1 January 2014Murat Volkan DülgerArticle

About this work

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

The study deals with how the Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098, the Code of Civil Procedure No. 6100 and the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102 regulate developments in the field of IT (such as the electronic signature, online general assembly meetings and service of documents by e-mail). It examines the risks that arise where these innovations are misused in a way that constitutes an offence, and the consequences in terms of criminal law.

Keywords

  • economic crime
  • cybercrime
  • Turkish Commercial Code
  • Turkish Code of Obligations
  • Code of Civil Procedure
  • electronic signature
  • registered electronic mail system
  • e-invoice application

Full text

This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

PEER-REVIEWED

Reflections in Criminal Law of the Provisions Relating to the Field of Information Technology in the Turkish Code of Obligations, the Turkish Commercial Code and the Code of Civil Procedure*

Asst. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan DÜLGER**

Ö Z

Since the 19th century, when the Industrial Revolution took place, the economy has been the basic dynamic of social life. This dynamic influenced many of the legal instruments drawn up in the 20th century, and rules were adopted in relation to it. As the stability and continuity of the economic structure became ever more important over time, that structure came to be protected by special provisions in the basic legal instruments and even by norms contained in the criminal statutes. The Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098 (TBK), the Code of Civil Procedure No. 6100 (HMK) and the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102 (TTK) are the most important of these. An examination of these statutes shows that they essentially incorporate the developments in the world of information technology. It is also apparent that they contain provisions reflecting the repercussions of the IT sector on everyday and commercial life. The instruments of the information age that are frequently encountered in economic and commercial relations, such as the use of electronic signatures, the holding of a company’s general meeting over the internet, valid service by electronic mail or the conclusion of a contract by fax, have each been turned into a legal practice by these general codes. On that basis, the study examines the risks inherent in the innovations relating to the field of information technology that are regulated in the TBK, the TTK and the HMK where, through their misuse, they also become the subject of acts constituting offences, the reflections of such acts in criminal law, and the kinds of violations to which they may give rise from the standpoint of criminal law.

Keywords: Economic crime, cybercrime, Turkish Commercial Code, Turkish Code of Obligations, Code of Civil Procedure, electronic signature, registered electronic mail system, e-Invoice application.

THE R E F L E CT IONS OF TH E LEGIS L AT ION S RE L ATE D INFOR M AT ICS ON T H E TU R KI SH CODE OF OBL IGAT ION S, TU R KI SH CODE OF COM M E R C E A N D CODE OF CIV IL PR O C EDU R E ON T HE CR IM INA L L AW

A B S TR A CT

Economics, is the basic dynamic of the communal living, from the beginning of industrial revolution in 19th century. This dynamic had effected many legislation that enacted in 20th century. In process of time, this system was started to be protected by private norms in basic law and also the norms in criminal law while the economic structure’s stability and continuation were becoming more significant. 6098 numbered Turkish Code of Obligation (TCO), 6100 numbered Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) and 6102 numbered Turkish Code of Commerce (TCC) are the most significant ones. When the aforementioned legislation are analysed, it’s going to be seen they include legal regulation on developments of informatics and their reflections on daily and business lives. Informatic ages instruments as electronic signature that being used in economic and trade relations, meetings of the general assembly through internet, sending elektronic mails fort he legal process or entering to an agreement by fax were legislated by these general codes. Thus, the jeopardies, the reflections of those actions on criminal law and their causation on what sort of breaches in the sense of criminal law in the case of abuse and being subject to punishable actions of the innovations of informatics that legislated in TCO, CCP and TCC are being examined in this study.

Keywords: Economic crime, cyber crime, code of commerce, code of obligations, code of civil procedure, electronic signature, registered electronic mail system, electronic billing.

INTRODUCTION

The functioning of the economic system is one of the most important of the legal interests protected by criminal law1. It is inconceivable that criminal law, whose purpose is to identify breaches of the social order and to lay down conduct contrary to that order as criminal norms and punish it, should fail to recognise the economic system, an important component of the social order, as a legal interest and to protect it. An economic system has existed at every time and in every place in which human beings have lived in communities. Since the 19th century, when the Industrial Revolution took place, however, the economy has been the basic dynamic of social life. It is this dynamic that influenced many of the legal instruments adopted in the 20th century, and rules were made in relation to it. Foremost among these are the Turkish Civil Code (TMK), the TBK, the TTK and the HMK. As the stability and continuity of the economic structure became ever more important over time, this structure came to be protected by special norms in those statutes and even by norms contained in the criminal statutes or in ancillary criminal statutes.

In contemporary criminal law the concept of economic offences has come to the fore and has acquired an important place in criminal law2. The emergence of this concept and its inclusion in the criminal statutes in fact show that the evolution of criminal law has reached a different stage. For when one looks at the criminal statutes of earlier periods, or at the statutes of those periods containing criminal norms, one finds that there were no norms concerning economic offences. From the 19th century onwards, however, as international trade became widespread and, in particular, as the financial sector became the most important actor in the economic system and supported that structure, unlawful acts committed against the economic structure were defined as offences.

A further step in the evolution of criminal law came, from the 1990s onwards, with the development of the world of information technology, the emergence of electronic commerce3 and the rapid entry of the internet into everyday life. For these changes and their consequences have given rise both to the emergence of new types of legal relationship and to the carrying out by new methods of types of legal relationship that have long existed, and these have begun to be transposed into various statutes as well4. This transposition has concerned the content of the relationships, that is to say the right itself, and it has also concerned the production of the documents serving to prove the right and the proof of the right, that is to say the method.

The legal order of our country has also been affected by the changes, and rules have been adopted accordingly. The Civil Code No. 743 of 1926, the Code of Obligations No. 818 of 1926 and the Code of Civil Procedure No. 1086 of 1927, which were enacted as part of the legal revolution carried out in the founding years of the Republic, and the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6762 of 1956, which was enacted after them, were, in the first period after their entry into force, instruments that were ahead of their time and of Turkish society; with the passage of time, however, they became outdated, their language came to differ from the Turkish spoken today, and they were left incomplete because they did not cover many legal relationships that did not exist at the time when the statutes were drafted. Moreover, the amendments made to the statutes on account of developing needs rendered statutes that already contained inconsistencies owing to translation errors still more inconsistent. Proceeding from these considerations, new texts were prepared to replace the statutes in question and were adopted by the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) and thus enacted. Those concerned here are the Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098 (TBK)5, the Code of Civil Procedure No. 6100 (HMK)6 and the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102 (TTK)7, each of which was enacted in 2011. It is these statutes that present themselves as the legal instruments requiring specific consideration.

An examination of these statutes shows that they contain provisions incorporating the developments in the world of information technology and their repercussions on everyday and commercial life. The instruments of the information age that are frequently encountered in economic and commercial relations, such as the use of electronic signatures, the holding of a company’s general meeting over the internet, valid service by electronic mail or the conclusion of a contract by fax, have been given statutory status by these general codes. Indeed, one of the reasons given for remaking the TTK was the wish to include provisions on information technologies. In this context, one of the basic factors behind the enactment of TTK No. 6102 was the spread of electronic transactions and commerce. In this context, the entry of technological developments into commercial life, such as the need to transpose into the statute provisions on the creation of documents in the electronic environment and their storage, beginning with the conclusion of contracts, on the convening of the meetings of company organs by electronic mail, and on attending the meeting, submitting proposals and voting by the same means, is cited as the reason for turning these into legal rules8.

It is, however, an inescapable reality that, through the use of the new provisions in these statutes, offences will be committed in greater numbers and by different models of offending. Having regard to the number and intensity of the cybercrimes already being committed, the unlawful use of the possibilities offered by the provisions of these three new statutes, and the breach of criminal norms in this way, will be encountered frequently.

On that basis, we shall attempt to examine the risks inherent in the innovations relating to the field of information technology that are regulated in the TBK, the TTK and the HMK where, through their misuse, they also become the subject of acts constituting offences, the reflections of such acts in criminal law, and the kinds of violations to which they may give rise from the standpoint of criminal law.

Since an exhaustive, one-by-one examination of all the provisions relating to the field of information technology in these statutes, which have the character of general codes, and an examination of their reflections in criminal law would exceed the dimensions of this study, the provisions in question will not be dealt with exhaustively; the method followed will be to examine the most striking provisions and those likely to fall within the domain of criminal law. Moreover, as this is a first and new study in this field, we prefer in our study the method of the “scholarly essay” rather than a study arriving at scientific theorems.

I. Reflections in Criminal Law of the Provisions Relating to the Field of Information Technology in the Turkish Code of Obligations

1. Examination, from the Standpoint of Allegations of Forgery, of the Possibility of Concluding a Contract by Electronic Signature or Confirmed Signature

The first provision in the TBK relating to the field of information technology that attracts attention is Article 14, on the conclusion of the contract. This article contains the following provision: “Contracts for which written form is prescribed must bear the signatures of those who assume an obligation. Unless otherwise provided by law, a signed letter, a telegram the original of which has been signed by those who assume an obligation, a fax or similar means of communication, provided that they have been confirmed, or texts that can be sent and stored with a secure electronic signature shall also take the place of written form”.

