Abstract
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
In our country, as in other developed countries that have adopted a liberal economic system, the State (hereinafter also referred to as “the administration” owing to the nature of the subject) has many infrastructure works carried out by persons or institutions operating in the private sector in order to be able to perform its duties in the nature of public service. This is one of the requirements of a liberal economy and is also a necessity if the administration is to perform public services better; otherwise it will not be possible for the administration to perform public services without interruption. In practice, however, a contract is concluded with the private sector for the performance of these infrastructure services, and after the work that is the subject of the contract has been brought to a certain stage or fully completed, the progress payments due to the companies carrying out the work are not paid by the administration on various pretexts, or substantial deductions that are incompatible with the nature of the work are made from the progress payments. When such deductions are made, recourse is had to the judicial bodies provided for in the contract in dispute; yet for some reason these judicial bodies interpret the contracts incorrectly, and in their decisions the administration’s act is found lawful even though it is unlawful.
Full text
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INTRODUCTION
In our country, as in other developed countries that have adopted a liberal economic system, the State (hereinafter, owing to the nature of the subject, also referred to as “the administration”) has many infrastructure works carried out by persons or institutions operating in the private sector in order to be able to perform its duties in the nature of public services. Just as this is one of the requirements of a liberal economy, it is also a necessity if the administration is to perform public services better; otherwise it would not be possible for the administration to perform public services without interruption.
In practice, however, after a contract has been concluded with the private sector for the performance of these infrastructure services and the work forming the subject of the contract has been brought to a certain stage or completed in full, the progress payments due to the companies carrying out the work are not paid by the administration, which puts forward various pretexts, or deductions are made from the progress payments which are substantial and incompatible with the nature of the work.
When such deductions are made, recourse is had to the judicial bodies provided for in the contract in dispute; yet for some reason these judicial bodies interpret the contracts wrongly, and although the act of the administration is unlawful, it is found lawful in their decisions. For the private-sector companies carrying out the work this creates a manifest loss of rights, great economic damage and hence an unlawful situation.
In this study, an attempt will be made to give a brief assessment of this unlawful situation in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to which our country is also a party, and of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) established under that Convention, and to explain the decision that might be obtained as a result of a possible application, by working through a similar sample case which the authors of this study have encountered in practice.
So that the subject may be better understood, and because this is a system of adjudication newly recognised in our country, the study will first describe the birth of the ECHR and the ECtHR and their entry into our country’s legal order; it will then give a legal characterisation of the works carried out and the contracts concluded by the administration with the private sector and explain the background of the dispute; thereafter an attempt will be made to explain, in turn, the sample dispute and its course in domestic law, the solution given to that dispute in domestic law and, starting from this dispute, the question whether that solution and, in general, disputes of this kind are compatible with the principles of the ECHR. In this way, by examining which violation of rights the situation following the exhaustion of domestic remedies gives rise to, the basis of a possible individual application will also have been set out.
I. The Birth of the ECHR and Its Entry into the Turkish Legal Order
The ECHR was produced by the Council of Europe, which was created within the framework of the project of uniting Western Europe militarily and economically after the Second World War and was organised as its basic structure. The Convention was signed on 04.09.1950 by twelve countries, among them Türkiye. The date of the Convention’s entry into force is 03.09.1953, and the date on which Türkiye completed the necessary formalities and became a party is 18.05.19541.
Together with the ECHR, two important institutions were created for the purpose of carrying out adjudication. These are the European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission), which ceased to exist upon the entry into force of Protocol No. 112, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which continues its judicial activity as a single and permanent court3.
From the point of view of Türkiye’s domestic law, the ECHR is treated as equivalent to laws; however, under Article 90 of the 1982 Constitution, an action for annulment cannot be brought before the Constitutional Court against treaties duly put into effect, as it can against other ordinary laws, and this places international treaties in a different position from other laws4.
Türkiye accepted the right of individual application to the Commission in 1987 and to the ECtHR in 1990, and thereby the jurisdiction of both organs, and all at once found itself inside this legal system as a result of the large number of applications lodged against it, under the influence also of the political structure at the dates in question5. As a result of more than ten years of practice, certain norms of domestic law that conflict with the ECHR are today being re-enacted in the light of the text of the ECHR and the judgments of the ECtHR, and efforts are being made to eliminate the contradictions6.
The ECHR is a text containing the principles which the States Parties are obliged to observe and, accordingly, to apply in their domestic legal systems. The rights adopted in response to the social needs observed after the adoption of the Convention and regulated by additional protocols are applied in exactly the same way as the articles of the ECHR.
