17 May 2019Murat Volkan DülgerCommentary

Introduction

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

For a long time Türkiye’s public agenda was dominated by the case of a teacher named Ayşe Çelik, who called in to Beyaz Show by telephone and said “Everything is being reported very differently; I mean, I really cannot speak. Do not stay silent; as human beings, approach this with a little more sensitivity. See us, hear us at last, lend us a hand. It is a pity; let people not die, let children not die, let mothers not cry”, and who was then convicted of the offence of making propaganda for a terrorist organisation and sentenced to imprisonment. On Ayşe Çelik’s individual application, the Constitutional Court delivered its decision on the matter known as the “Teacher Ayşe case” on 10 May 2019 (Application no. 2017/36722).

In this decision the Constitutional Court gave detailed explanations of the meaning and scope of freedom of expression and of making propaganda for a terrorist organisation, and held unanimously that Teacher Ayşe’s freedom of expression had been violated. Although a right protected by the Constitution and international conventions may be restricted, certain conditions must be met for the restriction to be regarded as legitimate. Article 13 of the Constitution regulates the conditions under which fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted: “Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and only on the grounds specified in the relevant articles of the Constitution, without infringing upon their essence. These restrictions shall not be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution, the requirements of the democratic order of society and the secular Republic, or the principle of proportionality.”

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This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

The fact that a teacher named Ayşe Çelik phoned in to the Beyaz Show and said “Everything is being reported very differently; I mean, I really cannot speak. Do not remain silent; as human beings, approach this with a little more sensitivity; see us, hear us at last, lend a hand. It is a pity; let people not die, let children not die, let mothers not weep”, and that she was subsequently convicted of the offence of making propaganda for a terrorist organisation and sentenced to imprisonment, occupied Türkiye’s agenda for a long time. On Ayşe Çelik’s individual application, the Constitutional Court delivered, on 10 May 2019, its decision on the matter known as the “Teacher Ayşe case” (Application no.: 2017/36722). In this decision the Constitutional Court (AYM) gave detailed explanations of the meaning and scope of freedom of expression and of making propaganda for a terrorist organisation, and held unanimously that Teacher Ayşe’s freedom of expression had been violated.

Although it is possible to restrict a right that is protected by the Constitution and by international conventions, certain conditions must be complied with if that restriction is to be accepted as legitimate. Article 13 of the Constitution lays down the conditions under which fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted: “Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and only on the grounds specified in the relevant articles of the Constitution, without affecting their essence. These restrictions may not be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution, to the requirements of the democratic order of society and of the secular Republic, or to the principle of proportionality.”

In this context, in assessing whether the interference constitutes a violation,

(1) Legality (the interference must be provided for by law)

(2) Legitimate aim (the restriction imposed on the right must be based on a legitimate aim)

(3) Compliance with the requirements of the democratic order of society; an examination must be carried out in terms of these conditions.

These conditions also run parallel to the ECtHR’s regime of restrictions. Under the case law of the ECtHR, a three-stage test must be applied before it can be said that a right has been legitimately restricted:

(1) The interference in question must be provided for by legal rules, and the legislation governing the interference must be such as to afford protection against arbitrariness and must be foreseeable as to its consequences.

(2) The interference in question must pursue a legitimate aim.

(3) The interference in question must be necessary in a democratic society. For this to be the case, the interference (a) must be necessary and proportionate with a view to preventing the harm and (b) must not impair the essence of the right.

In the Teacher Ayşe case, the AYM stated that the restriction imposed on the applicant’s freedom of expression satisfied the conditions of legality and legitimate aim, and assessed the criterion of compliance with the requirements of the democratic order of society.

Before turning to the AYM’s assessments, it will be useful, for a better examination and understanding of the decision, to say a few words about freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is governed by Article 26 of the Constitution, under the heading “Freedom of expression and dissemination of thought”, in the following terms: “Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his or her thoughts and opinions by speech, in writing, in pictures or by other means, individually or collectively. This freedom also includes the liberty to receive or impart information or ideas without interference by official authorities”.

Article 10 of the ECHR, which concerns freedom of expression, reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom of opinion and freedom to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers.”

The last instrument that must be mentioned is the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The use, in the relevant Article 19, of the formula “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds” is highly important for understanding the breadth of the scope of freedom of expression.

