Abstract
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
With the development of societies and the growing complexity of social relations, the concept of crime, which has existed throughout human history, has also gradually changed and acquired various dimensions. In the light of the complex commercial relations and organisational principles of the capitalist economy, today’s concept of criminality and the methods of committing crime have changed in parallel, and as a result “organised crime” has emerged.
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
Murat Volkan Dülger∗∗∗
INTRODUCTION
With the development of societies and the growing complexity of social relations, the concept of crime, which has existed throughout human history, has also gradually changed and acquired various dimensions. In the light of the complex commercial relations and organisational principles of the capitalist economy, today’s concept of criminality and the methods of committing offences have changed in parallel, and as a result “organised crime” has emerged.
Humanity, which in every period of history has tried to combat crime, the criminal and the socio-economic, cultural and psychological causes underlying them, has, albeit belatedly, begun to combat this special type of crime too by special means. One of the important elements supporting this struggle is “the special protective measures used in combating organised crime”, which are one type of the protective measures of the law of criminal procedure.
In this study, accordingly, an attempt has been made to assess the protective measures in question briefly from the standpoint of the text of the ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights) and the judgments of the ECtHR (European Court of Human Rights). In the study, the definitions of the relevant concepts are given first; secondly, the position of special protective measures in terms of Human Rights Law as it has taken concrete shape in Europe is examined; and finally a brief assessment is made from the standpoint of the domestic law of the Republic of Türkiye.
I. Concept
Owing to the particular nature of the subject, both the concept of “organised crime” and that of “protective measure” need to be explained briefly. After that, the concept of “special protective measures used in combating organised crime”, which forms a sub-heading of protective measures, can be better understood.
1. Organised Crime
The concept of organised crime is a subject of research in its own right for Criminal Law and Criminology; for this reason the definitions to be given will always remain incomplete and its elements will need to be examined separately. Nevertheless, the following definition may briefly be given:
Organised crime consists of the organisations formed by more than one person, in a hierarchical order and in a disciplined and continuous manner, in order to commit offences directed at the same aim and assumed to disturb public order, for the purpose of obtaining gain at whatever cost1.
In addition, in our law, Article 1 of Law No. 4422 on Combating Interest-Oriented Criminal Organisations, as amended by Law No. 4723, defines the interest-oriented criminal organisation, that is, organised crime, as follows:
“Those who form an organisation in order to commit offences by using the power to intimidate, frighten or cow through the application of threats, pressure, force or violence, with the purpose of directly or indirectly seizing the management and control of an institution, body or undertaking, obtaining influence and control over public services, over press and broadcasting organisations, or over tender, concession and licensing procedures, creating cartels and trusts in economic activities, bringing about the scarcity and shortage of substances and goods or the fall or rise of prices, securing unjust benefit for themselves or for others, or obtaining votes in elections or obstructing elections, or those who direct the organisation, or who act on behalf of the organisation, or who knowingly undertake services for it...”
Although this definition is given in great detail, this stems less from its being a scientific definition than from the law’s wish to provide for every type of offence; it nevertheless sets out a concrete definition of organised crime for our law.
Organised crime, as its name indicates, requires an organisation; for this reason it is sometimes assessed in the same way as terrorist offences, which are likewise committed in an organised manner2; offences committed by forming a gang are assessed in the same way too. However, because terrorist offences are committed with a political motive and their members generally come together in order to put a political idea into practice, “organised crime” differs from offences of this kind. In the association referred to in the offence of “forming an association in order to commit offences” regulated in Art. 313 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK), on the other hand, a group generally comes into being in order to commit one or several offences, and the group disperses after particular offences have been committed. In organised crime, by contrast, since the aim is “to obtain benefit by committing offences”, the offences committed are very varied and numerous, and alongside them an attempt is made to gain influence within society. The two groups formed to commit offences are thus distinguished from one another3.
2. Protective Measure
In Turkish law various terms are used in this regard, such as “procedural measures”4, “measures of criminal procedure”5, “coercive measure”6, and “protective measure”7. In this study the expression “protective measure”, which has by now become established in doctrine, will be used.
