Abstract
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
At first glance, and without the need for any explanation, the concept of human rights evokes the notion of the rights that a human being has. This concept is expressed by the terms “human rights” in English, “droits de l’homme” in French and “Menschenrechte” in German. Although human rights are defined in legal scholarship as the rights a person has simply by virtue of being human, it is beyond dispute that this is a very vague and abstract explanation. When these words are unpacked, it is seen that the concept raises two important theoretical questions: what it means to have a right, and how it is that simply being human forms the basis of rights. These are the first and perhaps the most important theoretical questions of human rights.
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION MECHANISM ESTABLISHED BY THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE AMENDMENTS ENVISAGED BY ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL NO. 14*
Murat Volkan Dülger**
INTRODUCTION
At first sight, and without any need for explanation, the concept of human rights calls to mind the rights that human beings possess. The concept is rendered by the terms “human rights” in English, “droits de l’homme” in French and “Menschenrechte” in German. Although human rights are defined in legal scholarship as the rights a person has simply by virtue of being human, it is beyond dispute that this is a very oblique and abstract explanation. When these words are unpacked, it becomes apparent that the concept raises two important theoretical questions: what it means to have a right, and how the mere fact of being human can form the foundation of rights1. These are the first, and perhaps the most important, theoretical questions of human rights.
A right is a concept with a very broad meaning, one whose boundaries cannot in fact be drawn precisely. In law the concept of right has two meanings: “rectitude” and “entitlement”. When a thing or an act is said to be right, what is expressed is that it is correct; when someone is said to have a right to something, what is expressed is that he is entitled to it. It is the second of these, right in the sense of entitlement, that constitutes the concept of right for the purposes of human rights.
Grounding human rights, that is, explaining what it means that they are “possessed simply by virtue of being human”, is more difficult. A right which a person can assert in national or international law in fact derives from the sources of positive law, that is, from statutes or treaties. If one goes further back, however, it becomes apparent that these written texts (national or supranational legal instruments) are not rules which someone wrote down on a whim, but have been brought together systematically in order to meet and regulate social and individual needs, and that human rights therefore also have their source in the needs of human beings and societies2.
The most important feature distinguishing these needs from other needs, and hence from other rights, is that a great many of the rights recognised as human rights emerged for the purpose of “protecting the dignity” which a being possesses by reason of being human. On this basis it can be seen that human rights have their source in the doctrine of natural law.
These rights are categories of rights which are accepted as existing even if they are not laid down in any positive rule, which protect the human being and human dignity, and which are regarded as the highest of rights: reducing them to writing merely makes the right concerned easier to assert against those who violate it, but does not strengthen the right itself3.
The development of the concept of human rights, and the possibility of asserting these rights against those who govern once they had been laid down in concrete documents, came about at the end of a long and bloody process. This struggle went hand in hand with the struggles of societies for emancipation and for fundamental rights and freedoms. Its first symbolic example is “Spartacus”, the gladiator slave who rose up against the rulers in the Roman Empire. The first example of a written, albeit symbolic, achievement in this field is the “Magna Carta Libertatum”, the first document in England by which the powers of the king were restricted against the king’s will.
In the course of this process, while humanity was fighting the battle for control of the means of production, which makes up objective history4, it at the same time carried on, as an extension of that battle, the struggle to be able to assert and protect the rights it possesses by virtue of being human. In the period that followed, particularly with the developing industrial society, and with the will and support of the ruling classes owning the means of production, efforts were rapidly undertaken, especially after the Second World War, to establish human rights so that production could take place in a safe and comfortable environment and consumption could likewise be secured, and the struggle for human rights began to be conducted more intensively and on firmer ground.
The first concrete achievement of this long struggle at the international level was the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” produced by the United Nations (UN). In the period that followed came the “European Convention on Human Rights” (ECHR), which is as important as that Declaration but which, being an international convention, has a far greater binding effect and, because it provides for a mechanism of judicial protection, was the first to be effective in this respect. This Convention was produced by the Council of Europe (CoE).
Although, apart from these, supranational instruments and protection mechanisms relating to human rights have also been produced at regional level on the African and American continents, the most effective and widespread among them have been the first two mentioned above. These two important conventions and their supplementary texts have not only played a very important role in bringing the concept of human rights to its present level but have also given rise to a new branch of law called “human rights law”.
This study, too, is concerned with the ECHR, which in particular through the arrangement it introduced made the individual a holder of rights under international law, and specifically with how the judicial protection mechanism it established functions. In examining this judicial protection mechanism, particular attention will be paid to the Convention, the Rules of Court and Protocols Nos. 11 and 14. The explanations concerning Protocol No. 14, which provides for changes in the functioning and structure of the Court and which, while its entry into force was awaited, could not enter into force because it was vetoed by Russia, are set in bold type in order to draw attention to them. In addition, the Turkish translation of Protocol No. 14 is given as an annex at the end of this article.
I. The Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights
A. The Emergence and Structure of the Council of Europe
1. The History, Formation and Aim of the Council of Europe
In order that the great suffering which the Second World War had brought upon people all over the world should never be experienced again and that wars might be prevented in advance by diplomatic means, the United Nations was founded in 1945 under the leadership of the States that had emerged victorious from the war. Within a short time thereafter, work was begun with a view to preventing the human rights violations that had been inflicted, in particular, on the peoples of the countries which took part in the war, and finally, on 10 December 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Although this Declaration reflects the demands of the world community, gives expression to very important human rights and is of great moral significance and influence, it is a document without coercive force or effectiveness. The Declaration places the member States of the United Nations under an obligation to secure and protect the rights set out in it, but provides for no effective sanction in the event of non-compliance5.
In order to build a civilised and once again strong Europe sharing common values, and never again to make room for anti-democratic, fascist or National Socialist dictatorships, the European States, giving priority to the protection of human dignity and human rights, first created a political organisation called the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe is the architect of the ECHR and hence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which provides judicial protection, the Convention’s most important effect, and establishes that the rights contained in the Convention have been violated; in other words, both the Convention and the Court set up by it were created by the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe was established by the Statute of the Council of Europe6, which was opened for signature on 5 May 1949 and entered into force on 3 August 1949 upon ratification by seven States, the condition for its becoming operative.
The Council of Europe was founded immediately after the Second World War, which had caused great destruction, both material and moral, on the European continent. The aim in bringing this organisation into being was to raise the level of Europe’s cultural, social and political life and to develop the idea of human rights, democracy and the rule of law7.
The Council was initially formed with the membership of ten Western European States which signed the Statute on 5 May 1949 and completed the membership formalities within a short time (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Ireland, Italy, Sweden); subsequently, as the Council’s effectiveness increased and, especially after 1990, the States of Eastern Europe formerly under socialist regimes joined, the number of member States reached forty-one as of 1 January 2001; thereafter, with the recent accession, in turn, of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and the Principality of Monaco, this number reached forty-six; and most recently, on 6 June 2006, when Montenegro, which had separated from the former Republic of Yugoslavia, also joined the CoE, it became forty-seven. As of 16 July 2007 the number of member States of the Council of Europe is forty-seven8.
Accepting the invitation addressed to it, Türkiye communicated its decision to join the CoE to the Secretariat General of the CoE on 08.08.1949, in accordance with Art. 4 of the CoE Statute. Law No. 5456 of 12.12.1949 was enacted in respect of this decision to accede9. Türkiye deposited its instrument of ratification with the Secretariat General of the CoE on 13.04.1950 and, pursuant to Art. 42(c) of the CoE Statute, became a member of the CoE with effect from that date10.
By the nature of international conventions, States may become parties to them of their “free will”, in accordance with the procedures laid down by their own domestic law and by the convention concerned, and may likewise, following the same method, terminate their membership of their own free will11. In the period during which the CoE has been in existence, a member State has terminated its membership only once to date. As a result of the systematic human rights violations committed by the “Colonels’ Junta”, which came to power through the military coup of 1967, Greece was faced with an inter-State complaint, as provided for by the ECHR, brought by several States, and while this complaint was being examined by the European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission), Greece withdrew from membership of the CoE on 31.12.1970. When that military regime was overthrown as a result of Türkiye’s military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, Greece returned to a democratic system and became a member of the CoE again on 28.11.197412.
The CoE emerged as a result of the reaction to the very serious human rights violations that occurred in Europe, particularly during the Second World War. The aim of the CoE is stated in Art. 1(a) of the CoE Statute as “to create a stronger bond among its members in order to safeguard and realise the ideals and principles which are their common heritage, with the aim of accelerating economic and social development”. Art. 1(b) of the Statute states that this aim can be attained, alongside other factors such as the work of the organs, through “the protection and development of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. For this reason, the most important of the aims behind the foundation of this Council is “the protection of human rights, the prevention of human rights violations and, by this means, the realisation and safeguarding of individual rights and freedoms on the European continent, thereby securing social and economic progress”.
From the moment the CoE first came into being, the principle of respect for human rights has been the organisation’s most important aim13. Indeed, Art. 3 of the CoE Statute expressly states that every member State accepts the principle of the rule of law and the principle that all persons within its jurisdiction enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms. Moreover, Art. 8 of the Statute lays down the procedure for expelling from the CoE member States which fail to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and seriously violate them, thereby providing for an important sanction in respect of the member countries14.
2. The Structure of the Council of Europe
In order to achieve the aim set out above, the CoE has been equipped with two organs. These are the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly. In addition, a Secretariat General of the CoE has been set up to assist these two organs and to carry out administrative business.
a. The Committee of Ministers
The Committee of Ministers consists of the ministers for foreign affairs of the member States of the CoE or of each member State’s permanent representatives to the CoE. When the Committee of Ministers meets at the level of the member States’ permanent representatives, it functions under the name “Committee of Ministers’ Deputies”. Whereas the Committee of Ministers composed of the foreign ministers meets twice a year, the Committee of Ministers’ Deputies composed of the permanent representatives works on a continuous basis. The Committee of Ministers is the highest decision-making body of the CoE; its decisions take the form of conventions, declarations and statements15.
By Additional Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR, the functions of the Committee of Ministers were also
intended to be changed. Accordingly, the Committee of Ministers is given the right to refer the matter to the Court where one of the States Parties to the Convention fails to comply with a judgment of the ECtHR. For this, a decision must be taken in the Committee of Ministers by a majority of 2/3 of the votes. In addition, Protocol No. 14 gives the Committee of Ministers the right, again, to apply to the Court for the interpretation of judgments delivered by the ECtHR.
Another important change sought to be introduced by this Protocol is that the Committee of Ministers
may alter the number of judges sitting in the Chambers. Under Art. 27(2) ECHR, which will become Art. 26 as amended by Protocol No. 14, the Committee of Ministers may, at the request of the plenary Court, by a unanimous decision and for a fixed period, decide to reduce the number of judges of the Chambers, which consist of seven members, to five (Art. 6 of Additional Protocol No. 14).
b. The Parliamentary Assembly
The Parliamentary Assembly consists of representatives elected by the national parliaments of the member States from among their own members. The number of members which each member State has in the Parliamentary Assembly is determined in proportion to its population. States that are not members of the CoE may also have representatives in this Assembly with the status of “special guest” or “observer”. Specialised committees set up to work on a particular subject are appointed by the Parliamentary Assembly. A further important task of this Assembly is to elect the judges of the ECtHR16. The Assembly has no legislative function. It performs functions such as making recommendations to the Committee of Ministers, serving as a forum in which social problems are debated, and acting as a driving force for the development of human rights17.
c. The Secretariat General of the Council of Europe
The Secretariat General is, in a sense, the executive organ of the Council of Europe. It consists of a Secretary General, a Deputy Secretary General and such staff as may be required. The Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General are elected by the Parliamentary Assembly. The other staff of the Secretariat General are appointed by the Secretary General. The Secretary General is responsible to the Committee of Ministers for his acts18.
d. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights
The office of Commissioner for Human Rights within the Council of Europe was established by Resolution (99)50, adopted by the Committee of Ministers at its 104th session on 7 May 1999. The Commissioner is elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The Commissioner has been given the task of promoting education in human rights in the member States of the CoE and of working to raise awareness of human rights. In addition, the Commissioner has been given the task of monitoring, so as to ensure that individuals are able to enjoy human rights in full, which is the matter to which the CoE attaches the greatest importance.
It is not possible to lodge an individual application with the Commissioner for Human Rights for the purpose of having him conduct an examination. The Commissioner carries out examinations at country level on matters falling within his remit; to date, for example, the Commissioner has carried out work in countries such as Chechnya and Georgia. Each year the Commissioner draws up a report to be submitted to the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly. In addition, the Commissioner makes recommendations, gives opinions and prepares reports on matters within his remit19.
Protocol No. 14 sought to grant the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights the right
to take part in proceedings before the Court. Accordingly, the Commissioner may submit written comments to the Court and may also take part in hearings as a third party (Art. 13 of Additional Protocol No. 14)20.
B. The History of the ECHR and the List of the Rights It Protects
1. The History and Formation of the ECHR
The CoE, the symbol of political unity in Europe (in Western Europe as at the date on which the Council and the Convention came into force), and the ECHR, its product, share the same origin. The purpose of drawing up this Convention was to make possible the political unification of Europe referred to in Art. 1 of the CoE Statute by safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms. Proceeding from this integration, it cannot be said that the ECHR is aimed solely at the protection of human rights. Having regard to the dynamics that gave rise to the CoE and to the fact that the Cold War prevailed at the time it emerged, it can be seen that, beyond its apparent aims, this Convention also had aims such as providing a framework for the Western European system of thought and clearly demarcating and protecting it from the system of thought prevailing in the Eastern Bloc. For this reason this Convention is in fact the manifestation of a political stance21.
The full title of this Convention is the “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”. In our country, however, it is today generally called the European Convention on Human Rights (Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi, AİHS); in legal scholarship there are also authors who use the form İnsan Hakları Avrupa Sözleşmesi (İHAS).
The ECHR was signed by the ministers for foreign affairs of the member countries of the CoE in Rome, the capital of Italy, on 4 November 1950. It entered into force on 3 September 1953, the date on which the condition for its entry into force, namely the completion by ten member States of the formalities for becoming a party, was fulfilled by the tenth country and its instrument of ratification was deposited with the Secretariat General of the CoE. In this way the foundation and starting point were laid for the process of producing human rights instruments among the texts drawn up by the CoE22.
With the acceptance by six States Parties to the Convention of the right of individual application, the most important innovation introduced by the Convention, the provisions relating to it also entered into force, and on 18 May 1954 the first members of the European Commission of Human Rights were elected by the Committee of Ministers. Subsequently, once the jurisdiction of the former European Court of Human Rights (the old Court) had been accepted and had taken effect, the first judges of the old Court were elected on 21 January 1959, and the system of judicial protection introduced by the Convention thus began to operate in the full sense.
When the Convention was first drawn up, it covered the fundamental rights and freedoms belonging to the principal first-generation rights on which ten States had reached agreement. However, having regard to the needs that have arisen in the nearly seventy years which have elapsed since 1950, when the Convention was concluded, rights which in particular could not be included in the Convention under the conditions of that time have been regulated, by additional Protocols to the Convention, as rights requiring protection. In this context, fourteen additional Protocols have been drawn up to date, some creating new kinds of rights and others containing procedural provisions altering the structure of the judicial protection system; thirteen of these additional Protocols have entered into force.
One of the most important of these Protocols is Protocol No. 11, which entered into force on 1 November 1998. From the date of its entry into force until that date, the Convention was applied in its original form. Protocol No. 11 changed the Convention, including the numbering of its articles, and, in consequence, the judicial protection system was substantially altered by this Protocol. The position of the Convention and of the judicial protection system before and after Protocol No. 11 will be explained below.
However, since the changes made by Protocol No. 11 also proved insufficient and, in particular,
because the workload that had accumulated in the Chambers prolonged proceedings to such an extent as to affect the “right to a fair trial”, Protocol No. 14 was prepared and submitted to the member States of the CoE for signature and ratification; however, because it was vetoed in the Duma, the lower house of the parliament of the Russian Federation, the only country that has not ratified the treaty, it has for the time being become inapplicable. Protocol No. 14, the changes sought to be introduced by it and the assessments concerning its veto by Russia will be explained in detail below.
The importance of the ECHR stems not from the rights it guarantees or from the fact that it forms the foundation of the CoE, but from the fact that, through the judicial protection system it provides for, it gives the States Parties to the Convention a right, unknown in international law, to bring what amounts to a public action (actio popularis) and, more importantly, gives individuals the right to lodge applications in respect of violations of rights which they themselves have suffered. In this way, individuals were for the first time envisaged as subjects holding rights under international law within a judicial protection mechanism whose operation is effectively regulated, and the protection of human rights was made the subject of regulation at the international level. Although individuals had earlier been made subjects of international law in a body called the Central American Court of Justice in 1907, that body was not effective and, moreover, survived for only a very short time23.
By virtue of this feature the Convention is, in one respect, also a document which shows in concrete form the abstract level attained by Western democracy24. It should not be forgotten, however, that although these rights were first defined by an institution created by the Western States in question and an attempt was made to protect them through a judicial protection mechanism, this does not mean that these rights have also been embraced by the rulers of those countries and applied equally and in full to everyone under the protective umbrella of the Convention.
2. Ratification and Application of the ECHR by Türkiye
The Convention was signed by Türkiye on 4 November 1950, the date on which the Convention was first opened for signature. Türkiye became a party to the Convention on 18 May 1954, approximately one year after 3 September 1953, the date of the Convention’s entry into force, when, having completed the necessary formalities, it deposited its instrument of ratification with the Secretariat General of the CoE. The Convention was approved by Parliament by Law No. 6366 of 10 March 1954, but there was no debate whatsoever on the matter when the approving law passed through Parliament25. Likewise, becoming a party to the Convention did not arouse much interest in political life either; it was seen merely as a part of integration with the West26.
Türkiye recognised the right of individual application, and thus the competence of the Commission, on 28 January 1987, and accepted the jurisdiction of the old Court on 22 January 1990. By accepting the jurisdiction of the old Court, Türkiye fully entered this legal system, the Convention became fully operative in respect of Türkiye, and Türkiye suddenly had a large number of applications lodged against it to contend with27. It was also only after this date that the Convention and the judicial protection system it introduced attracted great interest in our country.
The legal systems of the other States Parties to the Convention contain differing arrangements as regards the status of the ECHR in domestic law. In some countries the Convention is placed on the same level as the constitution, in others on the same level as statutes, and in yet others it occupies a position between the constitution and statutes. In Türkiye’s domestic law the ECHR was placed on the same level as statutes; under Art. 90 of the 1982 Constitution, entitled “Approval of International Treaties”, no action for annulment may be brought before the Constitutional Court against international treaties duly put into effect, as it may be against other statutes, and this places international treaties in a different position from other statutes28. In this form, however, the provision gave rise to debate in legal scholarship and differing views were expressed on the subject29; the prevailing view in legal scholarship, which we also shared, was that international treaties, and hence the ECHR, rank between the Constitution and statutes and have a stronger position than statutes. This debate was conducted in particular on the question of the effectiveness of the rules of the ECHR in domestic law and of whether they could be applied directly by the courts in place of a statute.
Wishing to put an end to these debates and to lay down a clear principle on the matter, the legislature, by Law No. 5170 of 07.05.2004, added the following as a second sentence at the end of Art. 90(5) of the Constitution: “In the event of disputes arising from the fact that international treaties on fundamental rights and freedoms duly put into effect and laws contain different provisions on the same matter, the provisions of the international treaties shall prevail”; it thereby brought this debate to an end in normative terms, in the manner we too had long advocated. Henceforth, where a rule of domestic law conflicts with an article of the ECHR regulating a fundamental right or freedom, the domestic norm will not be applied and the article of the Convention will be applied directly.
Protocol No. 14, for its part, was signed by Türkiye on 6 October 2004 and adopted by the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) on 1 June 2006 as Law No. 5512, and the law on its adoption was published in the Official Gazette No. 26253 of 8 August 2006. After the ratification procedure had been completed, the instrument was deposited with the Secretariat General of the CoE on 2 October 2006.
3. The List of the Rights Protected by the ECHR
The Convention regulated and placed under protection the minimum level of human rights on which the European States members of the CoE were able to agree under the conditions of some seventy years ago30. The ECHR and the Protocols produced as additions to it contain a substantial part of the “classical–liberal” rights and freedoms which are regulated under the headings of “civil and political rights” in the instruments produced by the United Nations and under the headings of “rights of the individual” and “political rights” in the 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye, and which are defined in legal scholarship as first-generation rights31. “Social rights”, characterised as second-generation rights, were made by the CoE the subject of a separate instrument and structure; in this field the “European Social Charter” was prepared, which was opened for signature on 18 October 1961 and entered into force on 26 February 196532.
The rights and freedoms in the Convention or the additional Protocols do not include all the rights and freedoms accorded to individuals in Western democracy today. Even so, not all the rights contained in the Convention and the additional Protocols are recognised by the countries that are parties to the Convention and the Protocols. This non-recognition is brought about in two ways. The first is by not becoming a party to the additional Protocols which lay down new rights; the second is by the entry of reservations by member States in respect of rights contained in the Convention or the additional Protocols33. It can be observed that reservations to the Convention or the additional Protocols have been entered in particular in countries which have become parties to the Convention in recent years34.
The rights and freedoms contained in the ECHR and its additional Protocols are as follows35:
Rights and freedoms contained in the ECHR
Right to life (Art. 2)
Prohibition of torture (Art. 3)
Prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Art. 4)
Right to liberty and security of person (Art. 5)
Right to a fair trial (Art. 6)
Requirement that offences and penalties be prescribed by law (Art. 7)
Right to respect for private and family life, the home and freedom of communication (Art. 8)
Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 9)
Right to freedom of expression (Art. 10)
Right to freedom of assembly and association (Art. 11)
Right to marry and to found a family (Art. 12)
Freedom to seek legal remedies (Art. 13)
Rights and freedoms contained in Protocol No. 1
Right to property (Art. 1)
Right to education and instruction (Art. 2)
Freedom to have the legislature constituted by secret ballot and free elections (Art. 3)
Rights and freedoms contained in Protocol No. 4
Right not to have one’s liberty restricted on the ground of an obligation arising from private-law relations (Art. 1)
Right to freedom of movement and to choose one’s residence (Art. 2)
Prohibition of the expulsion of nationals and of preventing them from entering their country (Art. 3)
Prohibition of the collective expulsion of aliens (Art. 4)
Rights and freedoms contained in Protocol No. 6
This Protocol merely provides for the abolition of the death penalty in respect of the countries that are parties to it and states that this penalty may be applied only in the special circumstances in which a state of war prevails.
Rights and freedoms contained in Protocol No. 7
Prohibition of the arbitrary expulsion of an alien lawfully present in a country (Art. 1)
Right of a person convicted of an offence to apply to a higher court (Art. 2)
Rule that compensation be paid to a person wrongfully convicted (Art. 3)
Prohibition of being tried or punished again for the same offence (Art. 4)
Right of spouses to equal rights in marriage (Art. 5)
Rights and freedoms contained in Protocol No. 12
This additional Protocol prohibits discrimination of every kind.
Rights and freedoms contained in Protocol No. 13
This additional Protocol provides for the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances.
Protocols Nos. 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11, for their part, introduced various rules concerning the functioning of the judicial protection system established by the ECHR. The most important of these, as stated above, is Protocol No. 11, which changed the Convention and the judicial protection system.
In addition, most recently, Protocol No. 14 too provided for changes to the structure and functioning of the Court designed to speed up proceedings; however, as briefly mentioned above, it is not possible at present for this Protocol to enter into force.
II. The Organs of Judicial Protection Provided for by the ECHR
The most important feature of the ECHR is that it introduces a system of judicial protection for the rights contained in the Convention and creates judicial organs, and that, by recognising the right of individuals to apply to those organs, it places individuals in the position of subjects of international law.
The Convention and the system it introduced have had an extremely constructive influence on the human rights policies of the member States of the CoE and on the development of the rules they have adopted in the field of human rights, and have been the most effective system in the field of human rights to date. The reason for this is said to lie in the effectiveness of the judicial protection system provided for by the Convention and in the attitude of the States Parties towards complying with it; as a further reason, Rolv Ryssdal, one of the former Presidents of the European Court of Human Rights, pointed to the fact that the Convention “has become the basic law of Europe”36.
For these reasons the protection system introduced by the Convention became the victim of its own success and came to be crushed under a very heavy workload37. This great increase in workload was due not only to the success of the Convention but also to the fact that, particularly from the beginning of the 1990s, countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans in particular became parties to the Convention and entered its judicial system, and that, apart from these, some other States Parties to the Convention also accepted the right of individual application and the jurisdiction of the old Court.
This great increase in workload, and the fact that lodging an application was in some cases perceived as a complicated procedure, raised the problem of the effectiveness of the protection mechanism, both because proceedings were prolonged and the outcome delayed and because lodging an application was in some cases difficult38. It was as a remedy for this that Protocol No. 11 was drawn up and the structure of the judicial protection system completely changed. However, the decisions and judgments delivered by the Commission and the old Court, which operated before Protocol No. 11, still retain their validity and applicability. These decisions are used in elucidating many legal concepts, and many judgments of the ECtHR refer to them as precedents.