Freedom of expression is a right that encompasses “every” expression; that is, all expressions, including those that are in favour of some, those that disturb some, those that shock some and those that anger others. The reason why freedom of expression is construed so broadly is that it is indispensable for the formation of individuals’ ideas and for ensuring that democracy functions in the true sense.

Within this framework, freedom of expression consists of two basic components: the individual and the collective. In its individual dimension, freedom of expression is individuals’ saying what is on their minds, expressing their thoughts and gaining access to the ideas of others; that is, the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas. The collective dimension of freedom of expression, for its part, encompasses communication between the individuals in society, and this communication is very important for the formation of individuals’ ideas and opinions. That individuals form their own opinions by gaining access to different ideas is, in turn, a sine qua non for being able to speak of a participatory democracy.

Indeed, by stating that “Expressions of opinion which, even if connected with terrorism or a terrorist organisation, contain no statements encouraging recourse to violence, do not give rise to a danger of terrorist offences being committed, and run parallel to the terrorist organisation’s ideology, its social or political aims and its views on political, economic and social problems cannot be regarded as propaganda for terrorism. As regards ideas concerning the social and political environment or socio-economic imbalances, ethnic problems, differences within the country’s population, the demand for greater freedom or criticism of the country’s form of government, their [e]xpression, their dissemination, their being instilled in others in an active, systematic and convincing manner, and their being suggested and recommended are under the protection of freedom of expression” (§44), the AYM drew a line between propaganda for a terrorist organisation and individuals’ voicing of opinions on the situation in the country in which they live. By stating that “In this context it must not be forgotten that freedom of expression is vital for a democratic society and constitutes the fundamental values of democracy. The foundation of democracy rests on the power to resolve problems through open debate. Except in cases of incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles, interferences arising from the exercise of freedom of expression harm democracy and endanger it. Even if some of the views and statements voiced are regarded as offensive, hurtful and unacceptable by the bodies exercising public power, in a democratic society established on the basis of the rule of law, ideas that oppose the established order or that criticise the acts of, above all, the bodies exercising public power must be freely expressed” (§53), the Court emphasised the importance, in a democratic society, of being able to exercise freedom of expression in respect of the acts of the persons and bodies that hold public power. In this decision attention was also drawn to the fact that, because they exercise public power, the tolerance of public authorities towards criticism must be far wider than that of a private individual (§54).

As to the assessment of the nature of the applicant’s statements, the Court stated that the element to be taken as the basis is whether the remarks contain hatred and hostility, and held that “statements concerning social or individual problems experienced in the legitimate struggle which the [S]tate has entered into with the terrorist organisation – even if these are entirely subjective assessments – [cannot], on their own, be regarded as expressions of opinion that make it possible to raise the awareness of, or to encourage, people who are ready to commit terrorist offences and that increase the risk of these offences being committed” (§56).

Proceeding from this, the Court stated that the applicant had aimed to raise awareness in society of the events and deaths occurring in the east and south-east of the country (§51) and that the applicant’s words could not be characterised as praise of PKK terrorism, as the offering of support to terrorism, or as incitement to the use of violence or to armed resistance or uprising (§57); in these circumstances it held that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression was not compatible with the requirements of the democratic order of society and that, consequently, the applicant’s freedom of expression had been violated.

The AYM’s Ayşe Çelik decision is a decision which contains highly important statements on the meaning and importance of freedom of expression and in which the fact that a democratic society cannot exist without freedom of expression is clearly set out. Disproportionate restrictions imposed on freedom of expression, by contrast, will in time intimidate the individuals who make up a society, will prevent individuals from challenging the status quo and will stunt individual development; consequently, in a society made up of individuals who do not hold opinions formed on the basis of information and debate, the sustainability of a participatory democracy will be in jeopardy. It is inevitable that, in individuals and societies unable to exercise freedom of expression, many other problems besides those listed will also arise.

This decision is of direct concern in particular to the public prosecutors who work on terrorist offences and to the courts of every level that conduct trials. Public prosecutors, when drawing up indictments, and courts, when giving their decisions, should take this decision of the AYM into account and, in respect of acts for which a finding of a violation would result, should give a “decision not to prosecute” at the investigation stage and a “judgment of acquittal” at the prosecution stage. Otherwise the decisions given will be found unlawful by the AYM, and the judicial activity carried out with so much effort, together with time, labour, money and, most important of all, human dignity, will have been wasted.

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