2005Murat Volkan DülgerArticle

Abstract

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

In criminal law, one of the important subjects of study in the general theory of crime, and perhaps the most important, is “culpability”. Indeed, it is stated in this regard that “no subject in criminal law constitutes as important and fundamental a problem as the will that must be present in the perpetrator”.

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This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

Murat Volkan Dülger∗∗∗

INTRODUCTION∗∗∗

In criminal law, one of the important subjects of study of the general theory of the offence, and perhaps the most important of them, is “culpability”. Indeed, it is said in this regard that “no subject in criminal law constitutes as important and fundamental a problem as the will that must be present in the perpetrator”1.

“Culpability” is indeed the most fundamental concept of law, and of criminal law in particular, and in criminal law it manifests itself in the principle “nulla poena sine culpa” (no offence and no punishment without culpability)2.

From the standpoint of criminal law, the fact that an individual has carried out the act which is described in the statutory definition and constitutes an offence is not in itself sufficient for him to be held liable; the perpetrator must in addition have acted culpably in carrying out that act.

Although the concept of culpability is itself subject to distinctions, “intent” is presented as the basic category of culpability. Indeed, criminal codes too provide that, for the perpetrator to be held liable for the act he has carried out, he must as a rule have acted intentionally, and that the other forms of culpability are the exception.

Accordingly, an attempt has been made to explain the concept of “intent”, perhaps the most important of the concepts making up the mental element, with particular regard also to the new criminal code.

The subject of this study is thus the examination of the elements and types of intent. After culpability in general has been dealt with in the first part of the study, the second part examines the concept of intent and its elements, and the third part the types of intent.

Ample space has been given to explanations of the provisions of the new Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (YTCK) relating to the subject under examination, the provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code No. 765 (TCK) have been compared with those of this new code, and in particular an attempt has been made to examine the much-debated concept of “conditional intent” (dolus eventualis) as extensively as possible within the limits of this study.

I. Culpability in Criminal Law

A. The Concept of Culpability

1. Culpability in General and Its History

The concept of culpability is a problem that concerns all legal disciplines and one to which great importance is attached. In criminal law in particular, however, because culpability is one of the elements constituting the offence, the requirement that the perpetrator must have been culpable when carrying out the act in order to be held liable for it increases the importance of this concept and of the explanations relating to it.

Only if they can be blamed for the act they have carried out, if that act can be subjectively attributed to them, in short, if they are culpable by reason of the act they have carried out3, can individuals be held liable for the unlawful acts defined in the statute which they commit4. For this reason it is stated that the element which gives criminal law its meaning and distinguishes it from the other legal disciplines is “culpability”5. Indeed, the rule “actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea” is accepted as one of the most fundamental principles of criminal law; it is stated that the act alone has no significance, and the indispensable importance of culpability for the existence of the offence is emphasised6. In the law of all countries in which the principles of modern criminal law apply, the “principle of culpability” has likewise been accepted as a condition for holding the perpetrator liable under criminal law7.

Culpability performs two important functions in its capacity as the subjective element of the offence. These are the function of justifying punishment and the function of limiting punishment8. Proceeding in particular from the function of justifying punishment, everyone can be punished on account of his own culpability. In this way the principle of the personal nature of criminal liability is arrived at and can be given a normative basis; culpability has accordingly become an important principle of the rule of law today and also performs a protective function in the field of human rights9. Indeed, it is stated that the principle of the personal nature of criminal liability in particular is one aspect of the right to a fair trial laid down in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)10.

“Culpability” is in fact not solely a concept of criminal law. It is a concept used by disciplines such as theology and philosophy and by numerous other branches of science based on observation, such as criminology and psychology, and it is used in order to derive, from individuals’ voluntary acts and their consequences, a meaning directed at the individual and to make an attribution. Over time, however, this concept has become an indispensable component of criminal law.

The entry of the concept of culpability into criminal law is quite recent. In primitive societies the individual was punished solely on the basis of the act he had carried out, without any inquiry into whether he was culpable. For this reason the period has been called the stage of the “material appearance of the offence”11.

In the periods in which Roman law was highly developed, however, the awareness emerged that the perpetrator must be culpable in order to be punished12. Canon law followed, and as that law gained influence, the human will and the evil thoughts a person harboured began to be punished. This in turn detached punishment from the act: persons were deemed culpable on the ground that they harboured evil thoughts or the devil within them, and were punished without having carried out any act. This way of thinking led humanity to the age of the Inquisition13.

Finally, with the separation of criminal law from canon law, the course taken was to punish the act carried out with a culpable will. In the meantime the principle of “mens rea”, which had become a fundamental rule through centuries of repetition, began to become operative14.

In modern criminal law, alongside many other rules of principle, the principle has been adopted that the individual can be held liable only for his culpable conduct. Accordingly, contemporary, modern criminal law does not accept punishment without culpability (objective liability)15.

2. The Distinction between Fault and Culpability

When culpability is examined from the standpoint of the perpetrator, what is at issue is the perpetrator’s “fault”; when it is examined from the standpoint of the act, what is at issue is the “culpability” of the act. That is to say, one speaks of culpability with regard to the act, whereas with regard to the perpetrator who carries it out one says that the perpetrator is at fault16. Since the principal subject of study of the general theory of the offence is the act carried out by the perpetrator and the mental state of the perpetrator when carrying out that act, and since all explanations and analyses are made on that basis, the concept of “culpability” is used as an element of the offence for the sake of consistency with this17.

Culpability means that, because the perpetrator chose and carried out unlawful conduct although he had the possibility of acting lawfully, the act can be attributed to him and he can be blamed for it18. As this definition of culpability shows, what is taken into account with regard to the perpetrator is not what kind of life he has led but whether he carried out the act constituting the offence culpably19. From this standpoint, the reason why the act can be attributed to the perpetrator is seen in his having made the wrong decision instead of the right one20. It should also be noted that the value judgment to be passed in respect of culpability, that is, the blaming of the perpetrator, is not moral but legal in nature21.

In other words, alongside the objective elements of the offence (conformity with the statutory definition of the offence, unlawfulness and the material element), culpability constitutes the subjective, that is, the mental element of the offence (the moral element of a crime/mens rea22)23, which establishes the psychic, that is, the mental and intellectual, link between the perpetrator and the act carried out24. It is accordingly stated that the concept of culpability has a meaning that gathers together the subjective element of all offences25.

In the Anglo-Saxon legal system too, the concept of culpability is accepted as an element required for criminal liability to arise and is rendered by the concept of “mens rea”26.

B. Views Explaining Culpability

Two important theories, the psychological and the normative, have been put forward to explain the essence of culpability27.

1. The Psychological Theory

According to this theory, culpability consists in the state of the perpetrator’s consciousness and will at the moment when they caused the result arising from the act(s) he carried out. In other words, the link between the perpetrator’s mental and intellectual activity and the result indicated by positive law constitutes culpability28.

According to the psychological theory of culpability, for the perpetrator to be regarded as culpable he must have willed the act he carried out and its result. Culpability is accordingly understood as the psychological relationship between the perpetrator and the act, and the psychological theory therefore proves inadequate when it comes to explaining “negligence”. For this reason, too, an attempt is made to explain intent and negligence by resting them on the same foundation29.

It is indeed evident that the psychological theory is inadequate to explain negligence, because under this theory both negligence and intent are rested on the same basis. Yet whereas a perpetrator acting with intent establishes a mental and intellectual link with the act he carries out (in the form of knowing and willing), a perpetrator acting negligently is regarded as culpable because he failed to foresee a foreseeable result, but he does not establish a psychological link of the kind described above with the act he carries out30.

2. The Normative Theory

According to the view which explains the essence of culpability by the normative theory, culpability is not a psychological relationship between the perpetrator and the act but the value judgment passed on that relationship31. Culpability accordingly means that an unlawful act is performed despite the prohibitions laid down by legal norms or the duties which those norms impose on individuals. According to this theory, legal rules impose certain duties on individuals, and the person who acts contrary to such a norm manifests, from a normative point of view, his culpable will32. The perpetrator thus manifests his culpable will in this direction by failing to comply with the legal rules that impose duties on him, and as a result he is blamed by the legal order33.

In this theory, which thus takes as its starting point the duty imposed on individuals, intent and negligence can be explained on the same basis34. In the case of intent the perpetrator knowingly and willingly acts contrary to the legal rule, whereas in the case of negligence he fails to exercise the duty of care expected of him in the face of the requirements of social life. In both of these situations the perpetrator is therefore blamed according to the normative theory35. In this way both acts committed with intent and acts committed through negligence can be characterised as offences and punished36.

This theory too has been criticised on the ground that it is uncertain which duties it is whose breach will be blamed and who will decide on that blame37. However, the duties whose breach will be blamed are indicated in the statutory provisions containing the criminal norm, and it is the judge who will decide on that blame at the end of the trial of the accused38. For this reason it is not possible to agree with this criticism levelled at the normative theory.

It is stated that in German law today the prevailing view in explaining culpability is the normative theory; that culpability is not understood, as in the explanation given by the psychological theory, as the perpetrator’s psychic relationship with his act; and that the essence of culpability, whether in intent or in negligence, is seen in blameworthiness and attributability. In line with this view, therefore, what is attributed to the perpetrator is that he decided to do wrong although he could have decided in a right and lawful direction39.

3. The Reconciling View

It is stated in legal scholarship that both theories explaining culpability have their shortcomings as well as their correct aspects, but that both theories nonetheless have their correct sides. It is further stated that culpability is in fact a psychological concept, because it is a matter concerning the perpetrator’s will, but that the normative theory is also valid in explaining negligence40. Indeed, in order to reconcile these two views, a definition is given in the scholarship to the effect that “culpability is the blameworthiness of the perpetrator by reason of the psychological relationship between the perpetrator and the act”41.

Both in TCK No. 765 (hereinafter referred to briefly as the TCK) and in YTCK No. 5237 (hereinafter referred to briefly as the YTCK), intent and negligence are indicated as the mental element of the offence, that is, as the types of culpability. The common feature of the types of culpability indicated in both codes is that the acts carried out by the perpetrator rest on free will. For this reason the voluntariness of the act is identified as the basis of culpability, and the psychological theory becomes predominant in explaining culpability. However, in order for the perpetrator to be held liable for his negligent conduct, weight must also be given to the explanations of the normative theory, and a mixed approach must thus be followed42.

C. The Scope of Culpability and the Types of Culpability

1. The Scope of Culpability

Two views have been put forward on the scope of culpability: act-based culpability and perpetrator-based culpability.

In act-based culpability, culpability is specific to the act carried out by the perpetrator. A perpetrator may have acted culpably in one act he has carried out and entirely without culpability in another. The act-based view of culpability is the classical and liberal view in this field. It is also the view generally accepted today. Under it, the perpetrator’s whole life is not taken into consideration for the purposes of his culpability; the inquiry into culpability is confined to the act carried out by the perpetrator. However, once it has been accepted that the perpetrator is culpable, his past life may also be taken into account for the individualisation of the penalty, particularly at the stage of execution43.

Perpetrator-based culpability, on the other hand, is a view put forward in particular by the German positivists and, among them, especially by von Liszt. According to it, a person forms a whole together with his past life, and for the purposes of his culpability, too, it is not the single act he has carried out but his entire way of life that must be taken into consideration. Culpability is accordingly an attribute and quality of the perpetrator44. This view has been adopted in particular in the criminal codes of totalitarian political regimes.

As stated above, the act-based view of culpability has been accepted in today’s modern criminal law. The perpetrator’s past life and characteristics are taken into account, in an entirely humane manner, for the individualisation of the penalty in the name of the principle of the socialisation of the offender (his reintegration into society), which is one of the requirements of modern criminal law45.

2. The Types of Culpability

Culpability, defined as the blameworthiness of the perpetrator by reason of the psychological relationship between the act and the perpetrator, used to be examined under two basic categories, one of which was called subjective liability and the other objective liability.

In the light of the principles of modern criminal law, however, objective liability must not be regarded as a type of culpability. For when one speaks of culpability, it must be established that the perpetrator acted with intent or with negligence; in objective liability, by contrast, no inquiry is made into whether the perpetrator acted with intent or with negligence, and the perpetrator is held liable for the result arising from his act without any mental link being established. Objective liability is therefore not a type of culpability.

In legal scholarship, the concept of culpability is understood to mean subjective liability. In modern criminal law, criminal liability rests on subjective liability46. Subjective liability, that is, culpability, is divided into two: subjective liability arising from intent and subjective liability arising from negligence.

Objective liability, by contrast, means that the perpetrator is held liable for the result that has occurred. Here, in fact, no inquiry is made into whether the perpetrator is culpable or whether he had any will in that direction; the individual is held liable for the result that has occurred. Since objective liability cannot be accepted as a type of culpability, it is generally accepted that in modern criminal law it should have no place whatsoever in legislation47.

Both the TCK and the YTCK have in principle adopted subjective liability based on culpability48. While they provide that offences are as a rule committed intentionally, in certain offence types it is specifically stated that the offence may also be committed through negligence. Indeed, it is stated that offences are essentially committed with intent and that in many events constituting an offence the perpetrator generally acts with intent49.

However, although it is not accepted in modern criminal law (in German law, for example, objective liability is not accepted, and it is stated that under § 15 StGB intent and negligence are the indispensable condition of punishment)50, cases of objective liability are regulated in both codes51.

Culpability is examined under two main headings: “liability arising from intent” and “liability arising from negligence”. The subject of this study is “intent” (criminal intent)52, which is one of the two manifestations of subjective liability, that is, of culpability, and which is provided for in both codes as, in principle, the primary form of liability.

Although in examining the subject the explanations will as a rule be given by reference to the concept of intent and to liability arising from intent, in order to present the subject more clearly the concept of negligence, liability arising from negligence and the distinction between the concepts of intent and negligence will also be addressed where appropriate.

II. Intent, the Difference between Intent and Negligence, Views Explaining Intent and the Elements of Intent

A. The Concept of Intent

It was stated above that culpability, that is, subjective liability, takes two forms, intent and negligence. This theoretical distinction is found in exactly the same way in the TCK and in the YTCK. Accordingly, for an individual to be punished for an act which the law treats as an offence, the act must as a rule have been committed intentionally53. Indeed, this is clearly expressed in the first sentence of Art. 45(1) TCK, which provides that “in the case of a felony the absence of intent removes the penalty”, and in Art. 21(1) YTCK, which provides that “the existence of an offence depends on the presence of intent”.

It is seen, however, that the wording of the first paragraphs of Art. 45 and Art. 21, which contain the provisions on intent in the two codes, differs. Whereas in the TCK the presence of intent is required for a felony to exist, in the YTCK the presence of intent is required for an offence to exist. The reason for this is that in the TCK offences are divided into two, felonies and misdemeanours, and that for misdemeanours to exist the mental element of the offence, that is, the perpetrator’s culpability, is not required; for that reason Art. 45 of that code refers specifically to felonies. In the YTCK, by contrast, this distinction, which has been abandoned in modern codes, was dropped, and misdemeanours ceased to be offences, so that only the acts formerly classified as felonies were regulated54; for this reason the expression “offences” is used in Art. 21 YTCK, in which intent is defined.

In legal scholarship this form of regulation was criticised on the ground that the expression “in the case of a felony the absence of intent removes the penalty” used in the TCK could be interpreted as meaning that intent is a condition (precondition) that must be present for the perpetrator to be punished, and it was stated that a wording such as “for the offence to exist there must be intent” ought to be used instead55. Indeed, intent is not a condition or precondition whose presence is required for the perpetrator to be punished but one of the elements of the offence, whose presence is required for the offence to exist. As stated above, the YTCK has been drafted in line with this criticism, and it has been clearly stated that intent is an element of the offence whose presence is required for the offence to exist.