However, very shortly after the entry into force of Protocol No. 11
it became apparent that the changes made were insufficient to cope with the workload, and for this reason the relevant committees began to devise remedies with a view to speeding up the functioning of the system and adopting new measures for the effectiveness of the Court’s judgments. As a result of this work the text of Protocol No. 14 emerged and was opened for signature by the States Parties to the Convention. This Protocol was signed by all the member States of the CoE and had been ratified by all of them except the Russian Federation. It was to enter into force once the Russian Federation, too, had completed its ratification, and the structure and functioning of the Court would have changed somewhat further. However, what was expected did not come about: the Protocol was vetoed by the Russian Federation and its entry into force was thereby prevented.
Even though Protocol No. 14 has not entered into force, it is useful to explain the changes sought to be introduced by it. For this reason, the judicial protection system under the original version of the Convention, before the entry into force of Protocol No. 11, will first be explained below, and then the changes introduced by Protocol No. 14 will be set out. Thereafter, the structure and functioning of the system currently in force following the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 and the changes to the system which Protocol No. 14 was intended to bring into operation will be explained together.
A. The Organs of Judicial Protection before Protocol No. 11
The original text of the ECHR, in force before 1 November 1998, provided for the European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) and the former European Court of Human Rights (the old Court) as the organs of the judicial protection system. In addition to these, the Committee of Ministers of the CoE, which was vested with a number of powers, chief among them the power to take the final decision on an application brought before the organs of judicial protection and to supervise the execution by the States Parties of the decisions given by those organs, also formed part of the judicial protection system introduced by the ECHR39.
As stated above, whereas the Commission and the old Court were organs established by the ECHR, the Committee of Ministers of the CoE is an organ established by the CoE Statute itself. Accordingly, whereas the Commission was a quasi-judicial organ and the old Court a fully judicial one, the Committee of Ministers of the CoE is an organ of a political nature. Under the original version of the ECHR, however, certain judicial functions were also conferred on this organ, which turned the Committee of Ministers of the CoE, although in reality a political organ, into one performing functions of a judicial nature40. The functions and structure of these organs are set out below.
1. The European Commission of Human Rights
Throughout the roughly fifty years during which it operated, the Commission was the most important organ of the judicial protection system. The main reason for this was that applications were first lodged with this organ and that it worked, as it were, as a filter. In the period before Protocol No. 11, when this organ was in operation, all applications were lodged with the Commission and were reviewed by it against the criteria for applications. Applications which the Commission found admissible could be brought before the old Court for adjudication. As regards applications which the Commission found inadmissible, on the other hand, it was not possible within this system to apply to any other authority or to request re-examination of the inadmissibility decision. With that inadmissibility decision the avenue of application within the ECHR system was exhausted.
Where the Commission declared the application admissible, the investigation into the merits of the case was pursued on the one hand, while on the other steps were taken with a view to a friendly settlement (former Art. 32 ECHR).
After this stage the Commission, also using the information it had obtained from the investigation, drew up a report on the merits of the application and stated in that report its opinion as to whether or not the right alleged to have been violated by the State Party as a result of the events giving rise to the application had been violated. At the next stage the report, which was not binding, was transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the CoE (former Art. 31 ECHR) and, depending on the circumstances, the application was dealt with and concluded either by the Committee of Ministers (former Art. 32 ECHR) or by the old Court (former Arts. 46–54 ECHR)41.
The Commission had one member in respect of each State Party to the ECHR. The Convention contained no provision as to the nationality of the members, however; former Art. 20(1) of the Convention merely provided that no two members could be nationals of the same State42; consequently, if a State Party to the Convention put forward for election a person who was not its own national, that person could be elected as a member43; indeed, examples of this were encountered in practice44. These members were elected by the Committee of Ministers of the CoE for a term of six years, each being one of three candidates whom the parliamentarians sitting in the Consultative Assembly put forward for their own countries. The first members of the Commission were elected on 18.05.1954 and the Commission took up its duties on 12.07.1954. Whereas the Commission consisted of fifteen members when first elected, by 1998, when its mandate came to an end, the number of its members had reached thirty-two45.
The members served independently, in their own name and not on behalf of the country in respect of which they had been elected46. In order to enable the members to perform their duties independently and to enjoy the immunities and exemptions required by their office, Additional Protocol No. 5 to the ECHR47 was adopted and put into effect48.
While the basic provisions on the internal structure of the Commission were contained in the ECHR, the provisions on its functioning were laid down in the rules of procedure drawn up by the Commission itself.
In accordance with the method laid down in its own rules of procedure, the Commission elected a President and Vice-Presidents from among its members for terms of three years each.
2. The Former European Court of Human Rights
In the original version of the ECHR, the old Court was provided for as the adjudicating organ examining applications where certain conditions were fulfilled; for this reason it has been said that the old Court was the “true judicial organ” introduced by this system49.
Under former Art. 44 ECHR only the States Parties and the Commission could bring an application before the old Court. In addition, for an application to be brought before the old Court it was necessary, unlike in the case of the Commission, that the State Party against which the application alleging a violation of a right had been lodged should have recognised the jurisdiction of the old Court by a declaration (former Arts. 46, 48 ECHR). Furthermore, the old Court could take up an application only after the Commission had reported that its efforts to reach a friendly settlement had failed, and within the three-month period specified in former Art. 32 (former Art. 47 ECHR). The judgments of the old Court were final and it was not possible to apply to any other authority against them (former Arts. 52, 53 ECHR).
The old Court consisted of a number of judges equal to the number of States Parties to the ECHR, and each State had one judge on it; no two judges could be nationals of the same State. As was also the case for the members of the Commission, however, these judges performed their judicial office entirely independently and in their own name, without representing the State in respect of which they had been elected50. In order to enable the judges to perform their duties independently and to enjoy the immunities and exemptions required by their office, Additional Protocol No. 5 to the ECHR was adopted and put into effect. These judges were elected by the Parliamentary Assembly for a term of nine years from among three candidates put forward by the governments of the States Parties; the judges could be re-elected at the end of that term.
Shortly after the date on which it recognised the right of individual application, on 22 January 1990, Türkiye also recognised the jurisdiction of the old Court.
B. The Innovations Which Protocol No. 14 Was Intended to Bring to the Adjudication System
1. The Circumstances Necessitating the Preparation of Protocol No. 14 and the Aim of the Amendment
When, despite the entry into force of Additional Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the workload of the Court
did not decrease but, on the contrary, increased, thought began to be given to ways of speeding up the functioning of the Court. To this end, in February 2001 the Committee of Ministers set up an “Evaluation Group” to submit proposals on enhancing the effectiveness of the Court. The Evaluation Group’s report on the subject was published in September 2001. Some of the proposals in that report were reflected in the additional Protocol, while others were not taken up. A body called the “Steering Committee for Human Rights”, composed of experts from the States Parties to the Convention, also assessed various proposals between 2001 and 2004 and prepared a draft protocol for an additional protocol to the Convention. As a result of this procedure, the above-mentioned draft was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe as Protocol No. 1451.
The aim of Protocol No. 14 is, by making various changes within the ECtHR system,
to simplify the individual application procedure and to speed up the attainment of a result. This Protocol will take effect once all the States Parties to the Convention have ratified it and deposited their instruments with the Secretariat General of the CoE. The Protocol will enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiry of three months from the day on which the last ratification is completed (Art. 19 of Protocol No. 14). In order that the Protocol may enter into force as soon as possible, the formalities of ratification and deposit have been made extremely simple.
While this Protocol was expected to be ratified by all the member countries of the CoE and,
upon deposit with the Secretariat, to enter into force within a short time, its entry into force was prevented by Russia’s refusal to ratify it. At its sitting of 20 December 2006, the DUMA, the lower house of the parliament of the Russian Federation, rejected the ratification of Additional Protocol No. 14. Although forty-five member States, including our own country, have ratified this Protocol, the path of this reform package, which speeds up the Court’s proceedings, appears to be blocked for the time being because of Russia’s refusal. Yet even the entry into force of Protocol No. 14 would have reduced the Court’s workload only to a certain extent, and the other problems stemming from the workload would have persisted. Indeed, for that reason a “Group of Wise Persons” consisting of eleven members was set up, and these persons were asked to submit to the ECtHR proposals for solving the problems that would persist after Protocol No. 14. With this refusal, however, all these reform packages have been left in uncertainty; in the present situation the functioning of the Court has in any case slowed down considerably, and this will continue.
Two main factors are said to have played a part in Russia’s refusal
to ratify this Protocol. Owing to the post-communist situation in which it finds itself, Russia is today the country against which the largest number of applications are lodged with the ECtHR. Many countries that formed part of the former Soviet Union are struggling for independence, and Russia does not shrink from suppressing them by force. In the course of this, many human rights violations occur. One of the reasons, then, is the existence of so many cases of serious violations and the fact that they are being made the subject of applications to the ECtHR. Russia believes that by obstructing the functioning of the Court it can also forestall possible findings of violations.
The second reason for the decision not to ratify is that Protocol No. 14 increases the powers of the Committee
of Ministers to supervise the execution of judgments delivered by the ECtHR. In the present situation in force since Protocol No. 11, too, the judgments of the Court are binding and their implementation by the States Parties is supervised by the Committee of Ministers. In the present situation, however, the power of the Committee of Ministers is political in nature and there is no serious sanction for failure to comply with a judgment. Had Protocol No. 14 been able to enter into force, a more effective arrangement in this respect could have taken effect. It would thus also have been possible to take more serious measures against a State which fails to comply with a judgment of the Court. It appears that Russia’s concern that it would face more serious sanctions in the event of problems arising in the implementation of the judgments finding violations delivered against it, and its wish to prevent this, were also an important factor in its decision not to ratify Protocol No. 1452.
2. The Changes Proposed by Protocol No. 14
The most important and most debatable innovation of this Protocol is the insertion into Art. 35 of the Convention
of a new admissibility criterion. This criterion consists of a three-step test; if the application displays the following features, the Court may
declare it inadmissible:
- where the applicant will not, by reason of the inadmissibility decision,
suffer a significant disadvantage,
- except for the rejection of a case which has not been duly
considered by a domestic tribunal,
- where the principle of respect for human rights does not require
a further examination of the merits of the application.
This new criterion is open to criticism in many respects. Many quarters, including judges of the ECtHR, national judges, government representatives and human rights organisations, state that the criterion in question is unnecessary, wrong in principle and excessively vague.
The concepts of “significant disadvantage” and of the “principle of respect for human rights”
contained in this new criterion will be given substance and clarified by the case law of the Court. Of these conditions, the second in particular has been the subject of debate and has met with opposition. The basic purpose of this condition is defined in the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14 as follows: “all disputes (case) must go through a process of adjudication, which may take place at national level or at European level”53.
This admissibility criterion, which Additional Protocol No. 14 to the Convention was intended to bring into force,
will not be applied to applications declared admissible before the entry into force of the Protocol. For two years following the entry into force of the Protocol, this criterion may be applied only to applications to be examined before the Chambers or the Grand Chamber; it follows a contrario that for two years from the date of entry into force the criterion in question will not be applied in the Committees or in the single-judge formation.
At this stage there is nothing to be done other than to hope that the change in question will achieve
its objectives; in legal scholarship, however, it is pointed out that there is a significant danger here, and it is said that this change may prolong the proceedings at the admissibility stage and make the system more complicated.54 We do not share this view and think that, had the Protocol been able to enter into force, this change would have speeded up proceedings; however, as stated above, we think that, in order to dispel the doubts and dangers, the Court must render these genuinely vague expressions clear and comprehensible through the judgments it delivers.
The most important of the changes sought to be introduced by Protocol No. 14 are shown below:
- An examining body consisting of a single judge has been created, and this judge has been given the task of examining the admissibility of applications. The decision given by this judge on the inadmissibility of an application is final. However, this judge may not decide on applications lodged against the State which he
represents55,
- In respect of applications of the same type on which case law has already been established by the Court,
the task of going into the merits, conducting the proceedings and giving judgment, as well as of deciding on admissibility, has been given to Committees of three judges. The aim is that applications of a similar nature arising from a structural problem in the domestic law of a country party to the Convention should be resolved more easily in this way and should not add to the Court’s workload. The Committees will examine such applications under a simple procedure
and decide on them swiftly56,
- The functions of the Committee of Ministers are changed. Accordingly,
the Committee of Ministers is given the right to refer the matter to the Court where one of the States Parties to the Convention fails to comply with a judgment of the ECtHR. For this, a decision must be taken in the Committee of Ministers by a majority of 2/3 of the votes. In addition, Protocol No. 14 gives the Committee of Ministers the right, again, to apply to the Court
for the interpretation of judgments delivered by the ECtHR57,
- The Committee of Ministers may, at the request of the plenary Court, by a unanimous
decision and for a fixed period, decide that the number of judges of the Chambers, which consist of seven members,
be reduced to five58,
- Judges serving at the ECtHR will henceforth serve for a term of nine years and may not serve again59,
- The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights has been given, in proceedings before any Chamber or the Grand
Chamber, the power to submit written comments and to take part
in hearings60,
- It has been accepted that the European Union, too, may become a party to this Convention61.
Below, the innovations sought to be introduced by Protocol No. 14 will, where appropriate,
be addressed separately and explained.
C. The Organ of Judicial Protection after Protocol No. 11 and the Changes Sought to Be Made by Protocol No. 14
The success of the judicial protection system introduced by the ECHR, and the resulting large number of applications coming before the Convention organs, meant that a long period of four or five years elapsed between the lodging of an application and its conclusion62. When it became clear that, owing to the gaps and shortcomings in the system, the adjudication procedure laid down by the Convention was inadequate in the face of the growing workload and that proceedings were taking far too long, it became necessary to adopt a number of new arrangements63. Proceeding from this need, various proposals aimed at speeding up and simplifying the adjudication system were debated from the 1980s onwards, and in the end agreement was reached on the proposals for amendment that were added to the Convention as Protocol No. 1164.
Protocol No. 11 was opened for signature in Strasbourg on 11 May 1994 and entered into force on 1 November 1998. It thereby brought about important changes both in the Convention and, more importantly, in the structure of the judicial organs and hence in the individual application procedure. The most important change provided for by Protocol No. 11 is that it abolished the Commission, which existed under the original version of the Convention, and, taking the old Court as its basis, turned it into a single structure under the name “European Court of Human Rights”. In addition, this Protocol changed the working arrangements of the old Court, which met at certain times of the year, and made the Court a full-time institution.
Over time, however, it was seen that the arrangements introduced by Protocol No. 11 were not sufficient either, and Protocol No. 14 was prepared and opened for signature on 13 May 2004. This Protocol, too, sought to make changes in the structure of the Court and in the procedure for dealing with applications which were expected to speed up proceedings. As stated above, however, its entry into force has not been possible because the Russian parliament refused to ratify this Protocol.
Although Additional Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR made radical changes to the structure of the organs of judicial protection and to the methods of adjudication, this change did not affect earlier decisions. The body of case law formed by the decisions and judgments of the Commission and the old Court continues unchanged for the ECtHR, which today functions as a single court.
It can therefore safely be said that, even if Additional Protocol No. 14 had entered into force, this case law
would have retained its validity65. However, as will be explained below, the new admissibility criterion sought to be introduced by Protocol No. 14 was such as both to lead to the production of new case law and to give rise to differences as regards the admissibility of subsequent applications. Although this would not have affected the value and validity of past case law, it could have led to different assessments, particularly with regard to the new admissibility criterion.
From this point on, our explanations concerning the structure of the ECtHR, the application procedure and the proceedings will be based on the rules contained in the ECHR as amended following Protocol No. 11. Thereafter the changes sought to be introduced by Protocol No. 14 will be explained.
1. The Structure and Composition of the European Court of Human Rights
a. The Composition of the Court
The ECtHR consists of a number of judges equal to the number of States Parties to the Convention. This provision, introduced by Protocol No. 11, changed the rule in force before Protocol No. 11 whereby there was a number of judges equal to the number of member States of the CoE. The intention was thereby to put an end to the debates on legitimacy concerning the judges of countries which, although not parties to the ECHR, had a judge because they were members of the CoE, and which thus, on the basis of a convention not binding on themselves, contributed to the trial of other countries that were parties to the Convention and even to findings of violations against them66. Today, however, there is no longer any practical difference between being a member of the CoE and being a party to the ECHR, because a State must now be a party to the ECHR and its additional Protocols in order to become a member of the CoE. We should nonetheless state that this new arrangement as regards the determination of the judges is appropriate.
The rule contained in the old text of the Convention, in Art. 20 for the members of the Commission and in Art. 38 for the judges of the old Court, that “no two judges (members) of the Court (Commission) may be nationals of the same State” has been abolished. Although it is stated, as mentioned above, that the Court shall consist of a number of judges equal to the number of countries party to the Convention, it is possible for a country to nominate as a candidate in the election of judges a national of another country party to the Convention or a national of a country not party to the Convention, provided that he fulfils the conditions for election as a judge, and for such persons to be elected and to serve. Indeed, as a result of this change, when the Court was first constituted two Italian and two Swiss judges took office. Liechtenstein, for its part, was represented not by a judge of its own nationality but first by a judge of Canadian nationality and then by a judge of Swiss nationality67.
b. Election of Judges, Term of Office and Conditions of Eligibility
The judges serving at the ECtHR are elected by the Parliamentary Assembly by a majority of votes from among three candidates nominated by the States Parties to the Convention. It should be noted at once that the fact that the drawing up of the list of three candidates is left to governments, which are political bodies, has attracted criticism and that various efforts are being made to change this.
Whereas before Protocol No. 11 judges were elected for a term of nine years, Protocol No. 11 reduced this term to six years; judges may be re-elected. The judges’ terms of office expire when they reach the age of seventy.
Protocol No. 14, for its part, provides for this term to be raised again to nine years and for a system in which judges
are elected to serve for a single term only; this Protocol, too, sets the age limit at seventy. Provision is made for an election to be held every three years for half of the judges; the aim is thereby to ensure the continuity of the Court68.
Art. 21(1) of the Convention sets out the qualities which judges eligible for election to the Court must possess. Accordingly, judges must be jurists of high moral character who possess the qualifications and abilities required for appointment to high judicial office. Moreover, since an age limit of seventy has been introduced for the judges’ term of office, this restriction also applies to the election of judges.
A judge elected to replace a judge who for some reason leaves office before the end of his term completes the term of office of the judge whom he replaces. Judges remain in office, even if their term has expired, until someone else is elected in their place. Moreover, judges continue to deal with the cases assigned to them even if another judge has been elected in their place.
The dismissal of judges, too, may be effected only by the Court. For this, any one of the other judges must make a request to that effect. Upon such a request, the judge whose dismissal is sought is heard by the plenary Court. A judge may be dismissed where two thirds of the judges in office in the plenary Court state that the judge whose dismissal has been requested does not fulfil the required conditions (Rule 7 of the Rules of Court)
c. Independence and Privileges of the Judges
As stated above, the judges of the ECtHR serve independently, in their own name and not on behalf of the country in respect of which they were elected. Again, in order to safeguard this independence, judges may not take on functions which are incompatible with this office and capable of raising doubts as to their independence (Art. 21(2), (3) ECHR). Likewise, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court repeats this prohibition and also makes it compulsory to declare to the President of the Court any additional activity undertaken by judges. Another important provision in the Convention designed to protect the independence of judges is that they cannot be dismissed without a decision taken by a 2/3 majority of the other judges of the Court (Art. 24(1) ECHR).
Judges enjoy the privileges and immunities provided for in Art. 40 of the CoE Statute and in the agreements made under that article. The measures necessary to safeguard the independence of the judges are laid down by the Convention and its additional Protocols.
d. The Presidency of the Court
The Court has a President, whose functions are set out in detail in the Rules of Court. The functions and powers of the President of the Court, the Vice-President, the Presidents of Chambers and of Sections and the Vice-Presidents of Chambers and of Sections are explained in detail in Rules 8–14 of the Rules of Court. The President of the Court, the Vice-President or Vice-Presidents and the Presidents of Chambers are elected for three years by the plenary Court, in which all members take part, from among its own members (Art. 26(a) ECHR, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court).
The functions of the President of the Court include directing the work of the Court, presiding at meetings of the plenary Court, the Grand Chamber and the Chambers, and representing the Court in relations with the authorities of the Council of Europe. The Vice-Presidents, for their part, assist the President in the performance of his functions and act in his place where the President is unable to perform those functions or the office of President is vacant. A further function of the Vice-Presidents is to act as Presidents of Sections or Chambers (Rules 10, 11 of the Rules of Court).
Presidents of the Court take part only in the examination of applications concerning the State which nominated them. Apart from this, they may not take part in proceedings pending before the Chambers (Rule 9(3) of the Rules of Court).
e. The Bureau of the Court
The Bureau was established by an amendment made to the Rules of Court on 7 July 2003. This body, which is governed by Rule 9A of the Rules of Court, is composed of the President of the Court, the Vice-Presidents and the Section Presidents. The Bureau may, if it considers it necessary, invite any member of the Court to its meetings.
The task of the Bureau of the Court is to assist the President of the Court in the functioning and administration of the Court. To this end, the President of the Court may leave to the Bureau the resolution of any administrative or extra-judicial matter falling within his own competence. Apart from this, the Bureau ensures coordination between the Sections of the Court. The Bureau may report and submit proposals to the plenary Court on any matter.
In addition, so that the Court may function in an orderly manner, its structure also includes the offices of Vice-President of the Court and of Presidents of Sections and Chambers (Rules 10–13 of the Rules of Court).
f. The Registrar of the Court
Like the local courts found in other domestic legal systems, the Court has a registry and a registrar at its head. The Registrar of the Court (registrar, greffier) is the head of the Registry of the Court (registry, greffe) and, under the direction and supervision of the President of the Court, assists in the performance of the Court’s functions. The Registrar’s duties include keeping the records relating to applications, assisting in the preparation of the Court’s judgments, ensuring that correspondence is conducted and keeping the records relating to the Court’s archives69.
The Registrar also has two deputies; in addition, the Registry of the Court has such staff as may be required. The Registrar and the Deputy Registrars are elected by the plenary Court for a term of five years; they may be re-elected. The Registrar and the Deputy Registrars may be dismissed by a two-thirds majority of the plenary Court (Art. 25 ECHR; Rules 15–18 of the Rules of Court).
g. The Seat of the Court
The seat of the Court is fixed by the Rules of Court as the city of Strasbourg in France, where the headquarters of the Council of Europe are also located. Rule 19(1) of the Rules of Court states that the Court may also perform its functions elsewhere in the territories of the member States of the Council of Europe. It should be noted at once, however, that the seat of the Court cannot be changed unless some significant event occurs. Since the seat of the Court is fixed by the Rules of Court, it is, on the other hand, always possible to amend the relevant Rule and change the seat of the Court accordingly70.
Apart from this, the Court may decide, at any stage of an application, that it is necessary that an investigation or any other activity be carried out elsewhere by the Court itself or by one or more of its members (Rule 19(2) of the Rules of Court).
2. The Legal Structure and Functioning of the European Court of Human Rights
a. In General
Following Protocol No. 11, the Court has been organised in a different form as regards its internal structure71. The tripartite judicial structure existing before Protocol No. 11, consisting of the Commission, the old Court and the Committee of Ministers, was changed and a single Court was set up; under the roof of this single Court, however, a two-tier system of adjudication was introduced. In effect, both a court of first instance and an appellate court have been provided for within the same structure.
This structure of the Court, in which two-tier adjudication takes place, consists of the plenary Court (plenary court, cour plénière), the Committees (committees, comités), the Sections (section), the Chambers (chambers, chambres) and the Grand Chamber (grand chamber, grande chambre). Of these, the plenary Court has only administrative functions and no judicial functions, whereas the other formations perform judicial functions.
Additional Protocol No. 14 also sought to change this structure of the Court
and created a new formation consisting of a single judge. In addition, the functions and powers of the Committees of three judges were increased in an effort to make them work more effectively.
While the internal structure of the Court is governed by Rules 24 et seq. of the Rules of Court, the above-mentioned parts making up the Court are defined in Rule 1 of the Rules of Court.
The plenary Court meets at least once a year, at the request of the President of the Court, to consider administrative matters; apart from this, the President of the Court has the power to convene the plenary Court at any time. The plenary Court may also be convened at the request of at least one third of the members of the Court (Rule 20 of the Rules of Court).
The Grand Chamber, the Chambers and the Committees, which make up the Court’s main working system, operate on a full-time basis. On a proposal by the President of the Court, the dates of the sessions of these formations are fixed in advance by the Court each year. In addition, in urgent cases and where necessary, the Grand Chamber and the Chambers may be convened by their Presidents (Rule 21 of the Rules of Court).
It is provided that the single-judge formations established by Protocol No. 14 will likewise work
on a permanent basis.
The meetings and deliberations of the Court take place in private and are secret. Only the judges take part in them; in addition, so that records may be kept, the Registrar of the Court or the person designated to replace him, such Registry officials as are considered necessary and interpreters are also present at those meetings and deliberations. Apart from these, no other person is admitted to the deliberations and meetings except by decision of the Court72.
