About this work
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
The article examines, in the context of comparative law, cybercrime legislation and its application in United Kingdom (English) law: it deals with the main statutes and types of offence, and with the charges, defences and court decisions in selected cases. It also draws on the legislation and case law of the United States of America. The study aims to build a bridge to our country in this field.
Keywords
- Anglo-American legal system
- United Kingdom (English) law
- cybercrimes
- computer misuse
- unauthorised access
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
The Cybercrime Law and Its Practice in United Kingdom Within the Context of Comperative Law
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER1
Received: 02.02.2017 Accepted: 24.05.2017
ABSTRACT
The subject of this article is the computer crime legislations and practice in United Kingdom in respect of comperative law. In this respect, the essential statuaries United Kingdom and the related offences are examined. Also the accusative arguments of prosecutors, the defence arguments of defendand’s attorneys and the court decisions for certain cases are also cited in order to explain the practice in field. The reasons of choosing the United Kingdom law are, the frequency and international nature of this kind of offences in UK, the dependecy of the daily and business life on ICT systems, and existence of a Govermental policy to tackle this kind of offences in UK. When examining computer crimes legislations and practice, also legislations and court decisions of the U.S which is an important member of common law system are discussed. Consequently, the regime against the computer crimes in UK, which is both a member of the common law system and a member of Council of Europe, is examined, an in this way it is aimed to establish a law bridge (liason) beetwen UK’s and Turkey’s computer crimes and practices. The subject of this article is the legislation on cybercrime in the law of the United Kingdom (England) and its application, considered in the context of comparative law. To this end, the basic statutes governing this field in the United Kingdom and the types of offence contained in those statutes are examined. In addition, in order to illustrate practice, the charges brought by the prosecution, the submissions of the defence lawyers and the decisions given by the judicial authorities in certain cases are examined. The prominent reasons for choosing United Kingdom law in this field are that cybercrime is frequently committed in that country and has an international dimension, that daily life and business life depend to a large extent on information systems, and that the fight against these offences has been chosen as a policy by the State. In giving examples from legislation and practice, the legislation and court decisions of the United States, an important member of the Anglo-American legal system, are also included. In conclusion, by examining the cybercrime regime of the United
Kingdom, which, as a member both of the Anglo-American system and of the Council of Europe, also forms part of the latter system, an attempt has been made to build a bridge with our country in this respect.
Keywords: Anglo-American legal system, law of the United Kingdom (England), cybercrime, misuse of computers, unauthorised access. Keywords: Anglo American law system, common law system, the law of United Kingdom (English), cybercrimes, computer misuse, unauthorized access.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
INTRODUCTION
I. Why the Law of the United Kingdom?
The answer to this question is in fact quite simple: the places where the computer and information systems first emerged are the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK); consequently, these are also the countries in which the first problems of IT law arose, the first legal rules were made, the first investigations were conducted and the first court decisions were given. Since English is the foreign language that I, as the author of the article, have a command of, I chose to examine the laws of these two countries first. The reason why I chose the United Kingdom in particular is that, although on the one hand it belongs to the Anglo-American legal system, which is foreign to us, and is indeed the source of that system, on the other hand it is a member of the Council of Europe and, albeit about to leave, of the European Union, and has as a result made the legal orders created by these organisations part of its domestic law. Türkiye, for its part, being respectively a party to the one and a candidate country for the other, in this sense has something in common with the United Kingdom in one way or another. I therefore chose to examine the United Kingdom system in order to be able to make a fruitful comparison, alongside its differences from Turkish law.
There is also a reason why I have chosen the expression “United Kingdom” in this study, although the expression “England” is frequently used in similar studies. In fact, when one reads publications written in English, the court decisions of that country or the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, one sees that “United Kingdom”, that is “Birleşik Krallık”, and, as its abbreviation, “UK” are used for England. This is a matter which stems from public international law and which, since it relates to jurisdiction and sovereignty, also concerns our subject.
England is a country situated on the island of Great Britain, in the centre and south of the island. In the north of the same island, however, lies Scotland, which is partly independent; in the central west of the island, Wales; and in the north of the island of Ireland, Northern Ireland. Although this varies from country to country, they have, according to the status they hold, their own parliament, cabinet and prime minister. Under the rule of the King or Queen (at present Queen Elizabeth II), however, they form the United Kingdom. Above this there is the Commonwealth of Nations (Commonwealth), made up of countries which are former colonies of the United Kingdom, such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada. This, however, is now a community formed by independent States.
The United Kingdom comprises three different jurisdictions: England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The abbreviation UK (United Kingdom) is used to refer to all three together. Some statutes, for example the Computer Misuse Act 1990, apply throughout the United
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Kingdom. Where differences arising from the jurisdiction are at issue, the focus of the study will be on England and Wales. In fact, although England/Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have different statutes, courts and legal orders, they are very similar to one another, particularly those other than Scotland. In addition, the legal system of England in particular is highly developed. When a legal work is published in any one of these countries, all the statutes and court decisions in these countries are generally taken into account and cited. Indeed, because of the similarities between them and their common past, the statutes and court decisions of the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are cited as well. Besides sharing a common legal heritage, these countries, which have developed economies, have made significant changes to their own statutes with regard to cybercrime. In this developing field of law, these countries have much to learn from one another’s experience in order to be able to deal with the difficulties to which cybercrime gives rise2. Since, unlike in England, a federal system applies in Australia, Canada and the USA, the federal statutes of those countries (the statutes which apply throughout the whole country, above the constituent states) have been taken into account in our study.
In this context, when a comparative law study is carried out by taking the United Kingdom legal system into account, examples are in a sense also given of, and analogies drawn with, the other countries in question3. This is another important reason why I chose this country.
In the article, in order to ensure consistency with other sources, court decisions and other international legislation and case law, I shall use the expression “United Kingdom” (“Birleşik Krallık”), which corresponds to the term United Kingdom in the original language; in abbreviating the names of statutes or of various institutions and organisations in United Kingdom law, or in court decisions, I shall use “UK”, the English abbreviation of United Kingdom.
Before going on to set out and explain the rules and practice of United Kingdom law on cybercrime, I shall also try, so that the subject may be better understood, to set out the salient concepts and the processes and ideas that have been influential in the determination of criminal policy. For this reason the first pages will be, as it were, in the nature of an introduction.
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Finally, I would point out that this study is not an exhaustive one (even United Kingdom lawyers themselves have difficulty in fully exhausting any given subject), and I hope that readers will regard my article merely as a sample study; as a step towards broadening our horizons and drawing lessons by seeing our positive and negative sides.
II. The Subject Matter of Technology and Terminology A. The Importance of Virtual Networks
Virtual networks (the internet, intranets, LANs etc.) are today one of the basic subjects of any regulation or study concerning cybercrime. This basis stems not only from the fact that virtual networks form the infrastructure for computers, but also from the fact that, just as electricity is necessary to power computers, virtual networks are a technological phenomenon for computers4. Accordingly, virtual networks have been taken into account in all the provisions of UK law on cybercrime and on its investigation and prosecution.
B. Personal Data as an Important Component
For the United Kingdom, personal data, their protection and the offences committed against them constitute one of the important components of IT law. Some explanation must therefore be given on this subject as well. There is a single reason why European data protection law uses the term “personal data” instead of “personal information”: threats to privacy begin with the use of raw, bulk data before they have been linked to individuals (personalised), and the law must therefore begin to concern itself with the matter at this very first stage. For this reason, even where there is as yet no specific information, but only a datum at the level of a scrap of information capable of identifying the individual, that datum must fall within the scope of data protection law. This is why the concept of personal data has been preferred5.
On this basis, the terminology used in this field in United Kingdom law, too, has been fixed as “personal data”, both on this ground and in order to be consistent with the international legislation in this field.
C. Statutory Definitions as a Potential Disadvantage
Where technological developments are concerned, statutory definitions are seen to have a potential disadvantage: definitions adopted at a particular moment in history and enacted through political compromise are not serviceable. In the absence of any definition, on the other hand, when a “computer” is encountered, it has to be
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defined by the courts. The development of wireless portable devices (for example, smart mobile phones) does not fit many individuals’ definition of a computer. The process of integrating semiconductor chips into the objects generally referred to as the “Internet of Things” (IoT), from televisions to washing machines, has led to these being regarded as computers and to the limits of punishment being extended where such objects are used without authorisation. While the embedding in the portable devices of the future of systems providing internet communication heralds, on the one hand, the possibility of increasing the functionality of remotely controllable objects, it will, on the other hand, also give rise to new kinds of criminal activity6. It is therefore not possible to draw a sharp and clear line between terms such as computer, data or network, or to define them clearly and within a fixed framework7. Just as every definition that is made will contain gaps, a definition that is valid today will be either inadequate or no longer valid for those who read this article six months from now8.
For example, most of the debates found in works on IT law consist of attempts to apply the terms found in traditional legal texts to the field of IT law. For example, in the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) in force in the USA, the internet, which is the network of networks, is defined solely as the “World Wide Web”. This definition is criticised for being very narrow in the face of today’s technology and for being confined to a single area. Consequently, because developments in the field of technology are very rapid, attempts to lay down statutory definitions directed at a particular technological environment become outdated and ineffective within a few years9. For this reason, United Kingdom law has refrained from defining devices or components of this kind in a precise manner. This approach, with which I agree and which I consider correct, also holds true for the legislation of our country. Indeed, our country has gone one step further and, by using the concept of “information systems”, has adopted a regulation capable of covering every new development and device.
D. The Problem of Naming: Computer Crime, IT Crime or Cybercrime?
“The scope of the crimes made possible by technology is constantly evolving; this evolution takes place both in terms of the functions of technological change and in terms of social interaction with new technologies”10.
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Defining the subject of our study is not confined to classical legal technique alone; in addition, the definition in question will, as “a fundamental conceptual tool”11 in the making of critical legal analyses, help us in naming and in drawing up a plan12.
There are as many terms describing cybercrime as there are ways of committing it13: terms such as “computer crime”, “computer-related crime” or “crime by computer” were used in the early period14. As digital technologies became more widespread, terms such as “high technology” crime were also added to the vocabulary15. The advance of the internet has also brought us the terms “cybercrime” and “internet” or, for short, “net” crime16. Apart from these, terms such as “digital”, “electronic” (or, for short, e-), “virtual”, “IT”, “high-tech” and “technology-enabled” crime have also been used17.
If these words are taken in their full sense (in their dictionary meaning), each term carries within it one or more deficiencies. Terms that focus on the computer do not include “networks”. Others, such as cybercrime or virtual crime, are seen as focusing solely on the internet. Terms such as digital, electronic or high technology crime, for their part, appear so broad as to lose their meaning. For example, high technology crime may go beyond networked information technologies to the point of including other high technology developments such as nanotechnology or bioengineering18.
For this reason these terms should not be approached in their dictionary meaning; for, rather than bearing their dictionary meaning, they are broadly descriptive terms which emphasise the role of technology in the commission of the offence. Nevertheless, no term has yet
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become one that truly covers the whole of this field and is fully explanatory. For this reason most of the terms are used as alternatives to one another.
In this context, for example, the Australian jurist Prof. Dr. Jonathan Clough, an important name in the field of IT law, used the term “cybercrime” in his book on the following grounds: first, this term is widely used in legal scholarship and in the literature19. Secondly, it has become a term in common use20. Thirdly, this term emphasises the importance of networked computers. Fourthly, this term is recognised and used internationally; it is a term used by the United Nations21 and by the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime22.
Another important name in the field of IT law, the English jurist Prof. Dr. Ian Walden, states that the concept of “cybercrime” forms a subset of “computer crime” and that attention in this field should be directed to a wider area. Nevertheless, he uses computer crimes and cyber crimes as synonyms23. I, on the contrary, think that the concept of “computer crime” forms a subset of the concept of “cybercrime”. However, Walden, and the English jurist Prof. Dr. Alisdair A. Gillespie, who finds Walden’s view correct and cites it, state in the following terms that this is a deliberate and correct choice: “A computer does not need to be connected to cyberspace (for our purposes, to the internet); therefore, if we are concerned with an internet crime, this means that, although some computer crimes are relevant to it, we are in fact accordingly concerned with a narrower field than computer crime. Similarly, it may be said that “digital” and “high technology” crimes are broader crimes which do not necessarily require being connected to the internet in the way that “e-crimes” or “cybercrimes” do”24. Gillespie explains this definition better by the following example: “A secretly enters an office and transfers confidential information from B’s computer to a USB memory stick. He then sells this information to C, who is B’s competitor. It is possible for this to be a cybercrime –if, instead of secretly entering B’s office, A breaks the IT security of B’s computer and transfers the data–
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nevertheless A has not connected to the internet. He has carried out all the operations without connecting to the network (offline)”. Investigators, too, therefore have to examine the incident in the same way (this is also the reason why police officers use “high technology crime” rather than “cybercrime” as the name of the unit in which they work). The prosecution brought at the end of the investigation into such an incident will likewise be conducted in the same way. It is therefore not possible to call incidents of this kind cybercrime in the strict sense25.
Despite all these differences in terminology, a consensus has now been reached as to what these terms cover. The two principal categories of cyber (IT) crime are “cyber-dependent” and “cyber-enabled” crimes26. Cyber-dependent crimes are offences “that can be committed only by using a computer, a computer network or another form of ICT”27. These frequently relate to offences in which technology is the target of the criminal activity, such as computer software, malicious software or DoS attacks28.
Cyber-enabled crimes, by contrast, “are traditional crimes which are committed, or whose rate of commission is increased, by using computers, computer networks or another form of ICT”29. Examples are child pornography, stalking, intellectual property theft or fraud. Although the perpetrators of these offences, too, are widely engaged with technology, unlike cyber-dependent crimes these offences can also be committed without information technologies30.
A third category is that of “computer-supported crimes”31. The use of the computer in the commission of these offences is incidental, but computers may provide important evidence relating to the offence. For example, the address of the suspect in a murder may be found on a computer, or records of the messages which the perpetrator and the victim sent to each other before the murder may be found on a computer. In cases of this kind technology is not an important factor in the commission of the offence, but it is an important factor in, and a rich source for, the finding of evidence32.
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This classification or variations of it33 have been adopted in Australia34, Canada35, the United Kingdom36 and the USA37. This classification also points to a question: is cybercrime an entirely new kind of crime, or is it simply a new way of committing old crimes?38 The answer is in fact both. The great majority of the cybercrimes which we discuss in our study are old (classical) crimes committed in new ways. True cybercrimes are offences which are committed against computers and computer networks themselves and which could not exist without computing39.
As can be seen, in the Anglo-American legal systems, and indeed in some countries belonging to the Continental European legal system40, the term “cybercrime”, that is “siber suçlar”, has become established. I, however, think that the use in its place of the concept of “bilişim suçları” (IT crime), which is a Turkish concept and is widely used in our country both in legal scholarship and in legislation, is more appropriate for the scholarship and practice of our country. I should also point out, on the other hand, that when Anglo-American sources are examined, the reason why the concept of “computer crimes” is still used in many sources lies not only in attachment to older usage but also in the fact that some authors consider it to be a more comprehensive concept41.
As can be seen from the explanations given above, it is not possible to determine the boundaries of cybercrime clearly or to set out clearly how it differs from other similar subjects. In addition, an act constituting an offence generally corresponds to several different types of offence at the same time, or may be committed together with other offences as part of a series of offences. The aim of an exercise in naming or classification in this field is not so much to attempt to define the field as it is, as to provide a framework within which the different kinds of criminal activity currently taking place in cyberspace can be examined effectively42.
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III. History
In fact, the history of people using technological developments as a tool for committing crime goes back a very long way. A simple reading of history shows us that the relationship between technology and crime is not new and that, alongside the beneficial uses brought by technological developments, the potential for causing harm by using them is not very far removed from the benefits they have brought. Nevertheless, although technological ideas and hardware have changed over time, many basic ideas of committing crime have remained the same. In particular, the idea of committing crime by exploiting the trust created by technology still holds good. An uncanny resemblance can be seen between certain fraud offences committed by using the first telegraph systems in the 19th century and today’s modern IT –hacking– offences. This long-standing relationship between crime and technology can at the same time, although not easily, also be asserted of the concepts of protection against crime and security. For example, the architecture of the Egyptian pyramids required the use of high-level security technologies in order to thwart tomb robbers. Taking a few small wrong steps or making a wrong movement caused the door of the tomb to close for ever. This system is similar to the methods used at today’s airports to detect potential terrorist activity by tracking abnormal movement. As regards the telegraph, again, it is known to have been used in the apprehension of criminals shortly after its invention. John Tawell, a murderer, said as much minutes before his execution in 1845; for when, after killing his mistress, he set out by train for London, information about Tawell was communicated by telegraph to the police stations, and on arriving in London he was apprehended by the police and taken into custody43.
Today too, the “game of cat and mouse” between criminals and the investigating authorities continues as it did in the past. While criminals produce and use new technologies, the investigating authorities for their part try to catch up with them and to use the same technologies for the investigation, detection and prevention of offences. What has really changed in our modern times is the emergence of, and the increase in, the use of personal information systems (computers) connected to one another by a global communications system. With the formation of this network, the time span for the emergence and fundamental transformation of harmful acts has become extremely short. The point to be noted in particular is that the time needed for the commission of a cybercrime has turned into the time needed for a wave of cybercrime, and one has begun to speak of hours and minutes rather than years and months. As a result, information systems and network technologies have today gone beyond simply being “a force multiplier”. The sharing on a global scale of the commission,
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investigation and prevention of crime is no longer merely an idea; its realisation, however, requires a high level of computing power. These are developing extremely rapidly, and speed in computing constitutes one of the most important defining features of this field. Indeed, according to Moore’s calculation44, an internet year corresponds to approximately three months or less of a normal calendar year45. The chronological account given below should be assessed in the light of this information.
In the United Kingdom and in the countries belonging to the Anglo-American legal system there are volumes upon volumes of books and articles on cybercrime and computers. The history of these publications begins in the 1970s. The first book published in England in this field is the work “Gerald McKnight, Computer Crime, Walker and Co., 1973”46.
The English scholar Hollinger divides the research carried out and the works written in this field up to 1997 into four periods47. According to the author, in the “discovery” period, which lasted from 1946 to 1976, the misuse of computers and means of communication first appeared as “the misuse of telephone lines” (phone phreaking) and entered the records and the literature in that form. In the “criminalisation” period, which lasted from 1977 to 1988, the problems that arose in a manner requiring the intervention of criminal law resulted, as a reaction to them, in legislative work specific to this field being carried out in various legal orders. The “prize for being the first to legislate on its own” in this field was won by Florida, a state of the United States of America (USA)48. The third period, which lasted from 1989 to 1993, is the period of the “demonisation of hackers”. In this period law enforcement agencies waged an intense struggle against the threats brought by the revolution in information and communications technologies (ICT) and led by hackers; they made great efforts, but frequently met with failure. Finally, Hollinger describes the period in which he wrote his book as the “control” period. In this period a large number of offences are at issue, ranging from offences against the integrity of the communications of information systems to the accessibility on the internet of unlawful content, as in the case of material relating to child pornography49.
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There is no reason not to accept Hollinger’s historical classification. One point must be made, however: today computers and cybercrime are driven by two major threats: terrorism and organised crime. Moreover, unlawful content still occupies an important place on the agenda of criminal policy. This period may therefore be called the period of “critical infrastructures”; for in this period issues at the societal rather than the individual level have become more important in the shaping of policies for the reform of criminal law and the law of criminal procedure50.
There are also alternative options for constructing the history of cybercrime. For example, the well-known German criminal and IT lawyer Prof. Dr. Ulrich Sieber divides it into “six main waves” according to the legislative responses of national legal systems to the dangers created by cybercrime51. In the first wave, seen throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the laws were concerned with data protection and privacy, as a response to the increase in the capacity of computers to process data about individuals. In the early 1980s, the existing criminal statutes were updated and supplemented in relation to offences committed for economic gain in which computers were used, but these too proved inadequate. Throughout the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s there were developments in national intellectual property regimes for the purpose of protecting the new kinds of property rights that had emerged by virtue of the internet and information technologies, such as computer software and new forms of traditionally protected works. With the spread of the internet in the mid-1990s, attention focused on the need to update the laws in order to provide protection against unlawful and harmful content. The reform of the law of criminal procedure, for its part, began in the 1980s, as developments in the internet and information technologies challenged traditional practices and methods. The last wave is defined by Sieber as the regulations made on security grounds, such as cryptology and electronic signatures, which continued throughout the second half of the 1990s52.
A history parallel to this may be structured around the persons who engage in criminal activities with varying motivations, as in the case of hackers and virus writers, for example. Early hackers, in the period which Hollinger calls the “discovery” period, acted primarily out of curiosity and the urge to have new experiences rather than with the aim of obtaining an unlawful benefit. With the spread of technologies, the existence of industry-based cybercrime committed for economic gain has become the rule. After the terrorist attacks carried out in New York in 2001, interest shifted primarily to terrorism; because it became plain that the internet and information technologies are, for cyber
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terrorists, both a tool and a weapon53.
In conclusion, it must be accepted that there is no fundamental and clear-cut distinction in the history of cybercrime; if a distinction must necessarily be drawn, it may be drawn between acts carried out before the internet and acts carried out after the internet, in cyberspace. When both are considered, as Hollinger too emphasises, the first legislative efforts in this field concerned acts targeting technology and took place in the pre-internet era, in the early days of the information age, and at that time the computing environment was a very different one. Our present and future work, by contrast, must, because of the earthquake which the internet has caused in the field of computing, be such as to include virtual networks54.
Indeed, taking this necessity into account, the United Kingdom has, as I stated at the outset, consistently made its regulations and shaped its practice relating to the field of IT, and in particular to criminal law and the law of criminal procedure, with virtual networks in mind, and has turned this into a State policy. In our country, by contrast, there are significant deficiencies of policy and legislation, particularly as regards the law of criminal procedure.
IV. Public Policies in the Field of Cybercrime, Critical
Infrastructures, the Frequency of Offences, the Reporting of Offences and
Distinctive Features
A. Public Policies
Law and statutes exist in order to facilitate certain types of human conduct and to restrict others. To attach an offence and a criminal sanction to an act, particularly where the sanction is a custodial sentence of imprisonment, is plainly to place the individual at the very end of the spectrum in this field as regards the application of public law. Criminal sanctions should therefore not be brought into force without the express approval of the State’s senior officials and legislators, and in some cases even of lawyers, and without clear criminal policy objectives to that end having been defined and articulated55.
As stated by the Law Commission56, which has important powers in the process of preparing legislation in England, harm, or the fear felt of possible harm, acts as a brake that halts the development and use of the internet and information technologies, which in turn has a negative
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effect on economic development. If people do not feel safe in the virtual sphere and do not trust it, they may, as stated in the forecasts put forward on this subject, refrain from using it, or become extremely cautious and selective as to the scope of the activities they carry out in it. If this reticence spreads over a very wide area, it may impede the growth and development of the internet and of the services accessible over the internet57.
This last paragraph is a product of comparative law which teaches us important lessons not only for IT law or criminal law but for every discipline of law. For this understanding shows us the need and the necessity for laws to be made or amended not in order to remedy a problem of the day or to react to certain particular events, but after careful thought has been given to the field in question and with social, economic, cultural and administrative sensitivities and policies taken into consideration. In short, when criminal norms and the corresponding sanctions are laid down, criminal policy and its positive and/or negative effects must without fail be taken into account. It is extremely difficult to say that this is the case as far as our country is concerned. Even the most basic laws are enacted as a reaction to a problem once that problem has arisen (to use the colloquial expression, at the eleventh hour). Hence many of even our basic laws are in the nature of reactive legislation. My wish is that this situation should change as soon as possible.
One thing, however, must not go unmentioned: prevention is better than cure58. Nevertheless, in the predictable and foreseeable future, legal obligations and incentives will remain a low-level component in the making of policies on data security, in the face of what technology itself offers, namely the techniques applied by computer engineering, such as cryptology, electronic signatures, anti-virus software and anti-spyware, as well as the new opportunities which it creates for crime59. Consequently, legislation and the work of law enforcement agencies (LEA)60 are not in themselves sufficient to achieve a result in this matter. Society must be educated on this subject and everyone must do his part. Otherwise chaos in the world of IT is inevitable.
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B. Critical Infrastructures
Modern societies are increasingly dependent on computers, computer systems and IT networks which run vitally important systems operating over the internet. This digital revolution extends to civilian infrastructures as much as to the infrastructures of the State and even to those of the armed forces. The magazine The Economist expresses this as follows in a well-known article: “Bombs are guided by GPS satellites, drones are piloted by remote control from anywhere in the world, fighter aircraft and warships operate as large data-processing centres, and even an ordinary infantry soldier acts connected to the IT network”61. Digitalisation, however, is a double-edged sword: in the 21st century bits and bytes have taken the place of bullets and bombs. Indeed, States that are more dependent on digital systems are more vulnerable to cyber-attacks: if information systems form the nervous system of society, disabling them will mean paralysing the country62.
As cybercrime came increasingly to be mentioned together with cyber terrorism, States drew attention to the vulnerability of the structures which are formed by virtual networks and are defined as “critical infrastructures”. The destruction of these facilities, networks, services or structures, or the disruption of their operation, could have serious effects on health, public order, security or the economic well-being of individuals, or on the effectiveness of the functions of the State63. While what the critical infrastructures are varies from country to country according to the particular interest taken in them, computer and communications networks, including the internet, are generally expressly identified64.
For example, the US government published a document entitled “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace”, which forms part of the more comprehensive national strategy work for homeland security. In this document, the language used, describing the virtual sphere as “the control system of the country” and stating that “the healthy functioning of cyberspace is essential to national security and
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the national economy”, made the extent of the potential or perceived vulnerability abundantly clear65. Recognition of the strategic importance of the internet is one of the reasons why the US government rejected the view, raised at the United Nations World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), that it should transfer its control over internet domain names, which are a critical internet resource, to an international governing structure66.
We now see this clearly: owing to the nature of the vulnerability created by cyberspace, we are faced with a dilemma: on the one hand, as a source of vulnerability, the capacity of virtual networks to form a channel for attacks on critical infrastructures such as ports or power stations; and, on the other, the fact that cyberspace is itself an important infrastructure and is therefore a vulnerable asset.
The vulnerability which we face in connection with the loss of the internet as an important information infrastructure is somewhat ironic, since the internet is supposed to have originated as an initiative designed to be robust against a possible attack on the communications networks of the US Department of Defense67; yet this organisation, the creator of the internet, itself receives more than its share of the attacks in question.
C. The Frequency of Offences
The relative inadequacy of empirical data on cybercrime is due to a large number of reasons. It must be said first of all that law enforcement and the investigating authorities lack experience in this area and that the sources of data are inadequate: for example, law enforcement and the investigating authorities do not deal with this field as a matter of priority, since other traditional and important areas such as violent crime compete for their attention with other areas such as cybercrime68. This situation is frequently aggravated by the inadequate training of staff; so much so that suspects sometimes have to educate the investigators about the nature of the offence they are alleged to have committed.
John Perry Barlow, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, recounted as follows the conversation he had with the FBI agent concerned in the course of a hacking investigation:
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“As you know, for things to get on track, potential suspects generally have to explain to the investigating forces the nature of the offences they are alleged to have committed!”69.
The second factor in question clearly contributes to the view that cybercrime is under-reported, since victims, when they perceive that they will receive a weak response from the investigating authorities, become more reluctant to make the effort to report the offence of which they are the victim70.
D. The Notification (Reporting) of Offences
One approach to securing the reporting of unreported offences is to impose a legal obligation on organisations to give notification of a security breach when one occurs. For example, since 2003 the Civil Code of the State of California71 has imposed on private enterprises and public authorities an obligation to give notification where they suffer a security breach72 involving personal data (including financial data). The evident purpose of this regulation is to combat identity theft, which is a growing problem. This initiative also shows that the data processed by an organisation, where they belong to the individuals who are the subject of the data, generally conflict with the interests of individuals and with the public interest. This breach, however, does not infringe the private interests of the organisations whose rights are infringed. In 2009 the European Union (EU), too, introduced a similar obligation to give notification of breaches for providers of publicly available telecommunications services73. There are now two proposals to extend notification obligations of this kind to all data controllers processing personal data (such as public administrators and marketing specialists). Laws of this kind may vary considerably according to the legal system, according to who is to give notification (for example, regulators, data subjects, the general public), according to the measure of the lower threshold of the breach (for example, how serious the breach is) or according to the subject matter of the breach (for example, whether it concerns financial data or health data). The obligations imposed and the legal remedies also vary74.
