2014Murat Volkan DülgerArticle

Abstract

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

With its judgment in Gäfgen v. Germany, delivered in 2010, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) made an unending debate in the field of criminal procedure even more intractable. With the motive of saving the life of an eleven-year-old child, a confession was taken from the suspect Magnus Gäfgen under threat of torture. Both the German courts and the ECtHR considered whether the use of evidence obtained on the basis of that confession, for the purpose of corroborating the suspect’s confession, affected the fairness of the trial.

In the end, both the national courts and the ECtHR stated that the suspect had been informed before the trial began that the confession taken from him under threat of torture was unlawful and would not be used at trial; that the suspect had nevertheless confessed of his own free will; that the real evidence obtained on the basis of the unlawfully taken confession had been used only to verify the truthfulness of the confessions the suspect had lawfully made; and that this had not rendered the trial unfair. While there are views that this judgment is lawful, there are also opposing views which maintain that the use of unlawfully obtained evidence renders the trial unfair in every case. In our article, by way of a detailed analysis of the judgment, it is essentially these two opposing views that are examined, and in conclusion our own view is stated.

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This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

A PROBLEM ON THE USAGE OF THE EVIDENCE RECEIVED BY THREATENING WITH TORTURE IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE GÄFGEN JUDGMENT BY EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Murat Volkan DÜLGER*

Abstract: With its 2010 judgment in Gäfgen v. Germany, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rendered a never-ending debate in the field of criminal procedure even more intractable. Both the German courts and the ECtHR considered whether the fairness of the trial was affected where evidence obtained on the basis of a confession extracted from the suspect Magnus Gäfgen under threat of torture, with the motive of saving the life of an eleven-year-old child, was used to verify the suspect’s confession. In the end, both the national courts and the ECtHR stated that the suspect had been informed before the trial began that the confession extracted from him under threat of torture was unlawful and would not be used in the trial; that the suspect had nevertheless confessed of his own free will; that the real evidence obtained on the basis of the unlawfully extracted confession had been used only to test the veracity of the confessions which the suspect had made lawfully; and that this had not rendered the trial unfair. While there are views to the effect that this judgment is in conformity with the law, there are also opposing views which maintain that the use of unlawfully obtained evidence renders the trial unfair in every case. In our article, by means of a detailed analysis of the judgment, essentially these

ning with torture and using them for correction of the suspect’s acknowledge with the inducement of rescueing an eleven year old kid’s life, was effected fair trial or not. In conclusion both national courts and ECHR, indicated that the suspect was informed before the proceeding get started, receiving the acknowledge by threatening with torture is contrary to law and can not be used in the proceeding, however the suspect acknowledged by his own will, the evidence received by the illegal acknowledge can be used only for checking the truth on the legal acknowledges, also this doesn’t make a proceeding unfair. There are some remarks in the doctrine in accordance with this judgment, however some further remarks as using any illegal evidence makes the proceeding unfair in any case. In this article these two contrary point of views are being examined basically by analysing the judgment in detail and our own opinion is being determined at the end.

Keywords: Unlawfull obtained evidence, distant action of unlawfull obtained evidence, fruits of poisonious tree, exclusionary rule, thread of tortue, inhuman or degrading treatment.

INTRODUCTION

Whether there can be exceptions to the prohibition of torture, and to the rule that evidence obtained by torture cannot be used as a means of proof, that is, as evidence, in criminal procedure, is a controversial question not only in our country and in Germany, on whose law the Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 is largely based, but throughout the world. Indeed, no consensus has been reached on this matter even in the Anglo-Saxon legal system, where the rules on unlawfully obtained evidence and its long-range effect emerged and are applied very strictly. In this connection the Fourth Amendment was added to the Constitution of the United States of America, an “exclusionary rule” was introduced, and attempts have been made to clarify the matter in a large number of court decisions. This example shows the importance of a subject that is controversial for all the legal systems of the world.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) sought, in the light of its judgment in Gäfgen v. Germany (Application no. 22978/05)1, to bring this problem to a solution of its own; or rather, by leaving what is, from a social, ethical and philosophical point of view, a hard case without a solution, as we see it, it made the problem even more complicated and also put at risk the gains achieved to date against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.

In its judgment of 1 June 2010 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR stated that, under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the prohibition of torture admits of no exception whatsoever, including where a person’s life is at risk. Indeed, this finding of the Grand Chamber also appears in identical terms in the reasoning of the judgment delivered by the Chamber of the ECtHR. There is a consensus in all countries – at least in those which claim to be modern States governed by the rule of law – that torture is absolutely prohibited and cannot be accepted as a method of interrogation.

Yet despite the existence of this consensus that torture is prohibited, it is still a matter of debate what legal consequences a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR will have, particularly in criminal proceedings, with regard to the perpetrator and the victim of torture. Indeed, in the application brought before it the ECtHR, after once again emphasising the principle of the prohibition of torture and the need for the protection of fundamental rights under the ECHR to be effective, entered into this debate in the judgment in question. In the result, the judgment discusses, on the one hand, the thoroughness of the investigation and the deterrent nature of the punishment to be imposed on the perpetrator and, on the other, discusses at length the exclusion, in the trial, of evidence obtained from a person who is the victim of torture or degrading ill-treatment by means of those very acts2.

The applicant alleged that the treatment to which he had been subjected on 1 October 2002, while being questioned by the police about the kidnapping and the whereabouts of an eleven-year-old child, constituted torture, a treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. The applicant further alleged that, because his statement obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention had been used as evidence in the criminal proceedings, his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, which comprises a person’s right to defend himself effectively and the right not to incriminate himself, had also been violated3.

In its legal assessment of the case, the ECtHR first stated that the threat of torture constituted inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the ECHR and that conduct of this kind could not be justified even if someone’s life was in danger. It is stated that the just compensation to be awarded to the person who is the victim of such conduct must at the same time be a notable punishment. Consequently, the ECtHR had to decide whether evidence obtained by means of a confession made under threat of torture was admissible in criminal proceedings. In this context the ECtHR, entering into various distinctions and details with regard to Article 6 of the ECHR which will be addressed in detail below, held that the fairness of the trial as a whole had not been affected.

The provisions alleged in the application to have been violated are laid down in Articles 3 and 6 of the ECHR. Article 3 of the ECHR provides: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.”; Article 6 of the ECHR provides: “Everyone … is entitled to have his case heard fairly and publicly, within a reasonable time, by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law which will decide on the criminal charges brought against him…”.

Since the ECHR has been duly brought into force in German domestic law, the provisions of the Convention and the judgments of the ECtHR have the same status in Germany as statute law4. The German courts, including the German Federal Court, are therefore obliged to apply the provisions of the ECHR5. The same is true of our country, and the ECHR is part of our domestic law. Moreover, sub-paragraph (f) of Article 311(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK)6 provides that a finding of a violation by the ECtHR in respect of a criminal judgment is a ground for the reopening of proceedings. In this respect, therefore, there is no difference between German law and Turkish law.

In our study, rather than examining the general theory of unlawfully obtained evidence and of exclusionary rules in the context of the prohibition of torture, we have made the judgment in question and its consequences the subject of examination and have taken care to follow the structure of the judgment. Accordingly, the facts of the case are presented first; thereafter the judgment of the ECtHR, its approach to the subject and its effects are assessed. In this way our study analyses the arguments of the ECtHR and, by assessing its approach to the subject, attempts to offer a general perspective. Finally, we set out our own views on the subject and the law as, in our opinion, it ought to be.

I. The Events Giving Rise to the Application and the Proceedings in Germany and before the ECtHR

On 27.9.2002 Magnus Gäfgen (MG), a law student living in Frankfurt, deceived Jakob von Metzler (JM), the eleven-year-old son of a banker in Frankfurt, by taking advantage of the fact that he was a friend of the boy’s elder sister and telling him that his sister had left her jacket at his home; he brought the boy to his flat, killed him by suffocation and concealed the body. Thereafter MG left a ransom note at the home of JM’s family, stating that JM had been kidnapped and that the kidnappers demanded one million euros. The note also said that the family would see the child again once the kidnappers had received the ransom and left the country. The applicant then took JM’s body by car to a privately owned pond near Birstein, about an hour’s drive from Frankfurt, and hid it there under a jetty. The family informed the police and, on police instructions, paid the ransom at a tram station at around 01:00 on the night of 30 September 2002. The necessary measures having been taken in advance, MG was placed under police surveillance from the moment he collected the ransom and was apprehended at Frankfurt airport in the afternoon of the same day7.

During the search of MG’s flat the police found, and seized, part of the ransom money and a note concerning the planning of the murder. Meanwhile MG stated that two other persons had been helping him and that they were holding JM in a hut by a lake. Daschner (D), the deputy chief of police in charge of the investigation, ordered police officer Ennigkeit (E) to frighten MG by threatening him with the infliction of physical pain in order to find out where the child was and, if necessary, even to subject him to such pain. Police officer E. thereupon told the applicant that, if he did not say where the child was, he would be subjected by a specially trained person to treatment that would cause him unbearably severe pain without leaving any traces. According to the applicant’s account, the same officer subsequently threatened to lock him in a cell with two huge black men and have them sexually assault him. This officer also struck the applicant several times on the chest with his hands and on one occasion banged his head against the wall. The Government, for its part, denied the allegations that the applicant had been physically assaulted during the interrogation and threatened with being subjected to sexual assault. As a result of this threat by E (but without it being physically carried out), MG disclosed some ten minutes later that he had in fact killed JM and where the body was. The applicant was then driven to Birstein in a car together with police officer M and several other police officers and there, while a video recording was being made, pointed out the exact location of the body. The police found JM’s body, as the applicant had said, under a jetty at a pond near Birstein. The applicant alleged that he had been forced to walk barefoot over pieces of wood to the place where he had left the body and had been obliged, on the instructions of the police, to point out the exact location of the body. The Government, for its part, denied the allegation that the applicant had been forced to walk without shoes and stated that no such thing had occurred8.

As a result of its forensic examination, the police identified tyre tracks belonging to MG’s car at the edge of the pond near Birstein where the body had been found. In consequence of this evidence, MG confessed, on the way back from the operation carried out at Birstein, that he had kidnapped and killed JM. Subsequently, at the places to which the applicant took them, the police found JM’s school books, his rucksack, his clothes and the container holding the typewriter that MG had used to write the ransom letter. The autopsy carried out on JM’s body on 2 October 2002 confirmed that JM had been killed by suffocation9.

In a note drawn up by the police on 1 October 2002 it was recorded that D, the deputy chief of the Frankfurt police, had said that he believed that morning that JM’s life, if he was still alive, was in danger because he had no food and the weather was cold. In order to save the child, deputy chief D instructed police officer E to threaten the applicant with the infliction of severe pain in a manner that would leave no traces. It was stated that this treatment was to be carried out under medical supervision. Deputy chief D further admitted that he had instructed another police officer to obtain a “truth serum” to be administered to the applicant. According to this note, the purpose of threatening the applicant was not to further the criminal investigation into the kidnapping but solely to protect the child’s life. In fact, since the applicant, who had been threatened with pain, subsequently disclosed where JM’s body was, no further measure was taken10.

MG confirmed his confession of 1 October 2002 in the statements he made to the police on 4 October 2002 and to the public prosecutor on 4, 14 and 17 October 2002, and when he was questioned by a judge on 30 January 200311.

At the first hearing of the trial held before the Frankfurt Regional Court (FBM) on 9 April 2003, MG lodged his first application, seeking the discontinuation of the proceedings (the return of the indictment)12. MG based this request on the fact that, before making his confession, he had been threatened by police officer E with the infliction of severe pain and with sexual assault. MG submitted that this treatment was contrary to Article 136a of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP)13 and to Article 3 of the ECHR and asked that the indictment against him be returned. In the alternative, MG sought a declaration that the statements he had made to the investigating authorities while the effects of the threat of violence used against him on 1 October 2002 were still continuing (Fortwirkung) could not be relied on in these criminal proceedings. MG further sought a declaration that, since the investigating authorities had come upon items of evidence such as the child’s body after his confession had been obtained in breach of Article 136a CCP, the use of those items as evidence was prohibited by virtue of the principle that “the fruit of the poisonous tree is poisonous” (Fernwirkung)14.

The FBM accepted that MG had been threatened with the infliction of severe pain if he did not say where the victim was. It concluded, however, that it had not been proved that MG had been threatened with sexual assault or had been influenced in any other way. The FBM therefore held, first of all, that this threat made by the police amounted to a violation of Art. 136a CCP, of Art. 115 and Art. 104(1)16 of the German Constitution and of Art. 3 ECHR. Notwithstanding this finding, that is to say, notwithstanding the fact that MG’s constitutional rights had been violated, the FBM concluded that this did not bar the criminal prosecution and dismissed the application17.

At this stage MG made two applications to the Regional Court: the discontinuation of the proceedings (the return of the indictment) and the non-use of the evidence obtained from him (on the basis of his confession). As regards the first of these requests, the Regional Court said that, although there had been a breach of MG’s constitutional rights, this did not bar the criminal proceedings and the case could therefore proceed. According to the Regional Court, the use of the method of interrogation in question, although prohibited by law, had not restricted the rights of the defence to such an extent as to bar the criminal proceedings. Having regard to the seriousness of the offences with which the accused was charged, there was no exceptional and intolerable breach of the rule of law such as to preclude the continuation of the criminal proceedings18. As regards the second of the requests, the FBM stated that, pursuant to Art. 136a(3) CCP, the statements and confessions made by MG to the police, at the public prosecutor’s office and before the investigating judge could not be admitted as evidence in the criminal proceedings because they had been obtained by prohibited methods of interrogation. Accordingly, every statement made by MG as a result of these prohibited interrogation activities is unlawfully obtained evidence and cannot be used in the proceedings. This exclusion of evidence (Beweisverwertungsverbot – Exclusionary Rule) covers not only the statements made immediately after the unlawful threat but also all the other statements made to the investigating authorities from that day onwards, for as long as the consequences of the breach of Article 136a CCP continued19.

While stating that MG’s confessions and statements were inadmissible as evidence under Art. 136a(3) CCP, the FBM excepted from this the evidence obtained as a result of MG’s statements (the child’s body, the tyre tracks, etc.) and held that it could be used in the trial20. In other words, it stated that this was lawful evidence and could be used. The Regional Court reached this conclusion by drawing an interesting distinction with regard both to the evidence to be excluded and to the evidence that could be taken into consideration. According to the court, the irregularity caused by the use of prohibited methods could have been remedied only if, at the time of his subsequent statement, the accused had been informed that his earlier statements, made as a result of the threat of being subjected to pain, could not be used as evidence against him. In reality, however, the applicant had merely been told that he had the right not to make a statement; he had not been given any information to the effect that unlawfully obtained evidence was inadmissible. The instruction given to the applicant before he made his subsequent statements was therefore not a “qualified instruction” (qualifizierte Belehrung)21. As can be seen, in view of the delicate situation encountered, the court indicated that, in order for the unlawfulness to be remedied, an “informed instruction”, akin as it were to the “informed consent” used in medical law, had to be given and that, failing this, the statements made after the statement that followed the ill-treatment were also unlawful, because the state of being a victim continued. The FBM limited the inadmissible evidence to these statements. On that basis, it dismissed the applicant’s request for a declaration that items of evidence such as the child’s body, which had become known to the investigating authorities as a result of the statements extracted from him by prohibited methods, would be excluded from the criminal proceedings and would not be used22. The relevant part of the FBM’s decision reads as follows:

“The breach of Article 136a of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not have so wide an effect as to require that the items of evidence obtained as a result of a statement may not be used as evidence. Our court shares the conciliatory view (Mittelmeinung) taken by scholars and the courts; according to this view, the interests must be balanced in the particular circumstances of the case; for the purposes of that balance, regard must be had in particular to whether the legal order has been flagrantly violated, as in the case of the provisions on fundamental rights, and to the seriousness of the offence under investigation. In the present case, when the gravity of the interference with the accused’s fundamental rights, in the form of a threat to use physical violence, is weighed against the seriousness of the offence with which the accused is charged and which has to be investigated, in the form of the killing of a child, the offence in question outweighs the request that items of evidence obtained as a result of the accused’s statement, such as, in particular, the discovery of the child’s body and the autopsy subsequently carried out, should not be used.”

This has led us to think that the FBM in fact excluded the theory of the long-range effect of unlawfully obtained evidence and accepted that evidence obtained on the basis of evidence procured by unlawful methods may be used under certain conditions. As the decision itself indicates, however, this approach is in fact the view found in German criminal procedure scholarship and in the decisions of the courts, which decides whether evidence obtained by unlawful means may or may not be used by weighing the protected legal interests.

After all this, MG, in reply to the charges, confessed that he had killed JM; indeed, he also admitted that he had acted from the outset with the aim of killing JM. On 28.7.2003 the court found MG guilty of kidnapping by force and of intentional killing and sentenced him to life imprisonment23. Some German authors, stating that the facts learned and the evidence found in the course of the investigation and prosecution rested on MG’s confessions at the trial and on the other evidence obtained, imply that the statements which MG made under threat of torture played no part in the formation of this judgment24. As we shall explain in detail below, we do not share this view.

The FBM stated that at the trial the applicant had been informed anew of his right to remain silent and of the fact that his earlier statements could not be used as evidence, and that the necessary qualified instruction had thus been given. Following the qualified instruction, the applicant confessed that he had kidnapped and killed JM. The applicant’s statements at the trial concerning the planning of the offence formed an essential, if not the only, basis for the court’s findings of fact. The testimony of JM’s elder sister, the ransom letter and a note concerning the planning of the offence found in the applicant’s flat corroborated those statements of the applicant. It was stated that the findings of fact concerning the commission of the offence were based exclusively on the applicant’s confession at the trial, and that the other items of evidence showed that the applicant was telling the truth and were used for that purpose. These items were stated to include the autopsy report on the cause of the child’s death, the tyre tracks of the applicant’s car at the edge of the pond where the child’s body had been found, and the money from the ransom which had been found in his flat and paid into a bank account25.

The Regional Court further found that the applicant had been questioned by methods of interrogation prohibited by Article 136a CCP. According to the Regional Court, whether and to what extent deputy chief D and police officer E were guilty on account of these threats would be determined at the conclusion of the investigation pending against them. However, the allegedly unlawful acts of these officers had not mitigated the offence committed by the applicant. The wrongful conduct of police officers, who belong to the executive, does not and must not prevent the judiciary from assessing the facts in accordance with the law26.

Following his conviction, MG appealed to the Federal Court of Justice (BGH), complaining of the Regional Court’s dismissal of the preliminary application he had made. The complaint also stated that the Regional Court had refused to declare that items of evidence such as the child’s body, which had become known to the investigating authorities as a result of the statements extracted by prohibited methods, could not be used in the criminal proceedings. The Federal Public Prosecutor, for his part, stated in his observations, among other arguments, that such a complaint was in any event unfounded, because the Regional Court had used only the confession which the applicant had made at the trial after it had informed him that his earlier statements would not be admitted as evidence. By its decision of 21 May 2004 the BGH dismissed MG’s appeal without giving any reasons27.

MG thereupon lodged a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court on 23 June 2004. The applicant alleged that, with regard to the manner in which he had been questioned by the police on the morning of 1 October 2002, Article 1(1) and the second sentence of Article 104(1) of the Constitution had been violated. The Federal Constitutional Court likewise dismissed MG’s complaint, by its decision of 14 December 2004. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the fact that fundamental rights had been violated outside the trial did not necessitate the conclusion that a judgment delivered by the criminal court on the basis of the findings it had made during the trial was unconstitutional. In the case in issue the criminal courts had found that the methods of investigation used by the police were prohibited, but had differed from the applicant as to the legal consequences to be drawn from that finding. The criminal courts had taken the view that the statements obtained as a result of the conduct in question could not be used, but that there was no specific bar to the continuation of the criminal proceedings. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the procedural flaw caused by the use of prohibited methods of interrogation could be said to have been remedied by the criminal courts, because those courts had prohibited the admission of the statements thus obtained. This prohibition was laid down in Art. 136a(3) CCP in order to compensate for breaches of the rights of the person concerned, whereas the conditions under which a serious procedural irregularity could constitute a bar to the criminal proceedings were not laid down in the statute. For example, as put forward in the applicant’s submissions, while the exclusion by the courts of evidence obtained by prohibited methods was provided for in the statute, it was not provided for in the statute that this should bar the conduct of the proceedings. That being so, the applicant had failed to explain why the methods of investigation in question should not merely prohibit the use of the statements thereby obtained but should, in addition, constitute a bar to the criminal proceedings against him. Secondly, the Federal Constitutional Court also found unfounded the constitutional complaint which the applicant had lodged concerning the Regional Court’s refusal of his request that the items of evidence obtained as a result of the confession extracted under threat be excluded from the trial, and stated that the applicant had not raised this issue before the Federal Court of Justice.