Protective measures are measures provided for by law in order to secure the progress of criminal proceedings or the enforcement of the judgment given. In Turkish law the protective measures are regulated as judicial control, apprehension, pre-trial detention, release on security, compulsory attendance, seizure, search, prohibition on leaving the country, suspension from office, establishment of identity, placement under observation and physical examination8. Since these measures are of such a nature as to infringe the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, they cannot be applied unless they are regulated by law.
3. Special Protective Measure in Combating Organised Crime
This concept, too, is expressed in doctrine by notions such as “special measure of criminal procedure in combating organised criminality”9, “covert investigation measure in combating organised criminality”10 and “protective measures in combating organised crime”11. In this study, however, it has been preferred to use the concept of “special protective measure in combating organised crime”, both in order to ensure consistency with the superordinate concept and in order to emphasise that these measures have a special character because, in contrast to ordinary protective measures, they are provided for the purpose of combating organised crime.
These measures have been provided for in order to make it possible to combat organised crime, which is a special form of the fight against crime. The aim of these measures is to gather information from the person or persons to whom the measure is addressed by concealing the fact that the work carried out to gather information is being done on behalf of the state12. In a sense, in order to uncover organised crime and its perpetrators by this means, use is made of the methods which intelligence services employ for the purpose of gathering information – and which cannot be characterised as a preliminary investigation13.
Although these types of measure differ from the others, the differences concern the manner and time of their application. Apart from this, the protective measures provided for combating organised crime must, like ordinary protective measures, be regulated by law, and the measures must be applied by decision of the competent authorities.
These special protective measures include long-term surveillance (observation), placing under police observation, the use of technical devices, the deployment of undercover investigators and the use of trusted persons, the monitoring of telecommunications and the use of automatic data-processing facilities14.
The distinctive feature of these measures is that, unlike ordinary protective measures, they are not resorted to after an offence has been committed as part of the preliminary investigation; on the contrary, these protective measures are taken, before an offence is committed, against persons who are in circles thought to be committing offences in an organised manner or about which reports to that effect have been received. As a natural consequence of this, in the case of ordinary protective measures the person to whom the measure is addressed becomes aware at once of the action taken in respect of him and can seek his rights by having recourse to legal remedies against these measures. In the case of special protective measures, by contrast, the person against whom the measure is applied is, by the nature of things, not informed of it and learns of the measure only once its application in respect of him has ended, and this may from time to time lead to violations of rights. Moreover, compared with ordinary measures, special measures are also difficult to review.
II. Special Protective Measures in the ECHR
Before the regulation on the subject in the ECHR is examined, it is useful to give brief information on the process by which this instrument emerged and came to be applied in our country.
1. The Birth of the ECHR and its Entry into the Turkish Legal Order
The ECHR was produced by the Council of Europe, which was created within the framework of the project of unifying Western Europe militarily and economically after the Second World War and was designed as the basic structure. The Convention was signed on 04.09.1950 by twelve countries, including Türkiye. The date of entry into force of the Convention is 03.09.1953, and the date on which Türkiye became a party after completing the necessary formalities is 18.05.1954.
Together with the ECHR, two important institutions were established for the purpose of carrying out adjudicatory activity. These are the European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission), which ceased to exist upon the entry into force of Protocol No. 1115, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which continues its adjudicatory activity as a single and permanent court.
In terms of Türkiye’s domestic law the ECHR is placed on the same footing as statutes; however, pursuant to Article 90 of the 1982 Constitution, an action for annulment cannot be brought before the Constitutional Court against treaties duly put into effect, as it can against other ordinary statutes, and this places international treaties in a different position from other statutes16.
Türkiye accepted the jurisdiction of the Commission in 1987 and that of the ECtHR in 1990, and all at once found itself inside this legal system as a result of the large number of applications lodged against it17. As a result of more than ten years of practice, certain norms of domestic law that conflict with the ECHR are today gradually being re-regulated in the light of the text of the ECHR and the judgments of the ECtHR.