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In addition to these notification obligations imposed on victims, another approach to this subject is to impose a notification obligation on certain persons in the position of intermediaries who may play a part in the criminal activity. Where the intermediaries have knowledge of the existence of the unlawfulness or are informed of it, their duty to notify may be framed by dividing it into certain rules in the form of effective monitoring in advance or of reaction. Whether the obligation in question takes the form of taking measures in advance or of reacting afterwards, the way in which it is perceived generally depends on the extent to which the intermediaries are involved in the acts constituting the offence. In order to combat offences committed for economic gain, for example, many States enact laws to combat the laundering of the proceeds of crime and impose on financial institutions and professional advisers, with the backing of criminal law, duties to report suspicious transfers to the competent authorities75. In the field of unlawful content offences, some States impose on internet service providers an obligation to give notification without delay where they obtain knowledge76 or become aware77 of the abuse of images relating to children, and where this is neglected the sanctions of criminal law again come into play.
In the United Kingdom, the Terrorism Act 2000 imposes on persons an obligation, “where they have information for preventing an act of terrorism which might lead to the apprehension, investigation or punishment of a person connected with terrorism”, to disclose that information to the relevant authorities “in the most reasonable and practicable manner possible”78.
E. Trends and Distinctive Features
Cybercrime also has the character of being a significant threat to the sustainable development of developing countries; for while in the short term it leads to various aid funds being diverted to improper ends, in the long term it adversely affects the confidence of the investors present in the country’s economy79.
The United Kingdom is one of the countries which make policy in the international community and seek to have it implemented. One of the ways of achieving this is the provision of funding in various fields, in other words the transfer of resources, both directly and, before Brexit, through the EU, to countries which are developing or
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are in the process of accession to the EU. It is because the United Kingdom regards this situation as a threat from the standpoint of its own national interests that it takes a serious interest in cybercrime and develops policies on the subject.
V. Policies and Trends Relating to IT Criminal Law
A. The Approach to Criminal Law and the Law of Criminal Procedure
According to legal theorists and practitioners in the United Kingdom, a regime on cybercrime may be defined not only, as a matter of substantive criminal law, by the appropriate definition of the different types of offence, but also, as a matter of the law of criminal procedure, by the ease with which acts of investigation and prosecution can be carried out. A failure in the second of these undermines the first as well. Unenforceable rules of criminal law are, in a sense, a stain on any legal system; yet this need not necessarily stem from the inadequacy of procedural law80. These inadequacies may also stem from the fact that the criminal norms are not well defined and are ineffective. In every case, however, this is a very serious shortcoming.
B. Sanctions in Respect of Cybercrime
Viewed from an international and historical perspective, the heaviest penalty in the theory of sanctions is the death penalty. However, the United Kingdom, as a member of the Council of Europe and a party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its additional protocols, has abolished the death penalty.
Moreover, no such penalty is generally provided for cybercrime. In the People’s Republic of China, however, this penalty is imposed on hackers. For example, in 1998, of the co-perpetrators who transferred money to their own accounts by breaking into the IT security system of a bank, Hao Jing-long was sentenced to life imprisonment and Hao Jing-wen to death81.
In our country too, as required both by international conventions and by domestic law, the death penalty is not provided for any offence. Furthermore, having regard to the wrongfulness inherent in the offence, penalties akin to the death penalty, such as life imprisonment, are likewise not provided for cybercrime. I should state that I regard these rules as positive.
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C. Security Measures (Prohibitions and Forfeiture)
In the United Kingdom, where the accused is found guilty at the end of the trial of the offences committed, measures similar to the security measures known in our law may be applied to the perpetrator in addition to the penalty. This may take the form of the confiscation of the instruments used in the offence or of the voluntary surrender of those instruments. In addition, a prohibition on the use of important IT tools may also be imposed in order to prevent offences likely to be committed in the future82. While the first of these exists in our country, the second and, in particular, the third do not. I think that the application in our system of sanctions of a norm similar to the third measure would be useful for the prevention of crime.
When the famous American hacker Kevin Mitnick was being tried, the prosecution requested that he be prohibited from possessing and using any computer, software or communications network device. This request, however, was opposed. In the end the court allowed him to access and use a computer only with the approval of the probation officer83. Indeed, throughout the proceedings even the telephone numbers that Mitnick could call were restricted84. Similarly, the hacker Kevin Poulsen, too, was made subject to special conditions during his period of probation85:
“…you may not obtain or have in your possession any computer or any computer-related equipment or software without the permission and approval of your probation officer; nor may you take up or continue in any employment that would give you access to computer equipment without obtaining prior approval from your probation officer”86.
In England, in the Collard case87, the accused was found guilty of making and possessing indecent images of children. In addition to the sentence of imprisonment which it imposed on the accused, the court made the following prohibition order under section 5A88 of the Sex Offenders Act 1997:
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“… You are prohibited from owning, using, having in your possession or having access in any way to any personal computer, laptop computer or any equipment capable of downloading material by accessing the internet in any manner. This prohibition shall not apply where the equipment in question is possessed and used in lawful employment, solely for that lawful purpose”89.
An appeal against this prohibition was brought before the Court of Appeal. The court allowed the appeal and, stating that such a prohibition would effectively deprive the person’s spouse and children of access to the internet and would cause collateral harm, did not set the order aside but added the following wording to the prohibition order:
“…you are prohibited from downloading any material from the internet. This prohibition shall not, however, apply to downloads from the internet made for lawful employment or for lawful study/research”.
The fact that this sanction covers an indefinite period of time was somehow not regarded as “excessive”. In the Halloren case90, by contrast, a decision likewise given with the same temporal indefiniteness was quashed on the grounds that the sentencing judge had not paid sufficient regard to the criteria of the statute and to whether the prohibition order in question was necessary rather than desirable91.
D. Recovery of the Proceeds of Crime
In the United Kingdom, the Assets Recovery Agency was established by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 for the purpose of recovering the proceeds obtained from unlawful acts carried out by criminals92. This agency is also a subordinate body of the structure whose present name is the National Crime Agency but which was called the Serious and Organised Crime Agency at the time it was set up. The recovery of the proceeds of crime either runs together with criminal proceedings, as in the case of a confiscation order, or operates as a “recovery order” in civil proceedings93.
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For example, in the McKinnon case94, a confiscation order was made for the taking of the proceeds which the accused had obtained from a website located in the USA and containing obscene publications. The images in question, however, had been taken in the United Kingdom and then sent to the USA. In the course of the appeal proceedings the accused argued that the proceeds obtained by means of the website were not solely proceeds of crime and that they also included proceeds obtained from countries in which the publication of the images at issue did not constitute an offence. This argument was rejected by the court; for it is not possible to break the proceeds obtained down into parts on this reasoning, the original offence (the production of the obscene publications) was committed in the United Kingdom and the proceeds may be subject to confiscation.
E. Law Reform: Problems and Principles
The fact that the subject of cybercrime is generally information systems, that is to say machines, brings certain problems with it. In the great majority of offences, as in the offence of fraud, the act is directed at a person. In cyberspace, by contrast, acts generally require no human interface and take place entirely digitally. Acts directed from human to machine and from machine to machine must therefore be regulated in criminal codes as a subject of the law95. However, our perception of law and our system, which are based on the “person – thing” distinction inherited from Roman law, are not yet ready for this. First our perception of this field and then our regulations must change.
According to European human rights law, transparency is a component necessary for an individual’s rights to be lawfully restricted. The principle of legal certainty requires that a person be in a position to know with sufficient clarity which of his acts is lawful and which unlawful. The principle of legal certainty yields economic benefits to the extent that it leads individuals to engage in positive conduct, for example by encouraging individuals to engage in electronic commerce96.
Another principle which is very close to the principle of certainty is the need for the continuity of legal rules, that is, legal stability. Continuity or sustainability has two key aspects. The first of these is that a set of legal rules can be applied for a considerable time, in accordance with the purpose for which they were introduced, in the field for which they were introduced. Secondly, the rules in question must be capable of being applied to the prohibited conduct. In no field of law, however, has one hundred per cent enforceability of the rules been attained;
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in cyberspace in particular, because of the existence of numerous and mutually conflicting legal jurisdictions, the lack of enforceability of the rules across a wide range undermines the value of the legal rules97.
As can be seen, the frequent amendment of criminal legislation, which has been encountered particularly in our country in recent years, is regarded as a significant problem not only here but also in the United Kingdom, which possesses a developed economic, socio-cultural and legal infrastructure and system. The right course is to produce good legislation after much thought and over long periods, and to be able to apply the legislation so produced properly for as long as possible.
F. The Perpetrator from a Criminological Point of View
What are the reasons that motivate cybercriminals and drive them to commit crime? According to Grabosky and his colleagues, cybercriminals have the traditional reasons for committing crime; the most apparent of these are greed, lust, power, revenge, adventure and the desire to obtain the fruit of the forbidden tree98. Kilger and his colleagues, by contrast, define the motivation in question by abbreviating it as “MEECES”99; according to this, money, entertainment, ego, being able to do it, being part of a social group and having status are the reasons that drive people to crime100. The examples given of all these motivating factors and the various explanations currently offered in the noteworthy sources in this field are in any event also voiced by the perpetrators themselves101. There are also attempts to express these motivations in mathematical formulae in the context of the proceeds obtained from crime102.
As the famous English jurist Prof. Dr. David S. Wall, who is recognised worldwide in the field of IT law, has stated, “since crime tends to follow opportunities, and the internet has generated a great many new opportunities, a great many new types of crime have indeed emerged”103.
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As well as giving rise to new types of crime, the internet has also provided new possibilities for the commission of classical offences. This has also been expressed in another way by Levi as “the democratisation of criminal opportunities”104. It can be seen that the commission of content offences in particular has become easier with the digitisation of information and the increase in the possibilities of copying it, accessing it and communicating. As regards copyright, while the debate as to whether infringements have an effect on trade continues, the fact that infringements have become widespread is beyond dispute. As technology enters ever more deeply into our daily lives, fraud and forgery offences committed by means of computers and information technologies are becoming the general rule; on the other hand, as pornography becomes one of the key industries in cyberspace, an increase is consequently being seen in consumers with unlawful and extreme demands, and this matter is reaching serious proportions particularly as regards child pornography105.
Therefore, in order to prevent harm to commerce, to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and to be able to prevent crime in general, various measures are being taken and regulations made, as seen in this article, both in terms of legislation and in terms of investigation/prosecution.
G. Criminal Organisations
The concept of a criminal organisation is not clearly defined in English law. At one end of this spectrum are profit-driven criminal organisations and criminal gangs, which are wholly unlawful formations, while at the other end are legal persons, which are recognised by law and are a form of company or commercial enterprise. Unlike in Türkiye, in English law these bear criminal liability for the acts they have carried out in their own right. In this context, under EU law for example, the principal harmonisation instruments in the field of substantive law refer to the criminal liability of legal persons and define it as follows106:
“… means entities having the status of a legal person under the applicable law; it does not, however, include States or public bodies acting under State authority, or public international organisations”107
In the field of criminal law there has historically been a struggle over how to determine the criminal liability of legal persons. Although the
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material element and the mental element of an offence can be realised only by natural persons and not by legal persons, this struggle has continued ever since modern criminal law systems began to evolve towards accepting the criminal liability of legal persons and towards fitting the new rules on the matter into the system108. Between these two extremes, widely differing degrees of formality, coordination and continuity are to be found. As far as English law is concerned, the mere fact that organisations have agreed to conspire against persons or to commit the offence of fraud is a matter for criminal law109.
In conclusion, as with other offences, the criminal liability of legal persons (corporate criminal liability) is also recognised in respect of cybercrime in the United Kingdom and in the criminal law systems of the other countries belonging to the Anglo-American system110. The penalties applied are security measures that are broader variations of those set out in Art. 60 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK).
H. Incitement to Commit an Offence
Unlike in our legal system, in the Anglo-American legal system incitement to an offence and the forms of complicity are examined as intertwined categories and are given meanings different from those we attach to them111. The difficulty of comparative law studies involving the Anglo-American legal system in particular arises from this difference, which is inherent in the nature of these systems112.
In the United Kingdom legal system, an important point of interest to us with regard to incitement to commit an offence and aiding an offence in the context of cybercrime is the supply of the necessary tools and facilities to others in order to enable them to commit offences such as hacking. As Ashworth points out, since it is what the possessor will do with the article or the economic asset
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that forms the basis on which offences of possession are defined as offences, they may be regarded as “inchoate offences” in the natural sense113. Such an outcome amounts, as the case may be, to encouraging / assisting others to commit an offence. In cyberspace, possession of this kind directed at encouraging / assisting an offence undoubtedly calls, as regards the tools to be used in the offence, for its definition as a separate offence. Such tools must be supplied by the person who clearly encourages / assists the offence in the case of an attempt or of a conspiracy. That said, the nature of the market in the tools used to commit cybercrimes of this kind is such that it can most appropriately be characterised as acts of encouraging and assisting114.
This explanation needs to be considered in relation to the offence entitled “prohibited devices or programs” in Art. 245/A, which was inserted into the TCK in our country by Art. 30 of Law No. 6698. This type of offence was introduced because the same situation holds true for our country as well. Certain cybercrimes cannot be committed without special software and hardware designed for them. However, if no operation is being carried out with these devices at the moment of an operation conducted by the law enforcement agencies, their mere possession falls within the scope of preparatory acts, that is, prior acts which are not punishable. It is by means of this provision, which resembles the one in English law, that such conduct having the character of a preparatory act has been made a punishable offence in its own right.
İ. Intermediaries: Liability Rules and Exemption from Liability
Exemption from liability for any activity depends on the existence of strict conditions designed to demonstrate a lack of knowledge or control115. In order to escape liability by relying on the “mere conduit” principle that applies in English law, three rules must be satisfied as regards content: First, the internet service provider (ISP) must not have initiated the transmission; for example, the decision to transmit the content or to give access to it must not have been taken and initiated by the ISP, and this must moreover be ascertainable from the operational data (indicators) relating to the service provided116. That is to say, when a user sends an e-mail message, for example, this must not coincide directly with the time at which the ISP transmits the message to the recipient. Second,
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the ISP must not select the recipient of the transmission117. Third, the ISP must not select or modify the information contained in the transmission118. Editorial control of this kind over the information contained in the transmission may be construed as a “content service”119. This does not, however, cover technical manipulations which take place in the course of the transmission of, or access to, the data and which do not impair the integrity of the data content120.
In order to benefit from the “caching provision” contained in the EU Directive and the United Kingdom legislation, details of which are given in the footnote below, ISPs must fulfil the following seven conditions, which are intended to furnish effective proof capable of defeating any charge121: First, any storage must be automatic, intermediate and temporary. Human intervention will most probably be needed at the outset in order to make the necessary settings for the caching service, but there must be no intervention for each individual event or on a continuing basis. Storage for back-up purposes may come into question; this means that more permanent storage has to be made than the caching service requires. Second, there must be a necessity linked to the purpose; for example, the sole purpose of the copying must be to provide the transmission to the recipient of the service. The third condition is that the ISP does not modify the data122. The fourth condition is the requirement that the conditions incumbent on the ISP as regards access to the data be fulfilled by means of rights such as a copyright licence123. The fifth condition is that any rule on updating the information, for example a requirement that the data be updated periodically, is in conformity with the legislation124. Sixth, the systems used by the data provider to monitor the use of the data, ranging from “cookies” to digital rights management (DRM) systems, must not be harmful125. Finally, where ISPs have actual knowledge that the original source has been removed, that access to it has been blocked, or that a court has ordered access to it to be blocked or the content to be removed, they must block access to the information or remove the content126. If these conditions are not complied with, the ISPs will incur liability127.
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As can be seen from our explanations above concerning the statutory exemptions from liability, the legal policy on the development of the internet as a medium is of its own kind (sui generis). In essence, this policy does not represent a radical break with the principles of traditional English criminal law. Apart from the exceptional cases provided for by statute, strict liability is applied very rarely; for liability for infringements of a certain level, “knowledge”, that is, intent, is the standard mental element. The rules in this field, however, also contain a form of “liability for omission”: accordingly, providers of cloud computing services are required to act where actual knowledge is apparent; they must act in accordance with the principle of “fair warning”128 and, without notifying any law enforcement authority, must expeditiously remove content constituting an offence or ensure that access to it is blocked129.
J. Specialised Courts
In countries such as India and Bangladesh, specialised courts with jurisdiction over cybercrime have been established. The aim is to overcome the lack of experience and knowledge within the judicial system, and these courts occupy a very important place in the judicial systems of those countries130. However, neither in England nor in any other country belonging to the Anglo-American legal system are there specialised courts charged with hearing cybercrime cases.
K. Private Law Enforcement
The nature and origins of the internet show us that self-regulation131 and private law enforcement mechanisms are a component at the heart of the responses to offences committed in the IT field. Arrangements of this kind operate over an extended period of time; in fact, these mechanisms also overlap with public law enforcement. They cover not only users and the groups concerned but also, and very importantly, the intermediaries which provide the infrastructure services giving users access to the internet, such as internet communications providers132. Consequently, in the United Kingdom, where there is a conviction for a cybercrime, private law sanctions also follow where the nature of the case so permits.
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In our country, although confiscation, the seizure of the proceeds of crime and the sanctions specific to legal persons partly correspond to these, they do not have the character of private law sanctions specific to this field. It is necessary and indeed imperative that private law remedies specific to this field be established in our legal system and operated separately from the measures and sanctions of criminal law. This stems from the structural difference between the two legal systems.
L. The Role of Private Persons in the Investigation and the Sanctions that May Be Applied by Private Persons
In the USA and in Western countries there are various initiatives by private persons / organisations and by non-governmental organisations to monitor cybercrime, and child pornography in particular, and to report it to the competent authorities. In addition to the activities of these civil initiatives, cybercrimes are also reported to the police by individuals or groups who act online or digitally as self-appointed law enforcers (vigilantes). In US v. Jarrett133, for example, child pornography found on the computers of two US citizens as a result of those computers being “hacked” by a Turkish hacker was handed over to the Alabama Police Department and used as evidence in charging those persons134.
From the relative perspectives of restorative justice and crime prevention, which rest on different policy foundations each justified in its own right, the most effective outcome of the private sector and the public sector informing one another in each case about the cybercrimes that have occurred is the application, together with claims for compensation, of a sanction that replaces or supplements the penalty to be imposed135. An approach of this kind, however, also raises policy questions as to the limits of its appropriateness. As noted earlier, a sanction of this kind consists in preventing the offender from using a computer or from accessing the internet. An alternative approach is for the police to send a report to the ISP serving the offender. Some ISPs may then choose to close that person’s account, and the other players in the sector, once informed, will not accept offenders as customers. This sanction is referred to as the “e-death penalty”136.
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Restrictive arrangements of this kind nevertheless attract, and are subject to, legal scrutiny and human rights law. A mechanism for sharing such information may be open to abuse, “although it ought not to be”137. Because of such concerns, EU rules regulate the protection of the processing of personal data for the purpose of ensuring cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of the EU Member States, in particular with regard to data transfers taking place between private persons138.
VI. Types of Cybercrime in United Kingdom Criminal Law
The impact of information technologies on society is extremely profound and intense139. This also holds true for the United Kingdom as an industrial society. In England, society was confronted with acts committed by means of information technologies even before the Computer Misuse Act 1990, and sought to combat them. The rules on fraud, theft or offences against the person were generally applied to these unlawful acts. Even so, there were various gaps in the protection afforded by criminal law. This was pointed out in particular by the Law Commission in the Working Paper which it published in 1988140. In its work the Commission concentrated in particular on acts of unauthorised access and prepared its proposals with these in mind. However, following discussions held with representatives of the financial and IT sectors before the final report was drawn up, it became apparent that legislating only on unauthorised access would be insufficient, and, on the proposal of these groups, it was decided that the use of unauthorised access as a means (stepping stone) for committing other, more serious offences and the unauthorised modification of data held on a computer should also be regulated. In the end, the Act in question entered into force in 1990 and has also been the source of many problems141.
In the decade immediately following the entry into force of the Act and thereafter, critics pointed out that the Act had become outdated, that computers were not so sophisticated at the time the Act was drafted, and that the internet was still in its
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infancy142. Pressure to extend the scope of the Act grew accordingly143. The All Party Parliamentary Internet Group reviewed the Act and produced a report making recommendations on the reform that the Act required144. The Group concluded that the problems voiced in relation to the Act stemmed from “the wide gaps existing in the Act in force”. A particular issue here concerns the applicability of the Act to DoS attacks, since such attacks prevent users who are acting lawfully from accessing commercial websites. The courts have interpreted the offences in the 1990 Act as being applicable to DoS attacks145. It is, however, common knowledge that offences specific to this matter are needed in order to combat unlawful conduct of this kind. Further pressure in this field came from international conventions146. In 2006, the Police and Justice Act 2006 supplemented the offences in the CMA and introduced new types of offence concerning the misuse of computers. Further additions were subsequently made by the Serious Crime Act 2007147.
In recent years, in the fight against organised crime, governments and law enforcement agencies have been seen to shift their attention so as to target the proceeds obtained from the laundering of the proceeds of crime. Legislation to this effect deals with offences of this kind somewhat more broadly than with other offences; in this context it focuses on the underlying purpose behind the act carried out in order to obtain an unlawful gain, rather than on a series of individual acts such as, for example, the making of unauthorised modifications. After all, cybercrimes are also part of organised crime, and legislation of this kind should increasingly be used to combat these offences as well148.
To foresee that criminal law will continue to face various difficulties in combating those who, by taking advantage of the opportunities and facilities offered by computers and especially the internet and choosing to exploit them, cause widespread harm and have opted for unlawful acts such as fraud, paedophilia, espionage, piracy, the laundering of the proceeds of crime or unfair
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competition and the like is not a prophecy but a statement of fact149.
It is extremely difficult to calculate the number of offences committed in this field. The business world is reluctant to report the offences committed against it, since reporting may expose the weaknesses in its security and deter customers from doing business. It may also be thought that, because the legislation in this field is highly complex, the number of charges brought may fall150. Indeed, I have already touched on the approach to this matter above.
In the United Kingdom, provisions on cybercrime have been enacted in this Act and in various similar Acts which I have mentioned above. Rather than listing those Acts and a few of their sections one after another, as is done in the majority of studies in this field, I consider it more appropriate for a comparative law study to set out some of these offences which I regard as important, their elements, and the court decisions in which they have been at issue.
A. Computer-Related Offences
1. Computer Espionage
Espionage activities have always played a part in the world of international relations. Governments, terrorists and others have used spies in order to find out what foreign governments and other organisations are doing, particularly in matters of defence and national security. Cyberspace offers an alternative route of access to secret information of this kind. One of the classic examples of cyber espionage is the activities of Markus Hess. During the 1980s, using ARPANET, the forerunner of the internet, he gained access from his base in Hanover, Germany, to more than 400 US military computers and supplied information to the Soviet Union151. As regards foreign intelligence activities conducted by the State, the disclosures made by Edward Snowden152 revealed that the signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities of the USA extended not only to its enemies but also to its allies, among them the United Kingdom153.
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The obtaining and disclosure of certain information having the character of official secrets has long been criminalised. Equally, an open and transparent State presupposes, first and foremost, the existence of a liberal and democratic society. Striking an appropriate balance and establishing workable rules to that end gives rise to an evident tension. Under English law, the Official Secrets Acts of 1911, 1920 and 1989 make it an offence to obtain and to disclose certain information having the character of official secrets. Depending on the nature of this information, it is possible for persons to commit an offence154.
These Acts do not expressly define what an official secret is. It is sufficient that the information is of a kind that could be used by enemies. The point of direct relevance to our subject, however, concerns where the information is located. Under the Official Secrets Act 1911, it is an offence to obtain secret information by entering “prohibited places”; the concept of “prohibited places” in that Act has been understood very broadly. When it was laid down in the Act, however, the concept was defined in terms of “physical places”; historically and logically, it cannot have been framed so as to cover, in the “virtual” world, the breaching of the security of an information system and unlawful entry into the system by accessing computers and information systems located in prohibited places155.
Where an offence is committed by targeting official secrets held in an information system, indirect protection may be provided, by way of analogy, through the offences committed against system integrity by means of unauthorised access (for analogy and extensive interpretation are possible in the Anglo-American system of criminal law). Indeed, in the USA, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the principal statute governing offences against computer integrity, protects first and foremost information, whether classified or unclassified, “used by the Government of the United States”156. That Act was introduced in order to protect157 private and public information systems on a very broad scale158.
An example of the potential role of the internet in disclosures of information of this kind is the case of Richard Tomlinson. While seeking to have a book published recounting the years he had worked for MI6, the British intelligence service159, Tomlinson was in 1997 found guilty of breaching the 1989
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Official Secrets Act and was sentenced to imprisonment160. He was subsequently accused of publishing a list of MI6 agents on a website. By the time publication of the list over the internet was stopped by the State’s lawyers, it had been republished many times over and very widely; moreover, Tomlinson’s connection with the matter was never proved161.
The regime governing the protection of official secrets was brought into operation by the Freedom of Information Act 2000. That Act established a disclosure regime setting out how information is to be provided by the State where forward-looking (proactive) publication is required or where there is an obligation to respond to individual requests for information162.
In the past, the regime for the protection of official secrets was criticised for being drawn too widely, because even information only remotely connected with State security could give rise to criminal liability163. The reform of this regime, however, has changed the rules and the practice of administrative law; most strikingly, the Freedom of Information Act has altered the perception held by many that official secrets are excessively protected by criminal law. In future the internet may be seen to undermine the effectiveness of these rules, because, since information on the internet can be accessed globally, national legal control over such information is at best temporary once it has been published. Wikileaks is the best and best-known example of this. It is a situation which the Thatcher Government faced in the United Kingdom in the mid-1980s with the publication of Peter Wright’s book “Spycatcher”. While the Government was initially able to obtain an injunction from the court restraining publication of the book, the application for a permanent injunction was refused by the court because the book had already been published over the internet in other jurisdictions164.
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2. Offences Relating to Trade Secrets and Confidential Information
Industrial espionage is a frequent feature of modern business life, since a business model or “know-how” can become an increasingly valuable asset. Today, activities of this kind are carried out by using ICTs, in forms such as breaching the security of information systems (hacking) as a way of getting at information, spyware165, electronic eavesdropping, or the use of a USB memory stick as a tool for removing useful information. Espionage of this kind may occur between competing companies and individuals, and also at the level of States166. Such acts may be accomplished with the complicity of someone inside the victim organisation who has a right of access to the information, or may be carried out by outsiders committing the unlawful acts themselves or using third parties to do so (procuring their services as a commercial service). Converting the value of trade secrets into money, however, is a complex process; this means that information of this kind is generally obtained in order to preserve the existing order (preventing competition) rather than on a speculative basis167.
The most prominent example in the field of cyber industrial espionage is the case of Mr and Mrs Haephrati, who held both Israeli and German nationality and operated outside England. The pair, together with a large number of prominent businessmen, were taken into custody for engaging in industrial espionage against Israeli business. The couple were accused of having used a Trojan horse program, which they had developed and distributed, to enter the information systems of rival companies covertly and obtain consent for access, and of having thereby enabled private investigators hired by rival companies to learn the trade secrets of those companies. The malware in question was activated when an e-mail sent to the victim was opened, or when a disk containing a business proposal was sent to the victim and run on the victim’s computer. The malware was hosted on FTP servers located in the USA and in Israel. The Haephratis were subsequently extradited to Israel. As a result of pre-trial bargaining with the competent authorities, they secured a reduction of their prison sentence thanks to the evidence they provided against the private investigators168.
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In most legal systems, the unlawful acquisition of trade secrets has essentially been regarded, like the protection of other intellectual property rights, as primarily a matter for private law disputes169. However, as a result of the growth of commercial information, many developed countries have supplemented the existing rules of private law with criminal law provisions in order to protect such information.