At the end of these proceedings the German courts accepted that the threat of torture used against MG was unlawful and that the confession obtained as a result of that threat could not be used as a means of proof at the trial; on the other hand, they accepted that the child’s body, the tyre tracks and the other evidence obtained as a result of MG’s confession could be used to corroborate the confession which MG had made of his own free will before the court28.

In the meantime, as a result of the criminal complaint lodged by the applicant with the Frankfurt Regional Court against police officers D and E, alleging that they had tortured him, criminal proceedings were brought against those persons. In its judgment the Regional Court stated that the method of interrogation used on the applicant was not lawful and did not accept the defence of necessity put forward for the use of this method, which violated human dignity as enshrined in Article 1 of the Constitution. According to the FBM, respect for human dignity lies at the heart of the second sentence of Article 104(1) of the Constitution and of Article 3 of the ECHR. The protection of human dignity is absolute and allows of no exceptions and no balancing of interests. In the result, the FBM sentenced the police officers to fines and suspended their sentences. In addition, the police officers in question were assigned to other departments not concerned with the investigation of offences and thus also suffered a setback in their careers29.

Ultimately, having exhausted all the domestic remedies available in the German legal system, MG lodged an application with the ECtHR on 15.6.200530. On 30.6.2008 the 5th Section of the ECtHR held that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR but that MG could no longer claim to be a victim of that violation, and further that there had been no violation of Article 6 of the ECHR31. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held, by 11 votes to 6, that for the purposes of Article 34 of the ECHR MG could still claim to be a victim of the violation of Article 3 of the ECHR; but, again by 11 votes to 6, that there had been no violation of Article 6(1) and (3) of the ECHR. The reasons for the ECtHR’s judgment and the reasoning by which it arrived at this result are explained in detail below.

II. Assessment of the Judgment with regard to the Violation of Article 3 of the ECHR (Prohibition of Torture and Ill-Treatment)

Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment32. On that basis the ECtHR was obliged, in the course of the case, to seek answers to two questions, namely “whether the threat of severe pain is to be characterised as inhuman treatment or as torture” and “whether this is to be decided according to a generally valid rule or according to the specific case”, and it formed its judgment within the framework of the answers it gave to these questions. In order to determine whether there had been a violation of Article 6, which was the main problem the Court had to resolve in this case, it first had to answer these questions. The judgment therefore begins with an examination under Article 3.

1. The Degree of the Threat Applied to the Victim and the Recognition of the Threat of Torture as a Violation

The ECHR contains no definition of what constitutes inhuman treatment and ill-treatment. For this reason the ECtHR has over time developed case law on the definition of inhuman treatment33. According to that definition, having regard to its effects, inhuman treatment must cause either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering34. Only a person on whom effects of this kind have been produced can be called a “victim” of the treatment in question. In addition, a “minimum level of severity” (must attain a minimum level of severity)35 must have been reached by the treatment36. The assessment of that minimum level varies according to the specific case: factors such as the intention to inflict suffering, the purposes of the treatment, the duration and content of the treatment and the situation of the person subjected to the treatment are taken into account in determining it37. In the final assessment of this question, however, the common standards of the European public order must always be borne in mind38. Accordingly, inhuman and degrading treatment may be defined as “treatment which, although it attains the minimum level of severity, lacks at least one of the elements required39 for it to be characterised as torture”40.

According to the Court, any treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The assessment of this level of severity depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim41. The purpose of the treatment, together with the intention and the motive behind it42, and also whether it occurred in a context of heightened tension and emotions43, are further factors to be taken into account44. The Court characterises as “inhuman” treatment that was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch over a long period and caused actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering45; and treatment which arouses in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them, or which drives the victim to act against his own will and conscience, is “degrading” treatment46 in the Court’s assessment47. In deciding whether a particular form of ill-treatment is to be characterised as torture, the Court has regard to the distinction drawn in Article 3 of the Convention between the notion of torture and the notions of inhuman or degrading treatment48. As also noted in the Court’s earlier judgments, it appears that the purpose of the Convention in drawing such a distinction was to place special emphasis on deliberate inhuman treatment causing very severe suffering49. Although a qualitative distinction is drawn between inhuman and degrading treatment and torture, neither is characterised as lighter or graver than the other.

Where there is an act committed with intent, together with aggravating factors such as harsh pressure and intense physical or mental suffering, inhuman treatment is deemed to have taken the form of torture50. In addition, the purpose of conduct defined as torture is generally to obtain information from someone, to inflict punishment on someone or to intimidate someone51. It must not be forgotten, however, that this definition has been formulated by the ECtHR and within the framework of the interpretation of the Convention52.

In its judgment the Court states that, in the case giving rise to the application, since deputy chief of police D, before finally giving the order to threaten the applicant with torture, had on several occasions ordered the heads of the units subordinate to him to use force against the applicant if necessary, it could not be accepted that he had given the order on the spur of the moment, and that the act had clearly been carried out with intent (in a premeditated manner). Another point made in the judgment is that the applicant was handcuffed while in custody in the interrogation room and was therefore in a state of vulnerability and constraint. Accordingly, having regard to the findings of the German national courts and to the material before it, the Court states in its judgment that the police officers, who believed that JM’s life could be saved, were persuaded to use this method of interrogation53. As will be seen below in the assessment under Article 6, this characterisation had a bearing on the Court’s decision.

It has become common in proceedings before the ECtHR for non-governmental organisations and advisers on the Government’s side to take part in the case and submit observations. The participation in the proceedings of persons who were victimised by the applicant, on the other hand, is a method applied only in exceptional circumstances. Owing to the importance and the implications of this case, that exceptional course was followed. Thus both JM’s parents and the Redress Trust, a non-governmental organisation, were heard by the Court and presented their views. Indeed, in its judgment the Court set out the views of both intervening parties. While JM’s parents supported the Government’s submissions, the Redress Trust sided with MG as regards his being a victim of the threat of torture54. In this connection the Redress Trust, relying in particular on the findings of the Convention institutions in the Greek case55 and in Akkoç v. Türkiye56, emphasised that, in order for a given act to constitute torture, it was not necessary for physical injury to have been caused. Mental harm is in itself a widespread form of torture; moreover, the Court confirms that even the mere threat of an act prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention may violate that Article57.

In the present case the ECtHR stated that the threat of torture had caused considerable fear, anguish and mental suffering. For MG was threatened to a considerable degree in order to make him confess where he had hidden the body, and this threat was made by the police officers for the purpose of producing those effects. As regards the circumstances of the specific case, the ECtHR held that the conduct directed against the accused had attained the minimum level of severity within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. The ECtHR stated, however, that the level of severity of the acts carried out did not reach the threshold of torture58. Furthermore, the Redress Trust, referring to Labita v. Italy59, emphasised that the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is absolute and that there is no limitation and no circumstance capable of justification that takes account of the conduct of the victim or the circumstances of the case60.

In this context it is prohibited to threaten anyone with torture even without any physical contact, for this act is regarded at the very least as inhuman treatment. Indeed, the Court expressly said so in the judgment. Accordingly, a threat of conduct prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention, provided it is sufficiently real and immediate, will constitute a violation of Article 3. To threaten a person with torture therefore constitutes at least inhuman treatment61.

2. The Rule that Torture, the Threat of Torture and Inhuman Treatment Cannot Be Regarded as Legitimate under Any Circumstances

When assessing the circumstances of a case, the ECtHR seeks an answer to the question whether the conduct alleged to have been directed against the accused was justified. This is because, at first sight, the definition of inhuman treatment appears also to cover conduct that is not prohibited, such as the legitimate use of force by law enforcement, the imprisonment of a suspect or perpetrator by order of a judge, or fighting in wartime. If conduct of this kind is properly justified, it can no longer be characterised as inhuman treatment. Thus, although certain acts may at first sight appear to be ill-treatment, they may, provided that they are justified, be in conformity with the law and hence with Article 3 of the Convention. The point to be noted here, however, is that such acts are regarded as falling outside the scope of the Convention. Acts of this kind therefore do not constitute an exception to Article 3; since they lie outside that Article, they are not assessed under it. According to the ECtHR, torture, the threat of torture and inhuman treatment can never, at any time or under any circumstances, be regarded as legitimate, nor can they be founded on any legitimate basis62. The furthest point of this is that a threat of torture made by State authority is regarded as inhuman treatment in every conceivable circumstance, including where it is made in order to save the life of a child.

Indeed, the Court states this expressly in its judgment as well. According to the Court, Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Unlike the other Articles of the Convention, this Article admits of no exception clause, and it cannot be suspended under Article 15(2) of the Convention even in times of emergency threatening the life of the nation63. The Court confirms that even in the most difficult circumstances, such as terrorism or organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, whatever the conduct of the person concerned64. The Court therefore states that the nature of the offence allegedly committed by the applicant is of no relevance for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention65.

On this point the ECtHR does not accept any weighing of the protected legal interests66. It is clear and beyond doubt that the prohibition of torture in Article 3 of the Convention admits of no exception67. The same rule applies to the prohibition of the threat of torture68. The strict prohibition of torture is the result of an important lesson learned from history69. Indeed, the creation of the Council of Europe and the establishment of an effective protection mechanism (formerly the Commission and the old Court, subsequently the Court) are the result of that bitter lesson70. What happened recently at Guantanamo is an example of the unacceptability of exceptions in this field71. It is therefore not appropriate to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate torture, or to draw a distinction according to whether torture is carried out for purposes of prosecution or of security. Situations that are said to make torture necessary are always situations in which there is suspicion, and the suspicion may be mistaken. Moreover, if torture were accepted, there would be no definite limit to its use72. These are reasons derived from history and from practice. From a legal and ethical point of view, on the other hand, the importance of the prohibition of torture can be inferred from the guarantee of human dignity or from the conditions of the legitimacy of the State. This gives deontological ethics precedence over consequentialist or teleological ethical theory73.

In view of the situation presented by the specific case, the consequences of the stance taken by the Court in its judgments up to this case will be difficult for German legal scholarship and practice to accept. Indeed, there are views in German scholarship to the effect that torture and ill-treatment may be excused in situations of this kind74. On the assumption that JM was still alive and that none of the attempts to obtain a confession from MG had succeeded, MG would have been under a legal obligation to reveal where he had hidden the child.

Otherwise MG would have been liable for intentional killing by omission. It would, however, have been unlawful for the police to disregard the law and put pressure on MG to make him say where he had hidden the child. When one considers which interests were at stake in such a situation, it can be seen that on the one side there was the child’s life and on the other MG’s freedom of will. Viewed from a different angle, under German law there is, in a case such as this, no provision prohibiting anyone other than public officials from subjecting the suspect to a threat of torture. It would therefore be acceptable to hand MG over to any person who was in a situation of self-defence. This line of reasoning shows that the reason for the prohibition of torture does not lie solely in its adverse effects on the person subjected to it75. The first reason for it is the limitation of public power in order to protect people from the danger of such violence, which by its very nature has no inherent limit. Indeed, the infliction of painful punishments by the State without a justified excuse is a phenomenon with deep historical roots76. Torture and the threat of torture perhaps embody the power of violence in its most intense form, for the person subjected to them is left entirely at the mercy of the State77. In conclusion, the ECtHR is right not to accept any exception to the prohibition of torture78.

In its assessment under Article 3, the Court, also taking into account the particular features of the specific situation as regards the violation of that Article, relied on the following reasoning:

“107. In this connection the Court accepts that the motive behind the police officers’ conduct was to save the child’s life. However, having regard to Article 3 of the Convention and to the Court’s established case law, it must be emphasised that the prohibition of ill-treatment applies whatever the conduct of the victim or the motive of the authorities (see paragraph 87 above). Torture or inhuman or degrading treatment cannot be inflicted even where a person’s life is at risk. No suspension of this prohibition is permitted even in a state of emergency threatening the life of the nation. Article 3 of the Convention, which is framed in unambiguous terms, recognises that every human being has an absolute and inalienable right not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment, even in the most difficult circumstances. The philosophical basis underpinning the absolute nature of the right under Article 3 of the Convention does not allow for any exception or justifying factor or balancing of interests, whatever the conduct of the person concerned and the nature of the offence.

108. Having regard to the factors characterising the treatment to which the applicant was subjected, the Court is satisfied that the real and immediate threat made against him in order to obtain information from him attained the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. According to the Court’s judgments referring to the definition in Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and to the views of the international human rights monitoring bodies referred to by the Redress Trust, a threat of torture may also amount to torture, since torture covers both physical and mental suffering. In particular, the fear of physical torture may itself constitute mental torture. However, there appears to be broad agreement, and the Court likewise considers, that the classification of whether a given threat of physical torture amounts to psychological torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment depends on all the circumstances of the case and, in particular, on the severity of the pressure exerted and the intensity of the suffering caused. Comparing the applicant’s case with those in which it has found torture, the Court considers that the method of interrogation to which the applicant was subjected in the present case was sufficiently serious to amount to inhuman treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention, but that it did not reach the level of cruelty required to attain the threshold of torture.”

3. The Victim’s Allegations of Having Been Subjected to Physical Torture and Ill-Treatment

As set out above in the account of the events giving rise to the application, the applicant alleges that, in addition to the threat of torture, he was physically assaulted by police officers while in custody and that he was also subjected to ill-treatment causing him physical pain when he was taken to Birstein to point out the location. Since these allegations of the applicant are important for the legal characterisation of the evidence obtained, they must be assessed with regard to a possible violation of both Article 3 and Article 6.

In assessing the evidence on which to base its decision as to whether Article 3 of the Convention has been violated, the Court adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”. Such proof may, however, also follow from sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or from similar unrebutted presumptions of fact79. The Court has held that, in particular where a person is taken into custody in good health but is found to be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused, and that the State’s failure to do so will raise a clear issue under Article 3 of the Convention80. Where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court conducts a particularly thorough scrutiny81. However, as the Court has consistently stated in similar situations, where domestic proceedings have taken place on the matter, it is not the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment for the national courts’ assessment of the facts, since it is as a rule for those courts to assess the evidence before them82. Although the Court is not bound by the findings of the national courts, it states that in normal circumstances there must be cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by those courts83.

Approaching the matter first from the standpoint of the applicant’s allegations that he had been threatened with physical assault, injury and sexual assault during the interrogation, the Court, in assessing whether these allegations, which the Government disputed, had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, had regard to the medical documents submitted by the applicant and found that his allegations of assault during the interrogation were not wholly without foundation. These documents in fact show that the applicant sustained the bruises on his chest on the day before the medical examination. The Court nevertheless also attached importance, alongside the Government’s explanations as to the cause of the applicant’s injuries, to the views of JM’s parents on this point. In this connection the Government and JM’s parents, relying on the applicant’s statements in his book84 published in 2005, argued that all the injuries sustained by the applicant, including the skin lesions, had been caused when he was laid face down during his apprehension. The Court further noted that the national courts had stated that the applicant’s additional allegations had not been proved. It is stated that the applicant does not appear to have alleged before the national courts, which heard and assessed the evidence, that he had sustained his physical injuries during the interrogation, at least not to the same extent as he did before the Court. Moreover, the medical documents are seen to contain no explanation as to the probable cause of the injuries. In view of the foregoing, the Court stated that it had reached the conclusion that the applicant’s complaints concerning physical assaults and injuries during the interrogation, as well as his allegation of having been subjected to sexual abuse, had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt85.

Secondly, the Court also assessed the applicant’s allegation that at Birstein he had been made to walk without shoes over wood and had been forced to point out directly the place where the body was and to disclose the other items of evidence, and had thus been subjected to treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. The Government disputed these allegations as well. The Court noted that, according to the findings of the national courts, the applicant had agreed after the interrogation to go with the police officers to the pond where he had hidden JM’s body. The Court stated that there was nothing to indicate that the applicant had been verbally threatened by the police officers present on the way to Birstein in order to make him point out the exact location of JM’s body; however, the question whether and to what extent the applicant’s disclosure of the evidence at Birstein was linked to the threats made at the police headquarters was a question to be determined under Article 6 of the Convention. Since the medical documents stated that there were swellings and blisters on the soles of the applicant’s feet, the Court found that his allegation that he had been forced to walk without shoes was not wholly without foundation. However, the national courts, having examined the evidence before them, did not consider these allegations, which the applicant had not raised at the outset of the proceedings before the national court, to have been proved. The doctors’ examinations had not been able to establish the cause of these injuries. In those circumstances the Court did not accept that the applicant’s allegations in this respect had been proved beyond reasonable doubt86.

In conclusion, the Court accepted that the first of the applicant’s three allegations of torture and ill-treatment had been proved, namely that on the morning of 1 October 2002 he had been threatened by the police with being subjected to unbearable pain in order to make him disclose JM’s whereabouts87. As regards the other two allegations, namely that he had been subjected to physical ill-treatment while making his statement and being interrogated and during the pointing-out of the location at Birstein, the Court held that, since nothing had been clearly proved, no violation had occurred.

4. The Problem of the Continuation of Victim Status

a. Allegations and Replies

According to the established case law of the ECtHR, “victim” status arising from a violation of the provisions of the ECHR continues unless the national authorities afford the injured person the necessary redress and make an effort to remedy the situation. There is thus a continuing victim status and, with it, a continuing violation. In cases of deliberately inflicted ill-treatment, an effective and thorough investigation into what happened must be carried out and compensation must be awarded to the injured person88. Beyond this, the ECtHR requires that those who inflicted the torture or ill-treatment be investigated and that a satisfactory punishment be imposed89. In addition, it states that persons under investigation should be temporarily suspended from duty and, in serious cases, that those who are convicted should be dismissed90.

In the present case the German courts and the ECtHR established that there had been a violation of Article 3. The two police officers were found guilty by the Frankfurt Regional Court of threat and of instigation to threat. The fines imposed, however, were extremely moderate: police officer E. was fined 3,600 euros and police officer D. 10,800 euros91. By way of disciplinary sanction, both were transferred to posts within the institution in which they could not take part in criminal investigations. D, however, was subsequently promoted.

In the first judgment, delivered by the Chamber, it was held that the fact that the national courts had acknowledged the violation of Article 3 and that the police officers had been punished and, in particular, that the use of prohibited methods in the investigation had resulted in a sanction in the form of the inadmissibility at trial of the statements made by the applicant before the trial, had to be interpreted as meaning that victim status no longer subsisted92.

The applicant, for his part, argued in particular, among other grounds, that the previous state of affairs (status quo ante) could be restored only by excluding from the trial all the items of evidence obtained as a direct result of the violation of Article 3 of the Convention. That evidence, which by reason of its admission had determined the outcome of the trial from the very outset, had implicitly secured his conviction and the imposition of the maximum possible sentence. The exclusion of only the statements he had made under coercion before the trial was not sufficient for redress, because once the real evidence had been admitted those statements were no longer needed for the prosecution’s case against him93. Relying on the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the applicant therefore argued that his victim status would come to an end with the exclusion from the trial of all the evidence which was in any way based on, and/or connected with, the statements unlawfully obtained from him.

The Government, for its part, in addition to its replies to the other allegations, responded to this important allegation in particular by stating that the Frankfurt Regional Court had excluded not only the confession of 1 October 2002 but also all the subsequent confessions made by the applicant before the trial to the police, to the public prosecutor and to a judge; but that the applicant, after having been informed that his earlier confessions would not be used as evidence, had made a new and full confession on the second day of the trial, before any evidence had yet been adduced94.

b. Relevant Principles

In order for a finding to be made that victim status no longer subsists, it must first be established that Article 3 has been violated; thereafter the principles governing the removal of victim status must be set out and an examination must be carried out in respect of each of those principles. In the case in question these principles were set out both by the Court and by the Redress Trust95. The principles are as follows:

First, an investigation must be conducted which is capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the ill-treatment96. Secondly, States are obliged to have an effective criminal justice system capable of effectively punishing those who commit torture and other prohibited ill-treatment and of preventing them from reoffending in the future97. Thirdly, for torture and other forms of ill-treatment to be adequately redressed, there must also be effective civil remedies, in particular to secure compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. The Court itself has consistently said that in cases of serious violations the mere delivery of a judgment will not constitute sufficient just satisfaction, and has awarded compensation for non-pecuniary damage98. Fourthly, in order to restore the rights concerned with regard to the continuing consequences of torture, confessions made involuntarily must be excluded. Fifthly, the State must take measures to guarantee that the prohibited act will not be repeated99.