By this provision of the TBK, which is the basic code for obligations, contracts concluded by electronic signature have been given exactly the consequences of the classic form of contract concluded with a wet-ink signature. Parallelism is thus established between the Electronic Signature Law No. 5070 (EİK) and the TBK, validity is conferred on this type of signature, and the concept of the secure electronic signature is used. For what the EİK recognises as to its effects and binding force is the electronic signature that has a security certificate. This is because the authenticity of that signature, and the person to whom it belongs, can be verified only by means of the security certificate. Indeed, the explanatory memorandum to the article confirms this by stating: “For texts sent with a secure electronic signature to take the place of written form, they must be sent in conformity with the Electronic Signature Law No. 5070 and must be capable of being recorded and stored in a computer environment by those who receive them”. That Law did not aim to regulate electronic commerce in its entirety; it regulated the electronic signature, which is the essential element of the infrastructure of electronic commerce and of the “e-government” project to be carried out in the public sphere. The completion with an electronic signature of an agreement made in the virtual environment will have the result that the requirement of simple written form is satisfied together with the signature. Article 15(1) of the TBK expresses this point as follows: “…A secure electronic signature also has the same evidential force as a handwritten signature.” Article 5 of the EİK states: “A secure electronic signature has the same evidential force as a handwritten signature”. Paragraph 2 of the article, however, specifies the cases in which the rule does not apply. These are stated to be “legal transactions which the laws make subject to official form or to a special formality, and security agreements…”. Pursuant to this provision, all contracts that are required to be made in simple written form may validly be made in the virtual environment by electronic signature, with the exception of contracts of suretyship, pledge and undertaking for the act of a third party. However, where a personal security other than suretyship (undertaking for the act of a third party, accession to a debt) is given by a legal person, it will in fact not be subject to any form, and it will therefore be possible for these too to be made by electronic signature9.

The EİK cannot apply to legal transactions whose validity is made conditional on official written form. For example, the financial leasing contract is made subject to the condition that it be drawn up in official written form before a notary. That contract cannot be concluded by electronic signature. Accordingly, the relevant statutes should be amended so as to provide that transactions made by e-signature carry official status as if they had been made before a notary. For the time being, however, we consider that, in reliance on a system in which the reliability of the electronic signature is not entirely assured and which contains various security vulnerabilities, such an amendment would not be appropriate. While it would facilitate practice and increase the use of the electronic signature, it is highly likely that the rate of offending would also rise. For there will be perpetrators who wish to take advantage of this vulnerability. Before such a provision can be adopted, the security of information systems must first be increased, so that the risk of information systems becoming the subject of offences is reduced to a minimum10.

In addition, apart from the secure electronic signature, Article 14 of the TBK provides that contracts may be concluded by means of “texts that can be sent and stored by fax or similar means of communication…, provided that they have been confirmed”, and that these satisfy the requirement of written form. A similar rule applies to the invoice and the letter of confirmation governed by Article 21(3) of the TTK; the paragraph states: “A person who receives a written communication confirming the content of contracts concluded, or statements made, by telephone, by telegram, by any means of communication or information technology or by any other technical means, or orally, shall be deemed to have accepted that the letter of confirmation in question is in conformity with the contract concluded or the statements made, if he has not objected within eight days of the date on which he received it.” What is striking is that, in the expression “who receives a written communication”, the manner in which the communication is received and the form and/or the means of the communication are not expressly regulated but are left open to interpretation. It follows that there is no requirement here that the communication be sent, for example, with a secure electronic signature or by the registered electronic mail system (KEPS), as under Art. 18 TTK11. In our view these provisions are liable to give rise to problems from the standpoint of both criminal law and the law of criminal procedure.

Having regard to the stage the world has reached, the drafters of the TBK, taking into account the variability of everyday life and the speed and global nature of commercial life, made a choice in favour of enabling contractual relationships to be established by making the greatest possible use of developing means of communication; indeed, this is expressly stated in the explanatory memorandum to the article12. The same does not, however, hold true to the same degree for criminal law, which is more conservative and gives priority to the requirement of form, that is to say conformity with the statutory definition of the offence (Tatbestandsmäßigkeit), and to legal certainty. Consequently, the absence of a signature, or of an electronic signature capable of taking its place, in channels of communication that may be regarded as a “similar means of communication”, such as fax or electronic mail, may make it easy to commit various offences of forgery and fraud.

In particular, the fact that these documents bear no wet-ink signature or secure electronic signature may lead to denials of signature, even where there is a signature at the foot of them. Where the signature is denied, since, in accordance with the settled decisions of the Court of Cassation, expert examinations carried out on documents that do not bear a wet-ink signature are not valid, it will not be possible to find the perpetrator and/or to punish him on the basis of lawful evidence13.

Indeed, this provision, as regards how the signatures of the persons assuming an obligation are to be confirmed where the requirement of written form is satisfied by fax or similar means, is a matter of controversy among specialists in the law of obligations as well. For example, one proposed solution voiced in various forums is that, in order to establish to whom the signature at the foot of a fax or an electronic mail belongs, its confirmation should be carried out before a notary. Having regard to the slowness and the cost of this, however, it does not seem possible to say that it is an appropriate solution. According to another view in legal scholarship, the confirmation must likewise be made by fax, and with this method there is no longer any need for a signature either14. Consequently, this provision, which is likely to cause problems from the standpoint of the law of obligations, is fraught with problems from the standpoint of criminal law as well.

it was unanimously decided on 6.05.1997 to DISMISS the objection of the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Cassation.“ Yargıtay Ceza Genel Kurulu E. 1997/6-63, K. 1997/96, T. 6.5.1997.

“1- As is also explained in the decision of the General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation dated 14.10.2008 and numbered 49/219, the aim of criminal proceedings is to bring the material truth to light, and documents are one of the means of proof resorted to for that purpose. In resolving the dispute arising from the criminal charge, the judicial authorities are also required to review the reliability of the documents that have been seized and obtained of their own motion, or that have been submitted in line with the prosecution and the defence. In order that reliability may be reviewed, the original of the document or, where that is not possible, specimens or copies whose conformity with the original has been certified by the competent authorities or persons must be placed in the case file. Article 26 of the Regulation on the Conduct of the Registry Services of the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Offices and of the First-Instance Criminal Courts of the Ordinary Judiciary states that, where it is decided to sever the investigation file, a certified copy of each of the documents shall be placed in the severed investigation file. In the light of these explanations, and given that certain investigation documents contained in the case file, which are understood to have been severed from another investigation file, have been found to be uncertified photocopies, the continuation of the trial on the basis of uncertified documents and the conviction of the accused as set out in the judgment, without the originals or certified copies of those documents having been obtained and placed in the case file; 2- The failure to bear in mind that, in offences of forgery of documents, the assessment and determination of whether the document is capable of deceiving belongs to the court, and that the documents forming the subject of the offence, which are registered in the judicial custody office, must be obtained and examined, their characteristics recorded in the hearing minutes, and the documents placed in the case file in a manner permitting review, are contrary to the Law; 3- Having regard to Article 7(2) of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) No. 5237, the necessity, pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 14 of Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) No. 5271, as amended by Article 562 of Law No. 5728, which was published in the Official Gazette dated 08.02.2008 and numbered 26781 after the judgment and entered into force on the same day, of assessing whether or not to decide, in respect of the accused, on “deferment of the pronouncement of the judgment”, CONCLUSION: These required the judgments to be quashed, and since the appeal objections of the accused’s defence counsel were accordingly found to be well-founded, it was unanimously decided on 13.07.2009 that the judgments, the other aspects of which have not been examined, be QUASHED for these reasons under Article 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 1412 (CMUK), which is to be applied pursuant to Article 8(1) of Law No. 5320.” Yargıtay 11. Ceza Dairesi, E. 2008/10310, K. 2009/9393, T. 13.7.2009.

Article 15 of the TBK likewise regulates what the signature is to be in contracts for which a formal requirement is laid down, by stating: “The signature must be affixed in the handwriting of the person who assumes the obligation. A secure electronic signature shall also produce all the legal consequences of a signature affixed by hand”. Sentence 2 of paragraph 1 of the article assigns to the secure electronic signature exactly the function assigned to the wet-ink signature. Consequently, the explanations we gave above concerning the secure electronic signature in connection with Article 14 apply to this article as well.

Articles 16 and 17 of the EİK define as offences acts of forgery relating to the secure electronic signature and to its certificates. These criminal norms can come into play in respect of electronic signatures that have a security certificate. Article 16 of the EİK lays down the “offence of unauthorised use of electronic signature creation data” and Article 17 the “offence of forgery in electronic certificates”15. The most important reason for including these offence types in the EİK is that the TBK was to make it possible to establish an obligation, and in particular to conclude a contract, by electronic signature. Accordingly, the offences committed by misusing the electronic signature protect the trust placed in data of this kind, which are assigned to individuals by the State and have credibility in the legal sphere, in short the trust placed in the electronic signature; consequently, an attempt is made to secure the formal reliability of contractual obligations by means of criminal law as well, and to provide protection by a criminal norm against unlawful acts directed at it16. Accordingly, where a secure electronic signature is used by unlawful methods, the offence types laid down in Articles 16 and 17 of the EİK will come into play depending on the nature of the act, and the offences of fraud and forgery of documents may also be at issue. However, where the offence of fraud is committed by creating a forged document through the misuse of an electronic signature, since the legal interests protected by these offences are different, no case of concurrence of offences will arise between them and the rule of real concurrence will apply.