There are two parties in the ECHR system: on the one side the Contracting State, on the other the individual whose rights have been violated within the borders of the Contracting State. The State’s obligation arising from the Convention is to ensure that the rights regulated by the Convention are not violated within the borders of its territory and, in addition, to establish the system capable of providing a remedy for any violation within the domestic legal system. The State also has the obligation to carry out the necessary investigations into the causes of the violation and to make good in an appropriate manner the damage suffered by the individual on account of the violation.
According to the system explained above, it is part of the natural functioning of the system that a dispute arising from any act of the State within the borders of a Contracting State is assessed within the framework of the ECHR and, where a “violation” is found as a result, is brought before the ECtHR as an “individual application”. Under Article 34 of the ECHR, the right of individual application has been granted not only to individuals but also, besides others7, “to legal persons (companies), even if they have been liquidated”8.
II. The Nature of the Work and of the Contract between the Administration and the Private Sector and the Applicable Branch of Law
The works carried out by the private sector in order to create the infrastructure of the public services that the administration is to perform are not in the nature of a “virtual public service”9 which it is considered appropriate for the private sector to perform. For in works of this kind there is no question, as there is in the “build-operate-transfer” model - as is generally seen in construction works - of the facilities being operated after the construction work has been carried out and of the income obtained being retained by the company that carried out the construction as consideration for the work. The construction is carried out for a fixed price and, when the work is finished, is handed over to the administration, which is the owner of the work.
The natural consequence of the work not being a virtual public service is that the contracts concluded between the private sector and the administration when such works are commissioned do not have the character of an “administrative contract” either; for in order to speak of an administrative contract, one of the parties to the contract must be the administration, the contract must relate to the performance of a public service, and the contract must confer on the administration powers exceeding those of private law10. As is also true of the contract concluded in the sample case to be examined below, since, of these requirements of an administrative contract, “the performance of a public service” and “the conferral on the administration of powers exceeding those of private law” are not present, the contract signed for works of this kind entrusted to the private sector is a classic “contract under the law of obligations”, and the applicable branch of law is the “law of obligations”. In the law of obligations such contracts are called “fully bilateral (synallagmatic) contracts”11. Accordingly, each of the two parties must reciprocally perform in full its obligations arising from the contract.
It is stated in legal scholarship that such fully bilateral contracts under the law of obligations may also be concluded by the administration; that they are like contracts concluded between individuals; that, as one of the parties to the contract, the administration has no superiority; that disputes arising from such contracts are to be resolved before the ordinary courts; and that the contracts of purchase, sale, lease and “commissioning of works” concluded by the administration under the State Procurement Law are regarded as contracts under the law of obligations12.
III. The Sample Case and the Cause of the Dispute
The sample dispute, which constitutes a violation in terms of the articles of the ECHR that are the subject of this study, arose in connection with the construction of a motorway begun under a contract dated 19.03.1987 between the administration and a large construction company in the private sector (hereinafter referred to in short as “the company”). Immediately after work had begun on the construction of the motorway undertaken by the Company under the contract, the Administration, by a letter dated 28.03.1988 and numbered 7101894, requested all motorway contractors and engineering firms to build the base of the construction in accordance with the “Motorway Technical Specification” and the “Technical Specification for Bituminous Pavements, Supplement 1986”. In this way the properties and the basis of manufacture of the materials for the work of “constructing a mechanically stabilised sub-base”, which had been agreed in the contract by the concordant mutual intentions of the parties, were completely changed by a unilateral declaration of intent on the part of the administration.
Thereupon the Company, by a letter dated 12.01.1990, submitted a request to the effect that there was a difference between the price of the material agreed to be used in the construction of the base of the motorway forming the subject of the contract and that of the material requested by the Administration, that this was not in conformity with the contract, and that a new unit price therefore had to be determined. Since no description and unit price suited to the work performed could be found in the unit price schedules and lists, it became necessary to fix a new unit price pursuant to clause 52.2 of the contract. The new unit price proposal prepared by the Company was also examined by the representatives of the company providing engineering services (hereinafter referred to in short as “the Engineer”), and, agreement having been reached as a result of the discussions held, this proposal was submitted as a New Unit Price Record to the Regional Directorate of the Turkish Highways (TCK), was signed by the Regional Directorate and, having been found appropriate, was sent to the Motorways Department of the General Directorate of Highways in Ankara.
