Abstract
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
Today, whether the offence is a cybercrime or a traditional offence, there is almost no act in which information systems are not used or in which the traces of the offence are not followed through information systems. However, the investigation of the offence and the offender requires a scientific approach and a legal infrastructure. In Türkiye this infrastructure was put in place by Article 134 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK), Law No. 5271. This article provides information on the rules laid down by this important statutory provision.
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
Asst. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger1
Today, whether a cybercrime or a classic offence is concerned, there is almost no act left in which information systems are not used or in which the traces of the offence are not followed through information systems. However, the investigation of the offence and the offender requires a scientific approach and a legal infrastructure. In our country this infrastructure has been established by Art. 134 of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 (CMK). This article provides information on the rules laid down by this important statutory provision2.
1. Legal Basis
When an offence is committed against information systems or by using information systems, one of the most important steps to be taken is the examination of the system in question. This system may belong to the perpetrator of the offence, or it may belong to the victim or to a third party. However, this search, just like searches carried out in a home or a workplace, must be based on a statutory norm, because it is a measure that restricts fundamental rights and freedoms. Otherwise, arbitrary and unlawful practices are inevitable. This would both harm the establishment of the material truth and mean that the evidence obtained, even if it reflects the truth, would be prohibited evidence because it was obtained unlawfully and could not be used in the investigation and the prosecution. It is for these reasons that Art. 134 of the CMK No. 5271, under the heading “search, copying and seizure in computers, computer programs and computer files”, regulates the method of searching for evidence in information systems. In addition, Art. 17 of the Regulation on Judicial and Preventive Searches contains a provision under the same heading as the statutory article. Apart from a few expressions, however, the regulation repeats Art. 134 of the CMK verbatim.
2. Existence of Strong Grounds for Suspicion Based on Concrete Evidence
Art. 134(1) of the CMK provides: “In an investigation conducted in respect of an offence, where there are strong grounds for suspicion based on concrete evidence and there is no possibility of obtaining evidence by other means, the judge shall decide, at the request of the public prosecutor, on the search of the computer, computer programs and computer files used by the suspect, on the copying of the computer records, and on the decoding of these records and their conversion into text.”
The article specifically uses the expression “used by the suspect”, because the information system on which the search and copying are to be carried out need not belong to the suspect. It is sufficient for the application of this measure that the suspect, in committing the act, used a computer which he owns, has rented or has borrowed, or which is open to shared use. However, in order to reach the evidence, it is not sufficient to search only the information system used by the perpetrator. In some cases it may be necessary to apply this measure, together with the system used by the perpetrator, to the information systems of the persons in question, or even solely to those of third parties. In our view, the fact that the law has not regulated this situation is a significant deficiency, and this deficiency should be remedied by a legislative amendment.
In order for an examination to be carried out in information systems for the purpose of obtaining evidence, there must first be “strong grounds for suspicion based on concrete evidence” and “no possibility of obtaining evidence by other means”. The requirement of strong grounds for suspicion based on concrete evidence was not contained in the original version of this article. This expression was added to the article by the amendment made to Art. 134 of the CMK by Art. 11 of the “Law Amending the Anti-Terror Law, the Code of Criminal Procedure and Certain Laws” No. 6526 of 21.2.20143. Accordingly, for the coercive measure of search (or seizure) in information systems to be applied, two conditions must first be met together. The first of these is the “existence of strong grounds for suspicion based on concrete evidence”, which was added to the paragraph by the statutory amendment.
Neither the CMK nor our legal scholarship draws a distinction between “concrete evidence – abstract evidence”; logically, too, drawing such a distinction would be meaningless. Items of evidence are facts which represent the event that is the subject of the proceedings and which are concrete, whether they are based on statements, on documents or on indications; we are therefore of the opinion that the concept of concrete evidence is not used here as the counterpart of a concept of abstract evidence. On the other hand, although a distinction between “concrete (real) evidence – confession evidence” is drawn in the Anglo-Saxon legal system4, no such distinction exists in the Continental European legal system, to which our country also belongs. Indeed, in our country’s system of criminal procedure law, as we have stated above, evidence in the form of statements, which also includes confessions, has the character of concrete evidence. The only remaining option, then, is that this concept is used to denote accessible, realistic (rational – reasonable) evidence5. There is, however, no need to state these separately, because they are in any case a characteristic of the evidence that may be used in criminal procedure and are contained within the concept of evidence.