It cannot be said that these provisions contained in the TBK are sufficient to cover all unlawful acts. It will become possible for various forms of the offences of aggravated fraud (Art. 158(1)(f) TCK), aggravated theft (Art. 142(2)(e) TCK), abuse of trust (Art. 155 TCK) and forgery of documents (Arts. 207 – 210 TCK), examples of which are already being encountered, to be committed by taking advantage of the climate of trust created by these provisions of the TBK. For example, a secure electronic signature may, in the offence of forgery of documents, constitute the signature at the foot of the document that forms the subject of that offence17; thus the unauthorised use of the electronic signature by persons who are not entitled to it may be at issue, as may the use of forged documents created with it and the obtaining of an unlawful benefit in that way.

2. The Use of Information Technologies in Unfair Competition in the Context of the TBK

A further matter in the TBK that we wish to address is Article 57, entitled “Unfair Competition”. This article contains the following provision: “A person whose customers have diminished, or who faces the danger of losing them, on account of the dissemination of untrue news or the making of announcements of that kind, or on account of conduct contrary to the rules of good faith, may request that such conduct be brought to an end and, where there is fault, that his loss be made good. The provisions of the Turkish Commercial Code on unfair competition relating to commercial matters are reserved.”

We should state that this article is the unfair competition provision applied to professional activities carried on by persons who are not merchants; for that reason it provides that the provisions of the TTK, which we shall address separately below, are reserved.

A look at the explanatory memorandum to the article shows that the article was drafted with the developments in information and communication technology in mind. Indeed, the explanatory memorandum expressly emphasises this point by stating: “The expression ‘false announcements’ used in the first paragraph of Article 48 of the Code of Obligations No. 818 has, having regard to the developments that have taken place in communication technology, been changed in the Draft to ‘the dissemination of untrue news or the making of announcements of that kind’, and the scope of the provision has thereby been broadened”.

A great many operations such as advertising, promotion and the like are carried out over the internet or social media. Where unfair competition at the same time reaches the dimension of an attack on personality rights and of insult, the offence of insult laid down in Article 125 of the TCK will be constituted. In that event the blocking of access to the website containing the insult may come into question. However, since the offence of insult is not among the catalogue offences in Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes Committed by Means of Such Publications, where a criminal complaint lodged with the public prosecutor’s offices on account of insult is accompanied by a request for an interim measure blocking access to the website, the request is refused either at the stage of the prosecutor’s office or at the stage of the criminal court of peace.

Although this appears to be a statutory gap, a result can be achieved by using the “notice and take-down” method laid down in Article 9 of Law No. 5651, that is, by first addressing the request on the matter directly to those concerned and, in the event of a negative reply, applying to the criminal court of peace. At present the system is generally working. It is also possible to make such a request to the civil judge under Arts. 24 and 25 TMK. Apart from this, the TBK, unlike the TTK, does not contain a specific offence of unfair competition.

II. Reflections in Criminal Law of the Provisions Relating to the Field of Information Technology in the Turkish Commercial Code

Of the three statutes, it is the TTK that contains the most provisions relating to IT law. This is only to be expected, since the trade and finance sector is foremost among the areas in which solutions from the field of information technology are most widely used. It is entirely normal that the matters in these sectors that are likely to give rise to disputes, and the means of resolving them, should be transposed into the TTK. In this context the TTK contains numerous provisions concerning the products of information technologies; the products in question and the articles in which they appear are as follows: electronic mail (Arts. 18, 428, 1525, 1528), electronic signature (Arts. 18, 94, 1526), website (Arts. 39, 171, 174, 198, 353, 359, 399, 414, 420, 422, 428, 448, 450, 455, 460, 461, 473, 474, 483, 486, 541, 562,966, 1524, 1527), database (Arts. 24, 1526), data carrier (Arts. 65, 82, 86), registered electronic mail system (Arts. 18, 1525), electronic general meeting (Art. 1527), electronic board of directors (Arts. 390, 1527), electronic environment (Arts. 24, 64, 65, 82, 127, 390, 1525, 1526, 1527, 1528).

1. The Risk that the Possibility of Announcing a Commercial Enterprise over the Internet Will Increase Acts of Fraud

The first matter in the TTK that catches our eye in this connection is the provision in Article 12(2) concerning those who are deemed to be merchants. The text of the article states: “A person who has notified the public, by circulars, newspapers, radio, television and other means of announcement, that he has established and opened a commercial enterprise, or who has announced the fact by having his enterprise registered in the commercial register, shall be deemed to be a merchant even if he has not actually begun to operate the enterprise”. Under this provision, notifying the public by other means of announcement, apart from the classic methods of announcement, that a commercial enterprise has been established and opened is sufficient for a person to be deemed a merchant. The most widespread of these other means are websites or publications made on social media such as “blog” and “linkedin”.

Although, in our view, this provision is apt and in keeping with the times, it carries various risks within it. For at the stage the information society has reached, the information found on the internet is generally accepted as true without being questioned. Indeed, while doubts are entertained about the reality of companies and institutions that have no website, companies that do not exist in reality but have a website may be perceived as a real, corporate company and commercial enterprise, even if they consist of a single person and a computer. This perception may enable ill-intentioned persons, by means of the promotion and the like that they carry out on social networks, to present their non-existent commercial enterprises as if they were real and to obtain unjust and unlawful benefits by fraud. A further point that must be made is that, because the provision in Article 12(2) of the TTK indicates that the status of merchant will be acquired where such a publication is made on social media, credibility, and acts of abusing it, may increase.

Our remarks do not mean, however, that the article of the TTK in question is badly drafted. In providing that the status of merchant is acquired by any kind of announcement, the legislature wished both to simplify the procedure and to thwart persons who act like a merchant and then seek to escape the responsibilities of that status on the ground that they have not fulfilled certain requirements of form and announcement. As we have stated above, however, excessive trust in the internet, or the existence of uninformed users, when combined with the provision in question, may lead to an increase in acts of fraud.

The TTK has made it possible to provide facilities in different situations by making use of the electronic environment. Art. 1524 TTK bears the heading “Electronic Transactions and Information Society Services, Website”. The aim is that internet services should be used in every matter primarily in order to ensure transparency. Accordingly, it is provided that the part of the website relating to information society services must be open to everyone. There is, however, no provision for the creation of an institution or body to supervise the reliability of the services provided. Nor does any such institution or body exist in practice. Nor is there any statute and/or secondary legislation regulating the activities of independent bodies whose task is to confirm the reliability of the services offered by enterprises engaged in electronic commerce. Such an institution should be created; it should, however, be fully independent both financially and administratively, it should not be set up within a presidency such as the Telecommunications Communication Presidency (TİB), and the executive should have no influence either when the members are selected or while they perform their duties. By determining both whether the mandatory provisions in the commercial field are being complied with and whether customers’ personal data are being protected, this supervision will be effective and useful in preventing the legal disputes that will be encountered in practice. During the passage of the Draft Law on the Regulation of Electronic Commerce into law, an independent institution/body to perform this task should be created18.

2. The Problem that the Failure to Define Acts of Misuse of the Registered Electronic Mail System as Offences Creates a Statutory Gap

Art. 18(3) TTK states: “Between merchants, notices or warnings concerning putting the other party in default, terminating the contract or withdrawing from the contract shall be given through a notary, by registered letter, by telegram or by the registered electronic mail system using a secure electronic signature”. A parallel provision is contained in Article 7/a, which was added to the Notification Law No. 7201 by Law No. 6099 Amending the Notification Law and Certain Laws, published in the Official Gazette of 19 January 2011, No. 27820: “Service may be effected by electronic means on a person who provides an electronic address suitable for service and requests that service be effected at that address. Service by electronic means on joint-stock companies, limited liability companies and partnerships limited by shares is mandatory. Where service by electronic means cannot be effected under the provisions of the first and second paragraphs for a compelling reason, service shall be effected by the other methods specified in this Law. Service by electronic means shall be deemed to have been effected at the end of the fifth day following the date on which it reaches the addressee’s electronic address. The procedures and principles for the application of this article shall be laid down by regulation”. In addition, the Regulation on Electronic Service (ETY) prepared by the Ministry of Justice was published in the Official Gazette of 19.1.2013 and entered into force on the date of its publication. As can be seen, the infrastructure for the provision in the TTK was put in place, as far as the law of service is concerned, before the TTK entered into force, by the amendment made to the Notification Law and by the relevant regulation. These provisions show that the registered electronic mail system and electronic service have been regulated so as to be, in particular, an effective element of commercial life. Art. 18(3) TTK provides that the warnings or notices to be sent between merchants for the purpose of carrying out certain transactions relating to the commercial enterprises of both parties must be given in conformity with the form indicated by the statute. Accordingly, warnings or notices concerning putting the other party in default, terminating the contract and withdrawing from the contract may be given by the registered electronic mail system using a secure electronic signature19. For example, an objection to an invoice, which is not subject to any formal requirement and is very frequently made in commercial life, may validly be made with a secure electronic signature20. Similarly, the records created by the registered electronic mail service provider in relation to the services it offers through the registered electronic mail system , and registered electronic mail evidence, are accepted as conclusive evidence until the contrary is proved (Art. 15(1) of the Regulation on Electronic Mail)21. In conclusion, whereas this provision of the TTK makes it possible, as an option, for all merchants to effect service relating to certain transactions by electronic mail, the Notification Law makes service by electronic means on joint-stock companies, limited liability companies and partnerships limited by shares mandatory; the same point is repeated in Article 7 of the ETY. Although electronic service is regulated in both statutes, the purpose, the scope and those who effect service are different.