2. Correspondence and the Right to Respect for Private Life in the ECHR
The ECHR contains no provision dealing directly with special procedural measures. Indeed, a Convention that is international in scale and draws the general framework of rights could not have been expected to regulate a specific subject of this kind. However, Article 8 of the Convention refers directly to one of the measures that form the subject of this study, and through the case law of the ECtHR it has also become possible to make generalisations in respect of the other special protective measures.
a. The Content of Art. 8 ECHR
The right directly related to special protective measures in the ECHR is regulated in Article 8 of the Convention. In the original text of the Convention this is expressed by the term “protection of privacy and family life”18 . Its Turkish equivalent is “the protection of private life and family life”. The scope of the right is indicated in the first paragraph of the Article as follows:
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private life and family life, his home and his correspondence”19.
Although the things listed in the content of the Article may appear to be different situations, they are in fact all conceived and interpreted as a whole. Indeed, Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük have expressed this as follows: “Since the concepts of private life, family life, home and correspondence (communication) are, as different extensions of one and the same source, namely individual life, in a sense intertwined, considerations valid for one of them are mutatis mutandis valid for the others as well”20.
Although rights related to the content of the right regulated in Article 8 are regulated as the right to “equality between spouses” in Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 and as the “right to marry” in Article 12 of the Convention, the manner in which Article 8 is drafted shows that the rights in the Article must be assessed as a whole separate from these parts21. For this reason the scope of the right governs interferences with private life from outside, whether by legal means or not, and here it is “special protective measures in combating organised criminality” in particular that come to mind.
The judgments of the ECtHR concerning special protective measures have been delivered in relation to the interception of communications and the use of anonymous witnesses. These are the judgments in Malone22, Huvig23, Kruslin24, Klass25, A. v. France26, Leander27 and Lüdi2829. Among these judgments the Klass judgment30 in particular is important both because it is a judgment of principle and because the ECtHR carried out an abstract review of norms even though there was no actual violation31. For this reason the explanations in this study will be based mostly on that judgment.
The text of the Convention contains no definition of the rights; the existence of these rights becomes apparent when they are violated. The rights in the Article are regulated in a positive manner32 and, by ordering that the rights it covers be respected, the Article makes the individual the holder of rights and in particular protects the individual against arbitrary interference by the state33. The content of the Article will become clearer once it has been set out in which cases the freedoms may be restricted.
b. Art. 8(2) ECHR, the Cases in which the Right May Be Restricted
The first point we must make in this regard is that the ECHR contains no general limitation clause such as that in the former Article 13 of the 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye. An anti-democratic form of regulation of this kind is incompatible with the general scheme of the Convention. In the Convention, the restriction of a right is indicated within the article containing that right, and in this way an attempt has been made not to create abstract grounds for limitation that can be stretched in every direction.
Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 are drafted in a similar manner. The first paragraphs of these articles regulate the right or freedoms sought to be protected, while their second paragraphs set out the grounds for limitation mentioned above34. For this reason the grounds for limitation relating to the above-mentioned articles of the Convention have been set out by the ECtHR in various judgments in a manner that is valid for the other articles as well. Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention likewise sets out the grounds for the limitations that may be imposed on the right to “protection of private life and family life”.
These grounds for limitation are listed, in the words of the Convention, as “the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the freedoms and rights of others,”.
Although at first sight a limitation clause of this kind may be thought to be very broad and vague, these limitations have been circumscribed within the framework of the criteria in the text of the Convention and of the case law created by the ECtHR itself. The first point to be made here is that the ECtHR stated in its Klass and Others judgment that a “narrow interpretation” is required when a restriction is imposed: this principle was expressly stated in the words “The Court... is faced with the principle of freedom of expression, limited by a few exceptions which must be interpreted narrowly”35. Thus the first finding we obtain from the judgments of the ECtHR is that the grounds for limitation relating to the right in question are subject to narrow interpretation36.