Thus, within the framework of the Administration’s letter dated 28.03.1988 and pursuant to clause 52.2 of the contract, the sub-base unit prices were established by agreement between the Company and the Engineer and, with the approval of the Regional Directorate, were entered by the Engineer in the Company’s progress payment certificate dated 31.12.1990 and became the contract price; payments at this new unit price continued to be made to the Company for 53 months, until progress payment certificate no. 79 dated 31.05.1995. During this period 90% of the sub-base work was also completed. As can be seen from this, the new unit price was paid by the Administration to the Company for 53 months, as it stood and without any reservation.
Apart from the change to the base, the Administration, by its letter dated 11.03.1998, requested from the Company the work of constructing a bituminous base, for which there was no price or description in the design, the bills of quantities and the unit prices. This work was begun in 1990.
The new unit price for the bituminous base was also signed by the Regional Directorate and by the Motorways Department of the General Directorate of Highways, and this price, which was applied without any reservation by the Engineer to the progress payments, was likewise paid by the Administration for approximately 5 years. In the meantime, up to 90% of the work relating to the bituminous base was fully completed.
Since the bill of quantities of the contract contained no unit price applicable to the work of carrying out ground improvement with free-draining material obtained from quarry stone and from excavated rock, as required by the approved designs and reports, the unit price analyses prepared by the Company were submitted for the Engineer’s examination by a letter dated 22.05.1990. Agreement having been reached as a result of the discussions held, the price was determined in accordance with the conditions for a new unit price. Accordingly, the new unit price was fixed at “8.11$/m3”.
The Engineer sent the new unit price to the Administration by his letter dated 08.12.1992. In the meantime, payments at the new price so fixed were made by the Administration without any reservation being entered. The whole of the work was carried out at these unit prices and was completed as of 1993.
As regards the supply of free-draining material from excavated rock, events took a course similar to those concerning the unit price for the supply of free-draining material from quarry stone: since the contract’s bill of quantities contained no applicable unit price, discussions were held with the Engineer at the Company’s request, agreement was reached between the two, in accordance with the terms of the contract, on a unit price of 5.39$/m3, and this was submitted to the Administration by the Engineer’s letter dated 08.10.1992. The works relating to these unit prices, which were again paid without any reservation, were completed as of 1992.
After these developments the Administration, by its letters to the Company dated 20.10.1995 and numbered 5383 and dated 27.10.1995 and numbered 5507, stated that, for four of the thirty-five newly determined items of work, the unit prices whose grounds and manner of formation are explained above had been redetermined by the ministry’s inspectors, and that for this reason:
a. the unit price of 23.50$/ton for the work of constructing the bituminous base had been changed to 23.44$/ton, that the progress payments for works yet to be carried out would be calculated at this new unit price, and that the overpayment of approximately 118.340$ made in the earlier progress payments had been deducted,
b. there was no need to make any change to the unit prices for the work of constructing the sub-base, that 11.-$/m3 would be applied as the unit price for works carried out thereafter, and that the overpayment of approximately 17.1 million $ made on account of the unit price of 15.80$/m3 used in the earlier progress payments would be deducted from the progress payments in instalments,
c. the unit price of 8.11$/m3 for the work of supplying, transporting and laying free-draining material from quarry stone and carrying out ground improvement had been changed to 5.69$/m3, that the progress payments for works yet to be carried out would be calculated at this new unit price, and that the overpayment of approximately 3.8 million $ made in the earlier progress payments would be deducted from the progress payments in instalments,
d. the unit price of 5.39$/m3 for the work of supplying and transporting free-draining material from excavated rock and carrying out ground improvement had been changed to 3.66$/m3, that the progress payments for works yet to be carried out would be calculated at this new unit price, and that the overpayment of approximately 1.1 million $ made in the earlier progress payments would be deducted from the progress payments in instalments.
As regards the application of the deductions:
- that the whole of the overpayment would be recovered by deducting 20% from subsequent progress payments,
- that the deductions might, where necessary, be made at a rate above 20%,
the Company was notified that these points had been decided.
As will be seen, in this situation the Administration, alleging that the payments it had made over five years as consideration for the works it had had the Company carry out under the contract were excessive, proceeded to deduct them by a unilateral act, five years later and without even a court decision. The Administration carried out this act in disregard of the rules that the contract it had concluded with the Company was a contract under the law of obligations and that no change could be made to the contract without mutual consent, and by acting in a manifestly unlawful manner.
Faced with this situation, the Company, which claimed that the contract price it had earned had been taken from it in a manifestly unlawful manner, first sought to assert its rights, by way of domestic remedy, through the “arbitral tribunal proceedings” provided for in the contract13.