Within the framework of the provisions contained in the TTK and the Notification Law, persons or companies for whom it is not made mandatory may also make use of electronic service on an optional basis. Accordingly, it will begin to be used between companies, between companies and natural persons, and within organisations, in countless areas such as all kinds of correspondence, document sharing, contracts, service, warnings/notices, e-invoices, telephone call records, bank instructions, account statements, the sending of credit card statements, orders, tender bids and e-commerce transactions. If users so wish, secure communication with the confidentiality of communication ensured, and the storage of electronic documents in a secure environment, will also be possible by means of the value-added services to be provided by the registered electronic mail service provider (KEPHS)22.

In order for these provisions to be understood, it is first necessary to set out what the registered electronic mail system is and how it differs from ordinary electronic mail. Electronic mail (e-mail) has become one of the most intensively used means of communication in our country and throughout the world, owing to the spread of the internet, the ease with which every kind of data can be transmitted and its low cost. The technical reliability and legal validity, for the sender and the recipient, of all kinds of documents and writings (e-mail messages) transmitted by e-mail, above all official and commercial ones, are of great importance. Communication by standard electronic mail (SEP), which is at present in widespread use, is a form of communication that is not regarded as secure legally or technically, in which the identities of sender and recipient cannot be established, in which the delivery of the mail cannot be ensured with certainty, and whose transmission and content can always be denied without the contrary being capable of proof.

The fact that standard electronic mail cannot ensure that an electronic document is sent, stored and received with technical and legal certainty, without being altered or seen by others, and above all the fact that the identities of the sender and the recipient cannot be established with certainty, constitutes one of the significant obstacles to official and commercial transactions being conducted over the internet.

Registered electronic mail (KEP) (Registered E-Mail: REM, Certified E-Mail: CEM), by contrast, may be defined in brief as electronic mail that is legally valid and technically secure. Using a legally valid secure electronic signature and time stamp, and by means of the “registered e-mail service provider (KEPHS)”, the KEP system guarantees that an electronic mail has been delivered, and makes it possible to establish the identities of the sending and receiving parties, the fact that the message sent and its attachments have not been altered by others, and the time of sending, and to produce legally valid conclusive evidence of these. With the KEP system it can be established with certainty when transmissions made in the electronic environment were made, who the sender and the recipient are, and what the message sent and its attachments are. As between the parties within the system, the sending party cannot deny that the message was sent by it, nor can the receiving party deny that it reached it.

In the registered electronic mail system, the e-mails sent and received pass through the “registered e-mail service provider (KEPHS)”, which is in the role of a “trusted third party”, has been authorised by the relevant authority and is subject to audits. Those who use the system may, if they so wish, also separately request the KEPHS to keep a copy of their transmissions (their electronic documents) so that it can be produced in a dispute that may arise in the future. The KEPHS is not obliged to keep or archive an exact copy of the content of the transmissions; technically, it may keep their “digest (hash)”. Nor is every user obliged to obtain services from the same KEPHS; users may communicate with one another securely and with legal validity by obtaining registered e-mail services from different service providers. In sum, the KEP system is operated by authorised KEPHSs. What the technical, administrative, financial and legal qualifications of these bodies are to be as trusted third parties, like the electronic certification service providers (ESHS) in the field of e-signatures, their responsibilities and obligations, and how they are to be audited are determined by regulations.

The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), which sets the standards of the European Union in the field of telecommunications, first published the standards relating to the KEP system (ETSI TS 102 640) in three parts on 20 November 2008. In addition to the first three parts of the standard that had been published, Parts 4 and 5 were published in full in January 2010, together with the updates to the first three parts. Today registered electronic mail and electronic service systems are applied in countries such as the United States, Belgium, Italy and Germany23.

It is clear from Article 1525(2) of the new TTK that in our country too the authority responsible and competent for making the regulations, granting the authorisations and carrying out the audits in this field is to be the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK). On the basis of this provision the BTK made the necessary arrangements by issuing the “Regulation on the Procedures and Principles concerning the Registered Electronic Mail System”, and this Regulation was published in the Official Gazette of 25 August 2011, No. 28026. Under Article 29 of the Regulation it was provided that the Regulation would enter into force on 1 July 2012, and under provisional Article 2 that those wishing to become a KEPHS could apply to the Authority from 1 May 2012.

With the KEP system, every kind of official, private and commercial document or writing will be capable of being sent and received electronically between institutions, organisations and individuals; in other words, it will be possible validly to carry out electronic correspondence and notification (declarations, returns, applications, service, warnings, notices, etc.). It will begin to be used in countless areas, such as correspondence between public institutions and within institutions, correspondence between public institutions and the private sector, organisations and citizens, every kind of service between natural and legal persons, the sending of documents, the sending of warnings/notices, the sending of electronic invoices, telephone call records, bank account statements, the sending of credit card statements, online shopping, loan applications, orders, contracts, tender bids and intra-company correspondence. Secure communication with the confidentiality of communication ensured, and the storage of electronic documents in a secure environment, will also be possible with KEP. In order to obtain a registered electronic mail address and to use the KEP24 system, the person’s legally valid identity details must without fail be established25. The KEPHS will store the evidence (documents) relating to this communication and the necessary transaction records securely for a long period. Where necessary it will make them available to the parties and/or to the judicial authorities and law enforcement26.

Where the data in the KEP system, which we have tried to explain briefly above, are misused in various ways by third parties or by the employees of the KEPHS themselves, it comes to mind that offences may be committed, above all the recording of personal data (Art. 135 TCK) and their dissemination (Art. 136 TCK), as well as offences such as aggravated fraud (Art. 158(1)(f) TCK) and theft (Art. 142(2)(e) TCK).

In our view, the fact that KEP is not regulated by a specific statute as the secure electronic signature is, and that specific offence types have not been created, as in the EİK, for acts such as the fraudulent production and misuse of KEPs, no regard being had to the way in which these differ from other similar offence types, constitutes a significant shortcoming and statutory gap. We consider that it would be more beneficial to strengthen the protection afforded by criminal law in this field by also defining acts of unauthorised use or production of these as separate offences.

3. The Use of Information Technologies Being Envisaged as a Means in the Offence of Unfair Competition in the Context of the TTK

A further article directly related to criminal law on which we wish to dwell here is Article 62 of the TTK, which lays down the acts entailing criminal liability on account of unfair competition. Although it is not so stated in the heading of the article, it is in fact possible to call this the “offence of engaging in unfair competition”. This offence type is defined in the statute as follows:

“(1) a) Those who intentionally commit one of the acts of unfair competition set out in Article 55,

b) Those who intentionally give false or misleading information about their personal circumstances, products, work products, commercial activity and business in order to have their own offers and proposals preferred to those of their competitors, c) Those who deceive employees, agents or other auxiliary persons in order to get them to obtain the production or trade secrets of their employer or of their principals, d) Those employers or principals who, having learned that their workers or employees or their agents have, while performing their work, committed an act of unfair competition entailing punishment, do not prevent that act or do not correct the statements that are contrary to the truth, shall, provided that the act does not constitute another offence entailing a heavier penalty, be punished, upon the complaint of one of those who have the right to bring a civil action under Article 56, with imprisonment of up to two years or with a judicial fine on account of the acts falling within each sub-paragraph.”

Article 63, for its part, regulates the criminal liability of legal persons in a manner different from the similar provisions contained in the TCK. It provides: “If an act of unfair competition is committed in the course of the conduct of the business of legal persons, the provision of Article 62 shall apply to the members of the organ, or the partners, who acted or ought to have acted on behalf of the legal person. Where the act of unfair competition is committed within the framework of the activity of a legal person, the security measures specific to legal persons may also be ordered in respect of the legal person”.

As can be seen, the offence type is laid down by reference to the unfair competition regulated in Article 55. Consequently, the elements of perpetrator, victim and act, which make up the material element of the offence type, are in fact laid down in Article 55. It is highly likely, and possible, that these forms of unfair competition will be carried out using information systems, and in particular over the internet. Indeed, at the present time, when electronic commerce and internet media and advertising have developed so far, we think that most of the acts of unfair competition specified in Article 55 will be committed in the areas we have mentioned. In this way this offence type too can be counted among the offences committed by means of information systems. Accordingly, we consider it entirely apt that Article 55, in which unfair competition is regulated, and hence the offence in question, were drafted with information systems and the field of information technology in mind.

It will be appropriate to mention here another problem that is frequently encountered in practice in this regard. Publications made over the internet in particular are instantaneous; that is to say, content can be uploaded to a website in an instant and can likewise be removed in an instant. The same is true where acts of unfair competition are carried out over the internet. Where steps are taken to prevent the unfair competition, to obtain compensation for the damage arising from it and to lodge a criminal complaint on account of these acts, the perpetrators of the act immediately destroy the content constituting unfair competition and thereby eliminate the most important piece of evidence for both the compensation proceedings and the criminal investigation. In order that this may be prevented and the harm suffered remedied, the evidence must be recorded for preservation without delay.