In the United States, trade secrets are protected by criminal law provisions at federal level170. An illustrative case tried under the statute in question is US v. Lange171. In that case, in which the accused was a disgruntled former employee, he was found guilty of attempting to sell secrets relating to electronic commerce which he had obtained from his former employer172.
In England, the protection of commercial information by criminal law was the subject of a recommendation by the Law Commission. It was proposed that the disclosure or unauthorised use of trade secrets be made an offence173. An offence of this kind would require a clear definition of “trade secret”, and that definition would need to have a number of criteria. First, the owner of the information must have indicated, expressly or impliedly, the wish that the information remain secret. As with authorisation in the offences relating to the integrity of information systems, the owner of the information must accordingly be under a duty to take some action. Second, in the same way that confidential information must have the necessary quality of confidence, the information in question must not be known to the public174. Third, keeping the information secret must have an economic value, so that there is a rational basis for its protection by criminal law175.
For the offence to be committed, a person must use or disclose the confidential trade secret knowing both that it belongs to another and that the owner of the information has not consented to its disclosure or use. According to the Law Commission, an offence of this kind should form part of the English legal system, as it does in the law of many other countries176.
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To date, the Law Commission’s initiatives have made no headway. In some situations, however, it is possible to apply the form of the offence contained in section 4 of the Fraud Act 2006: “fraud by abuse of position”. The best and most frequently encountered example of this is that of an employee who is leaving his job but has a right of access to his employer’s information systems and who uses that right to copy valuable information belonging to his former employer (such as a customer list, for example) with a view to passing it to his future employer, even though he knows that this conduct is contrary to company rules. A scenario of this kind may also give rise to various claims under employment law for breach of the duties of loyalty and confidentiality177.
Whereas in England the absence of such a provision is felt and its enactment has been proposed, in our country a provision of this kind has been part of the TCK since 2005. Art. 239 TCK, entitled “Disclosure of information or documents having the character of a trade secret, banking secret or customer secret”, makes it an offence to give or disclose information having the character of a trade secret to unauthorised persons, without expressly mentioning data held in digital form. There is no doubt that the trade secrets forming the subject matter of the offence also include secrets kept as data in digital form. I must point out, however, that I have not come across any court decision on this point in the practice of our country. For in practice, in particular, difficulties are encountered in explaining to the investigating and prosecuting authorities that information of this kind is a confidential trade secret and, even where this is done, in proving the act committed (for the investigating authorities regard cases of this kind as a commercial dispute and do not, or cannot, devote sufficient and the necessary staff, equipment and time to them), and this does not allow the dispute to be brought before a court, a decision to be rendered and that decision to be reviewed by the higher courts.
3. The Offence of Fraud
In the United Kingdom, in the great majority of cases involving computers, the Theft Act was sufficient for bringing charges. In Thompson178, for example, an employee of a bank in Kuwait tampered with (manipulated) the bank’s computers and thereby misappropriated money from the accounts and credit accounts of certain customers under his management. Later, while he was in the United Kingdom, he sent a transfer order for the money to be transferred to his accounts there; it was at that point that the fraudulent transactions he had carried out were discovered. Nevertheless, as in other areas of criminal law, the definitions contained in traditional
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legislation gave rise to certain problems of application that had not been foreseen before the advent of the computer. Under the legislation of some countries, as under the United Kingdom’s Theft Act, a natural person must be deceived for the offence of fraud to be made out179. This is true of the law of our country as well: under Art. 158(1)(f) TCK, which governs aggravated fraud committed by using information systems, the offence of fraud likewise requires that acts of a deceptive nature be carried out against a natural person by using information systems.
English court decisions define the act of deception, and hence the offence of fraud, within a broader framework. However, because neither the provisions mentioned above nor the court decisions were sufficient and a gap had arisen in this field, the Law Commission, which is established in England for the preliminary stage of law-making, emphasised in the Report on Fraud which it published in 2002 the need to criminalise, in particular, the dishonest obtaining of services over the internet. In May 2004 the Home Office published an outcome paper in response to the report prepared by the Law Commission. This was followed by recommendations for the reform of the offence of fraud, which also included the Law Commission’s proposal on “theft of services”. Ultimately, the Fraud Act 2006 made it an offence to obtain services from internet services by means of falsification and deception180.
In addition to the definition of the offence in this Act, three further elements not written in the Act must also be present for the offence to be made out. The first of these focuses on the terms of the service provided: the service must have been, or be going to be, provided in return for payment. The second element is that the perpetrator must have obtained the service without making that payment. The third element, which is also the second mental element of the offence, is that the perpetrator must know that the service is, or will be, obtainable but must not intend to pay181.
4. The Offence of Forgery
In our daily lives we use a wide range of documents, from a twenty-lira banknote to a driving licence or an insurance policy. Many of these documents are used either to establish our identity in a particular matter or to attest to the truth of that matter. The production of forgeries of these physical documents has, as a benefit of the advances in information technology, become one of the major
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concerns of the criminal world. Today forgeries of even the most original documents can be made by means of computers; computers accordingly make possible methods by which such forgeries will frequently go undetected. Present-day software-based digital manipulation applications place the most powerful tools in the hands of even the most amateur forgers182.
In cyberspace, perpetrators may, using information obtained from a wide range of sources, create new entitlements or exploit existing ones by using forged documents. This information is obtained from the victims themselves by means of social engineering techniques; for the deceptive acts carried out by human beings in order to induce other human beings to disclose their information help to overcome the mechanisms and procedures put in place for data security. The success of these techniques is made easier in part by people’s readiness to disclose their private information over the internet (as on social networking sites, for example). Another option in this field is for the perpetrator to break into the customer database of an e-commerce site and seize credit card details and other documents belonging to the customers. Both of these acts constitute offences in English law under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981183.
B. Content-Related Offences
1. Intellectual Property Offences
In September 2013 the City of London Police set up a unit called the “Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit” (PIPCU). Among its many activities, in June 2014 this unit launched an advertisement-replacement initiative called “Operation Creative”. Under it, the information system security of websites hosting products that infringe intellectual property rights is to be breached by the police themselves (hacking), and the advertising spaces of the site are to be altered so that a notice that “the site in question is under criminal investigation” is placed in those spaces for those who visit the sites. The project is run jointly with the United Kingdom advertising industry and can be applied only to visitors accessing from IP addresses originating in the United Kingdom; it is nevertheless a project designed to disrupt the revenue stream of sites of this kind184.
This approach is an extremely important example of how much importance is attached to intellectual property in the United Kingdom and how strictly these rights are protected.
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2. Pornography
As a matter of legal approach, a distinction must be drawn between pornographic images in general and pornographic images falling into special sub-categories such as child pornography, since the activities of law enforcement focus on these sub-categories in particular. Laws against child pornography are concerned primarily with the child abuse that takes place when the images are created, and only secondarily with the consequences of the consumption of such products. In this respect child pornography offences differ fundamentally from other pornographic and obscene images; in the latter offences the focus is on the effects of the material on its consumers, ranging from potential offending to sexual dysfunction and from violence to drug use185.
In the traditional field of obscenity, children’s access to obscene material is not a major problem where access is controlled by the manager of the outlet through which the product is physically distributed (as with the sale of magazines or books, for example); in the internet environment, however, practices such as age verification are inadequate, and this gives rise to various offences. The following must therefore be anticipated: a site which aggressively promotes access to pornographic material to internet users by means of search engines and complementary techniques such as “meta-tags”, without placing any control on access to the material, may be held liable on the basis that children are among the visitors whose attention may be drawn to such sites. This view becomes considerably stronger where an e-mail with potentially obscene content is sent that has not been requested by the recipient186.
In a trial on this matter, what the jury is concerned with when deciding the issue is not numerical magnitude (quantity); the investigation need not show how many persons, and what type of people, actually visited a site of this kind; the real concern is to establish whether vulnerable beings such as children could potentially visit the sites in question. Accordingly, questions still remain as to what the numerical threshold is when the jury decides on the likelihood of children seeing the content. In Calder and Boyars Ltd, Salmon LJ stated that a “significant proportion” was required187. That approach, however, was rejected by Lord Pearson in DPP v. Whyte188;
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according to Lord Pearson, it is sufficient under the “de minimis”189 principle that some people are affected.
In Perrin191, which concerned the US-based site “sewersex. com”, a site providing a kind of preview, accessible to anyone over the internet, of pages depicting images of coprophilia190, the court rejected the submission (a submission made on behalf of the defence) based on the “significant proportion” view as against the “more than a negligible number” argument. In the aftermath of Perrin, the Government stated that it was concerned with the threshold of obscenity for material likely to be accessible to children and was considering, for example, what “the degree of sexual explicitness equivalent to that available to those aged 18 and over in licensed sex shops” ought to be. Access of this kind is deemed “likely” where the material is not “behind a suitable payment barrier or other generally accepted age verification system”, for example where the material is on the front page of a pornography site and is material supplied by a non-commercial user192.
What constitutes the act of publication in cyberspace? What does it mean to publish? Does making obscene content available for download from a website, or transferring it over a P2P connection, amount to publication? Transmission is another way of describing the sending of information by a sender to a recipient; in other words, it is the receipt by the recipient of the information sent by the sender. A similar semantic problem has also arisen in the field of copyright. The statutory reform in that field makes it clearer that an exclusive right is required in order to communicate a copyright work to the public; that right means that the individuals making up the public may access the work in question at a place and time individually chosen by the right holders. The courts take a robust approach in interpreting this point: in Fellows and Arnold193 the court rejected the argument that publication requires some form of active conduct rather than the passive conduct of keeping information ready for access194. Accordingly, passively keeping content open to access is also regarded as “transmission”, without any active conduct being required. In short, the act of transmission may also be carried out by an omission.
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In Waddon195 the accused operated a website entitled “extreme perversion”. A police officer accessed the site and subscribed in order to be able to download obscene images. At the appeal stage it was accepted on the part of the defence that the accused was responsible for having the content in question transmitted to the website and, likewise, for its transmission to the police officer. The court nevertheless questioned the rule as to what the position would be where an individual uploads content to a site without intending its onward transmission. The court took issue with the rule on this point and expressed the view that publication does not consist of one single, simple act but of multiple acts, and that a continuing act of publication takes place each time the content is downloaded. On this view, the material element of the offence is first realised by the perpetrator when the content is uploaded to the internet, but subsequently, when the content is downloaded, the victim continues the act alone or together with the perpetrator. In addition, treating the act in this comprehensive manner ultimately means that the obiter dictum in Waddon increases the likelihood that publication will take place in more than one place and that the offence will accordingly fall within more than one jurisdiction196. In Perrin197 this situation was subsequently merely touched upon198. In neither case, however, was an in-depth examination carried out199.
In Smith (Gavin)200 the accused was tried on a charge of engaging, in a live internet chat, in explicit conversations about various sexual fantasies, including sadistic sexual conduct towards children. At trial the accused successfully argued that being in communication with only one person cannot be regarded as publication where the other party to the conversation is not expected to publish the conversation further at a later stage. This interpretation was overturned by the Court of Appeal. According to the court, it is possible to regard this as publication where there is only one recipient, since it is possible that this one person is the only person who has been depraved and corrupted by the content in question201.
Where digital information is concerned, particularly where a person intends to distribute obscene content by means of file-sharing programs, it is a matter of “reasonable expectation” that the further effect of the dissemination of such content will, unlike the dissemination of physical printed content, be of a higher order202.
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3. Extreme Pornography
The offence of possessing extreme pornographic material is a relatively recent addition to English law. The great majority of legal scholars draw a distinction between obscenity and extreme pornography, since the Obscene Publications Act 1959 (POA), which governs the offence of obscenity, contains no offence dealing with content of this kind. It should be noted, however, that the provision enacted on extreme pornography did not repeal the POA. As will be seen, extreme pornography is an offence of possession, whereas the offences in the POA are not concerned with possession (that Act focuses on publication). Accordingly, where extreme pornographic content is published, the POA ought “technically” to be applied; practice has shown, however, that even in that situation it is the offence of possessing extreme pornography that is preferred, since that offence is easier to apply203.
In August 2005 the Home Office in England published a consultation paper on “the possession of extreme pornographic material”. This initiative was prompted in part by some disturbing evidence presented in Coutts204. In the trial of Graham Coutts on the charge of having killed Jane Longhurst, one item of evidence adduced against the accused was that, before the relevant period in which the offence was committed, he had visited a large number of websites containing sexual violence, including rape, as well as murder and necrophilia205.
The consultation paper focused on the problem that, while the Obscene Publications Act 1959 can be applied to acts of this kind, such material is supplied over the internet by publishers who are generally established abroad. The paper therefore puts forward a proposal that the rules adopted for child pornography be carried over to this field as well, by criminalising even the possession of the material in question and thereby targeting the person on the demand side206.
By criminalising certain specified content, in a manner similar to the Video Recordings Act 1984, this proposal differs from the Obscene Publications Act, which adopts an approach directed at the likely effects of such material on its audience. Given the vague nature of the concepts of depraving and corrupting, the principles of certainty and clarity could, were a possession offence of this kind to be added to the 1959 Act, be
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undermined207. It was therefore proposed that, as a separate type of offence, the possession of material showing the following, whether in actual form or in realistic depictions, should constitute an offence: a) oral, anal or vaginal intercourse with an animal, b) sexual acts performed on a human corpse, c) serious violence in a sexual context, d) serious sexual violence208,209.
This shift of focus, however, presents legislators with a problem in framing an appropriate definition without harming activities that are currently carried on lawfully, such as certain sado-masochistic practices and the film industry. The proposal also gave rise to differing views with regard to the last two types of content210. The penalty for possession of the material in question is three years’ imprisonment. Because the Obscene Publications Act provides for imprisonment of up to five years, a distinction has to be drawn between the publications falling within the scope of each of the two Acts211.
Although opinions on the proposal were sharply divided, the Government continued with the proposal process and brought into operation the new type of offence which it enacted in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008212. The new Act criminalises the possession of extreme pornographic images213. An image is regarded as pornographic if it is “reasonably assumed” to have been produced for the purpose of sexual arousal214. In addition, the content must be extreme. This means that it must fall within section 63(7) of the Act and be different from what is of a grossly offensive, disgusting or obscene character215.
The offence essentially covers four types of content216: acts which threaten a person’s life; serious injuries which harm, or are likely to harm, a person’s anus, breasts or
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genitals217; sexual activity with animals or with a human corpse218. In 2015 this list was extended to cover images of rape219. For it is said that the section did not fully meet the purpose for which it was originally enacted; Prof. Dr. Gillespie gives the following example in his work “Cybercrime”:
“X has downloaded to his computer a film in which Y, a 19-year-old girl, is forced to perform a striptease in front of a person named Z, during which Z cuts off Y’s hand at the wrist with the machete he is holding, and after which Z has sexual intercourse with Y”220.
Under this section of the Act, possession of the film in question is entirely lawful. It is perfectly clear that the part of the person’s body that is harmed is not the anus, the breasts or the genitals, and so the depiction of such a serious injury inflicted on a person does not constitute an offence under section 63(7). The response to this will be “but does this not constitute a threat to life?”; yet what if the film also shows Y receiving medical assistance during this time? This is an extreme example, but it shows that the Act fails to achieve its expressly underlined purpose221. It was for this reason that the section in question was amended shortly after those lines were written.
As with obscenity and indecency, the court must first establish that the material is pornographic and must also determine whether it shows a real act or a portrayal (animation) presented as if it were a real act. This Act provides for the carrying over of the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 concerning images of child abuse222. In addition, in respect of animals, unlike the other acts, the Act accepts as a defence (ground of justification) proof that the act is normal in nature223. By way of a lower maximum than that for offences of the other kind, where material involving serious violence is depicted a maximum of three years’
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imprisonment is prescribed. As with the other offences relating to expression, the investigation of this offence too may be conducted only by the public prosecution service224,
225.
4. Child Abuse and Pornography
If there is one subject on which politicians, the media and the public are indisputably united with regard to the dark side of the internet, it is child pornography226. Perhaps the most tragic aspect of the spread of the internet and digital technology is that they facilitate the production and distribution of child pornography and of images of other forms of child abuse227. Child abuse and child pornography are the subject that has most occupied the agenda in the field of IT law in recent times228.
Some images are created covertly, without any direct interaction with the child, whereas the vast majority, “hard-core” images, are created through the direct abuse of children. It should in fact be noted that the term “pornography” is inappropriate where children are concerned, since, describing as it does a semi-legal industry, it creates confusion in the public mind, a confusion which is all the greater where images of adolescent children are concerned229. The more appropriate term in this context is therefore simply “child abuse”230.
In Atkins & Goodland v. Director of Public Prosecutions231 the court found it necessary to examine the status of the images which formed the basis of the charge, were held in the cache of the accused’s machine and constituted the subject matter of the offence232. Copies of this kind are generally created and stored automatically by the internet browser software in order to make processing more efficient. The expert report submitted in the case shows that the great majority of computer
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users are unaware of the operations which the cache memory performs on their machines233.
In this context the court was faced with two questions: are cached copies to be regarded as “making” under section 1(1)(a) of the POCA 1978, or as “possession” under section 160(1) of the CJA 1988? In the earlier case of Bowden234, the court had held that downloading and printing out images from the internet amounted to “making”, and that this term applies “not only to original photographs but also to negatives, copies of photographs and data stored on a computer disc”. In Atkins, by contrast, the prosecution was unable to prove that the accused was aware of the cached copies and accordingly, stating that the accused could be liable for “making” or “possession” only under section 1(1) or section 160(1) respectively, submitted that these were offences governed by the principle of strict liability rather than offences requiring an element of knowledge. The general presumption applied by the courts when interpreting a criminal statute is that Parliament does not intend an innocent individual to be punished and that the mental element of the offence must therefore be inferred from the meaning of the statute235. The court accordingly held that knowledge was required, and the appeal succeeded on this point. Had the prosecution been able to prove that the accused was aware of the caching operations by showing that the default settings of the memory functions had been altered, the accused could have been found guilty236.
In Atkins the court accepted that subjective knowledge is required for the offence of “possession” to be made out; in another trial, Warwick237, the court gave the matter closer attention and stated that it was necessary to determine what “possession” means in relation to information systems. In that case the accused was charged separately with possessing approximately 3000 still images and 40 film files. It was not in dispute that, at the time the offence was alleged to have been committed, the images and files had been placed in the recycle bin of the operating system and the recycle bin was empty, and that the files in question either could be viewed only in reduced size (thumbnail)238 or were present only in the cache. Likewise, apart from the cached files, the other deleted files could be recovered only by using software designed for that purpose; and in this case
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it was accepted that the accused did not have such software239. During the trial the judge directed the jury that there was in reality no connection, affecting the subject matter of the trial, between the possession of indecent images and their deletion; in the end the accused was found guilty240.
At the appeal stage the defence argued that the offence of possession is not made out where material is no longer “readily accessible in readable form”, particularly where the person has taken all reasonable steps to delete the material in question and render it inaccessible. In deciding this issue the court referred to a defence provided by section 160, under which a person is not held liable where “an indecent photograph was received without any prior request made by the person or on his behalf and was not kept for a reasonable time”241. According to this defence, which the court emphasised, if “possession” is construed simply on the basis of a person’s control or custody of the computer on which the deleted files containing the images he possessed are located, the computer issue is undermined. The court held that “if a person cannot retrieve or gain access to an image, he no longer has control or custody of that image”; accordingly, “possession” for the purpose of the offence in section 160 cannot be said to exist. Whether or not some of the circumstances of the case show that the accused’s control over the deleted files continued, this will, depending on the accused’s technical skills and abilities, be a matter for the jury to decide in each case. The court accepted that this was put forward as a second subjective element of the offence alongside the element of knowledge242.
Another technical defence has been developed in child pornography cases involving “Trojan horses”. These are programs which present themselves as useful and which use certain functions of the computer without the user’s knowledge. In Schofield243 the accused claimed that his computer contained a Trojan horse which had downloaded pornographic images to it without his knowledge. The feasibility of this scenario was established by an expert report, and the prosecution was unable to adduce any evidence to the contrary244.
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In Westgarth Smith and Jayson245 too, an argument similar to that in Atkins was developed concerning the receipt of an e-mail containing a pornographic image as an attachment. In that case counsel for Smith argued that “making”, in relation to the receipt of an unsolicited e-mail, was in a position similar to that of the cached copy in the Atkins case. The court accepted this argument in general terms but held that it had no bearing on the situation before it. As regards Jayson, the prosecution was able to prove that the accused was aware of the caching function of the browser software he used. The court nevertheless held that “the mere act of voluntarily downloading an indecent image from the internet so that it appears on a computer screen is an act of making”; whether or not there is any subsequent intention to store the image is immaterial246.
In Jayson, reliance by way of defence on the issue of technical ignorance, which had formed part of Atkins, came at the cost of the most basic electronic operation in cyberspace, the downloading of information, being accepted as a form of “making”. The offences in the Protection of Children Act address the supply of child pornography, criminalising its taking, making, distribution, showing or advertisement. The Criminal Justice Act, by contrast, is concerned with the demand for material of this kind and criminalises mere possession. The two are plainly linked with one another, and by the nature of that link demand generates supply; in particular, although the range of some of the persons who possess such images extends as far as those who abuse children, these are not precisely known. Parliament nonetheless perceives “possession” as a less serious problem and considers a lesser penalty appropriate. Yet in Jayson the process of possession is itself treated as an act of supply. The prosecution regards even the purchase of such material as incitement to supply and brings charges on that basis, so that the line between supply and possession is once again blurred247.
A further example of the blurring of the line between supply and possession arises in connection with the offence of possession with a view to distribution or showing248. In Dooley249 the accused had obtained indecent images by means of “KaZaA”, a P2P program. After being downloaded to the accused’s “My Shared
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Folder” directory, images of this kind are transferred to another part of the computer used by the accused, which cannot be accessed by other persons using the same software. The accused was charged with contravening section 1(1)(c) of the POCA on the ground that six indecent images were found in the “My Shared Folder” directory on his computer. The submissions of the defence were to the following effect: the accused had no intention of distributing the images in question or showing them to others; on the contrary, his intention had in fact been to move the images to a part of his computer that was not open to access by other persons. Until that move has been completed, however, the images remain open to access by third parties. At first instance, the Crown Court250 held that the expression “with a view to” did not have the same meaning as the accused’s intention and that mere knowledge of the accessibility of the images was therefore sufficient. At the appeal stage, the court held that the correct question for the jury to determine was whether one of the accused’s reasons for leaving certain images in the “My Shared Folder” directory was to enable them to be shared subsequently. No such intention had been alleged by the prosecution, and the court therefore felt it necessary to quash the conviction251.
Cases generally concern the supply and/or possession of large numbers of images; the figures often run into the thousands. Indeed, one of the mechanisms developed by offenders to control admission to groups of this kind and access to the content is for the applicant to supply, in return, more than a certain number of images. The volume of the images creates difficulties when an indictment on the matter is being drawn up, since giving detailed particulars of every image is not a suitable method. As a result, the courts have laid down uniform practice guidance on the matter252. According to this guidance:
— The indictment must contain images both in a number serving as specimens and in a comprehensive number;
— The specimens must be sufficient in number to represent the images broadly;
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— If sampling in this way is not feasible, the images must be classified according to the different criteria of indecency and made available for inspection by the defence as well;
— The specimens must be divided into real images and pseudo-images;
— Each image must itself be linked to the file;
— For each specimen, the approximate age range of the children must be stated253.
As can be seen, in the light of the foregoing, when determining the seriousness of cases the Court takes key factors such as the number of images, the age of the children, the subject matter of the images and whether the images are real or pseudo-images (animated images / virtual child pornography)254 into account255.
5. Grooming
In its relatively short life the internet has introduced us to a great many new concepts and phenomena. One of those deserving particular attention is the solicitation of children to engage in online sexual conversations or acts, or, in short, “grooming”256.
The word grooming means “preparing, tending”. Historically, the great majority of cases of child abuse have been committed by a family member or someone close who knows the child. The internet, however, has provided paedophiles with new opportunities to make contact with children for the purpose of child abuse; this is what is called “internet grooming”. In activities of this kind the internet is used as an intermediary for establishing contact with children and coaxing them. For example257, attempts are made to arrange physical meetings with children through chat rooms, to normalise images of this kind by showing pornographic content to children, and to encourage children to engage in sexual activity258.
The widely used term “grooming” denotes a complex phenomenon that can be neither fully explained nor defined. The stages of grooming are as follows: a) the use of a variety of manipulative or controlling techniques, b) the presence of a vulnerable victim, c) the existence of interpersonal and social settings
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(to a certain extent) d) the establishment of an environment of trust in order to make harmful sexual behaviour appear normal, e) the carrying out of all of the foregoing in order to facilitate the abuse and/or to prevent its disclosure259. The definition may also be summarised as follows: “The set of actions by which a potential abuser seeks (attempts) to gain children’s trust and confidence in order to obtain their acquiescence in abusive activities”260.
Although grooming itself is not new, the internet and other electronic channels of communication have begun to offer offenders far greater opportunities to make contact with children261. In the past only family members or close friends, or priests or teachers, had the chance to approach children in private. Now it has become possible even for complete strangers to make private contact with children. Parents who are constantly vigilant about whom their children associate with in real life paradoxically have very little or no control over their children’s online lives262. According to a recent study conducted in Australia, 95% of children aged eight to eleven and 100% of children aged sixteen to seventeen had gone online in the preceding month263. Young people’s use of mobile phones increases with age; according to the study, 11% of children aged eight to eleven use a mobile phone, whereas among children aged sixteen to seventeen the figure is 94%264.
In order to combat activities of this kind, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 introduced the offence of “meeting a child with a view to sexual ‘grooming’”. The offence covers the following conduct:
“Where a person (A) communicates with or meets another person (B) in one or more settings and subsequently –
(i) A intentionally meets B,
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(ii) A travels to any part of the world with the intention of meeting B, or makes arrangements to meet B in any part of the world, or
(iii) B travels to any part of the world in order to meet A265...”
The penalty prescribed for this offence is a maximum of ten years’ imprisonment; nevertheless, on the basis of the protection of the public, the penalty has been framed as an indeterminate one, with only its upper limit specified. The offence is framed in a manner similar to the method used in relation to harassment: it targets the steps taken by a potential perpetrator in preparation for an offence. These steps are acts falling short of an attempt (preparatory acts). Although the offence is drafted broadly so as to cover all forms of communication, its purpose, as the Government has stated, is to criminalise internet-based activities. Where an act has not reached the stage at which an attempt to commit the offence can be found, an application may be made for a sexual offences prevention order, so that the suspect can be prevented from continuing to communicate with persons by using chat rooms or similar facilities266.
Bearing in mind the cases of child abuse of which we become more and more aware every day, I believe that activities of this kind, which are a major problem throughout the world and of course in the United Kingdom and which have been criminalised, should be made an offence in the legal order of our country as soon as possible.
6. Sexual Communication
Grooming focuses on the perpetrator’s physical meeting with the targeted child and on the preparatory acts. In some cases, however, the intention may be solely to obtain sexual gratification from the communication itself, without any intention of physically meeting the child.
In 2015 the “offence of sexual communication with a child” was added to the Sexual Offences Act 2003267. The content of the communication must relate to “sexual activity” in a way that a reasonable person would accept as such. The communication must take place between an adult and a child under the age of sixteen. The penalty for this offence is a maximum of two years’ imprisonment; an interesting point also worth noting is that, unlike other offences relating to the expression of opinion, the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions268 for the investigation of this offence
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is not required269.
As I stated above, I believe it would be extremely useful for a similar offence to be laid down together with the above type of offence in the same article, but in separate paragraphs and with the sanctions for the offences graded as between them.
7. Malicious and Indecent Communications
Another type of content-related cybercrime committed by using means of communication is “revenge porn”. Such material is generally sent by former partners and contains sexually explicit images. Before acts of this kind were defined as an offence, problems arose because harmful conduct of this kind did not always reach the requisite threshold.