In the formations making up the Court, decisions are taken by the affirmative vote of the majority of the members present. In the event of a tie, a fresh vote is taken. If the second vote also results in a tie, the President has a casting vote. Before a question is put to the vote, the President of the Court has the power to request the judges to state their opinions (Rule 22 of the Rules of Court).
b. The Plenary Court
The plenary Court is composed of all the judges serving at the Court. As stated above, the plenary Court meets at certain times and does not work on a permanent basis like the other organs of the Court. Protocol No. 11 narrowed the functions of the plenary Court and conferred on it only administrative functions; the functions of the plenary Court are set out in Art. 26 of the Convention. The functions of the plenary Court are as follows:
- to elect the President and the Vice-Presidents of the Court,
- to set up Chambers for fixed periods,
- to adopt the Rules of Court,
- to elect the Presidents of the Chambers of the Court,
- to elect the Registrar and the Deputy Registrars.
C The Single-Judge Formation
In keeping with the purpose for which Protocol No. 14 was produced, the most important change introduced in order to speed up proceedings
is the creation of a formation consisting of a single judge. This single-judge formation has been given the task of reviewing the admissibility of applications lodged with the Court. The inadmissibility decisions given by these judges in respect of the applications they examine are final; it is not possible to apply to any other authority against these decisions. The admissibility decisions given by the single-judge formation in respect of the applications it examines, on the other hand, are examined by a Committee of three judges or by a Chamber, and the decision on admissibility is given by those Committees or by the Chamber. In the performance of its task the single-judge formation will also be assisted by rapporteurs assigned by the Registry of the Court.
Judges sitting in the single-judge formation may not examine and decide applications lodged against the State
which they represent.
We are of the opinion that this change sought to be made in the structure and functioning of the Court
would be beneficial in terms of speeding up proceedings. For a great many of the applications lodged wait a long time at the admissibility stage, which prolongs the length of proceedings and gives rise to a contradiction with the right to a fair trial laid down in Art. 6 of the Convention; for in many applications the Court finds a violation of Art. 6 of the Convention on the ground that the proceedings in domestic law lasted too long. With this formation, long waiting periods can be avoided, and the cases coming before the Committees and the Chambers will be ones whose examination as to admissibility has been completed and whose merits can be examined73.
c. The Committees
Committees consist of three full members and one substitute member and operate at Section level. The number of Committees to be set up in each Section is determined by the President of the Court after consulting the Section President (Rule 27 of the Rules of Court). The judges sitting on the Committees are chosen by the Section in rotation for periods of twelve months. The Committees are presided over by the senior member sitting on the Committee.
The task of the Committees is to carry out the preliminary and initial examination of the admissibility of applications lodged with the Court (Art. 27 ECHR, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court). For this reason it is said that the Committees have been given a filtering function in the examination of individual applications74.
In an application assigned to it for initial examination as to admissibility, a Committee may, by a unanimous vote, declare the application inadmissible or strike it out of the list where, pursuant to Art. 34 of the Convention, the application does not require further examination. These decisions given by the Committees are final. In accordance with the wish of the Parliamentary Assembly, these decisions must be reasoned75.
Protocol No. 14 also changed these functions of the Committees. Accordingly,
the Committees will carry out an examination in order to decide on applications which the single-judge formation has found admissible. In this way, the task of the Committees, which acted as a filter after Protocol No. 11, has been given to the single-judge formations, while the power to decide on the cases that have passed through the filter has been given to the Committees. As a result, the workload of the three-member Committees will have been distributed among individual judges.
In addition, particularly where, owing to structural defects arising from the domestic law of the respondent country,
there is an earlier judgment of the Court on the same subject, the Committees will go into the merits of the case, conduct the proceedings and give judgment on it. This stems from the character of the ECtHR as a court of precedent. In this way the Chambers and the Grand Chamber will be relieved of the workload of constantly hearing and deciding cases on similar subjects.
d. Sections and Chambers
It should be noted first of all that there is no difference of substance between the organ of the Court referred to in the text of the Convention as a “Chamber” (chamber, chambre) and the organ referred to in the Rules of Court as a “Section” (section) (Rules 25, 26 of the Rules of Court), although, as will be explained below, there are some differences between these two formations in terms of functioning.
The Sections are set up by the plenary Court for a period of three years, after the election of the President of the Court, on a proposal prepared by the President of the Court (Rule 25(1) of the Rules of Court). There are at least four Sections in the Court; when these Sections are constituted, regard is had to a balanced distribution of judges in terms of geographical area, gender and the systems prevailing in the domestic law of the countries (Rule 25(2) of the Rules of Court). Where circumstances so require, the President of the Court may exceptionally modify the composition of the Sections (Rule 25(4) of the Rules of Court). The plenary Court may, on a proposal by the President, set up an additional Section (Rule 25(5) of the Rules of Court).
Every judge who is a member of the Court is a member of a Section. If a judge’s term of office expires before the end of the three-year period for which the Section was set up, the judge elected in his place who takes up office continues in the vacated position in that Section (Rule 25(3) of the Rules of Court).
The Vice-Presidents of the Court, of whom there are two, also preside over the Sections of which they are members. The Presidents of the other two Sections are elected by the plenary Court from among the judges in the Section. Each Section also has its own registrar and registry. Registry officials other than the Section Registrar and the Deputy Section Registrar are appointed by the Secretary General of the CoE in agreement with the President of the Court or the Registrar of the Court acting under the President’s authority (Rule 18(3) of the Rules of Court).
The Sections form the basic structure in the composition of the Court76. Applications lodged with the Court are distributed among these Sections having regard to their workload, and the proceedings relating to an application are conducted in the Chambers formed by these Sections. In other words, the judicial activity of the Court is carried out on the basis of Sections. Moreover, the Grand Chamber, the Chambers and the Committees, the formations making up the Court after Protocol No. 11, are constituted on the basis of the “Sections”.
Chambers consist of seven judges, and once an application has been sent to a Section, that Section is thenceforth referred to as the Chamber dealing with the case77. The Chamber constituted for each case includes the Section President and the judge elected in respect of the State against which the application has been lodged, while the other five judges are chosen by the Section President from among the members of the Section in rotation. In this way judges sit in rotation as full members in two Chambers and as substitute members in one Chamber. If the judge elected in respect of the respondent country is not a member of the Chamber hearing the case, he is deemed, pursuant to Art. 27(2) of the Convention, to be an ex officio member of that Chamber and takes part in the proceedings. And under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court, if the judge elected in respect of the State against which the application has been lodged is prevented from sitting in the Chamber or has withdrawn from the case, the State Party notifies the President of the Court of another person possessing the qualifications required of a judge as an appointed (ad hoc) judge.
As stated above, Additional Protocol No. 14 to the Convention sought to enable the Committee of Ministers
to alter the number of judges sitting in the Chambers. Accordingly, under Art. 27(2) ECHR, which will become Art. 26 as amended by Protocol No. 14, the Committee of Ministers may, at the request of the plenary Court, by a unanimous decision and for a fixed period, decide to reduce the number of judges of the Chambers, which consist of seven members, to five (Art. 6 of Additional Protocol No. 14). In this way it will be possible to set up more Chambers where this is considered necessary, for instance where the workload increases, and an attempt will be made to speed up the Court’s adjudication and decision-making process. This, too, is an arrangement consistent with the purpose for which the Protocol was produced.
The Chambers decide on the “admissibility” and the “merits” of inter-State applications or individual applications (Art. 29 ECHR). As stated above, however, where a Committee has unanimously declared an application inadmissible, that application can no longer be dealt with by a Chamber.
Protocol No. 14, too, provides that inadmissibility decisions given by the single-judge formation or by a Committee,
and judgments on the merits of an application given by Committees, cannot be made the subject of examination by a Chamber.
A judgment delivered by a Chamber at the conclusion of the proceedings becomes final in the following cases:
- where the parties have not requested within three months of the date of the judgment that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber, at the end of that three-month period,
- where referral of the case to the Grand Chamber has been requested, when the panel rejects that request,
- where the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber, on the date on which that declaration is made (Art. 44(2)(a), (b), (c) ECHR).
The judgment of the Chamber which has become final in the above manner is published in one of the official languages of the Council, English or French, or in both languages (Art. 44(3) ECHR).
e. The Grand Chamber
Following Protocol No. 11, as a result of the establishment of a single Court for which a two-tier system of adjudication was nevertheless provided, another organ formed outside the Sections and entrusted with an important task has been the Grand Chamber. It can be seen that this organ both provides a second-instance review of proceedings conducted on a Chamber basis within the framework of the ECHR and seeks to ensure uniformity of case law within a Court structure made up of more than one Section78.
Pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Rules of Court, the Grand Chamber is composed of seventeen full members and three substitute members. The Grand Chamber is constituted so as to include the President of the Court, the Vice-Presidents and the Presidents of the Sections, who are ex officio members of the Grand Chamber. In addition, in proceedings brought before the Grand Chamber, the judge elected in respect of the respondent State is likewise regarded as an ex officio member of the Grand Chamber and sits in the case. If the judge elected in respect of the respondent State is prevented from sitting in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber or has withdrawn from the case, the State Party notifies the President of the Court of another person possessing the qualifications required of a judge as an appointed (ad hoc) judge.
The other judges who are to sit in the Grand Chamber and the members of the panel referred to in Art. 43 of the Convention, which first examines the cases coming before the Grand Chamber, are designated by the drawing of lots. In addition, in order to ensure that the judges are able to sit in the Grand Chamber in a balanced manner, the judges are divided into two separate groups by the plenary Court; the members who are to hear the case and the substitute members are designated by rotation within each group for periods of nine months. When the plenary Court divides the judges who are to serve as members of the Grand Chamber into two groups, regard is had to balancing the members as far as possible in terms of geographical distribution and to reflecting the different legal systems among the States Parties (Rule 24(3) of the Rules of Court).
In cases heard by the Grand Chamber under Art. 30 of the Convention (cases in which the Grand Chamber acts as the first-instance judicial body), the judges of the Chamber that has relinquished jurisdiction also sit as natural members of the Grand Chamber; in cases heard by the Grand Chamber under Art. 43 of the Convention (cases in which the Grand Chamber acts as the second-instance judicial body), however, none of the judges of the Chamber that delivered the first judgment may take part in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, with the exception of the President of the Chamber and the judge elected in respect of the respondent State.
Judges whose term of office as a judge has expired continue to be members of the Grand Chamber until the case in whose hearing they have taken part has been concluded (Rule 24(3) of the Rules of Court).
In the Court, where proceedings are normally conducted at Chamber level, a case can be heard by the Grand Chamber only if certain conditions are fulfilled. These will be examined in detail later under the heading “remedies against the judgment on the merits”; below they are indicated briefly.
Where, in a case being heard by a Chamber, serious questions arise concerning the interpretation of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, or where there appears a possibility that the resolution of the question by the Chamber would produce a judgment inconsistent with the previous case law of the ECtHR, the Chamber may, provided that none of the parties objects, refrain from deciding the case and relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber. In that event the proceedings take place before the Grand Chamber (Rule 72(2) of the Rules of Court). It is stated, however, that an objection by the parties serves no purpose here79; indeed, where the Chamber takes such a decision, there is no point in the parties being able to argue that it would be undesirable for the case to be heard by the Grand Chamber; in any event, there is no drawback whatsoever in the Grand Chamber, which acts as the second-instance judicial body, hearing the case as a court of first instance.
Under Art. 43 of the Convention, after an individual application or an inter-State application has been heard by any Chamber, the Grand Chamber acts as the second-instance review body. However, not every case decided by a Chamber can be brought before the Grand Chamber. Where one or both of the parties to a case that has been decided request that the case be heard once more by the Grand Chamber, a decision is first taken by the panel of the Grand Chamber as to whether or not the case may be brought before the Grand Chamber, and only thereafter may the case be examined by the Grand Chamber (Rule 73 of the Rules of Court).
Lastly, under Art. 47 of the Convention, the Grand Chamber considers and decides on requests by the Committee of Ministers for advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto (Art. 31).
Additional Protocol No. 14 adds a sub-paragraph “b” to Art. 31 ECHR, and the
currently existing sub-paragraph “b” is intended to become sub-paragraph “c”. Under the said sub-paragraph “b”, it is stated in respect of the Grand Chamber that it “decides on issues brought before the Court by the Committee of Ministers under Article 46(4) of the Convention”. By Art. 46(4) of the Convention, which Art. 16 of Protocol No. 14 seeks to amend, a new task is in turn conferred on the Committee of Ministers and on the Court with regard to the binding force and execution of the final judgments delivered by the Court; this task will be performed on behalf of the Court by the Grand Chamber.
Accordingly, where the Committee of Ministers considers that the respondent State is refusing
to abide by a judgment in a case to which it is a party, it will first notify the State Party of this and may subsequently, by a decision adopted by a two-thirds majority of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee of Ministers, refer to the Court the question whether the State Party concerned has fulfilled its obligations. Where a matter comes before the Court in the manner described above, it will be considered and decided by the Grand Chamber. This is a provision introduced in order to increase the effectiveness of the Court’s judgments; it has not been explained, however, what kind of decision the Court will give in this situation. In our view, failure to execute the Court’s judgments should also be capable of leading to a finding of a violation, and it should be possible to deliver a judgment finding a violation against States Parties that do not execute the Court’s judgments, on the ground that they have violated the Convention.
The judgments delivered by the Grand Chamber are final; there is no authority or judicial procedure to which recourse may be had against these judgments.
III. The Application System Provided for by the ECHR
A. The System of Protection in General
It was stated above that the most important feature of the ECHR is that it introduces a system of judicial protection for the rights set out in the Convention and, accordingly, establishes judicial organs and recognises the right to apply to those organs. This system of judicial protection introduced by the Convention is set in motion by an application duly lodged with the Court. As with any court, certain rules must be complied with when applying to the ECtHR; this requirement is laid down both to ensure that the proceedings are conducted within a definite system and to prevent anyone who so wishes from applying to the Court indiscriminately.
An application to the ECtHR may be lodged both by States Parties to the Convention in respect of another State Party to the Convention and by an individual within the area in which a State Party carries on its activity against a State Party to the Convention, on the allegation that one or more of the rights laid down in the ECHR and/or in one of the additional Protocols has been violated. Below, the features of the inter-State application will first be touched on briefly; explanations will then be given on the procedure of individual application, which is encountered far more frequently in practice, and the respects in which it differs from or resembles the inter-State application will be addressed.
B. The Inter-State Application
One of the features of the ECHR is that it enables States to lodge applications against one another, which is also called the “collective guarantee”80. One of the rules prevailing in international law is that, unlike in domestic legal systems, there is in this field no rule allowing a public action (actio popularis) to be brought. States take action only where their own interests are harmed. Beyond that, there is in international law no right to apply to an authority in the name of a common order, nor any right of a State or States party to a convention to apply to any authority against another State party to that convention on the ground that it has failed to comply with the provisions contained in the convention81.
The drafters of the ECHR, however, departed from this system. Under the system introduced by the Convention, each State Party has been held individually responsible for the protection of the rights set out in the Convention and its additional Protocols; in this way an objective responsibility has been imposed on the States Parties and an attempt has been made to create a common public order in the field of human rights82. This public order stands beyond national borders and interests, resting on common ideals and interests83. Each State Party to the Convention is under an obligation to monitor whether the other States Parties to the Convention respect the Convention and whether they violate the rights protected by the Convention and by the Protocols thereto. This obligation is not limited to the States Parties protecting only their own nationals and their own interests; it exists, in particular, with regard to the rights of everyone within the scope of the Convention and, in general, with regard to ensuring respect for the Convention84.
As a consequence of this, it has been accepted that a State Party to the Convention may lodge an application against another State Party to the Convention on the allegation that it has violated one or more of the rights contained in the Convention and/or its additional Protocols, or the other provisions contained in the Convention. As can be seen, an important feature distinguishing inter-State applications from individual applications is that the rule that an application may be lodged only where rights and freedoms contained in the Convention or the additional Protocols have been violated, and in reliance on them, has been broadened in inter-State applications; accordingly, States Parties may also lodge an application on the basis of an article of the Convention or of the additional Protocols that does not contain a right or freedom, alleging that it has been violated. The purpose of this arrangement is that ensuring compliance with the Convention by the States Parties is regarded as a task of the other States Parties and that this is therefore sought to be secured through such a mechanism.
For States Parties to be able to lodge such an application, it is not necessary that the right of one of their own nationals has been violated; the application may be lodged even where the respondent State has violated the rights of its own nationals or of nationals of a third country85; what matters here is that the respondent State Party has acted in breach of the obligations contained in the Convention or an additional Protocol. This arrangement therefore confers, as it were, a power to bring a public action in international law86. In this way an attempt has been made to ensure that the rights protected by the States Parties rest on the “collective guarantee” which is also expressed in the Preamble to the Convention. Indeed, the following statement made by the Court in the case of Ireland v. the United Kingdom confirms this inference: “The Convention must be read with regard to its special character, which is aimed at placing human rights and fundamental freedoms under a collective guarantee, and must be interpreted accordingly”87.
In inter-State applications it is not required that a concrete interest has been infringed. It is therefore possible, by means of this application procedure, for the national legislation of one of the States Parties to be reviewed in the abstract. This remedy has been framed, as far as the States Parties are concerned, both as a right and as an obligation88. In addition, in inter-State applications the general and concrete practices of the respondent State Party may also be made the subject of the case. Lastly, the subject matter of such applications may also be the protection of persons falling within the scope of the Convention. In other words, in inter-State applications the existence of an objective interest on the part of the applicant State Party, as indicated above, is required; beyond that, there is no requirement that the State’s own interest has been harmed, that is, the existence of a subjective interest is not required89. Indeed, although neither their own interests nor those of their citizens had been harmed, France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands lodged an application against Türkiye in 1982, alleging that the Convention had been violated on account of the very large number of human rights violations that occurred in the lawless environment which, with the military coup of 12 September 1980 and thereafter, prevailed in our country90.
It is stated that inter-State applications are, in general, applications of a political nature91. Indeed, when the proportion of inter-State applications is compared with that of individual applications, it is clearly seen that the essential structure of the system of judicial protection introduced by the Convention consists of individual applications. This does not mean, however, that inter-State applications are unimportant; on the contrary, these applications are of great importance because they have a political content and affect international relations.
Despite this political importance, inter-State applications are lodged less frequently owing to various factors; one of the reasons for this is that this procedure is used as an instrument of political pressure. When the inter-State applications lodged to date are examined, and in particular when those lodged against Türkiye and Greece are taken into account, it is seen that, especially in cases of anti-democratic changes of regime, the States Parties to the Convention have used this procedure as an instrument of pressure to bring anti-democratic practices to an end. In this context it is seen that the applications in question have been lodged in particular in cases of violation of Art. 3 ECHR, which prohibits torture, ill-treatment and inhuman practices and punishments and whose violation meets with a wide response in public opinion92. When the Convention establishing the system of judicial protection and the CoE Statute are assessed together, it is seen to be entirely natural that inter-State applications should take this form for the purpose of establishing a democratic system, which is the common aim, and of creating a common public order. Another reason why inter-State applications are seldom lodged is that States tend rather to choose diplomatic channels for the resolution of problems of a kind that might give rise to an application and prefer to resolve these problems behind closed doors. A further reason put forward in this connection is the thought that the applications lodged will have a boomerang effect and that an application will in turn be lodged against the applicant State Party93.
In conclusion, for these reasons the inter-State application has become ineffective to a degree at which it cannot meet the aims of providing a “collective guarantee” and creating a “common public order”.
To date twenty applications have been lodged by States Parties. These applications can be classified into four groups. Accordingly, they consist of the applications lodged against the United Kingdom in connection with Northern Ireland; the applications lodged against Greece on account of the practices of the colonels’ junta that came to power in Greece through military intervention; the applications lodged against Türkiye on account of the problems arising as a result of the military operation carried out by Türkiye on the island of Cyprus; and, finally, the applications lodged against Türkiye on account of the practices of the junta that came to power through the military coup of 12 September94.
From the standpoint of legal technique, however, there is no difference between the inter-State application and the individual application. This application procedure too is effected by delivering to the Registry of the Court a duly drawn-up application together with the evidence relating to the facts annexed to it, after which the ordinary course of proceedings follows. The application procedure and course of proceedings in question will be explained in detail below.
C. The Individual Application
The right of individual application laid down in the ECHR is the most effective means of protecting human rights and the basic structure of the system of judicial protection provided for by the ECHR95. By the introduction of this procedure, the effective protection and realisation of human rights has been ensured and, at the same time, the individual, who is not a holder of rights in international law, has been made a rights-bearing subject of that branch of law.
The recognition of the right of individual application gave rise to significant reservations in some countries, and during the drafting of the Convention the delegates of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Greece opposed the recognition of this right, arguing that “this right could easily be abused and could serve subversive propaganda”96. Because of these reservations, under the arrangement made before Protocol No. 11 individual application did not become operative automatically upon a State’s becoming a party to the Convention; the fulfilment of certain conditions was required for this. Accordingly, States Parties had in addition to notify the Secretariat General of the CoE that they accepted individual application. Moreover, these declarations were made for fixed periods and had to be renewed each time. It must be noted, however, that during the period in which the old system was applied all the States Parties that had once recognised the right of individual application continuously renewed their declarations recognising that right. Some States Parties, although they did not voice these reservations, bore them in mind and recognised the right of individual application only towards the end of the period during which the old system was in force97.
After Protocol No. 11, however, Art. 34 of the Convention, which governs the right of individual application, did away with the situation described above, and the right of individual application was made operative automatically upon a State’s becoming a party to the Convention. Accordingly, as from 1 November 1998, the date on which Protocol No. 11 entered into force, the right of individual application has been made effective for persons within the sovereign territory both of the States that were parties to the Convention before that date and of the States that have become parties to the Convention after that date.
D. The Jurisdiction of the Court
The first point to be examined in connection with applications to the Court is the jurisdiction of the Court; the questions of who may apply to the Court, against whom, on what subject, and on account of violations occurring where and when must each be answered in turn. In short, the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of persons, subject matter, place and time98 must be determined.
Art. 1 of the Convention clearly sets out the scope of the Convention; it states that “the High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”. Under Art. 32 of the Convention, moreover, “the jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in Article 33, Article 34 and Article 47.” Consequently, when the above-mentioned articles are taken together, Art. 1, which determines jurisdiction for the purposes of the Convention, also applies to the jurisdiction of the Court.
It should also be noted that Art. 32(2) of the Convention, by stating that in the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction the Court shall decide the matter, indicates that a boundary in matters of jurisdiction will be drawn by the Court’s own case law. As will be seen below, the Court interprets this jurisdiction broadly.
The situations in which the Court has jurisdiction are explained below.
1. Jurisdiction in Respect of Persons
a. Those Who May Lodge an Application
In examining the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of persons, Arts. 1, 33 and 34 of the Convention must be considered together. What is meant by the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of persons is who may lodge an application with the Court. These are indicated in Arts. 33 and 34 of the Convention; those who may lodge an application fall into two categories, namely those lodging an inter-State application and those lodging an individual application99. Accordingly, in inter-State applications the States Parties to the Convention (high contracting party), and in individual applications persons within the scope of application of the Convention (person), groups of persons (group of individuals) and non-governmental organisations (non-governmental organization), may apply to the Court alleging a violation of rights. As can be seen, those who may lodge an application are defined very broadly in the Convention100.
For natural persons, Art. 34 of the Convention uses the concept of “any person within the scope of application of the Convention”, “any person”. For this reason, the applicant need not be a national of the State against which the application is lodged, nor need he be a national of a State Party to the Convention. Any person may apply to the Court if, in any way, in a State Party to the Convention, one of the rights or freedoms protected by the Convention or the additional Protocols has been violated in his regard101.
A person applying to the Court need not have the capacity to exercise his rights under his own national law or under the law of the country against which the application is lodged. The fact that the person is under legal incapacity, mentally ill or in detention is no bar to lodging an application102.
Individual applicants may apply to the Court through their legal representatives; for this, however, a form of authority must be submitted.
Those referred to by Art. 34 of the Convention are natural persons, legal persons under private law and groups of persons without legal personality. What is meant by legal persons under private law is associations, trade unions, foundations, political parties and commercial companies. Legal persons under private law may lodge an application not in order to protect the individual rights of their members but in order to protect the right of the legal person103. Accordingly, public legal persons, or bodies such as municipalities which are subject to administrative law and exercise public authority, cannot lodge an individual application with the Court.
It should also be noted that, in determining who may lodge an application, the Court has regard not to the provisions of the domestic laws of the countries on the matter but to the provisions of the Convention. Indeed, the Court stated this clearly in its judgment in Norris v. Ireland104.
An important point to be made in this connection is that, in an individual application, persons may apply only where a violation of rights has been committed against themselves. Beyond that, a person cannot lodge an application on account of a violation of rights by which he is not personally affected; for, in contrast to inter-State applications, the prohibition of the public action (actio popularis) applies in individual applications. Naturally, lodging an application on behalf of a person in the capacity of representative is not regarded as falling within this prohibition.
b. Those Against Whom an Application May Be Lodged
In the system of judicial protection introduced by the ECHR, applications may be lodged only against one of the States Parties. This rule applies without variation, whether the application is an inter-State application or an individual application. As a natural consequence, no application may be lodged against natural persons, legal persons under private law or groups of persons. Where, on the other hand, the acts and measures of legal persons under public law give rise to a violation of rights, an application is possible, since these are regarded as falling within the concept of the State in the broad sense.