For the perpetrator to be punishable for an act he has carried out intentionally, there is no need for this to be expressly stated in the statutory definition of the offence; as stated above, offence types are in principle drafted on the assumption that the perpetrator commits the offence by an intentional act56. For the perpetrator to be punishable for a negligent act, however, this must be expressly stated in the offence type set out in the statutory definition57. Accordingly, the perpetrator can be punished for an act carried out through negligence only where the statute defines the negligent commission of an act, too, as an offence type58. This is expressed in the second sentence of Art. 45(1) TCK in the words “the cases in which the law prescribes a penalty for an act that is the consequence of the perpetrator’s doing or not doing something are excepted”, and in Art. 22(1) YTCK, headed “negligence”, in the words “acts committed through negligence shall be punished in the cases expressly specified by law”.

The TCK contains no definition of intent; this was, however, criticised in legal scholarship, where it was stated that it would be more appropriate for intent to be defined in the statute59. Indeed, in Anglo-Saxon law too, the judges, whose task it is to make and apply the law, are criticised on the ground that they have not given a clear definition of intent and reach their conclusion in each specific case on the basis of a different definition of intent60.

Whether or not a definition of intent is included in the criminal code is a matter of choice. Indeed, in comparative law there are criminal codes that include a definition of intent (Art. 18(2) of the Swiss Criminal Code; Art. 5(1) of the Austrian Criminal Code) as well as criminal codes that do not (the German Criminal Code)61. There is no need for intent to be expressly defined in the criminal code, because it is unanimously accepted in scholarship and practice that intent means that the perpetrator carries out the act constituting the offence knowingly and willingly. For this reason it is not an appropriate approach to include in the criminal code a problem that has been solved from the standpoint of the theory of the offence as though it were only now being resolved. It is unnecessary to include in the criminal code every piece of knowledge relating to the general theory of the offence; otherwise this will lead to legislation by a casuistic method, which is a method of law-making that has been superseded today.

In the YTCK, by contrast, intent has been defined, taking into account the criticisms voiced in the scholarship. In Art. 21(1) YTCK, headed “intent”, intent is defined as “the knowing and willing realisation of the elements in the statutory definition of the offence”. According to this definition, the perpetrator must carry out the act defined as an offence in the statute “knowingly and willingly”. The YTCK has thus expressly stated that the elements of intent are “knowing” and “willing”.

This provision is heavily criticised in legal scholarship, where it is argued that the expression “the elements in the statutory definition of the offence” contained in this definition conflicts with the principle “ignorance of the criminal laws shall not be deemed an excuse” laid down in Art. 4(1) YTCK62. This expression, and with it the definition, is also criticised in the scholarship on the ground that what is necessary for intent to exist is that the perpetrator knows and wills the act constituting the offence, and that there can therefore be no question of the perpetrator knowing and willing the elements in the definition of the offence63.

This definition does indeed create the impression that the perpetrator will be held liable for the act he has carried out only if he knows the elements of the offence type defined in the statute and acts knowing and willing those elements. Yet it is not possible to require individuals to know each and every offence type in the criminal laws, or to treat ignorance of them as a ground of excuse leading to impunity. If this were accepted, ignorance of the law could be pleaded as a ground of justification, and it is in order to prevent this that criminal codes contain provisions to the effect that “ignorance of the law shall not be deemed an excuse”. For this reason it would be more appropriate to define intent, without the criticised expression, as “the knowing and willing commission of the offence”.

B. The Difference between Intent and Negligence

Establishing the difference between intent and negligence is essential, in particular in order to draw the distinction between conditional intent and conscious negligence more accurately. In setting out this difference, negligence must first be briefly explained.

It was stated above that negligence is a type of subjective liability and is an exception in relation to intent, and that it applies only where the offence type set out in the statutory definition expressly indicates that the offence may be committed through negligence.

Negligence is, in brief, the situation in which a person – in cases where the result described in the offence type could not have occurred had he observed the duty of care (obligatio ad diligentiam) imposed on him by the legal order – fails to observe that duty of care with regard to the result described in the offence type and, without acting with intent, unlawfully realises the offence type set out in the statutory definition64. It should be noted here that this duty of care is not of a subjective nature varying from person to person but an objective duty of care applicable to the average individual65.

In liability arising from negligence, the perpetrator fails to comply with an objective duty of care imposed on him by the legal order, that is, he fails to foresee a foreseeable result of the acts he carries out, and he is liable for a consequence which he brought about by performing his act of his own will but which he did not want to occur.

The difference between intent and negligence is that in offences committed with intent the perpetrator wills the result, whereas in offences committed through negligence he does not66. Thus, in offences committed with intent the perpetrator carries out his act knowingly and willingly, whereas in offences committed through negligence he brings about a result which the legal order states he ought to have foreseen but which he did not foresee, and he does not will that result. That is to say, what gives rise to the perpetrator’s liability in negligence and leads to punishment is the “possibility of foreseeing”, not the fact that the result was “foreseeable” in the specific case67.

Negligence is itself divided into two: “unconscious negligence” and “conscious negligence”. Unconscious negligence exists where the perpetrator, although in performing his act he ought to have foreseen that the offence set out in the statutory definition would be realised as a result, fails to exercise the duty of care expected of him and thereby causes the result to occur and the offence to come into being68. Conscious negligence, by contrast, exists where the perpetrator, in performing his act, foresees that the result set out in the statutory definition, and hence the offence, may be realised as a consequence, but does not will that result and makes an effort to prevent it from occurring, and the offence nevertheless comes into being69.

When intent, unconscious negligence and conscious negligence are compared in the light of the above explanations, the following picture emerges. In both types of negligence the perpetrator does not will the result that occurs; in unconscious negligence he fails to foresee what he ought to have foreseen according to the objective duty of care, whereas in conscious negligence, although he foresees the result, he does not want it to occur and makes an effort to that end70. In intent, by contrast, the perpetrator both foresees and wills the result and also does everything in his power “for this result to occur”.

C. Views Explaining Intent

Two principal views have been put forward that seek to explain the legal basis of intent. These are the “theory of representation” and the “theory of will”.

1. The Theory of Representation

According to the theory of representation, intent rests on the perpetrator’s having represented to himself in advance (foreseen) and apprehended (known) the act contained in the statutory definition. Under this theory it is not necessary, for intent to exist, that the perpetrator should will the result and act in order to bring it about. The representation of the result, and the willed performance of the act in the awareness that the result will occur, are necessary and sufficient for intent to exist. That the perpetrator has thought of the result and is aware that such a result may arise from the act he is about to perform is necessary and sufficient for intent to exist; there is no further need for that result to be willed71. According to the theory of representation, therefore, intent must not be confined to cases in which the result is also willed72.

This theory has been criticised on the ground that it widens the scope of intent and leaves no difference between intent and negligence73. A further criticism levelled at this theory is that it cannot be said that everything that is represented turns into action, and that not all the consequences of every act can have been willed74.

2. The Theory of Will

According to the theory of will, by contrast, the distinguishing feature of intent is that the perpetrator wills the result. Under this theory too the perpetrator must think of the result of the act he carries out and be aware of the result that will occur, and in addition he must also will the result of the act he performs75.

However, the authors who advocate this theory have put forward differing views as to which result must have been willed. While some state that the result willed by the perpetrator is the violation of the criminal law, other authors state that the result willed by the perpetrator, and his will, are directed towards carrying out an unlawful act76. Although many other, differing ideas have been advanced on this point, this theory too is on its own inadequate to explain the legal basis of intent.

3. The Reconciling View

As seen above, neither the theory of representation nor the theory of will is sufficient on its own to explain the legal basis of intent. For this reason some authors have followed a middle course on this matter and have chosen to explain the legal basis of intent by using what the two theories have in common77.

This reconciling definition has been adopted in the legislation of the countries in which intent is defined in the criminal code. Art. 18 of the Swiss Criminal Code and Art. 42 of the Italian Criminal Code may be cited as examples.

Since the TCK gives no definition of intent, the legislature made no such theoretical choice; in legal scholarship, however, the view expressed has generally been in this direction.

In Art. 21 YTCK, by contrast, intent has been defined, and by stating in this definition that the perpetrator must “know” and “will” the act he carries out, the reconciling view has been adopted, so that both the theory of representation and the theory of will have been given a place.

4. The Definition of Intent

On the basis of the above explanations, intent may be defined as “the knowing and willing carrying out of an act that is foreseen and constitutes an offence”78. In brief, intent may be defined as “liability for the result that was willed”.

According to the view prevailing in scholarship and practice today, intent is the knowing and willing, in the specific case, of the objective elements of the offence provided for in the statute79. As can be seen, of the views explaining intent it is the “reconciling view” that is accepted in the scholarship; it is also called the “theory of consciousness and will”80. Although this definition was formulated with offences of harm in mind, in which a result must occur, it is a definition that is also valid for offences of endangerment, in which no result is required to occur for the offence to exist81.

On the basis of this definition, it is seen that intent consists of two elements, “knowing” and “willing”82,83.

D. The Elements of Intent

1. Knowing

For it to be accepted that the perpetrator acted intentionally, he must have foreseen, that is, known in advance, all the elements contained in the statutory definition of the offence type84. This is the most important criterion distinguishing negligence (unconscious negligence) from intent85. In legal scholarship the element of knowing is also called the “element of thinking and foreseeing”86.

As to what knowing covers and what the perpetrator must know for intent to exist, almost the same points are made in legal scholarship. Accordingly, the perpetrator must first of all know the conduct that makes the act he carries out an offence. Indeed, some authors in the scholarship, referring to the conduct, state that “the perpetrator must know the constituent elements of the act”87. If the act carried out is an offence of commission, he will have acted intentionally by knowing the conduct, that is, by thinking of and foreseeing the conduct he is going to perform. If the act carried out is an offence of omission, the perpetrator will have acted intentionally by knowing the conduct which he fails to perform88.

The constituent elements relating to this conduct may also include legal elements relating to the conduct that are specified in the statutory definition. For example, a person who utters an insult without knowing that the person before him is a public official cannot be regarded as having committed the offence of insulting a public official (Art. 266 TCK; Art. 125(3) YTCK)89.

Where, under the statutory definition of the offence type, a result must also occur for the offence to exist in addition to the conduct performed by the perpetrator (offences of harm), the perpetrator must know, in addition to the conduct constituting the material element of the offence, the result that may arise from the conduct he performs. In offences of commission and in offences of commission by omission, this result is the result which the law prohibits and does not want to occur; in offences of omission90 it is the result which the perpetrator did not want to bring about but which the law requires to be brought about91. What is meant here is the legal result provided for in the statutory definition and arising from the conduct, not the occurrence of harm. In cases where the occurrence of harm is provided for as an aggravating circumstance, in other words where the aggravating circumstance depends on the result (for example where the results regulated in Art. 87 YTCK occur), the perpetrator need not foresee the result92.

In addition to these, the perpetrator must also know the material object of the offence. For it to be accepted that the perpetrator acted intentionally, he must know that the being he kills is a human being and that the thing he takes is a movable object. Likewise, the other matters relating to the objective elements of the offence that bring the act within the statutory definition must also be known to the perpetrator. For example, for it to be possible to speak of the perpetrator having acted intentionally, in the offence of violation of the inviolability of the home he must know that the building he enters is a dwelling, and in the offence of theft that the thing he takes belongs to another93.

If the statutory definition of the offence contains, as a condition for the offence to exist, a specification concerning the identity of the perpetrator or of the victim, this too must be known to the perpetrator for it to be possible to speak of intentional conduct, as where the perpetrator knows that he is a public official (Art. 339 TCK; Art. 204(2) YTCK) or that the victim is a descendant or ascendant (Art. 450 sub-para. 1 TCK; Art. 82 sub-para. “d” YTCK)94. However, where the perpetrator carries out his act under a mistake as to the person or with a deviation in the execution of the act, the situation will be resolved in accordance with the provisions contained in Art. 52 TCK and Art. 30(2) YTCK95.

Furthermore, in offences of concrete endangerment, for it to be accepted that the perpetrator acted intentionally, he must know that the act he carries out is capable of bringing about that concrete danger96.

As to whether aggravating circumstances must be known to the perpetrator, the following distinction is drawn: if the aggravating circumstance relates to the result and the offence is aggravated by reason of the result that occurs (offence aggravated by its result), then, since this is a situation falling within objective liability97, its being known to the perpetrator is not required for intent to exist98. However, since, for the offences aggravated by their result regulated in Art. 23 YTCK, the perpetrator is required to be culpable at least to the degree of negligence in respect of the aggravated result, and since, even though the aggravating circumstances need not be known to the perpetrator, he must under Art. 23 foresee the aggravated result, it will have to be established that the perpetrator was under an objective duty of care in this respect. If the aggravating circumstance relates to the object of the offence, then the aggravating circumstance too must be known to the perpetrator. For example, for Art. 244(3) YTCK to be applicable, the perpetrator must know that the information system whose functioning he has obstructed or disrupted belongs to a bank or credit institution or to a public institution or organisation. Likewise, the matters the perpetrator must know may relate to the basic form of the offence or to its aggravated (qualified) form99. For example, if the perpetrator does not know that the thing he has stolen is “property allocated to public benefit or service”, it will not be possible to hold him liable for aggravated theft (Art. 491(2) sub-para. 1 TCK; Art. 142(1) sub-para. “a” YTCK).

Grounds of justification, by contrast, need not be known to the perpetrator100. Where they exist, the act will be lawful even if the perpetrator is unaware of them. Likewise, mitigating circumstances need not be known to the perpetrator either. Where they are present, they too will operate to reduce the perpetrator’s penalty; for example, whether or not the perpetrator knows that the value of the thing he has stolen is slight, he will benefit from the ground of slight value under Art. 145 YTCK (Art. 522 TCK)101.

2. Willing

That a thing or an act is known, or thought of and foreseen, does not mean that this thing or act is willed. Willing something includes knowing it; as a matter of logical inference, it is not possible to will what is not known. Conversely, however, it cannot be said that everything that is known is necessarily willed. Individuals do not will everything they know. The reflection of this logical inference in criminal law is that, for intent to exist, in addition to knowing, the act (and the result) thus known must also be willed102.

Some authors in the scholarship also use the concept of the “element of will” as an equivalent of the concept of willing. This concept is preferred because willing rests on a will103.

An important feature of the element of willing required for intent is that it serves as a criterion for distinguishing intent from negligence. For whereas the perpetrator who acts negligently does not will the result which he foresees will occur, the perpetrator who acts intentionally, quite to the contrary, wills the result which he foresees will occur104.

The result(s) caused by the act carried out by the perpetrator occur in dependence on his willing them. It cannot be said, however, that every result known and foreseen by the perpetrator is willed with the same intensity. It is according to this intensity of the perpetrator’s willing that the distinctions “direct intent”, “direct intent of the second degree” and “conditional intent” are drawn in the scholarship. These distinctions, which are made by reference to the element of willing in intent, will be examined below under the types of intent, and what falls within the element of willing will be set out in detail.

E. The Relationship between Intent and Motive (Motivation)

In carrying out his act, the perpetrator may act not only with the intent to commit the offence defined above, that is, carrying out the act knowingly and willingly, but also with a thought that precedes it, a motivation (motive). In some offence types this thought that motivates the perpetrator is expressly specified. In Turkish criminal law scholarship this is called “specific intent”105.

The motivation in question is a factor which is accepted in the statutory definition as an element of the offence, which forms in the person’s inner world with a view to bringing about the result specified in the offence type, and which relates to the carrying out and the direction of the perpetrator’s act constituting the offence. In other words, intent is the voluntary violation of the statutory provision by carrying out the act defined in the statute as an offence type; the motivation, by contrast, is the psychological background that explains the reason for this voluntary conduct106. This motivation is also called “motive”107 or “aim”108109. This element, which is termed motive or aim and is called specific intent in the scholarship, must be present in the perpetrator before he realises the offence type set out in the statutory definition and must constitute the preliminary stage of intent110. That is to say, this motive will first be present in the perpetrator (for example the motive of blood feud), under its influence intent will form in the person (the intent to kill), and finally the act will be carried out by the perpetrator.