When these infringements first emerged, they were recorded by notaries, that is to say, it was notaries who certified that the printout taken from the website at a given moment was identical to the screen display. That practice made matters extremely easy. Subsequently, however, by Circular No. 27 of 9.7.2004 issued by the Union of Notaries, it was announced that recordings of this kind fell within the competence of the courts and could be made only by the courts27. With the Circular, it was the civil courts of peace that began to make recordings of this kind. When a recording was requested from the civil courts of peace, an expert was appointed immediately and the recording was made irrespective of where the persons making the publication were located, and this recording could be used as evidence both in private-law proceedings and in criminal proceedings. With the HMK, which entered into force on 1.10.2011, however, the situation has changed. In requests for recordings of this kind the article on the territorial jurisdiction of the courts is now applied very strictly; for example, where recording is sought of acts of unfair competition carried out over the internet throughout Türkiye by a person (for example, a dealer) located in Van, the request is refused for lack of jurisdiction when the application is made from İstanbul, even though the registered office of the company against which the unfair competition is directed is in İstanbul. This not only causes needless expense and loss of time for a very short and simple procedure but, more importantly still, because of the loss of time the perpetrators, who in most cases become aware of the situation, destroy the evidence of the act by removing the content from the internet. In short, the courts, whose task is to secure justice and to remedy injustice, give rise to injustice by their practice. To resolve the problem, either the article in question must be interpreted in accordance with its purpose and requests of this kind granted, or the article must be amended.

A further matter on which we wish to dwell is the provision on the liability of legal persons laid down in Article 63 of the TTK. In the provision on the criminal liability of legal persons contained in Article 63 of the TTK, the wording “shall apply to the members of the organ, or the partners, who … ought to have acted on behalf of the legal person” is such as to bring back objective criminal liability that is not based on culpability. This is also at odds with the approach of the TCK to the matter. For it can be seen that with the TCK No. 5237 the last traces of objective criminal liability, which does not exist in developed legal systems, were erased (the requirement, in offences aggravated by their result, that the perpetrator be liable at least to the degree of negligence in respect of the aggravated result) and that an attempt was made to establish a conception of liability based on culpability28. The provision, by contrast, appears as one that runs counter to this conception.

In our opinion, the reason why this provision was included lies in the complex structure of the offence type and in the fact that both acts of commission and acts of omission are included in the same offence type. Indeed, paragraph (d) of Article 62, in which the offence is laid down, indicates that the offence may be committed by omission, by referring to those who, having learned that an act of unfair competition entailing punishment has been committed, do not prevent that act or do not correct the statements that are contrary to the truth. It must be accepted that the wording in question in Article 63 was likewise used for the provision contained in paragraph (d) of Article 62.

Otherwise Article 63 will be seen as wholly incompatible with the criminal code currently in force and with the general theory of the offence accepted today, and as the product of a conception that belongs to the past.

Article 58 of the TTK regulates “the liability of press, broadcasting, communication and information technology organisations” in the commission of unfair competition. While under this provision it is in principle the content providers that are held liable, it is stated that, in a manner similar to the scheme of liability in press law, persons other than these may also be held liable in certain cases; these, however, are liabilities under private law. Again, sentence 2 of Article 58(4) contains a provision on the blocking of access as an interim measure. It provides: “In cases where the adverse consequences of the act of unfair competition are extensive or the damage it will cause will be great, the court may, after also hearing the service provider concerned, issue the interim order for the cessation or prevention of the act of unfair competition against the service provider as well, or may take other practicable measures suited to the individual case, including the temporary removal of the content.”

Although this provision concerning the service provider is aimed at the prevention of unfair competition, it is liable to lead to grave consequences. To begin with, when the removal of the content is possible and is provided for in this article, it is meaningless to apply a measure against the service provider even though it is not the service provider that is engaging in the unfair competition. Moreover, it is stated that the service provider must be heard before this interim order is issued. What, then, will happen if the service provider cannot be reached, or does not appear and is not heard despite valid service? In our view this provision is a clear manifestation of holding someone else liable for the act of the perpetrator. Because of the difficulty in preserving evidence to which we have referred above, the application of this article too is extremely difficult, since it is not possible to bring this article into operation in respect of unfair competition that cannot be substantiated by evidence. In conclusion, holding the service provider liable is not an apt provision.

4. The Risk that the Keeping and Storage of Commercial Books,

Documents and Records as Electronic Data May Form the Subject

of Various Cybercrimes

Articles 64 and 65 of the TTK provide that commercial records and documents and commercial books may be in the form of electronic data and may be stored and archived in that form, that these are valid records, and that they are both sufficient for the fulfilment of the obligation in this area and capable of being used as evidence. The books and the other records that merchants are required to keep may be kept in the form of the filing of the documents establishing facts and transactions, or by means of data carriers. Where the books and the other requisite records are kept in the electronic environment, it must be ensured that the information can be accessed throughout the retention period and can readily be read at any time within that period; this is a mandatory condition. Pursuant to Art. 65(4) TTK, paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 65 will apply by analogy. This provision offers those who keep books two options for the storage of the documents that contain, and at the same time prove, records, facts and transactions. The first of these is physical filing; the second is the use of data carriers. The term data carriers denotes every kind of data-carrying device that holds data in digital form, such as CDs, external disks and USB memory sticks29.

Great care must be taken with the storage of these data, particularly in the electronic environment. It is possible for these data to be personal data, and at the same time they are generally in the nature of trade secrets. Consequently, they may form the subject of the offences of recording personal data (Art. 135 TCK), unlawfully giving or obtaining data (Art. 136 TCK), failure to destroy data (Art. 138 TCK) or disclosure of information or documents in the nature of trade secrets, banking secrets or customer secrets (Art. 239 TCK). Moreover, by obtaining these data it may be possible to commit the offences of threat (Art. 106 TCK), blackmail (Art. 107 TCK) or unfair competition (Art. 62 TTK) against the holders of the information and documents, or to commit the offence of fraud (Arts. 157/158 TCK) by obtaining the information and using it to deceive third parties.

The risk that the data may become the subject of the offences mentioned above does not mean that the provisions in Articles 64 and 65 of the TTK are flawed; on the contrary, in our view they constitute a positive step forward, in that information technology is reflected in commercial law. It should not be overlooked, however, that risks of this kind are also inherent in them. The difficulty encountered stems not from the provision in the TTK but from the fact that in our country there is still no statutory regulation on the protection and processing of personal data that shows what personal data are, where and how the data in question must be stored, who may have access to the data, and by whom and in what manner the data may be processed.

This situation places our country in the category of countries that are not trustworthy as regards the sharing of personal data, with the result that foreign investors either do not come at all or do not invest at the expected level, and commercial life and the economy are thus adversely affected. The absence of a law on personal data also hampers the initiatives to be undertaken from the standpoint of criminal law.

As a result of the lack of legislation, many public institutions are unable to make use of the possibility of international cooperation and miss the opportunity to be far more effective in their services. Private-sector organisations, for their part, are missing out on significant economic potential because of the lack of national legislation that would regulate the flow of information to and from abroad and give assurances to their customers or counterparts abroad.

The protection of personal data plays a critical role in enabling certain sectors that are expected to grow in Türkiye (such as information technology, health and automotive) to develop and to attract customers from abroad. For example, in the case of health services, for which demand from abroad is expected to increase still further in the coming period, the fact that potential customers turn to other options because there is no assurance in this regard that meets the standards is causing, and will continue to cause, the loss of a significant economic opportunity.

In particular, the spread of new technologies involving the use of personal data, and the fact that the economic potential of these technologies has reached serious dimensions, have increased the need for rules to be made on this subject. Moreover, because the legislation of the countries to which foreign firms are subject does not permit the data they hold to be transferred to firms in Türkiye, they are unable to establish a presence in our country and significant investment opportunities are therefore being missed; and again because of this shortcoming, firms of Turkish origin doing business abroad experience difficulties in the processing of customer data and miss the opportunity to create added value30.

As can be seen, the making of positive and forward-looking provisions in the TTK alone is not enough. The increase of trade and investment should be thought of as a whole, and the bodies of legislation in this field that support one another or form part of one another should be brought into force as a whole.

5. The Obligations Imposed on Commercial Companies Creating a Risk, Particularly

in the Event of Attacks on Their Websites, and Carrying the Potential to Lead to

Unjust Sanctions

Article 1524 of the sub-chapter entitled “Electronic Transactions and Information Society Services” in the chapter entitled “Final Provisions” of the TTK lays down the obligation of every capital company to have a website; Article 1525 governs the notifications that are valid if made by electronic mail; Article 1526 the transactions that may and may not be carried out with a secure electronic signature; and Article 1527 the company organs that may meet in an electronic environment. In this way the added value brought by information and communication technologies has ceased to be auxiliary and secondary for commercial companies and has become one of the essential assets, one of the building blocks, of a commercial company31.

The unlawful alteration or destruction of the information on the company’s website, the blocking of access to the website, the inclusion on the site of content amounting to the offence of unfair competition or to insult, the commission of unlawful acts against electronic mail or by using it, the prevention, by sabotage, of a meeting of the company’s board of directors held in an electronic environment, or the publication of its content after it has been obtained unlawfully, are acts that constitute offences, and they form – in the terminology of the IT sector – the “back door” of the TTK’s appropriate and well-intentioned provisions in this field.

Where these acts are committed by third parties with the aim of harming commercial companies, the commercial companies will be victims of these attacks and will, in addition, face the potential of being victimised a second time on account of the sanctions they are likely to incur because, even if only temporarily, they have been unable to fulfil the obligations set out above. Accordingly, when these provisions are applied the evidence must be assessed carefully, and a purposive interpretation must be preferred to rigid application.