In 2015 a new offence was adopted: “disclosing private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress”270. The term “sexual” refers both to a specific part of the body (for example, the genitals or the pubic area) and to conduct or an image that a reasonable person would regard as sexual. The disclosure must take place without the consent of the person appearing in the photograph or film and must be made with the intention of causing distress to that person. The penalty prescribed for this offence is a maximum of two years’ imprisonment271.
The existing body of law governing harmful communications was founded on “one-to-one” communication techniques, and voice telephony in particular; it still continues to rest on that foundation. However, “one-to-many” communication options, such as personal websites in cyberspace, challenge the suitability of those existing rules. The distress and anxiety which malicious, indecent or harmful communications cause by targeting someone are probably of a considerable magnitude when account is taken of the public, rather than individual, nature of the communication272.
C. Offences against Computer Integrity
1. Subject Matter of the Offence
Offences which directly target computers and are committed against the integrity of information systems are among the most common cybercrimes. Offences of this kind
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are generally referred to under the umbrella heading of “hacking”273. This umbrella heading covers a correspondingly wide range of acts carried out by persons acting with a wide range of purposes. With information systems appearing all at once in every corner of modern life and modern commercial relations becoming dependent on computer networks, the serious consequences of offences of this kind have begun to be seen274. As regards the question of what a computer or an information system is, the problem arises from its being perceived as a physical, discrete object in its own right, separate from the data it processes, rather than as a device with integrated hardware, firmware, operating system and other software, and data. In fact, a computer is a virtual machine, an inseparable whole together with the hardware and software components of which it is made up (virtual machines in the technical sense / virtual machine ware are not meant here). Criminal law, for its part, should protect the confidentiality, integrity and operability of these virtual machines without needing to break them down into their components. Acts such as unauthorised access to, or interference with, a part or the whole of these machines are regarded as wrongs. Differences in treatment stem from the nature of the act committed, of the harm caused and/or of the perpetrator’s culpability. They therefore do not stem from certain obscure and inappropriate technical distinctions275.
2. Lack of Authorisation and Ground of Justification
In some jurisdictions, in order to limit criminal liability and in a manner that encourages good security practice, certain special obligations have been imposed on system administrators which they must observe when carrying out operations on their systems. In Germany, for example, data must be “specially protected” against unauthorised access276. Norwegian law contains a similar provision, under which liability arises where an individual gains access to “a protected device or a facility of a similar kind”277. These provisions, which are in effect consequences, were brought out by the Supreme Court
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in simple terms as follows: “Connecting probe computers to the internet in order to show that security has been breached is not unlawful”278. A system administrator’s failure to implement measures of this kind undermines the prosecution’s ability to characterise unauthorised access as an offence. The European Convention on Cybercrime provides the Contracting Parties with an optional limiting element for the constitution of the offence, to the effect that “the offence may be required to be committed by infringing security measures”279. A limitation of this kind is likewise optional in the European Union under the EU Framework Decision280, but has been made mandatory by the Directive281. The European Commission’s original proposal did not contain a requirement that a security measure be infringed or, in particular, that specific notice be given of “additionally adopted structural elements”282. However, on the initiative of the MEP Jan Albrecht, representative of the Greens / European Free Alliance, the European Parliament stated that it did not agree with this proposal and decided that a limitation should be introduced283. Even so, there are concerns284, in particular, that employees’ unauthorised use of their work computers for their own private purposes would entail criminal liability285.
In England, an attempt was made to have a provision added to the Computer Misuse Bill to the effect that, by virtue of the following clause286 being in force, hackers could put forward as a defence the fact that a computer user had not implemented security measures:
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“For the purposes of this section, it may be a defence to prove that the measures reasonably required by the circumstances were not taken, with due care, in order to prevent the access or attempted access”.
A “security measures” threshold is likely to generate further legal uncertainty: where a court has to form a view on the appropriateness and adequacy of the security measures and, at the same time, the defence challenges the prosecution and subjects its allegations to intense scrutiny, doubts will arise in the minds of the jury. Although the existence of security measures is indirectly relevant to the question whether access took place “without authorisation”, the proposal was rejected. Some scholars, however, have continued to argue that criminal liability for unauthorised access can be triggered only where there is “code-based prevention”287. EU Directive No 13/40/EU, for its part, explains the matter as follows: “contractual obligations or agreements to restrict access to information systems by way of a user policy or terms of service” should not, on their own, form the basis for the application of criminal law to unauthorised access288.
In the pre-internet era of the 1980s, when legislation on computer misuse was first proposed, the comparison was drawn with apparently parallel matters taken from traditional criminal law: acts of trespass into a system in the case of unauthorised access, and acts that by law call for a criminal sanction in the case of unauthorised interference. This comparison has remained under the influence of the continuing debate on questions of authorisation, and in particular of the debate on trespass. Indeed, trespass, as in “cybertrespass”289, is a descriptive term used in legal scholarship for unauthorised access. The term is used in legislation290 and is put forward as the basis of legal actions in cybercrime cases in the USA291. Entering an open house may be unlawful, but it does not constitute an offence unless the person entering has been properly warned; following this line of thought, it can therefore be said that an unsecured computer, too, is akin to an open house. Despite the attractiveness of the analogy, the idea has also suggested itself that the legislation on cybercrime, in order to designate the types of misuse committed against information systems, as in the case of trespass,
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was adopted as a response to the failure of property-based solutions292.
In the legislation on interception, the problems of authorisation are far more complex than in the case of access and interference, and they concern three different dimensions. First, there is an authority that controls persons’ communications network. By its nature, this dimension closely resembles the other offences against system integrity. Secondly, in order to be able to make use of the network in question, there must be either an authority or the consent of the communicating parties. The primary purpose of interception laws is to protect the privacy of users. Finally, as an investigative tool and from the standpoint of the exercise of power, where investigating authorities are entrusted with an interception, they must hold the authorisation required to render that measure lawful293.
The issue that must necessarily be built on authority and the lack of it, and that crosses and intersects boundaries, is the distinction between the public and the private sphere. Indeed, numerous problems of authorisation have arisen in cyberspace; some of them are due to the way in which the internet disturbs and challenges the traditional distinction between “public and private spheres”. The “World Wide Web”, the popular conception of the internet, which is governed by implied authorisation, is a private service that can be used as a “network of networks”, a large part of which operates in the public sphere, and it provides the basis for the exchange of information and for access to it294. At the same time, the public consciousness of the internet is generally associated with anonymity, with being an environment of private relationships and spaces, and with the perception of being neither hindered nor monitored by state surveillance. Taken together, these tendencies may call into question the reliance placed on authorisation in the offences against system integrity295.
Under the Computer Misuse Act, access is regarded as unauthorised access in the following cases, namely if:
a) the person is not himself authorised to control access to the program or data in question, or
b) that person has not obtained consent from a person who is authorised to access the program or data in question,
but this subsection is subject to section 10296.
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Where the perpetrator is someone from outside the victim’s organisation, this shows that no authorisation exists, or the question of consent generally poses no problem and forms the subject of the scenarios discussed above. Where, however, the perpetrator is an employee of the organisation (a company, a hospital, a university, etc.), the prosecution bears the burden of showing that the accused knew that “such access” was unauthorised, rather than of showing that an express or implied right of access was misused; as, for example, where an accounts clerk enters false items of expenditure297. On this point the Law Commission stated the following:
“An employee can be found guilty of an offence only in the following case: if his employer has clearly defined the employee’s authority to access the program or data”298.
United States federal law does not criminalise mere unauthorised access in a manner similar to the offence under section 1. For such access to constitute an offence, it must be connected with further purposes, such as obtaining national security information or financial records299. In addition, unlike the United Kingdom, United States federal law expressly distinguishes between two different scenarios as regards authorisation: “accessing a computer without authorisation and accessing it in excess of authorisation”300. The latter term is intended to cover “insiders”301, such as employees, and is defined as follows302:
“It means to access a computer with authorisation and to use that access to obtain and alter information in the computer, although not authorised to obtain or alter that information”303.
There are, however, conflicting decisions in cases concerning departing employees as to when the threshold of authorisation is crossed. In International Airport Centers LLC v. Citrin304, a departing employee downloaded a program onto a laptop owned by the employer and securely (irrecoverably) erased all the data owned by the employer company. The court held that Citrin lost his authorisation as an employee of the company “at the moment when, as an
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employee, he breached his duty of loyalty”. This decision sets a very low threshold; rather than clearly determining which conduct of the employee is permitted and which is not, it thereby gives priority to the employee’s duty to behave properly. In Lockheed Martin Corporation v. Speed305, such a broad approach was expressly rejected by the court. That case concerned three departing employees who, before moving to a rival company, copied various media data containing information owned by Lockheed. The court took into account that the “breach of loyalty” test effectively places an employee in the position of being “without authorisation”, as opposed to exceeding the limits of such authorisation. This second interpretation appears more logical and more principled in bringing out the meaningful difference between “without” and “exceeding”. For this decision to serve fully as a precedent in criminal law, however, it would have to be endorsed by a higher court and to form the subject of criminal rather than civil proceedings306.
The interpretation of “authorisation” under the Computer Misuse Act in the employment context was first dealt with in detail in DPP v. Bignell307. The case concerned two serving police officers who, for personal purposes, obtained access to the Police National Computer (PNC) through an operator. They were charged with the offence under section 1 of the CMA and were convicted by the Magistrates’ Court. Their appeal against conviction succeeded before the Crown Court; that decision became the subject of a further appeal to the Divisional Court, and that appeal was dismissed308.
The central issue identified by the court was whether, where a person is authorised to access an information system for a specific and limited purpose (for example, policing activities), the use of such authorisation for a purpose falling outside its scope (for example, a personal purpose) constitutes the offence defined in section 1. The Crown Court stated that the primary concern of the CMA was “to protect the integrity of the computer system itself rather than the integrity of the information held on the computer”; unauthorised uses of this kind therefore fall outside the scope of the Act. This view was also upheld by the Divisional Court. Astill J
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first noted that section 17(5)(a) contains the following: “Access of this kind” refers to the types of access detailed in section 17(2): altering, erasing, copying, moving, using and obtaining output. Secondly, the expression “control access” refers to the granting to police officers of authority to access the PNC”. Astill J concluded that this did not create a gap in the Act, since at the time the act was committed the Data Protection Act 1984 contained appropriate offences relating to the use of personal data for unauthorised purposes309. In the end, the perpetrator was found guilty not under section 1 of the CMA but of breaching the Data Protection Act 1984310.
A situation similar to Bignell also came before a court in the United States and ended in a similar way. In State v. Olson311, a police officer was convicted of trespassing on a police database in order to find the registration details of the car of a female student at a local college. After the officer’s initial conviction had been quashed by the court of appeal, the court held “that such uses of data obtained in spite of departmental policies did not show that access was permitted to computers on which the use of the data was subject to conditions”. In this way, the concept of access was firmly distinguished from what may happen once access has been obtained; moreover, in this case the court did not support its view with any statutory definition. In New Zealand, the relevant provision expressly states that the offence of unauthorised access is not committed “where a person who is authorised to access an information system accesses the system for a purpose other than the one for which the authorisation was given to that person”312. In that event, a breach of other provisions313 may come into consideration314.
The Bignell decision, like the Sean Cropp decision, is seen to have attracted substantial criticism and to have significantly restricted the scope of the Act315. The key points of the decision were, however, reconsidered in the Allison decision316
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by the House of Lords. That case concerned a request by the United States Government for the extradition of an American Express employee who had used the authority to access information systems in order to obtain personal identification numbers to be used in producing counterfeit credit cards and who was therefore charged with fraud. As in Bignell, the defence argued that the offence defined in section 1 had not been committed, on the ground that the employee was authorised to access the information systems in question. The House of Lords, which shared the view taken in the Bignell decision, nevertheless rejected the explanation317 of section 17(5) that Astill J had gone on to give in that decision318.
Lord Hobhouse first stated that the expression “access of this kind” simply means that the authority given under section 17(5) is limited to certain kinds of programs and data, and that it does not refer to the kinds of access detailed in section 17(2). The evidence shows that the American Express employee accessed data for which no authorisation had been given; the access obtained was therefore unauthorised access. Secondly, “control of access” does not mean an individual’s authorisation to access the system; rather, it is the organisational authority that grants authority to individuals. In Bignell, the person exercising such control was the chief officer of police himself, and under the operating rules access was reserved solely for policing purposes. As a consequence of the Allison decision, in a subsequent case concerning misuse of the PNC by the police319, it proved possible to have the accused convicted of unauthorised access320.
The Allison decision clarified the meaning of “control” under section 17(5); the court’s acceptance of the Bignell decision, however, perpetuated the uncertainty of the case law arising from the CMA. First, Lord Hobhouse emphasised that the computer operator in Bignell had not exceeded his authority and had therefore committed no offence. Since the operator was merely an innocent employee321, this emphasis does not appear relevant to the question whether Bignell committed the offence defined in section 1; nor does it break the causal link between Bignell’s request and the unauthorised access. Secondly,
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Lord Hobhouse accepted that the scope of authorisation needs to be refined (corrected) as regards authorisation to secure access of this kind, and accepted the example that authority to access data in order to view them does not extend to copying or altering them. On this reasoning, the court must implicitly be deciding that authority given to view data is not limited by particular circumstances, which appears inconsistent. The accused in Bignell knew that they were authorised to access the PNC for policing purposes only, and they knowingly pursued purposes that served their own needs322.
The concept of “without right” used in the Convention on Cybercrime and in the EU Directive emerges as a fundamental difference from the common law approach. In Anglo-American criminal law a matter is lawful unless otherwise stated, whereas in the Continental European system of criminal law a matter is lawful only if this is expressly stated (in the Continental European system of criminal law, the definitions of offences in criminal statutes need not expressly state that the act is unlawful, for conformity with the statutory definition of the offence (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit) is a presumption of unlawfulness). The Explanatory Report to the Convention states that the expression “without right” refers both to conduct “undertaken without authority” – an authority that is derived from numerous sources, such as legislation and consent – and to conduct that is not covered by “self-defence, grounds of excuse, grounds of justification or other similar principles” recognised by domestic law323. From the standpoint of United Kingdom law, the former expression points to a “positive” authority and the latter to a “negative” authority. The drafters of the Explanatory Report are particularly keen to make sure that the conduct of law enforcement in a cybercrime investigation will not be affected by the new offences in question324.
Law enforcement agencies need “positive” authority in order to carry out certain investigative measures such as interception; at the same time, however, a “negative” lawful authority is also required so as to provide a defence in the event that an offence against system integrity is committed. This second aspect of the conduct of law enforcement carried out under the CMA demonstrates how complex the matter is, and it has varied over time. In the original version of the Act, a saving provision concerning the unauthorised access offences was inserted, rendering them inapplicable where law enforcement exercised powers of interception, search and seizure325. Where, however, a law enforcement officer is not exercising such a power, the potential for exposure to such liability
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remains. Indeed, taking advantage of this gap, some websites began to state specifically that law enforcement was not authorised to access them. To address this point, the saving provision was amended in 1994 as follows326:
“…there is no provision restricting the permission of persons such as law enforcement officers to access any program or data; law enforcement officers may engage in unauthorised access in order to achieve the purposes set out in section 1(1)”.
Very recently, further amendments were made to the saving provision327; both focal points of the provision were extended so as to cover all the offences against system integrity laid down in the CMA; in this context, the provision in question affords a defence for more effective policing conduct and, at the same time, the power in question also authorises such conduct328.
It also appears that there is a problem specific to the concept of “without right” as set out in the EU Directive. In the Convention, the authorisation relating to control refers to the system as a whole, and access of this kind is also permitted. In the Directive, however, authorisation extends beyond the owner of the system to another right holder, a third party, or to a part of it329. As discussed above, its scope rests in part on the distinction between system and data. To what extent are data a part of the system? If data are a part of the system, then the product must be protected by intellectual property law (for example, by copyright, design right or chip protection). In that case, use of the product without the right holder’s permission potentially gives rise to an offence. Criminalising such an infringement of intellectual property rights through the back door of the offences against computer integrity was certainly not the aim of those who drafted this Directive330.
The expression “without lawful excuse or justification” used in the Commonwealth Model Law also appears to be a problematic formulation. The expression is not defined in detail in the Model Law. In English law, however, the expression “without lawful excuse” comes into play where criminal damage has occurred; this excuse can be explained in two ways: the existence of a belief that consent exists or would exist, or its being necessary for the protection of property331. The term “belief” is subjective; it has nothing to do with being justified
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or being reasonable. The defence may be expected to argue, for example, that the lawfulness of the perpetrator’s act lies in its demonstrating the vulnerability of the measures taken in the field of security. This point was raised in Grey332: “Your alleged motive in fact shows and proclaims that e-commerce retailers lack security awareness…”.
Anyone can imagine that a ground of justification of this kind would be a powerful Robin Hood appeal to a jury. “Consent”, meanwhile, shares common ground with the “authorisation” approach; it is, however, framed as a kind of defence rather than as a requirement to demonstrate “knowledge” in respect of authorisation. This latter requirement is regarded as a positive feature, since it is likely to reduce the scope of the criminal law as regards the offences against system integrity333.
3. Unauthorised Access
a. The Offence of Unauthorised Access under Section 1 of the CMA
Section 1 of the CMA provides for unauthorised access as a basic offence334. For the offence to be committed, the material element of “causing a computer to perform any function” must be fulfilled. There must therefore be some form of interaction with the computer, but actual access is not required for this element to be fulfilled. A definition of this breadth means that simply pressing the start button of the computer is sufficient and that this act alone constitutes the material element335. Nevertheless, stealing a computer solely with a view to selling it later cannot amount to the offence under section 1 of the CMA336.
The idea behind the creation of this offence is, in essence, to close every door in the face of hackers. The offence is committed even if the hacker has no malicious purpose or is acting with no aim beyond the impulse of curiosity. The essence of the offence under section 1 of the CMA is intentionally causing a computer to perform an operation in order to secure unauthorised access. The perpetrator need not target a particular computer;
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it is sufficient that an attempt is made to obtain unauthorised access. Indeed, setting up an arrangement designed to obtain unauthorised access is sufficient for this offence to be committed337.
The scope of this offence prompts the question “why accessing files on an office computer is made an offence when accessing a paper kept in a filing cabinet is not”338. The Law Commission considered that closing every door to hackers was the best way to deter all those who intend to commit fraud, or who wish to commit offences at further stages, or whom others seek to use, on account of their skills, to assist in the commission of offences for malicious purposes. From this standpoint, the question is not a convincing argument against punishment; if non-punishment were chosen, the perpetrator’s act would not be appropriately punished, because such acts may be the precursor to the commission of an offence. One of the reasons for criminalising such acts is that the owner of the system is obliged, because of the person obtaining unauthorised access, to incur considerable expense in order to protect his system339. Of course, the owner of paper files will likewise have to incur expense for repairs if someone breaks through the security of the office and forces an entry in order to look at the files kept there. There are, however, important differences between printed documents and information systems: in the case of printed documents, the intruder cannot reach them without breaking through the security of the office and entering it; where information systems are concerned, on the other hand, the perpetrator can enter the system and reach the documents (data) from another part of the country or even, as has been seen in many cases, from another part of the world340. Information systems are always vulnerable to determined hackers. In a world that is becoming increasingly dependent on computers and on their soundness (data integrity), the use of the criminal law to discourage hackers must be regarded as an entirely correct choice341.
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When mere unauthorised access was first criminalised, the appropriateness of applying the norms of criminal law to such situations was the focus of debate. Indeed, as noted above, that debate still continues as far as international instruments are concerned. In the United Kingdom, however, it can be seen that the views opposing criminalisation have declined and that, instead, the initiatives to create offences are being taken very seriously342.
The harm caused to a system owner by unauthorised access, as distinct from what the perpetrator intended, falls into three broad types. The first is the cost of the investigation that has to be carried out in order to check the breach of the confidentiality of the system and whether it has had any effect on the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the data. The second is the cost of the remedial measures needed to protect the system against unlawful access of this kind in the future. The third is the cost of repairing the damage or the alterations that the perpetrator’s acts have unintentionally caused to the system or the data. All these examples, however, such as unintentional damage or alteration, are used as a justification for applying more severe sanctions to unauthorised access, which is divided into these three types. Losses of this kind arising from the offence of unauthorised access can be seen to lead to confusion between the issue of access and the issue of interference; of these, the latter offence is the more serious and does not require unauthorised access343.
As noted above, the material element of the offence under section 1(1) of the CMA consists in causing a computer to perform a function344. As we have also noted above, under the definition of the offence the mere pressing of the computer’s start button by the perpetrator appears sufficient for the offence to be committed; if that act is all the perpetrator has done, however, proof of the mental element (mens rea) of the offence will be extremely difficult. On the other hand, cases are reported in which the strict requirements attaching to the burden of proof have caused difficulties in prosecutions under the CMA. Merely seeing data on a computer screen is not sufficient for this offence; the offence is, however, committed where, for example, the perpetrator, by using the backspace or return key, connects to a university’s computer network by means of a computer that the last user walked away from while still logged on to the system345. In cases concerning this offence, expert evidence is not always needed to establish that the computer performed a function346.
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The perpetrator must carry out the act of causing a computer to perform an operation (i) with intent to secure access to a program or data held in any computer and (ii) knowing that the access he is seeking to secure is unauthorised. Committing this act through negligence is not an offence347. The circumstances in which access is unauthorised are defined in section 17(5) of the CMA. Accordingly, there is unauthorised access where the perpetrator accesses the data in the cases in which “(i) the perpetrator is not in some way authorised to access the program or data in question, (ii) the perpetrator has not in some way been given consent by a person who is authorised to access the program or data in question”348.
If the perpetrator believes, however unreasonably, that he is authorised to obtain access or that he has been given authority to do so by an authorised person, he cannot know that his access is unauthorised. What has to be examined here is, in all probability, the following: does the perpetrator have authority to authorise or to forbid? The more difficult question is what happens where the perpetrator, although unsure whether he is authorised or – as is more often the case – what the limits of his authority are, nevertheless decides to act without checking whether he has authority or what the limits of his existing authority are. If, as is often seen in the cases, the perpetrator could easily have found out whether he had authority or what its limits were, but chose not to do so and took the risk by deciding that he was authorised to obtain access, this does indeed show that his access was unauthorised. Although it may be said in such a case that the perpetrator did not know that his access was unauthorised, that ignorance stems solely from his unwillingness to find out. Wilful blindness of this kind is regarded as sufficient to constitute knowledge. At the other extreme lies the case in which it merely crosses the perpetrator’s mind that he may have exceeded the limits of his authority, which is not sufficient for knowledge349.
The offence may also be committed where the perpetrator is authorised to use the computer but not to use a particular program350. It may also happen that the perpetrator is authorised to access a particular computer (for example, computer X) but accesses another computer which he is not authorised to access (for example, computer Y). In that situation the offence is committed even where the perpetrator, in order to be able to access computer Y, first accesses computer X but has not yet accessed computer Y351. Similarly, the offence is also committed where the perpetrator has limited permission to access but acts in excess of the limits of that permission. For example, an American Express employee who was authorised to access only certain
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accounts committed this offence by also accessing other accounts352.
As can be seen, in English law, unlike in our country, even acts that would amount merely to an attempt, and sometimes even to preparatory acts, are treated as falling within the offence and are punished as a completed offence. In this sense, the concept of attempt in our law and the concept of attempt in the Anglo-American legal system differ considerably.
Throughout Europe, the EU Member States have transposed similar offences of unauthorised access into their domestic law353. By contrast, the United States has no provision in its federal legislation similar to the offence under section 1 of the CMA. Unauthorised access is treated as an offence only where a certain threshold is exceeded; for example, the offence is committed where unauthorised access to a computer results in loss exceeding five thousand dollars over a twelve-month period354.
The penalty prescribed for this offence is imprisonment for a maximum of two years.
b) The Offence under Section 2 of the CMA of Unauthorised Access to Facilitate
the Commission of Further Offences
Under section 2 of the CMA, committing the offence under section 1 in order to commit or to facilitate the commission of other (further / more serious) offences is a separate offence. The distinction between these offences and mere access lies in the difference in purposes – in the existence, in the words of the Law Commission, of an “ulterior purpose”355. Linking the act of unauthorised access with other, additional purposes is a feature frequently found in the laws of other countries as well. Indeed, the Convention on Cybercrime gives the Contracting Parties the option of requiring an additional intent for the offence, in the form of “the intent of obtaining computer data or other dishonest intent”356. The penalties for the further offences referred to in section 2 of the CMA are fixed by law; for example, life imprisonment for murder, or imprisonment for five years or more for fraud committed by means of information systems. It is not necessary that the access and the further offence be intended to be committed at the same time; moreover, the fact that commission of the further offence is not possible, or that the offence to be committed subsequently is one capable of being committed by means of information
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systems, is neither material nor necessary357 (section 2(2), (3), (4) of the CMA). Depending on the grounds of the conviction, where the perpetrator is over twenty-one years of age and has no previous conviction, he may be sentenced to up to five years’ imprisonment for this offence358; following a trial without a jury, on the other hand, a sentence of six to twelve months’ imprisonment may be imposed for this offence (section 2(5) of the CMA)359.
In practice, these offences are most likely to be committed by the perpetrator with intent to commit, or in order to facilitate, offences against property; it should be noted, however, that the offence in section 2 is not confined to offences against property360. Probably, at the time the CMA entered into force, the Theft Act (together with an additional offence relating to the deception of machines361) was also adequate for application to offences against property of this kind. This reflects the Law Commission’s initial view of the problem at the time the CMA was being drafted. The second view taken on the matter, and the conclusion reached, was, however, that it is a preferable approach to extend the field of application of the norms of criminal law to the acts of hackers before they have committed, or attempted to commit, the principal offence. Like section 1 of the CMA, section 2 too is aimed at preparatory acts. The example given by the Law Commission in this connection is as follows: a hacker who is searching for a password to gain entry to an account in order to commit theft cannot be found guilty of attempted theft; similarly, a hacker searching for confidential information in order to send a threatening message cannot be found guilty of attempting to send a threatening message362. Both, however, will have committed an offence under section 2 of the CMA. The perpetrators of this offence are not only, as is customarily assumed, hackers; where a bank employee who accesses bank data discloses those data to his accomplices so that they can carry out their fraudulent acts363, this offence is likewise committed364.
The Law Commission considered that the offence in section 2 of the CMA would open the door to “connections of a kind relating to attempt”, so that the subsequent offence need not be committed and it would suffice that it was merely intended, and that, pursuant to section 2(4),
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the offence in section 2 would be committed even where commission of the subsequent offence was not possible. It has been argued that this provision is not necessary but that it is a safeguard (auxiliary) norm. For example, the offence applies where the perpetrator enters the victim’s computer in order to obtain information about the victim’s bank account, but the victim has already closed that bank account365.
Where the offence under section 2 of the CMA constitutes a basic offence, an offence of conspiracy may also come into consideration, for it constitutes an attempt to commit the offence, or aids and encourages its commission. This confronts us with an offence that is drawn very broadly. Perpetrator A may have agreed with perpetrator B to access victim C’s computer in the future and to take whatever information they are able to obtain and use it in preparing another offence. Because of the preparatory nature of this offence, very little room is left for an attempt to commit it366.
The following cases are examples of offences that may be committed under section 2 of the CMA367:
— Pearlstone368: in this case, a former employee of the company deceived the computer-controlled telephone system by using the company’s telephone and another subscriber’s account, and made free telephone calls to persons in the United States.
— Borgy369: in this case, an analyst at an investment company was charged with creating fictitious accounts under the name of a “live” fund management system. The “further offences” forming the subject of the charge consisted in the expectation that the proceeds of fraudulent transactions would be transferred to the fictitious accounts.
— Grey370: in this case, the accused, exploiting a vulnerability in an e-commerce site that used the Microsoft Internet Information Server application, gained access to the site’s customer database and obtained the credit card details and personal data of at least 5,400 customers. He subsequently published this information on the internet and, in addition, used it to purchase various goods and services.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
— Brown371: in this case, the accused obtained stolen bank and credit card details, used them to change account details online and, impersonating the account holder, generated new cards and PIN numbers, and then emptied the accounts.