The point that must be emphasised here is the view that motive and intent are different elements and that it is wrong to consider motive as part of intent111. It is indeed incorrect to treat motive as though it were an element of intent. Whereas intent establishes an intellectual and mental link with the acts carried out by the perpetrator, that is, is directed at the act, motive is directed entirely at the perpetrator’s mental and intellectual world; motive forms before intent does and thereby exerts an influence on the formation in the perpetrator of the intent to commit the offence. For this reason motive and intent must be assessed separately in the specific case.

For this reason, when the mental element of the offence is examined and it is inquired whether the perpetrator acted intentionally, it will first be inquired whether the perpetrator had the intent to commit the offence (general intent) and thereafter whether he acted with the motive specified in the offence type (specific intent).

A view is also expressed in the scholarship to the effect that motive is necessary in order to make it possible to distinguish from one another offences whose material element is the same and to explain the difference between them in the amount of the penalty112. Indeed, specific intent is included in an offence type for purposes such as distinguishing offence types from one another by reference to the perpetrator’s motive, or influencing the determination of the penalty. However, the purpose for which specific intent has been included must be determined by examining separately each offence type in which it is required, because this motive serves a variety of purposes.

Some authors in the scholarship give as the reason for regulating motive in the offence type the fact that it has a role to play in the individualisation of the penalty according to the perpetrator’s dangerousness, as a requirement of modern criminal law, and with a view to the socialisation of the offender, which is the aim of criminal law113. However, “specific intent”, as a topic of the mental element of the offence, is a concept examined within the theory of the offence, and whether the mental element of the offence is realised is assessed from the standpoint of whether this concept is a type of culpability. The authors holding the view described above, by contrast, approach the concept of specific intent not from the standpoint of the theory of the offence but from that of the “theory of sanctions”. Even though this view may be the rationale for including specific intent from the standpoint of the theory of sanctions, it constitutes the rationale for specific intent in terms of the policy on the execution of sentences, but not the rationale for including specific intent in terms of culpability.

While both the TCK and the YTCK contain a general provision on intent as regards the mental element of the offence, they contain no general provision on motive. Motive is included within the relevant offence type in cases where the perpetrator’s motive in committing the offence is important and that motive performs a function for the offence type. Nor is there any need for a general provision on specific intent; it is sufficient and necessary for it to be regulated in the offence type in which it is required and to which it relates.

It should be noted that it is also stated in the scholarship that the use, for motive, of the concept of “specific intent”, which derives from French law, is inappropriate in that it leads to conceptual confusion114. For where the statute requires a motive, the element of “knowing and willing”, which, as opposed to “specific intent”, may be described as “general intent” , has not been dispensed with. In this case too the statute requires the perpetrator to carry out his act knowingly and willingly, but it additionally requires him to act under the influence of a motive (motivation, aim). For this reason the use of the concept of specific intent as an equivalent of motive is not considered correct. Although this view is well founded in so far as it seeks to avoid conceptual confusion, there is no objection to using this term, since in substance it conveys what is meant and since in Turkish criminal law scholarship and practice the term “specific intent” denotes “motive”.

III. The Types of Intent

A. In General

When liability for the result, characteristic of the primitive periods that saw the individual as a plaything in the hands of fate, gave way to liability based on culpability as canon law gained influence, the view that there is a subjective link between the individual’s act and the result was accepted, and as a consequence the types of intent emerged. In later periods, however, as it began to be considered that the acts carried out by the perpetrator might also give rise to different results and, in consequence, intent came to be defined as the knowing and willing carrying out of an act that is foreseen and constitutes an offence, as “foreseeing” thus began to be examined within intent, and as the boundary between intent and negligence was properly drawn, the distinctions made with regard to the types of intent lost their importance115.

The types of intent that retain their importance today are examined below.

B. Direct Intent – Conditional (Eventual) Intent

It was stated above that the result caused by the act carried out by the perpetrator occurs in dependence on his willing it, and that, according to this intensity of the perpetrator’s willing, the distinctions “direct intent” and “conditional intent” are drawn in the scholarship.

In dealing with the types of intent, direct intent and conditional intent will be explained first, because they are of great importance for the element of willing in intent and will complete the explanations concerning that element, and also because there are various debates on “conditional intent”.

1. Direct Intent

Direct intent is itself divided into two: direct intent of the first degree and direct intent of the second degree. In the scholarship, however, “direct intent” is understood to mean direct intent of the first degree, while direct intent of the second degree is referred to expressly as such116.

a. Direct Intent of the First Degree

Direct intent (dolus directus/direct intention) exists where the perpetrator foresees the consequence of his acts and brings it about knowingly and willingly117. Where the perpetrator has decided to carry out the act constituting an offence under the statutory definition and carries out his act having regard to the results whose occurrence is certain according to the everyday experience of an average individual, it can be said that he acted with direct intent118. For example, a person who forcefully swings his fist at his adversary in order to inflict bodily harm on him has committed the offence of bodily harm with direct intent. Likewise, where a person who points his gun at the victim, takes aim and fires ends up killing the victim, the perpetrator has carried out the act of homicide intentionally.

Even where the likelihood of the perpetrator hitting the victim is low for reasons such as his distance from the victim or his lack of skill and ability, the perpetrator has intent if he performs his act in order to attain the result he aims at and brings about the result119.

b. Direct Intent of the Second Degree

In some cases, however, the perpetrator, while acting for the purpose he wishes to achieve, foresees that secondary consequences other than the one he wishes to attain may also occur. If the occurrence of these secondary results is a necessity for the result the perpetrator wishes to attain to come about, the situation described in the scholarship as “direct intent of the second degree” arises.

For example, the shipowner who sinks his ship on the high seas in order to collect the insurance indemnity foresees with certainty, although he does not want it, that the seafarers and passengers on board will die; likewise, the terrorist who places a bomb on the aircraft carrying a politician in order to kill that politician foresees with certainty, although he does not actually want it, that the flight crew and passengers on board will die; yet both carry out their acts in order to attain the result they want. In this situation too the perpetrator acts with direct intent.

Legal scholarship is divided, however, on the basis on which the perpetrator is to be held liable where the secondary results that, according to experience of the ordinary course of life, would necessarily follow from the perpetrator’s act fail to occur despite that act.

Some authors state that direct intent exists in this case too and that, as in the example given above, if the seafarers and passengers are rescued by the coastguard even though the ship has sunk, the perpetrator must be held liable for attempted intentional homicide120.

The authors who take the opposite view, by contrast, state that in such cases the existence of eventual (conditional) intent rather than direct intent must be accepted and that the rule “dolus indeterminatus determinatur ab eventu” (indeterminate intent is determined by the result) must be applied here121. Accordingly, on the basis of the above examples, the secondary results which lie outside the perpetrator’s intent to kill a particular person but which necessarily follow from the act he carries out can be attributed to the perpetrator only if and to the extent that they actually occur. If there are persons who died or were injured on the ship that sank as a result of the perpetrator’s act, the perpetrator will be held liable for those offences; if these consequences do not occur, he will not be held liable for attempted homicide or attempted bodily harm.

As regards determining the perpetrator’s liability for the secondary result whose occurrence is necessary, both of the views explained above have an element of truth as well as an aspect open to criticism. In carrying out his act, the perpetrator, although he foresaw that others too would suffer harm by reason of the secondary results that would necessarily occur, was indifferent to this and manifested his dangerousness. For this reason there is merit in the view that holds the perpetrator liable on the basis of direct intent even if the consequence does not occur. On the other hand, the perpetrator did not will these secondary results that occurred and had no will in that direction. Were the perpetrator unable to achieve his aim, were he, for example, not to sink the ship because he could not obtain the insurance indemnity, he would not go back and try to kill the persons on that ship; that is, he has no intent to kill those persons. This is where those who advocate the second view are right.

When it is borne in mind that this debate concerns intent and that intent consists of knowing and willing, the opinion of those who advocate the first view gains weight. For while the perpetrator has knowledge as regards the occurrence of the necessary secondary act at issue, it cannot be said that he did not will it either. Admittedly, those who advocate the second view might say: “when placing the bomb on the aircraft, the perpetrator knew and willed that the politician he was targeting would die, but, while he knew that the other passengers on the aircraft would die, he did not will their death; hence, where the necessary consequence does not occur and the aircraft makes an emergency landing and everyone on board is saved, holding the perpetrator liable for intentional homicide in respect of the passengers would be in contradiction with the theoretical explanations given with regard to intent. Holding a person liable for a consequence which did not occur and which he did not will is incompatible with the explanations concerning intent”; even so, it cannot be said in this case that the perpetrator did not will the death of the passengers.

When placing the bomb on the aircraft, the perpetrator knows that its explosion will inevitably also kill the passengers on board; not only does he do nothing to prevent this, he continues his acts in the full knowledge that it will happen. The non-occurrence of this result, which was bound to occur, is, as in the examples given, an extraordinary situation rarely encountered in the ordinary course of life. In this case, having regard also to the heightened dangerousness of the perpetrator, he must be held liable for attempted homicide. To hold otherwise would produce an outcome that does not accord with the sense of justice either.

It must be noted, however, that the distinction between direct intent of the second degree and conditional intent has to be examined separately for each specific case. For the occurrence of the secondary consequence to be a necessity, the means used and the acts performed in committing the offence must be capable of bringing about the secondary consequence. If, in the specific case, the means and acts used in committing the offence are capable of bringing about the secondary consequence, the existence of direct intent of the second degree will be accepted; if they are not, the existence of conditional intent will be accepted. In other words, it will be examined whether, in the specific case, given the acts performed and the means used by the perpetrator, the occurrence of the secondary result is a necessity alongside the occurrence of the main result.

2. Conditional (Eventual) Intent

a. The Concept

“Conditional intent” (dolus eventualis/oblique intention) arises where the perpetrator, while acting for the purpose he wishes to achieve, foresees that secondary consequences other than the result he wishes to attain may also occur, but the occurrence of these secondary results is not a necessity122. In the scholarship it is also called “indirect intent123, probable intent or indeterminate intent”.

For example, where a terrorist places a time bomb in a shopping centre with the aim of creating panic among the public and, when the bomb explodes, in addition to panic being created among the public several persons passing by the bomb are killed, there is conditional intent; for in placing the bomb the perpetrator foresees that, besides creating panic among the public, one or more persons passing by at the moment of the explosion may also die, yet he remains indifferent to this result, as it were accepts it, and makes no attempt whatsoever to prevent it from occurring. This is not, however, a result that is bound to occur, because at the moment when the set time comes and the bomb explodes there may be nobody near it, and the secondary result of homicide may thus not occur. Likewise, where a bomb is planted in a person’s car, there is direct intent to kill that person. It is possible, however, that there may be a person or persons in the car other than the one whose killing is intended, or that other persons too may die at the time or place of the explosion. As regards the persons, other than the one whose killing was intended, who die or are injured, the perpetrator has acted with conditional intent124.

As the above examples show, in the case of conditional intent the occurrence, alongside the result conforming to the statutory definition, of the secondary result, and hence of the offence, is left to the course of events. The occurrence of the secondary result and of the offence is neither willed nor not willed by the perpetrator; yet, although the occurrence of this result is within the realm of possibility, the perpetrator does not refrain from carrying out the act. The perpetrator is thus deemed to have accepted the secondary result.

b. Theories Explaining Conditional Intent

Intent, as stated above, means in brief that the perpetrator knows and wills the result he foresees; in conditional intent, however, while it can be established with certainty that the perpetrator foresaw and knew the result, it cannot be said with certainty whether he willed it, yet the conclusion is reached that he did will it. Whether or not the perpetrator willed the result is also of great importance for establishing the difference from conscious negligence. The conclusion that the perpetrator “willed the result” has been reached by way of views based on various theories; these theories are the following:

i. The Possibility Theory

According to this theory, the perpetrator regards the occurrence of the result he foresees as possible but nevertheless carries out his act. For this reason he is deemed to have willed that result.

ii. The Consent Theory

According to this theory, the perpetrator, when carrying out the act, foresaw that the secondary result might arise and, by performing his act, consented to it. The fact that the perpetrator gave this consent therefore shows that he willed from the outset the secondary result that occurred as well.

iii. The Acceptance Theory

According to this theory too, the perpetrator, when carrying out the act, regarded the occurrence of the secondary result as concretely possible and performed his act. He also accepted the result that arose; for this reason he must be deemed to have willed the result125. Although the acceptance theory and the consent theory resemble each other, in the consent theory the act is considered from the very beginning and the perpetrator is deemed to have consented to the secondary result he brought about. In the acceptance theory, by contrast, the perpetrator is deemed to have accepted this result by continuing to perform his act from the moment he foresaw the secondary result126.

Although all of these theories have their merits in explaining the basis for assuming that, in conditional intent, the perpetrator willed the result, the acceptance theory in particular is considered more appropriate, because it is more definite than the others and because it explains that the perpetrator, by remaining indifferent to the secondary result, as it were accepted it and willed the result.

c. The Relationship between Conditional Intent and Attempt

Legal scholarship is also divided on whether, where the secondary result that was likely to arise from the act carried out by the perpetrator and was foreseen by him does not occur, the perpetrator is to be held liable for attempt in respect of that result which did not occur.

Some authors, proceeding from the view that “conditional intent is determined by the result”, state that the perpetrator cannot be held liable for attempt where the secondary result that was likely to occur does not occur127.

Other authors, taking the opposite view, state that attempt is also possible in the case of conditional intent and that, in the case of conditional intent, the perpetrator can be held liable for the result that did not occur128.

It should be noted that, unlike the situation examined above in which a secondary result that would necessarily occur as a consequence of the perpetrator’s act fails to occur (direct intent of the second degree), in the situation in which a secondary result that would not necessarily occur fails to occur (conditional intent) the rule “dolus indeterminatus determinatur ab eventu” (indeterminate intent is determined by the result) has to be applied. In this situation there is no necessity, according to the experience gained in the ordinary course of life, that the secondary act should come about; that is to say, if this result does not occur, this will not be perceived as a miracle, and consequently the perpetrator, when carrying out his act, does not know that this result will definitely occur. For this reason, in the case of an act which, according to the ordinary course of life, already carries within it the possibility that the result will not occur, holding the perpetrator liable for the result although it did not occur as a consequence of the acts of execution is not only logically contradictory but also incompatible with the general theory of the offence.

Moreover, holding the perpetrator liable under the rules on attempt in cases of conditional intent would greatly extend the scope of liability, and this, with regard to proving the attempt, would give rise to problems129. For this reason, in cases of conditional intent the perpetrator should not be held liable for an attempt in respect of the secondary result that has not occurred.

d. The Distinction between Conditional Intent and Conscious Negligence

Conditional intent is a subject that is much debated in legal scholarship, because in many cases it is disputed whether, in terms of culpability, conscious negligence or conditional intent is present, and differing views are put forward on this point130.

Before turning to the explanation of the subject, these concepts need to be defined. Conditional intent may be defined as “the case in which a person, although foreseeing that his act may also bring about different results constituting an offence, carries out his act while remaining indifferent to those results; his liability for the secondary result that occurs”. Conscious negligence (luxuria), in turn, may be defined as “the case in which a person, while foreseeing that an act constituting an offence will come about, relies, in breach of the duty of care, on the result he has foreseen not occurring and performs the act, yet makes an effort to prevent the result from occurring”131.

As regards the distinction between conditional intent and conscious negligence, it should first be noted that conditional intent is, as its name indicates, a type of intent, whereas conscious negligence is a type of negligence. Hence in the one there is knowing and willing, whereas in the other there is foresight but no willing of what is foreseen. The most important criterion distinguishing conscious negligence from conditional intent is likewise whether or not the perpetrator wills the result that occurs. That is to say, in conditional intent the perpetrator foresees that, as a consequence of the act he carries out, secondary results different from the result he aims at may also occur, but remains indifferent to them and, as it were, accepts them; in conscious negligence, by contrast, he foresees the result that will occur as a consequence of his act, but does not will that result to occur and makes an effort to prevent it from occurring. In short, in both conditional intent and conscious negligence the result that may arise from the act is foreseen; but whereas in the one the result is not willed and an effort is made to prevent it from occurring, in the other the perpetrator remains indifferent to the result and makes no attempt whatsoever to prevent it from occurring. In other words, in conditional intent the aim which the perpetrator is striving to attain becomes so important to him that, for the sake of attaining that objective, he puts up with the possibility that an offence conforming to the statutory definition will be committed and, as it were, accepts this result132.