6. The Need, Should the E-Invoice System Be Adopted, to Provide that the Commission of the Offences of Tax

Evasion, Loss of Tax and Forgery of Documents by Using That System Constitutes an Aggravated Form Increasing the Penalty for the Offence

The documents and documentation that e-commerce companies, which by their nature carry out transactions for a far greater number of customers, must prepare under the legislation create difficulties for these companies in terms both of workload and of filing/record-keeping. One of the steps taken to reduce this difficulty is the introduction of the Electronic Invoice Recording System.

The documents to be issued for sales made on the internet do not differ from those to be issued for sales made through traditional channels. Foremost among the documents to be issued by taxpayers engaged in commercial business is the “invoice”. Taxpayers engaged in electronic commerce naturally carry out a large number of transactions. For this reason they wish to reduce their workload by issuing electronic invoices. The Electronic Invoice Recording System (EFKS), an interim solution envisaged for the transition to the electronic invoice, may be used by firms that have signed a protocol with the Revenue Administration. Firms making use of the EFKS are not obliged to keep on paper a copy of each of the invoices they have issued in accordance with the tax legislation; they may give their recipients invoices on paper or on magnetic media. The e-Invoices to be prepared in that case must be prepared in PDF format or signed with a secure electronic signature; in all other cases an e-Invoice has no validity whatsoever under the tax legislation. Users making use of the e-Invoice application:

• may send e-Invoices to users registered in the system,

• may receive e-Invoices from users registered in the system,

• may download the e-Invoices they have sent or received to their computers, keep them in electronic form and produce them on request.

Under the Tax Procedure Law General Communiqué, Serial No. 416, taxpayers who are obliged to issue invoices under Article 232 of the Tax Procedure Law No. 213 (VUK) may make use of the e-Invoice application. Taxpayers wishing to issue and send e-Invoices must first create a user account of their own on the e-Invoice Application.

The following may be cited as the advantages of the electronic invoice system:

• Since the copy of the invoice that remains with the taxpayer and, if the customer so wishes, the copy that goes to the customer will be sent electronically, the costs of printing and dispatching invoices will come to an end.

• Since under the VUK invoices are subject to a five-year period of retention and production, the costs of storing them for five years will come to an end. Particularly when it is borne in mind that some companies work with professional storage companies, these costs have begun to become significant for companies.

• The misfortune of having to bear the penalties entailed by non-compliance with the duties of retention and production laid down in the VUK as a result of physical damage to invoices (fire, flooding, etc.) will be eliminated. The penalty imposed by Article 359 of the VUK is a penalty for tax evasion, and the article provides for a penalty of one to three years. Alongside this, the threefold penalty in the event of loss of tax under Article 344 of the same law should not be forgotten either32.

It should not be forgotten, however, that this regulation, which directly concerns commercial law, also directly concerns criminal law. For Article 359 of the VUK, referred to above, is one of the provisions whose violation is frequently encountered in practice. In connection with this, in a great many cases proceedings are also brought against perpetrators for the offence of forgery of documents on account of the issuing of false invoices. It should not be overlooked that, as the e-Invoice application becomes widespread, the rate at which these offences are committed may increase. In this field, where a large number of offences are already committed even under the system of printed documents, an increase in the rate of crime and of offenders will be inevitable once the transition to the electronic environment is made, in cases where accomplices such as a printing house under contract with the Ministry of Finance or a third company no longer need to be involved in the preparation of the document. This in turn will lead to further disruption of public order in this field, to a considerable loss of tax for the State and to an increase in unfairness in competition.

In order to prevent this to some extent and to protect the reliability of the system by increasing deterrence, it would be appropriate, should the system be put into operation, to provide that the commission of the offences of tax evasion and loss of tax and of the offences of forgery of documents by using the e-Invoice system constitutes an aggravated form increasing the penalty for the offence. For the commission of classic offences by using information systems is generally easier and also reduces the perpetrators’ risk of being caught.

III. Reflections in Criminal Law of the Provisions Relating to the Field of Information Technology in the Code of Civil Procedure

The HMK No. 6100, which entered into force on 1 October 2011, likewise contains various important provisions aimed at making use of the field of information technology. Art. 199 HMK states that data such as written or printed text, deeds, drawings, plans, sketches, photographs, films, visual or sound recordings, as well as data in electronic form and similar information carriers, have the character of documents.

Paragraph 2 of Article 205 provides that electronic data duly created with a secure electronic signature have the force of a deed, and paragraph 3 that the judge shall examine of his own motion whether a document bearing an electronic signature that is submitted to the court as evidence was created with a secure electronic signature. In this way, as is also stated in the explanatory memorandum to the law, an attempt has been made to remove the doubt as to the evidentiary force of documents bearing an electronic signature.

One of the benefits expected of secure electronic signatures, and more broadly of digital signatures, is that as a rule they are non-repudiable33. As a rule, a document signed with a secure electronic signature is deemed to have been signed by the signatory, and the sending party is deemed to be responsible for that signature34. However, it cannot be said that these signatures can in no way be disputed, and to say so could moreover lead to losses of rights. For in situations such as where the electronic signature creation device needed to create the secure electronic signature has been stolen or has otherwise left the signatory’s possession, it may be possible for persons other than the signatory also to sign by means of the signatory’s secure electronic signature creation data35. It is for this reason that Article 210 provides that, where data created with a secure electronic signature are denied, an expert examination must be ordered if the judge is unable to reach a conclusion after hearing the party denying the data.

In the case of documents bearing a wet-ink signature, the signatory can be determined with near certainty by examining the document, whereas in the case of documents bearing an electronic signature the identity of the person who signed the document cannot be determined with certainty. This is because the electronic signature is created in an electronic environment, and that environment does not reflect the person’s characteristic features. Whether the secure electronic signature was created with the secure electronic signature creation device of the signatory concerned can be established only by technical examination. Consequently, with signatures of this kind it can be established to whom the secure electronic signature belongs, but not by whom the signature was actually affixed36.

Under sub-paragraph (f) of Article 15 of the Regulation on the Procedures and Principles for the Implementation of the Electronic Signature Law, the signatory is obliged to inform the electronic service provider without delay if he doubts the confidentiality or security of the signature creation data. The electronic certification service provider is obliged to ensure that requests for the revocation of a qualified electronic certificate can be made at least by telephone and without interruption. Once the revocation request has been received, the qualified electronic certificate must be revoked immediately. A qualified electronic certificate revoked in this way remains in the revocation status records until the end of its period of validity. Under Article 13 of the Electronic Signature Regulation, the electronic certification service provider is obliged to keep the revocation status record relating to qualified electronic certificates accessible to the public free of charge and without interruption, without any need for identity verification37.

Article 16 of the EİK provides that persons who, for the purpose of creating an electronic signature, obtain, give, copy or recreate signature creation data and a signature creation device without the consent of the signatory, and those who create an electronic signature without authorisation by means of signature creation devices obtained without authorisation, shall be punished with imprisonment of one to three years and a judicial fine of not less than fifty days. Article 17 of the EİK provides that those who create wholly or partly false electronic certificates, or who imitate or falsify validly created electronic certificates, and those who knowingly use such electronic certificates, shall be punished with imprisonment of two to five years and a judicial fine of not less than one hundred days. Where the offences in question are committed by employees of the electronic certification service provider, the penalties are to be increased by one half. While it is provided that compensation shall in addition be payable for the damage arising from these offences, no liability has been laid down as regards the signatory38.

Article 219 governs the method by which electronic documents are submitted to the court; Article 243 provides that witnesses may be summoned by electronic mail; Article 412 that an arbitration agreement may be concluded in an electronic environment; and Article 445 that actions may be brought, and many other procedural acts carried out, through the UYAP system and in an electronic environment with a secure electronic signature.

Accordingly, the HMK too attaches great importance to the solutions offered by the field of information technology and to electronic data. The fact that actions can be brought and every other kind of procedural act carried out through the National Judicial Network Project (UYAP), and that no separate physical copy is required for these, is in itself indicative of the importance attached to the subject.

These provisions do, however, harbour significant risks. Where a document signed with a secure electronic signature is denied, important duties fall in particular to experts. Here too the importance of the choice of expert becomes apparent. The reports given on this subject, which is an entirely technical field, will bind the parties to the proceedings and the lawyers involved, namely the judge and the parties’ counsel. If this is abused, the “offence of giving a false expert opinion or a false interpretation” governed by Article 276 of the TCK will come into question. If it is done in return for a particular benefit, the aggravated form of the offence of bribery governed by Article 252(2) of the TCK will come into question.

Since, under Art. 199 HMK, electronic data are accepted as documents and, under Art. 205(2), documents signed with an electronic signature are accepted as having the force of a deed, acts of alteration, modification and destruction carried out on documents created with electronic data will henceforth also constitute the offence of forgery of a private document governed by Article 207 of the TCK and the offence of damaging, destroying or concealing a private document governed by Article 208.

It may also come into question that the offences relating to personal data in Articles 135 and 136 of the TCK, or the offence of system interference and of destroying or damaging data in Article 244, are committed by using electronic data in accordance with the methods permitted by the HMK.

Despite these risks that they harbour, we consider that the provisions made in the HMK with a view to making use of the solutions offered by the field of information technology are also appropriate.