2. Jurisdiction in Respect of Subject Matter
a. The Rule
The Court’s jurisdiction in respect of subject matter is determined by the Convention and its additional Protocols. Accordingly, it is not possible to apply to the Court alleging the violation of a right that is not provided for in the Convention or its additional Protocols. Which rights and freedoms are contained in the Convention and its additional Protocols was briefly indicated above; an application may be made to the Court only on the allegation that these have been violated. Consequently, since the power to interpret the Convention and the additional Protocols belongs to the Court, what each right or freedom comprises and what its scope is are determined by the Court; this makes the Court’s judgments extremely important. For this reason, when an application is to be lodged with the Court, the Court’s judgments concerning the right and freedom thought to have been violated must without fail be examined. However, as also stated above, in inter-State applications it is possible to lodge an application alleging the violation of a provision which is contained in the Convention but does not embody any right or freedom.
b. Reservations That May Be Made to the Convention and the Additional Protocols
It is possible for a Contracting State to limit the application of the Convention and hence the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of subject matter. This can be done by making a reservation to the Convention or its additional Protocols, as is permitted in the law of international treaties, or by not signing the additional Protocols at all. For example, Türkiye signed the Convention without making any reservation; however, it made a reservation to the right to education laid down in Art. 2 of Additional Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, to the effect that the provisions of Law No. 430 of 3 March 1924 on the Unification of Education would remain reserved105.
The Court may examine its jurisdiction in respect of subject matter, depending on the degree of complexity of the application, during the examination of the admissibility of the application, or it may examine it together with the merits of the case.
3. Jurisdiction in Respect of Place
a. The Rule
The Court’s jurisdiction in respect of place denotes the area within which the Convention, and hence the jurisdiction of the Court, is operative. As a rule, the Court’s jurisdiction covers the territory over which the State Party to the Convention has “effective authority”, that is, the national territory of that State106. However, the Court and the Commission have extended this area of jurisdiction in various decisions. Accordingly, it has been stated that the territories over which a country that is a party to the Convention exercises de facto sovereignty are also regarded as areas in which the Convention is operative. Indeed, the Court regarded as falling within its jurisdiction in respect of place the applications lodged by Cyprus in 1974 and 1975107 as a result of the military operation carried out by Türkiye in Cyprus in 1974. It was stated there that, through the military operation it had carried out, Türkiye had established sovereignty over a certain part of the island of Cyprus and that the Convention was operative there, so that the Court and the Commission of the time had jurisdiction. Likewise, the Court has jurisdiction in respect of violations of rights committed outside the national territory by an official of a State Party. A similar situation applies to aircraft and vessels flying the flag of a State Party.
Another point to be made in this respect is that it is not necessary for a person to be physically present within the sovereign territory of the State Party in order to lodge an application. If, by an act or measure of the State Party, a person’s rights are violated within the sovereign territory of the State Party, the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of place is established108.
b. The Exception Introduced by Art. 56
Art. 56 of the Convention grants the States Parties a right of limitation with regard to the application of the Convention and the jurisdiction of the Court. Under the general rule set out above, jurisdiction in this field extends to every place where the State Party exercises sovereignty. Under Art. 56 of the Convention, however, a State Party may, by a notification addressed to the Secretariat General of the CoE, declare that the Convention shall apply to all or any of the territories “for whose international relations it is responsible”, and may further declare, whenever it itself considers it necessary, that it recognises the right of individual application in respect of those territories. As can be seen, as far as the States Parties are concerned, the application of the Convention and the additional Protocols beyond the national borders, and the exercise of the right of individual application, have been left to the choice of the State concerned109.
Indeed, in one application, in a case concerning the application of Art. 63, the equivalent of Art. 56 before Protocol No. 11, the Commission applied this rule strictly. In the application X v. Belgium110, the applicant argued that the Congo formed part of Belgian territory, that it was therefore not necessary for the Belgian State to make the declaration provided for in Art. 63 in order for the Convention to apply, and that the declaration made by Belgium under former Art. 25 was consequently also valid for the Congo. The Belgian State, in its defence, wholly opposed this view. In the decision it gave on this matter, the Commission did not accept the applicant’s argument and stated that the Congo could not be regarded as the national territory of Belgium, that it therefore fell within the scope of former Art. 63 and that, since the Belgian State had not made a declaration under former Art. 63, it was not possible to apply the Convention to violations in the Congo or to accept the application111.
This limitation has placed a very significant restriction on the application of the Convention and the jurisdiction of the Court. The provision in question cannot be explained by the level which the international protection of human rights has reached today. This provision makes an open distinction between human beings. Thus, a State Party which, under Art. 56, does not accept the application of the Convention to a country over which it has established sovereignty, in particular by military intervention or in some other way, or which it has even colonised, treats the people within its own territory as first class and lets them enjoy human rights, whereas it does not treat the people in the place “for whose international relations it is responsible”112 as human beings and does not let them enjoy those rights. Yet it is highly probable that cases of violation of the rights protected by the Convention occur in greater numbers, more gravely and more frequently in such areas of sovereignty. As is well known, these are rights which all human beings possess from birth by virtue of being human. In our view, this limiting provision can be explained neither by the spirit of the Convention nor by the level of development of Western democracy; or, seen from the opposite angle and perhaps on a correct approach, this limitation reveals the true face of Western democracy and shows that, while it accords democracy and human rights to its own people, it begrudges others that democracy and those human rights.
Moreover, if it is assumed for a moment that the States Parties give effect to this rule and that a State accepts the application of the Convention to any territory “for whose international relations it is responsible”, we are then confronted with Art. 56(3). That paragraph lays down the rule that “the provisions of this Convention shall be applied in the said territories with due regard to local conditions”. In other words, local rules will be able to take precedence over the Convention. In that case, for example, where a doctor who is an official of a State Party carries out the practice of “female circumcision” for scientific purposes in an African country “for whose international relations” that State “is responsible”, will this, local rules being taken into account, not be regarded as a violation of Art. 3 of this Convention? As can be seen, Art. 56 stands in the Convention as a provision that is in every respect wholly contrary to human rights.
By way of comparison it should be noted that, in the judgments it delivered on the applications Cyprus v. Türkiye and Loizidou v. Türkiye, the Court accepted in very definite terms that, in a region over which a country has established sovereignty by military intervention, the intervening State Party bears responsibility under the Convention and the Court has jurisdiction, irrespective of whether a State under another name has been established in that region; and, as a result of the proceedings, it reached the conclusion that Türkiye had committed violations of rights113. As can be seen, however, unlike the provision in Art. 56(1) of the Convention, this judgment does not speak of a “territory for whose international relations it is responsible” but uses the expression “a region over which a country has established sovereignty by military intervention”, and states that in the latter case the Convention will apply automatically.
4. Jurisdiction in Respect of Time
a. The Rule
In international law, treaties as a rule do not have retroactive effect; they enter into force only after any procedure or period specified in the treaty has been completed, or after they have been signed. For this reason treaties cannot be applied to events or acts prior to the date of their entry into force.
This rule also applies to the ECHR, which is an international treaty, and to the jurisdiction of the Court. The ECHR and its additional Protocols become valid for the State concerned only after they have been duly signed and the instrument of ratification has been deposited with the Secretariat General of the CoE. For this reason the time at which the Convention and/or the additional Protocols take effect may differ for each State Party to the Convention.
As regards the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of time, however, the position differs as between the period before and the period after Protocol No. 11. Since, before Protocol No. 11, the States Parties to the Convention had to declare separately their acceptance of the right of individual application and of the jurisdiction of the Court, there could be a difference between the time at which the Convention entered into force for the State Party concerned, the time at which it recognised the right of individual application and the time at which the jurisdiction of the Court was accepted. After Protocol No. 11 this difference was removed by the arrangement then made. Under the system now in force, once the Convention has been duly ratified and the instrument of ratification deposited with the Secretariat General of the CoE, the system of judicial protection comes into operation automatically together with the Convention as it enters into force for the State Party; that is to say, both the right of individual application and the jurisdiction of the Court are thereby accepted.
b. Exception: Continuing Violation
Although non-retroactivity is the rule in international law and in the Convention system, in certain situations constituting an exception it has been accepted, through decisions of the Commission and of the Court, that the applicability of the Convention and the jurisdiction of the Court operate retroactively. Where the violation of rights committed by the State Party is of a continuing nature, the rule of non-retroactivity is not applied and the Convention applies.
The Commission first used the concept of a continuing violation in its decision in De Becker v. Belgium114. De Becker was tried and convicted in 1947 on the ground that he had collaborated with the occupying Nazi forces during the Second World War, and was deprived for life of the right to work as a journalist and writer. The Commission regarded this ongoing state of prohibition as a continuing violation and decided that the application fell within its jurisdiction in respect of time115.
In various decisions the Commission has distinguished between cases in which the rights contained in the Convention are violated once and cases in which they are violated in a continuing manner. For example, while stating that depriving a person of the right of property is an act carried out by a single measure and giving rise to a single violation of the Convention, it decided that depriving a person of the right to enjoy the property, without touching the right of property itself, is a continuing violation of the Convention116. Likewise, a person’s being wrongfully held in detention as a result of the unlawful pre-trial detention of the accused constitutes a continuing violation117. Failure to respect family life constitutes another example of a continuing violation118.
In applications lodged after the entry into force of the Convention in a State and displaying the character of a continuing violation, the Court draws a distinction in terms of time. Accordingly, in a complaint concerning a violation of rights that continues after the Convention has entered into force, the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction as regards the part relating to the period before the date on which the Convention entered into force for the respondent State, and that it has jurisdiction as regards the part relating to the period after the date on which the Convention entered into force.
The conclusion to be drawn from the explanations given above is that it is not possible to lay down a definite criterion for continuing violations. The Court assesses each concrete case on its own terms and determines its jurisdiction in respect of time accordingly119.
E. The Admissibility Criteria for Applications
A great many applications are lodged with the ECtHR alleging that States Parties to the ECHR have violated rights, but most of them are eliminated before reaching the stage of adjudication. The reason for this is that applications are assessed against certain admissibility criteria and only those applications that pass this examination can become the subject of a case.
The reasons for laying down these criteria may be said to be: ensuring that, as with an application to any judicial authority, this application too is made within the framework of definite rules; preventing anyone who so wishes from applying as and when he pleases; endeavouring to keep the Court’s workload at a certain level; and, perhaps most importantly, seeking, as in every legal system and in the interests of legal certainty, to prevent every matter from remaining open to adjudication for ever.
These admissibility criteria are examined first of all, before the application is dealt with as a case. When an application is sent to one of the Sections of the Court, the Committees of three judges operating under those Sections carry out the preliminary and initial examination, as to admissibility, of the applications lodged with the Court and function, as it were, as a filter (Art. 27 ECHR; Rule 27 of the Rules of Court)120.
However, as also stated above, Additional Protocol No. 14 provides that the initial examination of applications
as to admissibility is to be carried out by the single-judge formation and that the applications which pass this examination are to be sent to the Committees of three judges or to the Chambers. In this way it was intended that the three-judge Committees, which have performed the filtering function since Protocol No. 11, should leave that task to the single-judge formations and that the latter should carry out the filtering.
The admissibility criteria are set out in Art. 35 of the Convention. Accordingly, when an application reaches the Court, it is first examined with regard to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies and the six-month rule contained in Art. 35(1). These two conditions are required both in inter-State applications and in individual applications. Art. 35(2) and (3), for their part, set out the admissibility criteria required for individual applications. Accordingly, in individual applications the following criteria must be met: the application must be signed, that is, the applicant’s forename and surname must clearly appear; no application on the matter must previously have been made to another international body; the application must not be manifestly ill-founded in terms of the rights contained in the Convention and its additional Protocols; and the right of application must not be abused.
By the amendment made to Art. 35 of the Convention by Art. 12 of Protocol No. 14,
the introduction of a new admissibility criterion was sought. Accordingly, were the Protocol to enter into force, the criterion that “the principle of respect for human rights does not require a further examination of the merits of the application” would also be examined in applications alongside the other criteria, and a decision of inadmissibility would likewise be given in respect of applications not meeting this condition.
Pursuant to Art. 35(4) of the Convention, an application that fails to meet one or more of the admissibility criteria contained in Art. 35(1), (2) and (3) may be rejected, and this may be done at any stage of the proceedings. Moreover, rejection on the ground that these criteria are not met may occur in respect of both individual applications and inter-State applications.
The admissibility criteria in question are examined one by one below.
1. Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
Before an application can be brought before the ECtHR, a solution to the matter must first have been sought through domestic remedies; lodging an application without these domestic remedies having been exhausted is a sufficient reason for the application to be found inadmissible.
The requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted before recourse is had to an international body is a rule of international law. This rule has its origin in the period before the Second World War and derives from the principle of respect for the sovereignty of States and for the jurisdiction of their judicial organs121. In this way the respondent State’s own judicial or administrative organs are first given the opportunity to bring about a solution to a problem122.
The domestic remedies that must be exhausted must be domestic remedies through which an effective application can be made and a result obtained123. Domestic remedies which do not satisfy these conditions and exist merely for show need not be exhausted124. Indeed, the Convention provides in Art. 13 that the States Parties must ensure the existence of effective domestic remedies in their legal systems and must grant the right of recourse to these remedies.
What is meant by domestic remedies is judicial remedies and administrative remedies; it must be said, however, that the most effective of these are judicial remedies125. Although in theory domestic remedies include political avenues of recourse, political avenues are not among the domestic remedies that must be exhausted for the purposes of an application to the Court126.
Applying to the administrative authority that carried out the administrative act or measure alleged to have caused the violation of rights is not one of the domestic remedies that must be exhausted; however, where recourse to an administrative authority as an authority of objection is provided for by statute, this remedy must be exhausted.
As regards judicial recourse, all the judicial remedies provided by the legal system of the State Party in which the injustice occurred must be exhausted in order to obtain redress for the injustice which the applicant claims to have suffered127. These judicial remedies may lie before the administrative courts or the ordinary courts. The Convention does not impose on the States Parties an obligation to introduce a two-tier system of courts128. However, where a two-tier system of courts has been introduced in the domestic legal system of the respondent State, for example where a court of appeal on facts and law or a court of appeal on points of law has been established, recourse to these second-instance courts must also be exhausted before applying to the ECtHR in order for all domestic remedies to be deemed exhausted129.
The application for “rectification of judgment” that exists in our country’s legal system must be addressed within this topic. Rectification of judgment is a sui generis legal remedy available against the decisions delivered by the Court of Cassation, the Council of State and the Supreme Military Administrative Court. Although it is not in fact an ordinary legal remedy, it is a remedy provided so that decisions may be reviewed once more; for this reason, in order for decisions to become formally final, either this remedy must be pursued and a decision obtained, or the time-limit for lodging it must have been allowed to expire. In respect of the decisions of the Court of Cassation in civil cases and the decisions of the Council of State and the Supreme Military Administrative Court, a request by one of the parties to the case is sufficient for this remedy to be pursued; it is therefore a domestic remedy that must be exhausted for the purposes of an application to the ECtHR. In the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 1412 (CMUK), which was in force before 1 June 2005, by contrast, in respect of the decisions of the Court of Cassation in criminal cases recourse to this remedy was granted not directly to the accused or the intervening party but to the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation, that is, to an administrative official; moreover, the CMUK expressly defined this remedy as an “extraordinary legal remedy”. For this reason this remedy need not be exhausted for the purposes of an application to be lodged with the ECtHR following criminal proceedings130. However, since the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 (CMK) makes no provision for the legal remedy of rectification of judgment, the distinction drawn in this regard has also disappeared. Accordingly, as far as the law of criminal procedure is concerned, under the provisions introduced by the CMK No. 5271, domestic remedies will be exhausted once the legal remedy of appeal on facts and law or of appeal on points of law, or, as the case may be, both in turn, has been exhausted.
For domestic remedies to be deemed exhausted, they must be genuinely exhausted both in substance (on the merits) and in form (procedure)131. For domestic remedies to be deemed exhausted in substance, the applicant must raise before the national authorities, expressly or implicitly, the right which he claims has been violated. That is, he must state before the national authority, expressly or at least in substance, that the right or rights laid down in the ECHR have been violated as a result of the injustice suffered132. What is meant by this, however, is not that the articles of the Convention must be expressly cited but that the event or measure giving rise to the violation of rights must be indicated133. Exhaustion of domestic remedies in form, on the other hand, denotes that an application or action must be brought in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the national legal system. Where an application or action remains without result because of procedural errors, this is regarded as the applicant’s responsibility134.
Although the exhaustion of domestic remedies is the rule for applying to the Court, in certain situations applications lodged without these remedies having been exhausted are also accepted by the Court. Examples of such situations are: the ineffectiveness of the domestic remedy provided; judicial recourse being barred by a provision of domestic law; the judicial application to be made being bound to produce a result that merely repeats the earlier case law of the judicial body; the existence of an “established administrative practice” contrary to the Convention; the case preceding the application being protracted and not being concluded within a reasonable time; the exhaustion of domestic remedies being obstructed by public officials; and doubt as to whether the domestic remedies are effective and adequate135. These situations in which the exhaustion of domestic remedies is not required have not been individually laid down in a text; they are general situations that have emerged from the case law produced by the Court on the basis of the conclusion reached in the course of each concrete case. This approach of the Court is entirely appropriate; it has thereby prevented individuals from having to struggle with formal rules, and even obstructions, in obtaining their rights, and has made the pursuit of rights simpler and more effective. Since these situations are the product of case law, their number may well increase in future.
2. The Six-Month Rule
Art. 35(1) of the Convention, which governs the admissibility criteria, lays down the rule that applications to the Court must be lodged within six months from the date on which the final decision on the matter was given.
The reason why the Convention provides for such a time-limit for applications is that legal certainty be ensured, that decisions taken on a matter be prevented from being continually called into question136 and that legal stability137 be secured138. Indeed, in its judgment in De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium139 the ECtHR stated that the reason for laying down a time-limit for the lodging of applications is to ensure legal certainty and stability140. By this provision it has been sought to put an end to the continual calling into question of the decisions which the States Parties give in their domestic law and which have the character of a final judgment, and to the state of uncertainty that is its inevitable consequence141.
This time-limit is in the nature of a “preclusive time-limit”142. Because of this character, the six-month time-limit is said to be a matter of “European public order”143. Whether this time-limit has been complied with is taken into account by the Court of its own motion144.
The exhaustion of domestic remedies and the time-limit for applying to the Court are regulated in the same article, because there is a close relationship between the two. For this reason, as a rule, the date on which the final decision was given in the domestic proceedings marks the beginning of the time-limit for applying to the Court. Apart from this, however, in various situations such as where no final decision could be obtained in domestic law, the beginning of the time-limit is determined as follows.
Where there is no domestic remedy against the violation that has occurred, or where the existing remedy is ineffective, the six-month period begins to run from the date on which the act giving rise to the violation of the Convention took place or the measure was taken.
For the time-limit for applying to the Court to begin to run, it is not necessary that the decision obtained from the last authority exhausted in domestic law be notified in writing (served); knowledge of this decision is sufficient for the period to begin. However, in cases where knowledge of the operative part of the decision alone is not sufficient for lodging an application with the Court alleging a violation of rights, the period begins to run from the date on which written notification is given. This varies according to the nature of the decision and of the application to be lodged. In our country, since in cases where the judgment is pronounced in the presence of the parties a very short decision is given and no information whatsoever on the reasoning of the decision is included, in many cases the period begins with the written notification of the reasoned judgment.
In the case of a continuing violation, the period begins to run from the date on which the violation ends; where this violation stems, for example, from a statute and there is no question of its coming to an end, and where moreover no domestic remedy is provided for it, the six-month rule does not apply. Nevertheless, the application must still be lodged within a reasonable time. Where a person whose rights are violated by a continuing violation fails to apply to the Court although he had the opportunity to do so, the application may be rejected as out of time145.
Where pre-trial detention, one of the coercive measures in the law of criminal procedure, is carried out in a manner that violates the rights laid down in the Convention, and no domestic remedy against it, for example a possibility of objection, is provided, the time-limit for applying begins to run from the date on which the detention order is lifted or the person is released146. The same rule applies where the criminal prosecution ends in a decision not to prosecute147.
Where there are several violations of rights, both the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies and the six-month rule are assessed separately for each violation of rights.
Where an application is lodged by the person whose rights have been violated without domestic remedies having been exhausted, the application is accepted as a valid application lodged in time if the applicant had first had recourse to domestic remedies, the domestic remedy was completed before the Court gave its decision on admissibility, and this is notified to the Court by the applicant148.
As a rule, the six-month time-limit applicable to applications to the Court can be neither suspended nor interrupted. However, the existence of a physical or mental illness of such a nature as to prevent the lodging of an application is accepted as a circumstance suspending the time-limit for applying149.
Apart from this, in cases of necessity where the applicant has reached the end of the six-month period, if he sends the Court by letter or fax a brief summary of the application and of the violation of rights committed, this interrupts the time-limit for applying; if the applicant lodges the complete application within an additional period of six weeks, the date of the letter or fax first sent is accepted by the Court as the date of the application150.
3. The Applicant’s Identity Must Be Known
Under Art. 35(2)(a) of the Convention, applications made anonymously are not accepted. Although the wording of the paragraph says “if the application is unsigned”, what is meant by this is that the applicant’s identity must be clearly apparent from the application. Likewise, where the application is lodged through a representative, a form of authority or power of attorney must also be attached to the application. However, where the applicant’s identity can be clearly ascertained even though the application does not bear the applicant’s signature, this is regarded as a valid application151.
This rule was laid down in order to prevent the application procedure from being used solely for political reasons and for propaganda purposes152. Consequently, applications lodged by various organisations or bodies on behalf of their members or of persons they support, without the applicants being named, are not accepted. Indeed, an application lodged by an association on behalf of members whose identities were not known was rejected as not complying with Art. 35(2)(a) of the Convention153. The strict application of this rule, particularly by the Commission before Protocol No. 11, prevented indiscriminately lodged applications from blocking the course of proceedings before the Court154.
An important point to be noted in this connection is that, although the identity of the applicant or applicants must clearly appear in the application, where the applicant requests that his name not be disclosed this request is complied with and the applicant’s name is not shown at any stage; instead, the letter “X” is generally used to designate the applicant. This does not mean that the application is anonymous155.
The Court attaches great importance to this rule of admissibility; in the applications lodged, applicants pay attention to this rule and give their full identities, and for this reason it is very rare in the decisions given by the Court for an application to be rejected on the ground that it is anonymous156.
4. The Application Must Not Have Been Previously Examined by the Court
Under Art. 35(2)(b) of the Convention, an application is rejected “if the application is substantially the same as the subject matter of an application already examined by the Court and contains no new facts”. This paragraph of the article is the reflection, in the system of judicial protection under examination, of the rule that “there can be no two trials on the same matter”, one of the universal rules of procedural law. Under this rule, where there is a judicial decision on a matter, no second trial may be held on the same matter.
5. The Application Must Not Have Been Previously Submitted to Another International Body
Another provision laid down in Art. 35(2)(b) of the Convention, likewise deriving from the rule that “there can be no two trials on the same matter”, is that, for an application lodged with the Court to be admissible, a matter arising from the same cause must not have been submitted to a different international body. Since there is no hierarchical structure among the different international bodies whereby one would review the decision given by another, and since the decision given by each different body has the character of a final judgment in international law, applications of this kind are rejected by the Court in accordance with the rule that no two trials are held on the same matter157.
6. The Application Must Be Compatible with the Convention
Art. 35(3) of the Convention states that “the Court shall find inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers it … to fall outside the provisions of this Convention and its Protocols”. In legal scholarship this admissibility condition is understood to mean that, for an application to be found admissible, it must fall within the jurisdiction of the Convention, and hence of the Court, in respect of place (ratione loci), persons (ratione personae), subject matter (ratione materiae) and time (ratione temporis)158. Since this admissibility condition was examined above under “the jurisdiction of the Court”, no separate explanation is given here.
7. The Application Must Not Be Manifestly Ill-Founded
Another important admissibility condition laid down in Art. 35(3) of the Convention is that “the application must not be manifestly ill-founded”. The importance of this rule lies in the fact that, by reason of this ground of admissibility, the Court first of all examines the application on the merits159. Under this ground of admissibility it is assessed, at the very first glance, whether the facts complained of disclose a violation of the Convention; applications in which no violation is “manifestly” apparent at first sight are thus found inadmissible and the Court’s workload is reduced. As a result, it is stated that this rule has been laid down in connection with procedural economy160.
The examination of the merits of the application that is generally carried out at this stage looks at whether there is sufficient evidence to show that a violation of rights has occurred and whether the facts complained of are of such a nature as to give rise to a violation of the right or rights laid down in the Convention; where it is decided that there is insufficient evidence and/or that the facts are not of such a nature as to constitute a violation of rights, the application is found inadmissible161.
8. The Right of Application Must Not Be Abused
Another of the admissibility conditions set out in Art. 35(3) of the Convention is that the application must not amount to an abuse of the right. This provision was made in order to allay the concerns of those States which, particularly while the Convention was being drafted, feared that individual applications would be used as an instrument of political propaganda. In practice, however, it is seen that this fear has not materialised and that, accordingly, the Court acts with great restraint in applying this rule162.