For the purposes of this application, however, the fourth principle is of far greater importance than the others. In order to reach a correct result, the findings as to whether there has been a violation of Article 6 can be made by looking at whether the fourth principle has been complied with.

c. The Court’s Decision on Victim Status

Of the principles governing the determination of whether victim status continues, the Court first examined whether the national authorities had acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, the breach of the Convention. As a result of this examination the Court declared itself satisfied that the national courts called upon to rule on this issue had acknowledged expressly and in an unequivocal manner that the method by which the applicant’s statement had been taken had violated Article 3 of the Convention100.

The Chamber, which first examined the application in the proceedings before the Court, stated in its judgment of 2008 that the applicant had been subjected to inhuman treatment but that his victim status no longer subsisted, since the German courts had expressly acknowledged that there had been a violation of his rights, and moreover those who had inflicted this treatment had been punished and the statements obtained by this means had been kept out of the trial. The Grand Chamber, by contrast, approached the matter from a different angle and stated that the penalties imposed on the police officers were so disproportionate as to show that they had been treated with manifest leniency. The six judges who gave a minority opinion, for their part, stated that whether an applicant’s victim status continues does not depend on the severity of the penalty imposed on the police officers who subjected him to inhuman treatment. Those judges observed that, according to the Court’s case law, issues of this kind – apart from friendly settlements – are left to the competence of the national authorities. Victim status must therefore be determined without regard to the imposition of a penalty and the fixing of its amount, which are matters for the national authorities. The judges in the majority, on the other hand, pointed out in clear terms that, in the fight against torture, the application of deterrent and effective policies by the States Parties to the Convention is of great importance for the upholding of human rights. This requires, at the very least, that penalties harsher than minor ones be imposed on State officials who are implicated in torture or inhuman treatment. In addition, victims must have the right of access to effective, adequate and accessible domestic remedies at national level enabling them to obtain redress for the harm they have suffered101.

The Court stated that, in principle, it falls first to the national authorities to provide redress for any violation of the Convention. It further explained that the question whether the applicant is a victim of the alleged violation may arise at every stage of the proceedings before the Convention institutions102. The Court stated expressly that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not, as a rule, sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, that the Convention has been violated and have afforded redress for the violation103.

The ECtHR states that, notwithstanding the existence of mitigating circumstances, the penalties imposed on the police officers are indicative of a disproportion in relation to the seriousness of the offences in question104. The ECtHR found that the deterrent effect necessary to prevent violations of Article 3 of the ECHR in difficult situations that may arise in the future had not been created. With regard to this disproportion the ECtHR referred to the case of Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria, which it had decided earlier105. In that case two police officers had intentionally inflicted grievous bodily harm on a person. Their subsequent negligence resulted in the person’s death. As in the Gäfgen case, those police officers were punished with the minimum penalty permitted by law106. In that situation the Court held that Article 3 had also been violated together with Article 2 (that, since the finding made in respect of Article 2 also covered Article 3, it was unnecessary to give a separate ruling under Article 3)107. This reference is an important clue in that it shows how the Court looked at the case.

From Article 1 of the ECHR the Court derives the rule that the Convention must prevent human rights violations effectively.

A State is obliged to secure the realisation and implementation of the human rights guaranteed by the Convention. Those rights must be not “theoretical and illusory” but “practical and effective”108. The Court regards it as a precondition for an investigation to be effective in practice as well that the State should have enacted provisions penalising practices contrary to Article 3 of the Convention109. Accordingly, the courts of a State are bound by the ECHR just as they are by the statutes of their own domestic law. For this reason the criminal courts must have regard to the effectiveness of the rights protected by the Convention. Moreover, the victim never has a right to demand a sanction corresponding to this obligation. The state of being a “victim” in which the person finds himself (the finding that victim status continues) is therefore of importance solely for the sake of preventing future violations of the ECHR110.

The ECtHR states that the police officers were punished with very light and suspended penalties for the offences they had committed against the applicant. In this connection the Court observes that it is not its task to rule on the degree of individual guilt111 or to determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed on the offender, these being matters falling exclusively within the jurisdiction of the national courts. Nevertheless, under Article 19 of the Convention and in accordance with the principle that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective, the Court must ensure that the State adequately complies with its obligation to protect the rights of those within its jurisdiction112. It follows that, while the Court accepts that it is for the national courts to choose the appropriate sanctions for ill-treatment by State officials, it must retain its supervisory function and intervene in cases in which there is a manifest disproportion between the gravity of the act and the punishment imposed. Otherwise the State’s duty to carry out an effective investigation would lose much of its meaning113. This problem is a reflection of the fact that guilt is individual. It can be resolved only by the courts at the place of the events, which are in direct contact with the evidence and with the persons connected with the case and which constantly encounter similar cases of this kind. That is why the ECtHR intervenes only where the national courts have refrained from imposing on the perpetrator the punishment that is called for.

In its judgment the Court stated that this case was not comparable to certain other cases114 in which State officials who had committed arbitrary and brutal acts had attempted to conceal them and in which the Court had considered that the imposition of an enforceable prison sentence would have been more appropriate. It was nevertheless also emphasised that the imposition of token fines of 60 daily rates of 60 euros on the one and 90 daily rates of 120 euros on the other, and the subsequent suspension of those penalties, even if consistent with the sentencing practice of the respondent State, could not be regarded as an adequate response to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. It was stated in clear terms that such a penalty, which is manifestly disproportionate to the violation of one of the core rights of the Convention, does not have the deterrent effect necessary to prevent breaches of the prohibition of ill-treatment in difficult situations in the future115.

As regards the disciplinary sanctions imposed, the Court further found that both D and E had been transferred, during the investigation and the trial, to units not directly concerned with the investigation of offences, and that D had subsequently been appointed head of the Department for Technology, Logistics and Administration of the General Directorate of Police. While accepting that the facts of this case were not of the same gravity as those of other similar cases, the Court nevertheless found that D’s subsequent appointment as head of a police unit raised serious doubts as to whether the authorities had responded adequately to the seriousness of the breach of Article 3 of the Convention116.

In addition to the objection concerning the leniency of the sanction, the ECtHR criticises the fact that MG’s compensation claim, and his obtaining legal aid in order to be able to bring that claim, took more than three years117. Indeed, the applicant also applied for compensation for the damage he had suffered as a result of the violation of Article 3 of the Convention. As regards the question whether the violation of Article 3 of the Convention was remedied at national level through the payment of compensation, the Court points out, first of all, that the applicant’s application for legal aid for the compensation action had been pending for three years and that, while the application was being examined before the Court, no hearing had yet been held and no judgment had been given on the merits of the claim. In this connection the Court stated that, having regard to the seriousness of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, it awards compensation for non-pecuniary damage under Article 41 of the Convention118. The Court is of the opinion that appropriate and sufficient redress for a Convention violation can be afforded only on condition that the application for compensation is accessible, adequate and effective. In particular, excessive delay in an action for compensation will render the remedy ineffective119. The Court stated that it found that the failure of the national courts to rule on the merits of the applicant’s claim for more than three years raised serious doubts as to the effectiveness of the compensation proceedings in the present case120.

The most important finding for the purpose of determining whether victim status continued was made in terms of its connection with the violation of Article 6. In this context the Court found that the question which measure of redress is appropriate and sufficient in order to remedy a breach of a Convention right depends on the circumstances of the case and must be decided accordingly. The Court therefore stated expressly that it did not rule out the possibility that, in a case in which the use of a method of investigation prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention had produced a result to the applicant’s detriment in criminal proceedings against him, appropriate and sufficient redress for that breach might require, in addition to the above-mentioned requirements, the taking of measures of redress addressing the continuing effects on the trial of the investigation by that prohibited method and, in particular, the exclusion of the evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention121. The Court stated, however, that in the case giving rise to the application it was not necessary to rule on this issue; that it was unnecessary to examine whether the interrogation conducted by the prohibited method during the investigation had had a continuing effect on the applicant’s trial and whether it had resulted in disadvantages for him122.

In the light of the findings made above, the Court held that, in any event, the various measures taken by the national authorities did not fully satisfy the requirement of redress as established in its case law, that for this reason the respondent State had not afforded the applicant sufficient redress for the treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and that, consequently, the applicant was still a victim of the violation of Article 3 within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention123.

d. What Is the Meaning of the Court’s Not Finding It Necessary to Give a Ruling? Does MG’s Victim Status Constitute an Advantage for Him in the Course of the Trial?

In German criminal law scholarship, views are put forward in favour of the Court’s stance, which shies away from giving a definite ruling and deserves to be criticised. It may in fact be said that this approach is the prevailing view in German criminal law. Unlike Turkish criminal procedure, German scholarship seriously avoids laying down a basic rule or criterion to be applied in every offence, case and set of facts; instead, a separate assessment in each specific case is preferred124. According to this view, the case in question is not of such a nature as to require interference with the penalties imposed on the perpetrators who threatened the applicant with torture and on whom a disproportionate sanction was imposed in return, and the case in question therefore does not constitute an exception to this principle. Among other conditions, and in contrast to the above-mentioned case of Nikolova v. Bulgaria, in the case giving rise to the application a reason was shown, in respect of the injured person, for the offence committed against him. MG was directly suspected on the ground that he was hiding JM, and it was assumed that JM’s life was in all probability in danger. For this reason the injustice, although it concerned a human rights violation, was regarded as being of minor gravity. Indeed, it is stated that in another case the situation from which MG suffered might arise from self-defence, since perpetrators will always invoke their own rights. It is further stated that it is not clear and certain whether a heavier penalty for the police officers would be more effective in preventing future violations, and that the more important point here is the fact that the criminal courts made clear the established rule that the threat of torture is prohibited in all circumstances whatsoever125. As can be seen, in this approach the case is addressed solely from the standpoint of the violation of Article 3, whereas the effect on the trial of the evidence obtained through the violation of Article 3, and whether this constitutes a violation of Article 6, are not discussed.

Beyond this, the Court makes no finding as to whether a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR requires the exclusion from the criminal proceedings of the evidence obtained as a result of that violation126. This finding overlaps with the question whether the right to a fair trial has been violated. In line with the view set out above, it is also stated that, even though he claims to be a victim on account of the violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, MG in reality enjoys an advantage that is rarely attained127.

We must say at the outset that it is impossible not to criticise this stance of the Court. After giving lengthy explanations concerning the violation of Article 3 and the continuation of victim status, setting out the principles on this subject and referring to a large number of its judgments (having the character of case law) relating to it, the Court, without giving reasons, stated that it was unnecessary to rule on the truly crucial point of the proceedings and thus, as it were, avoided giving a decision or expressing a view on this matter. As we shall see in the following pages, this also laid the ground for avoiding a decision on the alleged violation of Article 6, which is the crucial point of the judgment. Yet, as is also true of national courts, no court may refrain from deciding a dispute brought before it. This principle, which applies to national courts, applies a fortiori to a supranational court. For this rule not to apply, the dispute brought before the court would have to fall outside the jurisdiction of national and supranational courts, and this is determined at the very outset, when the case passes through the filter of admissibility. In our view, to give a ruling on one part of an application that has passed the admissibility stage while stating that there is no need to rule on another – and the most important – part amounts to a declaration by the Court that it was helpless in the face of the case in question.

On the other hand, although at the end of the proceedings this situation did not constitute an advantage for MG, even if it were accepted for a moment that it did, it is in our view neither logical nor legally sound, having regard to the threat of torture which the victim faced (and, in many cases, torture and/or ill-treatment), to present the fact of being subjected to such treatment as an advantage. On this logic, in legal systems in which the prohibition on obtaining and using unlawful evidence is strictly applied, offenders subjected to torture and ill-treatment in order to obtain evidence from them would be pleased, thinking that this would turn into an advantage, and would even wish it to be inflicted on them. And what, then, would be the state of mind and the advantage of an innocent person if this treatment were also applied, without distinction, to innocent persons under suspicion of an offence? In our view this is a question without an answer. In a legal system in which it is thought preferable that a hundred guilty persons should go free rather than that one innocent person should be wrongly convicted, to speak of such an advantage in this field, which is an important part of the protection of human dignity, is in our view not an appropriate choice. Whether this was really an advantage for MG will be examined separately in the section below.

III. Assessment of the Judgment with regard to the Violation of Article 6 of the ECHR

In addition to the alleged violation of Article 3 explained above, the applicant submitted that the admission and use of the evidence obtained as a result of the confession thus extracted from him had also violated his right to a fair trial. The following observations concern that allegation:

Whether the trial before the national courts was fair constitutes the second, independent and most controversial issue of the Court’s judgment, after the issue of the violation of Article 3. The child’s body was found immediately after the confession which MG made under threat of torture. This is directly connected with the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine”, which means that evidence (information) obtained as a result of unlawful acts of State officials cannot be used to prove a charge. It should be noted at once that this doctrine is connected both with the right to remain silent and with the right not to incriminate oneself128. The Court further notes that in the countries and conventions which accept this doctrine – such as the States Parties to the Convention, the relevant international conventions (for example the United Nations Convention against Torture) and even some countries outside Europe such as the United States and the Republic of South Africa – there is no proper consensus as to the conditions and the application of the doctrine.

The Court’s judgment essentially consists of two main parts. First the alleged violations of Article 3 were examined and a conclusion was reached; then, on the basis of the findings underlying that conclusion, the alleged violations of Article 6, which are the main issue, were examined and a decision was given on them as well. Following this method of the Court in our study, we too shall examine the alleged violations of Article 6 on the basis of the outcome of our examination under Article 3.

Under this heading, the applicant’s allegations, the Government’s replies and the views of the third parties intervening in the case, which are of particular importance for this case, will first be summarised and presented with comments. The next section will explain the Court’s finding that the rules of procedure and of the assessment of evidence must be determined by the national legal authorities. Thereafter explanations will be given on the content of the right to a fair trial and on the specific rules for determining whether that right was violated in the case in issue. This section will also deal with the ECtHR’s implicit acknowledgement that it considers the use of unlawfully obtained evidence to be wrong. We shall then examine the exclusionary rule and its limits, which the ECtHR accepts as a postulate and whose validity both the ECtHR and the German courts accept for their own jurisdictions. Finally, the ECtHR’s reasons for not accepting a violation of the right to a fair trial will be explained.

To summarise, according to the Court the trial was entirely fair within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR, because MG was convicted on the basis of the confession he made during the trial (before the court). That confession has no connection with the ill-treatment of which MG was the victim129, and in this context the continuation of his victim status is no longer of any significance.

1. Allegations and Defences

The Chamber, which first examined the application, held that there had been no violation of Article 6(1) and (3) of the Convention. The Chamber stated that it observed that, on account of the continuing effect of the interrogation by prohibited methods during the investigation, the statements which the applicant had made to the investigating authorities before the trial had not been used by the Regional Court. It was found, however, that the national court had used certain items of evidence obtained as an indirect result of the statements taken from the applicant. The Chamber stated that there was a strong presumption that the use of evidence obtained as the fruit of a confession extracted unlawfully in breach of Article 3 of the Convention would, just like the use of the confession itself, render the trial as a whole unfair. In the particular circumstances of the case, however, it was stated that the essential basis for the applicant’s conviction had been the new confession he made at the trial. The other items of evidence, including the impugned real evidence, were merely of an accessory nature and had been used solely to prove the veracity of the confession. The Chamber indicated that it was not persuaded by the applicant’s argument that, in view of the admission of the impugned evidence, he had been left with no defence option at the hearing other than to confess. According to the Chamber, in the proceedings before the national court, in which he was assisted by defence counsel, the applicant had wished to confess out of remorse. The fact that the confessions differed in the course of the trial, for its part, showed that the defence strategy had changed. Moreover, the applicant had had the opportunity during the trial to object to the impugned real evidence. The Chamber also accepted that the Regional Court, in deciding to admit this evidence, had had the opportunity to weigh up all the interests involved. In view of these elements, the Chamber concluded that the use of the impugned items of evidence had not rendered the applicant’s trial as a whole unfair130.

The applicant submitted that the admission of real evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention had rendered the criminal proceedings before the national court contrary to Article 6 of the Convention, and that, once this evidence had been admitted, he had been entirely deprived of his rights of the defence. The applicant further claimed that he had also been deprived of the protection afforded by the privilege against self-incrimination, since the evidence found at Birstein and on the return journey from Birstein had been obtained on the orders of the police, who compelled him to show where it was. The applicant stated that he had been forced to walk without shoes through the trees to the place where he had hidden JM’s body, and that the fact that his walk to the place where he had hidden the body and his subsequent finding of the body had been recorded on video showed that the events at Birstein had not been about rescuing the child but about finding evidence intended to secure his conviction. The applicant claimed that the impugned real evidence had been not merely accessory but decisive evidence for his conviction; that, although other charges could have been brought against him, the self-incriminating evidence obtained as a result of the confession had been indispensable in order to charge him with, and convict him of, aggravated intentional killing; that the assumption that there had at the time been another clean (lawful) path leading the police to this evidence was not valid; and that whether the police would have been able to find it by another route was pure speculation. According to the applicant, since the court of first instance had, at the very outset of the trial, rejected his request to exclude the evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, the outcome of the trial had been largely determined from that point onwards. Consequently, defence strategies such as relying on his right to remain silent, or claiming that JM had died by accident, or making a full confession at the initial stage in the hope of mitigation of sentence had thereafter become ineffective. The applicant stated that he had confessed only partially on the second day of the hearing and that, after the items of evidence whose exclusion he had sought had been presented at the hearing, he had admitted at the end of the trial that he had killed JM intentionally. Indeed, in the proceedings before the national court, the prosecution and the joint prosecutors, in opposing the possibility of mitigation of sentence, had pointed out that he had confessed to matters that had already been proved. Moreover, according to the applicant, whether the interrogation method amounted to torture or to inhuman treatment, the Convention and the rules of public international law (Art. 14 ICCPR and Arts. 15 and 16 of the UN Convention against Torture) require the exclusion of all evidence obtained in breach of the “absolute prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment”. The applicant stated that, contrary to the views of the national courts and the Chamber, the protection of the absolute right under Article 3 of the Convention could not and should not be balanced against interests such as securing a conviction, and that the exclusion of the evidence in question was, as a rule, necessary in order to remove all incentives for torture and ill-treatment and to prevent such conduct in practice131.

In its replies, the Government denied the allegation that the applicant had been forced to walk without shoes at Birstein or on the return journey, or had been subjected to further threats; it accepted, however, that at the outset of the trial the Frankfurt Regional Court had decided to use the items of evidence found at Birstein as evidence in the case. According to the Government, although the applicant could have remained silent or made false statements before the court, he had said that he wished to confess during the trial out of remorse because he wanted to take responsibility for the offence; after the trial court had reminded him of his rights, he had confessed on the second day of the hearing, and, as was apparent from that confession, he had killed JM intentionally. The difference between the applicant’s first confession at the hearing and his second was slight; in the first he had merely not admitted that killing JM had from the outset been part of his plan. According to the Government, this additional admission was not a necessary element for proving the killing. The Government stressed that the applicant’s conviction was based on the confession he had made of his own free will during the trial. The Government stated in particular that the items of evidence obtained after the trip to Birstein, such as JM’s body and the autopsy report on the body and the tyre tracks of the applicant’s car near the pond, were of an accessory nature and had been used only to test the veracity of the confession the applicant made at the hearing. Indeed, this was expressly stated in the judgment of the Frankfurt Regional Court which convicted the applicant. The Government stated that Article 6 of the Convention did not lay down any rule on the admissibility of evidence and that this matter was essentially one for regulation under national law. The Government stressed that under the Convention it was obliged to apply the criminal law against a murderer and that, moreover, there was a very great public interest in the conviction of a murderer who had kidnapped a child. The Government further argued that the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, which goes very far in prohibiting the use of the “fruit of the poisonous tree”, also had to be analysed very carefully. The Supreme Court had held, for instance in Nix v. Williams, that, in the circumstances of the case, a body which would have been found in any event could be admitted as evidence after an irregular investigation. The Government claimed that this was also the situation in the present case, that JM’s body had been hidden at a place the applicant had previously visited, and that the body would have been found sooner or later132. In conclusion, the Government argued in its defence that where evidence obtained on the basis of unlawfully obtained evidence is evidence that could in any event have been obtained by other means, it may be used, and that in such a case there is no unlawfulness.