The fact that the events took place in this way and that the Company’s rights were infringed by the deduction of its progress payments by a unilateral declaration of intent, despite the contract concluded, will be examined below from the standpoint of a violation of the right to property under Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR.
IV. The Proceedings, the Decision Rendered and the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
A. The Award of the Arbitral Tribunal
The Company, which claimed that its rights had been violated as a result of the events recounted above, resorted to arbitration, exercising its rights under the contract, in order to have the dispute that had arisen between it and the Administration resolved; by a formal notice served through the Ankara Notary Office on 20.11.1995 it gave notice that it had chosen its own arbitrator and that the other party should also choose its arbitrator, and in this way it initiated the arbitration process.
The arbitral tribunal held its first meeting on 13.01.1996 and thereby began its proceedings, which it concluded with its award dated 08.07.2000. At the end of the proceedings the award was reached by a majority of votes. The arbitrator chosen by the Company entered a dissenting opinion and declared his dissent from this award. According to the award, it was concluded that the method applied by the Administration was in conformity with the contract and the law, and it was stated that the deduction made from the Company’s progress payments was not unlawful. As a result of this award the Company suffered a significant14 loss of income. Following this award the Company lodged an appeal on points of law.
B. The Review on Appeal on Points of Law
Considering the award of the arbitral tribunal unjust, the Company brought its claims before the 15th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation by its petition dated 16.10.2000. There it set out in detail its objections as to both procedure and substance.
The grounds of appeal on points of law that may be raised against awards of arbitral tribunals are fixed at four, and thus limited, in Article 533 of the Code of Civil Procedure (HUMK). These are:
a) the award having been made after the expiry of the arbitration period,
b) a decision having been given on something that was not claimed,
c) the arbitrators having decided on a matter not within their powers,
d) the arbitrators having failed to decide on each of the claims of the two parties.
Despite this statutory limitation, the 15th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation conducted its review on appeal by referring to the Decision on the Unification of Case Law dated 28.01.1994 and numbered 4/1 and by proceeding from the view adopted in that decision that “...where the parties have provided that the dispute is to be resolved according to substantive law, the dispute shall be resolved according to substantive law, and in that case the 15th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation shall also carry out a review of substantive law in its review on appeal...”.
Yet, in the specific case, the part of the contract between the parties concerning arbitration contains no provision to the effect that the arbitrators are to apply substantive law. This is clearly stated in clause 67.3, entitled “Arbitration Procedures”, of the section of the contract under the general heading “Settlement of Disputes”; the clause in question reads as follows:
“The procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal...............shall be determined and applied by the arbitral tribunal itself in accordance with the Turkish arbitration laws, regulations, procedures and rules.”
After this erroneous finding and decision on procedure, the 15th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation also gave an erroneous decision in its examination of the merits and upheld the award of the arbitral tribunal. With this decision upholding the award the domestic remedy came to an end, because, although the provisions of the HUMK provide for the remedy of “rectification of the decision” in respect of other judicial decisions, they do not provide for the remedy of rectification of the decision in respect of awards made by arbitral tribunals15.
The fact that the unlawful features encountered in the manner and method in which the arbitration clause, as regulated in our domestic law, operated in the dispute in our case were not taken into account in the review on appeal will be dealt with below in the context of the right to a fair trial regulated in Article 6 of the ECHR.
V. Assessment of the Dispute in the Light of the ECHR
A. The Essence of the Dispute and the Relevant Provisions of the ECHR
As set out in detail above, the Company was confronted with the fact that the sums paid to it over a period of five years were deducted by a unilateral declaration and act of the Administration and, more importantly still, without any court decision. In other words, the Administration’s act in respect of the company’s assets caused it to suffer substantial loss. There is therefore a violation directed at the Company’s right to property. When this situation is considered within the framework of the ECHR, the provision whose application first comes into consideration is the “right to property” regulated in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (P-1 Art. 1).
The text of the Protocol regulating the said right to property reads as follows:
“Every natural and legal person has the right to demand that the inviolability of his possessions and property be respected. A person may be deprived of his possessions and property only on grounds of public interest and in accordance with the conditions provided for by law and with the general principles of international law.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the right which States have to apply such laws as they deem necessary to regulate the use of property in accordance with the public interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or of fines.”