The Court accepts that the right of application has been abused where political propaganda is made in applications, where the application contains language of an insulting nature and where untrue information is given in the application. It interprets this, however, within a very narrow framework. For example, it does not reject every application containing political propaganda but also requires that it contain an allegation of a violation falling outside the scope of the Convention; where an application meets the other conditions of admissibility, the Court does not reject it merely because it contains political propaganda163. Where, however, the application does not involve a violation of rights and is lodged purely for the purpose of propaganda, it holds that the application is inadmissible164.
Since the article containing this condition is stated, in normative terms, to be applicable solely to individual applications, it cannot be applied to inter-State applications. On the other hand, under international law the applications which States make to international organisations are not regarded as an abuse of a right. For these two reasons this condition is not required in respect of inter-State applications. It must be said, however, that it is perfectly possible for any State applying to an international organisation in general, and for a State Party to the ECHR in particular, to lodge an application purely for political purposes in order to harass other States, and for this to constitute an abuse of the right of application. In our opinion, this rule constitutes one of the reflections, in the present day and in the ECHR, of the conception of the “sacred State” that commits no error and does no evil, which has come down to us from the Middle Ages.
9. The Principle of Respect for Human Rights Must Not Require Further Examination of the Merits of the Application
By Art. 35(3) of the Convention as amended by Art. 12 of Protocol No. 14, the introduction of a new admissibility criterion was sought. This criterion consists of a three-step test; if the application displays the following features, it may be declared
inadmissible by the Court:
- where the applicant will not, by reason of the inadmissibility decision,
suffer a significant disadvantage,
- except for the rejection of a case which has not been duly
considered by a domestic tribunal,
- where the principle of respect for human rights does not require
a further examination of the merits of the application.
This new criterion is open to criticism in many respects. Many quarters, including judges of the ECtHR, national judges, government representatives and human rights organisations, state that the criterion in question is unnecessary, wrong in principle and excessively vague. The content of the concepts of “significant disadvantage” and of the “principle of respect for human rights” contained in this new criterion, moreover, is such that it can be clarified and filled in only by the case law of the Court.
Of these conditions, the second in particular has been the subject of debate and has met with opposition. The basic purpose of this condition is defined in the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14 as follows: “all disputes (case) must go through a process of adjudication, which may take place at national level or at European level”165. For this reason, where an application is lodged on the ground that the matter was not duly examined in the domestic law of one of the States Parties to the Convention (particularly in applications alleging a violation of Art. 6), a decision of inadmissibility will not, by reason of this criterion, be given in respect of that application and the application will be examined on the merits, even if the applicant will not suffer a significant disadvantage as a result of the inadmissibility decision and even if the principle of respect for human rights does not require a further examination of the merits of the application. For, according to the CoE, every legal dispute (case) must in some way be capable of being made the subject of adjudication.
This admissibility criterion, which Additional Protocol No. 14 to the Convention was intended to bring into force,
will not be applied to applications declared admissible before the entry into force of the Protocol. For two years following the entry into force of the Protocol, this criterion may be applied only to applications to be examined in the Chambers of the Court or before the Grand Chamber; a contrario, it follows that, had the Protocol been able to enter into force, the criterion in question would not have been applied in the Committees and in the single-judge formation for two years from that date.
At this stage it is not possible for the amendment in question to achieve its aims,
because the Protocol has not entered into force. In legal scholarship this proposed amendment has been criticised, and it has also been stated that there is a significant danger here, namely that this amendment may prolong the proceedings at the admissibility stage and make the system more complex166.
We, however, take the opposite view and consider that the provision in question is positive, and that the Committees and the Chambers,
the organs deciding on the merits within a Court to which a very large number of applications are made, will be able to give their decisions in a shorter time by not occupying themselves with the stage of deciding on admissibility and by proceeding as soon as possible to the adjudication on the merits of applications in which that question has been resolved. We are also of the view that having a single judge and the expert lawyers of the secretariat who assist him deal with the question of an application’s admissibility, rather than a three-judge Committee, will in practice bring gains in terms of workload and time as well.
As regards the danger and the reservation mentioned above, the point on which we agree is that the concepts of “the principle of respect
for human rights” and “the applicant will not suffer a significant disadvantage from this” are indeed vague. However, the Court has to date given decisions capable of dispelling the concerns in this regard; we therefore consider that, in respect of these two concepts as well, the Court will give decisions displaying its liberal attitude and will fill in their content. For to date many expressions that are vague in the Convention, its additional Protocols or the Rules of Court have likewise been filled in by the case law developed by the Court, and there is no indication whatsoever that the same will not happen from now on.
F. The Examination of Admissibility
1. The Procedure for the Examination of Admissibility
When applications reach the Court, they are first given a provisional number and examined by the expert lawyers working in the Registry as to whether they contain any obvious deficiency; if there is no such deficiency, they are formally registered and examined as to admissibility, according to the criteria explained above, in the Chamber to which they are sent. As a rule this examination is conducted in writing on the basis of the file, but in exceptional cases where it is considered necessary a hearing is held on this matter too (Rules 51(5) and 54(4) of the Rules of Court).
As explained above in the section on the structure of the Court, after an application has been sent to the Court, has passed the initial examination and has been formally registered, it is sent to one of the Sections of the Court. The President of the Section designates one of the formations which the Section has constituted within itself as the Chamber for the case and transfers the application to that Chamber.
In inter-State applications, the application is communicated to the State Party, and the respondent State Party is asked for its observations on the admissibility of the application. Once these observations have been received, they are transmitted to the applicant State Party and its observations on the matter are obtained. Thereafter the Chamber decides on the admissibility of the inter-State application at a sitting held in private, having regard also to the report prepared on the matter by the Judge Rapporteur167 (Rule 51(3), (7) of the Rules of Court).
In individual applications, on the other hand, the examination of admissibility is carried out by a Committee of three judges or by a Chamber. If, as a result of its examination, the Committee finds that the application is such that a decision of inadmissibility, or a decision to strike the application out of the Court’s list of cases, can be given without further examination, it may so decide by a unanimous vote; this decision is final (Rule 53 of the Rules of Court).
Protocol No. 14 provides that the decision on admissibility is to be examined by single-judge formations
and that the decisions of inadmissibility given by the judges are to be final. A decision that the application is inadmissible is final and thus brings the proceedings to an end; no objection may be lodged against this decision. The applications in respect of which the single-judge formations have given a decision of admissibility, on the other hand, will be sent to the Committees and/or the Chambers for a decision on their merits and admissibility.
Where the Committee does not give a decision of inadmissibility or of striking out, the application is taken up by the Chamber. As in the examination by the Committee, if the Chamber finds that the application is such that a decision of inadmissibility, or a decision to strike the application out of the Court’s list of cases, can be given without further examination, it may so decide by a unanimous vote (Rule 54(2) of the Rules of Court).
Instead of bringing the application to an end by such a decision of inadmissibility, the Chamber may decide to request the parties to submit any information or documents concerning the facts which they consider to be connected with the application (Rule 54(3)(a) of the Rules of Court), to give notice of the application to the “respondent State Party” and have it communicate its observations (Rule 54(3)(b) of the Rules of Court), or to invite the parties to submit further observations in writing (Rule 54(3)(c) of the Rules of Court).
Once the file has been completed in this way, the Chamber decides on the admissibility or inadmissibility of the application. A decision that the application is inadmissible is final and thus brings the proceedings to an end; no objection may be lodged against this decision. Where, on the other hand, it is decided that the application is admissible, this decision gives rise to the commencement of a series of legal processes, namely the attempt to secure a friendly settlement between the parties and the commencement of the examination of the merits of the application168.
When an application is found admissible, the applicant and the respondent State Party are notified of this and are requested to submit in writing, within the time-limit fixed, their “observations on the merits of the case”. This is an important stage for the application. In addition, at this stage, if it was not indicated in the application, the claim for just satisfaction must be particularised and claimed from the Court in figures, together with the costs of the proceedings.
2. Intervention of a Third Party in the Case
Where an individual or individuals lodge an application against a State Party to the Convention, the State Party or States Parties of which that individual or those individuals are nationals also have the right to take part in the proceedings, to submit their written comments and to be present at the hearing (Art. 36 ECHR)169.
Accordingly, after a decision of admissibility has been given in respect of an applicant, this is also notified to the State Party of which the applicant is a national (Rule 61(1) of the Rules of Court). Where the State Party gives notice that it will exercise this right, the procedure to be followed is determined by the President of the Chamber (Rule 61(2) of the Rules of Court).
Apart from this, the Court may also, for the purpose of the proper administration of justice, give notice of the application to another State Party or States Parties not party to the application, or to institutions or organisations, so that they may communicate their comments and, exceptionally, take part in the hearings (Art. 36(2) ECHR; Rule 61(3) of the Rules of Court). Here, however, what is involved is no longer intervention in a case but presence in the case, as it were as an expert, in order to convey views and information.
Protocol No. 14 also sought to grant the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights the right, as a third party,
to take part in the proceedings conducted before the Court. Accordingly,
the Commissioner may submit written comments to the Court and may also take part in hearings as a third party (Art. 13 of Additional Protocol No. 14)170.
A request to intervene before the Court must be made within an appropriate period171 after the notification given by the Registry and in one of the official languages of the Court (Rule 61(3) of the Rules of Court).
The President of the Chamber has the power to refuse requests to intervene that are not made within the time-limit and in one of the official languages, and not to add them to the case file. The President of the Chamber may, however, extend the time-limit granted and also has the power to allow the submission to be made in the official language of one of the States Parties other than the official languages of the Court (Rule 61(4)-(5) of the Rules of Court).
G. The Application Procedure
1. Information That Must Be Included in the Application
Art. 34, under which individual applications are regulated in the Convention, contains no explanation as to the form and content of applications; by contrast, Rule 47(1) and (2) of the Rules of Court in force since Protocol No. 11 set out in detail all the information that must be included in the application.
Accordingly, the information that must be included in an application is as follows:
The applicant’s name, date of birth, occupation and full address; the name, occupation and full address of the applicant’s representative, if any; the name of the State Party against which the application is lodged; an account of the facts giving rise to the violation of the Convention; an explanation relating to the articles of the Convention alleged to have been violated; a statement, with regard to the admissibility conditions, that the domestic remedies provided for in Art. 35(1) of the Convention have been exhausted and that the six-month rule has been complied with; the object sought to be achieved by the application and, where applicable, pecuniary redress for the damage suffered on account of the violation of the Convention; a statement as to whether or not an application on the matter has been made to another international body; and the signature of the applicant or, where there is one, of the representative.
In addition to these, the following must be annexed to the application: any evidence capable of proving the facts alleged to have given rise to the violation of rights; the decisions of the administrative or judicial bodies showing that domestic remedies have been pursued and exhausted; and, if the applicant has appointed a representative, the form of authority relating thereto.
In the part of the application setting out the claims, the result sought to be achieved by the application must be briefly stated. This should be in two parts. In the first part it should be stated that, depending on the nature of the application, the Court is requested to find which articles of the ECHR or of its additional Protocols have been violated. In the second part it should be stated that, if there is a violation of rights and if it is claimed, just satisfaction is requested pursuant to Art. 41 of the Convention. At this stage it is not necessary for the compensation and the costs of the proceedings incurred to be expressed concretely in figures172. However, the existence of this claim must without fail be stated expressly; for the Court, in the absence of a claim, neither examines of its own motion an article in respect of which no finding has been requested nor awards just satisfaction.
A specimen showing the application in the form of a form can be obtained from the Court’s official website, and an application adapted by us from this specimen is also included in the annexes at the end of this study (Annex 1). The form of authority can likewise be obtained from the Court’s official website; the Court also accepts a general power of attorney for litigation drawn up by a notary if it contains the statement “is also authorised to act as representative before the European Court of Human Rights”. A form of authority adapted from the specimen prepared by the Court is included at the end of the study (Annex 2). It is sufficient for the form of authority to be signed by the applicant; it need not in addition be certified by any authority or by a notary173.
The application prepared in this way, together with its annexes, is sent to the Court by post. It is not clear whether this should be done by ordinary post or by registered post with acknowledgment of receipt. However, since the lodging of the application is an important stage in the pursuit of one’s rights, and in order that any problems of proof that may arise in future can be overcome from the outset, we are of the opinion that it would be more appropriate to send it by registered post with acknowledgment of receipt or by express mail service174.
The address to which applications are to be sent is as follows:
Cour européenne des droit de l’homme,
Conseil de l’Europe,
67075 Strasbourg – Cedex – France
or
The Registrar
European Court of Human Rights
Council of Europe
67075 Strasbourg – Cedex – France
Apart from the normal application procedure described above, it is also possible in exceptional cases for the application to be made by fax, by e-mail or by telephone175. However, for applications made in this way to acquire the character of a valid application, they must subsequently be confirmed by an application made by post176. This too must be done within the six-week period which, although it is not a written rule, derives from the practice of the Court177.
Of these, application by fax in particular is frequently resorted to where the application is to be lodged in the final days of the six-month period but there is not enough time to make the necessary preparations. This fax message must again state the names and full addresses of the applicant and of any representatives, the name of the respondent State Party and, very briefly and if possible in no more than one page, the act or measure alleged to have given rise to the violation. On account of this character, these applications are called “preliminary applications” in legal scholarship178. Some authors, on the other hand, call this an “urgent individual application” and say that it can be used in particular in the event of a violation of the right to life (Art. 2 ECHR) or of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment (Art. 3 ECHR)179. We must point out, however, that neither the Convention nor the Rules of Court makes any mention of an “urgent” application of this kind, and that this course may also be taken, where necessary, in situations other than urgent ones.
An application to the Court is not subject to any fee. Likewise, even if the application is found inadmissible at the very last stage or is lost, there is no question of having to pay the costs of the proceedings or the costs incurred by the respondent. This is a factor that makes it easier for persons to pursue their rights.
After the application has been lodged, the Court first opens a provisional file and examines the application for obvious deficiencies; if these can be remedied, the Registry of the Court writes to the applicant and requests that the deficiencies be remedied as soon as possible. If there is no deficiency, the application is formally registered and the Registry of the Court sends the applicant a letter indicating the application number and the date on which the application was registered, and stating in particular that the application number must without fail be quoted in all subsequent correspondence.
2. Request for Interim Measures
a. Legal Nature and Procedure
Although in international law the taking of interim measures by supranational bodies is a frequently encountered institution that features in the positive rules of this field180, no provision was made for interim measures either in the text of the ECHR prior to Protocol No. 11 or in its text following Protocol No. 11. However, because it is highly necessary and important for the implementation of the Court’s judgments, this institution was provided for, before Protocol No. 11, by the Commission in Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure and, in the Rules of Court as amended after Protocol No. 11, in Rule 39, under the heading “interim measures”.
Accordingly, upon an application the Chamber or, where appropriate, the President of the Chamber may, of its own motion or at the request of the parties or of any other person concerned, adopt and indicate to the parties the interim measures which it considers should be taken in the interests of the parties or so that the case can be properly heard and decided (Rule 39(1) of the Rules of Court). Notice of these measures is given to the Committee of Ministers (Rule 39(2) of the Rules of Court). The Chamber which took the decision may request the parties to provide information on the implementation of the interim measure and on any matter connected with it (Rule 39(3) of the Rules of Court).
Legal scholarship, interpreting the decisions given to date by the Commission and the ECtHR, states that the Court requires three conditions to be fulfilled before it will order an interim measure. These are: urgency; the existence of harm that is manifest or highly likely to occur and that cannot subsequently be made good; and the existence of facts capable of showing clearly, prima facie, that the claim is well founded or that there has been a breach of the Convention181.
An interim measure may be ordered following an examination carried out at the applicant’s request, or by the Court of its own motion in connection with an application. A request for an interim measure should be made by the easiest and fastest means of communication, namely by fax, e-mail or courier. If the request is to be sent by post, ordinary post should not be used, and once a reasonable time has passed after the request was sent, the Registry of the Court should be telephoned to confirm that it has arrived182. Care should be taken to ensure that requests made by fax and e-mail are, as far as possible, sent during the hours when the Registry of the Court is open.
The request must be made in one of the official languages of the Court or in one of the official languages of the member States of the Council. The words “Rule 39 – Urgent” must appear in large, bold type on the cover of the written submission containing the request. In addition, documents proving the allegations should, as far as possible, be annexed to the submission.
So that the Court can examine the matter thoroughly and properly, a request for an interim measure should be made as soon as possible, without delay, immediately after the final decision has been taken in domestic law. Apart from this, in matters concerning expulsion and extradition, it is also possible to make a request before the domestic decision has become final, where such decisions become enforceable as soon as they are taken183.
An examination of the decisions given by the Court to date shows that interim measures have been ordered in matters concerning the death penalty, extradition and expulsion. For an interim measure to be ordered in respect of an extradition or expulsion decision taken by a State Party, there must be a high risk that the person subjected to that measure will be exposed to ill-treatment in the country to which he is obliged to go184.
b. The Problem of the Binding Force of Interim Measures
The most important problem in this field, however, is that of the enforceability and binding force of an interim measure ordered by the Court. As stated above, the interim measure is an institution regulated not by the Convention but by the Rules of Court. The fact that it is not regulated by the Convention creates uncertainty, and it is argued that no obligation can be imposed on the States Parties by rules of court outside the Convention and its additional Protocols. Indeed, on this point, the decision given by the Commission in Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden185 stated that the Commission’s decision on interim measures was in the nature of a recommendation and was not binding on the States Parties, and that it was not possible to impose obligations on the States Parties by rules of court outside the Convention and its additional Protocols.
However, in its later judgment on the same issue in Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Türkiye186, the ECtHR changed its case law and held that failure to comply with an interim measure constituted a violation of Art. 34 of the Convention. When that judgment was referred to the Grand Chamber, the latter gave the same ruling on the point. Indeed, the Court maintained the same view in the decision187 it gave on Abdullah Öcalan’s request for an interim measure, but did not find a violation of Art. 34 because Türkiye had complied with that decision188.
The Court’s ruling, by this change in its case law, that interim measures are binding and that failure to comply with them gives rise to a violation of a right has been entirely appropriate from the standpoint of the effectiveness of ECtHR judgments and the administration of justice. Where a person’s right to life or the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment is at stake, the States Parties must comply with the interim measures ordered by the Court; otherwise, the “obligation not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of individual applications” laid down in the last sentence of Art. 34 of the Convention will have been breached189.
3. Request for Legal Aid
Applications to the ECtHR are not subject to any fee. Nevertheless, bringing an application before the Court entails various expenses, and it may happen that persons whose rights have been violated are, because of their lack of means, unable to meet these expenses and thus unable to assert their rights. It is in order to prevent this and to ensure that everyone can assert his rights on a fair footing that Rules 91–96 of the Rules of Court lay down the principles and procedure for granting “legal aid” to applicants.
Accordingly, a copy of the letter sent to the State Party inviting it to submit its observations on the admissibility of the application is also sent to the applicant for information; in an annex to that letter the applicant is in addition asked whether he wishes to receive “legal aid”, and the corresponding “Declaration of Means Form” is enclosed. An applicant who requests legal aid must reply to this enquiry within the time-limit laid down in the letter sent.
The President of the Chamber examining the application may decide on this within the time-limit provided for in Rule 54(3)(b) of the Rules of Court. In deciding on legal aid, the President of the Chamber is not bound by the applicant’s request; he may also grant legal aid of his own motion without any request having been made (Rule 91(1) of the Rules of Court).
The declaration of means form contains questions concerning the applicant’s financial situation. This form must be completed accurately, certified by the neighbourhood or village headman (muhtar) and then sent to the Court. It is reported, however, that in practice muhtars refrain for various reasons from certifying this form, and that instead the same form may be certified by the relevant municipal departments, or that a certificate of indigence obtained from the muhtar’s office is also accepted by the Court in place of this form190.
Legal aid is granted only where the President of the Chamber is satisfied that it is necessary for the case to be conducted fairly before the Chamber and that the applicant does not have sufficient means to meet all or part of the costs that will be entailed (Rule 92 of the Rules of Court).
If it is decided to grant the applicant legal aid, the applicant or, if there is one, his representative is informed of this and is sent three information forms to complete. Once this form has been completed and returned, the legal aid is sent in euros to the account number indicated by the applicant or the representative. Legal aid is not paid in a single payment but as and when required, and in the amount required, according to the stage the proceedings have reached.
Legal aid also covers the proceedings before the Grand Chamber (Rule 91(2) of the Rules of Court).
Where the Court awards just satisfaction in its final judgment in the case, it deducts the amount of legal aid it has previously paid from the amount awarded by way of just satisfaction191.
H. Procedure and Course of the Proceedings
Having set out above the procedure for the application to be made to the ECtHR by States Parties or persons claiming that one or more of the rights guaranteed by the ECHR and its additional Protocols have been violated, and the examination of admissibility to which that application is first subjected, we now come to the examination which the Court carries out on the merits of the application. The explanations that follow are given with regard to that examination on the merits.
An application that has passed the admissibility stage is first dealt with by the relevant Chamber of the Court with a view to establishing the facts reported; thereafter, while it is being examined on the merits, an attempt is at the same time made to bring about a friendly settlement between the parties to the case. In the end, the application results either in a friendly settlement, or in a finding that there has been no violation, or in a finding that there has been a violation and, where there has been a violation and if this is considered necessary, in a decision that just satisfaction is to be paid by the respondent State Party to the applicant or applicants.
1. Investigation and Establishment of the Facts
Once the admissibility stage of an application has been passed, the Court, in order to reach a conclusion on the matter, first examines the events alleged to have caused the violation. In carrying out this examination, the Court first has recourse to the respective submissions of the parties. The States Parties concerned by an application are under an obligation, so that the investigation can be carried out, to give the Court all necessary assistance and to furnish all necessary facilities (Art. 38(1) ECHR)192.
The Court is vested with broad powers to carry out this examination, in other words the investigation. For the purposes of the investigation it may hear witnesses, do so where necessary at witness hearings held outside the Court, obtain expert opinions or carry out on-site inspections. The Court conducts these steps through one of its members whom it appoints from among its number.
Depending on the complexity of the application and the importance of the subject matter, the Court may decide to hold a hearing; in principle, however, proceedings before the ECtHR are conducted on the basis of the case file. Where it is decided to hold a hearing for the purposes of the investigation, the procedural rules governing the hearing are set out in Rules 63–65 of the Rules of Court.
2. The Power of Committees of Three Judges to Decide on the Merits of an Application
Protocol No. 14 also sought to change the functions of the Committees. Accordingly, the Committees were given the task of examining on the merits, and deciding, applications of the same type on which case law has already been established by the Court. This stems from the character of the ECtHR as a court of precedent. In this way the Chambers and the Grand Chamber will be relieved of the workload of constantly hearing and deciding cases on similar subjects. Decisions of this type will come into play in particular where the Court has previously heard and decided cases concerning human rights violations arising from a structural problem in the domestic law of the respondent State Party to the Convention. In such a situation the Committees will examine the applications under a simple procedure and decide them quickly193.
This provision, too, is consistent with the purpose of the Protocol and is such as both to increase the speed of the
proceedings and to reduce the Court’s workload. The Court will thus no longer be obliged to hear and decide applications of the same type over and over again. Since decisions of principle have in any event been formed on these matters through case law, those decisions will be applied to similar cases by the Committee. In this way there may also be a decrease in the number of applications going to the Chambers and the Grand Chamber.
3. Attempt at a Friendly Settlement (Friendly Settlement)
Art. 38(1) of the Convention provides for the friendly settlement procedure. Accordingly, after an application has been declared admissible and before a decision is given on the merits, efforts are made to bring about a friendly settlement between the parties. The fact that provision is made for this method of settlement stems from the ECtHR’s being a subsidiary mechanism of judicial protection; indeed, all international dispute-settlement bodies are of the same nature194. The friendly settlement procedure is a means of settlement adopted by international law and therefore also included in the ECHR195. In essence, the friendly settlement procedure is one of the forms of “conciliation”, itself one of the traditional methods that have emerged in the field of international relations for resolving disputes arising between States by peaceful means196. It differs from conciliation, however, in that it does not take place solely between States; this procedure also applies between an individual and a State197.
The reasons given for providing for this procedure are the idea of enabling applications to be concluded before the ordinary and rather lengthy course of the proceedings has run, and of sparing the States Parties the difficult position in which they would find themselves at international level in the event of a finding of a violation198.
The friendly settlement attempt is a procedure resorted to both in individual applications and in inter-State applications. After the admissibility decision has been given, the parties are informed that the Court, through its Registry, is ready to provide every assistance so that the application may be brought to a friendly settlement. If a positive reply is received from the parties, the steps necessary for a friendly settlement are initiated. In the meantime the application is held in abeyance. Here the Court assumes, as it were, the role of a “mediator”199.
The negotiations conducted with a view to a friendly settlement are confidential (Art. 38(2) ECHR; Rule 62(2) of the Rules of Court). The purpose of introducing this rule of confidentiality is to try to prevent the friendly settlement negotiations from being jeopardised. If this rule of confidentiality is breached, the application may be struck out of the list200.
No discussion or statement made in connection with the friendly settlement may have any effect or be used if the friendly settlement fails and the proceedings move on to a decision on the merits of the application. No communication, oral message, offer or concession made in the course of this attempt may be referred to during the proceedings on the merits of the application; the proceedings are continued and decided as though there had been no friendly settlement attempt at all (Rule 62(2) of the Rules of Court).