As we have noted above, one of the interesting aspects of this case is that third parties were allowed to intervene in support of both the Government and the applicant. Among these, certain interesting points can be identified in the submissions of JM’s parents in support of the Government. According to these, the applicant claimed to have confessed fully and freely, although he was aware that this would have no mitigating effect on the trial court’s judgment. In the book subsequently published by the applicant under the title “Alone with God – The Way Back”, there is no statement implying that his confession at the hearing was caused by his interrogation by the police. In that book the applicant repeated, as regards his motive for making a new confession at the hearing, that he had wished to express his remorse. Thus the applicant, despite the risk that his confession would have no effect on the sentence he would receive, assumed that risk and described his acts in every detail; in the end, however, that risk materialised and he was granted neither a reduction of sentence nor the possibility of conditional release133. The significance of this statement lies in the fact that MG undertook all these legal steps (including the confession he made before the Frankfurt Regional Court) in order to receive a lighter sentence or to benefit from the possibility of conditional release. However, these arguments of JM’s parents, and in particular the fact that they advanced them by referring to the book written by MG, call into question the ground on which MG relies.

The Redress Trust, the other third party intervening in the case, stated that the rationale of the exclusionary rule prohibiting the admission of evidence obtained by torture or ill-treatment rests on the following points: (i) the unreliability of statements obtained as a result of torture; (ii) the outrage to civilised values caused by torture; (iii) the existence of a policy aimed at removing any incentive for torture anywhere in the world; (iv) the need to ensure the protection of fundamental rights; (v) the need to preserve the integrity of the trial process134. According to the Redress Trust, it could be argued that, although Article 15 of the United Nations Convention against Torture in particular had narrowed it somewhat, the exclusionary rule covered not only confessions but also derivative (indirect) evidence found as a result of a statement made under torture; indeed, it stated that the Court too had previously delivered judgments to that effect135.

2. The Court Has Stated That the Determination of the Rules of Procedure Is a Matter for the National Courts

In setting out the principles governing the matter, the Court first stated that it is not its function to examine errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless they have infringed the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention137. According to the Court, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair trial, it does not contain any specific rules on the admissibility (assessment) of evidence; determining this is therefore primarily a matter for regulation under national law138. Indeed, the Court accepts that the rules on the admissibility of evidence are primarily a matter for the national courts and that it is not appropriate for it to substitute its own assessment for theirs139. Accordingly, the Court does not subject the national courts’ appreciation of the evidence to a general review. Such a review comes into play only where the national courts, despite the facts presented to them, give an arbitrary or grossly unjust decision140. Since the admission and assessment of evidence fall within the competence of the national courts, whether those courts assessed the evidence properly lies outside the Court’s jurisdiction141. Accordingly, it was stated that, as a rule, it is not the Court’s role to decide whether a particular type of evidence, for example unlawfully obtained evidence, is admissible under domestic law; the question that must really be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair142. In this context, Article 6 comes into play only when unlawfully obtained evidence renders the proceedings as a whole unfair143. Indeed, according to legal scholarship, although important opportunities have arisen (the most important of which is the judgment examined here), the Court deliberately refrains from giving a clear and definite ruling and from taking a position on this matter 144; yet, when the Court’s judgments are in one way or another binding on, or at least a guide for, the domestic legal order and the courts, it is impossible to understand why it should take refuge in such reasoning145.

Proceeding from this, the Court stated that, in examining whether the criminal proceedings against the applicant, who had from the outset objected to the use of evidence obtained in breach of his Convention rights, were fair as a whole, it must first have regard to the nature of the Convention violation and to the extent of the impugned evidence obtained through that violation146. Indeed, in reaching its decision it first set out the principles governing this area and then arrived at a conclusion by applying those rules, from its own perspective, to the case at hand.

Where an applicant claims to have been convicted on the basis of evidence obtained by torture or by inhuman or degrading treatment, the Court likewise states that the admissibility and assessment of evidence is a matter for the national courts. Nevertheless, the Court reviews whether the national court made an arbitrary assessment, or whether the safeguards afforded to the applicant in the national court’s assessment of the reliability of the confession evidence were sufficient147.

3. The Determination and Interpretation of Specific Rules with regard to the Right to a Fair Trial

In determining the content of the right to a fair trial and whether that right was violated in the case under examination, it is important first to analyse the structure of the rules which the ECtHR presupposes, because the specific rules which the Court presupposes with regard to the admissibility of evidence are not clear. In its reasoning the Court clearly distinguishes between a single procedural act that may be regarded as unfair and the trial as a whole. A single unfair procedural act may render an entire trial unfair, but this need not always be so. The unfairness of a trial is a matter not so much of necessity or causation as of an assessment of the proceedings as a whole148. It is therefore possible to distinguish two types of rules in terms of the rights of the accused. The first rule concerns the court’s ensuring a fair trial and a fair decision. This rule relates to the outcome of the proceedings. Rules of the second type command the prohibition of particular procedural acts149. However, a breach of such rules does not always necessarily result in a breach of the first rule, since the fairness of a trial depends on an assessment of the proceedings as a whole. For that reason, a breach of rules of the second type will in some cases produce no legal consequences within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR. However, where it denies that the proceedings as a whole were unfair, the ECtHR needs to recognise a rule of the second type.

The Court has to determine the procedural acts that will render a trial unfair. Whether a trial is fair should not depend solely on circumstances that arise by chance, as with MG’s confessions in the present case, or, as in other cases, on whether other rights of the defence were disregarded. For this reason, the ECtHR adopts, in principle, specific rules on the use of evidence150. It may be said, moreover, that the rules in question are weak, since no “sanction” is resorted to when they are breached151.

Whether the ECtHR will adopt, in principle, specific rules within this framework is a contested matter152. So far the Court has, as in its Schenk v. Switzerland judgment, refused to adopt rules of this kind153: “While Art. 6 ECHR guarantees the right to a fair trial, it does not lay down any rule on the admissibility of evidence. This is therefore primarily a matter for regulation under national law. The Court cannot rule out, as a matter of principle and in the abstract, that unlawfully obtained evidence of the present kind may be admissible. All it has to do here is to ascertain whether the trial as a whole was fair” While Article 6 of the ECHR protects the right to a fair trial, it does not lay down any rule on the admissibility of evidence154. Proceeding from this view, the Court states that the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence in the proceedings will not of itself constitute a violation of Article 6155.

The Court states that a special situation exists with regard to Article 3 of the Convention. According to the Court, the admission of evidence obtained as a result of a violation of one of the core rights of an absolute nature guaranteed by the Convention will raise serious issues as to the fairness of the proceedings156. As regards confessions, the Court states that the admission as evidence in criminal proceedings, in order to establish the relevant facts, of statements obtained as a result of torture157 or of other ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention158 will render the proceedings as a whole unfair. This finding must apply irrespective of whether the statements have probative value and whether their use was decisive in securing the accused’s conviction. As regards the use at trial of real evidence obtained as a direct result of ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court takes the view that evidence obtained as a result of acts of violence, at least of acts that can be characterised as torture, may never be relied on as proof of the victim’s guilt, whatever its probative value. To accept the contrary would serve indirectly to legitimise the kind of morally reprehensible conduct which the authors of Article 3 of the Convention sought to proscribe; in other words, it would “afford brutality the cloak of law”159,160. As regards the use of evidence obtained in breach of the right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate oneself, the Court recalls that these rights are generally recognised international practices which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. The essential rationale of this right is to protect the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities, thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6 of the Convention. Indeed, in Saunders v. the United Kingdom, concerning an investigation conducted by the Department of Trade and Industry into an offence of fraudulent share dealing, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 in that the person questioned by the inspectors, who took statements under oath in the course of the investigation, had no right to remain silent or not to give evidence against himself, and in that the law expressly provided that the answers given to the questions put by the inspectors could be used in evidence against him161. In particular, the right not to incriminate oneself presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seeks to prove its case without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused162. For a fair trial in criminal cases includes the right of the accused not to contribute to his own conviction; in other words, the right not to be compelled to make statements or to give evidence against himself. Although it is not expressly mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention, it is implicitly accepted that, in cases involving a criminal charge, the right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate oneself163 are included in order to ensure that a person is not placed in a self-incriminating position164.

It is, however, readily apparent that the ECtHR avoids clear findings. Unlike the national courts, the Court does not have the task of laying down procedural rules in detail. Yet both the national judicial authorities and the ECtHR ought to give concrete shape to the rule as to what kinds of definite (reliable) evidence may be used. They must also give reasons for such a rule and decide whether a breach of the rule in the course of the proceedings is to be attached to a legal sanction. The determination to be made in this context will take the form of giving content to the exclusionary rule.

4. Application of the Exclusionary Rule to the Present Case

a. The Exclusionary Rule and the Approach of

German Criminal Procedure Law

The exclusionary rule is a rule created by the case law of the courts which prohibits the gathering of evidence in violation of the rights of persons who are the subject of a criminal investigation (that is, unlawfully). That evidence secured through an unlawful search and seizure may not be used to convict a person was first stated in a decision delivered by the American Supreme Court in 1914165. In the Mapp v. Ohio decision delivered in 1961166, it was stated that without the exclusionary rule the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution could not be effectively enforced167. This rule was thus first introduced into the legal world by the American courts168.

The prohibition on using against the accused, in any form whatsoever, information which State officials169 have learned as a result of their unlawful acts is deeply rooted in the legal tradition of the United States of America170. This prohibition also applies to information obtained by a coerced confession171. This means that if the confession has led to the obtaining of additional evidence, that evidence, together with the confession, will likewise not be admitted by the court (the long-range effect of unlawfully obtained evidence/the fruit of the poisonous tree)172. However, evidence is excluded only where the unlawfulness was an effective cause of its discovery; in other words, the evidence is excluded where it is shown that, “but for” the unlawful act, it would not have been found173. Where the connection between the unlawful act of the police and the discovery of the evidence is so remote as to dissipate the taint, the exclusionary rule does not apply. For example, where the police relied on an independent source to find the evidence174, or where the evidence would ultimately and inevitably have been found in any event even if a provision of the Constitution (the American Constitution) had not been violated175, the evidence is not excluded176. Otherwise, evidence obtained by an unlawful method must be excluded and may not be taken as a basis for the judgment.

In US law and in the laws of other countries belonging to the Anglo-Saxon legal system there is, despite differences of detail, a general consensus on the scope and application of this rule. Among the States Parties to the ECHR, however, there is no similarly clear consensus on the scope of the exclusionary rule; indeed, this has also been noted by the Court177.

Turning to German law, it should first be noted that this theory is rejected by the prevailing view in German legal scholarship, and that the characterisation of evidence as unlawfully obtained, rather than being extended to evidence obtained by indirect means as well, is accepted only for evidence obtained directly by unlawful methods178. It is said that the most important outcome of the judgment in question is its statement of the rule that evidence which is the indirect result of the obtaining of any evidence in breach of Article 3 of the Convention may not be used in criminal proceedings, since, from the standpoint of both German law and the case law of the ECtHR179, this is a new rule180. The ECtHR justifies this rule on two grounds. The first relates to the legitimation of criminal proceedings: “There is a public interest of vital importance in preserving the integrity of the trial procedure. It is for this reason that the values of civilised society are founded upon the rules of law”181. The second argument relates to the effectiveness of the human rights protected under the ECHR : “The admissibility under Art. 6 ECHR of evidence obtained by conduct absolutely prohibited by Art. 3 ECHR may be an incentive for law-enforcement officers to use such methods notwithstanding that express prohibition”182.

This preventive aim has been accepted with caution in German legal scholarship. For the specific means of preventing violations by the law enforcement authorities are criminal and disciplinary sanctions, and these do not amount to a sanction that ties the hands of criminal proceedings and stands in the way of the imposition of a justified punishment183. Instead, German case law has recognised three principles in weighing against one another the aims that justify prohibitions on the use of evidence (Beweisverwertungsverbote) or require them to be rejected184. Preserving the legitimacy of punishment is the first aim185. This rule is of importance in the present case, since criminal proceedings must avoid giving the impression that they rest on an act of torture or on inhuman treatment. The second rule corresponds to the purpose of criminal proceedings, that is to say, the purpose of establishing the truth and imposing a just punishment186. This aim conflicts most strongly with a prohibition on the use of manifest evidence. Finally, rights of control over information (Informationsbeherrschungsrechte) are recognised187. These are legally recognised rights relating to the individual’s determination of when and in what manner he will provide information. If this right is violated, for example if a person is unlawfully compelled to give information, that person will then be entitled to demand that the consequences of the violation be eliminated (Folgenbeseitigungsanspruch)188.

In public law, similar rights are widely recognised where a subjective right has been infringed189. By virtue of these assumptions, the use of certain evidence is justified despite the long-range effects (Fernwirkung) to which the prohibition on obtaining it unlawfully would give rise. As a rule, evidence found as a result of a threat of torture cannot be admitted. Such evidence may be used only if the evidence in question has also been obtained by lawful means. In a case concerning a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court has in effect endorsed the right referred to. However, the Court’s reasoning is based exclusively on an objective point of view190.

German law recognises the long-range effect of prohibitions on obtaining or using evidence only “in a narrow sense”191. In this context the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) has delivered decisions on the problem of whether evidence obtained in the course of an unlawfully conducted investigation is to be admitted in criminal proceedings192. In order to resolve this problem, the BGH takes into account the circumstances of the case, such as the seriousness of the charge against the accused and the elements that are unlawful. In the case reported at 34 BGHSt 362, the BGH found, as in the present case, that there had been coercion (pressure/compulsion) contrary to Article 136a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). The accused had been confined in a cell together with another accused who was cooperating with the police. The accused disclosed to the other accused the theft he had committed. In this way a further witness for the prosecution was found. The court held that the statement of the witness in question was admissible. With regard to effective prosecution and the prevention of crime, the BGH stated that a single unlawful act should not obstruct the entire proceedings. It was also stated that it was scarcely possible to conclude that the witness could not have been identified in some other way. Art. 136a(3) CCP provides only that statements obtained through breaches of the prohibition of coercion, threats and deception do not have the quality of evidence. For this reason, it was stated, it should not be said that the indirect results of statements are generally inadmissible193.

In addition, there are authors in German legal scholarship who maintain that the torture and inhuman or degrading treatment applied by the police in this case, or in the questioning of a terrorist who knows the location of a bomb that is about to explode, should be regarded as necessity or as self-defence for the benefit of a third party194. It is stated, however, that whether the prohibition of torture may exceptionally be set aside in such exceptional cases is still a matter of controversy in Germany; that the view of Brugger, who accepts the application of torture at least in such cases, has not been adopted by many German scholars of international law and criminal law; and that, at the same time, the majority oppose this view. It is also stated that for Germany this question has ceased to be a legal problem and has become a moral problem that cannot be solved by legal means195. It is further pointed out that in cases of this kind the risk of error is always present; that, had the police known that the child was dead, the threat of torture could not have been legitimate on any view; that, if torture were permitted in order to save life, its use would also have to be accepted in situations where it is not certain whether there is any chance of rescue; and that the second major problem area of lawfully applied torture concerns its practical application and control196.

b. The ECtHR’s Approach to the Exclusionary Rule and Its Application to the Present Case

When the matter is examined from the standpoint of the present case, it is clear that it is first necessary to establish what the impugned items of evidence are. In its judgment the Court stated that, for the purposes of the assessment it was to make under Article 6 of the Convention, the decisive point was the causal link between the applicant’s interrogation in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and the real evidence gathered as a result of the applicant’s statements, such as JM’s body and the autopsy report subsequently obtained, the tyre tracks left by the applicant’s car at the edge of the pond, JM’s rucksack and clothes, and the applicant’s typewriter. In other words, the Court stated that the impugned real evidence had been gathered as a direct result of the interrogation conducted by the police in breach of Article 3 of the Convention197.

The first point to be made is that, according to the Court, the use at the decision-making stage of evidence obtained by unlawful means will not of itself render a trial unfair. The Court has therefore not accepted a prohibition on the use of unlawfully obtained evidence in giving judgment198. The Court stated that an issue would arise under Article 6 if evidence obtained by a method in breach of Article 3 of the Convention were not excluded from the criminal proceedings against the applicant. The Court notes that none of the confessions which the applicant made during the investigation under threat or under the continuing effect of the threat was admitted by the Regional Court. However, by rejecting the applicant’s request at the outset of the hearing, the Regional Court also rejected his request that the items of evidence which the investigating authorities had gathered as a result of the statements he made under the continuing effect of the treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention should not be admitted199.

It has been argued that the ECtHR’s Gäfgen proceedings bear similarities to, and are in line with, the above-mentioned decision of the BGH. For the contested evidence was found as a result of a violation of a fundamental human right. By contrast, in the case reported at 27 BGHSt 355 the BGH accepted the long-range effect of unlawfully obtained evidence, since freedom of communication, a constitutional right, had been violated200. On examination of that decision, however, it is apparent that the offence with which the accused was charged was not of significant gravity201. This leads us to think that the exclusionary rule is readily applied in cases where the severity of the penalty and its impact on society are insignificant, whereas in the opposite situations the rule is not applied, and that, even where a fundamental human right has been violated, evidence obtained on the basis of unlawfully obtained evidence is readily used in the proceedings.

It is also worth touching on the Schenk and Khan cases referred to in the paragraph above, since they are decisive judgments on this point. In Schenk v. Switzerland, the applicant was incriminated through the admission of this evidence even though the conversations between the applicant and a third person had been recorded in breach of the Swiss Criminal Code and other laws. For in that case it was not accepted, for the following reasons, that the trial as a whole had been unfair. First, the rights of the defence had not been disregarded. In particular, the defence had had the opportunity both to challenge the authenticity of the recordings and their admission as evidence and to examine the third person who had instigated the conversations contained in those recordings and the police officer. Secondly, the recordings in question were not the only evidence on which the conviction was based. The Schenk v. Switzerland judgment was also applied in Khan v. the United Kingdom, where it was likewise found that there had been no violation of Article 6. That case concerned conversations between the applicant and X, held at the latter’s home, which were detected and recorded by the police by means of electronic listening devices. These recordings were admitted as evidence in proceedings in which the applicant was tried on a charge of drug trafficking. In contrast to Schenk v. Switzerland, this equipment and the recording of the conversations by means of it were not contrary to national criminal law, and these recordings were the only evidence on which the applicant’s conviction was based. The Court nevertheless attached little weight to this last consideration, since the recordings were both very strong evidence and undoubtedly reliable. Indeed, in Schenk v. Switzerland too the recordings had been really important and probably the most important evidence. Moreover, as in Schenk v. Switzerland, the applicant had been able to challenge the authenticity and admissibility of the evidence at each of the three levels of the national courts; these objections, however, were rejected on the ground that the evidence would in any event be excluded if it rendered the proceedings unfair202.

The situation is different, however, as regards the admissibility of evidence obtained in breach of the right “not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment” enshrined in Article 3 of the Convention. In Jalloh v. Germany, to which we have also referred above, the applicant was found guilty of drug trafficking and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, suspended. The most important evidence against him consisted of the drugs recovered when he vomited under the effect of an emetic forcibly administered to him. While the forcible administration of the drug was not regarded as unlawful under German law, the Court held it to be a violation of the “right not to be subjected to inhuman treatment and ill-treatment” under Article 3 of the Convention, but did not characterise it as torture. Had the administration of the emetic attained the level of torture, its admission as evidence would indisputably have constituted a violation of Article 6. According to the Court’s judgment, “incriminating evidence – whether in the form of a statement or of real evidence – may not, where it has been obtained as a result of violence, brutality or other treatment characterised as torture, be relied on as proof of a victim’s guilt, irrespective of its probative value”203. On the facts of that case, the Court held that the obtaining of evidence by inhuman treatment and ill-treatment had, in breach of Article 6 of the Convention, rendered the proceedings against the applicant unfair. For the drugs that had been vomited up were the most important evidence securing the conviction in that case; moreover, the public interest in that conviction was limited, since the applicant, on whom a light sentence was imposed, had worked as a street dealer for a short time. The Court takes into account as mitigating circumstances the fact that the pain and suffering caused by the ordeal may not have been intended and that the applicant was able to object to the use of the evidence in question. The judgment is, however, specific to its own facts. The Court has now opened up for discussion the general question whether evidence obtained through a violation of Article 3 by inhuman treatment and ill-treatment categorically renders all proceedings unfair. In subsequent cases too, referring to the Jalloh v. Germany judgment, it has held that where evidence obtained through a violation of Article 3 by inhuman treatment and ill-treatment is submitted to the national courts, this constitutes a violation of Article 6 even if the evidence was not important for the outcome of the conviction204; the important factor to be borne in mind in those cases, however, is that the persons accused in them had had no access to the assistance of a lawyer while held in police custody205.