Next, the award rendered by the arbitral tribunal to which the Company duly resorted for the resolution of the dispute, as provided for in the relevant section of the contract - an award unlawful both as to procedure and as to substance - and the unlawful decision upholding that award, which the 15th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation in turn rendered as a result of an erroneous characterisation, lead to the conclusion that, as far as the company is concerned, an unfair trial was conducted. When this situation is considered within the framework of the ECHR, the provision whose application first comes into consideration is the “right to a fair trial” regulated in Article 6 of the Convention.
The part of the article regulating the said right to a fair trial that is relevant to the subject under examination reads as follows:
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair trial and a public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly; however, the press and the public may be excluded from all or part of the hearing, in a democratic society, in the interests of morals, public order or national security, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or, to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court, where there are special circumstances in which publicity could prejudice the requirements of justice...”
B. Applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Dispute in the Light of Practice
It is stated both in legal scholarship and in practice that the concept of “assets” referred to in P-1 Art. 1 must be given a comprehensive meaning, namely the one expressed by the word “biens” in the French text, which is broader than the word “possessions” in the English text.16 This concept and the protection it affords may cover a variety of rights, such as movable and immovable property, tangible or intangible assets, shares, patents, arbitration awards, the right to a pension, a landlord’s right to receive rent, economic interests connected with the running of a business, the right to exercise a profession, a legitimate expectation that a certain procedure will be applied, a legal claim and the clientele of a cinema17. On this basis, it is natural that sums collected in return for work performed under a contract and earned as consideration for the work done should, being regarded as falling within the scope of assets, be under the protection of this provision.
The protection referred to here is understood essentially as protection against interference by the State. Moreover, the interference must have affected, to the applicant’s detriment, an economic value which he currently holds; for example, in applications concerning expropriation, the Turkish State has been held responsible for the late payment of the compensation18. Consequently, the State’s “taking back”19 of a contract price already collected, by its unilateral declaration of intent and act, is also an interference within the meaning of Article 1.
Under P-1 Art. 1, the State has a wide margin of appreciation in implementing social and economic policies that have the effect of interfering with the right to property. This does not mean, however, that the ECtHR has no role in assessing the legitimacy of such an interference. The ECtHR stated its view on this point in its James v. the United Kingdom judgment, where it is said that “the ECtHR cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the national authorities, but under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 it is bound to review the contested measure and, in so doing, to inquire into the factors that determined the approach of the national authorities”2021.
Particularly in recent years, there have been many judgments in which the ECtHR, relying on its judgment cited above, has held that the State exceeded its margin of appreciation in restricting property and violated the right to property guaranteed by P-1 Art. 122.
Since the ECtHR’s Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment of 23 September 1982 against Sweden, it has been accepted, as regards the application of P-1 Art. 1, that the article contains three distinct rules23. These are:
a) The first rule, set out in the first sentence of Article 1, is of a general nature and regulates the free enjoyment of the right to property.
b) The second rule, regulated in the second sentence of Article 1, covers deprivations of the right to property and subjects them to certain conditions.
c) Finally, the third rule, regulated in the second paragraph, recognises the power of the Contracting States to adopt rules controlling the use of the right to property in accordance with the general interest24.
Viewed in the light of these rules, the interference of the Administration (the State), which took the form of “taking back” sums already paid, clearly violates the principle of the free enjoyment of the right to property.
In examining whether this rule has been violated, the Court examines whether, in the interference carried out, a “fair balance” has been struck between the right to property, which is one of the fundamental rights of the individual, and the general interests of the community25.
When we look at our case within this framework, it must first be stated that the Administration (the State), by its unilateral declaration and act and without any court decision, and moreover on the basis of an inspector’s examination carried out of its own motion and approximately five years after all the payments had been made, effected a substantial monetary deduction; in other words, it seized money in that amount. No statutory provision was taken as the basis for the interference with property that thus arose, nor can this act be described as safeguarding the general interests of the community, since the administration had in any event concluded a contract with the general interest in mind and the parties had undertaken to remain faithful to that contract.
In the Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece judgment26, a recent case that is similar and may serve as an example, the ECtHR treated the subsequent non-payment of the sums due to a company which had carried out work for the State on the basis of a contract as falling within the concept of “property” and concluded that the State had violated the company’s right27.
The conclusion reached in the light of these explanations and of the judgments of the ECtHR is that, in the sample case forming the subject of this study, the interference of the Administration (the State) violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
C. Applicability of Article 6 of the ECHR to the Dispute in the Light of Practice
The obligation of the courts to which the Company had recourse as a “remedy” in domestic law on account of the dispute recounted above to act in accordance with the principle laid down in Article 6 of the ECHR is clear; proceedings conducted without acting in accordance with this principle will give rise to a violation of rights.