For example, where a terrorist organisation places a bomb in a shopping centre on one of its busiest days at the weekend with the aim of creating panic among the public, and the explosion of the bomb causes the death of many people, conditional intent is present. For while committing the offence of creating panic among the public, the perpetrator places a bomb in a shopping centre at the time when it is busiest at the weekend and thereby foresees that, as a non-necessary secondary result of this, some people may die or be injured, but remains indifferent to this in order to attain his objective and accepts this result.

On the other hand, a perpetrator who drives a car after drinking a bottle of rakı and who, under the influence of the alcohol he has voluntarily consumed, cannot even see the road properly, nevertheless takes to the road although he foresees that in this state he may have an accident and cause the death or injury of others; and because, again under the influence of the alcohol, he is driving very fast, he is unable to stop at the red light despite braking, hits a pedestrian and causes that person’s death. Here it is conscious negligence that will be present; for the perpetrator foresaw the result that might occur but did not will this result and, by applying the brakes, did all he could to prevent it from occurring, yet owing to his culpable conduct he brought about the result constituting an offence although he did not will it133.

It has not been possible to find decisions of the Court of Cassation concerning its approach to conditional intent and conscious negligence and the way it distinguishes the two from each other. It should first be noted that no decision of the Court of Cassation concerning conscious negligence has been found so far. As regards conditional intent, there are decisions which confuse this concept with other concepts relating to culpability and which are regrettably erroneous, as well as recent decisions containing correct findings.

In its less recent decisions the Court of Cassation, although conditional intent was present in the specific case, treated this as unconscious negligence and determined the perpetrator’s liability accordingly134. In another decision, although conditional intent was present in the specific case before the court, the Court of Cassation based its decision on the provision on mistake of fact laid down in Art. 52 TCK135. In a recent decision of the General Criminal Assembly of the Court of Cassation, on the other hand, the perpetrator was held liable and punished on account of his conditional intent136. However, it is open to debate whether, in this decision of the General Criminal Assembly (YCGK), the secondary result for whose occurrence the accused was held liable is a matter of “conditional intent”. For it is stated in the decision that, according to the on-site inspection and the expert examination carried out, “...even in the event of the house burning, it was inevitable, having regard to the point at which the fire started, that part of the forest land would burn...”. That being so, the decision ought to have discussed whether, in the specific case, there was conditional intent or direct intent of the second degree. Although the two situations are of no practical significance for the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator, this discussion ought to have been conducted and a conclusion reached, in view of the detailed theoretical explanations given in the decision and of the need to arrive at the correct result. On this basis, if the burning of the forest land was also inevitable as a consequence of the perpetrator’s attempt to burn the house and the perpetrator foresaw this, direct intent of the second degree ought to have been accepted; if, on the other hand, the burning of the forest was within the realm of possibility as a consequence of the perpetrator’s attempt and the perpetrator foresaw this, conditional intent ought to have been accepted. However, since the decision states that the burning of the forest was both inevitable and within the realm of possibility, it is not possible to reach a definite conclusion.

According to the conclusion drawn from the explanations given above, two decisive questions are to be asked when distinguishing between conditional intent and conscious negligence in a specific case. The first is whether the perpetrator did not will the result he foresaw to occur or remained indifferent to it; the second is whether or not the perpetrator made an effort to prevent the result he foresaw from occurring. If the perpetrator does not will the result he foresees to occur and makes an effort to prevent it from occurring, there is conscious negligence; if the perpetrator neither wills nor does not will the result he foresees, remains indifferent to it and does nothing to prevent the result from occurring, there is conditional intent.

It must be noted, however, that Art. 45(3) TCK137 and Art. 22(3) YTCK, which govern conscious negligence, do not lay down the requirement that “the perpetrator makes an effort to prevent the result from occurring”, which is one of the criteria distinguishing conscious negligence from conditional intent and ought to be included in the definition of conscious negligence. As will also be indicated under the heading below, this has produced a deficiency in the definition of conscious negligence that amounts to an error, and has also caused the definitions of conditional intent and conscious negligence to be identical to the point of being indistinguishable.

e. The Distinction between Conditional Intent and Conscious Negligence in the YTCK and the Criticisms Made

Unlike the TCK, the YTCK expressly regulates conditional intent and conscious negligence138. In Art. 21(2) YTCK, headed “intent”, conditional intent is defined as “the case in which a person, although foreseeing that the elements in the statutory definition of the offence may be realised, commits the act”. In Art. 22(3) YTCK, which governs negligence, conscious negligence is defined as “the case in which the result occurs although the person does not will the result he has foreseen”.

As is plain from these definitions, there is no difference between the two. Yet it is stated above that there are two important differences between conditional intent and conscious negligence. These differences have not been included in the definitions given in the law, and these two situations, which are in any case frequently confused with each other in specific cases, have been rendered wholly liable to confusion by the provision made in the law139.

In the definition of conditional intent given in Art. 21(2), the manner of regulation which, as noted above, in effect requires the perpetrator to know the elements in the statutory definition of the offence has been criticised, and it has been stated that this conflicts with Art. 4 YTCK140. Indeed, what the perpetrator must foresee here is not whether the elements in the statutory definition of the offence will be realised, but whether a secondary result which, taken as a whole, constitutes an offence will occur as a consequence of the act he carries out.

In addition, while the definition states that the person must foresee the secondary acts that may come about as a consequence of his acts, it does not dwell on the question of “whether or not he wills them”141. Yet, as stated above, the most important feature that sets conditional intent apart from conscious negligence is that the perpetrator remains indifferent to the secondary results that occur and thereby, as it were, accepts those secondary results. Since this important distinguishing criterion has not been included in the statutory definition, this definition has turned out to be an erroneous provision liable to cause confusion142.

It should be stated that it would be a more appropriate provision if this definition read: “there is conditional intent where a person, although foreseeing that his act may also bring about different results constituting an offence, carries out his act while remaining indifferent to those results”143.

Indeed, the explanations given in the explanatory memorandum of the law with regard to the definition of conditional intent, to the effect that “in the case of conditional intent the person commits the act although it is foreseen that one of the elements contained in the statutory definition of the offence may be realised in the specific case. In other words, the perpetrator accepts that the elements will come about”, are also incomplete.

As can be seen, in the explanatory memorandum too, exactly as in the definition in the article of the law, the element of foresight in conditional intent is included, whereas the element of remaining indifferent to the result is not touched upon at all. Accordingly, the examples given in the explanatory memorandum of the law in order to explain conditional intent likewise do not touch at all upon the question of whether or not the perpetrator wills the result144.

It should also be noted that one of these examples given to define conditional intent was that of a traffic accident, which in fact has to be assessed as conditional intent or as conscious negligence depending on the manner of commission and the specific case; this is erroneous. For in conditional intent the perpetrator aims to commit an offence, foresees that other, secondary results may also arise in the course of that offence, and remains indifferent to those results. In conditional intent, however, the perpetrator remains indifferent to the occurrence of the secondary results and does not, as in conscious negligence, make an effort to prevent the result from occurring. Yet in the first example given in the explanatory memorandum to the article defining conditional intent145, where there are pedestrians on the road while the perpetrator is committing the act of passing through a red light, which is a traffic offence, and the perpetrator continues on his way knowing this, no mention is made of whether or not the bus driver made any effort to prevent the result from occurring. Where, for instance, the perpetrator, while speeding along in order to escape from the police after a robbery he has committed, sees that the light is red but, because he wants to get away, does not slow down and continues on his way although he foresees that he may hit people crossing the road and kill or injure them, and in the end kills several people, there is conditional intent; but where the perpetrator, because he is unable to control his speed while driving fast, passes over the pedestrian crossing despite the red light, yet at that moment brakes and/or swerves in order not to hit the pedestrians, there is conscious negligence. In other words, where the perpetrator drives his car on despite the red light showing against him and despite the pedestrians crossing the road, an assessment must be made according to the specific case and the decision must be taken according to the perpetrator’s culpability; giving a generally valid example on this matter, as the explanatory memorandum does, is erroneous.

Indeed, by including this example in the explanatory memorandum, an attempt has in effect been made to achieve through the memorandum what could not be achieved through the article of the law, and the intention was to influence practitioners by means of the examples given. The reason for this is that the legislature acted in response to various pressures coming from public opinion and wished to treat certain traffic accidents that have occurred in our country as cases of conditional intent; in doing so, however, it compromised the general theory of the offence.

Likewise, as the second example of conditional intent the explanatory memorandum cites the incidents of firing into the air which are seen at various celebrations in our country and which are a display of joy that undoubtedly dates back to archaic times146. In these incidents, however, it is not the case that the perpetrator, while committing another offence, remains indifferent to its secondary result. It should first be noted that in the incidents in question the perpetrators using the pistol certainly do not will the fatal result that occurs, and to accept by way of reasoning that they willed this result is not possible either. The perpetrators who carry out these acts do not, when acting, think along the lines of “let me fire into the air, and if someone happens to die in the process, so be it, what can I do”; on the contrary, for the sake of a primitive display of joy these perpetrators fire into the air precisely so that no one comes to harm, foreseeing the result that may occur and making an effort to prevent it from occurring; yet as a consequence of their carelessness and lack of precaution the result does occur, and one or more persons die or are injured as a consequence of this act. As can be seen, this is clearly an example that can be given for conscious negligence. However, the legislature, again under the influence of public opinion, used this example for conditional intent, in effect indicating that incidents of this kind must be treated as cases of conditional intent, and sought to reach a result which it had been unable to achieve in the statutory definition; but this, too, plainly contradicts the general theory of the offence.

Similarly, because the definition of conscious negligence has also been drawn up erroneously and an important feature distinguishing it from conditional intent has not been stated, the likelihood of the two concepts being confused with each other has increased.

Art. 22(3) YTCK, in defining conscious negligence by providing that there is conscious negligence where the result occurs although the person does not will the result he has foreseen, does not state that the person must make an effort to prevent the result he has foreseen from occurring. The distinction will be better understood if the matter is again explained by means of an example relating to a traffic accident. A perpetrator who, after drinking a bottle of alcohol, gets into his car in a drunken state and starts to drive it foresees that, as a consequence of this act, he may hit people and cause their death or injury, but does not will this to happen; moreover, when such a possibility materialises, the perpetrator also does everything in his power to prevent the unwanted result from occurring, for example by applying the brakes of his car or by turning the steering wheel in the opposite direction. As can be seen, unlike in conditional intent, the perpetrator takes action to prevent the result from occurring, whereas in conditional intent the perpetrator takes no action whatsoever to prevent the result from occurring. The definition of conscious negligence given in the law contains no provision referring to the perpetrator’s acts directed at preventing the result from occurring, and the definition has therefore turned out incomplete and erroneous.

It should be stated that it would be a more appropriate provision if this definition read: “there is conscious negligence where the unwanted result occurs although the person does not will the result he has foreseen and makes an effort to prevent it from occurring”.

In both conditional intent and conscious negligence the result is foreseen. However, whereas in conditional intent the perpetrator remains indifferent to this foreseen result and the result is, as it were, willed, in conscious negligence this result is not willed and action is taken to prevent it from occurring; definitions of conditional intent and conscious negligence in which these features are not stated will be erroneous and incomplete and may therefore also give rise to problems such as conflict with the general theory of the offence.

Indeed, as is apparent from the explanations given above, the definitions of conditional intent and conscious negligence in the YTCK are incomplete and erroneous; the fact that these definitions have been drawn up incompletely and erroneously will lead to these two concepts, which are important in terms of culpability, being confused with each other and to problems arising in this respect once the YTCK enters into force147.

It must be said plainly that Art. 21(2) YTCK, where conditional intent is defined, in fact contains the definition of conscious negligence. For in conscious negligence, too, the perpetrator, although foreseeing that a result constituting an offence may occur, carries out his act. These are elements that are present in conditional intent; but, as also stated above, conditional intent has other features as well, and if these are not stated in the definition, what is defined is not conditional intent but conscious negligence148.

The last point to be made on this subject is that the second sentence of Art. 21(2) YTCK provides for a reduction of the penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator where conditional intent is present, in effect regulating conditional intent as a general mitigating circumstance.

In comparative law, no criminal code provides for a reduction of the perpetrator’s penalty in the case of conditional intent. Nor is there any need for such a reduction; for it should first be noted that this is a type of “intent”, that is to say, the perpetrator has committed this act intentionally and has revealed his dangerousness in terms of committing offences. It should first be noted that intent is either present in the perpetrator or it is not; once the existence of intent has been accepted, a reduction of the penalty is not possible in this respect149. Moreover, in conditional intent the perpetrator remained indifferent to the secondary result that occurred and, as it were, willed this result; he took no action whatsoever to prevent this result constituting an offence from occurring, and he foresaw that, alongside the result he wished to bring about, different results might also occur, but regarded them as unimportant on the way to attaining his aim. It is precisely for this reason that he is deemed to have carried out the act knowingly and “willingly”.

The real reason why the second sentence of Art. 21(2) YTCK provides for a reduction of the penalty for conditional intent is the wish to make use of the theory of conditional intent in order to punish the perpetrator in traffic accidents, coupled with the wish, out of a sense of justice, to reduce the penalty. It must be stressed, however, that this gives rise to two errors at once from the theoretical point of view. The first of these is the fact that in traffic accidents the perpetrators act with conscious negligence. Indeed, the reason why the concept of negligence has gained so much importance over the last two hundred years, and why the concept of conscious negligence has emerged, is the development seen in machines in parallel with the advances in science and technology over these last two hundred years, the accidents that have occurred as a result, and the harm that individuals have suffered from them; and the instruments that have played the greatest part in these accidents and this harm are motor vehicles, which became widespread in the 20th century and are an inseparable part of modern life150. To disregard this fact and to accept the existence of conditional intent for traffic accidents in response to the reactions coming from public opinion constitutes the first error. The other error in this regard is that, by providing for a reduction, a gradation is introduced with regard to intent. Yet gradation may be valid for negligence. An individual may cause a result to occur through slight or gross negligence, and a gradation and a determination of the penalty on that basis may therefore be possible. Gradation of intent, by contrast, is not possible: a person either knows and wills an act and its result or does not know and does not will them. In short, intent is either present in a person or it is not; it is not possible for there to be something in between in the form of slight or gross. For this reason, introducing a gradation of intent by providing for a reduction of the penalty in respect of conditional intent gives rise to an error from the scientific and theoretical point of view.

For the reasons explained, there is nothing in conditional intent that would call for mitigation of the perpetrator’s penalty. The provision of the YTCK to this effect is likewise erroneous and incompatible with modern criminal law151.

C. General Intent – Specific Intent

As was also explained above under “the relationship between intent and motive (motivation)”, general intent and specific intent are also cited as types of intent. General intent (dolus generalis) is the type of intent that arises where the two elements of intent, “knowing” and “willing”, are present in the perpetrator. In specific intent, in addition to these elements of knowing and willing (general intent), it is also required that the perpetrator act out of a motivation when carrying out his act. Thus, specific intent is present in cases where the perpetrator acts out of a motivation152.

The inclusion of specific intent in the statutory definition of an offence serves, by taking account of the motive present in the perpetrator, to distinguish from one another offence types whose other elements are the same, or to influence the determination of the penalty153. However, specific intent may perform different functions in respect of each offence type; for this reason the function of specific intent must be determined separately for each offence type for whose commission its existence is required.