CONCLUSION

As can be seen, provisions relating to the field of information technology have been made throughout the TTK and the HMK, and by means of provisions of a general nature the solutions and conveniences of the information technologies already in use in commercial life have been given a legal infrastructure. Similarly, the TBK also contains very important provisions in this field that affect the substance. We consider these provisions to be extremely appropriate and suited to the information age in which we currently live.

Although the field of information technology and the world of the internet are, just like the invention of the motor car and the discovery of atoms, inventions made for the benefit of humankind, they are open to misuse. Notwithstanding all these negative aspects, it should not be thought that the inventions or innovations in question are bad. As we have stated from the outset in connection with the risk of these possibilities being misused, some twenty years of practice in this field show that cybercrime, in particular cybercrime committed for economic gain, is being committed with ever-increasing frequency.

It is at this point that criminal policy comes into play and makes it possible to determine which acts are to be defined as offences and punished, and which acts are not to be regarded as offences but are to be assessed within the concept of permitted risk in criminal law and left unpunished. In briefly providing information above on the provisions relating to the field of information technology in all three statutes, we have tried to address those matters which carry a risk of these tools being misused and which criminal law treats as offences in an effort to prevent and/or punish that risk. In this context, we may summarise the points we have identified in general terms as follows:

The possibility of concluding a contract by electronic signature or confirmed signature may cause problems as regards allegations of forgery; the use of information technologies in unfair competition in the context of the TBK is a possible situation; the possibility of announcing a commercial enterprise over the internet carries the risk of an increase in acts of fraud; in the offence of unfair competition in the context of the TTK the use of information technologies is envisaged as a means; the keeping and storage of commercial books, documents and records as electronic data may form the subject of various cybercrimes; the obligations imposed on commercial companies have the potential to create risk and to lead to unjust sanctions, particularly in the event of attacks on their websites.

Furthermore, although possible misuse of the registered electronic mail system is not at present defined as an offence, we consider that such acts can be punished to the extent that they fall within other offence types, whereas this system ought to be protected by creating separate offence types, taking into account the specific characteristics of the system and of its misuse, exactly as in the case of the secure electronic signature.

In addition, we consider that, should the e-Invoice application be adopted, it would be appropriate, in order to prevent possible violations to some extent and to protect the reliability of the system by increasing deterrence, to provide that the commission of the offences of tax evasion and loss of tax and of the offences of forgery of documents by using the e-Invoice system constitutes an aggravated form increasing the penalty for the offence, since the commission of classic offences by using information systems is generally easier and also reduces the perpetrators’ risk of being caught.

In conclusion, the making of positive and forward-looking provisions in the TTK alone is not enough. The increase of trade and investment should be thought of as a whole, and the bodies of legislation in this field that support one another or form part of one another should be brought into force as a whole. Accordingly, we consider that, with the entry into application of these three statutes, which have the character of general codes, new offence types will perhaps not be created immediately; that, however, alongside the uses of the provisions relating to the field of information technology in particular that are, to a very large extent, in keeping with their purpose, their misuse will first of all give rise to new models of offending; and that in time efforts will be made to prevent and punish these risks and instances of misuse by creating new offence types in the TCK or in other statutes.