Strong suspicion, for its part, is the type of suspicion generally required as a precondition for coercive measures. For example, Art. 100 of the CMK requires the existence of this kind of suspicion for a pre-trial detention order by providing that “where there are facts indicating the existence of a strong suspicion of an offence … a pre-trial detention order may be issued in respect of the suspect or the accused”. Strong suspicion is the suspicion, supported by concrete facts, that the suspect/accused committed the offence, where it is highly probable that a conviction can be handed down on the evidence on which it rests. Under the law, if there is reasonable suspicion that the perpetrator may be apprehended or that evidence of the offence may be obtained, the person, belongings, dwelling, workplace or other premises of the suspect or the accused may be searched (CMK Art. 116). If, as a result of the assessment to be made on the available evidence, the probability of the accused being convicted is greater than the probability of his being acquitted, there is “sufficient suspicion (evidence)”. For the public prosecution to be brought, “sufficient suspicion” is required (CMK Art. 170(2))6.
Strong suspicion, then, lies above and beyond these and arises in situations where a conviction will follow with a very high degree of probability. Thus, the addition made to the text of the article was intended to make the application of the coercive measure under examination more difficult. From now on, great care and diligence must be exercised when this measure is requested and when it is ordered. Otherwise, the evidence will have been obtained unlawfully and it will not be possible to use it.
3. No Possibility of Obtaining Evidence by Other Means
As we have also stated above, the “existence of strong grounds for suspicion based on concrete evidence” is not sufficient for ordering the measure of search (and seizure) under examination. In addition, there must be “no possibility of obtaining evidence by other means”. Since the two expressions are joined by the conjunction “and”, both preconditions must be present together for the measure to be ordered in a specific case.
Under the law in force, ordering the measure without these conditions being fulfilled is unlawful; the evidence obtained as a result of an order issued in this way is likewise “unlawfully obtained evidence” and, pursuant to CMK Art. 217(2), must not be taken as a basis for the judgment.
The existence of strong grounds for suspicion based on concrete evidence, why there is no possibility of obtaining evidence by other means, and the reasons for which this course is being resorted to must be stated clearly and with reasons both in the prosecutor’s written request and in the judge’s decision. In practice to date, however, it is seen that, apart from a few exceptions, this rule has hardly ever been observed, and that requests have been made and decisions issued merely “by repeating the statutory provision”. Consequently, the great majority of the decisions issued are unlawful. Our expectation is that, following the amendment made to Art. 134 of the CMK, care will now be taken in this regard and that both requests and decisions will be reasoned in a manner that satisfies the requirements of the law.
Moreover, it is not clear at which point of the investigation stage the precondition that there be “no possibility of obtaining evidence by other means” is to be established. By virtue of the normative structure of Art. 134 of the CMK, a certain search for evidence must have been carried out in relation to the offence under investigation, no evidence must have been obtained as a result of that search, and this must be expressly entered in an official record.
From the standpoint of the law as it ought to be, we are of the opinion that requiring this condition is extremely mistaken, particularly with regard to investigations into cybercrime and offences committed by means of information systems. For in offences committed against information systems or by means of information systems, the first thing to be done is to identify the data and connections contained in the system without impairing the structure of the system and the integrity of the data. In investigations into these offences there is, as a rule, no possibility of obtaining evidence in any other way either. If an examination of the information systems is embarked upon only as a last resort, after attempts have been made to obtain evidence by other means, it will be far too late, and reaching the perpetrators and the evidence will become extremely difficult. Indeed, this is the reason why, in practice, this article is applied in all investigations as though no such precondition existed.
Against this view of ours, a counter-view that is not without justification may also be put forward, namely that if the coercive measure of search and seizure in information systems is applied as the first step in every criminal investigation, nothing will remain of the security of personal data or of privacy. However, this criticism, too, can be met by genuinely applying the requirement of the “existence of strong grounds for suspicion based on concrete evidence” added in Art. 134 of the CMK.
In line with these views, and taking into account the speed that cybercrime investigations require, the partly defective norm and the wrong practice could be corrected by an exception to be introduced into paragraph 1 of Art. 134, stating that “for the offences contained in the chapter of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) on offences in the field of information technology and in Articles 135, 136, 138, 142(2)(e) and 158(1)(f), the condition that there be no possibility of obtaining evidence by other means shall not be required”. In its present form, however, not only is the provision of the article defective, but the practice and the evidence obtained by this method are also unlawful.