In some offence types motive has been included so that offence types realised by the same acts can be distinguished from one another. For example, a person who takes another’s movable property with the motive of benefiting from it commits the offence of theft (Art. 491 TCK, Art. 141 YTCK); a person who takes it with the motive of exercising a right which he claims over that property commits the offence of arbitrarily exercising one’s own right (Art. 308 TCK); and a person who gets hold of this property with the motive of damaging it commits the offence of damage to property (Art. 516 TCK, Art. 151 YTCK)154. As can be seen, the feature that distinguishes these offences from one another is the motive which the perpetrator has when committing the offence.

In addition, in some offence types motive is provided for as an aggravating circumstance, as for example in the offence of homicide committed with the motive of blood feud (Art. 450 sub-para. 10 TCK, Art. 82 para. i YTCK) or the offence of homicide committed with the motive of custom155 (Art. 82 para. j YTCK).

As a rule, the fact that specific intent is required for an offence to come into being is expressly stated in the statutory definition of the offence. Although it is stated in legal scholarship that, in cases where the law recognises a special unlawfulness, specific intent must be accepted because the perpetrator’s intent will relate to this special unlawfulness156, this is an interpretation that broadens the existence of specific intent and makes it more difficult for the offence to come into being; therefore, in cases where the perpetrator is not required to act from a particular motive and this is not expressly stated in the offence type, the existence of specific intent should not be accepted.

It should also be stated here once more that the use of the concept of “specific intent” for motive is not appropriate157. For where the law requires a motive, the element of “knowing and willing”, which may be described as “general intent” as against “specific intent”, is not dispensed with.

D. Sudden Intent – Deliberated Intent

It is stated that “sudden intent” is present where the perpetrator takes action and commits an offence as the result of a sudden decision, and that deliberated intent is present where there is a period of time between the formation of intent in the perpetrator and his commission of the offence and the perpetrator commits the offence after reflecting, during this intervening period, on the consequences of his act158.

This distinction is important in two respects. In premeditation, which is a form of deliberated intent with special features, there is no sudden intent, and time elapses between the perpetrator’s intent, formed upon prior reflection, and his carrying out of the act. However, premeditation is not present in every case in which there is deliberated intent; this matter will be examined in detail below.

The other respect in which the distinction is important concerns offences committed under the influence of unjust provocation (Art. 51 TCK; Art. 29 YTCK); for in order for unjust provocation to be accepted it is generally required that the perpetrator carried out his act with sudden intent.

1. Sudden Intent

When the perpetrator carries out an act defined as an offence in the criminal laws, he does so, as a rule, knowingly and willingly; and this comes about as the result of an awareness. That is to say, when carrying out his act the perpetrator acts knowing that it will constitute an offence and bearing this awareness. In some cases, however, the perpetrator may carry out his act constituting an offence without thinking about the kind of conduct by which it is to be carried out or about its consequences. In legal scholarship this situation is called sudden intent (dolus repentinus)159.

The commission of an offence with sudden intent may take the form of the perpetrator reaching his decision under the influence of some conduct or some remark, or it may take the form of a person who suddenly comes face to face with someone towards whom he has long harboured enmity taking action on a sudden decision. For this reason it cannot be said that in every case in which the perpetrator commits an offence with sudden intent a diminution has occurred in the perpetrator’s capacity of will and that this must therefore be assessed among the circumstances reducing culpability160. Consequently, in every specific case in which there is sudden intent, it must be examined whether or not there is a situation calling for the application of the rule on unjust provocation.

2. Deliberated Intent

a. In General

Apart from the perpetrator’s committing the offence with sudden intent as explained above, it is also possible for him, before committing the offence, to reflect on the acts of execution needed to do so and on the result that will ensue from those acts, and thereafter to commit the offence. In legal scholarship this is called deliberated intent (dolus deliberatus)161.

It is not possible to determine whether the basic manner in which offences are committed is sudden intent or deliberated intent. There are, however, views in legal scholarship to the effect that the basic manner of commission of an act defined as an offence in the law is that it is committed with the perpetrator knowing in advance the manner of its commission and willing its consequences, that is to say, deliberated intent162. If this view is accepted, however, it is not possible to explain why, in respect of some offence types, premeditation, which is a special manifestation of deliberated intent, is accepted as an aggravated form of the offence. It must therefore be stated that offences may be committed with deliberated intent just as they may be with sudden intent, and that this will differ in each specific case.

There are views in legal scholarship which accept that premeditation163, which is a special manifestation of deliberated intent, and deliberated intent are the same concept164; it must be stated once more, however, that while every premeditation is a deliberated intent, not every deliberated intent is a premeditation. This distinction having been emphasised here, premeditation, which is an important manifestation of deliberated intent, will be examined below.

b. Premeditation

It should first be noted that neither the TCK nor the YTCK contains a definition of premeditation, nor has any general provision on premeditation been made165. Premeditation is included in sub-paragraph 4 of Art. 450 TCK as an aggravated form of the offence of homicide, and in addition it is indicated, through the reference made by Art. 457 to Art. 450, that premeditation is provided for as an aggravating circumstance with regard to bodily harm. Likewise, sub-paragraph “a” of Art. 82 YTCK includes premeditation as an aggravated form of the offence of homicide.

Whether premeditation renders the offence of homicide aggravated is a matter of debate. Proceeding from the idea that the perpetrator’s committing the offence of homicide after planning it in advance and in cold blood shows the intensity of the intent present in him, it may be said that premeditation is an aggravated form of the offence of homicide166; but it may equally be said that in many cases a person who suddenly takes the decision to commit an offence is more dangerous, and his decision to commit the offence more intense, than a person who reflects on the commission of the offence, and that premeditation is therefore not an aggravated form of the offence of homicide167.

Two theories have been put forward that seek to explain why premeditation is regarded as an aggravated form. The first of these is the “cold-bloodedness theory” and the other is the “planning theory.”

i. The Cold-Bloodedness Theory

According to the cold-bloodedness theory, two elements must be present in premeditation. One of these is that there is an interval of time between the perpetrator’s decision to commit the offence and his starting to act; the other is that the perpetrator carries out his acts in cold blood168.

This theory has, however, been criticised on the grounds that cold-bloodedness is not an objective criterion but a mental state that varies from person to person169; that people living in countries with a hot climate are generally also hot-blooded, so that, if this theory were accepted, it could not be accepted that people living in those countries are capable of committing offences in cold blood, which is not logical; and further that premeditation is seen in very serious offences such as homicide, that in offences of this kind it is a very rare occurrence for the perpetrator to act in a completely unemotional manner without feeling any anger or passion, and that cold-bloodedness is a mental disorder alien to criminal law170.

ii. The Planning Theory

According to this theory, by contrast, the legal basis of premeditation is that, in the period between the perpetrator’s taking the decision to commit the offence and his taking action in order to carry it out, he gathers his thoughts directed at committing the offence and, by carrying out the offence according to a plan, makes it more feasible to bring about the result he aims at. What is meant by this plan is not that the perpetrator knows all the details relating to the act, but that he has knowledge, in broad outline, of the manner in which the offence is to be committed171.

Like the cold-bloodedness theory, the planning theory has also met with criticism. First, if, under the planning theory, the prior preparation of the means of committing the offence and the determination of the place where the offence is to be committed are required for the existence of premeditation to be accepted, premeditation would have to be accepted in a great many specific cases, which goes beyond the purpose of premeditation. On the other hand, it has been pointed out in the criticisms levelled at this theory that where the perpetrator has premeditated the offence he wishes to commit in accordance with the planning theory and, on his way to commit the offence, sees the victim in the street, flies into a rage and commits the offence at once in a manner that does not correspond to the plan he has made, it cannot be determined whether the perpetrator is to be held liable for aggravated homicide in the form of premeditation or for the basic form of the offence of homicide172.

The significance of the theories on premeditation explained above lies in determining whether or not premeditation and unjust provocation can exist side by side. For the rules on unjust provocation to be applicable to an act constituting an offence, the perpetrator must act in a state of “anger and distress”. If the cold-bloodedness theory is accepted in order to explain premeditation, premeditation and unjust provocation cannot be applied together, because being in a state of anger and distress and being cold-blooded cannot be present in the same person at the same time. If, on the other hand, the planning theory is accepted in order to explain premeditation, it may be possible for the perpetrator, under the influence of the unjust provocation he has suffered, to be seized by rage and distress and, under that influence, to commit an offence according to a plan, so that unjust provocation and premeditation can be applied together173.

Since in the criminal law scholarship of our country premeditation is explained by adopting the “planning theory”, it is accordingly accepted that premeditation and unjust provocation may be applied at the same time174.

In practice, however, the position is different: in some of its decisions the Court of Cassation, proceeding from the cold-bloodedness theory, states that the rules on unjust provocation cannot be applied in cases of premeditation175, whereas in other decisions, proceeding from the planning theory, it states that the rules on unjust provocation can be applied in cases of premeditation176. These decisions of the Court of Cassation vary over time, and from time to time the Court also decides by relying on more than one view instead of basing the legal foundation of premeditation on a single view177. However, in a view concerning practice which has also found its way into legal scholarship and which also appears in the dissenting opinions to decisions of the Court of Cassation, it is stated that the synthesising approach applied by the Spanish Supreme Court in this matter is compatible with our system of criminal law and that the application of this approach would be appropriate. According to this approach, in premeditation, “the presence has been required of intellectual elements such as prior planning within a more or less extended period of time, of psychological elements such as a decision in favour of execution as the final stage, and of chronological elements such as the existence of a legally appreciable period between reflection and execution, and it has been emphasised that these elements must emerge not from assumptions but from findings manifested externally”178. Accordingly, it has been stated that on this view too it is possible for premeditation and unjust provocation to exist side by side179.

The legal basis for providing for and regulating premeditation as an aggravated form of the offence of homicide is that the perpetrator carries out the offence he commits by making a plan; for cold-bloodedness is closely bound up with the characteristics of the individual, whereas an individual, whether he is cold-blooded or has a very impetuous and excitable personality, can commit the offence of homicide by making a plan in advance and acting according to that plan, and in this way the influence of the individual’s own characteristics on premeditation is excluded. The cold-bloodedness theory, by contrast, is a subjective approach, since the perpetrator’s being cold-blooded is an entirely individual characteristic and may vary according to the momentary psychological states in which the perpetrator finds himself. Although in the matter of culpability in criminal law it is the mental element pertaining to the individual who commits the offence that is made the subject of examination, this too must be placed on certain objective foundations valid for everyone; accordingly, the planning theory, which is a relatively objective approach, is preferred for the purpose of explaining the legal basis of premeditation.

Because it is accepted that the legal basis of premeditation is the planning theory, it is considered possible to apply both the rules on premeditation and the rules on unjust provocation to the same perpetrator in one case.

E. Intent Formed at the Outset – Supervening Intent

When the explanations concerning the element of knowing in intent were given above, it was stated that the perpetrator must know the elements relating to the offence he commits. In the same way, the perpetrator must also have the intent relating to the offence he wishes to commit from the moment he enters upon the path of the crime (iter criminis)180.

Where the perpetrator has the intent to commit the offence from the time he enters upon the path of the crime and begins to carry out his act until he completes it, “intent formed at the outset” is present in the perpetrator181.

In some cases, however, the perpetrator, in carrying out an act, first intended to commit one offence and then, in the face of the situation that subsequently arose, acted with a different intent and realised another offence type. This is so, for example, where a perpetrator who wishes to commit theft in a house he has entered in the belief that its owners are on holiday commits the offence of robbery by using violence when the occupants of the house resist.

In another situation the perpetrator, having begun his act with negligent conduct, continued it with intent in response to the events that unfolded. This is so, for example, where a perpetrator who, through his negligent conduct, has hit a person with his car and caused that person’s injury sees that the person he has hit is someone with whom he has a blood feud, leaves the victim in that state and, by his omission, causes the victim’s death.

A further possibility in this connection is that the perpetrator is initially in good faith and has no thought of committing an offence, but, in response to the situation that arises, intent is added to his conduct and he commits an offence. This is so, for example, where the perpetrator enters a dwelling with the consent of the person living there but subsequently does not leave the dwelling although he is asked to do so.

In the situations to which the examples given above relate, some authors state that the intent initially present in the perpetrator has now changed and that, in response to the new situation that has arisen, the perpetrator carries out his act with an intent added subsequently, and they call this “supervening intent” (dolus subsequens); according to the authors who hold this view, since in such cases the perpetrator commits a more serious offence with the supervening intent, the perpetrator’s liability is also to be determined according to the more serious offence182.

Some authors who think differently, on the other hand, state that it is not possible to accept such a type of intent, because the subjective elements of the offence must also be present while the objective elements of the offence are being realised; that in all the situations mentioned above the intent does not come into being subsequently but is present at the moment when the perpetrator realises the offence type that entails his liability for the intentional offence; in other words, that intent is always present at the outset183.

As can also be seen in the examples given above, before carrying out the acts relating to the offence type for which he is liable on account of his intent, the perpetrator acts either in good faith, or negligently, or with intent relating to another offence. These acts, which are not carried out with intent or are carried out with a different intent, are the acts that make up the conduct giving rise to the offence type which the perpetrator has realised and for whose results he is liable; yet when carrying out these acts the perpetrator is not acting with intent to commit an offence, or with intent to commit the offence for which he is liable. Once the decision to commit the offence has been formed and the acts relating to it are continued, intent in respect of this offence type is also present in the perpetrator, but this is not an intent that has been present from the beginning. For example, when the perpetrator enters the dwelling he has no thought of not leaving; his intent is formed at the moment he thinks of not leaving the dwelling, yet the beginning of the conduct of the offence, which takes the form of not leaving the dwelling, is the perpetrator’s presence in a dwelling which he entered with consent. For this reason it does not seem possible to agree with the view that such a type of intent should not be accepted. For when the offence types given as examples in this connection are examined, it is seen that the acts which the perpetrator carried out during the period in which he had no intent in respect of the offence type for which he is liable are acts contained in the statutory definition of the offence type that he committed with the intent formed subsequently.

The reason why, in supervening intent, the offence is regarded as a single offence is that a single offence type has been violated as a consequence of the act carried out by the perpetrator. As was also stated above on the subject of culpability, at the stage which criminal law has reached today it is not possible to punish a person’s mere culpability in the absence of an act. For this reason, even if the perpetrator acted with another intent or negligently before the intent he had in respect of the result for which he is liable, he is not punished for that culpability, because no act defined in the law came about as a result of that negligence or intent. In supervening intent, since the acts performed with the intent or negligence previously present in the perpetrator are also acts of the offence type to which the subsequently formed intent belongs, there is a single offence type and the perpetrator is held liable for that alone.

However, where supervening intent is cut short and the acts following the supervening intent do not constitute an offence, the explanations as to what the perpetrator’s liability will be must be given according to the threefold distinction set out above concerning the perpetrator’s situation. Accordingly, where the perpetrator was in good faith at the outset but, in response to the situation that arose, acted with intent being added to his conduct, the perpetrator will not be liable for the part up to the moment at which the intent was added, since those parts do not constitute an offence in any way. Where the perpetrator, having begun his act with negligent conduct, continued it with intent in response to the events that unfolded, then, since up to the moment at which the supervening intent was formed he acted negligently in his conduct and this part separately constitutes an offence, the perpetrator will be liable for this negligent conduct. In the last possibility, where the perpetrator, while acting with intent, changes his aim and commits another offence, he will be liable for the offence he first intended if that offence had been realised at the moment he abandoned his acts. Naturally, depending on the manner in which the offence remained incomplete between the supervening intent and the preceding part, an assessment will have to be made in each specific case with regard to effective remorse and attempt.

Another point to be made in this connection is the question of which intent the perpetrator is to be held liable for where, although he began his acts with an intent entailing a more serious result, he brings about an offence causing a less serious result. For example, where the perpetrator, because there is no one in a building he has entered in order to commit the offence of robbery, commits theft inside the building, the perpetrator will be liable not for the offence of robbery which he originally intended but for the offence of theft inside a building which he actually committed, since here again it is the perpetrator’s act that will be taken into account184.