There are two basic elements to be borne in mind in a friendly settlement. The first is that an agreement must have been reached between the parties; the second is that the solution embodied in that agreement must also have been accepted by the Court. The mere fact that an agreement has been reached between the parties is therefore not sufficient for a friendly settlement to have come about. The Court reviews whether the agreement is consistent with the purpose of the Convention and only then states whether or not it approves the friendly settlement201.
In fact, two kinds of friendly settlement occur. The first is the “formal friendly settlement”, whose general principles we have tried to set out above and which is brought about before the Court with the participation of the parties. The other is the situation in which, while the proceedings are continuing, the parties come together informally and reach an agreement, as a result of which the applicant does not pursue the application, thereby causing it to be struck out of the list, and the application is thus brought to an end. Naturally, the information and statistics given on friendly settlement attempts relate to friendly settlements brought about by the formal route.
Where an application ends in a friendly settlement, the agreement may be of two kinds. The friendly settlement is either of an individual nature or of a public nature. In a friendly settlement of an individual nature, either a certain amount of compensation is paid to the applicant, in an attempt to make good the damage which the applicant has suffered as a result of the attitude and conduct of the State, or the State withdraws a measure it has taken in respect of the applicant or remedies its consequences. In a friendly settlement of a public nature, by contrast, the State undertakes an obligation to amend a legal norm of its domestic law, and other persons who have been victims in the same way can also benefit from the consequences.
The fact that an application ends in a friendly settlement “does not mean that the respondent State has committed a violation”; this is also expressly stated in the decisions on friendly settlements. The payment which the State agrees to make is likewise described not as the counterpart of a liability assumed by the State Party but, as it were, as a “favour” or a “gesture of goodwill”. This route is therefore a middle course in which there is no winning or losing party202. Of course, while this is a positive route for the person whose right has been violated, since the damage is made good in one way or another, for the States Parties in general it amounts to a kind of “pay and be rid of it” route. Particularly as regards applications in which the public dimension predominates, it is a means of settlement which ensures that the violations committed by States, and the attitude of States in this regard, do not come to light. By taking this route, respondent States thus escape the adverse repercussions of the “judgment finding a violation” that would be given against them203.
Once the friendly settlement has been reached, the Court’s decision on it is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the CoE (Art. 46 ECHR). Thereafter, if a problem arises concerning the implementation of the friendly settlement, resolving that problem is the responsibility of the Committee of Ministers. With the transmission of the decision to the Committee of Ministers, the Court’s competence and responsibility in the matter come to an end204.
Protocol No. 14 also sought to simplify the provision on friendly settlement and to make it
easier to use. Accordingly, it is stated that the Court will place itself at the disposal of the parties at any stage of the proceedings with a view to securing a friendly settlement. All steps relating to the friendly settlement attempt will be kept confidential. If a friendly settlement is reached, the Court will strike the case out by a decision containing a brief summary of the facts and the solution reached. In addition, the decision on the friendly settlement will be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers so that it may be carried out and monitored (Art. 15 of Additional Protocol No. 14).
As can be seen, this provision does not, compared with the previous provision on friendly settlement,
introduce any very great differences. The wording used for this procedure in the text of the Convention is simplified, and it is stated that the attempt may be made at any stage of the proceedings. This means that the friendly settlement procedure can be set in motion even while an application is still being examined for admissibility. By making the friendly settlement procedure easier, an effort is made to render it more effective, the aim thereby being to bring about a reduction in the Court’s workload. Apart from this, what has been said about the friendly settlement procedure also holds good for the system which Protocol No. 14 seeks to introduce.
4. Completion of the Investigation and the Hearing
If the friendly settlement attempt is unsuccessful, the examination of the merits of the application continues. At this stage it is decided whether or not a hearing will be held for the purposes of the proceedings on the application. If it is decided that the application will be dealt with at a hearing, the parties are informed of this and are notified that they must attend the hearing.
Before the hearing, the parties’ representatives meet with the President of the Chamber in the President’s office and together decide on the order of the hearing. Hearings generally do not last more than two hours. The parties are given thirty or forty-five minutes, depending on the nature of the application, to present their claims and submissions, and each side is in addition granted ten or fifteen minutes to reply to the other side’s submissions. Depending on the nature and importance of the case, however, this time may be extended205.
Under the arrangements introduced by Protocol No. 11, hearings are held in public. Accordingly, hearings are public unless the Court, of its own motion or at the request of one of the parties, decides otherwise (Art. 40(1) ECHR; Rule 33 of the Rules of Court). However, in the situations referred to in Rule 33(2) of the Rules of Court, namely where the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, the interests of children or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or where, in special circumstances in which publicity would prejudice the interests of justice, this is strictly necessary in the opinion of the Chamber, those attending the hearing and members of the press may be excluded from all or part of the hearing.
Where one of the parties fails to appear at the hearing without sufficient cause, the hearing may be held, and the case may thus be proceeded with, if the Court decides that continuing the hearing in the absence of the parties will not offend the sense of justice and will have no bearing on reaching a fair decision (Rule 65 of the Rules of Court).
Once an application has been registered, all records and documents deposited with the Registry of the Court in connection with it are open to inspection by the public. The only exception to this is constituted by the documents deposited and the records kept within the framework of the friendly settlement attempt. In addition, the President of the Chamber also has the power to decide that these records and documents shall not be accessible to the public (Art. 40(2) ECHR; Rule 33(4) of the Rules of Court).
After the hearing stage, the parties submit to the Court in writing their observations on the arguments put forward at the hearing and their final submissions on the case. Together with these submissions, if this has not been done up to that point, the claim for compensation in respect of the application must also be expressed and requested in specific figures; even if these claims were stated at the outset of the application, they must without fail be restated at this stage in order to obtain a decision on them from the Court, because, as stated above, the ECtHR does not award just satisfaction of its own motion in the absence of a claim by the applicant.
5. The Judgment Given on the Merits of the Application
After completing its investigation, the Court gives its judgment on the merits of the application; these judgments of the Court are always reasoned. The judgment contains the names of the President and the judges of the Chamber in which the proceedings were conducted, the names of the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar, the dates on which the judgment was adopted and delivered, the parties to the case, the names of the representatives of the State Party and, if any, of the applicant’s representatives and advisers, an account of the stages through which the case has passed, the facts of the case, a summary of the parties’ submissions, the legal reasons for the judgment, the operative provisions, the decision on costs, if any has been made, and the decision on compensation under Art. 41 of the Convention, the number of judges constituting the majority, any dissenting opinions, where appropriate a statement as to which text is to be taken as authentic, and the signatures of the President of the Chamber and the Registrar (Rules 74–77 of the Rules of Court).
In respect of an application that has passed the admissibility stage, the Court may give three kinds of decision. These are an inadmissibility decision, a decision to strike the case out, and a judgment on the merits of the case. Of these, the inadmissibility decision has been explained in the relevant sections above.
a. The Judgment on Violation of the Convention
On the merits of the case, in turn, the Court may give two kinds of judgment. These are a judgment finding that there has been no violation of a right and a judgment finding that there has been a violation of a right. If, at the close of the proceedings, the conclusion is reached that the respondent Contracting State has not violated any right or freedom of the applicant, this is stated in the judgment and the proceedings are thereby brought to an end.
The other judgment that may be given on the merits of the case is the judgment to the effect that the respondent State Party has violated a right or freedom of the applicant, in short the judgment finding that there has been a violation. The ECtHR’s jurisdiction is limited, as regards the question whether the events or acts alleged in the file it examines upon an application, and confirmed to exist, have violated the rights and freedoms set out in the ECHR and/or its additional Protocols, to “making a determination and, where there is a violation, awarding compensation in order to remedy its adverse consequences for the applicant”206. By its judgment, then, the Court will confine itself to making this determination and will establish that the Convention has been violated by the State Party.
Apart from this, the Court has no power, in respect of the conduct of the respondent State Party giving rise to the violation, to take decisions such as “annulling, amending or repealing the domestic-law provisions, such as statutes, decree-laws (KHK), statutory rules or regulations and the like, which form the basis of the acts, actions and practices; amending administrative acts; setting aside or amending judicial or administrative decisions; setting aside judicial or administrative penalties or staying their execution”207. Nor, moreover, is there any question of the Court “ordering the reopening of proceedings” in its judgments, a matter much debated in our country, in particular in those given in connection with a violation of the “right to a fair trial” laid down in Art. 6 of the Convention208.
Whether judgments of the ECtHR finding a violation are provided for as a ground for reopening proceedings is a question of domestic law. However, in two very recent judgments finding a violation of Art. 6 of the Convention209, the Court, after establishing the violation, stated, although not in the operative provisions, that “the adverse consequences to which this violation gave rise could in principle be remedied only by a retrial of the applicants, in due time and in appropriate conditions, by an independent and impartial tribunal”210. This shows that the Court, albeit implicitly, wishes its judgments, especially those concerning Art. 6, to be provided for as a ground for reopening proceedings. In addition, by its Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 of 19.01.2000, the Committee of Ministers of the CoE recommended to the member States that, where the ECtHR establishes that a domestic court decision is contrary to the Convention or its additional Protocols, the member States should accept this as a ground for reopening proceedings. Many member States have followed this recommendation and have provided in their domestic law that such ECtHR judgments finding a violation constitute a ground for reopening proceedings211.
Indeed, in our country too it has been accepted, as regards criminal procedure, that ECtHR judgments finding a violation constitute a ground for reopening proceedings. In this connection, sub-paragraph 11, added to Art. 445(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure No. 1086 (HUMK) by Art. 1 of Law No. 4793 of 23.01.2003, and sub-paragraph 6, added to Art. 327 of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 1412 (CMUK) by Art. 3 of the same Law, provide that, where the ECtHR has given a judgment finding that judgments delivered by the ordinary courts violated the ECHR, a request for the reopening of proceedings may be made within one year. Law No. 4793 thus treated ECtHR judgments as a ground for reopening proceedings in both civil procedure law and criminal procedure law. Likewise, in the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 (CMK), which entered into force on 01.06.2005 and repealed the CMUK, the same situation is regulated in sub-paragraph “f” of Art. 311(1), the article governing the cases in which proceedings are reopened212. Today, in the ordinary courts of our country, judgments of the ECtHR finding a violation are one of the grounds for reopening proceedings.
As regards administrative procedure law, sub-paragraph “ı”, added by Art. 6 of Law No. 4928 of 15.07.2003 to Art. 53(1) of the Administrative Judicial Procedure Law (İYUK), the article governing the institution of the reopening of proceedings, expressly provides that ECtHR judgments are a ground for reopening proceedings.
It has thus been expressly laid down by normative provisions that ECtHR judgments are a ground for reopening proceedings in civil procedure law, criminal procedure law and administrative procedure law.
b. The Judgment on Just Satisfaction
Where, following an application, it is held that the respondent State Party has violated the Convention and it is not possible for the applicant’s damage to be made good through domestic remedies, the Court may, if the applicant so requests, decide under Art. 41 of the Convention that appropriate just satisfaction be paid to the applicant.
This just satisfaction both constitutes pecuniary redress for the damage the applicant has sustained on account of the violation and covers the costs incurred for the application. This is, however, entirely within the Court’s competence. Depending on the nature of the application, it may sometimes order only the payment of costs without awarding compensation, sometimes the exact opposite may occur, or it may hold that there is no call for just satisfaction at all.
Certain conditions must be fulfilled for the Court to be able to award just satisfaction. These are: that one or more of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its additional Protocols has been violated; that it is not possible under the relevant domestic law for the consequences of the violation to be made good in full; and that the applicant has made a claim for just satisfaction and has substantiated it with documents. However, where it is not possible to document the damage or to calculate it, the Court awards just satisfaction by using the concept of “equity”213.
In its judgment on the merits of the application, the Court clearly states the amount of the just satisfaction it awards, the manner, place and time-limit for payment, the fact that it is exempt from attachment, the fact that it must be paid directly to the applicant, and the default interest to be applied. In some cases, however, after the violation has been established and judgment given, separate proceedings are held on the claims for just satisfaction, and the questions whether it is called for and, if so, in what amount are determined in those specific proceedings.
c. When the Judgment Becomes Final
Judgments given by a Chamber become final, by virtue of the reference made in Art. 42 of the Convention to Art. 44(2), when the circumstances specified in that paragraph occur. Accordingly, judgments given by a Chamber become final: when the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; on the expiry of a period of three months from the date of the Chamber’s judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested by the parties; and where the Grand Chamber rejects, under Art. 43 of the Convention, the request to refer the case to the Grand Chamber.
Judgments which have become final are published, pursuant to Art. 44(3) of the Convention, in the manner provided for in Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
6. Remedies against the Judgment on the Merits
With the arrangements made in the judicial protection mechanism by Protocol No. 11, the ECtHR was turned into a sui generis two-tier judicial body. This is achieved by the fact that the judgments given by its Chambers can be brought before the Grand Chamber and reviewed there. In addition, a request for revision may also be made against judgments of the Court which have become final. There are therefore two remedies against the Court’s judgments, one ordinary and the other extraordinary, as they may be described214. It should also be noted here that the Grand Chamber, which is the ordinary forum of review against Chamber judgments, acts in some cases as a court of first instance.
a. The Grand Chamber Acting as a Court of First Instance
The Grand Chamber, which was in fact structured by Protocol No. 11 as a court of second instance, also acts as a court of first instance in respect of applications sent to it under Art. 30 of the Convention.
If the Chamber to which an application has been assigned foresees that serious questions will arise in connection with the application concerning the interpretation of the articles of the Convention, or that there will be an inconsistency with earlier judgments, it may decide to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber (Rule 72(1) of the Rules of Court). The Chamber may so decide at any stage of the proceedings. This decision of the Chamber is notified to the parties by the Registrar, and the parties have the right to object to it within a period of one month (Rule 72(2) of the Rules of Court). However, as stated above, an objection by the parties to this decision has no concrete consequence; by this decision the Chamber sends the matter to the Grand Chamber.
Where one of the parties does not object to this, the case likewise comes before the Grand Chamber. In this situation the Grand Chamber acts as a court of first instance; the procedure described above also applies to cases in which the Grand Chamber acts as a court of first instance.
b. The Ordinary Remedy
Art. 43 of the Convention, for its part, governs the situation in which the Grand Chamber acts as a court of second instance, which is the real reason for its creation. Accordingly, this remedy is set in motion when one or both of the parties request that the judgment given by the Chamber be referred to the Grand Chamber. Under Art. 43(1) ECHR, a case may be brought before the Grand Chamber within three months of the date on which the Chamber gave its judgment. The request is made by a written submission which also sets out the grounds considered to call for second-instance proceedings. The request is first examined by a panel of five judges within the Grand Chamber, which decides whether or not the application needs to be referred to the Grand Chamber. Only the cases accepted by this panel can be brought before the Grand Chamber.
It is expressly provided in Art. 43 of the Convention and Rule 73(1) of the Rules of Court that the bringing of proceedings before the Grand Chamber constitutes an exception to the normal procedure. Accordingly, this procedure introduced by Protocol No. 11 is not second-instance proceedings in the full sense. A case is referred to the Grand Chamber by this five-member panel only where it is considered that there is a serious question affecting the interpretation and application of the Convention and its additional Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance which warrants examination by the Grand Chamber215. Since there is no question of a Chamber judgment being referred to the Grand Chamber without passing through a preliminary review, this is an exceptional remedy.
The re-examination of the case by the Grand Chamber is an appeal on facts and law rather than an appeal on points of law216, because the case is not merely subjected to a legal review directed solely at the application of the Convention and its additional Protocols; in addition, proceedings are also conducted with regard to the facts of the case.
The decision of the five-member panel rejecting the request for referral of the case to the Grand Chamber is final. With this decision the case is concluded and the Chamber’s judgment becomes final. The panel is not required to give reasons in this decision (Rule 73(2) of the Rules of Court); this provision is rightly criticised in legal scholarship on the ground that it impairs the right to a fair trial laid down in Art. 6 of the Convention217.
Apart from this, the points set out above concerning the proceedings before the Chambers also apply before the Grand Chamber; only such modifications are made to them as correspond to the structure of the Grand Chamber.
The judgment given by the Grand Chamber is final and brings the proceedings to an end.
c. The Extraordinary Remedy
In fact, neither the Convention nor the Rules of Court make any distinction such as that between an ordinary remedy and an extraordinary remedy. These instruments provide for the remedies of referral to the Grand Chamber and of the reopening of proceedings. However, the fact that one of them is provided for judgments that have not yet become final and the other for judgments that have become final has led to their being classified in legal scholarship as ordinary and extraordinary.
The reopening of proceedings governed by Rule 80 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy against the Court’s judgments, because this remedy is available only against final judgments given by the Court.
Under this remedy, where one of the parties learns of the existence of a fact which by its nature has a decisive influence on the outcome of the judgment and which, on the date the judgment was delivered, was unknown to the Court and could not have been known to that party either, the party has the right to apply to the Court for revision of the judgment within a period of six months from the date on which it learned of the fact.
A request for revision of a judgment is made by a written submission lodged with the Registry. The submission states the judgment whose revision is sought and the ground giving rise to the request for revision. In addition, a copy of each of the items of information and documents showing the ground that justifies the request for revision is annexed to the submission.
The Chamber or Grand Chamber which gave the judgment may refuse the request for revision on the ground that there is nothing to warrant its consideration. Where the request for revision is accepted, it is communicated by the Registry to the parties, who are invited to submit their observations in reply within the time-limit laid down by the President of the Court. If it has been decided to hold a hearing on the matter, the President of the Chamber also fixes the date of the hearing and notifies it to the parties.
The Court also gives its decision on the reopening of proceedings in the form of a judgment. Pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the procedure for the reopening of proceedings also applies to judgments given by the Grand Chamber.
d. Interpretation of the Court’s Judgments
Any party to the case may request the Chamber or Grand Chamber which gave the judgment to interpret the judgment given by the Court. This request is submitted to the Registry in writing, and the paragraph or paragraphs of the judgment whose clarification is sought are clearly indicated.
If the Court considers that there is no point requiring clarification in the judgment in respect of which clarification is requested, it may decide to refuse the request. If the request is not refused, it is communicated to the other party or parties, who are invited to submit their observations on the request within the time-limit laid down by the President of the Chamber. If it has been decided to hold a hearing on the matter, the President of the Chamber also fixes the date of the hearing and notifies it to the parties.
The Court also gives its decision on interpretation in the form of a judgment (Rule 79 of the Rules of Court). Pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the procedure for the interpretation of judgments also applies to judgments given by the Grand Chamber.
e. Rectification of Errors in Decisions and Judgments of the Court
Pursuant to Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, the Court may, of its own motion or at the request of one of the parties, rectify clerical errors, errors in calculation or errors relating to dates in a decision or judgment it has given, within one month of the date on which it was delivered. Again pursuant to Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, the provisions on the revision of judgments and on the restoration of applications to the list for examination are reserved.
7. Striking Applications out of the List
Under Art. 37 of the Convention, the Court may decide to strike applications out of its list where the grounds set out in that article are present. The Convention gives the following as grounds for striking an application out of the list:
- the applicant does not intend to pursue the application,
- the matter giving rise to the application has been resolved
- there is a reason, established by the Court, for which further examination of the application is not required.
In addition, it is stated in legal scholarship, on the basis of an interpretation of various decisions given by the Court, that an application is also struck out of the list on account of the withdrawal of the application, the impossibility of establishing contact with the applicant, the failure to reply to correspondence within the prescribed time-limit and hence the lack of will to continue the application, and the death of the applicant where there are no heirs or where the heirs have not declared any intention to continue the application218.
A decision to strike out may be given at any stage of the proceedings until the judgment is given. For the purposes of striking an application out of the list, it makes no difference whether the application has passed the admissibility stage.
As regards the procedure and grounds for striking applications out of the list, there is no difference between individual applications and inter-State applications.
The second sentence of Art. 37(1) of the Convention, the article governing striking out, states that the Court may continue the examination of the application, notwithstanding the existence of grounds for striking out, if respect for human rights as set out in the Convention and its additional Protocols so requires. Likewise, the second paragraph of the same article states that the Court may restore to its list an application which it has struck out, and resume its examination, where the circumstances justify such a course.
IV. The Enforceability of Judgments
A. The Final Nature of the Court’s Judgments
The first point to be made as regards the enforceability of the Court’s judgments is that they are final in nature. Judgments given by the Chambers of the Court become final in accordance with Art. 44(2) of the Convention. Judgments given by the Grand Chamber, for their part, are final. No recourse to any other body is possible against judgments of the Court which have become final in this way or which are final in any event.
The Court’s judgments are relative in nature and are therefore binding only on the parties to the case. It is not possible for persons, institutions or States other than these to benefit from those judgments. However, because ECtHR judgments are highly influential in the formation of the European public order, the States Parties take care to comply with the case law created by the Court and to produce legislation consistent with its judgments219.
B. The Obligation to Implement the Court’s Judgments
As far as the States Parties are concerned, the obligation to abide by the Court’s judgments is laid down in Art. 46(1) of the Convention. Under that provision, the States Parties accept to be bound by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.
C. The Implementation of the Court’s Judgments and Their Effect on Domestic Law
A judgment given by the Court does not, in and of itself, have direct effect220; that is to say, it is not executory in nature221. The Court merely gives a “declaratory judgment” to the effect that rights or freedoms laid down in the Convention or its additional Protocols have been violated and, in addition, where it considers this necessary and a claim has been made, awards an amount by way of just satisfaction. In short, the judgments given by the Court are judgments of a “declaratory/determinative/explanatory” nature222. Putting the Court’s judgments into practice, for its part, is left to the States Parties against which judgment has been given223. This is the natural consequence of the absence of an organ of compulsory enforcement in international law224.
What is to be implemented by the State Party is the operative part of the judgment given by the Court. Its interpretation and implementation are left entirely to the State Party225. Given the nature of the judgment as described above, the Court for its part cannot give a decision imposing an obligation on the State Party, such as, for example, setting aside a sentence or amending a statute. It may, however, give explanations or guidance with a view to the implementation of the judgment226. Indeed, in its judgment of 12.05.2005 in Abdullah Öcalan v. Türkiye, the Grand Chamber indicated, by way of recommendation, two courses for the implementation of the Court’s judgment, in the form of “the reopening of the file or the reopening of proceedings”.
The Court’s judgments may be executed by amending legislation, by changing the way legislation is applied, by remedying a matter on which there is a gap in legislation, by granting the applicant the right to be retried, or by paying the applicant the amount of just satisfaction determined by the Court227.
As far as actual practice is concerned, it can be seen that the States Parties do implement the Court’s judgments.
D. Supervision of the Implementation of the Court’s Judgments
The task of supervising the implementation of the Court’s judgments by the States Parties is entrusted, under Art. 46(2) of the Convention, to the Committee of Ministers of the CoE. The supervisory competence of the Committee of Ministers comes to an end when the decision establishing that the Court’s judgment has been executed is given.
The Committee of Ministers is a body of a political nature; for that reason, the power to take the final decision in a case, which the Committee of Ministers held before Protocol No. 11, was withdrawn from it by Protocol No. 11, and the Committee was assigned the role of a purely supervisory body, with no judicial function, as regards the implementation of the Court’s judgments.
The manner in which the Committee of Ministers is to exercise its supervisory power is governed by the rules which the Committee adopted on 10 January 2001, at the 736th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, for the application of Art. 46 of the Convention228.
Under these rules, a final judgment given by the Court is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers. The Committee of Ministers places this judgment on its agenda. Where the Court has found a violation, the Committee of Ministers asks the State Party what measures it will take to execute the judgment and requests that it be informed of them. In doing so, the Committee of Ministers does not make any proposal or give any guidance to the State Party as to the measures needed for the judgment to be executed.
If the Committee of Ministers considers the proposals put forward by the State Party to be appropriate, it records this in a decision which it adopts and removes the case from its agenda. Otherwise, the case remains on the agenda of the Committee of Ministers until the measures to be taken to execute the judgment are found appropriate, and is used as an instrument of political pressure on the State Party against which the violation was found, with a view to the execution of the judgment229.
By Additional Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR, the functions of the Committee of Ministers were also
intended to be changed. Accordingly, the Committee of Ministers is given the right to refer the matter to the Court where one of the States Parties to the Convention fails to comply with a judgment of the ECtHR. For this, a decision must be taken in the Committee of Ministers by a majority of 2/3 of the votes. In addition, Protocol No. 14 gives the Committee of Ministers the right, again, to apply to the Court for the interpretation of judgments delivered by the ECtHR.
However, this provision contains no rule on what kind of decision the Court will give, or what action it will take, where the Committee of Ministers applies to the Court because one of the States Parties to the Convention
has failed to execute a judgment of the ECtHR. In our view, failure to implement the Court’s judgments is in itself a human rights violation, and in such a situation a judgment finding a violation should be given against the State that has failed to execute the Court’s judgment.