Article 6 of the ECHR regulates the “right to a fair trial”. This article guarantees the individual’s right to a fair and public trial in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or where he is charged with an offence. The ECtHR has interpreted this provision in a broad sense, on the ground that it is of fundamental importance to the functioning of democracy, and stated this in its Delcourt v. Belgium judgment28 as follows: “In the context of the Convention, the right to the fair administration of justice holds so prominent a place in democratic societies that a restrictive interpretation of paragraph 1 of Article 6 would not be consistent with the aim and purpose of that provision”29. Article 6 regulates both the determination of the individual’s civil rights and obligations and the case in which he is charged with an offence; however, since the subject of this study relates to the right to property and the explanations are confined to this and related matters, the explanations that follow will deal only with the “determination of the individual’s civil rights and obligations” under Article 6.
Article 6 of the ECHR, in which the right to a fair trial is regulated, guarantees first of all everyone’s right to a fair hearing in the determination of civil rights and obligations. As is clear from the text of the article, it does not cover all proceedings to which the individual is a party, but is limited to those concerning civil rights and obligations. It is therefore important to determine what these rights and obligations are30.
A point that must first be noted here is that the guarantees afforded by Article 6 of the ECHR may be relied on by natural persons, by legal persons and by groups of persons alike31. The ECtHR has built up an extensive body of case law on what civil rights and obligations are. The ECtHR has made it clear that the concept of civil rights and obligations is autonomous and cannot be interpreted solely by reference to the domestic law of the respondent State32.
Civil rights and obligations include, first of all, the rights and obligations of private persons in their relations with one another. As regards the subject under examination, contractual relations between a private person and the State are also included in this concept. Property is regarded by the ECtHR as one of the areas falling within the scope of application of Article 633. The right to a fair trial will apply in expropriation, consolidation and planning cases, in those stages of building permits and other real-property permits which directly affect the property rights in the property concerned, and also in cases of more general scope whose outcome affects the use and enjoyment of the property34.
It must, however, be stated here at once that, in a decision given in 1979, the ECtHR indicated with regard to arbitration proceedings that arbitral tribunals set up in cases of “compulsory arbitration” must act in conformity with Article 6 of the ECHR, but that Article 6 cannot be applied to arbitral tribunals chosen by the parties under contracts containing a “voluntary arbitration” clause.35 In the light of that decision, if a violation of Article 6 were alleged in the sample case on account of the procedural and substantive irregularities in the proceedings of the arbitral tribunal, the Court is not expected to reach a conclusion different from its decision cited above. Consequently, in the sample case, only the fact that the 15th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation conducted its review on appeal without covering all the points raised by the claimant and in a manner contrary to the provision laid down in the HUMK can be put forward as a violation of the “right to a fair trial” regulated in Article 6.
The different procedural rules applied in appeals against awards of arbitral tribunals and the fact that the decision of the 15th Civil Chamber is final, there being no possibility of resorting against it to, for example, the remedy of “rectification of the decision” available in ordinary appeal practice, may also be put forward as a violation both of Article 6 and, in conjunction with that article, of Article 13. Article 13 of the Convention reads as follows:
“...Everyone whose rights or freedoms as regulated in the Convention are violated must be able to apply to an authority before which he can find an effective remedy in the domestic law of the country, even if these violations have been committed by official persons in the performance of their duties...”
Within the framework of this provision, described as the “existence of an effective domestic remedy”, the point that the review on appeal by the 15th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation is not an effective remedy can be brought before the ECtHR as a violation of rights. In conclusion, it appears possible to allege a violation of rights on the ground that the “right to a fair trial” was not respected in the part following the arbitral tribunal stage.
VI. The Procedure for Individual Applications
A. In General
The procedure for individual applications to the ECtHR is set out in Article 34 of the Convention. Accordingly, the first of the two most important rules to which prospective applicants must pay attention is that the individual application must be lodged after domestic remedies have been exhausted. Applications lodged without domestic remedies having been exhausted are not accepted36. The second important rule is that the application must be lodged within a period of 6 months from the date on which the final decision concerning the dispute (in the sample case, the decision of the 15th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation) was taken37.
The application process is set in motion when the application form is sent to the Registry of the ECtHR and that office gives notice that it has been received and registered. In order to interrupt the 6-month period, an individual application may sometimes also be made by a letter, to be sent to the Registry before the expiry of the period, which clearly sets out the subject of the application, the party and the provisions alleged to have been violated. In that case an additional period of six weeks is granted for collecting and sending both the application form and all the other information and documents. No fee or payment of any kind is required for these applications to be accepted by the Court38.