It is likely that charges under section 2 of the CMA will be relatively infrequent, or that problems of concurrence with other offences will arise. For prosecutors prefer to charge the other (further / more serious) offences committed by way of this act rather than unauthorised access. Nevertheless, in some isolated cases, the charge is seen to be brought primarily under section 2. In addition, the perpetrator’s act of unauthorised access may be sufficient to found a charge of attempting the more serious offence372; indeed, it is more likely that such acts will be relied on as steps taken by way of “preparatory acts”373.
An effective criminal code requires it to be determined which acts are to be regarded as offences “facilitating” the commission of crime. These are offences that make it possible to investigate an offender and to charge the perpetrator with more serious offences; they are not, however, generally used as the principal or leading offences. The offences contained in both section 1 and section 2 of the CMA can be described as a kind of “facilitating offence”. Nevertheless, the fact is that, as with other offences of attempt or preparation, they should be applied restrictively, and their actual use should not lead to their being regarded as tools that are of no value in themselves in the fight against crime374.
4. Unauthorised Interference
a) Impairing System Integrity and Data
Obtaining unauthorised access to an information system poses an obvious threat to the confidentiality of the information held in that system. More important than obtaining access to an information system, however, is the fact that the perpetrator, by interfering with the data or hardware in the system, can affect the integrity and availability of the information being processed. Such interference may be the result of a deliberate act, as a kind of electronic vandalism or as a by-product arising while hackers carry out their activities within the system. Indeed, the argument advanced in favour of defining mere unauthorised access to a system as an offence is that such access may also cause
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unintended harm. The alterations resulting from unauthorised access range from mere inconvenience to incidents endangering human life; in Rymer375, for example, a nurse working in a hospital hacked into the hospital’s information system, gained access to it and altered a patient’s drug prescription376. This case is a good example of how networked computers can be used in a murder377.
The second major concern in this regard is the difficulty faced in practice by the police and the prosecution in explaining to judges and juries how the facts correspond to criminal damage under the existing legislation378.
In Whitaker379, the court found it necessary to determine the scope of the offence of unauthorised modification committed against the owner of an intellectual property right. The case concerned a software developer and his client and arose from the developer’s triggering, following a dispute over payment, a logic bomb that he had developed in order to prevent the software from being used. The accused developer argued that under the contract all intellectual property rights in the software belonged to him (ownership being transferred once payment was made) and that he was entitled to modify the software. The court held that, although copyright in the software existed, the nature of the contract for the development of the software constituted a limitation on the developer’s rights. The court nevertheless considered that carrying out such an act would be justified if it were expressly provided for in the contract, for instance where the licensee was aware of the consequences of defaulting on payment. In the result, the accused was found guilty under section 3 of the CMA. This decision is highly important because the software industry resorts to methods of this kind in order to secure the sums owed to it in return for its services380.
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In May 1993, the first classic “hacker” was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for having entered into an agreement to commit the offences defined in sections 1 and 3 of the CMA381. The accused was a person known as the “Eight Legged Groove Machine” (8LGM), whose hacked information systems included various institutions ranging from the Polytechnic of Central London to NASA and who caused damage amounting to 123,000 pounds sterling. The paragraph in the judge’s decision that shows his view of hacking reads as follows:
“There may be people out there somewhere who engage in hacking without causing harm; but hacking is not a harmless activity. Computers now play a central role in our lives and contain our personal details… Protecting the integrity of these systems is a fundamental matter, and breaches of security damage the integrity of computers”382.
Judicial sentiments of this kind are of critical importance if the Act is to have a significant deterrent effect. The jury, however, acquitted the accused Bedworth, who was tried in the same case, because the defence successfully argued, through the testimony of a medical expert (a medical expert report), that the accused was an “obsessive” hacker383. The case was widely publicised and was seen by many as a potential “hacking charter”. The verdict was, however, in part a flawed one, owing to the prosecution’s preference for a charge of conspiracy to commit an offence over a charge under the CMA384.
b) An Important Example of an Attack on System Integrity: The Pattern of
Commission, the Charge, the Defence and the Decision
aa. Denial-of-Service Attacks / DoS Attacks
The applicability of the “offence of unauthorised modification” contained in the original version of section 3 of the CMA to DoS attacks, particularly those launched against commercial websites such as eBay and Amazon and against other online resources, is a matter that calls for attention. Such attacks are designed in such a way that, in order to disrupt / impair the operation of a site, multiple requests for information are deliberately sent, “in a veritable flood”, to the server on which the content is hosted385.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
DoS attacks sometimes cause congestion on the communication lines rather than on the target machine. An incident of this kind occurred in October 2002 with the attack on the thirteen root name systems of the domain name system (DNS)386. Whether the attack affects connection capacity or bandwidth, its primary target is not the integrity or confidentiality of the system but the jeopardising of the availability of online resources. The purposes of such attacks extend from blackmail against gambling sites387 to political protest, directed against the World Trade Organization388 or multinational companies389, by anti-globalisation activists390.
The “distributed denial-of-service attack” (DDoS), carried out in order to achieve the necessary volume and to conceal the attackers’ location, is the standard form of attack in this field. In order to mobilise multiple computer requests, attackers generally covertly take over computers known as “zombies” or “botnets”, which come under the attackers’ control without their owners’ knowledge. Indeed, there is a black market for “botnets” in which computers are hired out for criminal activities in sets of hundreds, thousands or even hundreds of thousands391. As one security expert has put it, “hackers no longer want to damage computers; they want to own them”392.
As regards the criminal conduct, a distinction must be drawn between obtaining control of the individual systems, including the “botnet”, which generally also involves unlawful access (DoS), and launching a DDoS
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
attack on the target system, which is generally designed to affect availability. Under the pre-amendment version of the offence in section 3 of the CMA, prosecutions seeking to establish the liability of those carrying out DDoS attacks encountered problems arising from two sources: conduct and culpability. First, as regards the conduct constituting the offence, it is a valid line of defence to establish that there is no responsibility in respect of the source machine from which the attack was launched, even if you are the owner of the computer from which it was launched. In an environment in which zombie machines prevail, proving the evidential link between the machine and the conduct of its owner is very difficult393.
bb. The Caffrey Case and the Trojan Horse Defence
In Caffrey394, for example, the accused successfully put forward the defence that the DDoS attack which disrupted the operation of the Port of Houston in the United States had been launched by a Trojan horse virus running on his computer without his knowledge. He did so despite the absence of any evidence establishing the existence of such malware. As can be seen, the accused was not held responsible for carrying out the material element of the offence; there was accordingly no need to go on to deal with his liability either395. I believe that this exemplary case, which illustrates the difficulty of proof in the field of cybercrime – a difficulty of which there are similar instances in our country too – and the need for the authority conducting the trial / giving the decision to be knowledgeable in this field, ought to be examined in detail.
On 20 September 2001 the information system at the Port of Houston crashed as a result of a DDoS attack396. The attack brought down the information system and, by denying requests for access to the system holding the database used by the companies providing berthing, mooring and support services at the port and by the tugboat pilots in order to assist the navigation of ships, put the world’s eighth busiest port out of action. As one observer noted, the attack was capable of having “catastrophic repercussions for life and limb”397; fortunately, however, it did not. At that time the USA was still in the grip of the unnerving dread caused by the 9/11 attack398.
By “following the electronic trail”, the United States authorities arrived at the home of Aaron Caffrey, an 18-year-old living in the United Kingdom. More precisely, digital investigators examined the system log files of the Port of Houston
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and identified the IP address of the computer that launched the attack and the IP address that was the target of the attack. An IP address is a numerical formula that serves as the identifier of a computer or other IT device connected to an information network, and every IP address is unique. Each IP address contains identifying information about the network to which the computer is connected and about the computer itself. Once the Houston investigators had found the IP address from which the attack was launched and that of its real target, they were also able to trace the person responsible for the attack399.
The investigation showed that the attacker’s target was not the Port of Houston but another country. The port’s information system shut down when the attacker took over the systems at the Port of Houston and other systems as a means of attacking his real target. The investigators established that the software used in the attack exploited a vulnerability in the software running on the system server and had been specially written by the person himself (coded by Aaron)400. The investigators thereupon traced the attack to the house in Fairland, Shaftesbury, Dorset, where Aaron Caffrey lived with his family401.
The English police seized Caffrey’s information system and apprehended him and took him into police custody on a charge of “unauthorised modification of computer material”, which is an offence under United Kingdom law402. After officers from the Computer Crime Unit had carried out a digital forensic examination of Caffrey’s computer, Caffrey was charged with hacking into the information system of the Port of Houston. Unlike in McKinnon, in this case the US authorities did not raise a dispute over leaving the case to the English authorities403.
The trial began in October 2003. The charge was not brought on the basis that Caffrey had acted with intent to shut down the information systems of the Port of Houston.
The prosecution’s theory was that the Houston attack was an unintended “revenge” attack whose consequences were nevertheless foreseeable (similar to the offence of illegal access to an information system aggravated by its result, provided for in Art. 243(3) TCK). Someone had insulted Caffrey’s American girlfriend, and Caffrey carried out this act in order to take revenge on that person.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
The prosecution stated that Caffrey was “madly in love”404 with Jessica, with whom he had formed an online relationship, and that the attack was carried out after a South African user of Internet Relay Chat (IRC) software called “Bokkie” had made anti-American comments in an IRC chat room. The Crown investigators did not merely trace Bokkie’s comments; they also found comments from “Aaron” stating that “Bokkie needed to take a break, because if that person hated America, it meant that he hated Jessica too”405.
The evidence not only showed the link between Caffrey’s computer and the computer system of the Port of Houston but also showed that, after Bokkie had made the anti-American comments, Caffrey had carried out searches in order to find Bokkie’s IP address406. Once he had found Bokkie’s IP address, he carried out his attack by running the DDoS attack software he had prepared, and in the process accidentally shut down the computer system of the Port of Houston as well407.
This was the theory of the Crown investigators, and it was also well supported by the digital evidence found and analysed by the digital forensics experts. The evidence adduced against Caffrey was extremely strong, and his lawyer was unable to contest many of the facts put forward by the prosecution. The defence therefore conceded that a DDoS attack had been launched from Caffrey’s computer against the information systems of the Port of Houston. The defence, however, stated that Caffrey could not be held responsible for this act, since his real aim (at least according to the charge) had been to launch an attack against Bokkie, and instead adopted a different approach408.
The defence theory, for its part, was that Caffrey had not carried out an attack; rather, his computer had been attacked. According to Caffrey’s lawyer, “someone” had installed a Trojan horse program on Caffrey’s computer without his knowledge and had used his computer to carry out the attack that shut down the system of the Port of Houston409. A Trojan horse is malicious software that can be installed on a computer while concealing itself and that enables whoever installed it to take control of the computer on which the software has been installed410.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
Caffrey accused Turkish hackers of framing him and of regularly taking over chat rooms and websites411. He stated that his computer’s operating system allowed remote access and control and had therefore become vulnerable to Trojan horse programs. Caffrey claimed that the log files on which the investigators relied in order to hold him responsible for the attack had been altered as part of the plot against him412. According to Caffrey, “someone has edited the log files. The fact that this is what they say does not mean that this is how these logs really are”413. Finally, when asked about the DDoS program named “coded by Aaron” that the investigators had found on his computer, Caffrey said that “Aaron is a very, very common name”414.
It fell to the Crown investigators to disprove Caffrey’s defence that a Trojan horse had been manipulated by someone in order to shut down the system of the Port of Houston. The prosecution responded with one single argument: the digital forensics experts testified that they had examined Caffrey’s computer very carefully and had found no trace of any Trojan horse program415. In his defence against the expert testimony, Caffrey told the jury that it was impossible for the experts to have examined every single file on his computer. He also stated that the Trojan horse might have been a self-deleting program and might therefore have erased itself from his computer after the attack416.
The prosecution sought to rebut Caffrey’s self-deleting Trojan horse defence not only on the ground that the digital forensics experts, when examining his computer, had found no sign of any such program, but also on the ground that they had found no evidence showing that the log files had been altered, or of any “wiping tool” for deleting the Trojan horse417. The investigating experts argued that, even if the Trojan horse program that Caffrey blamed for the attack had deleted itself, the deletion would necessarily have left traces on Caffrey’s computer, whereas they had come across no such trace418.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
After a two-week trial, the case was left to the jury. The jury of five men and six women deliberated for three hours before acquitting Caffrey of all charges419. When the verdict was communicated to the prosecution, the police officers were stunned by it. An expert who testified for the prosecution said: “It is extremely difficult to counter the argument that someone did it and then ran away. We wanted to show that if someone had done it they would have had to leave fingerprints … but that there were no fingerprints”420.
The Caffrey case showed that the prosecution faces various evidential difficulties in cybercrime investigations and prosecutions. One of these difficulties is proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty421. The other difficulties relate to the ability to obtain evidence of an admissible kind422.
The Trojan horse defence that Caffrey used successfully is an updated version of an old defence technique, SODDI (Some Other Dude Did It)423. As explained in a legal article, when a defence lawyer seeks to persuade the jury that his client is not guilty, either on the ground that the client did not carry out the act of the offence charged (innocence as to the act) or on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove the client’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt (failure of proof), he will have to give the jury an alternative theory, and that other theory is “another suspect”424. For it is assumed that, in order to acquit the accused, a jury finds it easier to find a reason to believe that another person committed the offence than to weigh the value and the shortcomings of the prosecution’s evidence425.
The SODDI defence has long been a tool used by defence lawyers to make it easier for the jury to acquit. Although it is generally unsuccessful for crimes in the physical world, there are exceptions (such as the murder trial of O. J. Simpson)426.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
The most important obstacle to presenting the SODDI defence successfully against a charge in the physical world is credibility. Let us suppose that Caffrey had been charged with breaking into the office building of the Port of Houston. Let us imagine that the investigating officers found Caffrey’s muddy footprints leading towards an office and, in the office they entered by following them, also found his fingerprint on a piece of furniture, and that they charged Caffrey with burglary of the building. At trial, the investigating officers testify about the evidence they found, and fingerprint experts explain in detail why the fingerprints found in the office are Caffrey’s. To make the case against Caffrey even stronger, let us suppose that the investigators also found Caffrey’s DNA in the office427.
In this hypothetical situation, Caffrey tells his lawyer that he did not commit the offence but also that he has no “alibi” (I was not there); the only option for the defence is therefore to run the SODDI defence. As in the real case, Caffrey’s lawyers put certain arguments to the jury: Caffrey’s fingerprints were left by persons seeking to frame him. The same applies to the DNA found in the office; both the fingerprints and the DNA were altered in order to frame him. The prosecutor points out that it is very difficult to leave fingerprints indistinguishable from Caffrey’s and reminds the jury that neither fingerprints nor DNA evidence can be altered. Altering any such evidence is extremely difficult, because it is tangible, physical evidence. In this version of the Caffrey case, the jury would undoubtedly reject the SODDI defence and find him guilty. From a common-sense point of view, this defence is simply not credible. The jury would find the footprints, the fingerprints, the DNA and the experts explaining how these point to Caffrey credible, and would understand the situation428.
The real Caffrey case, however, took place in the virtual world of hard disks, software and cyberspace. Anyone who uses a computer must understand that digital data (and hence digital evidence) are not tangible and not immutable in the way the physical evidence was in the hypothetical case in which Caffrey was found guilty of burglary. Anyone who follows the news knows that hackers exist and that these hackers can interact with information systems. As a result, this part of Caffrey’s defence is credible, because, unlike in the hypothetical burglary case, it gives the jury a specific “other dude” argument429.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
In this case the “other dude” is not a specific person. Instead, it is a group of people: Turkish hackers who hack websites and computers. This gave the jury the possibility of attributing the incident to an identifiable person for the purposes of Caffrey’s SODDI defence. The jury’s total or relative disregard of the digital evidence, together with the missing element added by the complexity of digital forensics, made it possible for them to believe Caffrey’s defence and to disregard the testimony of the experts. In the hypothetical burglary case, the jurors had their common sense in understanding footprints and their confidence in the value of DNA and fingerprints, and this made it easy for them to reject the SODDI defence. Here, by contrast, the jurors’ common sense tells them that digital data are malleable and inadequate. In the jurors’ experience, data can be altered or deleted without leaving any trace; Caffrey’s SODDI defence therefore appeared to them to be “a reasonable alternative theory”. In the end, Caffrey won the case430. Other cybercriminals have also followed this line of defence431.
Finally, we should note the following: the Trojan horse defence can be perfectly valid. It is possible, by using a Trojan horse or similar software, to plant child pornography material or evidence of another offence on a person’s computer and thus to frame that person432. Likewise, material can be downloaded to some part of the main memory in a way that the person will never notice. Just think: do you know every file that is on your computer? As a retired federal prosecutor has remarked, “the scary thing” about the Trojan horse defence is that it “could be true”433.
c) The Offence under Section 3 of the CMA of Intentionally or with Conditional Intent / Conscious Negligence
(Recklessness) Committing Harmful Unauthorised Acts
In July 2003 the British Government announced its intention to review the 1990 Act, in part in order to fill the gap that had emerged in combating certain DoS attacks and to achieve conformity with the relevant international instruments434. The provisions amending the CMA were introduced by the Police and Justice Act 2006435. Rather than supplementing the existing provisions
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with an additional offence, the offence in section 3 of the CMA was changed entirely.
aa. The History of the Offence in Section 3 of the CMA436
Under the Criminal Damage Act 1971, damaging or destroying a computer or computer software is an offence; for example, damaging a computer by taking a hammer and smashing it is an offence. Where tangible property is physically damaged, the application of the 1971 Act poses no problem. But even where the damage is done to tangible property, might it not be done in a way that the senses cannot perceive? Where the perpetrator disables the computer so that it performs functions other than those the computer programs were designed to perform, or interferes with the programs in order to restrict some of their functions, the answer to this question may be “it might”. In such a case, damage may be caused without any physical damage perceptible to the senses437.
In Cox v. Riley438, the perpetrator was held guilty of causing damage by erasing the plastic circuit card of a saw that cut timber according to programmed designs. The perpetrator’s defence counsel argued that, for the purposes of the Criminal Damage Act, the program in question was not “property of a tangible nature”. There is no doubt that counsel was right on this point; in the court’s view, however, counsel erred in failing to take account of the fact that the perpetrator was charged with damaging not the program but the plastic circuit card. In Whiteley439, on the other hand, the perpetrator was, quite properly, convicted of damaging a computer disk, since he had succeeded in obtaining unauthorised access to an academic computer system and, by altering its magnetic particles, had caused files to be deleted and new files to be added. The argument of his defence counsel that “only the intangible information contained on the disk had been damaged” was rejected, because the disk, too, had been damaged in that its usefulness had been impaired440.
These decisions may appear to address computer misuse, as can be understood from their apparent potential as regards damage and also from the strained meaning given to the Criminal Damage Act441; accordingly,
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both decisions are defensible in terms of that Act. Although it was not accepted that the plastic circuit card in Cox v. Riley had been rendered useless and could be reprogrammed to perform its specific function, the disk was in fact not physically damaged. The disk merely became unable to perform one of the tasks for which it had been programmed, and this case should not be regarded as different from Fisher442. As in Whiteley, the computer itself was not damaged, but it was treated as unable to function because its control mechanism had been tampered with; that is to say, the programs are on the disk. The fact that the disk can be repaired, however, is not relevant to the impairment resulting from the temporary damage443.
The Law Commission came, in one way or another, to the view that computer misuse needed to be tackled more directly. Adding to the Criminal Damage Act an offence of interfering with data and programs was seen as one possible solution to the problem; the Commission decided, however, that a new offence should be created, for two reasons. The first is the difficulty, from the legal standpoint, of accepting the uncertainty created by “the theoretical difficulties arising from applying the concept of damage to intangible property such as programs or data”. The other is that damage of relevance to the criminal law may be caused with conditional intent / conscious negligence (recklessness)444; the Law Commission did not envisage that the new offence to be created should extend to the acts of those who modify computer material with conditional intent / conscious negligence445. In addition, as can be seen, the Commission also sought to clarify the relationship between the offence of modification in the CMA of 1990 and the offence of causing damage in the Criminal Damage Act446.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
In its version prior to the subsequent amendment of the Act, the offence in section 3 of the CMA was narrowly drawn and was confined to the modification of data held in computers. Even so, this version of the offence was interpreted very broadly by the courts. In Zezev447, for example: if a piece of information (an e-mail) coming from one person (in fact, coming from any person) has caused a computer to record a piece of information (an e-mail), this plainly affects the reliability of that information. This shows that the offence in question was considerably extended. The e-mail tells a lie about itself, but it does not affect the reliability of the other data in the computer. Subsequently, in cases of DoS attacks, the courts extended the scope of the offence even further. In DPP v. Lennon448, the perpetrator sent five million e-mails to his former employer by using a “mail-bombing” program. The Divisional Court did not share the view of the district judge and held that, by adding data, the perpetrator had caused an “unauthorised modification”. The owner of a computer capable of receiving e-mail is ordinarily presumed to consent to receiving the e-mails sent to him. That implied consent is not unlimited, however; it does not cover e-mails sent not for the purpose of communicating with the person but for the purpose of disrupting that person’s computer system. The court expressed the view that the test to be applied was “whether, had the perpetrator asked his former employer, the former employer would have consented to five million e-mails being sent to it”. The new section 3 of the CMA, which we examine below, was framed so as to be applicable to DoS or DDoS attacks of this kind449 and has removed some of the doubts that arose in Lennon450.
bb. The Post-Amendment (Current) Form of the Offence under Section 3 of the
CMA
For this offence to be committed, there must be an unauthorised act in relation to a computer. The extended meaning of “unauthorised” is defined in section 17(8) of the Act. It is not actually necessary that the computer, program, data or the like be damaged. The offence is committed by doing the unauthorised act with intent to bring about such damage or with conditional intent / conscious negligence as to it451.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
In essence, section 3 deals with sabotaging or damaging a computer system by doing any act or series of acts defined in section 3(2). The clearest examples are the sending of viruses452, Trojan horses or worms to information systems, or the bringing down of websites453. It is sufficient for the offence that the act prevents or hinders other persons’ access to the system; the offence is committed, for example, where the capacity of the server is exceeded by a DoS or mail-bombing attack. Beyond this, no data need be deleted nor anything altered; in this respect, therefore, the scope of the offence has been considerably widened compared with its original version. The concept of impairment / damage is very difficult to prove in some cases; for instance, by how much must the perpetrator intend to slow a program down, compared with its state before the impairment, for it to be accepted that the program has been impaired? In this respect, unauthorised use may suffice; this is the case, for example, where the perpetrator, intentionally or with conditional intent / conscious negligence (recklessness), impairs the reliability of data. The offence is committed where a computer is caused to debit the victim’s bank account and to credit the perpetrator’s account, because the data relating to the victim’s bank account are then no longer reliable454. Moreover, it is sufficient for the offence that the impairment brought about intentionally or with conditional intent / conscious negligence is temporary. Let us repeat that this amendment has widened the scope of the offence455.
The commission of the offence depends on the presence of the following:
a) The perpetrator must intentionally bring about, by an unauthorised act, one of the results specified in section 3(2) (impairment, etc.).
b) The perpetrator must know that the act causing the impairment, which he performs intentionally or with conditional intent / conscious negligence, is unauthorised. The element of knowledge must relate to the unauthorised nature of the act that he performs with intent to impair. It need not be proved that the perpetrator knew that the impairment was brought about without authorisation (under the former version of section 3, by contrast, knowledge that the modification was unauthorised was required).
Intent is used in its ordinary sense. Conditional intent / conscious negligence (recklessness), on the other hand, must, as stated in G456, be understood in its “subjective” sense457. The fact that the offence
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can be committed with conditional intent / conscious negligence (recklessness) is one of the salient features of the 2006 amendment, which considerably widened the scope of the offence. In the original version of the offence, the existence of conditional intent / conscious negligence was not sufficient for the offence to be committed, because the Law Commission had explained that, out of concern that people might modify the contents of a computer by mistake, a restricted mental element was necessary458.
The perpetrator’s intent or conditional intent / conscious negligence need not be directed at the result of impairment, directly prohibited by the Act, of any particular computer or program. The problem is that the lawful activities of IT security consultants have also been criminalised by this provision459.
To date, DoS attacks have been discussed in terms of attacks by outsiders, in contrast to acts of unauthorised access, which are primarily and frequently committed by insiders. Attacks of a different and opportune kind are, however, also possible. For example, it was reported in 2006 that the FBI had received information that a group of users within the online game environment Second Life had carried out repeated DoS attacks that caused the “virtual world” to crash460.
cc. The Offence under Section 3A of the CMA of Supplying or Obtaining Devices Used in the Commission of the Section 1 and Section 3
Offences
Section 37 of the Police and Justice Act 2006 added three new offences to the CMA. The penalty prescribed for these offences is imprisonment for a maximum of two years or a fine; in some cases both penalties may be imposed together.
Under section 3(A)1, a person commits an offence under this provision if he “makes, adapts, supplies or offers to supply any device with intent to commit, or to assist in the commission of, an offence defined in section 1 or 3 of the CMA”. This offence is a very close reflection, in the field of cybercrime, of the Fraud Act 2006. In the ordinary case, the mental element required for the offence is intent461.
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Under section 3(A)2, it is an offence to supply or offer to supply any device believing that it is likely to be used to commit, or to assist in the commission of, an offence defined in section 1 or 3 of the CMA. The concept of “believing” must be understood in the sense it bears in criminal law; in this context, it is more than mere suspicion. It is not, however, as certain as knowledge. The question whether the device is “likely” to be used to commit an offence defined in section 1 or 3 of the CMA gives rise to various difficulties in practice. According to the Explanatory Note of the Home Office, if the perpetrator is charged in respect of a large number of devices, the prosecution must prove its case “in relation to a particular one or more of the devices in question”. Accordingly, “it is not sufficient to prove that the perpetrator believed that a certain proportion of the devices was likely to be used to commit an offence defined in section 1 or 3 of the CMA”462. In other words, the prosecution must identify, and prove, which device or devices were regarded as likely to be used.
Section 3(A)3, for its part, makes it an offence for a person to possess a device with a view to its being used in the commission of an offence defined in section 1 or 3 of the CMA or to assisting in the commission of such an offence. It may be argued that, as the Court of Appeal has stated in another context463, the mental element of this offence restrictively requires “purpose” in addition to intent. This is a relatively unusual form of offence, for it criminalises in themselves the acts of the “middleman” (the supplier). The perpetrator’s merely obtaining or possessing the device is not sufficient for the offence. Its commission also requires the existence of a further purpose. This offence takes the offence in section 3(A)1 a stage further, since it moves it back to the stage before the perpetrator supplies or offers to supply the device464. From the standpoint of our legal system, this in fact amounts to the punishment of preparatory acts and closely resembles Art. 245/A, which was added to the TCK by Law No. 6698. Indeed, just as in English law the preparatory acts in question have been made punishable in respect of all cybercrime offences, the position is the same in our country.
Under section 3(A)4, for the purposes of all three offences, “device” means any program or data held in electronic form. For each of these offences, the presence of the mental element is extremely important and indispensable. For the devices used in committing cybercrime cover an incredibly wide range, from a screwdriver to a sophisticated program or a computer password465. What the device used is can therefore be determined by reference to the perpetrator’s intent in using it.
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The Government explained the purpose of introducing these new offences as being necessary in order to combat attacks aimed at breaking the security of information systems (hacking) and the places where the devices used in such attacks (hacking tools) are marketed. However, the possibility that lawful research into computer security systems might also constitute an offence has given rise to various problems466. These provisions also satisfy the obligations467 that have to be fulfilled towards the Council of Europe and under the Convention on Cybercrime468.
dd. The Offence under Section 3ZA of the CMA of Unauthorised Acts Creating or
Causing Serious Danger
As noted earlier, in April 2015 a new offence was introduced into the CMA: unauthorised acts creating a risk of, or causing, serious danger469. This offence is designed for cyber-attacks that are capable of causing material damage470 and target critical national infrastructure such as transport or financial systems – the most serious cyber-attacks471. The attackers must know that their conduct is unauthorised and must, in addition, have intent to cause such damage or be negligent as to its occurrence472. Where serious damage is caused to human welfare or national security, the maximum penalty is life imprisonment; where the damage is caused to the economy or the environment, it is imprisonment for up to fourteen years473. This shows that the term of imprisonment that may be imposed in the United Kingdom for an offence against the integrity of information systems has been increased very significantly, and that the harm arising where a target system is successfully damaged has also attracted the attention of the Government474.