Again, in its Sunday Times37 judgment the Court, referring to the Handyside38 judgment, stated that it is primarily the Contracting States that are under an obligation to protect the rights recognised in the Convention and that a margin of appreciation is afforded to them for this purpose, but that at the final stage the Court in any event has the power to review them.
The Convention has in addition required that the limitation be made in accordance with the law. What is emphasised here, particularly from the standpoint of our domestic law, is that measures restricting the rights listed in the Convention be taken by means of statute.
The conclusion we have reached as a result of these explanations is that, in order for the right regulated in Article 8 of the Convention to be capable of being restricted by a special protective measure, the conditions stated in two important criteria must be fulfilled:
1. The limitation shall be made by law, in accordance with the law. These laws must be accessible to all citizens and the consequence of conduct contrary to the law must be clear. Moreover, this law may be constituted not only by a formal statute in the classical sense but also by other sources of law such as custom, usage or established practice. Even certain rules of ethics are assessed as falling within this field39.
2. The limitation must be based on one of the grounds stated in paragraph 2 of Article 8. These grounds are as follows:
i) Protection of national security;
ii) Protection of public safety;
iii) Protection of the economic well-being of the country;
iv) Protection of order, prevention of crime;
v) Protection of public morals and health;
vi) Protection of the freedoms and rights of third parties.
c. Art. 8(2) ECHR, the Limit of the Limitation
The grounds set out in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the ECHR which justify restriction of the right to “protection of private life and family life” also have a limit. This limit has been laid down in the judgments of the ECtHR and is twofold: “necessity in a democratic country” and “proportionality”. Although in the Court’s other judgments on the subject certain different criteria have been introduced depending on the circumstances, these two criteria are taken into account in all judgments concerning limitation40.
As regards the first of these criteria, the Court examines, in relation to the matter before it, whether the restriction imposed is necessary in a democratic country, and looks for a “social need” for the restriction imposed41. In the Handyside judgment the Court also clarified the matter by explaining what is to be understood by “democratic society”. According to the Court, a democratic society is a society in which there is “pluralism, openness and tolerance”42. Accordingly, recourse may not be had in every preliminary investigation to telephone tapping and the use of undercover agents in particular; for this there must be a social need in a democratic society, as there is in combating organised crime. The Court, too, stating this in the case of Klass and Others, did not find contrary to the Convention the law made by the German government which contains special protective measures for combating organised crime43.
In the second criterion taken into account in the review, the Court looks for proportionality between the limitation decision taken in domestic law and the aim sought to be achieved. This is a principle that is valid in every field of law. In every discipline of law a reasonable relationship is always sought between the measures taken and the aim achieved. Even where it is organised criminality that is being combated, no concessions must be made on human rights.
III. The Situation in Turkish Law
In our law there was a gap in this area until Law No. 4422 on Combating Interest-Oriented Criminal Organisations, enacted in 1999. Until that date it was argued by various authors that the interception of communications, which is one of the special protective measures, could be carried out on the basis of the concept of “other consignments” in Article 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMUK)44. Alongside this, some authors argued that it was objectionable to reach by way of interpretation a conclusion on so important a matter, one capable of infringing fundamental rights and freedoms, and that a separate law needed to be enacted for it45. The legislature must have considered the authors holding the second view to be right, for it sought to clarify the matter by enacting the law mentioned above.
The Law on Combating Interest-Oriented Criminal Organisations (ÇASÖMK) provides for the following special protective measures: the interception and recording of communications in Article 2, covert surveillance in Article 3, the examination of records and data in Article 4, the use of undercover agents in Article 5, the application of extended seizure in Article 6 and the protection of witnesses in Article 746. The same law also sets out the cases in which these measures may be applied and the review mechanisms. In our law it is not possible to have recourse to any protective measures other than these, which are provided for combating organised crime. To do otherwise would not only create an unlawful situation but would also lead to a violation of the Convention.