5. The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule

The ECtHR thus assumes that the criminal court breached a rule deriving from the right to a fair trial. The criminal court was not permitted to admit the evidence found as a result of the threat of torture. Nevertheless, the ECtHR rejects the claim that Article 6 of the Convention was violated. For, according to the Court, the proceedings as a whole were fair, since the violation of Article 3 of the Convention had no bearing on the conviction and the sentence. At the beginning of the trial, MG confessed of his own accord to having killed JM. Before this confession the court had informed MG that none of the statements he had previously made in respect of the charges could be used as evidence against him. The judgment rests primarily on that confession. The contested items of evidence were used only to confirm the truth. The ECtHR concluded that “it can thus be said that there was a break, as regards the contested real evidence, in the causal chain leading from the prohibited methods of investigation to the applicant’s conviction and sentence”206.

Six judges of the Court do not share this view207. They argued that there was a connection between the violation of Article 3 of the ECHR and MG’s confession, and indeed his conviction. On the first day of the trial MG lodged a preliminary application for the exclusion of the contested evidence. With the rejection of that application, MG in reality confessed only to matters that had been proved. It is plain that MG’s defence strategy depended on this point. The rejection was therefore the condition of the actual confession.

The reasoning by which the Court arrived at the finding that there had been no violation of Article 6 ran as follows. In order to analyse this problem it is essential to distinguish between the effect of the violation of Article 3 of the Convention on the conviction and the effect of the exclusionary rule which the ECtHR accepts in principle. Admittedly, the rejection of MG’s preliminary application is the condition of the confession and in that respect is connected with the trial and the conviction. But this is not relevant to the issue. The real purpose of the exclusionary rule is to prevent violations of Article 3 of the ECHR from affecting the conviction. This conclusion follows from the Court’s argument concerning the legitimacy of the proceedings and of the judgment. The conviction may not be affected in any way by the violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In the present case, however, the conviction and the sentence do not rest, or rest only to a very small extent, on the evidence found through the violation of Article 3 of the Convention. This is the reason why the purpose of the exclusionary rule has been achieved. MG’s confession is not the result of the violation of Article 3 of the Convention. It is the result of the court’s declaration of the breach of the exclusionary rule. However, the proper way to react to the errors of a court is always to apply to a higher court. For this reason, the court’s error has no effect in excluding MG’s freedom to confess208. Consequently MG’s confession, in the words of the ECtHR, “breaks the chain of causation”209. This is not a problem of the natural conception of causation but an assessment that rests essentially on the purposes of the rules in question.

We consider that the confession made as a result of the threat of torture in question, the announcement by the Federal Court of Justice that this confession was excluded, the fact that MG nevertheless made a confession of this kind, and ultimately the conviction cannot be explained by reasoning as simple as a break in the chain of causation. The evidence obtained by an unlawful method did in some way influence the proceedings and the judgment ultimately delivered. To seek to prove the contrary would amount to claiming that the participants in the proceedings are not human beings, which is meaningless and unreal. Indeed, the national courts accepted that the evidence which had been obtained on the basis of the confession, and which was in fact unlawful, was used to verify the confessions MG made on the second day of his trial. This alone vitiates the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. Why was this verification needed? Is it not possible to convict on the basis of the accused’s confession alone, without such verification? If it is not possible, does the judgment delivered not also lose its quality of fairness? In our country, for example, the Court of Cassation does not regard the accused’s confession on its own as sufficient for a conviction unless it is supported (corroborated) by other evidence210. Had a similar situation arisen in our country, what would the ECtHR’s attitude have been in the face of such a decision of the Court of Cassation? Since the assessment of evidence is left to the national courts, the ECtHR would, in a similar case, have had to find a violation in respect of Türkiye (as we have become accustomed to). Would this, then, not be a double standard? What would the Court’s attitude be if a similar application came from Türkiye? These questions could be multiplied. But these questions, the answers to which are known, are ones that need to be asked in order to show how mistaken the Court’s judgment is.

6. The Court’s Decision on the Alleged Violation of Article 6

The matter which the Court essentially had to decide under Article 6 was whether the admission of real evidence obtained as a result of an act which did not constitute torture but was characterised as inhuman treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention affected the fairness of the proceedings. As can also be seen from the judgments the ECtHR has delivered in the past, the Court has not given a clear and intelligible ruling on whether further evidence obtained on the basis of unlawfully obtained evidence will, irrespective of the other circumstances of the case, render a trial unfair as a general rule; in other words, it has not resolved this problem. The Court has, however, stated that both the use in criminal proceedings of statements obtained as a result of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (whether torture or inhuman or degrading treatment) and the use of real evidence obtained as a direct result of acts of torture render the proceedings as a whole, and inevitably, unfair in breach of Article 6 of the Convention211.

The converse conclusion to be drawn from this statement is that the Court is saying that evidence other than statements obtained as a result of treatment contrary to Article 3 (for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) this expression covers both the taking of statements and judicial examination), real evidence obtained as a direct result of unlawful acts other than torture (such as inhuman and degrading treatment and the like), and indirect evidence obtained by means of these do not render the proceedings as a whole, and inevitably, unfair in breach of Article 6 of the Convention. In such situations regard will be had to the specific case, and if the situation is appropriate or, in legal language, if the conditions are met (conditions which are not defined), the evidence may be used even if it was obtained by unlawful means. The Court thus categorises evidence and, while stating that evidence obtained as a result of instances of unlawfulness which it regards as grave may not be used, states that in the case of certain violations which, again in its own view, are insignificant, such evidence may be used where the unlawfulness is minor, regard being had also to the situation in the specific case. This is the conclusion that follows from the wording the Court used in its judgment.

In its judgment the Court stated that there is no clear consensus among the Contracting States, other States and other human-rights monitoring bodies on the scope of application of the rule excluding evidence, which is indeed true. It was further pointed out that, independently of the prohibited methods of interrogation, factors such as whether the impugned evidence would have been found at a later stage may have an influence on the admissibility of such evidence212. However, the absence of such a unity of view and practice among the Contracting States should not hold the Court back from taking a decision to that effect and from expressing a clear opinion. On the contrary, by laying down the principles and rules on this subject, the Court can give guidance to the Contracting States on the matter, as it has done on many points before. Moreover, the fact that the impugned evidence might be found later or earlier should make no positive contribution to the question whether the fairness of the proceedings is affected. The evidence in question was obtained unlawfully and, for whatever purpose, was used in the proceedings. The proceedings thereby lost their fair character, even if only in appearance, and for that reason this argument has, in our view too, lost its validity.

The Court also stated that, where unlawfully obtained evidence and its long-range effect are concerned, there are different rights and interests competing with one another. On this point the Court used exactly the following words:

“On the one hand, the exclusion of real evidence, which is often reliable and compelling, from a criminal trial will hinder the effective prosecution of crime. There is no doubt that the victims of crime, their families and also the public have an interest in the prosecution and punishment of criminals; in the present case this interest was of very great importance. The present case also has the following particular feature: the impugned real evidence was derived from prohibited methods of interrogation which were applied not with the aim of furthering a criminal investigation, but in order to save a child’s life and thus to safeguard another core right guaranteed by Article 2 of the Convention. On the other hand, the accused has the right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings; an issue arises with regard to that right where the national courts use evidence obtained as a result of a violation of the prohibition of inhuman treatment in Article 3, one of the core rights of an absolute nature guaranteed by the Convention. Indeed, there is also a vital public interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial process and thus the values of civilised societies founded upon the rule of law”213.

While keeping the above-mentioned interests in mind in the context of Article 6 of the Convention, the Court stated that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines an absolute right; that, since this right is absolute, it cannot be weighed against other interests such as the seriousness of the offence under investigation or the public interest in effective criminal prosecution; and that, if it were so weighed, the absolute nature of the right would be undermined214. According to the Court, neither the protection of human life nor the punishment of the accused will be possible if the protection of the absolute right not to be subjected to the ill-treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention is compromised, because compromising that right would sacrifice the values in question and undermine confidence in the administration of justice215.

In this context the Court also took into account the Government’s argument that it was protecting the right to life by punishing a person who had committed the offence of intentional killing. The Convention does indeed provide that the right to life must be protected by the Contracting States216. Under the Convention, however, States are not compelled to protect the right to life by conduct that violates the absolute prohibition of inhuman treatment (Art. 3) or in a manner contrary to the right of every accused to a fair trial (Art. 6)217. The Court accepts that in the present case the police officers acted in a difficult and stressful situation and with the aim of trying to save a life; yet even such a situation does not alter the fact that the police obtained the real evidence in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. More importantly, respect for the right to a fair trial must be ensured by democratic societies to the highest possible degree precisely where the heaviest penalties are at stake218.

An important point to be made here is that Article 6 of the Convention, unlike Article 3, does not enshrine an absolute right. The Court therefore stated that it had to determine what measures are necessary and sufficient in criminal proceedings, as regards evidence obtained as a result of a breach of Article 3, in order to secure effective protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention. The Court clearly accepts, as established in its previous case law, that the use of such evidence raises serious issues as to the fairness of the proceedings. The Court further stated that the admission of evidence obtained by an act absolutely prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention might encourage law-enforcement officers to use such methods notwithstanding the absolute nature of that prohibition. Proceeding from this, the Court stated that, even though real evidence obtained as a result of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention is more remote from the breach of Article 3 than a statement extracted in the same way, the effective protection of individuals against the use of methods contrary to Article 3 of the Convention may, as a rule, require that such real evidence not be used at trial; otherwise the proceedings as a whole may become unfair. Nevertheless, the Court is of the view that both the effective protection of the absolute prohibition in Article 3 of the Convention and the fairness of the criminal trial are at stake only if the breach of Article 3 has a bearing on the outcome of the proceedings against the accused, that is, has an impact on the accused’s conviction and sentence219. As can be seen, the Court stated in principle that the use of evidence obtained as a result of a violation of Article 3 will call the fairness of the proceedings into question and, in addition, that it may encourage law-enforcement officers to resort to prohibited methods of obtaining evidence. Yet, having identified these important principles and consequences, it nonetheless stated that the fairness of the trial can be in issue only where the evidence obtained by prohibited methods had an effect on the outcome. On the one hand the Court does not abandon the principles it has established and upheld to date; on the other it is looking for a way out for the specific situation. It believes that it has found that way out with this very argument and gives it a place in its judgment . However, whether or not it had an effect on the conviction, the use of a method of this kind in the investigation, the bringing of such evidence before the court, the use of that evidence even if, as is alleged, only to test the result reached without it, and, most importantly of all, the contamination of the minds and consciences of the prosecutors and judges by this unlawful evidence mean that, in our view, it should be neither possible nor lawful to accept that the proceedings in question were fair.

The Court stated that in the present case the Regional Court had expressly based its findings concerning the facts relating to the manner in which the applicant committed the offence on the new, full confession he made at the hearing, and that those findings had therefore been decisive for the applicant’s conviction of kidnapping and homicide. The Court further stated that the Regional Court had also based its findings on the facts relating to the planning of the offence, which played a part in the applicant’s conviction and sentence, essentially on the new confession. In this connection it was stated that the additional evidence admitted at the trial had been used by the national court not to prove the applicant’s guilt but solely to test the veracity of his confession. The additional evidence included the results of the autopsy as to the cause of JM’s death and the tyre tracks left by the applicant’s car at the place where the child’s body was found. The national court also relied on corroborative evidence gathered, independently of the first confession extracted from the applicant under threat, through the applicant’s covert surveillance by the police from the time he collected the ransom and through the search of the flat in which he lived immediately after his apprehension. The testimony of JM’s elder sister, the blackmail letter, the note concerning the planning of the offence found in the applicant’s flat, and the money from the ransom found in the applicant’s flat and in his bank account were among the evidence untainted by the violation of Article 3 of the Convention220.

On the basis of these considerations the Court stated that it was of the view that the second confession made by the applicant at the trial, alone or together with the corroborative and untainted real evidence, formed the basis of the applicant’s conviction of kidnapping and homicide and of his sentence ; that the impugned real evidence was evidence that had been neither necessary nor used to prove the applicant’s guilt and to determine his sentence; and that, in those circumstances, it could be said that, as regards the impugned real evidence, there had been a break in the causal chain leading from the prohibited methods of interrogation to the applicant’s conviction and sentence221.

In fact this case gave the Court one more opportunity to examine the question of evidence obtained by methods which do not reach the level of torture but remain at the level of inhuman and degrading treatment. In general, the Court’s position is that Article 6 of the Convention does not constitute a specific rule applicable to the admissibility of evidence at trial, and that this is a decision to be taken by the national courts222. In the light of that assessment, the Court considers the question whether the proceedings as a whole were fair. In the Gäfgen case, the Court indicates that the crucial factors are the nature of the violation of rights in the case and, consequently, the extent to which the evidence used in the proceedings was so obtained. According to the Court, the element that determined the outcome of MG’s conviction was the new confession he made before the national court after the statement he had given under threat of torture had been excluded. The child’s body, which was obtained as a result of MG’s first statement, was not used as operative evidence but in order to verify the veracity of MG’s new confession. Indeed, this is expressly stated in paragraph 178 of the Court’s judgment. In conclusion, the new and voluntary confession broke the causal chain between MG’s conviction and Article 3 of the Convention. The existence of an uninterrupted causal link is therefore very important223.

Proceeding from this, the Court also examined whether the breach of Article 3 of the Convention that occurred during the investigation had any bearing on the applicant’s confession at trial. In his application to the Court the applicant said that it did have a bearing on his confession. In his application the applicant stated that, once the Regional Court had at the outset of the hearing rejected his request to exclude the real evidence obtained through the violation of Article 3 of the Convention , he had no longer had any defence option in the proceedings other than to confess224. In response to this claim, the Court first pointed out that, before he confessed on the second day of the hearing before the national court, the applicant had been reminded of his right to remain silent and told that none of the statements he had previously made on the charges would be used as evidence against him. The Court was therefore satisfied that national legislation and practice attached a consequence to confessions obtained by means of ill-treatment225 and that the applicant’s position had in this respect been restored to the situation he was in before the violation of Article 3 of the Convention226. In addition, the applicant, who was represented by defence counsel, stressed in the statements he made on the second day of the hearing and at the end of the hearing that, notwithstanding the events of 1 October 2002, he was confessing freely, out of remorse and in order to take responsibility for his offence, and he confessed even though his attempt to prevent the use of the impugned real evidence had been unsuccessful. The decision which the Court reached as a result of these considerations is reproduced verbatim below:

“The Court therefore has no reason to assume that the applicant did not tell the truth, that he would not have confessed if the Regional Court had decided at the outset of the trial not to use the impugned real evidence, and that his confession should for that reason be regarded as a consequence of measures which extinguished the rights of the accused227.

In any event, it is clear from the reasoning of the Regional Court’s judgment that the second confession made by the applicant on the last day of the hearing was of vital importance for his conviction of homicide; had the applicant not confessed, he might not have been found guilty of that offence. The applicant’s confession also contained many additional elements unrelated to what could be proved by the impugned real evidence. Whereas the real evidence showed that J. had been suffocated and that the applicant had gone to the pond at Birstein, the applicant’s confession also proved the intent to kill J. and, in addition, the motive behind it. In view of these elements, the Court is not persuaded that, after the rejection at the outset of the trial of the request not to use the evidence in question, the applicant could not have remained silent and had no defence option other than to confess. The Court is therefore also not persuaded that the breach of Article 3 of the Convention during the investigation had a bearing on the applicant’s confession at the hearing228.

As regards the rights of the accused, the Court observes that the applicant was given the opportunity during the trial to object to the admission of the real evidence in question and that he made use of that opportunity, and that the Regional Court had discretion as to whether or not to use that evidence. The applicant’s rights as an accused were therefore not disregarded in this respect either229.

The Court notes the applicant’s claim that he was deprived of the protection of the right not to incriminate himself during the trial. As stated above, a person’s right not to incriminate himself presupposes that the prosecution will prove its case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. The Court refers to its findings above that the national courts based the applicant’s conviction on the second confession he made during the trial, without resorting to the real evidence in question to prove his guilt. The Court therefore concludes that the right not to incriminate oneself was complied with in the proceedings against the applicant230.

The Court concludes that, in the particular circumstances of the applicant’s case, the rejection of the request to exclude the real evidence in question, gathered after a statement had been extracted by means of inhuman treatment, had no bearing on the applicant’s conviction and sentence. As the applicant’s rights as an accused and his right not to incriminate himself were also respected, the proceedings may be regarded as fair as a whole. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 6(1) and (3) of the Convention231”.

IV. The Finding That the Right to a Fair Trial Was Not Violated: The Scales Caught between Law and Equity

MG’s principal aim is to obtain the right to be retried in criminal proceedings from which the contested evidence is excluded. It was for this reason that MG confessed before the court and, when the heaviest possible sentence was imposed on him despite his confession, applied to the ECtHR. In the end the Court concluded that the Frankfurt Regional Court had not violated MG’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. MG’s efforts thus came to nothing. However, whether the Court, seeing this endeavour on MG’s part, gave this judgment in order to thwart it or because matters truly stood that way is, in our view, open to debate. In our view the goddess of justice, who ought to act with her eyes closed, erred on this occasion “with the idea of securing equity”. This in turn shows us the fragility, even at the supranational level, of the justice system we have built.

It can be seen that the Court’s judgment was adopted by a majority and that, opposite the majority view, the minority view was also included in the judgment as a dissenting opinion. This dissenting opinion is extremely important for an analytical examination of the judgment, since it appears in the judgment as a view that shakes the perspective of the majority on solid grounds.

The first point to be criticised in the Court’s judgment concerns whether MG’s victim status continued. Having regard to the fact that the police officers had been punished, albeit inadequately, and that their careers had been affected, the Court decided that the wrong suffered by the applicant had been redressed. Yet in a case of this kind, redress in the true sense would have consisted not in punishing the perpetrators but in excluding the unlawfully obtained evidence. Indeed, this point was made in the dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Ziemele and Bianku. In this context, the principle of subsidiarity, a fundamental principle of criminal law, must not be overlooked in situations where punishment serves the aim of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms at the cost of obscuring the fact that punishment is itself a threat to fundamental rights and freedoms. It should not be forgotten that recourse to the weapon of punishment is acceptable only where there is no other means of protecting the interests or values at risk. It cannot be said that the criminal proceedings conducted against the police officers in the present case were the only means of preventing future violations of Article 3, which forms part of the core rights protected by the Convention. In fact, as also stated in the minority opinion, the most appropriate form of redress for the violation of Article 3 of the Convention found and acknowledged in the present case would be the exclusion from the trial of the evidence obtained in breach of the Convention. Since this was not done, the applicant’s victim status continues232.

The part of the Court’s judgment that most deserves criticism, however, is that no violation was found although Article 6(1) and (3) of the Convention had been violated. In the proceedings before the Regional Court, real evidence secured as a direct result of the violation of Article 3 of the Convention was used as evidence in the criminal case against the applicant. Moreover, the fact that this evidence was obtained through the applicant’s incriminating himself aggravated the violation in question.

Indeed, this point is set out in detail in the dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power. The admission in criminal proceedings of evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention raises a fundamental and vitally important question of principle. As we have noted above, the Court’s case law on the admission of a confession obtained through a violation of Article 3 is entirely clear: statements, whether extracted by torture or by inhuman or degrading treatment, can never be admitted.

The problem at issue in the present case, which had to be resolved, is whether the admission of evidence other than statements (real evidence) obtained as a result of treatment which, although not torture, falls within the scope of Article 3 affects the fairness of the proceedings. Although the resolution of this problem is difficult, particularly on account of the matters we mentioned in the first paragraph of this section, the present case offered the Court an important opportunity to determine the scope of the exclusionary rule with regard to evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Instead of seizing this opportunity and giving a categorical answer of principle, stating very clearly that, however serious the accused’s act and its gravity may be, fairness for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention presupposes respect for the rule of law and that evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 is to be excluded, the Court decided to the contrary by straining the provisions of the Convention and stretching the principles it had previously laid down. Indeed, it has been noted that even before the judgment under examination the Court had shied away from giving a ruling of principle on this matter233. Yet it is in no way possible to regard as a fair trial criminal proceedings in which evidence obtained as a result of the violation of an absolute provision of the Convention is admitted and, to some extent, relied upon234.