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5. Unauthorised Interception
a) General Framework
Offences against the integrity of information systems are directed at data “at rest” in a system that is accessed or modified by an attacker. Criminal law must, however, also protect data that are in transit between networks and are affected through interception by third parties. The aim pursued in attacks on data in transit may be the same as in attacks on data held within a system; it may be, for example, to impair confidentiality and integrity or to prevent access to the data; the primary harm, however, is traditionally the violation of the confidentiality and privacy inherent in them. This tendency is also reflected in the relevant legal orders475, for example:
“This provision aims to protect the privacy of data communications”476.
“The measures to be taken to prevent unauthorised access to communications are for the purpose of protecting the privacy of communications…”477
The focus on privacy means that unlawful interception, rather than being regarded as an offence against the integrity of an information system, is generally seen as a part of the private life of the individual, who must be protected first and foremost against interception carried out by the State478. Nevertheless, while interception offences concern obtaining access to the content of a person’s communications, they are not classified as content-related offences, because the legal order protects the right to the confidentiality of a conversation irrespective of whether it is private or public, lawful or unlawful479.
As with other offences against the integrity of information systems, for example hacking, interception may serve to bring about the act constituting the offence, or it may be a tool used by the law enforcement agencies conducting a criminal investigation in the course of their investigations. Today’s legal policy-makers, however, are more concerned with the latter480.
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b) The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000481
In the United Kingdom, Chapter I of Part I of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) is the principal regulatory legal text in this field. Part I is divided into two chapters, dealing respectively with the interception of the content of communications and with the acquisition and disclosure of communications data. The Act is directed primarily at the activities of the investigating authorities rather than at the individuals who make up the public; it regulates the exercise of investigatory powers in a manner compatible with human rights482. Nevertheless, the first prosecution under RIPA was brought, in September 2005, against a private individual483. That person, who worked for a private detective agency, was sentenced in January 2006 for intercepting a telephone conversation484. For this reason it has been called for that acts of this kind be treated as an offence against the integrity of information systems485.
RIPA provides for two offences. One of them is committed where a person “intentionally and without lawful authority intercepts a communication in the course of its transmission by means of a public communication system”. The commission of the same act by using “a private communication system” is likewise made an offence486. The maximum penalty for this offence is two years’ imprisonment487. In addition, an administrative penalty known as a “monetary penalty notice”, applicable to acts of interception carried out without intent, was added in 2011488.
The terminology used in both offences requires further consideration and clarification. First, as with computer misuse, the question of authority needs to be addressed. RIPA sets out comprehensively and in detail the situations in which such authority exists489. These are set out in detail in particular in Sections III, IV and V and are generally concerned with the powers exercised
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by the investigating authorities. The two limited situations in which a private person490 engages in an act of interception with “lawful authority” depend on the interceptor having obtained the consent of both parties491 to it, or having been authorised by a regulation issued in that respect by the Secretary of State492.
Interception is defined as follows:
“…a person intercepts a communication in the course of its transmission by means of a telecommunication system if, and only if, that person
(a) modifies or obstructs/interferes with the system or its operation,
(b) monitors a communication made by means of the system, or
(c) monitors the transmission by means of a wireless telegraphy system or an apparatus comprised in the system,
and some or all of the contents of the communication become accessible, in the course of transmission, to a person other than the sender or the person for whom it is intended…”493
Where the system stores data for subsequent access or for collection by the intended recipients, as in the case of voicemail boxes, they are still regarded as “data in the course of transmission”494. The meaning of this provision was examined at length in the Edmondson case495, which concerned phone hacking carried out by a journalist of the News of the World newspaper. The accused argued that a voice message could not be regarded as still being in transmission for as long as it was held in the service provider’s system ready to be collected by the recipient. The court rejected this view and held that the natural meaning of the provision did not support the proposition that “the first recipient of the communication must be regarded as the person who brings the transmission to an end”. The court considered it significant that the intended recipient of a voice message is “totally dependent” on the service provider in order to be able to access that message. It therefore appears arguable that a distinction may be drawn between the voice message so accessed and e-mail systems, in which the intended recipient is able to obtain his messages
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by means of his own devices, such as a computer or a smartphone496.
The difficulty of distinguishing what is public from what is private is not a debate peculiar to cybercrime. In our integrated and networked society this debate has become even more complex. This view also underpins the historical debate on the duty of protection incumbent on common carriers in the telecommunications sector497. The Telecommunications Act 2003 grapples with the distinction by defining a public service in terms of its being “available for use by a member of the public”498. The point was subsequently elaborated in detail by the sector regulators; Oftel states that this means “anyone who will pay and will comply with the applicable rules and conditions”499. In the world of the internet, the problem is how to characterise the various networks that are the components used in the transmission of a communication. For example, BT FON is an initiative that enables BT customers to share a part of their own WiFi bandwidth securely, through a separate channel on their home router, with other members within range of its signal. A “router” is normally a telecommunication system characterised as personal/private; when it shares its capacity, however, it ostensibly becomes a part of the public telecommunication system500.
The lack of the requisite clarity in these definitions may, as with its natural consequence on the public side, be interpreted as a breach of Ashworth’s principle of “maximum certainty” and as being at odds with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights501 according to which legal rules must be formulated with sufficient clarity to enable citizens to regulate their conduct502.
A narrow technical explanation of this kind gives the impression of a failure to provide the protection of privacy that is required by the right to privacy in Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and by the Court’s case law on it503. Instead, the determining factor of interception
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should be the purpose for which it is carried out. For example, the right not to have the confidentiality inherent in a communication violated is the protective purpose of such a statutory provision. Support for this approach can be found in RIPA itself: where a practical approach has been adopted, interception is carried out for lawful business practices504. The Home Office Code of Practice on Covert Surveillance, issued in 2002, contains the following provision:
“The use of a surveillance device should not simply be regulated, because it may incidentally pick up one or both ends of a telephone conversation… However, where the transmission takes place by means of a telecommunication system, the use of this method is not appropriate if the sole purpose is to overhear and surveillance is being carried out at the same time. In such cases, the application required for obtaining the warrant needed for the interception of communications must be made under section 5 of the 2000 Act”505.
This clearly confirms that the concept of “interception” is based on purpose rather than on a single meaning. This approach was, however, abandoned in the revised 2010 and 2014 versions of the Code. The current guidance reads as follows:
“The overhearing or recording of one or both ends of a telephone conversation by a listening device … where the product obtained by the operation in question does not involve any interference with, or modification of, the telecommunication system or its operation … does not constitute interception”506.
The Convention on Cybercrime may be seen to support a broad interpretation of “interception”; accordingly, the Convention also includes “electromagnetic emissions from an information system” as a form of interception507. Indeed, such techniques can easily be used, in a manner similar to covert listening devices (bugs), as a sophisticated method of eavesdropping508.
c) Right to Control
The issue of control lay at the heart of the first prosecution brought under section 1. Stanford, who had previously worked for Redbus Interhouse Plc, was able to intercept the
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e-mails of three of the company’s employees, including its chairman. Stanford persuaded a senior employee of the company to enable him to gain access to the company’s e-mail system by using the username and password supplied by that employee. Subsequently, by means of software downloaded onto the system, a copy of the e-mails was sent to a Hotmail account operated by George Liddell, a private investigator509. Stanford claimed that the employee who had provided the access had a right to control under section 1(6)(a). Cliff Stanford, the founder of Demon & Redbus, and George Liddell pleaded guilty after the judge ruled that “they had neither a right to control nor any express or implied consent in that regard”510.
On appeal, the court upheld the judge’s ruling. The court considered the meaning of the term “control” as accepted under the CMA by Lord Hobhouse in the Allison case; for example, “control” means having the right to “authorise or forbid” the use of a computer, and not merely the ability to use it511. In addition, the Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court as to the imposition of a six-month supervision sentence and, because the main purpose of the act was to obtain a commercial advantage, of a fine512. It can be seen that, as with unauthorised access and modification, the question of authorisation is likely to give rise to many problems, particularly where the act is committed by someone inside the organisation513.
6. Unlawful Devices
The primary distinction drawn between offences against the integrity of information systems and offences related to information systems and to content is that, in the latter, computers and communication systems are used as a tool in carrying out an act constituting an offence, as if they were a preliminary element of the offence514. In the commission of the offence, technology is merely a tool rather than forming the subject (object) of the offence. However, the general heading of the criminalisation of the supply or possession of devices specially
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designed to assist in the commission of an offence essentially falls into three categories. These tools generally include software developed for password cracking, cryptology and keylogging515.
As regards the offence of fraud, it is an offence to carry or supply a device for use in an act of fraud516, or to possess or supply devices that make it possible to obtain electronic communications services fraudulently517. In the offence of forgery, it is an offence to make, possess or have under one’s control a “machine, implement, document or any material” specially designed or adapted for the making of a particular instrument518. In intellectual property law, it is an offence to supply devices designed to circumvent technological protection measures519. Similarly, in IT law, the possession and supply of devices designed for committing offences in respect of the integrity of information systems have been criminalised520.
All these offences may be characterised as “precursor” offences, described as causal components that enable a completed principal offence to be committed. They also lie somewhere on the borderline of the distinction between the computer as the subject and as the object of an offence. Possession, which constitutes the material element of the offence, resembles the theft of a machine; the mental element of the offence, by contrast, is directed elsewhere, for example at the integrity or confidentiality of the system or of the data521.
Under Art. 6 of the Convention on Cybercrime, the States Parties are under an obligation to criminalise the possession and supply of devices, computer passwords, access codes or similar data. This obligation includes defining as an offence devices such as information about a known weakness or vulnerability of an application, for instance the software, generally called “exploits”, that is used in the Windows operating system to introduce malicious software into another person’s system. The article in question was designed, in view of what has become an inescapable feature of cybercrime and is described as a “malicious marketplace”522, to criminalise the marketing of “tools
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for hackers”523.
The term “device” is not defined in detail in the Convention; the term “device” does, however, include “computer software” and is used in the definition of “computer system”524. The Explanatory Report to the Convention notes that a device consists of “hardware or software developed for the automatic processing of digital data”525. Accordingly, the Convention appears to draw a distinction between a device and data; computer software, however, is clearly a particular form of data, and this creates potential confusion. In addition, the list of data components, such as “computer password, access code or similar data”, may not be interpreted as including data about a particular exploit of, or intrusion into, a system. For the exploitation of such data, while varying according to the nature of the intrusion, is not of the same kind as a password, an access code or a modification. Where a device takes the form of data, the criminalisation of the carrying or supply of such information is similar in nature to content-related offences526.
Supply is understood in a broad sense as “production, sale, or procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available”527. The concept of otherwise making available covers keeping such material on a website for downloading and providing access by means of a P2P network or a hyperlink528. For liability to be imposed, there must be a general intent to supply and a specific intent to commit one of the offences against system integrity by using the device in question. Under English criminal law, depending on the circumstances, a person who supplies may be characterised as an accessory, a conspirator, or a person giving material (assisting) or moral (encouraging) assistance529.
For greater certainty, the gaps were filled, so as to make the definition of the offence clearer, by a provision stating that “where an act constituting an offence is carried out for the purpose of the authorised testing or protection of an information system, supply shall not be interpreted
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as giving rise to criminal liability”530. This article appears to relate to the question of intent. Although the Explanatory Report links it only to the question of “unlawfulness”, the article focuses on intentional use531. The wording that qualifies the provision in question is necessary in order to protect persons working in the field of data security who make use of such devices for their lawful activities, whether academic or commercial532.
This article further requires that the device be designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing one of the offences against system integrity; this is a significant burden of proof for the prosecution and a very important question that must be determined objectively by the court. Generally, however, the conduct and statements of the persons engaged in the supply must be taken into account. For example, in Invicta Plastics Ltd v. Clare, although there was a warning that what the accused were doing infringed the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, there was incitement implied in the advertisement used for the sale of devices for detecting police radar traps533. In a manner similar to the position in the United States and Australia, the court held, on the basis of evidence showing that the companies had intentionally promoted unlawful conduct of this kind, that they had committed intellectual property infringement by distributing P2P software. The devices used in the offences against system integrity with which we are concerned here resemble the devices used in intellectual property infringements. As noted earlier, computers and networks of a kind that enable intellectual property infringement have been adapted for new offences committed against devices that circumvent copy-protection measures534 and devices that provide conditional access535536.
As regards possession, two separate intents are again required. According to the first of these, it is required that the person does not possess the device in question by chance, that the person has the intent to possess the device and that the person has the intent to use the device without right in order to commit one of the offences. The Convention on Cybercrime allows the States Parties to provide that a certain number of devices must be possessed before criminal liability can be imposed on persons537. This appears to be directed at
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the question of intent: possession of a minimum number of devices provides a basis for establishing the intent to use them in unlawful activities. Indeed, such an intent is in all likelihood an indication that it is directed at supplying these products to others rather than at personal use. Moreover, the States Parties are free not to make possession an offence538.
The inclusion in the offence of the requirement of acting “without right” must be viewed in terms of unlawfulness and grounds of excuse rather than as a positive notion conferred by an authority. Where an investigation/prosecution is initiated against a person for supplying a device, the prosecution is not obliged to prove only the dual intent; general intent is sufficient, depending on the circumstances. The existence of that dual intent is, however, used not only for the constitution of the offence but also for determining whether a device supplied is “lawful” or “unlawful”. This serves to prevent unnecessary over-criminalisation, particularly with regard to the dual use of devices539.
In addition, the EU Directive, unlike the 2005 Framework Decision, contains an article on “tools used for committing offences”540. This article is limited to supply in respect of two types of device: in a manner similar to the Convention on Cybercrime, “computer software designed and conceived primarily for that purpose” or “a computer password, access code or similar data” providing access to an information system. This offence requires conduct without right and the existence of an intent to commit an offence against the integrity of an information system541.
Although the CMA in its original form contained no provision on “devices”, it was possible for a person who supplied such devices to be charged as an accomplice or as a person aiding the offence542. Ultimately, in accordance with the obligation imposed by the Convention on Cybercrime, the Government first inserted a provision to this effect in the 2006 Act and then, in April 2015, amended that provision as follows:
“3A. Devices made, supplied or possessed for the commission of the offences defined in section 1, 3 or 3ZA.
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he makes, adapts, supplies or offers to supply a device with the intent that it be used in the commission of, or in assisting the commission of, the offences defined in section 1, 3 or 3ZA.
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(2) A person is guilty of an offence if he supplies or offers to supply a device in the knowledge that it is likely to be used in the commission of, or in assisting the commission of, the offences defined in section 1, 3 or 3ZA.
(3) A person is guilty of an offence if he possesses one of the following devices:
(a) where there is an intent to use the device to commit, or to assist in the commission of, the offences defined in section 1, 3 or 3ZA,
(b) where the devices in question have been supplied for the purpose of committing, or assisting in the commission of, the offences defined in section 1, 3 or 3ZA.”
This section addresses the supply of the “devices” in question. These devices are in all likelihood both tangible and intangible in nature. Only the intangible ones, however, are expressly mentioned in the section: “any program or data held in electronic form”543. The making, adaptation or supply of a device is an offence only if the person intends an unauthorised access or an offence committed by means of unauthorised access. This is a rather high threshold to be met when a prosecution is brought544. The second offence, however, has a different mental element: it must be believed that the device is likely to be used in hacking or in unauthorised access. The third offence, concerning the possession of such a device, targets the prospective intermediary who possesses the device with a view to using or supplying it and who will take part in the distribution of such devices. When this third offence was inserted in the Act in 2006, it concerned only the supply of a device to a third party. This was considered too narrow; the section was therefore extended to include the “personal use”545 of such devices in the commission of offences against system integrity. The maximum penalty for all three offences is two years’ imprisonment. Compared with the penalties for the offences of supplying and possessing devices for use in fraud, which are ten and five years respectively, the penalties for these offences appear rather inadequate546.
These offences were enacted with the aim of targeting the growth of “malicious markets”, such as bulletin boards, in which individuals are able to sell to other individuals devices to be used in crime, without any particular intention as to who will use them, how, where and when547. However, the second offence, which concerns the belief that the device supplied
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will be used in an offence, is criticised on the ground that it criminalises potential, and it therefore also creates legal uncertainty for information security researchers, penetration testers and others working in this field who develop and possess such devices for use in their scholarly work or in their business. The nature of the mistake in cases where “belief” is required has not so far been clearly explained in English law. Nevertheless, the expression “likely” suggests a probability in favour of such misuse, rather than mere suspicion, or even probable knowledge, that some of the downloaded items will fall into the wrong hands to be used for malicious purposes548.
On the issue also referred to as the “dual use” of devices, the Government asked the Director of Public Prosecutions to publish guidance on the investigations and prosecutions to be conducted under this section. As to what the expression “likely” means, that guidance states that prosecutors must take into account “the functionality of the item and, if any, the person to whom the suspect would give the item”549. Other relevant factors are whether the item is available on a commercial basis through legitimate channels and whether it has a substantial installation base550.
Under US federal law, the provision in question was created for the use of “access devices” in fraud, in such a way as to cover all categories of computer crime and cybercrime, and it is broadly defined as follows551:
“any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, mobile device identification number or other telecommunications service, equipment or identifying instrument, or other means that can be used to access an account, which, alone or in conjunction with another, provides access in order to obtain money, goods, services or any other thing of value, or for use in the transfer of funds (other than transfers made solely by paper document)552.”
A distinction must be drawn between the concepts of “counterfeit access devices” and “unauthorised access devices”; the former is a false concept, whereas the latter is genuine and means that the device is not in the possession of the rightful user (for example, it has been lost or stolen) or is no longer valid (for example, it has expired or been revoked). The production of,
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trafficking in, use and possession of such a device is an offence punishable by up to twenty years’ imprisonment553.
7. Unsolicited Communications
Unsolicited e-mail, or “spam” as it is better known, is an activity with which all internet users are thoroughly familiar. The incessant arrival of messages that, through various malicious practices, try to sell us something, show us something or win us over to something is both a very well-known subject and one on which much has been written. The scale of this problem in recent years, which is believed to account for a significant proportion of all e-mail traffic, combined with the perceived threat that such activities pose to the future of cyberspace, has resulted in numerous initiatives by both governments and the IT industry to combat it. Similar techniques have also spread to other messaging services, such as blogs (weblogs) and instant messaging, known as “spimming”554555.
Governments are concerned not only with unsolicited e-mail but also with other means of communication, in particular voice calls and faxes. Historically, the sending of such communications is not characterised as an offence unless the content of the message sent is itself unlawful (for example, child pornography) or its manner is unlawful (for example, hostility). However, owing to the increasing frequency of these messages and the capacity of their abuse to generate a high volume of communications, with effects on an industrial scale, there have been initiatives in various jurisdictions to criminalise such activities. Reflecting the distinct forms of intrusion and the harm resulting from them, the legal response often varies between the different means of communication. Voice calls require persons communicating directly; unsolicited e-mails cause the recipient’s mailbox to fill up unnecessarily, while unsolicited faxes give rise to costs by using the recipient’s machine and paper556.
Unsolicited communications may, moreover, be classified as a content-related offence. Sometimes the content alone constitutes an offence.
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As stated by the Spamhaus Project, “spam is an issue about consent, not content”557; consent, in turn, is closely related to authorisation and is of central importance in the criminalisation of acts that threaten the confidentiality, system integrity and availability of ICTs. The public policy objectives expressed for legislative initiatives of this kind reflect the effects of such traffic on the availability and integrity of the internet and of e-mail services, as well as on the integrity of the information contained in such messages, such as the origin of the message. The distinction drawn between the unsolicited communications discussed in this section and other offences against system integrity generally depends on the degree of interference with the victim’s ICT resources. Direct and significant threats to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of resources are more likely to be criminalised558.
Under United Kingdom law, the problem of unsolicited communications is addressed directly by two legal instruments. Both of them transpose EU measures and provide recourse to private law, not to criminal law. The Electronic Commerce Regulations 2002 (EC Directive 2002) impose on service providers a statutory obligation to ensure, among other things, that unsolicited e-mails are “clearly and unambiguously identifiable”559. Although the nature of this obligation is rather light, the basis on which the Directive rests is the confirmation that such communications pose a threat to the integrity and availability of network systems, noting that they may affect “the smooth functioning of interactive network systems”560. The second measure concerns the threats to privacy posed by modern communication technologies: the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003 (EC Directive 2003)561. Its provisions regulate unsolicited communications made by means of automated calling systems, faxes, voice telephone calls and e-mails, and prohibit such activities when carried out under certain conditions. As regards e-mails, the concealment of the identity or address of the sender, where the sender has concluded a contract for further protection, is an attempt to address the problem of anonymity in cyberspace. As a further measure, in order to justify the prohibition, the Directive refers to the fact that a high volume of unsolicited messages may, in electronic communications networks and terminal equipment,
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cause difficulties562. A breach of these obligations again entails only private-law sanctions; indeed, the Information Commissioner has the power563 to impose monetary penalties of up to 500,000 pounds sterling in respect of such breaches564.
The picture as regards the criminalisation of the sending of unsolicited communications in the United States is, in terms of both state and federal legislation, the reverse of the picture in the United Kingdom. The first measure at federal level is the Controlling the Assault of Nonsolicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM Act)565. As in the EU Directive, the congressional findings refer to the effect of unsolicited e-mail, and of the excessive use of communications infrastructures and services, on the integrity and availability of those systems566.
As well as using traditional criminal law terminology by referring in its title to a kind of act of “assault”, the CAN-SPAM Act criminalises the following activities in particular:
— Gaining unauthorised access to a computer for the purpose of sending unsolicited e-mails; this also includes creating “zombie” computers.
— Sending messages designed to deceive or mislead as to their origin by using “open relay” and “open proxy” techniques567. This provision is similar to the United Kingdom’s Privacy Regulations 2003.
— Falsifying “header”568 information and the messages sent; this is distinct from the offence of deception mentioned above.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
— Registering deceptive identifying information for e-mail, user accounts or domain names and for messages intentionally sent. This method, which takes the form of registering countless accounts by using false certificates, is an alternative to the use of zombie computers.
— Intentionally sending messages while falsely representing oneself as the registrant or as the successor to an IP address. The aim here is to take over blocks of IP addresses that are not on a “blacklist”.
These representative activities are carried out by spammers in order to evade the filters applied by communications service providers and to avoid detection by the investigating authorities. These provisions have been placed in the United States Criminal Code at the place where the other cybercrime offences are located569. These offences are investigated by the “Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice”570.
Several prosecutions have been brought under this Act. It is noted that in a significant proportion of these prosecutions guilt was admitted571. The penalties are set at a maximum of five years’ imprisonment where the acts constituting the offence are carried out as part of a felony or where the perpetrator has previously been convicted of the same or a similar offence572. The penalties vary according to other factors, such as the volume of the messages sent or the number of false accounts registered. The guidelines of the United States Sentencing Commission provide for an increase in the sentence in certain circumstances, such as the harvesting of e-mail addresses573. Finally, in such a case, seizure and confiscation orders may be made in respect of both the proceeds of the offence and the ICT equipment used in its commission574.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
The United States’ perspective on the criminal-law treatment of unsolicited communications is entirely different from that of the United Kingdom. Moreover, the differences in most other European countries and in countries such as Australia are less significant than those first mentioned. Under United Kingdom law, breaking the security system of a machine and installing “zombie” software in it so that unsolicited mail can be sent are assessed under sections 1 and 2 of the CMA. The offences of fraud and forgery, and in particular the new offence of fraud in the Fraud Act 2006 (fraud by false representation and fraud by failing to disclose information), may be applied to the deceptive and falsifying acts of spammers. The offence of fraud by failing to disclose information is committed where a person, although under a legal duty to make a truthful disclosure, makes a disclosure to another person in a dishonest manner. Such a duty can be found in the Privacy Regulations 2003575. The advantage of the United States approach, however, is that such measures show – both to the general public and to potential spammers – that the acts in question are regarded as criminal. At the same time, policy decisions and the conclusions drawn from the information resources of those who apply the law make a commitment to combating such activities576.
Conclusion
Cybercrime challenges the existing system of criminal law. This challenge applies both to substantive criminal law, in which the offences are defined, and to the procedural rules on the investigation and prosecution of offenders. It requires the criminal law system to be reviewed and supplemented so that the needs of law enforcement can be properly met, the rights of the victims of crime better protected and society as a whole protected against crime. As far as English law is concerned, the most important criticism made in this respect is the need for an appropriate criminal code to be enacted in order to ensure that the rules in this field are uniform and brought together in one place577.
In order to meet this criticism, the United Kingdom enacted the Computer Misuse Act 1990, which we have examined above, and subsequently made various amendments to that Act in line with changing and growing needs. In addition, for offences committed by means of information systems, such as fraud, forgery, obscenity, extreme pornography and grooming,
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
it has also made the necessary amendments to the statutes governing the physical-world counterparts of those offences. It has, moreover, criminalised acts relating to the protection of personal data and made them separate offences in the relevant statute. Apart from these, the United Kingdom, as a party to the European Convention on Cybercrime, has also made various amendments to its legislation concerning cybercrime in order to fulfil its obligations under the Convention.
As can be seen, however, it has not been possible to bring the cybercrime offences together as a whole in a single statute. One important reason for this is that Anglo-American legal culture, unlike ours, has no uniform criminal code. Given that in our country, despite the existence of a uniform criminal code, criminal provisions are nevertheless also laid down in other laws, it is entirely natural that this has not happened in the United Kingdom. Although a draft uniform model criminal code was drawn up in the United Kingdom, this too was unsuccessful. It is therefore not expected that cybercrime will be regulated under a single umbrella statute in the near future.
In England, a large number of cases have been brought and leading decisions handed down concerning the cybercrime offences I have described above, particularly since the early 90s. Because analogy and extensive interpretation are permitted in the Anglo-American system of criminal law, the courts’ reaction to such activities, and the punishment of perpetrators through the application of statutes (and earlier court decisions) to such acts, has been swift. One problem encountered in our country, however, applies in exactly the same way to the United Kingdom: proof. As can also be seen from the sample decisions I have given above (in particular the Caffrey case), however strong the evidence may be, if it cannot be understood by the authority conducting the trial / the body giving the decision, the guilty may be acquitted or, on the contrary, the innocent convicted. I am of the opinion that this can be prevented only through specialisation.
In England, the Law Commission has important powers and influence in the process of preparing and making legislation. This body shapes England’s legal policy in the true sense and prepares its reports with regard to the many aspects of legislation, such as the social, cultural, economic and criminological aspects. Both Houses of Parliament (the House of Commons and the House of Lords) take these reports into account and take them seriously.
This is a product of comparative law which teaches us important lessons not only for IT law or criminal law but for every discipline of law. For this understanding shows us the need and the necessity for laws to be made or amended not in order to remedy a problem of the day or to react to certain particular events, but after careful thought has been given to the field in question and with social, economic, cultural and administrative sensitivities and policies taken into consideration. In short, when criminal norms and
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
the corresponding sanctions are laid down, criminal policy and its positive and/or negative effects must without fail be taken into account.
It is extremely difficult to say that this is the case as far as our country is concerned. Even the most basic laws are enacted as a reaction to a problem once that problem has arisen (to use the colloquial expression, at the eleventh hour). Hence many of even our basic laws are in the nature of reactive legislation. My wish is that this situation should change as soon as possible.
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Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
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Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
Reports and News
Australian Communications and Media Authority, “Like, post, share: Young Australians’ experience of social media”, Quantitative Research Report, 2013.
Attorney General’s Department (Australia), National plan to combat cybercrime, 2013.
Barrett, Neil, “Scary Whodunit Will Have Sequels” IT Week, 27 Ekim 2003.
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Doç. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive study on cybercrime, 2013.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER
US Department of Justice (DoJ), “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers with Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage”, Press Release, 19 Mayıs 2014, https://www.fbi.gov/ contact-us/field-offices/pittsburgh/news/press-releases/u.s.-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-with-cyber-espionage-against-u.s.-corporations-and-a-labor-organization-for-commercial-advantage, 1.1.2017.