Moreover, instead of the terms “computer, computer programs and computer files”, it would have sufficed for the article simply to say “information system”. Unfortunately, although a terminology in keeping with the present day is used in the TCK, the same approach was not followed in the CMK. What the term computer file is intended to denote is any kind of device, fixed or portable, that carries data and serves to store them.
4. The Measure of Search and Copying
As is clear from the text of paragraph 1 of Art. 134, this measure as a rule comprises the search of the information systems used by the suspect, the copying of the data in the system, and the decoding of the records and their conversion into text. In other words, the rule is the measure of search; the information system used by the suspect is to be left where it is, and the copying is to be carried out at the place where the system is located. Furthermore, the law enforcement officers are not to take away the original of the system or of the data carrier. This is the rule, and it is these measures that must be applied first.
The original version of the CMK provided that, at the request of the suspect or his defence counsel, a copy of the backups taken would be given to the person making the request. At that time we, too, used to stress to all our colleagues who took on the task of defence counsel in investigations that they should without fail obtain this copy, and that this copy was very important so that the integrity, and hence the reliability, of the evidence could be verified in the future.
Taking into account the criticisms of the provision voiced in legal scholarship and in practice, the legislature, by Art. 11 of Law No. 6526 of 21.2.2014, amended Art. 134 of the CMK7, removing the expression “upon request” in paragraph 4 from the article and replacing it with the expression “taken pursuant to the third paragraph”. In this way, the handing over to the suspect or defence counsel of a copy of the backup made as a result of the search measure ceased to be optional and was made mandatory. We should state that we welcome this amendment.
5. The Measure of Seizure
Paragraph 2 of Art. 134, for its part, regulates the measure of seizure as an exception to paragraph 1. It provides: “Where the computer, computer programs and computer files cannot be accessed because the password cannot be broken, or where concealed information cannot be reached, these tools and equipment may be seized so that the decryption can be carried out and the necessary copies taken. Once the password has been broken and the necessary copies have been taken, the seized devices shall be returned without delay.”
Although this paragraph very clearly lays down an exception, in searches of information systems, too, this exception has been turned into the rule, just as many exceptional provisions in our country’s legislation are turned into the rule in practice. In all of the searches they carry out under Art. 134 of the CMK, law enforcement officers invoke the exceptional provision of paragraph 2; to that end they draw up, together with the other law enforcement officers taking part in the operation, an official record stating that there is a password on the information system they are to search, and thus, by circumventing the law, they perform their duties in the belief that they are acting in conformity with the law, if only in appearance. As the justification for this, they state that “they do not have sufficient personnel and that, if they were to attempt to search and copy at the place where the system is located, they would not be able to get any of their work done”. This excuse, which in fact contains a large measure of truth, neither confers the right to alter the statutory provision nor renders the evidence obtained in this way lawful. For the records drawn up contain no entry whatsoever as to what kind of password or hidden data was present and why this could not be neutralised by the cybercrime police, who are the experts in the field. Consequently, this record bears no relation to reality, cannot be verified, and has no legal value whatsoever. This procedure plainly circumvents the law and is unlawful. Not only is the manner in which the procedure is carried out an unlawful method of obtaining evidence, but the evidence obtained in this way is also prohibited evidence and must not be used at any stage of the proceedings.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 134, by providing that “During the seizure of computers or computer files, all the data in the system shall be backed up.” , sets out what must be done where the exceptional provision of paragraph 2 is applied. In connection with this, paragraph 4 was amended by Law No. 6526 and, by providing that “A copy shall be made of the backup taken pursuant to the third paragraph and given to the suspect or his or her representative, and this shall be entered in the official record and signed.”, made it mandatory, where the measure of seizure is applied, for a copy of the backup made to be given to the suspect or his defence counsel.