In its settled case law the Court has held that it would be unfair to rely on evidence whose nature and source are tainted by oppression and coercion235. According to the Court, the use of statements obtained as a result of violence, brutality or other acts that can be characterised as torture or ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention will always render the proceedings as a whole unfair, irrespective of whether that evidence was decisive in securing the applicant’s conviction. Whether this principle applies in the same way to other types of evidence, however, has to be examined and decided. Indeed, this is the “problem” which, in the present case, the Court was expected to answer and to turn into an opportunity for laying down a principle on the matter.

In Jalloh v. Germany the Court was confronted with a similar problem, but there too it refrained from answering the question clearly. In that case the Court held that the proceedings against a drug dealer had been unfair, since the evidence that was the leading and decisive element in his conviction was a quantity of cocaine, and it had been obtained by treatment that gave rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention . The small bag containing the drugs had been recovered when an emetic was forcibly administered to the suspect and he vomited as a result. In that judgment the Court did not exclude, as a general rule, the use of evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention; it preferred, rather, to decide in the light of the particular features of the case. The Court does, however, indicate that where the ill-treatment attains the level of torture, such evidence “may not be relied on as proof of a victim’s guilt, irrespective of its probative value”236. In addition, whatever the degree of the ill-treatment, testimony obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention renders the proceedings unfair. In conclusion, as is clearly apparent from its judgment in Gäfgen v. Germany, the Court has drawn a distinction between the testimony itself and the real evidence obtained as a result of such testimony237.

As can be seen, and as we have noted above, the Court avoids taking a clear stance on unlawfully obtained evidence, the theory of the fruit of the forbidden tree and prohibitions on the use of evidence. This is an attitude that plainly deserves criticism. Indeed, it is impossible not to agree with the views of the esteemed Ünver and the esteemed Hakeri on this subject, which we quote below:

“…Instead of stating in sharp terms what is to be understood by unlawfully obtained evidence and whether or not it may be used, and thereby guiding the judicial authorities and officers of the States Parties for the future with clear indicators, remaining silent on this matter, assessing whether the proceedings as a whole were fair and having regard to whether the rights of the defence were respected leaves an area of uncertainty and thus, when the facts come before it after the practices have taken place, gives the green light to the use of unlawfully obtained evidence, sometimes and on certain grounds, depending on the specific case and the material in the file. This is not an acceptable attitude or approach. While the ECtHR is undoubtedly right as to the need to look at the circumstances of the specific case, proposing clearer and more explicit rules on the scope of the concept of unlawfulness and its effect on the law of evidence and proof would have been a very necessary and more appropriate legal stance”238.

With its judgment in Gäfgen v. Germany, the Court has introduced a distinction between statements obtained in breach of the absolute prohibition of inhuman treatment and ill-treatment and other evidence obtained by the same means. The justification for this distinction is unclear and, in our view, it is not a legal one either. Proceeding from this, the Court’s judgment and its reasoning also carry the risk of weakening the effectiveness of the absolute rights guaranteed by Article 3 of the Convention, which is a great risk not foreseen even by those who delivered the judgment239.

In the present case the majority accepted that the real evidence against the applicant admitted at trial was “the direct result of the interrogation in breach of Article 3 of the Convention” conducted by the police. As a result of the confession obtained unlawfully and in breach of the Convention, the police went to the place where the child’s body was; on the instructions of the police the applicant pointed out where the body was; the pointing-out of the location was filmed; and the applicant thereby assisted in the discovery of self-incriminating evidence. There is no doubt that this evidence was submitted to the court during the proceedings before the national courts, was examined and relied upon, and was referred to in the judgment of the Regional Court. Despite this, the majority nevertheless concluded that the applicant’s trial had been fair because there had been “a break in the causal chain” leading to his conviction and sentence, and this view became the judgment of the Court. As the judges in the minority also stated, it is impossible to agree with this view240. For, from the taking into police custody through to the determination and individualisation of the sentence, criminal procedure forms an organic whole whose parts are wholly interconnected. An event that occurs at one stage affects, and sometimes determines, an event that arises at another. The requirements of justice and the suspect’s absolute right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment require that the adverse consequences of a violation occurring at the investigation stage be entirely erased from the proceedings and that the decision given be in no way affected by that unlawfulness, whether to a greater or lesser extent, remotely or closely . This approach had previously been confirmed and emphasised by the Court itself, which, when examining the importance of the investigation for the preparation of the criminal trial, had said that, as a rule, the evidence obtained at the investigation stage determines the framework of the offence to be considered at trial. In its Salduz v. Türkiye judgment concerning the restriction of access to defence counsel in police custody, the Court found that neither the legal assistance provided subsequently nor the adversarial nature of the ensuing proceedings could cure the defects that had occurred during the time spent in custody, and held that there had been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention241. If that is the position with regard to a violation of the right to consult defence counsel, then the same reasoning must of course apply with even greater force when one is faced with a violation of a suspect’s right not to be subjected to inhuman treatment and the subsequent admission in criminal proceedings of evidence obtained as a result of such a violation242.

Rather than viewing the criminal proceedings as an organic whole, the majority’s reasoning consisted in dividing the proceedings into separate parts, breaking them down and analysing them, so that the outcome determined by the national court, namely a conviction for homicide and the maximum sentence, would not be affected by the admission of evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Yet such an approach is not only formalistic but also far removed from reality, because it entirely disregards the specific structure of criminal proceedings (the investigation and the prosecution forming an indivisible whole) and the internal dynamics at work in the course of proceedings. In our view, what the Court overlooked in its judgment is this: the confession which is said to have broken the causal chain was made immediately after the rejection of the applicant’s request for the exclusion of the evidence incriminating him and was repeated in detail after all the evidence had been presented at the hearing. The applicant thus saw that, despite his request, this evidence had not been excluded from the trial and that the evidence whose location he had indicated on the orders of the police, and which would plainly establish his guilt, was before the court. Accordingly, the applicant’s confession has no legal value or significance; for the applicant confessed after everything that had to be proved in the course of the case had already been proved. The process of proof that preceded the applicant’s confession, for its part, was carried out on the basis of evidence obtained by unlawful means; the fruit of the poisonous tree was used. This is where the essence of this case, and of the problem dealt with in our article, lies243.

In its judgment the Court contends that the trial was freed from unlawfulness by the declaration that the evidence obtained at the investigation stage had been excluded, that this evidence was used only to test the confession and that its effect on the trial was slight. Yet precisely the opposite line of reasoning can be put forward on far more solid grounds. On that reasoning, it cannot be maintained that the fact that the evidence was obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and subsequently admitted at trial had no bearing on the later course of the case and on its outcome. Even if the exclusion of only the statements made by the applicant at the investigation stage was of some benefit in remedying the defect caused by the breach of Article 3 of the Convention, that benefit was extremely small. Once the evidence in question has been admitted, the applicant’s freedom to defend himself is substantially, if not entirely, curtailed and his conviction of the offences with which he is charged becomes inevitable. This gives rise to serious doubt as to the applicant’s ability to defend himself effectively, which in turn, proceeding from the principle of equality of the parties and of arms, renders the trial as a whole unfair244. Neither the applicant’s confession at the hearing nor the ostensibly limited reliance on the unlawfully obtained evidence in order to establish the truth of that confession can cure the manifest defect in the proceedings caused by the admission in evidence of findings obtained unlawfully. The only way of ensuring effective protection of the applicant’s fundamental right to a fair trial is to exclude the unlawfully obtained evidence and to conduct a trial (if that is possible) on the basis of the untainted evidence in the hands of the prosecution245.

With this judgment the Court has for the first time, at least as regards the consequences for the fairness of the trial, drawn a distinction and created a dichotomy, in cases where Article 3 of the Convention has been breached, between the torture prohibited by that Article and inhuman and degrading treatment. In fact the Court reached the conclusion that real evidence obtained by subjecting the suspect to inhuman treatment may be admitted in evidence at trial and that, if this evidence has no bearing on the outcome of the case, such a trial may nevertheless be regarded as “fair”. Indeed, it is stated in legal scholarship that the Court, with regard to evidence derived from unlawfully obtained evidence, treats the fruits of some of that evidence as, so to speak, “lethally poisonous” and the fruits of other evidence as “non-lethally poisonous (sweet)”246. Yet if this evidence has no effect on the trial, there is no point in admitting it either. On this basis, and by the same reasoning, the use of real evidence obtained by torture could perfectly well become possible too. For example, if a confession made during the trial by a victim of torture breaks the causal chain between the torture and the conviction, it would be possible to allow this evidence to be admitted at the outset of the trial and then to wait for the causal chain to be broken. It is thus easy and natural for the reasoning that holds for the threat of torture to be applied in the same way to torture itself. It is precisely the grave consequences to which these distinctions and lines of reasoning would lead that keep us from thinking in this way and from devising solutions according to the specific case. Societies founded on the rule of law must not tolerate or sanction, whether directly, indirectly or in any other form, the commission of acts absolutely prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. Otherwise they will see the fundamental values on which they stand, and which are the ground of their civilisation, suddenly slip from under their feet; history is indeed full of examples of this. Neither the text of Article 3 of the Convention nor any other Article of the Convention draws any distinction between the consequences attaching to torture and those attaching to inhuman and degrading treatment. There is no legal basis for regarding inhuman treatment as different from torture in terms of its consequences. Consequently, as stated in the minority opinion, neither ‘a break in the causal chain’ nor an intellectual construct can overcome the wrong that occurs where evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention is admitted in criminal proceedings247.

The Court has consistently held that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines an absolute right and that, under Article 15(2) of the Convention, this right cannot be suspended even in times of emergency248. Since this right is absolute, all breaches of it are serious, and the most effective way of safeguarding the absolute nature of the prohibition is the strict application of the exclusionary rule where Article 6 of the Convention is concerned. Such an approach will create an awareness, among State officials tempted to resort to inhuman treatment, of the futility of engaging in such prohibited conduct. This approach will deprive public officials of any potential incentive or inclination to treat suspects in a manner incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention249. This approach calls to mind the application, in American law, of the doctrine of unlawfully obtained evidence and of the exclusionary rule in order to discipline the law enforcement authorities, and it is correct. It is in any case beyond dispute that this doctrine and this rule have a dual function (protecting human rights and disciplining the law enforcement authorities). These two functions, however, constantly support each other. And for a country such as ours, which has a record in this matter, how apt this view is stands all the more beyond debate.

In the legal scholarship of our country there are differing views on this subject, and in practice too there are differing decisions. While some authors state, in the context of the long-range effect of unlawfully obtained evidence, that evidence obtained as a result of torture or ill-treatment and other unlawfully obtained evidence must not be used in the proceedings in any way250, other authors state that the legal interests at stake must be weighed in this regard and that, particularly in the case of unlawfulness other than torture and ill-treatment, or where evidence obtained by torture and ill-treatment has been excluded and there is other evidence, even if it was obtained in connection with the excluded evidence, such evidence may be used251. In the decisions rendered by the Court of Cassation too there is, in our view, no stance of principle; decisions are taken according to the circumstances of the specific case252. As a result of the research we have carried out on this subject,

549; Bahri Öztürk, Yeni Yargıtay Kararları Işığında Delil Yasakları, Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi İnsan Hakları Merkezi Yayınları, 1995, s.128; Ünver/Hakeri, s. 194, 195, 208; Ersan Şen, Türk Ceza Yargılama Hukukunda Hukuka Aykırı Deliller Sorunu, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1998, s.86 vd; Özgün Öztunç, Ceza Muhakemesinde Hukuka Aykırı Deliller, Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul, 2010, s.195, 196; Muharrem Özen/Mustafa Özen, “Ceza Muhakemesi Hukukunda Delil Yasakları”, YÜHFD, Prof. Dr. Duygun Yarsuvat’a Armağan, C.IX, S.2, 2012, s.324, 325; Ali Rıza Çınar, “Hukuka Aykırı Kanıtlar”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, S.55, 2004, s.41 vd.; Timur Demirbaş, Sanığın Hazırlık Soruşturmasında İfadesinin Alınması, İzmir, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1996, s.305 (Demirbaş states, however, that this provision will give rise to major problems in a criminal justice system that has reached the point of gridlock and that, in order to prevent this and to turn back from the mistake as soon as possible, Art. 254(2) of the former Code of Criminal Procedure (CMUK) must be repealed or amended so as to fit the system); Timur Demirbaş, Soruşturma Evresinde Şüphelinin İfadesinin Alınması, 3. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2013, s.355-357 (in the updated latest edition of his work Demirbaş has not included the statements cited above and has stated that, under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) currently in force and Article 38(6) of the Constitution, even a debate of this kind is unnecessary). we see that the legal scholarship of our country does not contain detailed explanations on unlawfully obtained evidence and exclusionary rules of the kind found, in particular, in American and German legal scholarship and in works on European human rights law. However, since this matter forms the subject of another study of ours, we prefer not to go into detail here. We may say that the most important respect in which our country differs from German law is that Article 38 of the 1982 Constitution also prohibits the obtaining of evidence by unlawful means by third parties who are not public officials253. Thus, in the legal order of our country there is no distinction as to persons of the kind found in German law. Whoever commits the unlawful act, the evidence obtained and the evidence derived from it must not be used. However, the other matters debated in the judgment that forms the subject of this study are also contested from the standpoint of the legal scholarship and practice of our country.

As human beings, we accept that the circumstances of the specific case were very difficult and that this was a shocking situation for the police officers, for JM’s family and for ordinary people who keep away from crime. We find it entirely natural, in particular, that a person without legal training should say of a murderer such as MG: “he has no right to any protection, let the child murderer be given whatever punishment is called for”254. It is precisely here that we wish to recall that legal rules are of general validity, that they are framed with abstract situations and not the specific case in mind, and that this is what ensures legal certainty. This is indeed the reason why the sentences with which we opened this paragraph ought not to be uttered by a lawyer who has had legal training. On that basis, we note that, where breaches of Article 3 of the Convention are at issue, the consequences that will follow from a strict application of the exclusionary rule must not be overlooked either. As a result of the strict application of this rule, reliable and compelling evidence may sometimes also have to be excluded, and its effect on the prosecution of an offence may thereby be weakened. Moreover, the exclusion of such evidence may lead to the accused receiving a lighter sentence where he would otherwise have received a severe one. When such a situation arises, however, responsibility for the accused’s enjoying such an advantage lies with the State authorities who, whatever their motives, permitted/condoned the inhuman treatment of the suspect and thereby put at risk the decision to be given in the criminal proceedings255.

One of the most important points to be borne in mind here is the competition between society’s interest in the prosecution and punishment of offenders and the interest attaching to the right to respect for human dignity, which forms the foundation of civilised societies. Which of the rights in question is given precedence in this contest of rights will determine the outcome of the case. Regrettably, the Court gave precedence to the first of these; in our view, the one that ought to prevail, under any circumstances whatsoever, is the second. This point is indeed very well expressed in the minority opinion256:

We are also aware that victims of crime, their families and the public at large have an interest in the prosecution and punishment of those who engage in criminal activity. In our view, however, there is likewise a vital, compelling and competing public interest in the preservation of the values of civilised societies founded on the rule of law. In such societies, subjecting individuals to inhuman or degrading treatment cannot be permitted in any way, whatever its purpose. In addition, there is a very important public interest in ensuring and maintaining the integrity of the judicial process; the admission at trial of evidence obtained in violation of an absolute human right weakens and endangers the integrity of that process. In our view, criminal activity may not be investigated, nor may the conviction of an individual be secured, at the cost of weakening the absolute right, guaranteed by Article 3 of the Convention, not to be subjected to inhuman treatment. To accept the contrary is to sacrifice core values and to bring the administration of justice into disrepute257.

Another point we wish to make here is that in this case the Court did not display the sensitivity and rigour which it has shown, in many instances, particularly in respect of countries with a record of human rights violations such as Türkiye and Russia. We would not wish this statement to be misunderstood. We are not criticising the fact that rigour is applied in respect of countries such as Türkiye and Russia; we are criticising the fact that rigour was not applied in a case coming from Germany. We want it to be declared, without regard to the country or to the circumstances of the specific case, that the gathering of evidence unlawfully, and all the more so where this is done by torture or inhuman ill-treatment, and the use of such evidence at any stage of the investigation and/or the prosecution, without any distinction or inference being drawn, renders the trial in question unfair and constitutes a violation of Article 6. Indeed, the same distinction was also drawn in the case of Jalloh v. Germany, and in that case too the Court refrained from giving a ruling. Yet in a case brought before it the Court ought to give its judgment having regard to the Articles of the Convention, to its own case law and to the supreme values of the law, irrespective of the difficulty of the situation and of the country from which the case comes. Otherwise the judgment will be open to debate both as regards its content and as regards side effects of this kind and, most importantly of all, will give rise to serious question marks over the credibility of the Court.

The Court therefore stated expressly that it did not rule out the possibility that, in a case in which the use of a method of investigation prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention had produced a result to the applicant’s detriment in criminal proceedings against him, appropriate and sufficient redress for that breach might require, in addition to the above-mentioned requirements, the taking of measures of redress addressing the continuing effects on the trial of the investigation by that prohibited method and, in particular, the exclusion of the evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The Court stated, however, that in the case giving rise to the application it was not necessary to rule on this issue. The Court stated that it was unnecessary for it to examine whether the interrogation conducted by the prohibited method during the investigation had had a continuing effect on the applicant’s trial and whether it had resulted in disadvantages for him.

Conclusion

The judgment examined above is striking and impressive both in terms of the events that gave rise to it and in terms of the conclusion reached at the end of the proceedings. The events were indeed of a kind that leaves a deep mark on the public conscience, that makes one say that this goes beyond all bounds, and that compels people to make value judgments by stepping outside the values in which they believe. The investigation and prosecution of the events were of a similar kind, likewise, on account of the obtaining of evidence by a threat of torture and the handing down of a judgment on the basis of that evidence. It is therefore a judgment that deserves detailed examination and from which conclusions need to be drawn in terms of criminal procedure policy.

Just as criminal policy gives direction to the living criminal law by performing various functions, such as determining which acts are to be decriminalised or which new types of offence are to be created, how much punishment is to be imposed for which offence and which acts are the more serious offences, so criminal procedure policy ought to give direction to the law of criminal procedure by performing functions such as determining by which methods offences are to be investigated, which evidence is to be used and which excluded, and which court, sitting where, is to have jurisdiction over which offence. This direction is given sometimes by statutory norms, sometimes by the general principles of the law of criminal procedure and sometimes by the case law of the courts.

With this judgment the ECtHR has expressed an important view in the context of the shaping of national criminal procedure policies through case law. In our view, however, this view is not a step forward but, on the contrary, a step taken backwards which may lead to the loss of various gains in this field. The law of criminal procedure, which has to date achieved many advances of principle, such as the transition from offender-based criminal law to act-based criminal law, the change in the method of trial and the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence, has with this judgment lost important ground, in that the doctrine of the long-range effect of unlawfully obtained evidence has been set aside and it has been accepted that in certain situations such evidence may be used as proof.

This judgment must also be assessed taking into account the internal dynamics of countries. As is seen in the Gäfgen v. Germany judgment, deputy chief of police D wrote down the unlawful act he had carried out, and the reason for it, in a note and placed it in the investigation file. This conduct is an attitude peculiar to the culture and internal dynamics of the people of that country. To expect the same conduct of the people of our country, and in particular of its police, would be an overly well-meaning approach. In our country, where the slightest breach is widened into a gaping hole and the smallest exception is turned into the rule, such conduct should not be expected, particularly of the law enforcement authorities. For our country, therefore, the doctrines of unlawfully obtained evidence, of exclusionary rules and of the long-range effect of unlawfully obtained evidence must be framed and applied in such a way as to permit not the slightest breach. Yet this judgment is of a kind that will open a gaping hole for our country and for other countries whose societies think and act as ours does. In this respect too the judgment has been a great misfortune.