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Ward, Mark, “Bookies suffer Online Onslaught”, BBC News, 19 Mart 2004, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/technology/3549883.stm, 23.9.2016.
Webster, Stephen/Julia Davidson/Antonia Bifulco/Petter Gottschalk/ Vincenzo Caretti/Thierry Pham/Julie Grove-Hills,/Caroline Turley/Charlotte Tompkins/Stefano Ciulla/Vanessa Milazzo/Adriano Schimmenti/Giuseppe Craparo, European Online Grooming Project, Final Report, European Commision Sefer Internet Plus Programme, Mart 2012.
Footnotes
- Faculty Member in Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and IT Law at Istanbul Medipol University Faculty of Law, mvdulger@medipol.edu.tr ↑
- Jonathan Clough, Principles of Cybercrime, Second Edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, s. 27. ↑
- For information on the United Kingdom legal system as a whole see: Alisdair A. Gillespie, The English Legal System, 5th Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, s. 1 vd.; Catherine Elliott, English Legal System Essential Cases and Materials, Second Edition, Harlow, Pearson Longman, 2009, s. 3 vd.; Stefan Fafinski/Emily Finch, English Legal System, 3rd Edition, Harlow, Pearson Longman, 2010, s. 1 vd.; Catherine Elliott/Frances Quinn, English Legal System, Eleventh Edition, Harlow, Pearson Longman, 2010, s. 11 vd.; Jacqueline Martin, English Legal System: Key Facts Key Cases, London and New York, Routledge, 2014, s. 1 vd. ↑
- Ian Walden, Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations, Second Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, pn. 1.05. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.12. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.17. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.19. ↑
- For details on the definition of the computer and of information systems see: Murat Volkan Dülger, Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku, 6. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2015, s. 63 vd. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.23. ↑
- Lawrence Lessig, Code and other Laws of Cyberspace, New York, Basic Books, 1999, s. 85- 99. ↑
- For the concept of “basic intellectual tool” see: Jeremy Horder, “The Classification of Crimes and the Special Part of the Criminal Law”, Defining Crimes: Essays on The Special Part of the Criminal Law, Ed: R. A. Duff/Stuart P. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, s. 21. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.26. ↑
- Alisdair A. Gillespie, Cybercrime: Key Issues and Debates, London and New York, Routledge, 2016, s. 1. ↑
- House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Computer Crime, Final Report, 1983, s. 12; Donn B. Parker, Crime by Computer, New York, Scribner, 1976, s. 1 vd; Ulrich Sieber, Legal Aspects of Computer – Related Crime in the Information Society - COMCRIME Study, http://www.edc.uoc.gr/~panas/PATRA/sieber.pdf; 25.11.2016, s. 1 vd.
- Susan W. Brenner, “Cybercrime Metrics: Old Wine, New Bottles?”, Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 9, No. 13, Fall 2004, s. 4. ↑
- Sheridan Morris, The Future of Netcrime Now: Part 1 – Threats and Challenges, Home Office Online Report 62/04, 2014, s. vi. ↑
- Clough, s. 9,10; Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 1. ↑
- Morris, The Future of Netcrime, s. vi; Clough, s. 10. See also: Susan W. Brenner, “Nanocrime?”, University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology and Policy, No. 1, 2011, s. 39-105. ↑
- The term is, moreover, also found (albeit rarely) in legislation, see: the Cybercrime Act 2001. ↑
- The Oxford English Dictionary defines “cybercrime” as “crime or crimes committed using a computer or the internet”, Oxford English Dictionary Online, Oxford University Press, December 2014. ↑
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive study on cybercrime, 2013. ↑
- Clough, s. 10. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.26. ↑
- Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 1; Paul Hunton, “The Growing Phenomenon of Crime and the Internet: A Cybercrime Execution and Analysis Model”, Computer Law and Security Report, Vol. 25, 2009, s. 529. ↑
- Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 3. ↑
- Mike McGuire/Samantha Dowling, Cyber Crime: A Review of the Evidence, Research Report 75, Summary of Key Findings and Implications, Home Office, October 2013, s. 5. ↑
- McGuire/Dowling, s. 5. ↑
- Clough, s. 10, 11. ↑
- McGuire/Dowling, s. 5. ↑
- Clough, s. 11. ↑
- Melaine Kowalski, Cyber-Crime: Issues, Data Sources, and Feasibility of Collecting Police- Reported Statistics, Cat. No. 85-558-XIE, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 2002, s. 6. ↑
- Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, The National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996, Legislative Analysis, US Department of Justice, 1998; Clough, s. 11. ↑
- For details on these classifications see: Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 3-8. ↑
- Attorney General’s Department (Australia), National plan to combat cybercrime, 2013, s. 4, 5. ↑
- Kowalski, s. 6. ↑
- McGuire/Dowling, s. 5. ↑
- Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, The National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime Metrics, s. 15 ↑
- Clough, s. 11. ↑
- See, for example: Eddy Willems, Cybergefahr: Wie wir uns gegen Cyber-Crime und Online-Terror wehren können, Wiesbaden, Springer Vieweg, 2015, s. 1 vd. ↑
- Dülger, s. 77-80. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.46. ↑
- David S. Wall, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Information Age, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014, s. 2. ↑
- G. E. Moore, “Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits”, Electronics, Vol.38, No. 8, 1965, s. 114–117. ↑
- Wall, Cybercrime, s. 2, 3. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.49. ↑
- Richard C. Hollinger, Crime, Deviance and the Computer, Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing, 1997, s. xviii. ↑
- Florida Computer Crimes Act, Fla. Stat. Ch. 815, date of entry into force 1 August 1979. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.50. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.51. ↑
- Sieber, COMCRIME Study. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.52. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.53. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.54. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.55. ↑
- For details on the function, powers and influence of the Law Commissions see: Matthew Dyson/James Lee/Shona Wilson Stark (Ed), Fifty Years of the Law Commissions: The Dynamics of Law Reform, Oxford and Oregon, Hurt Publishing, 2016, s. 1 vd. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.61. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.62. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.69. ↑
- The bodies authorised and entrusted with investigating offences and offenders and bringing them first before the public prosecutor’s office and then before the court, which in our legal scholarship and practice we refer to in short as “kolluk” or “kolluk güçleri” (the General Directorate of Security, the Gendarmerie General Command, the Coast Guard Command, etc.), are in the United Kingdom called law enforcement agencies, LEA for short. The word “enforcement” in this expression also carries a certain sense of coercion and of the performance of a duty. The reason for using this expression is that, since the police consist of various units at national and local level which have different or similar powers and in some cases even work side by side, an attempt is made to bring them together under a single heading. ↑
- “War in the fifth domain”, The Economist, 1 Temmuz 2010, http://www.economist.com/ node/16478792; 1.2.2017. ↑
- Marco Rosci, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, s. 1. ↑
- For details on this subject see: Murat Volkan Dülger, “Teknolojideki ve Kitle İletişim Araçlarındaki Gelişmelerin Uluslararası Terörizme Etkileri”, Hukuk ve Adalet Eleştirel Hukuk Dergisi, İstanbul, Y. 4 S. 8, Nisan 2007, s. 55–76; Philip W. Brunst, “Terrorism and the Internet: New Threats Posed by Cyberterrorism and Terrorist Use of the Internet”, A War on Terror? The European Stance on a New Threat, Changing Laws and Human Rights Implications, Ed: Marianne Wade/Almir Maljević, Heilderberg, Springer, 2010, s. 51-80; Ulrich Sieber, “Instruments of International Law: Against Terrorist Use of the Internet, A War on Terror? The European Stance on a New Threat, Changing Laws and Human Rights Implications, Ed: Marianne Wade/Almir Maljević, Heilderberg, Springer, 2010, s. 171-220. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.72. ↑
- US Government, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003, see: https:// www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf, 11.7.2016. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.75. However, in March 2014 the USA announced its intention to transition key internet domain name functions to the global community of stakeholders, see: National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), “NTIA announces intent to transition key Internet domain name functions”, Press Release, 14 March 2014, https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions, 11.7.2016. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.77. ↑
- Marc D. Goodman, “Why the Police Don’t Care about Computer Crime”, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 10, Number 3, Summer 1997, s. 465 vd. ↑
- John Perry Barlow, “Crime and Puzzlement: in advance of the law on e electronic frontier”, Whole Earth Review, No. 68, Fall 1990, s. 44-57. Although this occurred twenty years ago, the author reports that in an investigation conducted in the United Kingdom in 2005 a similar situation still prevailed. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.82. ↑
- California Civil Code, ss. 1789.29 and 1798.80 et seq. At present the majority of US states have provisions of this kind; see: National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), “Security Breach Notification Laws”, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx, 13.7.2016. ↑
- California Civil Code, s. 1789.82(d): “Means the unauthorised acquisition of digitised data that compromises the security or confidentiality of personal information”. ↑
- Directive 2009/136/EC, OJ L 337/11, 18 December 2009; inserted into Art. 4 of Directive 02/58/EC. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.96. ↑
- For details on this subject see: Murat Volkan Dülger, Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasına İlişkin Suçlar ve Yaptırımlar, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2011, s. 240-278. ↑
- See: US federal law at 42 USC s. 13032 (Reporting of child pornography by electronic communications service providers). ↑
- Australian Criminal Code Act 1995, s. 474.25 (Obligations of Internet Service Providers and Internet Content Hosts). ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.97. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.103. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.108. ↑
- Cong Lixian, “Chinese E-Commerce (2) and Legal Environment”, Chinese Intellectual Property and Technology Laws, Ed: Rohan Kariyawasam, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, s. 279. Walden, pn. 2.142. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.150. ↑
- Arthur L. Bowker/Gregory B. Thompson, “Computer Crime in the 21st Century and Its Effect on the Probation Officer”, Federal Probation: A Journal of Correctional Philosophy and Practice, Vol. 65, No. 2, September 2001, s. 18-24. ↑
- Katie Hafner/John Markoff, Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1991, s. 342. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.151. ↑
- Letter of 22 May 1996 from Marc J. Stein, United States Probation Officer, to Kevin Poulsen, cited in: Douglas Thomas, “Criminality on the Electronic Frontier: Corporality and the Judicial Construction of the Hacker”, Cybercrime: Law Enforcement, Security and Surveillance in the Information Age, Ed: Douglas Thomas/Brian D. Loader, London & New York, Routledge, 2000, s. 30. ↑
- [2004] EWCA Crim 1664. ↑
- This provision has now been repealed and replaced by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and the section in question has been enacted as the “sexual offences prevention order”. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.152. ↑
- [2004] EWCA Crim 233; [2004] 2 Cr App R (S) 57. ↑
- For details see: Ian Walden/Martin Wasik, “The Internet: Access Denied Controlled!”, Criminal Law Review, Issue 5, 2011, s. 377-387; Alisdair A. Gillespie, “Restricting Access to the Internet by Sex Offenders”, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2011, s. 165-186; Walden, pn. 2.152. ↑
- POCA, s. 241. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.158. ↑
- [2004] 2 Cr App R (S) 46. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.166. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.173. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.174. ↑
- Peter Grabosky/Russell G. Smith/Gillian Dempsey, Electronic Theft: Unlawful Acquisition in Cyberspace, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, s. 2. ↑
- It is formed from the initial letters of the English words “money”, “entertainment”, “ego”, “cause”, “entrance to social groups” and “status”. ↑
- Max Kilger/Ofir Arkin/Jeff Stutzman, “Profiling”, in Honeynet Project, Know Your Enemy, Learning about Security Threats, 2nd edn, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2004, Bölüm 16. ↑
- Kevin D. Mitnick/William L. Simon, Art of Intrusion: The Real Stories Behind the Exploits of Hackers, Intruders & Deceivers, Wiley Publishing, 2005, s. 1 vd.; See also: Zhengchuan Xu/Qing Hua/ Chenghong Zhang, “Why Computer Talents Become Computer Hackers”, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2013, s. 64-74. ↑
- See: Nir Kshetri, “The Simple Economics of Cybercrimes”, IEEE Security and Privacy, Vol. 4, No. 1, January/February 2006, s. 8-13, (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=881421); Walden, pn. 2.185. ↑
- David S. Wall, Cyberspace Crime, London, Dartmouth, 2003, s. xv. ↑
- Michael Levi, “Between the Risk and the Reality Falls the Shadow”, Crime and the Internet: Cybercrimes and Cyberfears, Ed: David S. Wall, London & New York, Routledge, 2001, s. 44- 58. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.188. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.196. ↑
- Directive 2013/40/EU, Art. 2(c). ↑
- On this subject see: David Ormerod/David Perry, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2017, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, Bölüm 10; Amanda Pinto/Martin Evans, Corporate Criminal Liability, Second Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008, s. 1 vd. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.197. ↑
- For details on the subject and examples from comparative law see: Mark Pieth/ Radha Ivory, Corporate Criminal Liability: Emergence Convergence and Risk, Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice 9, Heidelberg, Springer, 2011, s. 3 vd. ↑
- For a comparison of the criminal law of the Anglo-American legal system with German criminal law see: Markus D. Dubber/Tatjana Hörnle, Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, s. 1 vd. ↑
- On these difficulties see: Murat Volkan Dülger, ““Hukuka Uygunluk Nedenleri ile Mazeret Nedenleri Arasındaki Ayrımın Tarihçesi, Niteliği ve Gerekliliği Üzerine Karşılaştırmalı Bir Deneme”, Ceza Hukuku Dergisi, Y. 9, S. 24, Nisan 2014, s. 124, 125. The difficulty of translations from or into English, particularly on legal subjects, has been the subject of a study in its own right, see: Rosanna Masiola/Renato Tomei, Law, Language and Translation From Concepts to Conflicts, Heidelberg, Springer, 2015, s. 5 vd. ↑
- Andrew Ashworth/Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law, 7. Bası, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, s. 487. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.222. ↑
- EU Directive 2000/31/EC concerns certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market; OJ L 178/1, 17 July 2000 (eCommerce Directive). This Directive was transposed into United Kingdom domestic law by the Electronic Commerce Regulations 2002 (Electronic Commerce [EC Directive] Regulations 2002 [SI No 2013] 2002 Regulations). It is these conditions that are contained in the instrument in question: eCommerce Directive, Recital 42. ↑
- eCommerce Directive, Art. 42; 2002 Regulations reg 17. ↑
- eCommerce Directive, Art. 12(1)(b). ↑
- eCommerce Directive, Art. 12(1)(c). ↑
- Framework Directive, Art. 2(c). Such as “audiovisual media services” (Directive 2010/13/EU, OJ L 95/1, 15 April 2010) or the website of a newspaper. On this subject see: Papasavvas v. O Fileleftheros Dimosia Etairia Ltd and others [2015] 1 CMLR 24. ↑
- eCommerce Directive, Art. 13(1)(a); Walden, pn. 2.233. ↑
- eCommerce Directive, Art. 13; 2002 Regulations reg 18. ↑
- eCommerce Directive, Art. 13(1)(a). ↑
- eCommerce Directive, Art. 13(1)(b). ↑
- eCommerce Directive, Art. 13(1)(c). ↑
- eCommerce Directive, Art. 13(1)(d). ↑
- eCommerce Directive, Art. 13(1)(e). ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.234, 2.235. ↑
- Ashworth/Horder, s. 55. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.246. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.275. ↑
- For details on the subject see: Jeanne Pia Mifsud Bonnici, Self-Regulation in Cyberspace, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2008, s. 9 vd. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.276. ↑
- 338 F 3d 339 (Va, 2003). ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.280. ↑
- For details on this subject see: Christopher T. Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation: European Law Regulatory Governance and Legitimacy in Cyberspace, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, s. 43 vd. ↑
- EURIM, Policing the Internet, Submission to the Internet Governance Forum, July 2006, http://www.eurim.org.uk/activities/ecrime/eurim_IGF06paper.pdf, s. 3. ↑
- Ben Wagner, Global Free Expression – Governing the Boundaries of Internet Content, Law Governance and Technology Series, Vol. 28, Switzerland, Springer, 2016, s. 11 vd. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.283. ↑
- David Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, s. 1045. ↑
- The Law Commission, Working Paper No 110, Computer Misuse. See also: Martin Wasik, “Law Reform Proposals on Computer Misuse”, Criminal Law Review, 1989, s. 257-270. ↑
- Neil MacEwan, “The Computer Misuse Act 1990: Lessons from Its Past and Predictions for Its Future” Criminal Law Review, Vol. 12, 2008, s. 955-967; Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1045, 1046. ↑
- Stephan Fafinski, “Access Denied: Computer Misuse on an Era of Technological Change” Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 70, Issue 5, 2006, s. 424-442. ↑
- It cannot be said, however, that all of these amount to a call for reform, see: C. Holder, “Staying One Step Ahead of the Criminals”, IT Law, Vol. 10, Issue 3, 2002, s. 17 vd. ↑
- For the debates on this subject see: G. Fearon, “All Party Internet (APIG) Report on the Computer Misuse Act”, Comps. & Law, Vol. 15, 2004, s. 36 vd. ↑
- DPP v. Lennon [2006] EWHC 1201. ↑
- See: Ian Walden, “Harmonising Computer Crime Laws in Europe”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 12, Issue 4, 2004, s. 321-336. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1046. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.04. ↑
- Morris, The Future of Netcrime, s. 13-19; Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1047. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1047. ↑
- For details see: Cliff Stoll, Cuckoo’s Egg, New York, Pocket Books, 1998. ↑
- See: Snowden Surveillance Archive, https://snowdenarchive.cjfe.org/greenstone/cgi-bin/ library. cgi, 12.8.2016. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.15. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.16. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.17-3.20. ↑
- Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Pub L No 98-473, Title II, Chapter XXI, s 2101(a), 98 Stat 1837, at 2190 (1984). ↑
- “Protected computers” are defined in 18 USC s 1030(e)(2). ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.21. ↑
- Tomlinson subsequently succeeded in having this book published in Moscow, see: Richard Tomlinson, The Big Breach: From Top Secret to Maximum Security, Narodny Variant Publishers, Moskova, 2001. ↑
- A. S. Reid/N. Ryder, “The Case of Richard Tomlinson: The Spy Who Emailed Me”, Information and Communications Technology Law, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 2000, s. 61 vd. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.23. ↑
- For the history, theoretical background, application and relevant provisions of this regime see: Philip Coppel, Informations Rights: Law and Practice, 4th Edition, Oxford & Portland, Hart Publishing, 2014, s. 1 vd.; Walden, pn. 3.24. ↑
- See: D. Williams, Not in the Public Interest; the Problem of Security in Democracy, London, Hutchison, 1965. ↑
- Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers [1987] 1 WLR 1286, Walden, pn. 3.26. ↑
- See: Ashton Investments Ltd and another v. OSJC Russian Aluminium and others [2006] All ER (D) 209 (Oct); in this case a Russian company was accused of having remotely accessed the information systems of the opposing party, an English company, in order to obtain important information in pending litigation concerning the parties. ↑
- See, for example: US Department of Justice (DoJ), “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers with Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage”, Press Release, 19 Mayıs 2014, https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/ pittsburgh/news/press-releases/u.s.-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-with-cyber-espionage-against-u.s.-corporations-and-a-labor-organization-for-commercial-advantage, 1.1.2017. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.39. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.40. ↑
- See: C. D. Freedman, “Criminal Misappropriation of Confidential Commercial Information and Cyberspace: Comments on the Issues”, International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, Vol.13, 1999, s. 147 vd. ↑
- The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-294, 110 Stat 3488 (1996), codified at 18 USC s 1832. The maximum penalty is fifteen years’ imprisonment. ↑
- 312 F 3d 263 (7th Cir 2002). ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.43. ↑
- Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Misuse of Trade Secrets, Consultation Paper No 150, 1997. ↑
- Coco v. AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.49. ↑
- Law Commision, pn. 5.3 and 5.8; Walden, pn. 3.50. ↑
- See, for example: Shepherds Investments Ltd v. Walters [2006] EWHC 836; Corporate Express Ltd v. Day [2004] EWHC 2943; Gabem Group Ltd v. Mahatma [2002] EWHC 2221; Intelsec Systems Ltd v. Grech Cini [2000] 1 WLR 1190; Walden, pn. 3.51. ↑
- [1984] 3 All Er. ↑
- For example, s. 263 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch - StGB); in addition, a separate offence has been added for computer fraud (s. 263a). Walden, pn. 3.54. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.55-59. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.60. ↑
- For example, software such as Adobe Photoshop CC. Walden, pn. 3.88. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.89. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.120. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.129. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.132. ↑
- [1969] 1 QB 151, at 168. ↑
- [1972] AC 849, at 866F. ↑
- This principle consists of the combination of the following two propositions: that a significant proportion be depraved and corrupted, and that this be more than a negligible number of the likely persons. ↑
- Images of excrement and a sexual orientation in which pleasure is derived from eating excrement. ↑
- [2002] EWCA Crim 747. ↑
- Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 209; Walden, pn. 3.133. ↑
- [1997] 2 All ER 548. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.135. ↑
- [2000] All ER (D) 502. ↑
- Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 211. ↑
- [2000] All ER (D) 359. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.136. ↑
- Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 212. ↑
- [2012] EWCA Crim 398. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.137. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.138. ↑
- Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 213. ↑
- [2005] EWCA Crim 52. ↑
- Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 213; Walden, pn. 3.149. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.150. ↑
- Jacop Rowbottom, “Obscenity Laws and the Internet: Targeting the Supply and Demand”, Criminal Law Review, February 2006, s. 102. ↑
- Committing an assault of this kind is the subject of an investigation for grievous bodily harm in England and Wales. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.151. ↑
- For these views see: Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 214, 215. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.152. ↑
- CJIA 2008, ss. 63-8. ↑
- In this context, as the court stated in Oliver (Philip) [2011] EWCA crim 3114, the fact that the accused had downloaded the “TeamViewer” software onto his computer in order to enable other persons also to gain access to images of this kind constitutes a more serious, aggravated form of the offence of possession. ↑
- CJIA 2008, s. 63(3). ↑
- Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 216. ↑
- Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 217. ↑
- For studies examining pornographic material in detail from the standpoint of criminal law see: Carmen C. Cusack, Pornography and yhe Criminal Justice System, Boca Raton, CRC Press, 2015, s. 79 vd. On the violence suffered by women in pornography see: Walter S. DeKeseredy/Marilyn Corsianos, Violance Against Women in Pornography, New York, Routledge, 2016, s. 57 vd. ↑
- CJIA 2008, s. 63(7). ↑
- The amendment made to CJIA 2008, s. 63(7A) and (7B) by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. ↑
- Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 217. ↑
- Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 217, 218. ↑
- CJIA 2008, s. 65. ↑
- CJIA 2008, s. 66. ↑
- CJIA 2008, s. 63(10). ↑
- Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 215; Walden, pn. 3.153.