CONCLUSION
As stated above, the system of judicial protection established by the ECHR is today the best-functioning and most effective system that has been established in this field. Underlying the effectiveness of this system is the desire of the member States of the CoE, which are therefore parties to the Convention, to create a common “European public order”. Proceeding from this desire and common aim, States act in their domestic law in accordance with the Court’s judgments and frame their legislation accordingly. Another important factor in the effectiveness of the Convention and of the system of judicial protection is that the European Union also applies to itself the “European public order”1 formed by the Convention and the Court’s case law and, in particular, makes compliance with it a condition for candidate countries.
As in every judicial system, the ECHR system too has certain shortcomings and defects of its own, both in terms of its normative provisions and in terms of the functioning of the judicial protection mechanism; indeed, some of these have been pointed out above under the relevant topics. One of the good features of this system, however, is that the Court, particularly in its decision-making process, has the capacity to create law “under the influence of the Anglo-American legal system” and is able to make its own Rules of Court; in this way, situations not regulated by the Convention and its additional Protocols, in particular those concerning the application of the Convention in terms of place, time and person, are being extended. Moreover, proceeding from the same axis, the Court is able to interpret and create law according to the nature of the case before it.
The ratification of the Convention, and in particular the recognition of the right of individual application followed immediately by the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction, has also been highly effective in improving the level of democracy in our country. In this context, certain democratic advances have been made, albeit with difficulty, through the judgments given by the Court and the political pressure of the Council. For that reason, the fact that the Court’s judgments are taken very seriously in our country, “as they should be”, and that efforts are made to frame legislation in line with them is appropriate in terms of practice, “if not in terms of the philosophy of the matter”. What ought really to happen is that those who govern, without pressure from anyone, should deem themselves and the people fit for these democratic rights and freedoms and make the necessary arrangements, should take the lead in this field, and should use these achievements as an instrument of pressure with regard to other States.
Viewed generally, the success of the system is readily apparent both from the large number of countries that are members of the CoE and parties to the Convention and from the fact that the Court is being crushed under its workload. Indeed, the ECHR and the case law produced by the Court are today regarded as the “basic law of Europe”. This shows that the Court will continue to exist for many years to come, increasing its powers and its effectiveness, and will maintain its protective role with regard to the attainment and, in particular, the exercise of democratic rights and freedoms.
As to our own, subjective expectations of Protocol No. 14, we should state that we take a positive view. In particular, the establishment of the single-judge formation and the assignment to that formation of the filtering function as regards admissibility, and the assignment to Committees of three judges of the function of deciding on the merits of an application, particularly in respect of applications of the same kind, are arrangements which will both speed up proceedings and bring relief by spreading the Court’s workload. Alongside these, giving the Committee of Ministers the power, where necessary, to reduce to five the number of judges sitting in the Chambers of the Court, and giving the Committee of Ministers the power to notify the Court of the situation where a country party to the Convention fails to execute a judgment given by the Court, are also arrangements which, although not to the same extent as the first two, both speed up proceedings and increase the Court’s effectiveness.
However, with Russia’s refusal to ratify Protocol No. 14, it has not been possible for these provisions to enter into force. Nor is it possible for them to become operative in the short term. Yet there was great expectation on this score at the Court and in all circles connected with the Court; indeed, the Protocol’s entry into force was regarded as a certainty, and for that reason the groundwork was being laid for further new arrangements on the assumption that the Protocol would enter into force. For the present, however, all the plans and preparations have come to nothing. This situation is, moreover, a very concrete indication of the extent to which Russia is in harmony with this system and of the extent to which it has embraced it.
We must nevertheless state that these are practical measures conceived in order to prevent the Court from being crushed under its growing workload. Securing a reduction in the number of applications lodged with the Court, on the other hand, is the real and ultimate solution in this matter. And this will come about only if the States Parties to the Convention show the utmost respect for human rights, the main rules of which are set out in the ECHR and its additional Protocols and which have been clarified in the judgments given by the Court, and prevent human rights violations from occurring within their own countries; if, where a violation does occur, they do not shield the perpetrators of the act but ensure that they are tried as quickly as possible and that justice is thereby done; and if they thus resolve these violations within their own domestic legal order and prevent them from going to the ECtHR as applications.
Annex 1
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Conseil de l’Europe – Council of Europe - Avrupa Konseyi
Strasbourg, France
APPLICATION
Submitted under Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Rules
45 and 47 of the Rules of Court
I - THE PARTIES
A. THE APPLICANT
1 Surname :
2 First name :
3 Sex :
4 Nationality :
5 Occupation :
6 Date of birth :
7 Place of residence :
8 Tel. No. :
9 Name of representatives : M. Volkan Dülger
10 Occupation of representatives: Attorney-at-Law
11 Address of representative :
Istanbul / Türkiye
12 Tel. No.: +90 (0212) Fax No.: +90 (0212)
B. THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTY
13. The State of the Republic of Türkiye
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
14.1 In this section the events or acts alleged to have caused the violation are to be set out in chronological order, without comment
14.2
III. STATEMENT OF THE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION ALLEGED BY THE APPLICANT AND OF THE GROUNDS FOR THE ALLEGATIONS
With Regard to Art. 6 ECHR, the “Right to a Fair Trial”
A. Failure to Provide the Applicant with the Assistance of a Lawyer
15.1 In this section the legal assessments concerning the rights set out in the Convention or its additional Protocols which are alleged to have been violated are to be set out.
15.2
B. Use of an Agent Provocateur to Make the Applicant Commit an Offence
15.4 In this section the legal assessments concerning the rights set out in the Convention or its additional Protocols which are alleged to have been violated are to be set out.
15.5
C. Failure to Hear the Agent Provocateur, a Prosecution Witness, at Any Stage of the Proceedings
15.8 In this section the legal assessments concerning the rights set out in the Convention or its additional Protocols which are alleged to have been violated are to be set out.
15.9
D. Lack of Reasons in the Quashing Judgment of the Court of Cassation and in the Conviction Judgment of the Ankara 6th Assize Court
15.17 In this section the legal assessments concerning the rights set out in the Convention or its additional Protocols which are alleged to have been violated are to be set out.
15.18
IV. STATEMENT RELATIVE TO ARTICLE 35(1) OF THE CONVENTION
16. Final decision (date and nature of the decision, authority which gave it – judicial or other)
Judgment no. 2003/000 of the 10th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, dated 00.00.2003, upholding the conviction. (So as not to cause any loss of rights as regards the time-limit, this application was notified to the Registry by fax dated 30.05.2004.)
17. Other decisions (the date and nature of each decision and the authority which gave it – judicial or other – must be indicated in chronological order)
a. Judgment of the Ankara 6th Assize Court dated 00.00.2002.
b. Quashing judgment of the 10th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation dated 00.00.2002.
c. Judgment of the Ankara 6th Assize Court dated 00.00.2003.
18. Is there any other remedy to which you have not had recourse? If so, what is it and why was it not used?
There is no other domestic remedy to which the applicants have not had recourse or which they have not attempted.
V. STATEMENT OF THE OBJECT OF THE APPLICATION AND OF THE CLAIMS FOR JUST SATISFACTION
19.1 Finding of a Violation
The applicant requests a finding that Art. 6 of the Convention has been violated.
19.2 Just Compensation
The applicant states that, as a result of proceedings conducted unfairly, a sentence of 1 year and 8 months’ imprisonment was imposed; that the applicant is a student who, if made to serve this unjust sentence, would have to give up school and whose entire future would be adversely affected; that for this reason the applicant is attending, at the applicant’s own expense, the University of Malta on the island of Malta, which entails a very heavy financial burden; and that, but for this unjust conviction, the applicant would have continued school in Türkiye. A decision that compensation of EUR 50,000 be paid to the applicant is therefore requested in order to cover the pecuniary damage.
The applicant further states that, because of this unjust conviction, the applicant has been branded a “drug dealer”; that the applicant is a young person at the start of life and fears that this unjust accusation will always resurface in the future, particularly in working life and in personal relationships; that at present, because of the execution pending against the applicant, it is impossible to come to Türkiye, since the applicant would be detained and sent to prison on arrival, which also creates great pressure; and that the applicant is unable even to see the applicant’s own family. The applicant states that the family is well known, in particular because the applicant’s father is a ………, and that, as this incident has very frequently been reported in the press, the reputation of the whole family, but especially of the father and of the applicant, has been seriously damaged. For these reasons the applicant requests a decision that compensation of EUR 100,000 be paid to the applicant in order to cover the non-pecuniary damage.
VI. STATEMENT CONCERNING PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES
20. Have you submitted the complaints in this application to any other international
authority? If so, give detailed information on the matter.
The applicants declare that they have not submitted their complaints to any other international authority.
VII. LIST OF DOCUMENTS
21. The documents attached are the following:
1. Document showing that the applicant was apprehended,
2. Record of the applicant’s statement,
3. Preliminary expert report,
4. Expert report of the Police Forensic Laboratory,
5. Indictment drawn up by the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office,
6. Record of hearing no. 1.
7. Record of hearing no. 2.
8. Judgment of the Ankara 6th Assize Court dated 00.00.2002.
9. Quashing judgment of the 10th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation dated 00.00.2002.
10. Judgment of the Ankara 6th Assize Court dated 00.00.2003.
11. Judgment of the 10th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation dated 00.00.2003 upholding the conviction.
12. Art. 136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
13. Art. 141 of the 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye.
14. Art. 404 of the Turkish Criminal Code.
15. Art. 403 of the Turkish Criminal Code.
VIII. DECLARATION AND SIGNATURE
22. I hereby declare that, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, the information I have given in this application form is correct.
Place : Esentepe/Istanbul/Türkiye
Date : 6 August 2007
M. Volkan DÜLGER
Attorney-at-Law
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
FORM OF AUTHORITY
I, the undersigned,
X
………………………………………………, Beyoğlu Istanbul
hereby authorise the lawyer whose name and address are given below and who is registered with the Istanbul Bar Association,
M. Volkan DÜLGER, Attorney-at-Law
Bar registration no. 25818
.. Istanbul Türkiye
to lodge an application with your Court on my behalf and to represent me before your Court.
This person will represent me before the European Court of Human Rights and in any procedural step that may be taken under the European Convention on Human Rights, in the application which I have lodged under Article 34 of the Convention
against the State of XXXXXXXXXXXXX.
6 August 2007
Full name and signature Annex 3
Turkish Translation of Additional Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR
(It was opened for signature on 13 May 2004 and will enter into force after it has been ratified by all the States Parties to the Convention.)
PREAMBLE
The member States of the Council of Europe, signatories to this Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 and hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”,
Having regard to Recommendation No. 1 and the Declaration adopted at the European Ministerial Conference on Human Rights, held in Rome on 3 and 4 November 2000;
Having regard to the Declarations adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 8 November 2001, 7 November 2002 and 15 May 2003, at its 109th, 111th and 112th sessions;
Having regard to Opinion No. 251(2004) adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 28 April 2004;
Considering that there is an urgent need to amend certain provisions of the Convention in order to maintain and improve the long-term effectiveness of the control system, mainly in the light of the increase in the workload of the European Court of Human Rights and of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe;
Considering, in particular, that there is a need to ensure that the Court continues to play its leading role in the field of the protection of human rights in Europe;
Have agreed as follows.
Article 1 – Article 22(2) of the Convention is deleted.
Article 2 – Article 23 of the Convention is amended as follows:
“Article 23 – Term of office and dismissal
1. The judges shall be elected for a period of nine years. Judges whose term of office has expired may not be re-elected.
2. The term of office of judges shall expire when they reach the age of seventy.
3. Judges whose term of office has expired shall continue in office until a new judge has taken their place. However, these judges shall continue to deal with a case which they have begun.
4. A judge may not be dismissed from office unless two thirds of the other members of the Court decide that the judge no longer fulfils the required conditions.”
Article 3 – Article 24 of the Convention is deleted.
Article 4 – Article 25 of the Convention becomes Article 24 and is amended as follows:
“Article 24 – Registry and Rapporteurs
1. The Court shall have a registry, the organisation and functions of which shall be laid down in the Rules of Court.
2. When sitting in a single-judge formation, the Court shall be assisted by rapporteurs who shall function under the authority of the President of the Court. The rapporteurs shall form part of the Court’s registry.”
Article 5 – Article 26 of the Convention becomes Article 25 (“Plenary Court”) and the following amendments are made to its text:
1. At the end of sub-paragraph d), the comma is replaced by a semicolon and the word “and” is deleted.
2. At the end of sub-paragraph e), the full stop is replaced by a semicolon.
3. A new sub-paragraph f) is added as follows:
“f. may make a request under Article 26(2).”
Article 6 – Article 27 of the Convention becomes Article 26 and its text is amended as follows:
“Article 26 – Single-judge formation, Committees, Chambers and Grand Chamber
1. To consider the cases brought before it, the Court shall sit in a single-judge formation, in committees of three judges, in Chambers of seven judges and in a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges. Committees shall be set up by the Chambers for a fixed period of time.
2. At the request of the plenary Court, the Committee of Ministers may, by a unanimous decision and for a fixed period, reduce to five the number of judges of the Chambers.
3. When sitting in a single-judge formation, a judge may not examine an application lodged against the Contracting Party in respect of which that judge has been elected.
4. The judge elected in respect of the State concerned by the case shall sit as an ex officio member of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber. If there is no such judge or if that judge is unable to sit, a person chosen by the President of the Court from a list submitted in advance by that Party shall sit in the capacity of judge.
5. The Grand Chamber shall include the President of the Court, the Vice-Presidents, the Presidents of the Chambers and other judges chosen in accordance with the Rules of Court. When a case is referred to the Grand Chamber under Article 43, no judge from the Chamber which gave the judgment shall sit in the Grand Chamber, with the exception of the President of that Chamber and the judge who sat in respect of the Contracting Party concerned.”
Article 7 – After the new Article 26, a new Article 27 is inserted into the Convention, the text of which reads as follows:
“Article 27 – Competence of single judges
1. A single judge may declare inadmissible, or strike out, an application submitted under Article 34 where it does not require further examination.
2. This decision shall be final.
3. If the single judge does not declare an application inadmissible or strike it out, that judge shall forward the application to a committee or to a Chamber for further examination.”
Article 8 – Article 28 of the Convention is amended as follows:
“Article 28 – Competence of committees
1. In respect of an application submitted under Article 34 of the Convention, a committee may, by a unanimous vote:
a. declare it inadmissible or strike it out, where such a decision can be taken without further examination; or
b. declare it admissible and at the same time give a judgment on the merits, if the underlying question in the case, concerning the interpretation or the application of the Convention, has already been the subject of well-established case law of the Court.
2. Decisions and judgments given under paragraph 1 shall be final.
3. If the judge elected in respect of the Contracting Party concerned is not a member of the committee, the committee may at any stage of the proceedings invite that judge to take the place of one of the members of the committee, having regard to all relevant factors, such as whether that Party has objected to the application of the procedure under paragraph 1.b).”
Article 9 – Article 29 of the Convention is amended as follows:
1. Paragraph 1 is amended to read as follows: “If, in respect of an application submitted under Article 34 of the Convention, no decision on admissibility has been given under Articles 27 and 28 and no judgment has been given under Article 28, a Chamber shall decide on the admissibility and merits. The decision on admissibility may be given separately.”
2. The following new sentence is added at the end of paragraph 2: “The decision on admissibility shall be given separately unless the Court, in exceptional cases, decides otherwise.”
3. Paragraph 3 is deleted.
Article 10 – Article 31 of the Convention is amended as follows:
1. The word “and” at the end of sub-paragraph a) is deleted.
2. Sub-paragraph b) becomes sub-paragraph c) and a new sub-paragraph b) is added as follows:
“decide on matters brought before the Court by the Committee of Ministers under Article 46(4) of the Convention; and”
Article 11 – Article 32 of the Convention is amended as follows:
In paragraph 1, a comma and the number 46 are inserted after the number 34.
Article 12 – Article 35(3) of the Convention is amended as follows:
“3. The Court shall declare inadmissible an individual application submitted under Article 34 in the following cases:
a. where the application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of individual application; or
b. where the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, save where the principle of respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols requires further examination of the merits of the application, and save where a case which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal would be rejected.”
Article 13 – A new paragraph 3 is added to Article 36 of the Convention, as follows:
“3. In all cases before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights may submit written comments and take part in hearings.”
Article 14 – Article 38 of the Convention is amended as follows:
“Article 38 – Examination of the case on the merits
The Court shall examine the case together with the representatives of the parties and, if need be, undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the Contracting Party concerned shall furnish all necessary facilities.”
Article 15 – Article 39 of the Convention is amended as follows:
“Article 39 – Friendly settlement
1. At any stage of the proceedings, the Court shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of the principle of respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols.
2. Proceedings conducted under paragraph 1 above shall be confidential.
3. If a friendly settlement is reached, the Court shall strike the case out by means of a decision containing a brief summary of the facts and the solution reached.
4. This decision shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise the execution of the terms of the friendly settlement.
Article 16 – Article 46 of the Convention is amended as follows:
“Article 46 – Binding force and execution of judgments
1. The Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the judgments of the Court in the cases to which they are parties.
2. The judgments of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers; the Committee shall supervise the execution of these judgments.
3. If the Committee of Ministers considers that the process of supervising the execution of a final judgment is hindered by a problem of interpretation of the judgment, it may refer the matter to the Court for a ruling on the question of interpretation. The decision to refer shall be taken by a majority vote of two thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee.
4. If the Committee of Ministers considers that a Contracting Party is not abiding by a final judgment given in a case to which it is a party, it may, after giving formal notice to that Contracting Party and by a decision adopted by a majority vote of two thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee, bring before the Court the question whether that Party has fulfilled its obligation under paragraph 1.
5. If the Court finds that paragraph 1 has been violated, it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers for it to decide on the measures to be taken. If the Court finds that paragraph 1 has not been violated, it shall likewise refer the case to the Committee of Ministers, and the Committee shall close its examination of the case.
Article 17 - Article 59 of the Convention is amended as follows:
1. A new paragraph 2 is added as follows:
“2. The European Union may accede to the Convention.”
2. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article become paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 respectively.
Final and transitional provisions
Article 18
1. This Protocol shall, by means of
a. signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval; or
b. signature subject to ratification, acceptance or approval,
be open for signature by the member States of the Council of Europe which have signed the Convention and which thereby express their consent to be bound.
2. The instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretariat General of the Council of Europe.
Article 19
This Protocol shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date on which all the Parties to the Convention have expressed their consent to be bound by the Protocol, in accordance with the provisions of Article 18.
Article 20
1. From the date of its entry into force, the provisions of this Protocol shall apply to all applications pending before the Court as well as to all judgments whose execution is under supervision by the Committee of Ministers.
2. The new admissibility criterion inserted by Article 12 of this Protocol in Article 35(3)(b) of the Convention shall not apply to applications declared admissible before the entry into force of this Protocol. In the two years following the entry into force of this Protocol, the new admissibility criterion shall be applied only by the Chambers and the Grand Chamber of the Court.
Article 21
The term of office of judges serving their first term of office on the date of entry into force of this Protocol shall be extended ipso jure so as to amount to a total of nine years. The other judges shall complete their term of office after it has been extended ipso jure by two years.
Article 22
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify the member States of the Council of Europe of the following matters concerning this Protocol:
a. any signature,
b. the deposit of any instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval,
c. the date of entry into force of this Protocol in accordance with Article 19,
d. any other notification or communication relating to this Protocol.