From the standpoint of criminal procedure policy, if the aim is to arrive at the material truth by using evidence obtained by entirely lawful methods, then, whatever the purpose and whatever the offence, where there is a violation, the evidence obtained by that violation, whether it was obtained directly or is other, indirect evidence obtained by using that evidence, must not be used at any stage of the proceedings, and it must be expressly stated that it has been excluded. Otherwise the fairness of the trial in question will always be open to debate. Nor does it make any difference whether the violation committed is torture, inhuman treatment or a threat of torture. Although such violations differ in nature, the effect they create and their consequences are the same. They must therefore in no way be shielded or tolerated. And the way to achieve this is to exclude such evidence at whatever cost.

On the other hand, this judgment has caused a serious crack in the system and outlook of European human rights law and has led to this stance of the Court, which had until now enjoyed a good reputation, being called into question. As we stated above, it is debatable whether such a concession would be made if a similar event were to occur in a country such as Türkiye, Bulgaria or Romania. Yet when the same situation occurred in Germany, this concession was readily made, as was also seen in earlier similar judgments. However, no distinction ought to be made between the States Parties to the Convention on economic, social or any other grounds, and judgments ought to be given on the basis of legal reasons, not political motives. In this respect too the judgment in question gives pause for thought.

In the specific case under examination it is abundantly clear that the State officials were acting in a highly difficult and tense situation. This does not, however, alter the fact that real evidence was obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, that this evidence was subsequently used in the criminal proceedings in which the applicant was tried and that the judgment relied on this evidence. Momentous though the situation in the present case was, it is precisely in such times of crisis that absolute values must stand firm and be applied.

As also stated above, on the main contested issue in the case the judges were divided, by eleven votes to six. The judges in the minority stressed that the Court ought to establish, in a much clearer and more categorical manner, a clearly defined rule to the effect that the “fruit of the poisonous tree” must be excluded from criminal proceedings. In conclusion, this debate is not yet entirely closed and the issue will have to be faced again in similar cases in the future; for evidence of this kind obtained through ill-treatment will play a decisive role in similar cases too258.

At this point it is worth listening carefully to the words of Prof. Dr. Perron: “…Even though we may agree with many esteemed colleagues in regarding the threat and use of torture as legitimate in extreme, exceptional cases, the State governed by the rule of law cannot put this into practice without endangering itself. We must therefore stop pursuing the debate and hope that cases in which torture appears to be the last way out will hardly ever occur. The German State governed by the rule of law put up with a great deal, particularly in the 1970s, in the kidnapping of politicians and other high representatives of the State and of institutions by the Red Army Faction. We may perhaps try to forgive individually each responsible person who, like Deputy Chief of Police Daschner in the kidnapping of Jakob von Metzler, did not have the strength required for this and succumbed to the desire to resort to the terror instruments of dictatorship, but we must oppose their act with all clarity and must say plainly that torture can have no place in a State governed by the rule of law”259.

Consequently, this judgment of the Court has opened an important breach, and one that is difficult to repair, both in the stance against torture and, in connection with it, in the right to a fair trial. We hope that this breach will not be widened further and turned into an ordinary practice.