B. The Admissibility Stage
An application lodged with the ECtHR in the manner described above is first subjected to an examination that may be described as the “admissibility stage”. This stage is regulated in Article 35 of the Convention. In this context it is first examined whether the application was lodged within 6 months of the exhaustion of the domestic remedy. Apart from this, applications with the following characteristics are found inadmissible at the admissibility stage:
a) Applications whose author is unknown (anonymous applications).
b) Applications which have the same content as a matter previously examined by the Court, which have been submitted to another international body of investigation or settlement, and which contain no new information on the matter.
c) Applications which do not fall within the provisions of the Convention or of the protocols thereto, which are manifestly ill-founded, or which are regarded as an abuse of the right of application.
It must also be noted that, if the characteristics described above are found in any application, the application may equally be rejected at any stage of the proceedings. Applications which the judge rapporteur finds at the preliminary examination to have these characteristics are “struck off the list” (strike off the list). The decisions given in this situation are generally brief and unreasoned39.
Applications found admissible, or in respect of which there is “no clear indication” requiring them to be found inadmissible at the preliminary examination, are communicated to the State concerned (communicate), and the judicial process thus begins.
The proceedings are quite lengthy. In the scholarly works on the Court’s practice it is stated that this period is 12 months in certain cases that are given priority40 and 4-5 years in certain other cases.
C. Türkiye and Individual Applications
In the approximately 16 years of practice that have elapsed since 28.01.1987, the date on which Türkiye accepted that the supervisory mechanism of the ECHR was applicable to itself as well, the human rights principles guaranteed by the Convention have greatly influenced the approach of society, the stereotyped and not easily influenced views of the State and, most importantly of all, in domestic law, the Constitution and the laws, and have brought about changes41. The very considerable number of applications lodged against Türkiye since 1987, when it accepted individual application, and the judgments delivered by the Court finding that it had violated rights have been highly influential in this. In addition, on account of the anti-democratic events that took place after the 1980 military coup, there have been State applications concerning Türkiye alongside the individual applications.42
Since 1993 there has been a serious increase in the number of individual applications on account of the human rights violations arising in the course of the fight against terrorism conducted in particular in the South-East. Alongside applications concerning fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the right to life, ill-treatment and torture, the length of police custody, violation of the right to a fair trial, restrictions on freedom of thought and the dissolution of political parties43, applications have been lodged on a very wide range of subjects, from compensation for the losses suffered on account of the “late payment of expropriation compensation” to “members of the armed forces retired by decisions of the Supreme Military Council”.
It has been observed at first hand that, as regards the events which at first attracted the attention of State institutions and led to certain negative attitudes being displayed towards those lodging individual applications, the organs of the State abandoned such hostile conduct once it was seen that conduct of this kind in turn led to a finding that Article 34 of the Convention had been violated. In the Turkish State, the ECtHR has now begun to be perceived as part of the legal system. Particularly in recent years, applications have for the most part begun to be concluded by way of friendly settlement before the Court delivers a judgment finding a violation.
In this respect it must be stated that today there is no difference, in moral or material terms, between lodging an application with the ECtHR and lodging an application with the Court of Cassation. Just as legal practitioners and State officials have become accustomed to this judicial system and its outcomes, so too the individual who is the real holder of the rights, that is, citizens, and the managers of the legal persons formed by their coming together must become accustomed to this fact and must not hesitate to assert their rights.
CONCLUSION
In the light of the assessments made above, the general conclusion reached is that it is not possible for the State to impose on property a restriction other than the restrictions specified in Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, and least of all to do so in disregard of the contracts which it has concluded with persons within its territory and in which it has acted in the capacity of a private-law person. Indeed, this is in the nature not of a restriction of a right but of a “usurpation of the right”. For this reason the doors of Europe are wide open for those aggrieved by events of this kind to assert their rights, and in the end this situation will in all probability be remedied by a judgment of the ECtHR. If, as a result of this being done, a judgment is delivered against Türkiye, then, from Türkiye’s point of view too, the continuous commission of a violation of rights will come to an end and, since one more human rights disgrace will be removed, a contribution will be made to the progress towards a more democratic country.
As regards the sample case, the conclusion is that it is possible and appropriate for the dispute, which may be briefly summarised as “the deduction, by the unilateral declaration and act of the administration and without any court decision, of the sums paid to the company over a period of five years”, to be brought before the ECtHR as an individual application, first and foremost with the allegation of a violation of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. It is considered that an application of this kind will also have a high chance of success, provided that it is well prepared and the facts are well presented.