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Footnotes

  1. This article has been peer-reviewed and is indexed in the TÜBİTAK–ULAKBİM Database.
  2. Member of the Faculty, Department of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, Faculty of Law, İstanbul Medipol University.
  3. Economics (iktisat) is the branch of science that examines how a balance between production and consumption, or between supply and demand, is to be achieved and how the factors of production (land, labour, capital and the entrepreneur) are to be used. It should not be overlooked, however, that this definition holds in principle for the capitalist system based on the rules of the market economy and does not hold for the socialist system. Ali Özgüven, İktisat Bilimine Giriş, 8. Bası, İstanbul, Filiz Kitabevi, 2005, s.3. ↑
  4. For the definition of economic crime and detailed explanations on this subject see: Murat Volkan Dülger, Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasına İlişkin Suçlar ve Yaptırımlar, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2011, s.213–218. ↑
  5. “The European Union has defined e-commerce simply as “the sale of goods and services over the internet”. In addition, the OECD defines e-commerce as “commercial transactions carried out over the internet” and divides it into two, namely “transactions between businesses and transactions between businesses and end users”.” For the definition in question and a detailed explanation see: Bilgi Toplumu Stratejisinin Yenilenmesi Projesi, İnternet Girişimciliği ve E-Ticaret Ekseni Mevcut Durum Raporu, 10 Nisan 2013, s.80 vd. ↑
  6. Murat Volkan Dülger, Bilişim Suçları ve İnternet İletişim Hukuku, 2. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2012, s.39, 40. ↑
  7. Date of adoption: 11.01.2011, date of Official Gazette: 04.02.2011, No: 27836. ↑
  8. Date of adoption: 12.01.2011, date of Official Gazette: 04.02.2011, No: 27836. ↑
  9. Date of adoption: 13.01.2011, date of Official Gazette: 14.02.2011, No: 27846. ↑
  10. Sami Karahan, Ticari İşletme Hukuku, 23. Bası, Konya, Mimoza Yayınları, 2012, s.11–13. ↑
  11. M. Kemal Oğuzman/M. Turgut Öz, Borçlar Hukuku Genel Hükümler, C.I, 10. Bası, İstanbul, Vedat Kitapçılık, 2012, s.148. ↑
  12. Bilgi Toplumu Stratejisinin Yenilenmesi Projesi, İnternet Girişimciliği ve E-Ticaret Ekseni Mevcut Durum Raporu, 10 Nisan 2013, s.150, 151. ↑
  13. Taner Sevim, “6102 Sayılı Türk Ticaret Kanununda Bilişim Hukuku”, Bilişimin Ticaret Hukukuna Etkileri Paneli, İstanbul Barosu Bilişim Hukuku Merkezi, İstanbul, 20.2.2013, s.9. ↑
  14. “…In the second paragraph of Article 14 of the Draft, in view of the new developments that have emerged in communication technology, there have also been added to these, provided that they have been confirmed, texts that can be sent and stored by fax or similar means of communication and with a secure electronic signature, and the scope of the provision has thus been broadened.” ↑
  15. “On the appeal on points of law lodged by defence counsel against the decision of Bakırköy 3rd Assize Court dated 19.12.1995 and numbered 441/409, by which the accused Ü.B. was sentenced for the offence of forgery to 1 year and 8 months’ heavy imprisonment under Articles 342(1) and 59 of the TCY, the 6th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, having examined the file, decided by its decision dated 5.2.1997 and numbered 13330/955 “to uphold the judgment, which was found to be in conformity with procedure and the law”. The Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Cassation, for its part, by its submission dated 5.3.1996 and numbered 26020, lodged an objection with the following explanation: (According to the expert reports it could not be established with certainty that the endorser’s writing and signature were the product of the accused’s hand, and there are moreover contradictions between the reports. Although it is not a requirement that the writing and signature forming the subject of the forgery be the product of the accused’s hand, and it may be regarded as possible that the accused had a third person write this text and sign it, such an assumption may not always reflect the truth. Indeed, instruments are very often also sent by post or through an intermediary. In this respect, a report establishing that the writing and signature are not genuine cannot always be regarded as sufficient for a conviction. The accused submits in his defence that he drew the cheque and gave it to Ş., his sister and the wife of the intervening party, to be handed to the intervening party, and that he had no knowledge of the endorsement; H.Ç. also confirms this defence; and since it is not consistent with the ordinary course of life for the accused, who is a graduate electronics engineer, to commit a disgraceful offence by forging a cheque of no great value, an expert examination should be ordered as to whether the endorser’s writing and signature belong to the accused. ) The file having been sent to the First Presidency of the Court of Cassation, it was read by the General Criminal Assembly, and the matter was discussed and considered: DECISION: According to the file examined, the disagreement between the Special Chamber and the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Cassation concerns whether or not it is necessary to extend the investigation. It is understood that, under a protocol drawn up between the parties on account of an immovable property they had purchased jointly, the accused undertook to draw a cheque for 6.965.000 lira on 30.6.1991 and to give it to the complainant; that, upon the accused’s failure to draw the said cheque, the complainant F.S. initiated enforcement proceedings against the accused on the basis of the protocol; that, since the accused objected to the debt, the complainant brought an action for annulment of the objection, and the action was allowed and the objection annulled by Bakırköy 5th Civil Court of First Instance; and that, when the examination ordered upon the accused’s production of the cheque at issue during the hearing before the Civil Court of First Instance showed that the endorsement was forged, the proceedings forming the subject of the objection were brought against the accused. In the trial of the accused, in the examination carried out on the cheque at issue, the Physics and Graphology Specialist Department of the Institute of Forensic Medicine stated in its report dated 6.1.1994 that the endorsement ( the signature F.S. ) on the back of the cheque at issue was forged and that the signature under the name F.S. was not the product of the complainant’s hand. In its report dated 24.3.1995 the same Specialist Department further explained that the writing and signatures “F.S.” on the back of the cheque at issue might be the product of the accused’s hand. The examinations by the Physics and Graphology Branch of the Institute of Forensic Medicine referred to above were carried out on the original of the cheque at issue. By contrast, the accused submitted to the file reports that he had obtained as a result of examinations he had privately commissioned from experts, the graphologists O.M. and K.S., on photocopies of the cheque; although it was stated in those reports that the writing and signature “F.S.” on the back of the cheque were not the product of the accused’s hand, it was concluded that these private reports were not convincing, since it is a scientifically established fact that an examination carried out on a photocopy cannot yield sound results. In these circumstances, since it is clear beyond any hesitation that the accused committed the offence charged by making a forged endorsement on the back of the cheque which he had genuinely drawn, the objection concerning the extension of the investigation must be dismissed. CONCLUSION : For the reasons explained, ↑
  16. “…Henceforth, telex, fax and other similar texts will satisfy the written form if the sender has notified the recipient that they are approved (confirmed) and the recipient has likewise notified the original sender that the text which he himself sent is approved; unless this notification of approval is sent, the requirement of form will be deemed not to have been satisfied. Another very important innovation introduced by this provision is that, where a contract is concluded by fax and similar messages, the requirement of form may be deemed to have been satisfied even without the parties’ signatures. When the recipient notifies the sender that the text sent is approved, the simple written form will have been satisfied without a signature being required. Although the provision is not clear on the point, we are of the opinion that the approval must be given by the same means (by fax). Undoubtedly, in cases where a special requirement of form is laid down by law, such as contracts of suretyship and other personal security contracts and certain consumer contracts, validity cannot be achieved under these provisions.” Oğuzman/Öz, a.g.e., s.147. ↑
  17. For detailed information on these offence types see: Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.637 – 652. ↑
  18. Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.639, 640. ↑
  19. Mehmet Emin Artuk/Ahmet Gökcen/Caner Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Özel Hükümler, 12. Bası, Ankara, Adalet Yayınevi, 2012, s.468. ↑
  20. Bilgi Toplumu Stratejisinin Yenilenmesi Projesi, İnternet Girişimciliği ve E-Ticaret Ekseni Mevcut Durum Raporu, 10 Nisan 2013, s.184, 185. ↑
  21. Sabih Arkan, Ticari İşletme Hukuku, 16. Bası, Ankara, Banka ve Ticaret Hukuku Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayını, 2012, s.67, 154; Karahan, a.g.e, s.109, 110. ↑
  22. Karahan, a.g.e., s.115. ↑
  23. Arkan, a.g.e., s.355. ↑
  24. Serhat Koç/Nihan Güneli, “Kayıtlı Elektronik Posta ve Elektronik Tebligat”, Bilişimin Ticaret Hukukuna Etkileri Paneli, İstanbul Barosu Bilişim Hukuku Merkezi, İstanbul, 20.2.2013, s.18. ↑
  25. The applications of registered electronic mail (KEP) around the world are as follows: in countries such as the EU countries Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Sweden and the United States, the KEP system was regulated and put into practice from the beginning of the 2000s, and in many other countries it is about to be put into practice. The KEP system and its components were officially published by ETSI as a telecommunications standard (ETSI/TS 102 640) in 5 parts as of January 2010. Since 11 February 2005 Italy has been applying the registered e-mail system as “certified e-mail (cep)” (posta elettronica certificata – PEC), with its legal regulations in place. In Germany, the KEP system, as an important part of the “E-Government 2.0” programme, was launched under the name De-Mail System in Friedrichshafen from the middle of 2009, and in 2010 work was begun on rolling it out nationwide. The United States regulated the legal infrastructure of registered electronic mail by the “Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act”, which it enacted in June 2000, and began to apply it. Rpost (www.rpost.com) operates in e-mail communication under US legal regulations, in particular as a provider of evidence. ↑
  26. (Çevrimiçi) http://www.verion.com.tr/index.php/tr/e-kutuphane/kep-nedr/kayitli-elektronk-posta-kep.html, 05.10.2011. ↑
  27. The sender sends the registered e-mail message that he wishes to send (together with its attachments, if any), using the registered e-mail address that he holds, to the registered electronic mail service provider (KEPHS) from which he receives the service. (If it is a document/letter that by law must be signed by the sender and must bear a time stamp, the sender sends it after signing it with his own secure electronic signature and stamping it with a time stamp from an authorised electronic certification service provider (ESHS)) On receiving the message, the KEPHS sends the Sender an “acknowledgement of receipt” stating that the message has been received. The acknowledgement of receipt contains the sender’s identity, the date and time of sending and information to the effect that the message has been received, and it is e-signed by the KEPHS and stamped with a time stamp. When sending the Sender’s message to the Recipient, the KEPHS creates a “dispatch envelope”, signs it with a secure electronic signature and adds a legally valid time stamp. The data integrity of the message is thereby ensured, and any subsequent alteration can be detected. The dispatch envelope, just as in ordinary post, consists of the identity and e-mail address details of the Sender and the Recipient and of the message itself. The KEPHS notifies the Sender by a “confirmation of transmission/delivery” that the message has been transmitted to the Recipient. If it could not be transmitted, it sends a “confirmation of non-delivery” to that effect. The confirmation of transmission contains the Recipient’s identity details and the date and time of transmission. In this way the e-mail message (and its attached files, if any) is deemed to have been delivered securely and with legal validity. ↑
  28. At its meeting of December 2008 the e-Transformation Türkiye Executive Board was given a general explanatory and informative presentation on e-KEP by the BTK. By its decision No. 28 of 15 July 2009, the E-DTR Executive Board tasked the BTK with carrying out work on KEP. Under the Electronic Communications Law, the duty and power to regulate and supervise electronic communications infrastructure, systems and services in line with the strategies determined by the Ministry of Transport have been conferred on the BTK. Under the Electronic Signature Law No. 5070, the power to regulate and supervise in matters of the electronic signature (e-signature) and the time stamp, which are the basic components of the KEP system, likewise lies with the BTK. By the new Turkish Commercial Code and the draft Law on the Acceleration of E-Government Projects and the Dissemination of Electronic Transactions, registered electronic mail is regulated by the addition of an article to the Electronic Communications Law No. 5809, and the duty of regulation, authorisation and supervision in respect of the KEP system is likewise conferred on the BTK. ↑
  29. “In the letter dated 22.03.2004 and numbered 06763 – received from the Directorate General for Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Justice, whose views on the matter had been sought upon the application of a Bar Association Presidency requesting that our circular under reference, to the effect that the recording of the publication rules to be complied with that are published on the internet cannot be carried out at notaries’ offices, be reviewed and assessed with regard to internet publications and that an amendment preventing losses of rights be made, and discussed at the meeting of the Board of Directors of 05.07.2004 – it is stated: “The preservation of evidence is a legal institution adopted in order to ensure that the evidence relating to an action that has been brought or will be brought in future is, under certain conditions, gathered ahead of time and secured. Article 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Hukuk Usulü Muhakemeleri Kanunu) states that a request may be made for a matter which, in pending proceedings, has not yet reached the stage of inquiry and examination, or which is to be relied on in an action to be brought in future, to be established by witnesses, on-site inspection, experts or other evidence. Article 370 of the same Law states that the court competent for the preservation of evidence is the court hearing the action or, if no action has been brought, the court or peace court judge by which the evidence can be preserved most speedily and at the least expense. The recordings made by notaries, for their part, are governed by Article 61 of the Notaries Law, and by providing in that article that “Notaries shall record the state and form and the value of a thing or a place, and the identity and statements of the persons concerned...” notaries have been given the power to make recordings in certain matters. This power is, however, limited by Article 60 of the same Law. According to the provisions of the first and second paragraphs of that article, in which the duties of notaries are listed, drawing up legal transactions the performance of which has been entrusted by law to another office, authority or person, and carrying out legal transactions which the laws require to be carried out officially and for which the competent authorities have been specified, fall outside the duties of notaries. The recording of internet publications is likewise in the nature of the preservation of evidence within the meaning of Article 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and since this power and duty are conferred on the courts by Article 370 of the same Law, it is not possible for recordings of this kind to be made by notaries. Accordingly, while the matter in essence requires judicial interpretation and, in the event of a dispute, the final decision to be given by the courts must be taken as the basis, it is not possible, in view of Article 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 60 of the Notaries Law, for requests for the recording of internet publications to be met by notaries’ offices”.” ↑
  30. Mehmet Emin Artuk/Ahmet Gökcen/Caner Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 6. Bası, Ankara, Adalet Yayınevi, 2012, s.14, 15. ↑
  31. Karahan, a.g.e., s.300. ↑
  32. Bilgi Toplumu Stratejisinin Yenilenmesi Projesi, Bilgi Güvenliği, Kişisel Bilgilerin Korunması ve Güvenli İnternet Ekseni Mevcut Durum Raporu, 10 Nisan 2013, s.63. ↑
  33. Koç/Güneli, a.g.y., s.7. ↑
  34. Bilgi Toplumu Stratejisinin Yenilenmesi Projesi, İnternet Girişimciliği ve E-Ticaret Ekseni Mevcut Durum Raporu, 10 Nisan 2013, s.194, 195. ↑
  35. Mehmet Ertan Yardım, “Güvenli Elektronik İmzanın İnkarı”, (Çevrimiçi) http://www. iscturkey.org/2010/2008/2006/pdf/ bildiri/29.pdf, 4.2.2013. ↑
  36. Mesut Orta, Elektronik İmza ve Uygulaması, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2005, s.60. ↑
  37. Ayşe Ece Acar, Medeni Muhakeme Hukukunda Elektronik İmzalı Belgelerin Delil Niteliği, İstanbul, XII Levha Yayıncılık, 2013, s.165. ↑
  38. Acar, a.g.e., s.171. ↑
  39. Acar, a.g.e., s.171. ↑
  40. For a detailed explanation of these offences see: Dülger, Bilişim Suçları, s.637 – 652. ↑

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