To explain these measures one by one would go beyond the scope of this study; by this regulation, however, the criterion of lawfulness, which is the precondition of the grounds for limitation stated in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention, has been met. Whether the other criteria are complied with will be revealed by concrete practice.
CONCLUSION
The conviction reached at the end of the study is that, in interpreting Article 8 of the ECHR, the ECtHR has chosen its customary method, which favours freedom and restricts the grounds for limitation. The Court has, however, underlined that the limit of freedom is the freedom of other people and, particularly in its judgment in the case of Klass and Others, has indirectly shown that certain sacrifices are necessary for “combating organised crime”. It has of course done so in conformity with the criterion of the requirements of a democratic society, and has stated that combating organised crime in a democratic society and introducing a number of special protective measures for this struggle is a “social need”.
Looking at the matter from the standpoint of our domestic law, it must also be stated that when these measures are ordered, applied and reviewed, the criteria of the ECtHR must always be borne in mind and close attention must be paid to the fine distinction in this area between what is lawful and what is outside the law.
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Footnotes
- This article was published in Yıldızhan Yayla’ya Armağan, İstanbul, Galatasaray Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003, s.275-283. • Attorney-at-law; doctoral student at the Department of Public Law, Institute of Social Sciences, Istanbul University. ↑
- Çetin Özek, “Organize Suç”, Prof.Dr. Nurullah Kunter’e Armağan, İstanbul, İÜHF Eğitim Öğretim ve Yardımlaşma Vakfı Yayını, 1998, s. 195; Turgut Kazan, “Organize Suçlarla Mücadelede Koruma Tedbirleri”, Yargı Reformu 2000 Sempozyumu, İzmir, İzmir Barosu Yayını, 2000, s. 566. ↑
- Kazan, a.g.y., s.566,567. ↑
- Mustafa Ruhan Erdem, Ceza Muhakemesinde Organize Suçlulukla Mücadelede Gizli Soruşturma Tedbirleri, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2001, s. 43,44. ↑
- Faruk Erem, Ceza Usulü Hukuku, 5.Bası, Ankara, Sevinç Matbaası, 1978, s. 461. ↑
- Erdener Yurtcan, Ceza Yargılaması Hukuku, 7.Bası, İstanbul, Kazancı Kitapçılık, 1998, s. 398. ↑
- Nur Centel, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukukunda Tutuklama ve Yakalama, İstanbul, Beta Yayınevi, 1992, s. 2. In her work, however, Centel followed the majority and used the term “protective measure”. ↑
- Nurullah Kunter/Feridun Yenisey, Muhakeme Hukuku Dalı Olarak Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku, 11.Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayınevi, 2000, s. 590; Bahri Öztürk/Mustafa R. Erdem/Veli Özer Özbek, Uygulamalı Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku, 5. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayınevi, 2000, s. 553, Öztekin Tosun, Türk Suç Muhakemesi Hukuku Dersleri I, İstanbul, İÜHF Yayını, 1984, s. 818. ↑
- Kunter/Yenisey, a.g.e., s. 597, Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s. 553-610. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s. 610. ↑
- Erdem, a.g.e., s. 23. ↑
- Kazan, a.g.y., s. 566. ↑
- Erdem, a.g.e., s. 48,49. ↑
- Erdem, a.g.e., s. 49. ↑
- Erdem, a.g.e., s. 48-119. ↑
- The date of entry into force of this Protocol is 01.11.1998. By it the structure of the ECtHR was completely changed and it was turned into a court working on a full-time basis. ↑
- Süheyl Batum, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Türk Anayasal Sistemine Etkileri, İstanbul, İÜHF Yayını, 1993, s.55- 58. ↑
- Osman Doğru/Atilla Nalbant, İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi ve Türkiye Karar Özetleri (1995-2000), İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 2001, s. 1-4; Hakan Karakuş, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Kararları ve Karşıoylarında Türkiye, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 2001, s. 2-5. ↑
- Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights – As Amended By Protocol No.11, European Treaty Series, No.5, Strasbourg. ↑
- For the Turkish translation of the Convention and its additional protocols see M. Semih Gemalmaz, İnsan Hakları Belgeleri (Bölgesel Sistemler), İstanbul, Alkım Kitapevi, 1999. For a comparative English–Turkish text see Osman Doğru, İnsan Hakları Uluslararası Mevzuatı – International Human Rights Instruments, İstanbul Beta Yayınevi, 1998. In addition, for the original English and French texts of the Convention instruments, the ECtHR’s website at www.echr.coe.int may be consulted. ↑
- A. Feyyaz Gölcüklü/A. Şeref Gözübüyük, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Uygulaması, 2. Bası, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 1998, s. 317; to the same effect see Erdem, a.g.e., s. 147. ↑
- Francis G. Jacobs/Robin C. A. White, The European Convention On Human Rights, 2’nd Edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, s. 172. ↑
- Malone v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 Aug. 1984, Series A, No. 82; (1985) 7 EHRR 14. ↑
- Huvig v. France, Judgement of 24 Apr. 1990, Series A, No. 176-B; (1990) 12 EHRR 528. ↑
- Kruslin v. France, Judgement of 24 Apr. 1990, Series A, No. 176-B; (1990) 12 EHRR 547. ↑
- Klass and others v. Germany, Judgement of 6 Sept. 1978, series a, No.28; (1979-80) 2 EHRR 214 ↑
- A v. France, Judgement of 23 Nov. 1993, Series A, No. 277-B; (1994) 17 EHRR 462. ↑
- Leander v. Sweden, Judgement of 26 Mar. 1987, Series A, No. 116; (1987) 9 EHRR 433. ↑
- Lüdi v. Switzerland, Judgement of 15 June 1992, Series A, No. 238; (1993) 15 EHRR 173. ↑
- Jacobs/White, a.g.e., s. 206-210. For brief summaries of the judgments see: Osman Doğru (ed.), İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi Kararlar Rehberi (1960-1994), İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 1999, No 086,215,214,030,442,126,357. ↑
- For the Turkish translation of the judgment see Osman Doğru (ed.), İnsan Hakları Kararlar Derlemesi, C.I, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998, s. 303–328. ↑
- Adem Sözüer, “Türkiye’de ve Karşılaştırmalı Hukukta Telefon, Teleks, Faks ve Benzeri Araçlarla Yapılan Özel Haberleşmenin Bir Ceza Yargılaması Önlemi Olarak Denetlenmesi”, İstanbul, İÜHFM c. LV s 3 Prof. Dr. Türkan Rado’ya Armağan Sayısı, 1997, s. 75. ↑
- Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the Eurapian Court of Human Rights, London, Blackstone Press Limited, 2001, s. 150; D.J. Harris/M. O’Boyle/C. Warbick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rigts, London-Dublin-Edinburg, Butterworths, 1995, s. 302. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s. 292. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s. 292. ↑
- Andrew Nicol/Gavin Millar/Andrew Sharland, Media Law & Human Rights, London, Blackstone Press Limited, 2001, s. 12. ↑
- Sözüer, a.g.y., s 74. ↑
- Sunday Times (The) v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 26 Apr. 1979, Series A, No 30; (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245. ↑
- Handyside v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 Dec. 1976 Series A, No. 24; (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737. ↑
- M. Şükrü Alpaslan, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Uygulamasında Düşünce ve Basın Özgürlüğü”, Prof. Dr. Sahir Erman’a Armağan, İstanbul, İÜHF Eğitim Öğretim ve Yardımlaşma Vakfı Yayını, 1999, s. 30; Sözüer, a.g.y., s. 74. ↑
- Alpaslan, a.g.y., s 30; Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s 294,295. ↑
- Alpaslan, a.g.y., s 30. ↑
- Erdem, a.g.y., s 151. ↑
- Sözüer, a.g.y., s. 76. ↑
- Sözüer, a.g.y., s. 76-80. ↑
- Sözüer, a.g.y., s. 86 vd. ↑
- Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s. 629 vd. ↑
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