av. Prof. Dr. Osman Korkut Kanadoğlu” (Hesap Sormak Suç Değildir: Av. Prof. Dr. Osman Korkut Kanadoğlu Hakkında Başlatılan Soruşturma Üzerine), Dülger Law Office, 27 October 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “On the Events Known to the Public as the ‘Fund Scandal’: An Assessment in Terms of Criminal Liability, Investor Rights and Supervisory Liability” (Kamuoyunda “Fon Skandalı” Olarak Anılan Olaylar Hakkında: Ceza Sorumluluğu, Yatırımcı Hakları ve Denetim Sorumluluğu Bakımından Bir Değerlendirme), Academia.edu, 1 October 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Delayed Occurrence of the Result (Dolus Generalis / Weber's Intent)” (Gecikmiş Neticenin Gerçekleşmesi (Dolus Generalis / Weber Kastı)), Essays in Honour of Asst. Prof. Dr. Sesim Soyer Güleç (Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Sesim Soyer Güleç’e Armağan), eds. Koray Doğan / Behiye Eker Kazancı, Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2025, pp. 223–288.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Assessment of the Constitutional Court's Decision on the Provisions Governing the Simplified Trial Procedure” (Anayasa Mahkemesinin Basit Yargılama Usulü Hükümlerine İlişkin Kararının Değerlendirilmesi), Dülger Law Office, 12 October 2023.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, Offences and Sanctions Relating to the Laundering of Proceeds of Crime (The Offence of Money Laundering) (Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasına İlişkin Suçlar ve Yaptırımlar (Kara Paranın Aklanması Suçu)), 3rd ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2026.