Although this is how the provisions read, this is not how matters stand in practice. When law enforcement officers go to the place where the information system is located in order to carry out the measure of search, copying and seizure on information systems, they, as we have also stated above, circumvent the law and apply the measure of seizure, and they carry out the backup at the centres where they themselves work. They also ask the suspect for the data storage media needed for the backup. This practice is entirely unlawful. For when the coercive measure of seizure is applied, the backup process is of the utmost importance for the reliability and impartiality of the investigation and for its compatibility with the right to a fair trial. That is to say:
The hard disk or data carrier of the information system to which the measure is applied has, for example, a data capacity of 320 GB. However, the whole of this is never used. If, for example, we assume that there are 100 GB of data on this disk, the remaining 220 GB are empty. If only the parts containing data are backed up, it is possible for other data to be written subsequently to the 220 GB that remain empty. Therefore, the entire disk, with its full and its empty parts, must be backed up exactly as it is – in technical terms, “its image must be taken” – and, as a result of this, its “hash value” must be obtained, that is, the disk must in a sense be sealed once the operation has been carried out. If the operations are not carried out in the presence of the suspect and defence counsel, there will always be the suspicion and the allegation that data were planted before the image was taken and that the image was taken afterwards. This will also affect the reliability of investigations that are conducted properly and fairly. Yet, in order for the right to a fair trial not to be violated, all investigative and judicial acts must be carried out impartially and lawfully, both in appearance and in substance, in accordance with the principle of fair dealing. Moreover, the digital forensic examinations carried out on information systems are always performed on these backups; in order to preserve the original of the evidence and to keep it intact for examination in the event of objections that may arise in the future, no operation whatsoever should be carried out on the original.
In practice, however, information systems are removed by law enforcement officers from the place where they are located, by circumventing the statutory provision, and taken to law enforcement centres, and the backup and the taking of the hash values are carried out in an environment where the suspect and/or his defence counsel is not present. This practice is absolutely unlawful! Not only is obtaining evidence by this method unlawful, but the evidence obtained is also prohibited evidence; it cannot be used or taken as a basis for the judgment. Regrettably, in almost all of the cases conducted in our country today, “including those that feature most prominently in the public eye”, evidence of this kind is used and the right to a fair trial is violated.
The last paragraph of Art. 134, by providing that “A copy of all or part of the data in the system may also be taken without seizing the computers and computer files. The data copied shall be printed on paper, and this shall be entered in the official record and signed by those concerned.”, contains a paragraph that creates a contradiction with the provisions above. For, as we have stated above, the rule in obtaining evidence from information systems is that the search is carried out, and the system data are copied, at the place where the information system is located; seizure is the exception. Yet the wording of this paragraph gives the impression that seizure is the rule and that taking a copy at the place where the system is located, without that measure being applied, is the exception. This paragraph is therefore a provision that is needlessly included in the article and gives rise to confusion.
6. CMK Art. 134 Is a Special Provision
The fact that Art. 134 was included notwithstanding the general search provisions in Arts. 116 and 123 of the CMK shows that it is a provision of a special nature. Accordingly, if, during a search carried out at the suspect’s workplace or dwelling on the basis of Art. 116, no separate order has been obtained for a search under Art. 134, it is not possible to search the computers used by the suspect. Even in order to search a mobile telephone with the features of a computer that is found on the suspect’s person during a search carried out on the basis of Art. 116, an order under Art. 134 must be obtained. Searches carried out without complying with this will constitute the obtaining of evidence by an unlawful method, and the evidence obtained will be prohibited evidence.
7. Criticisms in Practice and the Method Applied
It should be noted that neither Art. 134 of the CMK nor the regulation mentions “forensic imaging” or the “hash value”. Instead, the terms “backup” and “copying” are used. Yet, as we have explained above, taking a backup or a copy of a data carrier and taking its image, and thereby obtaining the hash value, are very different operations. In backing up and copying, empty sectors are not copied, nor can the integrity and security of the data be ensured. This deprives digital data of the quality of being “reliable evidence”. The fact that these methods are regulated neither in the CMK nor in the regulation is a major deficiency.
In practice, however, investigating officers, “entirely out of their own good faith and their wish to perform their duty properly”, follow the international standards in this field and take the image and the hash value in every investigation. Yet if they did not carry out this operation, there is no legal basis in our legislation on which they could be called to account for not having applied this standard. This major deficiency must be remedied as soon as possible by amendments to both the CMK and the regulation.
As we have also stated above, an important criticism levelled at investigating officers is that the search (forensic imaging) is carried out not at the place where the data carrier is located but, by applying the measure of seizure, at the centre where the investigating officers are based, so that the measure of seizure, which is the exception, is turned into the rule. The officers in question put forward certain reasons for this which are not without justification, and they also devise and apply solutions. Some of these reasons are as follows:
• The lack of a sufficient number of adequately qualified digital forensics experts and crime scene investigation teams,
• The fact that breaking passwords or finding concealed data mostly requires a long time and special equipment,
• The fact that, during a search that takes a long time, the persons present in the home or workplace where the information system being searched is located are inconvenienced, or that these places are not suitable for work and/or not hygienic,
• The absence, at the place where the image of the information system is to be taken, of an uninterruptible power supply to ensure data integrity, and the need, particularly in cases where data recovery has to be carried out, for these operations to be performed in dust-free environments equipped with special equipment.