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Footnotes

  1. two opposing views are examined and, in conclusion, our own view is stated. Keywords: Unlawfully obtained evidence, long-range effect of unlawfully obtained evidence, fruit of the poisonous tree, exclusionary rule, threat of torture, inhuman treatment and ill-treatment, Abstract: The Gäfgen v. Germany judgment that was delivered by European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on 2010, so that a storm was brewing in the criminal procedure law. There was a serious discussion in the courts of Germany and ECHR, if the issue on receiving evidence from suspect Magnus Gäfgen’s acknowledge by threate ↑
  2. Assistant Professor, Faculty Member in the Department of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, Istanbul Medipol University Faculty of Law. 1 Gäfgen v. Almanya, Başvuru 22978/05, 1.6.2010, for the English (original) text of the judgment see: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/ eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-99015 For the Turkish text of the judgment see: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx ?i=001-111106, 19.2.2013. ↑
  3. Stephan Ast, “The Gäfgen Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights: On the Consequences of the Threat of Torture for Criminal Proceedings”, German Law Journal, Vol.11, No.12, 2010, s.1393. ↑
  4. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §2. ↑
  5. Christoph Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, 4. Auflage, München, Verlag C.H.Beck, 2009, pr. 3, 6. ↑
  6. Ast, s.1393. ↑
  7. Art. 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) “(1) A case that has been concluded by a judgment which has become final shall be heard again, by way of reopening of proceedings in favour of the convicted person, in the cases set out below: … (f) where it has been established by a final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights that the criminal judgment was given in violation of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or of the protocols thereto and that the judgment is based on that violation…”. ↑
  8. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §10-13. ↑
  9. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §14-17. ↑
  10. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §18. ↑
  11. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §20. ↑
  12. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §22. ↑
  13. “to discontinue the criminal proceedings” ↑
  14. “(1) The freedom of the suspect or accused to make decisions and to manifest his will shall not be impaired by torture, ill-treatment, physical interference, fatigue, the administration of drugs, deception or hypnosis. The use of force is possible only in the cases permitted by law. It is prohibited to threaten the suspect or accused with acts not permitted by the code of criminal procedure or to promise an advantage not provided for by law. (2) Acts which weaken the memory of the suspect or accused or his capacity to understand and accept a given situation (Einsichtsfähigkeit) are prohibited. (3) The prohibitions in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article shall apply even if the suspect or accused has consented [to the act contemplated]. Statements taken in breach of this prohibition may not be used [as evidence], even if the suspect or accused consents to their use. ↑
  15. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §24, 25. ↑
  16. “Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect human dignity is the duty of all State bodies.” ↑
  17. “Persons held in detention may not be subjected to physical or mental ill-treatment.” ↑
  18. Frankfurt LG – Bölge Mahkemesi, 23 Strafverteidiger 327, 2003. ↑
  19. As can be seen, the German court weighed the legal interests in the light of the specific case and, giving precedence to the right to life over the right to a fair trial, reached a decision to that effect. ↑
  20. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §28, 29. ↑
  21. LG Frankfurt, 23 Strafverteidiger 325, 2003. ↑
  22. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §30. ↑
  23. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §31. ↑
  24. LG Frankfurt, 5-22 E. 2/03 3490 K. 230118/02, http://juris.de. ↑
  25. Ast, s.1393. ↑
  26. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §34. ↑
  27. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §36. ↑
  28. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §37-39. ↑
  29. Antoine Buyse, “Introductory Note to European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber): Gäfgen v. Germany”, International Legal Materials, American Society of International Law, Washington D.C., Vol.49, No.6, 2010, s.1597. ↑
  30. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §48, 49. ↑
  31. The aim underlying the fact that MG, although he had confessed of his own free will, took the case in which he was tried as far as these stages may be summarised briefly as follows: under Article 211 of the German Criminal Code, where the killing of a person involves aggravating qualifying elements such as greed, treachery or the concealment of another offence, the act is regarded as aggravated homicide. The penalty for aggravated homicide is life imprisonment. A statement by the criminal court that the accused’s guilt is of particular gravity may, among other things, have a bearing on a decision on conditional release which may later be taken in respect of the accused. Under Article 57a of the German Criminal Code, if the convicted person has served fifteen years of the sentence of imprisonment, the remainder of the sentence of life imprisonment may be suspended, provided that there is no objection on grounds of public security and that the accused’s guilt does not require the execution of the sentence to be continued. MG in fact confessed of his own free will as a defence strategy in order to benefit from this conditional release. However, since, despite this confession, the court accepted that the offence of intentional killing was of particular gravity and did not grant him the right to conditional release, he then lodged the applications in question, claiming, on the basis of the theory of the long-range effect of unlawfully obtained evidence, that the entire proceedings were unlawful. The ultimate aim here, in our view, was to be able to benefit from early conditional release; when this aim was not achieved, the theory of prohibited evidence and of the fruit of the poisonous tree, put forward so vehemently before the national courts, in particular before the Frankfurt Regional Court, was made the principal basis of the application, especially before the ECtHR. ↑
  32. Gäfgen v. Almanya, Başvuru 22978/05, 30.6.2008, for the English text of the judgment see: (Online)http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ sites/eng/pages/search. aspx?i=001-99015, 18.2.2013. ↑
  33. In various sources the term “treatment offending dignity” is used instead of the concept of “degrading treatment”. We prefer the concept of “degrading treatment” in order to remain faithful to the Turkish translation of the judgment. In addition, the expression “ill-treatment” is also used for short, in place of the expression “inhuman and degrading treatment”. ↑
  34. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §88-91. ↑
  35. Kudla v. Polonya (GC), 2000-Xl Eur. Ct. H. R. 510, §91-92. ↑
  36. İrlanda v. Birleşik Krallık, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, §162; Labita v. İtalya, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., §120; Selmouni v. Fransa, 25803/94, 29 EHRR 403, ECHR 1999 – V, §101; Gäfgen v. Almanya, §88-89. ↑
  37. For a detailed explanation on this subject see: Robin C. A. White/Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White & Ovey The European Convention on Human Rights, 5. Bası, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, s.170; David Harris/Michael O’Boyle/Ed Bates/ Carla Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2. Bası, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009, s.74. ↑
  38. White/Ovey, s.170; Harris/O’Boyle/Bates/Buckley, s.74, 75; Ast, s.1396. ↑
  39. Murat Önok, Uluslararası Boyutuyla İşkence Suçu, Seçkin Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2006, s.176. ↑
  40. According to the Court, the elements of torture are as follows: I. Material Element: The act must cause severe physical or mental pain and suffering. Whether an act is of this nature is assessed by taking into account the intensity of the act, the duration and conditions of its application, the physical and mental effects it produces on the victim, and factors such as the victim’s sex, age and state of health. II. Mental Element: The act must be committed intentionally. The act must be committed with a specific intent such as obtaining a confession or information, punishing, intimidating or coercing, or discrimination. III. Perpetrator: The act must have been committed by persons acting in an official capacity, or by third parties with the knowledge or consent of such persons. ↑
  41. Osman Doğru, İnsan Hakları Avrupa Sözleşmesi Hukukunda İşkence ve Kötü Muamele Yasağı, Legal Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2006, s.19. ↑
  42. İrlanda v. Birleşik Krallık, Seri A no. 25, 18 Ocak 1987, §162; Jalloh v. Almanya, Başvuru No.54810/00, ECHR 2006-IX, §67. ↑
  43. Aksoy v. Türkiye, Reports 1996-VI, 18 Aralık 1996, §64; Egmez v. Kıbrıs, Başvuru No. 30873/96, ECHR 2000XII, §78; Krastanov v. Bulgaristan, Başvuru No. 50222/99, 30 Eylül 2004, §53. ↑
  44. Selmouni v. Fransa, §104; Egmez v. Kıbrıs, §53. ↑
  45. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §88. ↑
  46. Labita v. İtalya, §120; Ramirez Sanchez v. Fransa, Başvuru No. 59450/00, ECHR 2006-IX, §118. ↑
  47. Keenan v. Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru No. 27229/95, ECHR 2001-III, §110, Jalloh v. Almanya, §68. ↑
  48. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §89. ↑
  49. Önok, s.170, 171. ↑
  50. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §90. See also: İrlanda v. Birleşik Krallık, §167; Aksoy v. Türkiye, §63; Selmouni v. Fransa, §96. ↑
  51. İrlanda v. Birleşik Krallık, §167; Gäfgen v. Almanya, §90. ↑
  52. Akkoç v. Türkiye, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R., §115; Gäfgen v. Almanya, §90. Compare with the definition in Art. 1(1) of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. See also: Eric Hilgendorf, “Folter im Rechtsstaat?”, JuristenZeitung, 59. Jahrg., Nr.7, 2 April 2004, s.331, 334. ↑
  53. For a detailed explanation of the offence of torture in Article 94 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) see: Önok, s.273 vd. ↑
  54. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §95, 105, 106. ↑
  55. Buyse, s. 1597, 1598. ↑
  56. 12 Yearbook 170, 1969, s.461. ↑
  57. Başvuru No. 22947/93 ve 22948/93, ECHR 2000-X, §25 ve 116, 117. ↑
  58. Campbell ve Cosans v. Birleşik Krallık, seri A no.48, 25.2.1982, §26. ↑
  59. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §101-108. ↑
  60. Başvuru No. 26772/95, ECHR 2000-IV, §119. ↑
  61. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §86, 103. ↑
  62. Campbell ve Cosans v. Birleşik Krallık, §26; Gäfgen v. Almanya, §91, 108. ↑
  63. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §107. ↑
  64. Selmouni v. Fransa, §95; Labita v. İtalya, §119. ↑
  65. Chahal v. Birleşik Krallık, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, 15 Kasım 1996, §79; Labita v. İtalya, §119. ↑
  66. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §87. See also: V. v. Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru No. 24888/94, ECHR 1999-IX, §69; Ramirez Sanchez v. Fransa, §116; Saadi v. İtalya, Başvuru No. 37201/06, ECHR 2008 ..., §127. ↑
  67. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §87, 176. See also: İrlanda v. Birleşik Krallık, §163; Chahal v. Birleşik Krallık, 23 Eur. H. R. Rep. 413, §79-81, 1997; Saadi v. İtalya, 37201/06, §138. ↑
  68. This is expressly stated in Art. 15(2) ECHR and in Art. 2(2) of the United Nations Convention against Torture. In addition, Art. 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 7 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Art. 3(1)(a) and Art. 3(1)(c) of the Geneva Convention. ↑
  69. Ast, s.1397. For the opposing view see: Rolf Dietrich Herzberg, “Folter und Menschenwürde”, JuristenZeitung, 60. Jahrg., Nr.7, 1 April 2005, s.321, 325, 328. ↑
  70. For a historical summary see Edward Peters, Torture, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, s.1–187, Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz, Yaşam Hakkı ve İşkence Yasağı, 2. Bası, İstanbul, Kavram, 1994, s.157–169; Önok, s.41–57. ↑
  71. Murat Volkan Dülger, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ile Düzenlenen Yargısal Koruma Mekanizması ve 14 Nolu Ek Protokolle Öngörülen Değişiklikler”, C.II, Uğur Alacakaptan’a Armağan, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008, s.239, 240. ↑
  72. Amnesty International, USA: Shadow over Justice, http://amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/094/2010/en, 30.3.2013. ↑
  73. Jan Joerden, “Über ein vermeintes Recht (des Staates) aus Menschenliebe zu foltern”, 13 Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, 2005, s.495, 518. ↑
  74. Luis Greco, “Die Regeln hinter der Ausnahme: Gedanken zur Folter in sog. Ticking Time bomb – Konstellationen”, Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht, Vol.154 No.11, 2007, s.628; Ast, s.1397. ↑
  75. On torture being regarded as legitimate in cases of this kind see: Winfred Brugger, “Vom unbedingten Verbot der Folter zum bedingten Recht auf Folter?”, JuristenZeitung, 55 Jahrg., Nr.4, 18 Februar 2000, s.165. Joerden, s. 503. ↑
  76. Ast, s.1398. ↑
  77. Mark Janis/Richard Kay/Anthony Bradley, European Human Rights Law – Text and Materials, 2. Bası, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, s.94. ↑
  78. The situation of torture is the supreme challenge in terms of power; for no one can substitute another act for this act that has been commanded. On the generalised medium of interaction in connection with the relationship between power, threat and force see: Niklas Luhmann, Die Politik der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main, Shurkamp, 2000, s.45, 55. ↑
  79. Ast, s.1398. ↑
  80. Jalloh v. Almanya, §67; Ramirez Sanchez v. Fransa, §117. ↑
  81. Tomasi v. Fransa, Seri A no. 241-A, 27 Ağustos 1992, §110; Ribitsch v. Avusturya, Seri A no. 336, 4 Aralık 1995 §34; Aksoy v. Türkiye, §61; Selmouni v. Fransa, §87. ↑
  82. Matko v. Slovenya, Başvuru No. 43393/98, 2 Kasım 2006, §100; Vladimir Romanov v. Rusya, Başvuru No. 41461/92, 24 Temmuz 2008, §59. ↑
  83. Klaas v. Almanya, Seri A no.269, 22 Eylül 1993, §29; Jasar v. “Eski Yugoslavya Makedonya Cumhuriyeti”, Başvuru No. 69908/01, 15 Şubat 2007, §49. ↑
  84. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §92, 93. ↑
  85. Magnus Gäfgen, Allein mit Gott – der Weg zurück, 2005, s.57-61. ↑
  86. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §96-98. ↑
  87. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §99. ↑
  88. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §100. ↑
  89. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §116-118. ↑
  90. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §117, 119, 123. ↑
  91. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §125. ↑
  92. LG Frankfurt, 58 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 692, 2005. ↑
  93. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §109. ↑
  94. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §111. ↑
  95. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §113. ↑
  96. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §114-119. ↑
  97. Assenov ve diğerleri v. Bulgaristan, Reports 1998VIII, 28 Ekim 1998, §102. ↑
  98. Nikolova ve Velichkova –Bulgaristan, §63. ↑
  99. Selçuk ve Asker v. Türkiye, Reports 1998-II, 24 Nisan 1998, §117-118. ↑
  100. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §114. ↑
  101. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §120. ↑
  102. Buyse, s. 1599, 1599. ↑
  103. Siliadin v. Fransa, Başvuru No. 73316/01, ECHR 2005-VII, §61; Scordino v. İtalya (no. 1), Başvuru No. 36813/97, ECHR 2006V, §179. ↑
  104. Eckle v. Almanya, Seri A no. 51, 15 Temmuz 1982, §66; Dalban v. Romanya, Başvuru No. 28114/95, ECHR 1999-VI, §44; Siliadin v. Fransa, §62; Scordino v. İtalya (no. 1), §180. ↑
  105. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §123-125; for the contrary see: Gäfgen v. Almanya, §6. ↑
  106. Nikolova ve Velichkova v. Bulgaristan, Başvuru 7888/03, §60-64, 20.12.2007. See also Harris/O’Boyle/Bates/ Buckley, s.48-52,108-111. ↑
  107. Ast, s.1399. ↑
  108. Nikolova ve Velichkova v. Bulgaristan, §64. ↑
  109. Artico v İtalya, 3 Eur. H. R. Rep. 1, §33, 1980. ↑
  110. X ve Y v. Hollanda, 8 Eur. H. R. Rep. 235, §27, 1985; Gäfgen v. Almanya, §117. See: Harris/O’Boyle/Bates/Buckley, 107, 384. ↑
  111. Ast, s.1399. ↑
  112. Öneryıldız v. Türkiye, Başvuru No. 48939/99, §116; Nachova ve diğerleri v. Bulgaristan, Başvuru No. 43577/98 ve 43579/98, ECHR 2005-VII, §147. ↑
  113. Nikolova ve Velichkova v. Bulgaristan, §61, 62; Ali ve Ayşe Duran v. Türkiye, §66. ↑
  114. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §123. ↑
  115. For example Nikolova ve Velichkova v. Bulgaristan, §63; Ali ve Ayşe Duran v. Türkiye, §67-72. ↑
  116. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §124. ↑
  117. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §125. ↑
  118. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §126, 8. ↑
  119. Selçuk ve Asker v. Türkiye, §117 ve 118. ↑
  120. As regards an action for compensation on account of failure to comply with the ‘reasonable time’ requirement in Article 6 of the Convention see: Scordino v. İtalya, No. 1, §195. ↑
  121. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §126, 127. ↑
  122. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §128. ↑
  123. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §129. ↑
  124. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §129, 130. ↑
  125. Yener Ünver/Hakan Hakeri, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku, C.II, Adalet Yayınevi, 7. Bası, Ankara, 2013, s. 183; ↑
  126. Ast, s.1399, 1400. ↑
  127. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §128,129. ↑
  128. Ast, s.1400. ↑
  129. Buyse, s. 1598. ↑
  130. Ast, s.1400. ↑
  131. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §147-149. ↑
  132. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §150-153. ↑
  133. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §154-157. ↑
  134. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §159. ↑
  135. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §160. ↑
  136. Jalloh v. Almanya, §99, 104 – 107; Harutyunyan v. Ermenistan, Başvuru No. 36549/03, §63. ↑
  137. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §161.
  138. Harris/O’Boyle/Bates/Buckley, s.256. ↑
  139. Schenk v. İsviçre, Seri A no. 140, 12 Temmuz 1988, §45, 46; Teixeira de Castro v. Portekiz, Reports 1998IV, 9 Haziran 1998, §34; Heglas v. Çek Cumhuriyeti, Başvuru No. 5935/02, 1 Mart 2007, §84. ↑
  140. Nuala Mole/Catharina Harby, A Guide to the Implementation of Artice 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Handbook No.3, 2. Bası, Council Of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2003, s.46. ↑
  141. Harris/O’Boyle/Bates/Buckley, s.258. ↑
  142. Sibel İnceoğlu, İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi Kararlarında Adil Yargılanma Hakkı, İstanbul, Beta, 2002, s.274. ↑
  143. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §162, 163. ↑
  144. Harris/O’Boyle/Bates/Buckley, s.256; İnceoğlu, s.274. See also: Chalkey v. Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru No. 63831/00. ↑
  145. Ünver/Hakeri, s.184. ↑
  146. “…It is not an understandable position to put forward as a reason the fact that the ECtHR is not to take the place of the national judicial authorities. The judgments given by the ECtHR directly influence, on the one hand, proceedings under domestic law through the legal remedy of reopening of proceedings and, on the other hand, the statutory arrangements made by legislatures and likewise, by virtue of the meaning it expressly gives to concepts, the application of legal rules; the domestic courts apply the law by looking to the judgments of the ECtHR. Consequently, the fact that the ECtHR is in the position of judging the acts of States does not confer on it a privilege enabling it to use unlawfully obtained evidence.” Ünver/Hakeri, s.214. ↑
  147. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §170. ↑
  148. İnceoğlu, s.284. ↑
  149. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §163-165; White/Ovey, s.243. ↑
  150. For a similar distinction between the two matters see: Stephan Ast, Normentheorie und Strafrechtsdogmatik, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot GmbH, 2010, s.16. Effect or causality – cause and consequence – norms are distinguishable. This is the unusual feature of the doctrine on the transformation of the fair trial, which is an inquiry into the effect that emerges as a result of the assessment carried out. ↑
  151. On the relationship between procedural rules, such as constitutional rules, and regulatory rules, such as the prohibition of torture, see Matthias Mittag, “A Legal Theoretical Approach to Criminal Procedure Law: The Structure of Rules in the German Code of Criminal Procedure”, German Law Journal, Vol.7, No.8, 2006, s.637, 643. ↑
  152. The judgment can be understood in an alternative way. The ECtHR accepts rules of the second kind, which are hypothetical, and denies the striking effect of the violations on the outcome of the proceedings. Nevertheless, on looking at the judgment it is seen that the Court does not accept these rules merely hypothetically. ↑
  153. For a detailed analysis see: Karsten Gaede, Fairness als Teilhabe – Das Recht auf Konkrete und Wirksame Teilhabe durch Verteidigung Gemäss Art. 6 EMRK, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot GmbH, 2007, s.804, 813. ↑
  154. Schenk v. İsviçre, §46. ↑
  155. See: Khan v. Birleşik Krallık, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R., §35; Gäfgen v. Almanya, §162- 165. ↑
  156. Mole/Harby, s.46. ↑
  157. İçöz v. Türkiye, Başvuru No. 54919/00, 9 Ocak 2003; Jalloh v. Almanya, §99 ve 104; Göçmen v. Türkiye, Başvuru No. 72000/01, 17 Ekim 2006, §73-74; Harutyunyan v. Ermenistan, §63. ↑
  158. Örs ve Diğerleri v. Türkiye, Başvuru No. 46213/99, §60; Harutyunyan v. Ermenistan, §63, 64, 66; Levinta v. Moldava, Başvuru No. 17332/02, §101, 104, 105. ↑
  159. Söylemez v. Türkiye, Başvuru No. 46661/99, 21 Eylül 2006, §107, 122-124; Göçmen v. Türkiye, §73-74. ↑
  160. Jalloh V. Almanya, §105) ↑
  161. In its Jalloh v. Germany judgment the Court left unresolved the question whether the use of real evidence obtained by an act which does not fall within the scope of torture but may be characterised as inhuman and degrading treatment always renders the trial unfair, that is to say irrespective, in particular, of the weight attached to the evidence, of its probative value and of whether the accused had the opportunity to challenge its admission and its use at trial. On account of the particular circumstances of the case, it concluded that Article 6 of the Convention had been violated in that case. ↑
  162. Saunders v. Birleşik Krallık, Reports 1996-VI, 17 Aralık 1996. ↑
  163. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §165-168. See also: Saunders v. Birleşik Krallık, Reports 1996-VI, 17 Aralık 1996, §68; Heaney ve McGuinness v. İrlanda, Başvuru No. 34720/97, ECHR 2000-XII, §40; Jalloh v. Almanya, §100. ↑
  164. The ECtHR explains the right to remain silent as follows: “Although not expressly mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention, the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination (the right not to incriminate oneself) are rights generally recognised in international standards which form the basis of the idea of a fair trial in Article 6. One of the purposes of these rights is to contribute to the protection of the accused against undue coercion by the authorities (improper compulsion) and thereby to the prevention of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6… The right not to incriminate oneself rests on the requirement that the prosecution in a criminal case prove its case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained by methods of pressure or oppression against the wishes of the accused. In this sense, this right is closely linked to the presumption of innocence contained in paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Convention. The right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned with respect for the wish of the accused to remain silent.” Saunders v. Birleşik Krallık, 17.12.1996, Reports 1996-VI, No.24, §68, 69; John Murray v. Birleşik Krallık, 8.2.1996, Reports 1996-I, No.I, §45. See: Billur Yaltı Soydan, “İnsan Hakları Açısından Vergi Yükümlüsünün Adil Yargılanma Hakkı III”, Vergi Sorunları Dergisi, S.145, Ekim 2000, s.124. ↑
  165. İnceoğlu, s.262, 263. ↑
  166. Weeks v. Birleşik Devletler, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914). ↑
  167. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed.2d 1081 (1961). ↑
  168. John M. Scheb/John M. Scheb II, Criminal Law & Procedure, 7. Bası, Belmont CA, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2011, s.466. ↑
  169. The exclusionary rule is directly related to the prohibition on obtaining evidence, to removal from the case file and to not being taken as a basis for the judgment. It is one of the most frequently applied rules of procedure in American law and is examined separately for each type of evidence. See: Wayne R. LaFave/Jerold H. Israel/Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure, 4. Bası, St. Paul, Thomson & West, 2004, s. 496 vd. ↑
  170. The concept of State official has been used here deliberately. For to use, for this concept as stated in terms of the American legal system, the concept of public official used in our law would not carry the same meaning. State official is used in the sense of officials who work as agents of the administration and who are attached to the administration in terms of their personnel rights. ↑
  171. U.S. Supreme Court, no.82-1651, Nix v. Williams, 11 Haziran 1984 tarihli karar, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), s.441 vd.; U.S. Supreme Court, no.82-5298, Segura v. United States, 5 Temmuz 1984 tarhli kararı, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), s.796, 797, 815; U.S. Supreme Court, no.07-513, Herring v. United States, 14 Ocak 2009 tarihli kararı, 555 U.S. (2009), II. A. kısım ve diğer referanslar). ↑
  172. U.S. Supreme Court, no.50, Blackburn v. Alabama, 11 Ocak 1960 tarihli karar, 361 U.S. 199, s.205 - 207, U.S. Supreme Court, no.8, Townsend v. Sain, 18 Mart 1963 tarihli karar, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), s.293, 307 - 309). ↑
  173. Nix, s.441 ve Segura, s.804. ↑
  174. Scheb/Scheb II, s.466. ↑
  175. Nix, s.441-444 ve Segura, s.796, 797, 804, 805, 815. ↑
  176. Nix, s.441-444. ↑
  177. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §73. ↑
  178. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §69. ↑
  179. Ünver/Hakeri, 209. ↑
  180. The ECtHR has held that statements obtained as a result of ill-treatment inflicted in breach of Art. 3 ECHR are, in a similar way to real evidence obtained as a natural consequence of acts of violence, generally inadmissible. See Gäfgen v. Almanya, §166-168; Harris/O’Boyle/Bates/Buckley, 257. For the most important judgment on this subject see: Jalloh v. Almanya, §105-108. The US Supreme Court, to which the ECtHR refers in Gäfgen v. Almanya, §73, accepts the doctrine of the “fruit of the poisonous tree”. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441, 1984. ↑
  181. Ast, s.1402. ↑
  182. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §175. ↑
  183. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §176-178. ↑
  184. See: Claus Roxin/Bernd Schünemann, Strafverfahrensrecht, München, C. H. Beck, 26. Bası, 2009, §24, 60. ↑
  185. Knut Amelung, Informationsbeherrschungsrechte im Strafprozess, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot GmbH, 1990, s.14-29. ↑
  186. 31 BGHSt, 304, 308. ↑
  187. 27 BGHSt, 355, 357. ↑
  188. Amelung, 24, 30. ↑
  189. Ast, s.1403. ↑
  190. Hartmut Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 17. Bası, Münih, C. H. Beck, 2009, §30. ↑
  191. Ast, s.1403. ↑
  192. “…in German law, where there is no such general prohibition on use, it is accepted that not every item of evidence defectively obtained(,) will lead to the consequence that the evidence so obtained may not be used. Accordingly, the fact that the evidence was obtained by means that are not lawful is not an absolutely compelling condition for accepting that the evidence obtained falls within a prohibition on use. In other words, the unlawfulness of the obtaining of evidence is one thing, and accepting that the evidence obtained falls within a prohibition on use is another. In German law no general rule has so far been developed as to when the breach of a prohibition on obtaining evidence will lead to a prohibition on use. It must nevertheless be said that certain criteria have been developed for determining a prohibition on the use of evidence. Where a provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure governing the procedure for obtaining evidence has been breached, whether the evidence obtained may be used when the judgment is given must be determined by assessing each individual case. Various views have emerged on this subject in German law: The protective scope of the breached norm on the obtaining of evidence. The balancing theory, under which the interests of the State in conducting criminal prosecution are weighed against the individual interests of persons in the protection of their rights. The theory of the sphere of rights. This theory was developed by the German Federal Court of Justice. The theory was established in a case concerning the breach of the duty to give instruction laid down in Art. 55 II of the German Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the theory, regard must be had to the extent to which the unlawfulness that occurred in the obtaining of the evidence infringes the rights of the accused. The theory examines whether the interference of the breach with the sphere of rights is significant, of minor significance or insignificant. If the rights of the accused have been infringed in a significant way, the unlawfully obtained evidence is removed from the case file. If the breach has remained of secondary importance and is of no significance for the rights of the accused, the evidence is used despite being unlawful. In making this assessment, regard is had to the question for whose benefit the breached norm was laid down. Within this framework the assessment is made on three points: -The interest protected in the proceedings by the breached norm; -The purpose for which the norm was laid down; -The consequences that the breach which has occurred produces for the legal position of the accused.” Veli Özer Özbek, “Ceza Muhakemesi Hukukunda Delil Yasakları”, Alman Türk Karşılaştırmalı Ceza Hukuku, C.II, Ed: Eric Hilgendorf/Yener Ünver, İstanbul, Yeditepe Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 2010, s.919, 920. ↑
  193. 29 BGHSt 244; 32 BGHSt 68; 34 BGHSt 362. ↑
  194. Ast, s.1404. ↑
  195. Brugger, s.167 vd. ↑
  196. Walter Perron, “İşkenceye Dönüş – Özgürlükçü Hukuk Düzeni Tehlikede Mi?”, Dünyada ve Türkiye’de Ceza Hukuku Reformları Kongresi (26 Mayıs – 4 Haziran 2010), C.II, Ed: Adem Sözüer, İstanbul, XII Levha Yayıncılık, 2013, s.1626, 1627. ↑
  197. Perron, s.1628, 1629. ↑
  198. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §171. ↑
  199. Friedrich Christian Schroeder, “Ceza Mahkemesinde ‘Fair Trial’ İlkesi” Adil Yargılanma Hakkı, İstanbul, Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Yayını, 2004, s.170, 171. ↑
  200. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §172. ↑
  201. By contrast, in cases involving a breach of Art. 8 ECHR the ECtHR has found that the evidence obtained was admissible. See: Schenk v. İsviçre, §46-49; Khan v. Birleşik Krallık, §38-40. ↑
  202. Ast, s.1404. ↑
  203. Harris/O’Boyle/Bates/Buckley, s.256, 257. ↑
  204. Jalloh v. Almanya, §105. ↑
  205. Hacı Özen v. Türkiye, Başvuru No. 46286/99, 12.4.2007; Göçmen v. Türkiye, Başvuru No. 72000/01, 17.10.2006; Söylemez v. Türkiye, Başvuru No. 46661/99, 21.09.2006. ↑
  206. Harris/O’Boyle/Bates/Buckley, s.257. ↑
  207. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §180. ↑
  208. Gäfgen v. Almanya, Rozakis J., dissenting. ↑
  209. In conformity with 27 BGHSt 355, 358. ↑
  210. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §180. ↑
  211. YCGK, E. 2009/7-160, K.2009/264, Kt. 17.11.2009; 10. CD, E. 2008/834, K. 2010/3241, Kt. 15.2.2010; Kazancı İçtihat Programı. ↑
  212. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §173. ↑
  213. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §174. ↑
  214. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §175. ↑
  215. Saadi v. İtalya, §138-139. ↑
  216. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §176. ↑
  217. Osman v. Birleşik Krallık, Reports 1998VIII, 28 Ekim 1998, §115-116. ↑
  218. Osman v. Birlşik Krallık, §116. ↑
  219. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §177. Cf.: Salduz v. Türkiye, Başvuru No. 36391/02, ECHR 2008-..., §54. ↑
  220. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §178. ↑
  221. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §179. ↑
  222. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §180. ↑
  223. Harris/O’Boyle/Bates/Buckley, s.256. ↑
  224. Buyse, s.1600. ↑
  225. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §181. ↑
  226. Hulki Güneş v. Türkiye, Başvuru No. 28490/95, ECHR 2003-VII, §91; Göçmenv. Türkiye, §73. ↑
  227. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §182. ↑
  228. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §183. ↑
  229. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §184. ↑
  230. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §185. ↑
  231. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §186. ↑
  232. Gäfgen v. Almanya, §187, 188. ↑
  233. Gäfgen v. Almanya, joint partly concurring opinion of Judges Tulkens, Ziemele and Bianku, §5-7. ↑
  234. The reasons given for this are both the absence of a common European approach on this subject and the fact that the Convention does not lay down rules on evidence, and in particular on the admissibility of evidence. İnceoğlu, s.278. ↑
  235. Gäfgen v. Almanya, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power, §2. ↑
  236. Perry v Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru No. 63737/00, 26 Eylül 2002. ↑
  237. Jalloh v. Almanya, §105. ↑
  238. Buyse, s. 1599, 1600. ↑
  239. Ünver/Hakeri, s.184. ↑
  240. Gäfgen v. Almanya, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power, §3. ↑
  241. Gäfgen v. Almanya, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power, §4. ↑
  242. Salduz v. Turkey, Başvuru No. 36391/02, ECHR 2008-…, §58. ↑
  243. Gäfgen v. Almanya, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power, §5. ↑
  244. Gäfgen v. Almanya, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power, §6. ↑
  245. Gäfgen v. Almanya, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power, §7. ↑
  246. Gäfgen v. Almanya, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power, §8. ↑
  247. Ünver/Hakeri, 209, dn.629. ↑
  248. Gäfgen v. Almanya, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power, §9. ↑
  249. Chahal v. Birleşik Krallık, Reports 1996-V, 15 Kasım 1996, §79; V. v. Birleşik Krallık, Başvuru No. 24888/94, ECHR 1999-IX, §69; Ramirez Sanchez v. Fransa, §116; Saadi v. İtalya, §127. ↑
  250. Gäfgen v. Almanya, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power, §10. ↑
  251. Erdener Yurtcan, Ceza Yargılaması Hukuku, 11. Bası, İstanbul, Vedat Kitapçılık, 2005, s.427-429; Bahri Öztürk/Mustafa Ruhan Erdem/Veli Özer Özbek, Uygulamalı Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku, 4. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 1999, s.547- ↑
  252. Feridun Yenisey, “Yasak Yöntemlerle ve Hukuka Aykırı Şekilde Elde Edilen Deliller”, 24.10.1994 tarihinde Yargıtay’da sunulan tebliğ, Vural Savaş/Sadık Mollamahmutoğlu,, Ceza Muhakemesi Usulü Kanununun Yorumu, C.I, Madde 1-257, Ankara 1995, s. 1238, 1239; Cumhur Şahin, Sanığın Kolluk Tarafından Sorgulanması, Ankara, Yetkin Yayınları, 1994, s.232, 233; Kayıhan İçel, “Sorgulamada Hukuka Aykırılık ve Sonuçları”, Prof. Dr. Nurullah Kunter’e Armağan, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını,1998, s.124; Ayhan Önder/Erol Cihan, Özet Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku’na 1992 Değişiklikleri İle İlgili Ek, İstanbul, Filiz Kitabevi, 1993, s.31; Adem Sözüer, “Türkiye’de ve Karşılaştırmalı Hukukta Telefon, Teleks, Faks ve Benzeri Araçlarla Yapılan Özel Haberleşmenin Bir Ceza Yargılaması Önlemi Olarak Denetlenmesi”, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası, C.LV, S.3, Prof. Dr. Türkan Rado’ya Armağan Sayısı, 1997, s. 109, 110; Seydi Kaymaz, Ceza Muhakemesinde Hukuka Aykırı Deliller, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 1997, s.274. ↑
  253. Yargıtay Ceza Genel Kurulu, E. 2005/7-144, K. 2005/150, Kt. 29.11.2005. In this decision, while it was stated that the Indian hemp seized as a result of an unlawfully conducted search could not be used as evidence, it was held that the confession obtained from the accused in connection with that search, and not supported by any other evidence, was on its own lawful evidence, and the conviction of the accused was upheld (it is known as the Indian hemp decision). Yargıtay Ceza Genel Kurulu, E. 2009/7-160, K. 2009/264, Kt. 17.11.2009. In this decision, by contrast, it was stated that the materials relating to the production of counterfeit rakı seized as a result of an unlawfully conducted search could not be used as evidence; that, as there was no other evidence or confession, there was not sufficient evidence for the charge; and that, even supposing for a moment that there had been a confession, such a confession, obtained on the basis of unlawfully obtained evidence, would have no evidential value and, moreover, could not be used because it was not supported by other evidence; the written opinion of the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor was accordingly rejected (it is known as the counterfeit rakı decision). ↑
  254. (Additional paragraph: 4709 - 3.10.2001 / Art. 15) Findings obtained in violation of the law shall not be accepted as evidence. ↑
  255. Indeed, in the article he wrote on this subject the German jurist Prof. Dr. Walter Perron says: “all the people with whom I spoke about this incident at the time declared, spontaneously and sincerely, that had they been in Daschner’s place they would not have acted differently… At the outset, the voices that regarded the threat of torture in this incident as right clearly predominated. Many even wanted to propose that Daschner be awarded a medal. At the latest when the court, in the proceedings, found clear words against Daschner and the conduct of the police was characterised not only as unlawful but also as a serious violation of human dignity, the atmosphere was reversed and the demands for the introduction of special provisions permitting the threat and use of torture in extreme cases ceased to be voiced.” See: Perron, s.1622. ↑
  256. Gäfgen v. Almanya, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power, §11. ↑
  257. For a similar view see: Ünver/Hakeri, 209, dn.629. ↑
  258. Gäfgen v. Almanya, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power, §12. ↑
  259. Buyse, s.1600. Amelung Knut, Informationsbeherrschungsrechte im Strafprozess, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot GmbH, 1990. Amnesty International, USA: Shadow over Justice, http://amnesty.org/en/library/ info/ AMR51/094/2010/en, 30.3.2013. Ast Stephan, “The Gäfgen Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights: On the Consequences of the Threat of Torture for Criminal Proceedings”, German Law Journal, Vol.11, No.12, 2010, s.1393-1405. Ast Stephan, Normentheorie und Strafrechtsdogmatik, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot GmbH, 2010. Brugger Winfred, “Vom unbedingten Verbot der Folter zum bedingten Recht auf Folter?”, JuristenZeitung, 55 Jahrg., Nr.4, 18 Februar 2000. Buyse Antoine, “Introductory Note to European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber): Gäfgen v. Germany”, International Legal Materials, American Society of International Law, Washington D.C., Vol.49, No.6, 2010, s.1597-1639. Çınar Ali Rıza, “Hukuka Aykırı Kanıtlar”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, S.55, 2004, s.31- 64. Demirbaş Timur, Soruşturma Evresinde Şüphelinin İfadesinin Alınması, 3. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2013. Demirbaş Timur, Sanığın Hazırlık Soruşturmasında İfadesinin Alınması, İzmir, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1996. ↑
  260. Perron, s.1630, 1631. ↑

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