- Walden, pn. 3.154. For a monograph devoted to this field see: Alisdair A. Gillespie, Child Pornography: Law and Policy, London & New York, Routledge-Cavendish, 2012, s. 1 vd. ↑
- Clough, s. 289. ↑
- For a comprehensive and up-to-date study discussing the problem of child pornography in all its aspects see: Carissa Byrne Hessick (Ed), Refining Child Pornography Law: Crime, Language and Social Consequances, Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2016, s. 19 vd. ↑
- This point was made by Jim Gamble, Deputy Director General of England’s National Crime Department, at a conference entitled “Child Pornography on the Internet: Research and Investigation” held in London on 19 October 2005. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.155. Although Clough also accepts this, he nevertheless used the term “child pornography”, stating that it is the most widespread term in this field; see: Clough, s. 298. ↑
- [2000] 2 All ER 245. ↑
- The images were also found in another directory; however, the images forming the subject of the charge had become invisible owing to the limitation period. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.171. ↑
- [2000] 1 Cr App R 438. ↑
- Sweet v. Parsley [1970] AC 132, at 148 H. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.172. ↑
- [2006] EWCA Crim 560. ↑
- This is the form of the image that contains not its own full dimensions but only a subset of them. In this case a deleted file is kept in a separate file elsewhere on the computer. ↑
- Thumbnail images can be recovered only with highly specialised software devoted entirely to this purpose, which can be procured only with the authorisation of the United States Federal Government. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.173. ↑
- CJA 1988, s. 160 (2)(c). ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.174. ↑
- Schofield, The Times, 18 Nisan 2003. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.175. ↑
- [2002] EWCA Crim 683. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.176. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.177. ↑
- POCA 1978, s. 1(1)(c). ↑
- [2005] EWCA Crim 3093. ↑
- The Crown Court of England and Wales is, together with the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal, one of the constituent elements of the senior courts of England and Wales. This court is the higher court among the criminal courts of first instance; nevertheless, for certain reasons, the Crown Court ranks hierarchically below the High Court and the Divisional Courts attached to it. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.178. ↑
- Thompson (Richard) [2004] EWCA Crim 927. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.186. ↑
- For details on this subject see: Clough, s. 313-325; Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 245-253. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.187. ↑
- Clough, s. 377. ↑
- For an example see: Mansfield [2005] EWCA Crim 927. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.188. ↑
- Anne-Marie McAlinden, ‘Grooming’ and the Sexsual Abuse of Children; Instituonal, Internet and Familial Dimensions, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, s.11. ↑
- Alasdair A. Gillespie, “Child Protection on the Internet – challenges for Criminal Law”, Child adn Family Law Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2002, s. 411, 412; Clough, s. 377, 378. ↑
- For a detailed discussion of grooming see: Stephen Webster/Julia Davidson/Antonia Bifulco/Petter Gottschalk/Vincenzo Caretti/Thierry Pham/Julie Grove-Hills,/Caroline Turley/Charlotte Tompkins/Stefano Ciulla/Vanessa Milazzo/Adriano Schimmenti/Giuseppe Craparo, European Online Grooming Project, Final Report, European Commision Sefer Internet Plus Programme, Mart 2012, Bölüm 3, s. 37-60. ↑
- Helen Whittle/Catherine Hamilton-Giachritsis/Anthony Beech/Guy Collings, “A Review of Online Grooming: Characteristics and Concerns” Aggression and Violence Behaviour, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2013, s. 65. ↑
- Australian Communications and Media Authority, “Like, post, share: Young Australians’ experience of social media”, Quantitative Research Report, 2013, s. 6. ↑
- Australian Communications and Media Authority, s. 7; Clough, s. 378. ↑
- SOA 2003, s. 15. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.189. ↑
- Added to s. 15A of the SOA 2003 by s. 15 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. ↑
- In England and Wales the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions was first established in 1880 as part of the Home Office and became an institution in its own right in 1908. This office, known for short as the “DPP”, was responsible only for the prosecution of a very small number of important cases until 1986, when the duty to prosecute was transferred to the newly established Crown Prosecution Service, which it also heads. The Director, who heads this office, is appointed by the Attorney General for England and Wales. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.192. ↑
- Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s. 33. ↑
- Gillespie, Cybercrime, s. 219-223; Walden, pn. 3.214. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.219. ↑
- For ease of use, the word “hack” (to chop, to cut, a blow) and its variations are used to describe acts of unauthorised access to computers and computer systems. Sometimes a distinction is accepted between “hacking”, which is seen as a well-intentioned endeavour, and “cracking”, which stands at the exact opposite and is regarded as a malicious endeavour, although both are in fact unauthorised access. Apart from the legal relevance of the element of motivation, which has a bearing on their punishment, very little distinction appears to be drawn between them in popular usage. ↑
- Clough, s. 31. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.234. ↑
- StGB, s. 202a. See also: Art. 154-A of the Brazilian Criminal Code (unlawful breach of a security mechanism), Art. 3(2)(1) of the Japanese Unauthorised Computer Access Law (limited by an access control function). ↑
- Norwegian General Civil Penal Code, s. 145. This provision entered into force in 1987 but was redrafted in 2005; its present version reads as follows: “If a person unlawfully gains access to another person’s letter or other closed document, or in a similar manner to its contents, or gains access to the contents of another person’s locked repository by breaking it open…”. See also: Finnish Criminal Code, s. 8(1) (breaking of protection). ↑
- Case No 83 B, RT-1998-1971, 15 December 1998. ↑
- European Convention on Cybercrime, Art. 2. ↑
- Council Framework Decision on attacks against information systems, OJ L 69/67, 16 March 2005, Art. 2(2) (Framework Decision). ↑
- Directive 13/40/EU on attacks against information systems, OJ L 218/8, 14 August 2013, Art. 9(5). ↑
- European Commission, “Proposal for a directive on attacks against information systems and report on the amendment of Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA”, COM (2010) 517 final, 30 September 2010, p. 7. ↑
- See: Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (Rapporteur M. Hohlmeier), report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on attacks against information systems and on the amendment of Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, A7-0224/2013, 19 June 2013. ↑
- See: Directive 13/40/EU, Art. 17; also the e-mail of 7 July 2015 sent by Senior Policy Adviser Ralf Bendrath to Jan Albrecht. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.242. ↑
- In most of the legislation of English law, the word “section” is used as the counterpart of “madde” (article) in Turkish law. Its exact translation, however, is “bölüm”. For the sake of consistency with the language we use and are accustomed to, I shall continue to use the word “madde” as the counterpart of “section/bölüm”. ↑
- Orin S. Kerr, “Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting ‘Access’ and ‘Authorization’ in Computer Misuse Statutes”, New York University Law Review, Vol. 78, 2003, s. 1600. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.243. ↑
- David S. Wall, “Policing the Internet: Maintaining Order and Law on the Cyber-beat”, The Internet, Law and Society, Ed: Yaman Akdeniz/Clive Walker/David Wall, Longman, 2000, Section 7, s. 157. ↑
- For example, Art. 154-A of the Brazilian Criminal Code, “Unauthorised entry into a computer-related device”. ↑
- Intel Corp v. Hamidi, 71 P 3d 296 (Cal 2003), where a tort claim of trespass to chattels was pursued in respect of unsolicited e-mails; the claim failed. ↑
- Kerr, s. 1602; Walden, pn. 3.244. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.245. ↑
- Chris Reed, Internet Law: Text and Materials, 2nd Edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, s. 66. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.246. ↑
- CMA, s. 17(5). ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.247. ↑
- Law Commission, Computer Misuse, Report No 186, Cm 819, London, HMSO, 1989, para. 3.37. ↑
- 18 USC s. 1030, “Fraud and related acts committed in connection with computers”. ↑
- 18 USC s. 1030(a)(1). Similarly, in Belgian law too, “a person gaining access to an information system by exceeding his or her authorisation” is regulated as a separate offence. ↑
- For example, EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc, 274 F 3d 577 (1st Cir 2001), s. 583, 584. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.248. ↑
- 18 USC s. 1030(e)(6). ↑
- 440 F3d 418 (7th Cir 2006). It followed an earlier decision, Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc, 119 F Supp 2d 1121. ↑
- 2006 US Dist LEXIS 53108, 1 Ağustos 2006. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.249. ↑
- [1994] 1 Cr App R. In an earlier case, Bernett (Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, 10 October 1991), a senior police officer was convicted of the offence under section 1 for using the PNC in order to find out who a person’s wife had been before his present wife. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.250; Clough, s. 97. ↑
- Data Protection Act, s. 5(6). This provision was replaced by the offence of unlawfully obtaining data contained in DPA 1998, s. 55. See also: Rooney (2006) EWCA Crim 1841, a case concerning an employee of Staffordshire Police who gained access to the PNC for personal purposes. Walden, pn. 3.251. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1050; Clough, s. 97, 98. ↑
- 735 P 2d 1362 (Wash Ct App 1987). ↑
- Crimes Act 1961, s. 252(2). ↑
- For example, accessing a computer by dishonest means in order to obtain pecuniary advantages: Crimes Act 1961, s. 249. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.252. ↑
- See, for example: David Bainbridge, “Cannot Employees also be a Hackers?”, Computer Law and Security Report, Vol. 13, No. 5, 1997, s. 352-354; Paul Spink, “Misuse of Police Computers”, Juridical Review, Vol. 42, 1997, s. 219-231. ↑
- Bow Street Magistrate and Allison (AP), ex parte US Government (HL)) [1999] 4 ALL ER 1. ↑
- This statement was followed by the Divisional Court when the decision was appealed. See: R v. Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Allison [1999] QB 847. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.253. ↑
- Begley, Coventry Magistrates’ Court, cited in: Michael J. L. Turner, “Computer Misuse Act 1990 Cases” http://www.computerevidence.co.uk/Cases/CMA.htm, 30.8.2016. In addition, for a judicial review in the appeal lodged in the case concerning this person’s dismissal for misconduct see: R (on the application of Begley) v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands [2001] EWCA Civ 1571. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.254. ↑
- For example, R v. Manley (1844) 1 Cox 104. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.255. ↑
- Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Cybercrime, para. 38. ↑
- Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Cybercrime, para. 38; Walden, pn. 3.256. ↑
- CMA, s. 10 (original version of 1990). ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.257. ↑
- CMA, s. 10. The provision in question was introduced by s. 44(2) of the Serious Crime Act 2015. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.257. ↑
- Directive 13/40/EU, Art. 1(d). ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.258. ↑
- Criminal Damage Act 1971, s. 5(2). ↑
- [2001] Swansea Crown Court, 6 July 2001, para. 4C. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.259. ↑
- However, it is stated that punishment for this offence is extremely rare. Between 1990, when the Act entered into force, and 2006, sentences were imposed for this offence in 161 cases. It is stated that organisations do not report offences committed against them in order to prevent their security vulnerabilities from coming to light. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1048. See also: MacEwan, s. 962. ↑
- Clough, s. 72. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.261. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1048. ↑
- Some of the views put forward on the Act argue that it is an excessive provision and that the offence in section 1 should be limited to acts involving the breach of “security measures”. See: S. Room, “Criminalising Cybercrime” (2004), 154 NLJ 950; cited in: Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1048. ↑
- In an example it gave, the Law Commission stated that, following unauthorised access, 10,000 hours of work had to be carried out by specialist staff in order to rebuild the system, and that the cost of this was 300,000 pounds sterling. See: Baker [2011] EWCA Crim 928. ↑
- On the question of jurisdiction see: Uta Kohl, Jurisdiction and Internet: Regulatory Competence over Online Activity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, s. 1 vd.; Michael Hirst, Jurisdiction and the Ambit of the Criminal Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, s. 193 – 196. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1048. ↑
- For example, the amendments made by the PJA and the Serious Crime Act 2015. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.272. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1048. ↑
- See: Ellis v. DPP [2001] EWHC 362. In this case the perpetrator’s defence that the act he had carried out was the same as in the case of a newspaper thrown away in the rubbish was unsuccessful. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s.1049. The case given in the preceding footnote is an example of this. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1050. ↑
- According to CMA s. 17(10), software also includes the data forming part of the software. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1050, 1051. ↑
- See: Ellis v. DPP [2001] EWHC 362. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1051. ↑
- Bow Street Magistrate, ex p Government of USA [2000] 2 AC 216, [2000] 1 Cr App R 61, HL. This decision does not regard the Bignell decision as correct. ↑
- For example, Art. 323-1 of the French Criminal Code: “Whoever fraudulently gains access to an information system and maintains it”. ↑
- 18 USC s. 1030(a)(4). Walden, pn. 3.273. ↑
- Law Commission, Computer Misuse, Report No 186, Cm 819, London, HMSO, 1989, pn. 3.49 ↑
- Convention on Cybercrime, Art. 2. Only the United States has declared that it makes use of this additional option. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1052. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1051. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.274. ↑
- It is possible to enter a road traffic or air traffic system with the aim of injuring or even killing. However, the commission of the offence of computer hacking with the aim of treason does not appear very likely (espionage is excluded from this). ↑
- This offence is now contained in the Fraud Act 2006. ↑
- See, for example: Zezev [2002] Crim LR 648. ↑
- Delamare [2003] All ER (D) 127 (Feb). ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1052. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1052. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1052. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.275. ↑
- Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, April 1991; see: Rupert Battcock, “Prosecutions under the Computer Misuse Act 1990”, Computers and Law, Vol. 6, No. 6, 1996, s. 22-26. ↑
- Battcock, s. 22-26. ↑
- [2001] Swansea Crown Court, 6 Temmuz 2001. ↑
- [2014] EWCA Crim 695. ↑
- See: Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s. 1: “If there is intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person is guilty of attempting to commit the offence where more than a merely preparatory act is done towards the commission of the offence”. ↑
- Martin Wasik, Crime and the Computer, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, s. 84; Walden, pn. 3.276. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.277. ↑
- Cited in: Turner, “Computer Misuse Act 1990 Cases”. See also: “Nurse Alters Hospital Prescriptions”, Computer Fraud & Security Bulletin, Issue 2, 1994, s. 4-5. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.278. ↑
- Susan W. Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal Threats from Cyberspace, Santa Barbara, Praeger, 2010, s. 101; Susan W. Brenner, Cybercrime and the Law: Challanges Issues and Outcomes, Boston, Northwestern University, 2012, s. 116. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.281. ↑
- Scunthorpe Magistrates Court, 1993, see: Battcock, s. 22-26. ↑
- For a private-law case heard in similar circumstances see: Rubicon Computer Systems Ltd. v. United Paints Ltd. (2000) 2 TCLR 453. In the United States, s. 816 of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 1999 expressly provides for an “electronic self-help” mechanism of this kind, although mass-market products were excluded from this provision by the amendment of 2000. Walden, pn. 3.292. ↑
- R. v. Strickland, R. v. Woods, Southwark Crown Court, 21 May 1993. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.293. ↑
- Southwark Crown Court, 17 March 1993. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.293. ↑
- Acts of this kind should be compared with multiple requests sent for ostensibly legitimate purposes, for example a competitor checking the prices currently in force. See, for example: eBay v. Bidders Edge, 100 F Supp 2d 1058 (ND Cal 2000), a case in which eBay, relying on a claim of misuse of its chattels, successfully obtained an order to stop the practice (an injunction). ↑
- Paul Vixie/Gerry Sneeringer/Mark Schleifer, “Events of 21 Oct 2002”, 24 Kasım 2002, http://c.root-servers.org/october21.txt, 23.9.2016. ↑
- See, for example: Mark Ward, “Bookies suffer Online Onslaught”, BBC News, 19 Mart 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3549883.stm, 23.9.2016. ↑
- See, for example, DJNZ and The Action Tool Development Group of the Electrohippies Collective, “Client-side Distributed Denial-of-Service: Valid Campaign Tactic or Terrorist Act?”, The Electrohippies Collective, Occasional Paper No.1, Şubat 2000. ↑
- On 22 May 2006 the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt held that the online demonstration, in the form of a two-hour DDoS attack carried out by 13,000 demonstrators against Lufthansa’s corporate website, did not constitute unlawful coercion or data alteration. The case brought against Andreas Thomas Vogel, Case No 1 Ss 319/05 991 Ds 6100 Js 226314/01-1009; for further details see: http://post.thing.net/node/1370, 23.9.2016. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.294. ↑
- See: Depertmant of Justice, “Computer Virus Broker Arrested for Selling Armies of Infected Computers to Hackers and Spammers”, Press Release, 3 Kasım 2005, https://www.justice. gov/ archive/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2005/anchetaArrest.htm, 23.9.2016; Drew Cullen, “Dutch Smash 100.000-Strong Zombie Army, DDoS Attacks and Paypal Fraud”, The Register, 7 Ekim 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/10/07/dutch_police_ smash_zombie_network/, 23.9.2016. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.295. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.296. ↑
- Southwark Crown Court, 17 October 2003. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.296. ↑
- Steve Bird, “Lovelorn Hacker Sabotaged Network of U.S. Port”, Times (UK), 7 Ekim 2003, s. 9. ↑
- Bird, s. 9. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 104. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 104. ↑
- Andy McCue, “‘Revenge’ Hack Downed US Port Systems”, ZDNet UK, 7 Ekim 2003, http:// www.zdnet.com/article/revenge-hack-downed-us-port-systems/; 25.12.2016. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 104. ↑
- Alison Purdy, “Hacker Cleared of Causing Biggest US Systems Crash”, Birmingham Post, 18 Ekim 2003, s. 5, https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Hacker+cleared+of+causing+biggest+US +systems+crash.-a0109001502; 25.12.2016. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 104. ↑
- John Chapman, “The Nerdy Brit Who Paralysed a U.S. City”, Express (UK), 7 Ekim 2003, s. 24. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 104, 105. ↑
- McCue, ZDNet UK. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 105. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 105. ↑
- See, for example: John Leyden, “Caffrey Acquittal a Setback for Cybercrime Prosecutions”, Register, 17 Ekim 2003, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/10/17/caffrey_acquittal_a_ setback/, 15.12.2016. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 105. ↑
- McCue, ZDNet UK. ↑
- Munir Kotadia, “Accused Port Hacker Says Log Files Were ‘Edited’”, ZDNet.co.uk, 8 Ekim 2003, http://www.zone-h.org/news/id/3300?zh=1, 25.12.2016. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.300. ↑
- McCue, ZDNet UK; Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 105. ↑
- Purdy, s. 5. ↑
- Purdy, s. 5; Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 106. ↑
- Neil Barrett, “Scary Whodunit Will Have Sequels” IT Week, 27 Ekim 2003. ↑
- Barrett, IT Week; Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 106. ↑
- Leyden, Caffrey Acquittal. ↑
- Leyden, Caffrey Acquittal; Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 106. ↑
- Both the United Kingdom and the United States sought the punishment of the accused; the jury, however, required that the prosecution prove all the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. See, for example: Mark Murdo Urquhart v. Her Majesty’s Advocate, [2009], HJJAC 18 (United Kingdom law), Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (United States law). ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 106. ↑
- Susan W. Brenner/Brian Carrier/Jef Henninger, “The Trojan Horse Defense in Cybercrime Cases”, Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal, Volume 21, Issue 1, 2004, s. 9. ↑
- W. William Hodes, “Seeking the Truth versus Telling the Truth at the Boundaries of the Law: Misdirection, Lying, and ‘Lying with an Explanation’”, South Texas Law Review, Vol. 44, Winter 2002, s. 59, dn.18. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 106. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 107. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 107. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 107. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 107. ↑
- Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 107, 108. ↑
- Brenner/Carrier/Henniger, s. 7-9. ↑
- See: United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 2008) (the prosecution and defence experts agree that child pornography or other material can be secretly downloaded onto a computer by means of Trojan horse software). ↑
- John Schwartz, “Acquitted Man Says Virus Put Pornography on Computer”, New York Times, 11 Ağustos 2003 (referring to the head of the Computer Crime Section of the Department of Justice); Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal, s. 108. ↑
- Speech delivered at the EURIM meeting on 14 July 2003 by Caroline Flint, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office and Member of Parliament. ↑
- Police and Justice Act, 2006 s. 36. ↑
- On the former offences relating to the subject in general see: Yaman Akdeniz, “Section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 – An Antidote for Computer Viruses”, Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, 1996. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1053. ↑
- (1986) 83 Cr App R 54, DC. ↑
- [1991] Crim LR 436, CA. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1053, 1054. ↑
- Wasik, Crime and the Computer, s. 137 – 145. ↑
- (1865) LR 1CCR 7; on this case see: Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1014, dn. 17. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1054. ↑
- In the Anglo-American legal system an offence essentially consists of two elements: the “material element / actus reus” and the “mental element / mens rea”. Of these, the mental element in turn consists of the distinction between “intent (intention)”, “negligence” and “conditional intent – conscious negligence (recklessness)”. What is essential in the last of these, the concept of “recklessness”, is that the perpetrator foresees the possible results of the act he is about to perform but nevertheless carries out his act, trusting that the risk will not materialise or accepting that risk. It is precisely this foresight, together with the trust that the result will not occur or its acceptance, that is regarded as “conditional intent and conscious negligence” under Arts. 21 and 22 of the TCK in force in our country and in the prevailing view in legal scholarship. For this reason I too have preferred to write the conceptual equivalent of the word. For a brief but sufficient explanation of this concept see: Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, Sixth Edition, San Francisco, LexisNexis, 2012, s. 135; Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law, Fourth Edition, St. Paul, Thomson & West, 2003, 269, 270. For a more detailed explanation of the subject see: Andrew Simester/G. Robert Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, Second Edition, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2004, s.139-147. ↑
- The new section 3, which has recently entered into force and is currently in force, also defines acts committed with conditional intent / conscious negligence as an offence. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1054. ↑
- [2002] Crim LR 648. ↑
- [2006] EWHC 1201 (Admin). For comments on this case see: Stefan Fafinski, “Divisional Court: Computer Misuse: Denial-of-Service Attacks” Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 70, Issue 6, 2006, s. 474-478. ↑
- This addition to the Act brought English law into line with Art. 3 of the EU Framework Decision on Attacks against Information Systems. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1054, 1055. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1055. ↑
- See, for example: Vallor [2004] 1 Cr App R (S) 54, a case concerning the distribution of what was, at the time of the events, the third most lethal virus in the world. ↑
- See, for example: Lindesay [2002] 1 Cr App R (S) 370, a case concerning an employee who, upset at having been dismissed, crashed the website of the company for which he had formerly worked. ↑
- Thompson [1984] 3 All ER 56, [1984] 1 WLR 962, CA. ↑
- See: MacEwan, s. 955-967; Stephan Fafinski, “Computer Misuse: The Implications of the Police and Justice Act 2006”, Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 72, Issue 1, 2006, s. 53-66. ↑
- [2004] AC 1034. ↑
- For R v. G, in which the “subjective” interpretation of the concept of “recklessness”, the counterpart of conditional intent / conscious negligence, was examined and accepted, and for the explanations relating to it, see: Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 123-125. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1055. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1056. ↑
- Aleks Krotoski, “Population Explosion Puts Our Virtual Worlds at Risk”, Guardian, 12 Ocak 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2006/jan/12/games. guardianweeklytechnology section, 23.9.2016. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1056. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1056. ↑
- See: Dooley [2005] EWCA Crim 3093. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1056. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1056. ↑
- See: House of Lords Science and Technology Report, Personal Internet Security, 2007. However, the Government’s responses on this matter have been heavily criticised; see: Tim Wright/ Dominic Hodgkinson, “Government Response to House of Lords Science and Technology Committee Report on Personal Internet Security”, Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, Vol. 14, 2008, s. 65. ↑
- Art. 6(1)(a) of the European Convention on Cybercrime. ↑
- Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 1056. ↑
- CMA s. 3ZA ↑
- CMA s. 3ZA(2). ↑
- Home Office, Serious Crime Act 2015, Circular 008/2015, 25 March 2015, para. 8, see: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/9/contents/enacted, 24.9.2016. ↑
- CMA s. 3ZA(1)(b) and (d) respectively. ↑
- CMA s. 3ZA(7) and (6) respectively. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.304. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.309. ↑
- Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Cybercrime, para. 51. ↑
- Directive 02/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerns the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector. OJ L 201/37, 31 July 2002, recital 21. ↑
- For example, Art. 8(1) ECHR and Art. 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.309. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.310. ↑
- Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). ↑
- Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Explanatory Notes, para. 3. ↑
- “Email Hackers Sentenced Following NHTCU Investigation”. Police Oracle, 19 Eylül 2005, http://www.policeoracle.com/news/Email-Hackers-Sentenced- Following-NHTCU-Investigation_8343.html, 25.9.2016. ↑
- “Eighteen detectives accused of conducting a covert investigation”, BBC News, 28 Ocak 2006, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4656780.stm, 25.9.2016. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.311. ↑
- RIPA s. 1(1) and (2) respectively. ↑
- RIPA s. 1(7): The possible penalties are, on indictment, a maximum of two years’ imprisonment or a fine, or, on conviction following a trial without a jury (summary conviction), a fine not exceeding 5000 pounds sterling (Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s. 32). ↑
- RIPA s. 1(1A) and Sch A1. Notices of this kind may be imposed by the Interception of Communications Commissioner. Walden, pn. 3.312. ↑
- RIPA s. 1(5) ↑
- This is a person other than the providers of telecommunications services; it depends on the role assumed in the investigation. Before the Communications Act 2003, disclosure by providers of communications services was regulated as a separate offence. (Telecommunications Act 1985, s. 45, previously the British Telecommunications Act 1981). ↑
- RIPA s. 3(1). In its original version the provision required only that the person intercepting “rely on a reasonable basis as to the existence of consent” of this kind. See: Chand v. Police of the Metropolis [2006] Po LR 301 (IPT). In this case, awareness of possible monitoring and continued use of the system were held to be sufficient for the existence of consent. ↑
- RIPA s. 4(2). Walden, pn. 3.313. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.314. ↑
- RIPA s. 2(7). In United States law, by contrast, there is no interception where a communication has been received by a storage medium; see: United States v. Steiger, 318 F 3d 1039 (11th Cir), cert denied (the application for leave to appeal was refused) 538 US 1051 (2003). ↑
- Edmondson and other v. R [2013] EWCA Crim 1026. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.316. ↑
- See generally: Eli M. Noam, “Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common Carriage”, Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 18, No. 6, 1994, s. 435-452. ↑
- Telecommunications Act 2003, s. 151. This Act uses the term “network” rather than the term “system”; the term “network” is consistent with EU law, whereas the term “system” is used in the BTA 1984. ↑
- Office of Telecommunications (Oftel) Guidelines for the Interconnection of Public Electronic Communication Networks, 23 Mayıs 2003, m. 6.1. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.321. ↑
- Sunday Times v. UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245, pn. 49. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.322. ↑
- David Ormerod/Simon McKay, “Telephone Intercepts and their Admissibility”, Criminal Law Review, January 2004, s. 15-38. ↑
- RIPA s. 4(2). ↑
- Home Office, Covert Surveillance: Code of Practice, The Stationery Office, 2002, pn. 4.32. ↑
- Home Office, Covert Surveillance and Property Interference: Revised Code of Practice, The Stationery Office, 2014, pn. 2.10. ↑
- Convention on Cybercrime, Art. 3. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.325. ↑
- See: Claire Walker, “Email Interception and RIPA: the Court of Appeal Rules on the ‘Right to Control’ Defence”, Communications Law: Journal of Computer, Media & Telecommunication, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2006, s. 22 vd. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.329. ↑
- Stanford, Times Law Reports, 7 Şubat 2006. ↑
- Walker, s. 22 vd. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.330. ↑
- I should state that, from the standpoint of the criminal law system in force in our country and of the theory of the offence that I have adopted, I do not accept the concept of preliminary elements of the offence. A matter relating to the offence either is an element of the offence or it is not. However, the perspective of the criminal law of the Anglo-American legal system is different. For this reason the concept in question is used. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.336. ↑
- Fraud Act s. 6 and s. 7 respectively. See: Charles Brown [2014] EWCA Crim 695, a case in which stolen bank and credit card details were found on the accused’s computer. ↑
- CA, s. 126. ↑
- FCA, s. 5(3) (4). ↑
- CDPA 1988, s. 296ZB. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.337. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.338. ↑
- For comments see: Roger Cummings, Director of the UK National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre (NISCC) in Tom Espiner, “Foreign Powers are Main Cyberthreat, UK Says”, CNET News.com, 23 Kasım 2005, http://www.cnet.com/au/news/foreign-powers-are-main-cyberthreat-u-k-says/, 27.9.2016. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.339. ↑
- Convention on Cybercrime, Art. 1(a). ↑
- Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, para. 23. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.340. ↑
- Convention on Cybercrime, Art. 6(1)(a). ↑
- Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, para. 72. See, for example: Universal City Studios, Inc and others v. Corley and others, SD Cal, 17 August 2000, a case concerning a link to the “DeCCS” software, which decrypts the mechanism providing the regional protection of DVDs. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.341. ↑
- Convention on Cybercrime, Art. 6(2). ↑
- Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, para. 77. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.342. ↑
- [1976] TRT 251. ↑
- Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 296ZB. ↑
- Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 297A. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.343. ↑
- Convention on Cybercrime, Art. 6(1)(b). See also: Commonwealth Model Law, s. 9(3). Under US law, pursuant to 18 USC s. 1029(a)(3), possession constitutes an offence only where fifteen or more counterfeit or unauthorised access devices are involved. ↑
- Convention on Cybercrime, Art. 6(3). Azerbaijan, Germany, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United States have made declarations concerning this article. Walden, pn. 3.344. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.345. ↑
- Directive 13/40/EU, Art. 7. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.346. ↑
- Section 3A was inserted into the CMA by PJA s. 42. ↑
- CMA, s. 3A(4). ↑
- See: Lewys Stephen Martin [2013] EWCA Crim 1420. ↑
- Home Office, Serious Crime Act 2015, Circular 008/2015, 25 Mart 2015, pn. 13. https:// www.gov.uk/government/publications/circular-0082015-serious-crime-act-2015, 1.10.2016. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.347. ↑
- See, for example: Europol, “Cybercriminal Darkode forum taken down through global action”, Press Release, 15 Temmuz 2015, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/cybercriminal-darkode-forum-taken-down-through-global-action, 1.10.2016. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.348. See also: Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, s. 855, 856. ↑
- CPS, Legal Guidance to Computer Misuse Act 1990, at “Section 3A CMA – Making, supplying or obtaining articles” http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/computer_misuse_act_1990/ index. html, 2.10.2016. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.349. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.350. ↑
- 18 USC s. 1029(e)(1). ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.351. ↑
- In the USA, in March 2005, Anthony Greco was found guilty of threatening to damage the information systems of MySpace.com with intent to extort; see: https://www.justice.gov/ archive/criminal/ cybercrime/press-releases/2005/grecoPlea.htm, 2.10.2016. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.352. ↑
- See: Bert-Jaap Koops, “Should ICT Regulation Be Technology-Neutral?”, Ed: Bert-Jaap Koops/Miriam Lips/Corien Prins/Maurice Schellekers, Starting points for ICT Regulation: Deconstructing Prevalent Policy One-liners, IT & Law Series Vol. 9, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2006, s. 77-108; Walden, pn. 3.353. ↑
- See: https://www.spamhaus.org/consumer/definition/, 4.10.2016. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.354. ↑
- SI No 2013, reg 8. ↑
- Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services relating, in particular, to the “internal markets” in electronic commerce. OJ L 178/1, 17 July 2000, recital 30. ↑
- Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, SI No 2426. ↑
- Directive 02/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector. OJ L 201/37, 31 July 2002, recital 40. ↑
- SI No 2426, reg 31 and DPA 1998, s. 55A. This power was amended by SI 2015/355, which lowered the threshold required for establishing the existence of a “serious contravention” in respect of the provisions on unsolicited communications. ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.355. ↑
- Public Law 108-87, 108th Congress, 15 USC s. 7701. ↑
- 15 USC s. 7701(a)3; Walden, pn. 3.356. ↑
- An “open relay” is a mail server that serves to launder persons who use e-mails without authorisation. An “open proxy”, in turn, is a network server that enables unauthorised users to connect without authorisation to other hosts. ↑
- The header is defined as follows: it is the source, destination and routing information attached to an electronic mail message, also including the originating domain name and electronic mail address of the message initiated by a person and other information identifying the line or indicating identity. See: 15 USC s. 7702(8). ↑
- 18 USC, Part I “Crimes”, Chapter 47 “Fraud and Forgery”, s. 1037 “fraud and related activity in connection with electronic mail”. ↑
- This Act has been put into effect by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). For further information see: www.ftc.gov; Walden, pn. 3.357. ↑
- For example, the “AOL spammer” Jason Smathers, the “wi-fi spammer” Nicholas Tombros and the “timeshare spammer” Peter Moshou. For the press releases published by the DoJ in general see: www.usdoj.gov. ↑
- 18 USC s. 1037(b). In April 2005 Jeremy Jaynes was sentenced to nine years for violating the anti-spam law of the State of Virginia (Title 18.2 – 152.3:1). See: David Hancock, “Spammer gets 9 years”, CBS News, 8 Nisan 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/spammer-gets-9- years/, 6.10.2016. ↑
- US Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (effective 1 November 2015), s. 2B1.1; see: http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2015-guidelines-manual/archive, 6.10.2016. ↑
- 18 USC s. 1037(c). Walden, pn. 3.358. ↑
- Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (SI No 2426). ↑
- Walden, pn. 3.359. ↑
- Walden, pn. 2.289. ↑
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Dülger, Murat Volkan, “The Use of Crypto Assets in the Laundering of Proceeds of Crime and the Measures to Be Taken” (Kripto Varlıkların Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasında Kullanılması ve Alınması Gereken Önlemler), Istanbul Aydın University Faculty of Law Journal (İstanbul Aydın Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi), Vol. 10, No. 1, 2024, pp. 41-94.
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