F. Intent to Harm – Intent to Endanger

In legal scholarship some authors divide the intent to commit an offence present in the perpetrator into two, intent to endanger and intent to harm185, while other authors oppose dividing intent in this way186. Subjecting intent to such a distinction is not considered correct; for it is offence types that are subject to the distinction between harm and danger, and these are indicated in the statutory definition of the offence.

Once this distinction has been made in the offence type with regard to the result, the perpetrator’s intent can no longer be subjected to such a distinction. The perpetrator either has intent to commit the offence or he does not. If the perpetrator has intent to commit the offence, this means that he accordingly also wills the result in its statutory definition; whether, when the offence whose result the perpetrator wills is realised, harm will ensue or whether the mere occurrence of a state of danger suffices to constitute the offence is something that will be determined not by the perpetrator’s intent but by the statutory definition of the offence.

In short, by willing to commit the offence and having intent to that effect, the perpetrator accepts the result of the offence; beyond this he has no intent directed at bringing about a state of danger or a state of harm187.

G. Weber’s Intent

It is stated in legal scholarship that insignificant deviations in the causal link foreseen by the perpetrator in the course of the realisation of the offence do not affect the existence of intent188. This matter was first raised by Weber in 1825, and for that reason the situation in question has been called “Weberische Vorsatz” or “weberische dolus generalis”.

In the situation in question the perpetrator acts with intent to commit an offence and, although he performs the acts necessary for the offence to be realised, the result he wills does not occur; but the perpetrator, who is unaware that the result has not occurred, brings about the result he originally willed by a second act, usually performed in order to destroy the traces of the offence, this time without having any intent to that effect. This type of intent is also called subsequently formed intent189.

For example, a perpetrator acting with intent to kill a person strikes that person on the head with an iron bar and the victim collapses to the ground; the victim, however, does not die but loses consciousness. The perpetrator, believing the victim to be dead, either throws the victim into the sea or burns him in order to get rid of the body. As can be seen, the result which the perpetrator originally willed was brought about by his second act, which he did not perform with intent to kill.

In this situation, proceeding from the general intent present in the perpetrator, it is stated that the causal link is not important in the occurrence of the result brought about by the perpetrator’s second act and that the perpetrator’s intent has ultimately been realised, and it is accepted that this result falls within the perpetrator’s liability for intent190.

According to a different view, however, it is stated that in this situation two different offence types are realised – taking the example above as the starting point – namely attempted homicide, since the victim did not die as a result of the perpetrator’s first act, and negligent homicide, since killing was not willed in throwing the victim into the water or burning him, and that these must be assessed separately and the rules on concurrence of offences must not be applied191.

In this situation the perpetrator commits an offence by acting with intent in order to obtain the result he wishes and, after completing his act, performs a second act in order to erase the traces and, without knowing it, obtains the result by this act as well. When beginning his act the perpetrator has intent to commit the offence and, in all probability, had he known that the result he willed had not occurred, he would have performed knowingly and willingly the second act which he performed unknowingly and by which he brought about the result he willed; in any event, as a result of all the acts he carried out, the perpetrator attained the result he had willed at the very beginning; for this reason he must be held liable on account of the intent he had at the outset.

CONCLUSION

The first finding obtained as a result of this study is that, as was also stated in the introduction, culpability and its determination are indeed one of the most important and most difficult problems of criminal law; for in every explanation relating to culpability and to intent, which forms the subject of the examination, numerous theories have been put forward, yet none of them has been seen to gain any significant superiority over the others. Furthermore, the “determinism – indeterminism” debate, which was said at the beginning of the article to have been overcome, particularly as far as criminal law is concerned, has not been entered into, and “indeterminism”, that is, that a person decides and acts of his own free will, has been accepted as a postulate. In fact, from the standpoint of philosophy and, accordingly, of criminal law, which examines the will of the person who commits an offence, this great debate remains where it was, particularly with regard to culpability.

It must regrettably be stated that the work on making a new criminal code, which set out with a good aim, turned, in the course of an activity of non-legislation! seen nowhere else in the world, and within a period of a brevity likewise seen nowhere else in the world, on the ground of the effort to join the European Union, into “panic legislation” of a kind that ought not to have been; and an attempt was made to regulate a very important discipline of a country’s legal system, and the present and the future of millions of people in terms of their thoughts and conduct, in a manner incompatible with any scientific method.

This has led to erroneous provisions being made, alongside many other matters in criminal law, particularly on the subject of culpability, which is one of the greatest problems of criminal law, and to these errors not being corrected, on account of haste, despite the warnings.

After this finding of a general nature, it should be stated that the provisions made on intent in the YTCK are seen to be such as to give rise to far greater confusion on this subject. This situation is of a magnitude that will add new difficulties to those already existing from the theoretical point of view.

In particular, the fact that the definitions of conditional intent and conscious negligence have been drawn up incompletely and erroneously and that, in addition, the explanations and examples given on these matters in the explanatory memorandum of the law also contain errors appears liable to render the problem almost insoluble.

In these circumstances the solution to the problem is to amend Arts. 21 and 22 YTCK, which are the relevant provisions; failing this, as explained in detail above, erroneous decisions in practice will be inevitable and the new criminal code will continue to live with a major contradiction from the theoretical point of view. It must be stated again that, in accordance with the principle of legality of offences and penalties, the only solution in this matter is to amend these relevant articles of the law.

Apart from this, the types of intent whose existence is accepted in legal scholarship and which it has been sought to explain above will apply in exactly the same way with regard to the provisions contained in the YTCK.

As regards the YTCK as a whole, however, the proposal to be made is that this law be taken up again in parliament and that its erroneous and incomplete aspects, which it is already clear will cause it to malfunction, be corrected as soon as possible, in particular before it enters into force.