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Footnotes
- This article is the first chapter, written by me and reduced to the size of an article, of the book on the European Convention on Human Rights and its application which we had planned to write together with my dear elder brother, Attorney Dr. M. Şükrü Alpaslan. Unfortunately, just as my elder brother was about to begin writing the chapters that fell to him, we learned that he had been struck by that accursed illness. Had we been able to do it, I am certain that, since he was one of the people who knew this subject, together with its practice, best in the whole of Europe, a very valuable work would have emerged and the immense store of knowledge he possessed would have been opened up to be shared by all. But, as he always used to say to me, “life is what happens to you while you are making plans”. May he rest in light. ↑
- Attorney-at-Law; doctoral student at the Department of Public Law, Institute of Social Sciences, Istanbul University. ↑
- Jack Donnely, Teori ve Uygulamada Evrensel İnsan Hakları, Çev: Musatafa Erdoğan/Levent Korkut, Ankara, Yetkin Yayınları, 1995, s.19. ↑
- Christian Bay, “Self-Respect as a Human Right: Thoughts on the Dialectics of Wants and Needs in the Struggle for Human Community”, HRQ, Y.1982, S.4, s.67. ↑
- Some authors, on the other hand, state that human rights are essentially outside the law; that their fundamental aim is to challenge or to change existing institutions, practices or norms – and legal institutions in particular; that this does not amount to saying that human rights are not, or ought not to be, legitimate in terms of national, regional or international law; that, on the contrary, the ultimate aim of the struggle for human rights is to confer legal validity on these rights; but that, once human rights have been made legally enforceable, those whose rights are violated, although they normally continue to possess them, assert not their human rights but their legal rights. Donnely, a.g.e., s.25. ↑
- Georges Politzer, Felsefenin Temel İlkeleri, Çev: Enver Aytekin, 6. Bası, İstanbul, Sosyal Yayınlar, 1993, s. 257,258; Server Tanilli, Uygarlık Tarihi, 5. Bası, İstanbul, Say Kitapçılık, 1981, s.99; Murat Volkan Dülger, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Işığında Düşünce Özgürlüğü”, Prof. Dr. Çetin Özek’e Armağan, İstanbul, İÜHF Eğitim, Öğretim ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Yayını, 2004, s.283. ↑
- A. Şeref Gözübüyük, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Bireysel Başvuru Hakkı”, İHY, C.9, TODAİE Yayını, 1987, s.3. ↑
- For the original English text of the CoE Statute see: (Çevrimiçi) http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm; for the Turkish text of the Statute of the Council of Europe see: Aslan Gündüz, Milletlerarası Hukuk: Temel Belgeler – Örnek Kararlar, 3. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1998, s.646-655. ↑
- Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005, s.1. ↑
- For the full list of the member States of the CoE and their dates of accession see: (Çevrimiçi) http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ ChercheSig.asp?NT=001&CM =8&DF=10/17/2006&CL=ENG, 01.04.2005. ↑
- R.G., T.17.12.1949, S.7382. ↑
- Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz, Ulusalüstü İnsan Hakları Hukukunun Genel Teorisine Giriş, 4. Baskı, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2003, s.420. ↑
- For details on becoming a party to international conventions and on the termination of the status of party see: Hüseyin Pazarcı, Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri I. Kitap, 6. Bası, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 1997, s.113-156, 194-197; Edip F. Çelik, Milletlerarası Hukuk, C.1, İstanbul, İÜHF Yayını, 1975, s.133-176, 264-278. ↑
- Gemalmaz, Ulusalüstü İnsan Hakları Hukukunun Genel Teorisine Giriş, s.421. ↑
- Donna Gomien, Short Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd Edition, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 2000, s.5. ↑
- A. Feyyaz Gölcüklü/A. Şeref Gözübüyük, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Uygulaması, 6. Bası, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 2004, s.8. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.1; Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.8. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.2. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.8,9. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.9. ↑
- Clare Ovey/Robin C.A. White, Jacobs&White European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd Edition, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, s.12; Leach, a.g.e., s.4. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.4. ↑
- Ömer Madra, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Bireysel Başvuru Hakkı, Ankara, S.B.F. Basın ve Yayın Yüksek Okulu Basımevi, 1981, s.14,15. ↑
- Gemalmaz, Ulusalüstü İnsan Hakları Hukukunun Genel Teorisine Giriş, s.422. ↑
- “The Central American Court of Justice was established by a convention concluded in 1907 between 5 Central American republics (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador), and it was accepted that natural persons could apply to this court in cases involving the violation of a treaty or of a rule of international law. The lodging of such an application was, however, made conditional on all domestic remedies having been exhausted beforehand. This court remained in operation from 1907 until 1918, but only five applications were made, four of which were rejected because the condition of exhaustion of domestic remedies had not been fulfilled, while one was decided against the applicant.” Çelik, a.g.e., s.460. ↑
- Gözübüyük, a.g.y., s.4. ↑
- Gözübüyük, a.g.y., s.5. ↑
- Rona Aybay, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Türk Pozitif Hukuku”, İnsan Hakları Armağanı XXX. Yıl, Birleşmiş Milletler Türk Derneği Yayını, 1978, s.119. ↑
- Hakan Karakuş, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Kararları ve Karşıoylarında Türkiye, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 2001, s.2-5. ↑
- Süheyl Batum, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Türk Anayasal Sistemine Etkileri, İstanbul, İÜHF Yayını, 1993, s.55-58. ↑
- “In conclusion, in the Turkish legal order treaties and statutes are accepted as being of equal rank and, in principle, neither prevails over the other. The sole exception to this is constituted by existing or future treaties on the matters regulated in Arts. 15, 16, 42 and 92 of our Constitution. For treaties on these matters acquire, within the conditions and limitations laid down in the Constitution, the value of a constitutional provision.” Pazarcı, a.g.e., s.34. “To put it briefly, in the event of a conflict between the Convention and the Constitution or any statute, the Convention is applied. By stating that the unconstitutionality of treaties cannot be alleged, the Constitution has adopted the principle of the supremacy of treaties in terms of domestic law.” Gözübüyük, a.g.y., s.7. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.6. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.11. ↑
- For the Turkish translation of this document and for details on this subject see: Avrupa Sosyal Şartı: Temel Rehber, Çev: Bülent Çiçekli, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2001. ↑
- For details on the legally binding force of the reservations made to these international treaties see: Mahmut Göçer, Uluslararası Hukuk ve İnsan Haklarının Uluslararası Korunması, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2002, s.34 vd. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.11. ↑
- For the original of the Convention see: (Çevrimiçi) http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm; for the Turkish translation of the Convention see: Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz, İnsan Hakları Belgeleri Cilt I: Avrupa Konseyi Birinci Bölüm Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi, Protokolleri ve İlgili Diğer Belgeler, İstanbul, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2003, s.3 vd. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.8. ↑
- Ovey/White, a.g.e., s.440. ↑
- For details on this subject see: Gülay Arslan, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Koruma Mekanizmasının Etkililiği Meselesi, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi (İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Entitüsü Kamu Hukuku Anabilim Dalı), İstanbul, 2002, s.28 vd. ↑
- J. G. Merrills/A. H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the European Convention on Human Rights, Fourth Edition, Manchester, Juris Publishing/Manchester University Press, 2001, s.271. ↑
- Gemalmaz, Ulusalüstü İnsan Hakları Hukukunun Genel Teorisine Giriş, s.428. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.24. ↑
- Kemal Fikret Arık, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Üzerine Bir İnceleme, Ankara, SBF Yayını, 1965, s.37. ↑
- Arık, a.g.e., s.38. ↑
- Merrills/Robertson, a.g.e., s.271,272. ↑
- Merrills/Robertson, a.g.e., s.271. ↑
- Arık, a.g.e., s.38. ↑
- Additional Protocol No. 5 to the ECHR, (Çevrimiçi) http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm. ↑
- Merrills/Robertson, a.g.e., s.272. ↑
- Arık, a.g.e., s.66. ↑
- Arık, a.g.e., s.72-75. ↑
- Leach, ag.e., s.8,9. ↑
- Rona Aybay, “Rusya’dan AİHM’ye Darbe”, Güncel Hukuk, S.2, Şubat 2007, s.32,33. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.9,10. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.10. ↑
- Amendment made to Arts. 26 and 27 of the Convention by Arts. 6 and 7 of Protocol No. 14. ↑
- Amendment made to Art. 28 of the Convention by Art. 8 of Protocol No. 14. ↑
- Amendment made to Art. 46 of the Convention by Art. 16 of Protocol No. 14. ↑
- Amendment made to Art. 27 of the Convention by Art. 6 of Protocol No. 14. ↑
- Amendment made to Art. 23 of the Convention by Art. 2 of Protocol No. 14. ↑
- Amendment made to Art. 36 of the Convention by Art. 13 of Protocol No. 14. ↑
- Amendment made to Art. 59 of the Convention by Art. 17 of Protocol No. 14. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.7. ↑
- Gemalmaz, Ulusalüstü İnsan Hakları Hukukunun Genel Teorisine Giriş, s.435. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.7. ↑
- Ömer Anayurt, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Hukukunda Kişisel Başvuru Yolu, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004, s.253. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.253. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.254. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.26. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.27; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.257. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.258. ↑
- Vahit Bıçak, “Yeni Yapısıyla Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi”, Liberal Düşünce Dergisi, S.16, 2000, s.10-21. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.259. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.14. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.260. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.14. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.261. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.28; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.262. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.263. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.29. ↑
- Gözübüyük, a.g.y., s.12; Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.31. ↑
- P. Van Dijk/G.J.H. Van Hoff, Theory and Practice of The European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd. Edition, Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 1998, s.40. ↑
- Van Dijk/Van Hoff, a.g.e., s.40,41; Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.31. ↑
- D.J. Harris/M. O’Boyle/C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, Londan-Dublin-Edinburg, Butterworths, 1995, s.585. ↑
- Gözübüyük, a.g.y., s.12. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.82. ↑
- J. L. Charrier, Code de la convention européenne des droits de l’homme, Paris, Litec, 2000, s.244. ↑
- Haris/Boyle/Warbrick, a.g.e., s.585; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.83. AİHM, İrlanda v. İngiltere, 18.01.1978, A.25, pr.239; Soering v. İngiltere, 07.07.1989, A.87, pr.87. ↑
- Danimarka v. Türkiye, paragraphs 2 and 20 of the friendly settlement judgment of 05.04.2000. Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.32. ↑
- Van Dijk/Van Hoff, a.g.e., s.41,42; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.83. ↑
- For a detailed explanation of this subject see: Bakır Çağlar, “İnsan Hakları Avrupa Sözleşmesi Hukuku’ndaki Türkiye Üzerine Kısa Notlar”, Türkiye Günlüğü, Ocak – Şubat 1997, S.44, s.22. ↑
- Madra, a.g.e., s.57; Gözübüyük, a.g.y., s.6. ↑
- Durmuş Tezcan/Mustafa Ruhan Erdem/Oğuz Sancaktar, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Işığında Türkiye’nin İnsan Hakları Sorunu, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004, s.55; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.85. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.85. ↑
- 1956 - Yunanistan v. İngiltere, the situation in Cyprus, Ap. No. 176/56 1956 - Yunanistan v. İngiltere, the situation in Cyprus, Ap. No. 299/57 1960 - Avusturya v. İtalya, the proceedings in the case of the North Tyrol youths, Ap. No. 788/60 1967 - Danimarka v. Yunanistan, the Greek military regime, Ap. No. 3321/67 1967 - Norveç v. Yunanistan, the Greek military regime, Ap. No. 3322/67 1967 - Hollanda v. Yunanistan, the Greek military regime, Ap. No. 3323/67 1967 - İsveç v. Yunanistan, the Greek military regime, Ap. No. 3344/67 1970 – Danimarka/Norveç/Hollanda/isveç v. Yunanistan, the Greek military regime, Ap. No. 4448/70 1971 - İrlanda v. İngiltere, the situation in Ulster, Ap. No. 5310/71 1972 - İrlanda v. İngiltere, the situation in Ulster, Ap. No. 5451/72 1974 – G. Kıbrıs v. Türkiye, the Greek Cypriots on the island, Ap. No. 6780/74 1975 – G. Kıbrıs v. Türkiye, the events on the island, Ap. No. 6950/75 1977 – G. Kıbrıs v. Türkiye, the events on the island, Ap. No. 8007/77 1982 – Danimarka v. Türkiye, the military regime in Türkiye, Ap. No. 9940/82 1982 – Fransa v. Türkiye, the military regime in Türkiye, Ap. No. 9941/82 1982 – İsveç v. Türkiye, the military regime in Türkiye, Ap. No. 9943/82 1982 – Norveç v. Türkiye, the military regime in Türkiye, Ap. No. 9944/82 1994 – G. Kıbrıs v. Türkiye, Ap. No. 25781/94 1997 – Danimarka v. Türkiye, Ap. No. 34382/97 See: Naz Çavuşoğlu, “Avrupa Konseyi: İnsan Hakları Avrupa Sözleşmesinin Denetim Sistemi”, İnsan Hakları, Der: Oktay Uygun, İstanbul, YKY, 1998, s.461,462; Charrier; a.g.e., s.245; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.86 dn.274. ↑
- Gomien, a.g.e., s.142. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.34. ↑
- Gomien, a.g.e., s.142. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.35. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.36. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.158. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.158. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.38. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.39. ↑
- Mah. K., Norris v. İrlanda, 26.10.1988, A 142, p.31. ↑
- Gemalmaz, Ulusalüstü İnsan Hakları Hukukunun Genel Teorisine Giriş, s.454. ↑
- On the concept of territory in international law and the question of the place where sovereign authority is to be exercised see: Sevin Toluner, Milletlerarası Hukuk Dersleri: Devletin Yetkisi, 5. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1996, s.31 vd. ↑
- 1974 – G. Kıbrıs v. Türkiye, the Greek Cypriots on the island, Ap. No. 6780/74 1975 – G. Kıbrıs v. Türkiye, the events on the island, Ap. No. 6950/75 ↑
- Madra, a.g.e., s.104; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.159. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.53. ↑
- Kom. K., X v. Belçika, 30.05.1961, Ap. No.1065/61; Ann. 4, s.261,265,269. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.53,54. ↑
- This expression is the diplomatic and legal equivalent of the concept of the “modern colony”. ↑
- For a detailed critique of these decisions see: Kemal Gözler, “Bireysel Başvuru ve Kıbrıs Sorunu”, İHY, C.15, TODAİE Yayını, 1993, s.165-174. ↑
- Kom. K., De Becker v. Belçika, 09.06.1958, Ap. No. 214/56, Ann. 2, s.215,235. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.55. ↑
- Kom. K., X v. İngiltere, 10.02.1976, Ap. No. 7379/76, DR. 8, s.211,214. ↑
- Kom. K., De Lynas v. İsviçre, 06.10.1976, Ap. No. 7317/76, DR. 6, s.141,152,154. ↑
- Kom. K., X v. İsviçre, 12.07.1976, Ap. No. 7041/73, DR. 6, s.124,125. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.55. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.260. ↑
- Rıza Türmen, “İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Sisteminde İç Hukuk Yollarının Tüketilmesi”, Prof. Dr. Sahir Erman’a Armağan, İstanbul, İÜHF Eğitim, Öğretim ve Yardımlaşma Vakfı Yayını, 1999, s.775,776; Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.63. ↑
- Kom. K., Nielsen v. Danimarka, 02.09.1959, Ap. No. 343/57, Ann. 2, s.413,439; Mah. K., Van Oosterwijk v. Belçika, 06.11.1980, A.40, p.34. ↑
- Türmen, a.g.y., s.779; Van Dijk/Van Hoof, a.g.e., s.135. ↑
- Van Dijk/Van Hoof, a.g.e., s.144; Madra, a.g.e., s.176. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.64. ↑
- Kom. K., X v. Belçika, 29.03.1960, Ap. No. 358/59, Ann. 3, s.223-235. ↑
- Türmen, a.g.y., s.783. ↑
- Pursuant to Art. 2 of Additional Protocol No. 7, which entered into force on 01.11.1988, the States Parties to that Protocol have been placed under an obligation to establish a two-tier system of adjudication in criminal procedure. This additional Protocol has been signed by Türkiye but has not yet been ratified by completing the necessary formalities. Some authors in legal scholarship state that the ECtHR has used the fact that the “appeal on facts and law” is not provided for in our country’s legal system under the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 1412 (CMUK) as a negative value judgment in its judgments finding a violation of rights, and they cite the judgment in Incal v. Türkiye as an example of this, see: Nurullah Kunter/Feridun Yenisey, Muhakeme Hukuku Dalı Olarak Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku, İkinci Kitap, 12. Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2003, s.1070 dn.2b. It must be pointed out at once, however, that in the judgment in question (Mah. K., Incal v. Türkiye, 09.06.1998) no such statement was made by the Court. In the final part of paragraph 72 of the judgment the Court states that the applicant could be adversely affected by the presence of a military judge on the court of first instance, and that the Court of Cassation could not dispel the applicant’s concerns because it carries out only a review of legality and cannot adjudicate on the factual part of the dispute, that is, because its jurisdiction is limited. Here, however, what the Court identifies as a negative value judgment is not the absence of an appeal on facts and law in the legal order but the presence of a military judge on the court of first instance which examines the facts (the former State Security Court, DGM). The final part of the said paragraph 72 of the Court’s judgment reads verbatim as follows: “It follows that the applicant could legitimately fear that, because one of its members was a military judge, the İzmir State Security Court might be unduly influenced by considerations which had nothing to do with the nature of the case. The Court of Cassation was not able to dispel these concerns, as it did not have full jurisdiction in this matter”; for the Turkish translation of the judgment see: Osman Doğru, İnsan Hakları Kararlar Derlemesi, C.2, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayını, 1998, s.395-418. ↑
- Türmen, a.g.y., s.780. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.66,67; Türmen, a.g.y., s.780. ↑
- Van Dijk/Van Hoof, a.g.e., s.142; Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.68,69; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.206,207. ↑
- Van Dijk/Van Hoof, a.g.e., s.142; Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.68; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.206. ↑
- Türmen, a.g.e., s.783; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.207. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.68; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.208. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.70-73. ↑
- Kom. K., X v. Fransa, 13.12.1982, Ap. No. 9587/81, D.R. 29, s.228. ↑
- Mah. K., De Becker v. Belçika, 27.03.1962, Ann. 2, s.215. ↑
- A. Şeref Gözübüyük, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Komisyonuna Başvuru Süresi”, İHY, C.12, TODAİE Yayını, 1990, s.3; Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.87; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.221. ↑
- Mah. K., De Wilde, Ooms ve Versyp v. Belçika, 18.06.1971, p.50. ↑
- Madra, a.g.e., s.191; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.221. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.221. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.87; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.221. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.221. ↑
- Mah. K., Walker v. İngiltere, 25.01.2000, Ap. No. 24979/97. cited in: K. Yıldız/P. Leach, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’ne Dava Götürme Klavuzu, Çev: H. Zafer Korkmaz, KHPR, İstanbul, Belge Yayınları, 2003, s.55. ↑
- Kom. K., De Becker v. Belçika, 09.06.1958, Ap. No. 214/56, Ann. 2, s.215,247. ↑
- Kom. K., Bozano v. Fransa, 15.05.1984, Ap. No. 9990/82, D.R. 39, s.119,130. ↑
- Kom. K., Eckle v. Almanya, 10.05.1979, Ap. No. 8130/78, D.R. 16, s.120,127. Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.89,90. ↑
- Kom. K., Luberti v. İtalya, 07.07.1981, Ap. No. 9019/80, D.R. 27, s.181,186. Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.90. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük state that they derived this, by way of an argument a contrario, from the Commission’s decision in X v. Austria; Kom. K., X v. Avusturya, 10.07.1975, Ap. No. 6317/73, D.R. 2, s.87. Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.91. ↑
- Alan Simmons, İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi’ne Başvuru: Avukatlar İçin Uygulamaya Yönelik Bir Klavuz, Çev: Defne Orhun, İstanbul, Legal Yayıncılık, 2005, s.31; Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.91; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.230,231. ↑
- Şeref Ünal, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi, Ankara, TBMM Basımevi, 1995, s.180; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.233. ↑
- Van Dijk/Van Hoof, a.g.e., s.109; Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.94; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.232. ↑
- Kom. K., Confederation des Syndicats medicaus français v. Fransa, 12.05.1986, Ap. No. 10983/84, D.R. 47, s.225. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.233. ↑
- Van Dijk/Van Hoof, a.g.e., s.109; Yıldız/Leach, a.g.e., s.60; Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.94; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.233. ↑
- Van Dijk/Van Hoof, a.g.e., s.109; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.234. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.234. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.96; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.244. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.97. ↑
- P. Van Dijk, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Türkiye’nin Bireysel Şikayet Hakkını Kabul Etmesi, Çev: Ömer Madra, Ankara, Gri Ltd. Şti., 1989, s.45; N. Demirel, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Çerçevesinde Yapılan Bireysel Başvurular İçin Gerekli Şartlar”, KHuka, 1999/1, s.27; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.242. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.97. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.98; Madra, a.g.e., s.209. ↑
- Kom. K., Lawless v. İrlanda, 30.08.1958, Ap. No. 332/57, Ann. 2, s.309-339; Kom. K., Foti, Lentini, Cenerini v. İtalya, 11.05.1978, Ap. No. 7604/76-7719/76-7781/77, D.R. 14, s.133. ↑
- Şeref Ünal, Temel Hak ve Özgürlükler ve İnsan Hakları Hukuku, Ankara, Yetkin Yayınları, 1997, s.181; Süheyl Batum, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi ve Türkiye, İstanbul, Kavram Yayınları, 1996, s.42; Van Dijk/Van Hoof, a.g.e., s.110; Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.99; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.241. Kom. K., McQuiston v. İngiltere, 04.03.1986, Ap. No. 11208/84, D.R.. 2, s.182-186. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.9,10. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.10. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.101. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.103. ↑
- M. Sezgin Tanrıkulu, İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi’ne Bireysel Başvuru İçin El Kitabı, 3. Bası, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004, s.54,55. ↑
- Leach, a.g.e., s.57. ↑
- Some authors in legal scholarship give this period as 12 weeks; however, no such period is specified either in the Convention or in the Rules of Court, the Rules of Court merely speaking of “an appropriate period”. On this point see: Tanrıkulu, a.g.e., s.55. ↑
- Tanrıkulu, a.g.e., s.47. ↑
- Both specimens are given entirely as Turkish texts in order to facilitate practice. The specimen application and form of authority have been appended to the article in the form resulting from a real application which was found admissible by the Court, after the necessary information had been removed in order to keep the applicant’s identity confidential. ↑
- To the same effect see: Anayurt, a.g.e., s.248. ↑
- Karen Reid, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’ne Bireysel Başvuru Hakkı:Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Rehberi, Birinci Kitap, Çev: Bahar Öcal Düzgören, İstanbul, Avesta Yayınları/KHRP, 2000, s.16; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.249. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.249. ↑
- Reid, a.g.e., s.16; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.250. ↑
- Reid, a.g.e., s.16; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.249. ↑
- Tanrıkulu, a.g.e., s.48-50. ↑
- For examples of interim measures ordered by the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the European Court of First Instance see: Hüseyin Özcan, “Avrupa Toplulukları Mahkemesi ve Birinci Derece Avrupa Mahkemesi’nde Yürütmenin Durdurulması”, Ed: Zehreddin Aslan, İstanbul, Alfa Yayıncılık, 2004, s.61-93; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.287-289. ↑
- A. C. Nørgaard/H. C. Kruger, “Interim and Conservatory Mesures Under The European System of Protection of Human Rights”, Progres in the Spirit of Human Rights, Strasbourg, Arlington, 1988, s.109-117; H. R. Garry, “When Procedure Involves Matters of Life and Death: Interim Measures and the European Convetion on Human Rights”, European Puplic Law, Vol.7, Issue 3, 2001, s.410; Yıldız/Leach, a.g.e., s.26; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.294,295; Tanrıkulu, a.g.e., s.51. ↑
- Tanrıkulu, a.g.e., s.51. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.296. ↑
- H. Burak Gemalmaz, “Ulusalüstü İnsan Hakları Hukukunda Geçici Tedbir Kurumu”, Türkiye’de ve Ulusalüstü Hukukta Bireylerin Geçici Yargısal Korunması”, Ed: Zehreddin Aslan, İstanbul, Alfa Yayıncılık, 2004, s.107. ↑
- Kom. K., Cruz Varas vd. v. İsveç, 20.03.1991, A 201, pr.34. ↑
- Mah. K., Mamatkulov ve Abdurasulovic v. Türkiye, 06.02.2003, pr. 110-111. ↑
- Mah. K., Abdullah Öcalan v. Türkiye, 12.03.2003, pr. 241. ↑
- For details on this subject see: H. Burak Gemalmaz, a.g.y., s.124-134. ↑
- Van Dijk/Van Hoof, a.g.e., s.104; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.301. ↑
- Tanrıkulu, a.g.e., s.59. ↑
- Tanrıkulu, a.g.e., s.59. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.105; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.268. ↑
- Amendment made to Art. 28 of the Convention by Art. 8 of Protocol No. 14. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.109; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.269. ↑
- Feyyaz Gölcüklü, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesinde Barışcı Yoldan Çözüm”, AÜSBFD, C.XLI, Y.1986, S.1-4, s.105. ↑
- For details on this subject see: Edip F. Çelik, Milletlerarası Hukuk, C.II, 2. Bası, İstanbul, Filiz Kitabevi, 1987, s.322 vd.; Seha L. Meray, Devletler Hukukuna Giriş, Ankara, AÜSBF Yayını, 1975, s.225 vd.; Melda Sur, Uluslararası Hukukun Esasları, İzmir, DEÜ Yayını, 2000, s.257. ↑
- Van Dijk/Van Hoof, a.g.e., s.179; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.270. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.270. ↑
- Mark W. Janis/Richard S. Kay/Anthony W. Bradley, European Human Rights Law, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, s.45. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.273. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.110. ↑
- Janis/Kay/Bradley, a.g.e., s.46; Ünal, Temel Hak ve Özgürlükler ve İnsan Hakları Hukuku, s.185; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.276. ↑
- Seza Reisoğlu, Uluslararası Boyutlarıyla İnsan Hakları, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2001, s.183. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.113. ↑
- For example, in the case of Abdullah Öcalan v. Türkiye, heard before the First Section, the representatives of the parties were each allowed one hour to present their claims and their defence, and the parties were in addition each given a further fifteen minutes to answer the questions put by the judges and by the other party. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.279. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.279. ↑
- M. Şükrü Alpaslan, “AİHM’nin Olası Büyük Kurul Kararına İlişkin Görüşler ve Düşünceler: Öcalan v. Türkiye Davası”, Güncel Hukuk Dergisi, S.17, Mayıs 2005, s.36,37. ↑
- Mah. K., Gençel v. Türkiye, Ap. No. 53431/99, 23.10.2003, p.27; Mah. K., Ükünç ve Güneş v. Türkiye, Ap. No. 42775/98, 18.09.2003, p.32 ↑
- “Where the Court finds that an applicant was convicted by a tribunal which was not independent and impartial within the meaning of Article 6&1, it considers that, in principle, the most appropriate form of relief would be to ensure that the applicant is granted in due course a retrial by an independent and impartial tribunal.” ↑
- For information on the regulations of the member States of the CoE on this matter see: İbrahim Şahbaz, “AİHS’ne Taraf Ülkelerde Yargılamanın Yenilenmesi”, TBB İnsan Hakları Avrupa Sözleşmesi ve Adil Yargı Sempozyumu, Ankara, TBB Yayını, 2004, s.589-598. ↑
- For a critique of these provisions from the standpoint of the law of criminal procedure see: Erdener Yurtcan, Ceza Yargılaması Hukuku, 11. Baskı, İstanbul, Vedat Kitapçılık, 2005, s.566-569. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.119. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.283. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.284. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.121. ↑
- Anayurt, a.g.e., s.284. ↑
- Tanrıkulu, a.g.e., s.114. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.123. ↑
- Jörg Polakiewicz, “The Execution of Judgements of the European Court of Human Rights”, Fundamental Rights in Europe: The ECHR and its Member States 1950-2000, Ed: Robert Blackburn/ Jörg Polakiewicz , Oxford University Press, s.56; Tanrıkulu, a.g.e., s.118. ↑
- Batum, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Türk Anayasal Sistemine Etkileri, s.127; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.317. ↑
- Batum, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Türk Anayasal Sistemine Etkileri, s.133; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.312. ↑
- Naz Çavuşoğlu, İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi: Kararların Uygulanması, İstanbul, Su Yayınları, 2003, s.58. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.124. ↑
- Çavuşoğlu, a.g.e., s.34. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.125. ↑
- For the full list of the amounts of just satisfaction in applications lodged against Türkiye between 1995 and June 2003 see: Çavuşoğlu, a.g.e., s.79-165. ↑
- Gölcüklü/Gözübüyük, a.g.e., s.128. ↑
- A good example of its use as an instrument of political pressure is the following: where a State having the status of a candidate country for the European Union fails to implement a judgment of the Court, this situation is used by the Committee of Ministers to create a negative image in the eyes of the member States of the European Union. Ovey/White, a.g.e., s.432-432; Anayurt, a.g.e., s.335,336. ↑
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Imprisonment in Defiance of the Law: Enemy Criminal Law in Türkiye in the Light of the European Court of Human Rights Judgments in Osman Kavala and Can Atalay” (Hukuka Rağmen Hapis: Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesinin Osman Kavala ve Can Atalay Kararları Işığında Türkiye’de Düşman Ceza Hukuku), Dülger Law Office, 20 November 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Demanding Accountability Is Not a Crime: On the Investigation Initiated Against Av. Prof. Dr. Osman Korkut Kanadoğlu” (Hesap Sormak Suç Değildir: Av. Prof. Dr. Osman Korkut Kanadoğlu Hakkında Başlatılan Soruşturma Üzerine), Dülger Law Office, 27 October 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “On the Events Known to the Public as the ‘Fund Scandal’: An Assessment in Terms of Criminal Liability, Investor Rights and Supervisory Liability” (Kamuoyunda “Fon Skandalı” Olarak Anılan Olaylar Hakkında: Ceza Sorumluluğu, Yatırımcı Hakları ve Denetim Sorumluluğu Bakımından Bir Değerlendirme), Academia.edu, 1 October 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Delayed Occurrence of the Result (Dolus Generalis / Weber's Intent)” (Gecikmiş Neticenin Gerçekleşmesi (Dolus Generalis / Weber Kastı)), Essays in Honour of Asst. Prof. Dr. Sesim Soyer Güleç (Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Sesim Soyer Güleç’e Armağan), eds. Koray Doğan / Behiye Eker Kazancı, Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2025, pp. 223–288.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Assessment of the Constitutional Court's Decision on the Provisions Governing the Simplified Trial Procedure” (Anayasa Mahkemesinin Basit Yargılama Usulü Hükümlerine İlişkin Kararının Değerlendirilmesi), Dülger Law Office, 12 October 2023.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, Offences and Sanctions Relating to the Laundering of Proceeds of Crime (The Offence of Money Laundering) (Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasına İlişkin Suçlar ve Yaptırımlar (Kara Paranın Aklanması Suçu)), 3rd ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2026.