This list could be extended further, and it is a fact that there is some justification in these points. In order both to avoid the drawbacks mentioned above and to forestall the –justified– objection that the evidence has been obtained unlawfully, investigating officers apply the following method:
After obtaining the order for the application of the measure of search and seizure under Art. 134 of the CMK, they go to the place where the measure is to be applied and, after duly unplugging all the devices used by the suspect that are capable of carrying data, place them in specially made bags and seal the opening. They enter all the operations carried out at this time in an official record. When the devices taken to the centre are to be examined, the suspect and/or his defence counsel, as the case may be, are summoned to the centre where the examination is to take place and are admitted to a special area prepared for this purpose. While the digital forensics experts examine the devices in their special dust-free premises, the suspect and/or defence counsel, thanks to the cameras installed there, watch the images transmitted by the cameras live on monitors in the area set aside for them. In this way, they free themselves from the obligation to conduct the examination at the place where the devices are located and carry it out in their own laboratories, while at the same time trying to free themselves from the objection that the data have been tampered with and that the evidence has been obtained unlawfully.
This is merely a method that the investigating officers have themselves devised and apply. This method, or a similar or more advanced one, must be placed on a statutory footing as soon as possible and put into practice as soon as possible. Otherwise, in our country “unlawfully obtained evidence” will continue to be obtained, and it will not be possible to investigate cybercrime and offences committed by means of information systems “as they ought to be investigated”.
Footnotes
- Faculty Member in Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, Faculty of Law, Istanbul Medipol University; Director of the IT Law Application and Research Centre of Istanbul Medipol University; Chair of the IT Law Commission of the Istanbul Bar Association. ↑
- For a detailed explanation of the subject see: Murat Volkan Dülger, Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku, 5. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2014. ↑
- By Article 11 of Law No. 6526 of 21.2.2014, the phrase “the existence of strong grounds for suspicion based on concrete evidence and” was added after the phrase “in the investigation,” in the first paragraph of this article, and the phrase “Upon his or her request, this” in the fourth paragraph was changed to “taken pursuant to the third paragraph”. ↑
- On this subject see: Kerri Mellifont, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree – Evidence Derived from Illegally or Improperly Obtained Evidence, Sydney, The Federation Press, 2010, s.7, 8. ↑
- On the classification of evidence see: Murat Volkan Dülger, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukukunda Dışlama Kuralı ve Hukuka Aykırı Delillerin Uzak Etkisi (Zehirli Ağacın Meyvesi Öğretisi), Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2014. ↑
- Nur Centel/Hamide Zafer, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku, 10. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2013, s.78, 79. ↑
- RG., 6.3.2014, 28933. ↑
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “The Use of Crypto Assets in the Laundering of Proceeds of Crime and the Measures to Be Taken” (Kripto Varlıkların Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasında Kullanılması ve Alınması Gereken Önlemler), Istanbul Aydın University Faculty of Law Journal (İstanbul Aydın Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi), Vol. 10, No. 1, 2024, pp. 41-94.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “The Legal Regime of Social Network Providers, Internet News Sites and Over-the-Top Service Providers, and a Critique” (Sosyal Ağ Sağlayıcıların İnternet Haber Sitelerinin ve Şebekeler Üstü Hizmet Sağlayıcıların Hukuki Rejimi ve Eleştirisi), Dülger Law Office, 1 June 2023.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “The Electronic Document as the Object of Document Forgery Offences” (Belgede Sahtecilik Suçlarının Konusu Olarak Elektronik Belge), Symposium on Forgery of Documents and Tax Offences (Belgede Sahtecilik ve Vergi Suçları Sempozyumu), 21–24 October 2019, Publication of the Presidency of the Court of Cassation / TOBB ETÜ Faculty of Law, Ankara, 2020.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “What Does WhatsApp's Privacy Change Mean? Will Our Data Be Shared?” (WhatsApp Güvenlik Değişikliği Ne Anlama Geliyor? Verilerimiz Paylaşılacak mı?), Dülger Law Office, 5 January 2021.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Commercial Electronic Messages and the Message Management System” (Ticari Elektronik İleti ve İleti Yönetim Sistemi), Dülger Law Office, 15 November 2020.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, Cybercrime and Internet Communication Law (Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku), 11th ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2025.