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Footnotes

  1. This article was published in Hukuk ve Adalet Eleştirel Hukuk Dergisi, Y: 2 S: 5, Nisan 2005, s.65–111. • Attorney-at-law; doctoral student in the Department of Public Law, Institute of Social Sciences, Istanbul University. ∗∗∗ The author owes a debt of gratitude to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yener Ünver, who, through the doctoral course entitled “culpability in criminal law” which he taught in the autumn term of the 2004-2005 academic year, contributed greatly to the understanding of the subject and to the genesis of this article, through the criticisms he made to bringing the article into a better state in scholarly terms, and, through his great and, as always, exemplary support, to the publication of the article. ↑
  2. Hyman Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice, New York, Oxford University Press, 1979, s.74. ↑
  3. Yener Ünver, “Ceza Hukukunda Objektif Sorumluluk”, Ceza Hukuku Günleri: 70. Yılında Türk Ceza Kanunu-Genel Hükümler (26-27 Mart 1997-İstanbul), İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1998, s.109. ↑
  4. In addition, in order for individuals to be held liable for the act they have carried out, they must also possess the capacity for culpability. The capacity for culpability is not, however, an element of the offence. Accordingly, within the theory of the offence the capacity for culpability must be placed in the part dealing with the law of liability. For if the capacity for culpability is accepted as an element of the offence, then, since no offence would come into being where the capacity for culpability is lacking, the legal basis on which security measures can be applied to the mentally ill or to children cannot be explained. If, by contrast, the capacity for culpability is assessed within the part dealing with the law of liability, it will be accepted that the offence has come into being even if the perpetrator lacks the capacity for culpability; the perpetrator who lacks the capacity for culpability will not be held liable for the result that has occurred, but he will be held liable in terms of sanctions and a security measure may be applied to him. In this respect it is accepted that adult individuals in particular possess the capacity for culpability, but where there are indications or submissions pointing to the existence of a situation to the contrary, this situation is investigated. ↑
  5. Yener Ünver, “Sebebinde Serbest Hareketler Kuramı”, Prof. Dr. Sahir Erman’a Armağan, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Eğitim, Öğretim ve Yardımlaşma Vakfı Yayını, 1999, s.801. ↑
  6. Timur Demirbaş, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 2. Baskı, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2005, s.310. ↑
  7. Richard Card, Card Cross and Jones Criminal Law, 16th Edition, Bedfordshire, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2004, s.54. This principle, referred to in short as “mens rea”, is accepted as one of the fundamental principles of criminal law, and it is stated that Lord Hailsham LC, who heard the case of Haughton v. Smith, said that it means “if the will is not guilty, the act does not make (the perpetrator) guilty”. ↑
  8. The legal systems of the countries which have also been taken as models in our country may be cited as examples of this. Thus, in Germany this principle has been raised to the status of a fundamental constitutional principle by the settled case law of the German Constitutional Court and of the Supreme Court (BGH). In Italy the principle of culpability is laid down in the Constitution as a norm of positive law. In France, in turn, culpability is accepted as the fundamental principle of punishability. Hans Heinrich Jescheck, “1989 Türk Ceza Kanunu Öntasarısının Genel Hükümleri Hakkında Karşılaştırmalı Bir İnceleme”, Çev: Adem Sözüer, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı İçin Müzakereler, Konya, Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1998, s.30. ↑
  9. Hans Joachim Hirsch, “Kusur İlkesi ve Ceza Hukukundaki Fonksiyonu”, Çev: Yener Ünver, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı İçin Müzakereler, Konya, Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1998, s.297, Jescheck, Karşılaştırmalı Bir İnceleme, s.37; Ünver, Sebebinde Serbest Hareketler Kuramı, s.803. ↑
  10. Ünver, Sebebinde Serbest Hareketler Kuramı, s.802. ↑
  11. Vesile Sonay Evik, “Ceza ve Ceza Yargılaması Hukuku Bağlamında Adil Yargılanma Hakkı”, Adil Yargılanma Hakkı ve Ceza Hukuku, Der: Yener Ünver, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004, s.287. ↑
  12. Kayıhan İçel, Ceza Hukukunda Taksirden Doğan Subjektif Sorumluluk, İstanbul, İÜHF Yayını, 1967, s.32; Kayıhan İçel/Süheyl Donay, Karşılaştırmalı ve Uygulamalı Ceza Hukuku, İstanbul, Filiz Kitabevi, 1993, s.39. ↑
  13. Sulhi Dönmezer/Sahir Erman, Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku, C.II, Yeniden Gözden Geçirilmiş Onbirinci Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1997, s.197 ↑
  14. Füsun Sokullu Akıncı, “Ceza Hukukunda Kusurluluk”, Ceza Hukuku Günleri: 70. Yılında Türk Ceza Kanunu-Genel Hükümler (26-27 Mart 1997-İstanbul), İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 1998, s.95,96. ↑
  15. Kayıhan İçel/Füsun Sokullu Akıncı/İzzet Özgenç/Adem Sözüer/Fatih Mahmutoğlu/Yener Ünver, Suç Teorisi, 2. Kitap, Yeniden Gözden Geçirilmiş İkinci Bası, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2000, s.198; Sokullu Akıncı, a.g.y., s.95. ↑
  16. Bahri Öztürk/Mustafa Ruhan Erdem/Veli Özer Özbek, Uygulamalı Ceza Hukuku ve Emniyet Tedbirleri Hukuku, Gözden Geçirilmiş ve Genişletilmiş Beşinci Baskı, Ankara, Seçkin Yayınevi, 2001, s.193; Sulhi Dönmezer, “Mukayeseli Hukukta Yasalaştırma Eğilimi ve İlkeleri”, İÜHFM Doğumunun 100. Yılında Atatürk’e Armağan Sayısı, İstanbul, C.XLV-XLVII, S.1-4, 1979-1980-1981, s.836. ↑
  17. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.198. ↑
  18. Mehmet Emin Artuk/Ahmet Gökçen/Caner Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler I, Üçüncü Baskı, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2002, s.582; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.197; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.198. ↑
  19. Ayhan Önder, Ceza Hukuku Dersleri, İstanbul, Filiz Kitapevi, 1992, s.267; Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.194. For the explanation of the principle of culpability in Germany given on the basis of the decisions of the highest courts, see: Klauss Tiedemann, “Objektif Cezalandırılabilme Şartları ve İflas Suçlarının Reformu”, Çev: Feridun Yenisey, İÜHFM, C:XLI, S:1-2, İstanbul, 1975, s.304-308. ↑
  20. In earlier periods it was seen that, in determining culpability with regard to the perpetrator, the perpetrator’s culpability for his entire life was also of influence. In Germany, for example, the rejection of culpability on account of the way of life as a factor in the determination of the penalty, and the express statement that the principle of culpability based on the act applies, came about with the criminal law reform of 1975, which is a relatively new and recent date. Hans Heinrich Jescheck, “Almanya’da Ceza Hukuku Reformu Genel Bölüm”, Çev: Teoman Oğuzhan, İÜHFM, İstanbul, C.XLIV, S.1-4, 1978, s.28. ↑
  21. Wolfgang Frisch, “Hukuk Devleti Ceza Hukukunda Cezalandırılabilirliğin Esaslı Şartları”, Çev: Hakan Hakeri, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı İçin Müzakereler, Konya, Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1998, s.125. ↑
  22. Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.194. ↑
  23. It is stated that in the Anglo-Saxon legal system the offence is divided into two parts, the material element and the mental element, and that the concept of “mens rea” is used as the equivalent of the mental element. It is further stated that the terms “guilty mind”, “scienter” or “criminal intent” are also used to correspond to this concept. Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law, Fourth Edition, St.Paul, Thomson/West, 2003, s.239. ↑
  24. Feyyaz Gölcüklü, “Criminal Law” Introduction to Turkish Law, Ed. Tuğrul Ansay, Don Wallace Jr., Ankara, Turhan Kiatbevi, 2000, s.167. ↑
  25. Nevzat Toroslu, “Cezai Sorumluluğun Gelişimi” YD, Ankara, C.16, No. 1-2, 1990, s.121. ↑
  26. Faruk Erem/Ahmet Danışman/Mehmet Emin Artuk, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, Tümüyle Gözden Geçirilmiş Ondördüncü Baskı, Ankara, Seçkin Yayınevi, 1997, s.429. ↑
  27. The other element required for criminal liability to arise is the “actus reus”, that is, the act. Card, a.g.e., s.55. ↑
  28. For details on this subject see: Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.201-205. ↑
  29. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.200; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.584. ↑
  30. İçel, a.g.e., s.11; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.201,202; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.585. ↑
  31. Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.310. ↑
  32. Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.310. ↑
  33. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.203. ↑
  34. İçel, a.g.e., s.14; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.430. ↑
  35. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.203; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.585. ↑
  36. Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.311. ↑
  37. Views opposing the punishment of negligent offences have also been put forward in legal scholarship; this view has generally been advocated by authors who explain culpability according to the psychological theory. According to this view, culpability consists in the result being willed by the perpetrator, and accordingly only intent can be a type of culpability. In conscious and unconscious negligence, by contrast, since the result is not willed, there is no culpability and consequently no offence comes into being either. In other words, acts carried out negligently do not constitute offences in the true sense. Only security measures and private-law sanctions should be applied to acts of this kind. For a detailed explanation of this subject see: Nevzat Toroslu, “Suçların Tasnifi Sorunu ve Taksirli Suçlar ile Kabahatler Konusunda Bazı Eğilimler”, Değişen Toplum ve Ceza Hukuku Karşısında TCK’nın 50 Yılı ve Geleceği, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1977, s.136; İçel, a.g.e., s.11,12,57,58. ↑
  38. Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.586. ↑
  39. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.203. ↑
  40. Frisch, a.g.y., s.124,125; Hirsch, a.g.y., s.298. ↑
  41. İçel, a.g.e., s.17; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.205; Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.311. ↑
  42. Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.311. ↑
  43. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.204. ↑
  44. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.205,206; Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.311. ↑
  45. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.206,207; Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.311. ↑
  46. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.208. ↑
  47. Ünver, Ceza Hukukunda Objektif Sorumluluk, s.109. ↑
  48. Ünver, Ceza Hukukunda Objektif Sorumluluk, s.110. ↑
  49. Some authors who take a different view, on the other hand, state that in the TCK culpability is divided into two, subjective liability and objective liability, and that subjective liability is in turn divided into three, namely intent, negligence and culpability in misdemeanours; whereas in the YTCK culpability is divided into three, namely intent, negligence and the offence aggravated by its result. See: Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.312. ↑
  50. A.P. Simester/G.R. Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, Second Edition, Oxford-Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2003, s.126. ↑
  51. Hans Heinrich Jescheck, “Türk Ceza Kanununun Ön Tasarısında Yer Alan Kusur İlkesinin Mukayeseli Hukuk Açısından İncelenmesi” İÜHFM, İstanbul, C.LIV, S.1-4, 1991-1994, s.21; Jescheck, Karşılaştırmalı Bir İnceleme, s.30. ↑
  52. Although Art. 23 YTCK, which governs liability for offences aggravated by their result, requires that the perpetrator must have acted at least negligently in order to be held liable for the result that has occurred, it may be argued that the case of objective liability has not been removed, because it is not expressly stated that there must be a “causal link” between the act carried out by the perpetrator and the result that has arisen. It may, however, also be argued that, by the expression “where he causes” in the article in question, it is indicated that a causal link must exist between the act performed by the perpetrator and the grave result that has occurred. In our view, the second of these views should be adopted and, with regard to the “offence aggravated by its result” governed by Art. 23 YTCK, both the perpetrator’s negligent conduct and a causal link between the act he performed and the grave result that has occurred should be required. However, the fact that it is not expressly stated in the article that a causal link is required may create problems in practice, and punishment may be imposed, without this causal link being required, merely upon establishing that the perpetrator acted negligently, which in our view would amount to the creation in practice of a case of objective liability that does not exist in the law; in this way the practice might erroneously be continued in this respect as though there were no difference between the YTCK and the TCK. For this reason the article of the law must be interpreted and applied in line with the second view stated above. Moreover, although this situation is generally called a “case of objective liability” in legal scholarship, it is stated in legal scholarship, on sound grounds, that this is a mistaken view and that “negligence, the exceeding of intent and offences aggravated by their result” are cases of subjective liability. For this reason a causal link must be required in offences aggravated by their result. Since it is not clearly expressed in the provision of Art. 23 YTCK that a causal link is required, the case of objective liability may continue – especially if attention is not paid to this point in practice. See: Ünver, Ceza Hukukunda Objektif Sorumluluk, s.111,112. ↑
  53. Gölcüklü, a.g.y., s.168. ↑
  54. Veli Özer Özbek, “5237 Sayılı Yeni Türk Ceza Kanunu’nun Teşebbüs ve Kusurluluğa İlişkin Hükümlerinin Değerlendirilmesi”, Kazancı Hukuk İşletme ve Maliye Bilimleri Dergisi, İstanbul, S.5,Ocak 2005, s.28; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.229. ↑
  55. The fact that many acts formerly regulated as “misdemeanours” are treated as offences in the YTCK is another aspect of this law that calls for criticism. Although this is a matter relating to the criminal policy pursued by the legislature, what is meant by the tendency to decriminalise misdemeanours, which is said to prevail in modern criminal codes, is not that the acts regulated in criminal codes under the name of misdemeanours should be regulated anew under the name of offences, but that they should be regulated as acts entailing an administrative fine which are governed by a separate law. ↑
  56. Sokullu Akıncı, a.g.y., s.97. ↑
  57. Friedrich-Christian Schroeder, “Taksirin Kanunen Tanımlanmasına İlişkin Problemler”, Çev: İzzet Özgenç, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı İçin Müzakereler, Konya, Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1998, s.257; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.256. ↑
  58. Schroeder, a.g.y., s.257; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.244; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.256; Özbek, a.g.y., s.28. ↑
  59. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.229. ↑
  60. Sokullu Akıncı, a.g.y., s.96; Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.201. ↑
  61. Michael J. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, London, Blackstone Press Limited, 1999, s.52,53. ↑
  62. Durmuş Tezcan/Mustafa Ruhan Erdem, “Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi’nin TCK Tasarısı Hakkındaki Raporu”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Reformu: İkinci Kitap: Makaleler, Görüşler, Raporlar, Der: Teoman Ergül, Ankara, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, 2004, s.340. ↑
  63. Nevzat Toroslu/Yüksel Ersoy, “Kanunlaşmaması Gereken Bir Tasarı”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Reformu: İkinci Kitap: Makaleler, Görüşler, Raporlar, Der: Teoman Ergül, Ankara, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, 2004, s.10. ↑
  64. Erdener Yurtcan, Yeni Türk Ceza Kanunu ve Yorumu, İstanbul, Kazancı Yayıncılık, 2004, s.66,67. ↑
  65. Önder, a.g.e., s.315. ↑
  66. For a detailed explanation of the objective duty of care see: Friedrich-Christian Schroeder, Die Fahrlässigkeit als Erkennbarkeit der Tatbestandverwirklichung, Juristenzeitung 1989, 776 vd; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.249,250. ↑
  67. Önder, a.g.e., s.316. ↑
  68. Schroeder, a.g.y., s.259. ↑
  69. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.248,249; Önder, a.g.e., s.318,319. ↑
  70. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.245,246; Önder, a.g.e., s.320. ↑
  71. Önder, a.g.e., s.320. ↑
  72. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.210; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.443; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.589. ↑
  73. Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.443. ↑
  74. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.211,212; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.444; Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.313; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.590. ↑
  75. Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.590. ↑
  76. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.212; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.444; Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.313; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.590. ↑
  77. Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.590,591. ↑
  78. Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.444. This view has been adopted in particular by Italian criminal law scholars such as Mezger, Pannain, Antolisei, Ranieri, Bettiol, De Marsico and Maggiore. ↑
  79. Card, a.g.e., s.90. ↑
  80. Sami Selçuk, Karşıoylarım: Hukukumuzda Tartışılan Hükümler ve İçtihatlar, Der: Cengiz Otacı, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 2001, s.45; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.230; Önder, a.g.e., s.294; Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.202. ↑
  81. Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.591. ↑
  82. Önder, a.g.e., s.294. ↑
  83. In legal scholarship and in practice the concepts of “consciousness and will” are also used as equivalents of the concepts of “knowing and willing”. See: Selçuk, a.g.e., s.45. ↑
  84. “The knowing and willing of the elements in the statutory definition must be understood as the knowing and willing of the descriptive and evaluative (normative) elements contained in the statutory offence type.” Özbek, a.g.y., s.28. ↑
  85. Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.203; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.592. ↑
  86. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.230; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.216; Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.314. ↑
  87. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.216; Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.314. ↑
  88. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.216. ↑
  89. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.216. ↑
  90. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.231; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.216. ↑
  91. For a detailed examination, in terms of act and result, of offences of commission by omission (non-genuine offences of omission) and of offences of omission, see: Manfred Maiwald, “İcrai ve İhmali Davranış – Bir Başkası İçin Hareket Etmek”, Çev: Cumhur Şahin, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı İçin Müzakereler, Konya, Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1998, s.163-171. ↑
  92. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.217. ↑
  93. Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.314. ↑
  94. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.230,231; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.216,217. ↑
  95. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.231. ↑
  96. For details on the cases of mistake as to the person and of deviation, see: Önder, a.g.e., s.331-337. ↑
  97. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.231,232. ↑
  98. Although this situation is generally called a “case of objective liability” in legal scholarship, it is stated in legal scholarship, on sound grounds, that this is a mistaken view and that “negligence, the exceeding of intent and offences aggravated by their result” are cases of subjective liability. See: Ünver, Ceza Hukukunda Objektif Sorumluluk, s.111,112. ↑
  99. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.233; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.218. ↑
  100. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.231. ↑
  101. Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.203; Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.314. ↑
  102. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.219; Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.314. ↑
  103. Önder,a.g.e., s.295; Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.204. ↑
  104. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.219; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.315. ↑
  105. Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.204. ↑
  106. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.239; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.226; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.448; Önder,a.g.e., s.304; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.448; Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.207; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.319,324; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.603. ↑
  107. Selçuk, a.g.e., s.45. ↑
  108. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.226; Önder,a.g.e., s.304; Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.207; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.319; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.603. ↑
  109. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.239. ↑
  110. Some authors in legal scholarship draw a threefold distinction in the form of “purpose, aim and motive”; according to this, the motive is the reason that leads the perpetrator to take action, and it is by determining the perpetrator’s motive that it will be possible to understand why the offence was committed; the purpose is the result which conforms to the type contained in the statutory definition and which the perpetrator wills, as the outcome of his acts, for the offence to come into being; the aim, in turn, is the benefit which the perpetrator wishes to obtain beyond this result. The following example has been given so that these concepts may be better understood: “For instance, in the example where (B), who, in order to obtain a document which (A) has not returned, wishes to get hold of the wallet in which that document is kept, kills (A), the wish to obtain the document is the motive, getting hold of the wallet and the document is the aim, and the killing of (A) is the purpose.” See: Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.224-226; Selçuk, a.g.e., s.45. In this explanation the states of consciousness which the perpetrator experiences in the commission of an offence have in fact been set out and an attempt has been made to identify them by means of different concepts. In order not to cause confusion in our explanations, however, we are not concerned with the process to which criminal law attaches no consequences and which is designated as the “aim” in this distinction. Accordingly, as is generally done in legal scholarship, we use the terms motive, motivation and aim to denote the same concept. ↑
  111. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.238; Önder,a.g.e., s.305; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.603. ↑
  112. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.239; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.226; Önder, a.g.e., s.305; Selçuk, a.g.e., s.45. ↑
  113. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.231; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.448; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.319. “Specific intent distinguishes from one another certain offences whose material element is the same. For example, if the ‘material act’ of abducting a person is committed out of ‘lust’ (Art. 429 TCK), it is an offence against ‘public morals’; if it is committed in order to have a sum of money paid to oneself (Art. 499 TCK), it is an offence against ‘property’; and if it is committed from other motives (Art. 182 TCK), it is an offence against ‘personal liberty’.” Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.448. “The inclusion of motive as an element of the offence is important in that the perpetrator’s acting from a particular motive serves to distinguish that offence from similar offences.” Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.319. ↑
  114. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.226; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.319; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.603. “As a rule, motive is not an element required for the offence to come into being. In general, the law requires only that the act be committed knowingly and willingly (general intent). However, regarding general intent as sufficient for the punishment of offenders is not in keeping with the present-day conception of criminal policy. Indeed, contemporary criminal law has made the reform and treatment of the offender, and hence the individualisation of punishment, its aim. For this purpose the personality of the offender must be known and the motives that drove the perpetrator to the offence must be understood.” Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.603. ↑
  115. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.239. ↑
  116. Önder,a.g.e., s.308. ↑
  117. Allen, a.g.e., s.49,50; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.235. ↑
  118. Card, a.g.e., s.90,91. ↑
  119. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.234; Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.205. ↑
  120. Allen, a.g.e., s.49. ↑
  121. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.235; Allen, a.g.e., s.50. ↑
  122. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.222,223. ↑
  123. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.235; Önder,a.g.e., s.296; Card,a.g.e., s.92. ↑
  124. Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.453. However, these authors state that indirect intent may be understood in two ways: that according to one view indirect intent is understood to mean the situation in which intent is exceeded, and that according to another view indirect intent is understood to mean conditional intent. ↑
  125. Allen,a.g.e., s.48. ↑
  126. Önder,a.g.e., s.298; Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.205; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.598. ↑
  127. Önder,a.g.e., s.298. ↑
  128. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.238; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.221. ↑
  129. Önder,a.g.e., s.299. ↑
  130. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.238. ↑
  131. Önder,a.g.e., s.296. ↑
  132. For similar definitions see: Schroeder, a.g.y., s.261,262; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.245,246; Önder,a.g.e., s.320. ↑
  133. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.244,245. ↑
  134. It must be noted, however, that conscious negligence cannot be said to exist in every case in which the perpetrator is under the influence of alcohol; to accept this would be an objective approach. In each specific case, the act committed negligently by the perpetrator and the effect on that act of the alcohol voluntarily consumed by the perpetrator must be examined, and it must be decided on the basis of that assessment whether conscious negligence applies in the specific case. Nevertheless, following the “erroneous” definition of conscious negligence contained in paragraph 3, added to Art. 45 TCK by Art. 1 of Law No. 4785 of 08.01.2003, and the statements made on this subject, a belief has formed in society that the perpetrator will be deemed to have acted with conscious negligence “as a result of every traffic accident occurring after alcohol has been consumed”. As stated above, this is a mistaken view. It must be repeated that, just as the voluntary consumption of alcohol is by no means required for conscious negligence to exist, so it cannot be said that conscious negligence exists in every case in which alcohol has been voluntarily consumed. Whether it exists must be assessed in each specific case. ↑
  135. “When the incident is considered in the light of these explanations on the concepts of intent and negligence, according to the accused’s defence set out above, the contrary of which could not be proved, the accused had no will directed at the result of death. For the accused maintains in his defence that he was joking, and the course of events is understood from the defence. When, at the first stage, in the psychological state into which he had fallen in the belief that the deceased had died, the accused went to the coffee house without opening the oven door, he did not want the deceased to die from lack of air. This is a case in which the result occurred although the accused did not want the result. In other words, it is not possible, save for the exceptions (Art. 45(2) TCY), to hold the perpetrator liable for a result that he did not will. Moreover, there was no enmity between the parties such as would call for a killing, and since the act described was based on a joke, the offence corresponding to Art. 455 TCY has been committed. In the incident there is no criminal intent; what exists is a state of grave and intensified negligence. This being so, the local court, exercising its discretion in the application when determining the basic sentence, should impose a sentence at the upper limit and thereby reach a just outcome corresponding to the act. For the reasons explained, since the accused’s act constitutes the offence corresponding to Art. 455 TCY based on gross negligence, it must be decided to quash the judgment of the local court persisting in its original decision.”YCGK, K.t. 09.04.1990, E.1990/1-60 K.1990/108, YKD., Temmuz 1990, s.1066-1073. For the opposing view see: However, O. Kadri Keskin, the member of the Assembly who wrote a dissenting opinion to this decision, rightly stated in his dissent that what existed in the specific case was not “unconscious negligence” but “conditional intent” and that the perpetrator should be held liable and punished accordingly. Likewise Sahir Erman, in his work on the subject, criticised this decision and stated that there was “conditional intent” here. Sahir Erman, Ceza Hukuku Özel Bölüm: Kişilere Karşı İşlenen Suçlar, İstanbul, Dünya Yayıncılık, 1994, s.22 dn.41. ↑
  136. “…The accused and the deceased woman Arife Gider were officially married; the accused’s nephew Hamdi and the deceased woman entered into a relationship, went from the district of Taşova to Bornova and began to live together. Although the accused and the deceased woman had agreed to divorce, the accused also applied to the public prosecutor’s office and lodged a complaint on account of the offence of adultery. Angered by this, the deceased Arife began from time to time to telephone the accused, telling him that they were happy and recounting the details of her sexual relations with Hamdi, and thus to distress the accused; under the influence of what he was told, the accused decided to kill his wife Arife. On the day of the incident the accused, who had come from Taşova armed with a pistol to the patisserie where Arife worked in the district of Bornova, fired 2 shots at his wife and hit her, and with the shots he fired subsequently he also killed, with a single bullet, Mustafa Musa Kayaoğlu, who had stepped in between in order to protect Arife and to stop the accused…Since it is understood that the accused, having hit the deceased woman with his first shots, saw, while continuing to fire at her, the deceased man, who had stepped in between and wanted to stop him, and, in circumstances in which it was foreseeable that he too would be hit, continued his shots at the deceased woman without sparing the deceased man and without taking care to get him out of the way, and that in the course of this he also brought about the shooting of the deceased man owing to some mishap such as a slip, a ricochet or a deflection; the decision of the Special Chamber to the effect that Arts. 448, 51(2) and 59 must be applied, by reference to Art. 52 TCK, in respect of the death of the deceased man is correct.” YCGK, K.t. 04.02.1997, E.1996/1-300 K.1997/4, cited in Selçuk, a.g.e., s.71,72. For the opposing view see: However, Sami Selçuk, the member of the Assembly who wrote a dissenting opinion to this decision, rightly stated in his dissent that what existed in the specific case was not a “mistake of fact” but “conditional intent” and that the perpetrator should be held liable and punished accordingly. Selçuk, a.g.e., s.72. ↑
  137. “...It has been established that arguments arose between the accused İbrahim, who lived in the house inherited from his father together with his brother-in-law Bülent and the latter’s family, and Bülent, because the house was not sufficient for two families; that the accused İbrahim, under the influence of these arguments, decided to burn down the house in which they lived together; that, in order to achieve this aim, he went to the forest area above the house and set fire to the dried grass, but the fire advanced not towards the house but towards the forest; that as a result a forest area of 875 m2, which was found to lie within the forest on the national map sheet no. İzmir L-20-94 and was determined to be degraded oak coppice in compartment no. 143 of the management plan, was burnt; that the distance of the burnt area from the house at the nearest point was 15 metres; and that, since there was no brushwood between the two points and the ground was uneven, there was no possibility of the house burning even if the fire had broken out at the point nearest to the house. Although the accused argued that his aim was not to burn the forest, it is understood from the evidence gathered that the area where the fire was started was forest land; that, given the starting point of the fire, it was inevitable that some forest land would burn even if the house burnt; that it must be accepted that the accused, who, although he foresaw that the forest would burn, did not desist from his act and voluntarily started the fire, also wanted the possible results of his act to occur; and that, even if they lie outside his purpose, as regards the results linked to the aim by a bond of necessity or of probability, the perpetrator is liable for intent, within the framework of the rules on (indeterminate intent), for the forest fire that occurred.” YCGK, K.t. 09.07.2002, E.2002/3-197 K.2002/288, (Kazancı Otomasyon Yazılımı). ↑
  138. In paragraph 3, added to Art. 45 TCK by Art. 1 of Law No. 4785 of 08.01.2003, conscious negligence was defined as follows: “there is conscious negligence where the result occurs although the perpetrator does not will the result he has foreseen”. ↑
  139. The definition of conditional intent in the YTCK has been criticised on the grounds that this subject is still disputed in legal scholarship and that a statutory definition would hinder the development of scholarship. Erol Cihan, “TCK Tasarısının ‘Ceza Hukuku’nun Amacı’ İle ‘Olası Kast’ Açısından Değerlendirilmesi”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı: Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Temmuz 2004): İstanbul Barosu-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Eylül 2004): Kurumsal Raporlar-Toplantılara Sunulan Raporlar-Bilimsel Raporlar, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu-Galatasaray Üniversitesi-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Ortak Yayını, 2004, s.30; Yurtcan, a.g.e., s.67. ↑
  140. Köksal Bayraktar/Önder Öztürel/Pınar Memiş, “Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı Genel Hükümleri”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı: Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Temmuz 2004): İstanbul Barosu-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Eylül 2004): Kurumsal Raporlar-Toplantılara Sunulan Raporlar-Bilimsel Raporlar, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu-Galatasaray Üniversitesi-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Ortak Yayını, 2004, s.33; Toroslu/Ersoy, a.g.y., s.10; Özbek, a.g.y., s.28,29; ↑
  141. Mehmet Emin Artuk/Ali Rıza Çınar, “Yeni Bir Ceza Kanunu Arayışları ve Adalet Alt Komisyonu Tasarısı Üzerine Düşünceler”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Reformu: İkinci Kitap: Makaleler, Görüşler, Raporlar, Der: Teoman Ergül, Ankara, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, 2004, s.75,76; Toroslu/Ersoy, a.g.y., s.10. ↑
  142. Some authors state that the confusion, in the definition of conditional intent, of the willing that must be present in intent with foreseeing may lead to unjust results. Ümit Kocasakal/Fehmi Demir/Mehmet İpek, “Kişilere Karşı Suçlar”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı: Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Temmuz 2004): İstanbul Barosu-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Eylül 2004): Kurumsal Raporlar-Toplantılara Sunulan Raporlar-Bilimsel Raporlar, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu-Galatasaray Üniversitesi-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Ortak Yayını, 2004, s.49. ↑
  143. Köksal Bayraktar, “Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı’na İlişkin Genel Bir Değerlendirme ve Genel Hükümler Üzerine Birkaç Eleştiri”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Reformu: İkinci Kitap: Makaleler, Görüşler, Raporlar, Der: Teoman Ergül, Ankara, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, 2004, s.30, Tezcan/Erdem, a.g.y., s.340. ↑
  144. A similar definition has been given in legal scholarship as follows: “If the perpetrator, although he foresaw the result, carried out the act while accepting the risk that this result might occur, there is conditional intent” Yurtcan, a.g.e., s.67. ↑
  145. Artuk/Çınar, a.g.y., s.76. ↑
  146. “A bus driver travelling on the road wishes to pass through the junction without stopping although the traffic light is red for him; however, he hits pedestrians who are crossing the junction with the light green for them, and causes the death or injury of one or more of them. The driver, for whom the traffic light was red, saw that people were passing over the pedestrian crossing at every moment; nevertheless, he did not stop at the junction and continued on his way. In this case the bus driver, foreseeing that the results of death or injury which occurred might come about, accepted them.” For the explanatory memorandum of the law and the example see: Yeni Türk Ceza Kanunu, Der: Erdener Yurtcan, 3. Bası, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 2005, s.59. ↑
  147. “While those attending the ceremony at a wedding house are firing their pistols one after another towards the ceiling of the room, one person, under the influence also of the alcohol he has consumed, loses control of the direction of his hand, and as a result a bullet from one of the shots he fires parallel to the ground hits one of those attending the ceremony in the forehead and causes his death. In this example the person foresaw that the bullets from the shots he fired might hit anyone present there; nevertheless, he continued to fire his weapon. Here too the perpetrator, while firing his weapon, accepted the results of injury or death that would arise.” For the example see: Yurtcan, Yeni Türk Ceza Kanunu, s.59. ↑
  148. Bayraktar, a.g.y., s.31. ↑
  149. To the same effect see: Duygun Yarsuvat/Köksal Bayraktar/Necmi Yüzbaşıoğlu/Erdoğan Bülbül/Ümit Kocasakal/E. Eylem Aksoy/Pınar Memiş/Gülşah Kurt/Çağla Tansuğ/Didem Yılmaz, “Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı Hakkında Galatasaray Üniversitesinin Görüşü”, Türk Ceza Kanunu Tasarısı: Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Temmuz 2004): İstanbul Barosu-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Toplantısı (10 Eylül 2004): Kurumsal Raporlar-Toplantılara Sunulan Raporlar-Bilimsel Raporlar, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu-Galatasaray Üniversitesi-Türk Ceza Hukuku Derneği Ortak Yayını, 2004, s.125. ↑
  150. Demirbaş,a.g.e., s.317. ↑
  151. Schroeder, a.g.y., s.255. ↑
  152. Bayraktar, a.g.y., s.30; Artuk/Çınar, a.g.y., s.76; Tezcan/Erdem, a.g.y., s.340; Özbek, a.g.y., s.29. ↑
  153. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.231. ↑
  154. Selçuk, a.g.e., s.45. ↑
  155. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.231. ↑
  156. It should be noted here that treating the commission of the offence of homicide “with the motive of custom” as an aggravated form of the offence is mistaken from the point of view of criminal law technique. On account of certain social needs experienced in our country, the aim may have been to increase deterrence by punishing acts carried out with this motive more severely; however, the concept of “custom” is a very broad concept which has no complete definition, which varies from culture to culture even among the citizens of one country living on the same territory, and which has ethical, sociological and psychological aspects. To include a concept so broad and incapable of clear definition as an aggravated form of an important offence type, and thereby to increase the penalty for it, is contrary to the principle of certainty, an important rule of the Continental European legal system, and consequently to the principle of legality of offences and penalties ↑
  157. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.231. ↑
  158. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.239. ↑
  159. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.233; Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.208. ↑
  160. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.241,242; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.233; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.448; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.605. ↑
  161. For the opposing view see: İçel vd., a.g.e., s.242. ↑
  162. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.233; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.449. ↑
  163. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.242. ↑
  164. It has also been argued in legal scholarship that “premeditation is a severe form of intent”; see: Sulhi Dönmezer, “İçtihatlarla Kan Gütme Saiki”, İÜHFM Ord. Prof. Dr. Ernst E. Hirsch’e Armağan Sayısı, C:XLII, S:1-4, İstanbul, 1976, s.9. However, as stated above, since it is not possible to grade intent, it is not appropriate to say of premeditation that it is a severe form of intent. For this reason premeditation is described only as a special manifestation of intent. The reason why a heavier penalty is imposed for premeditation than for an offence committed with intent is not the “severity of the intent” in the perpetrator, but the intensity of his determination in committing the offence and the fact that, by making a plan for the offence, he renders its commission easy and certain. ↑
  165. Önder,a.g.e., s.308. ↑
  166. In legal scholarship, by contrast, premeditation is defined as follows: “Premeditation is the name given to the volitional process which, in the final analysis, is uninterrupted, obstinate, irreversible and unchanging in nature and in which, between a decision to commit a felony [offence] that is taken after prior reflection, that is understood from the external indications which emerge to be directed, in a manner not giving rise to confusion (iltibas), at committing a particular felony [from the point of view of the YTCK ‘a particular offence’], that underlines the dangerousness of the perpetrator and the intensity of the intent, that is not necessarily based on a reprehensible motive, and that is prepared according to a plan and for that reason makes the victim’s defence more difficult, and the carrying out of that decision, there is at most a period of time such as can be perceived and legally assessed, and which therefore has a psychological, chronological and intellectual structure.” Selçuk,a.g.e., s.50. ↑
  167. In Anglo-Saxon law too, premeditation is provided for as an aggravated form of the offence of homicide and is punished with a heavier penalty than the offence of homicide committed with sudden intent. John Kaplan/Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law Cases and Materials, Canada, Little, Brown & Company (Canada) Limited, 1986, s.294,295. ↑
  168. Önder,a.g.e., s.308,309. ↑
  169. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.236; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.242; Önder,a.g.e., s.309; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.319; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.607. ↑
  170. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.243; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.320. ↑
  171. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.236,237. ↑
  172. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.237; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.242; Önder,a.g.e., s.309; Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.209; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.320. ↑
  173. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.243; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.237,238; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.320. ↑
  174. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.237,238. ↑
  175. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.244; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.240; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.603; Önder,a.g.e., s.309,310; Öztürk/Erdem/Özbek, a.g.e., s.208; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.321. ↑
  176. “Premeditation is the perpetrator’s committing the act, without abandoning his intention, after having thought the matter over coolly and calmly before committing an offence which he intends to commit.” 1. CD. Kt. 01.07.1971 E.1971/2163 K.1971/2474; cited in Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.239; “Premeditation, according to the decisions of the Court of Cassation, means the will to prepare the offence in cold blood…” Dönmezer, Kan Gütme Saiki, s.2. ↑
  177. “Where the conditions are met, premeditation and unjust provocation may coincide.” YCGK Kt. 15.04.1968, 1-252/137; cited in Önder, a.g.e., s.311. ↑
  178. “For it to be accepted that the offence was committed with premeditation, the accused must have decided beforehand to kill the victim, must have shown insistence and perseverance in that decision, a period of time must have elapsed between the premeditation and the execution, and he must have killed without going back on that decision…In the incident described, however, there is no evidence against the accused to the effect that he took the decision to kill before the theft from the victim’s house on the day of the incident or before the day of the incident. According to the accused’s defence, the contrary of which has not been established, the fact that he went to the scene a few days after the killing and hid the body in a disused well shows that he did not think and act coolly and according to a plan before the incident. There is no evidence, beyond assumption, that the pistol was obtained for the purpose of killing the victim. A judgment cannot be founded on assumptions. The words ‘Pendik will be too small for the two of us’, which the accused said to the victim’s mother in the days before the incident, referring to the victim, are a verbal reaction to the victim’s continuing his relationship with İrem. These words cannot be regarded as proof that the accused pursued the aim of killing and made plans to that end. Accordingly, since there is no definite and sufficient evidence, free from all doubt, showing the existence of premeditation, namely that the accused coolly took the decision to kill because the person killed did not break off his relationship with İrem, who was also the accused’s lover, that he procured a weapon for this purpose, followed the victim on the day of the incident and took him into his car, and that, although enough time passed to cover a distance of 150-200 km by car from there, he did not go back on his decision to kill but persistently carried it out, the accused’s act constitutes the offence of intentional homicide committed in a sudden fit of anger.” YCGK Kt. 26.09.1995, 1-233/258; cited in Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.321. ↑
  179. Selçuk, a.g.e., s.30,31 ↑
  180. “In our case, the matter in dispute is premeditation (taammüt). This concept is not defined in the Turkish Criminal Code [TCK No. 765]. However, the Turkish Criminal Code, which was taken from Italy, was interpreted in the Ankara and İstanbul Faculties of Law, in the early Republican period, according to French criminal law. This was an easy and mistaken path. For the French Criminal Code had been born as a reaction to canon law and differed from the system of the source Zanardelli Code, which emerged as a code of synthesis in a different legal time and place. For that reason, the interpretations under the French Criminal Code cannot be carried over as they stand to the Italian Criminal Code. Indeed, Art. 296 of the French Criminal Code of 1810, which is now no longer in force, also provided for homicide with premeditation or by lying in wait as murder (aggravated homicide, assassinat). In Art. 297 premeditation was conceived on a psychological plane. In Art. 298, on the other hand, a phenomenon very close to premeditation, namely lying in wait, was defined. It can be seen that the system of the French Criminal Code corresponds to the psychological definition, that is, to the foundation of cold-bloodedness. That is why, in that country, scholarship and practice developed in this direction and in conformity with the system. In the Italian criminal system, by contrast, what premeditation is has been left to the trial judge. Italian scholarship and practice likewise developed in line with the essence of the system, and the element of cold-bloodedness was pushed aside. For that reason unjust provocation and premeditation can coexist in Italy and in Türkiye, and this practice is correct. It cannot be denied, however, that the practice in Türkiye, which frequently has recourse to the criterion of cold-bloodedness and wavers between the French system and the Italian system, creates an internal contradiction. In order to overcome this impasse, the Turkish Court of Cassation must first of all establish and define the elements of premeditation one by one, and must also review the decisions of the courts of first instance in the light of these.” Selçuk, a.g.e., s.33. ↑
  181. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.227; İçel vd., a.g.e., s.239,240. ↑
  182. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.227; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.322; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.452; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.600. ↑
  183. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.240; Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.227,228; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.322,323; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.452,453; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.600-602. ↑
  184. Önder,a.g.e., s.312. ↑
  185. İçel vd., a.g.e., s.241. ↑
  186. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.232,233; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.325; Erem/Danışman/Artuk, a.g.e., s.454; Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.612. ↑
  187. Önder,a.g.e., s.312. ↑
  188. As a contrary and different view, it is stated that intent to endanger and offences of endangerment are different concepts: “Intent to endanger must not be confused with offences of endangerment. Just as an offence of harm may be committed with intent to endanger, so an offence of endangerment may be committed with intent to harm. For example, in the offence of agreeing with a foreigner for war to be declared against Türkiye, regulated in Art. 304(1) New TCK (Art. 127 TCK No. 765), danger is sufficient; because an offence of endangerment has been provided for here.” Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.323. To the same effect see: Artuk/Gökcen/Yenidünya, a.g.e., s.612. However, this explanation and the example have no connection with the intent of the perpetrator. ↑
  189. Önder, a.g.e., s.301. ↑
  190. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.228; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.326. ↑
  191. Önder,a.g.e., s.301; Demirbaş, a.g.e., s.326. ↑
  192. Dönmezer/Erman, a.g.e., C.II, s.228,229. ↑

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