Apart from this alleged violation, it must be stated that the allegation of a violation of the “right to a fair trial” laid down in Article 6 of the ECHR can be put forward only and exclusively in respect of the review on appeal by the 15th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation; that, in respect of the proceedings of the “voluntary arbitral tribunal”, it cannot be put forward owing to the earlier similar decision of the ECtHR; and that, even if it were put forward, the chance of success in having the Court establish a different line of case law on this point is not high.
It may be argued that the fact that, owing to the different procedure at the appeal stage, the 15th Civil Chamber is the court of last instance and that the stage of rectification of the decision, which is available for other cases, is not available for awards of arbitral tribunals constitutes a violation in terms of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 6. It cannot, however, be said that this allegation of a violation would be a strong one.
The likelihood of the company encountering certain difficulties with regard to State contracts after exercising the right of individual application is considered low at the stage reached today and in the process of democratisation and harmonisation with the EU in which the country finds itself. It has been stated above that, should such a situation arise, it too would constitute a separate violation. It is also possible to report, at every stage of the proceedings conducted following the application to the ECtHR, that a negative attitude in this respect has arisen on account of the applications lodged by companies, and to raise a new allegation of violation.
Footnotes
- Murat Volkan Dülger, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Kararlarında Organize Suçla Mücadelede Özel Koruma Tedbirleri”, Yıldızhan Yayla’ya Armağan, İstanbul, Galatasaray Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003, s.277. ↑
- The date of entry into force of this Protocol is 01.11.1998. By it the structure of the ECtHR was completely changed and it was turned into a court working full time. ↑
- Dülger, s.277. ↑
- Süheyl Batum, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Türk Anayasal Sistemine Etkileri, İstanbul, İÜHF Yayını, 1993, s.55-58. ↑
- Osman Doğru, Atilla Nalbant, İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi ve Türkiye Karar Özetleri (1995-2000), İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 2001, s.1-4; Hakan Karakuş, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Kararları ve Karşıoylarında Türkiye, İstanbul, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 2001, s.2-5. ↑
- Dülger, s.278. ↑
- Besides individuals, groups of individuals, non-governmental organisations, companies, shareholders, foundations, professional bodies, trade unions, political parties and religious organisations may also lodge applications. ↑
- Mehmet Şükrü Alpaslan, “İnşaat Sözleşmelerinden Doğan İhtilafların Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesine Bireysel Başvuru Olarak Götürülebilmesi Hakkında Bir Değerlendirme”, İntes İnşaat Sanayii Dergisi Türkiye’de Tahkim ve İnşaat Sözleşmeleri Eki, Y:12, S: 71, Mayıs, Haziran 2002, s.20. ↑
- İl Han Özay, Günışığında Yönetim, İstanbul, Alfa Yayınevi, 1996, s.232-235. ↑
- A. Şeref Gözübüyük, Yönetim Hukuku, 9. Basım, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 1996, s.275. ↑
- M. Kemal Oğuzman/M. Turgut Öz, Borçlar Hukuku Genel Hükümler, İstanbul, Filiz Kitabevi, 1995, s.43, 44. ↑
- Gözübüyük, s.277, 278. ↑
- Alpaslan, s.21-23. ↑
- Ratio of the amount deducted to the total project price: since the total project price is 360.000.000.-$ and the amount deducted is approximately 33.065.000.-$, this ratio comes to approximately 10%. ↑
- Alpaslan, s.24-26. ↑
- D.J. Harris/M. O’Boyle, C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, London, Dublin, Edinburg, Butterworths, 1995, s.517. ↑
- Monica Carss-Frisk, The Right to Property: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, Second Impression, Germany, Human Rights Handbooks No.4, Directorate General of Human Rights Council of Europe, 2003, s.6. ↑
- A. Şeref Gözübüyük/A. Feyyaz Gölcüklü, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Uygulaması: Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi İnceleme ve Yargılama Yöntemi, 11. Ek Protokola Göre Hazırlanıp Genişletilmiş 4. Bası, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi, 2003, s.419. ↑
- The taking back referred to here may also take the form, as in the sample case, of a deduction made subsequently from “accrued receivables”, and this too is an “interference”. ↑
- James v. Birleşik Krallık, A98, 1986, par.46. ↑
- Carss-Frisk, s.6. ↑
- See, for example: Sporrong ve Lonnroth v. İsveç, A52, 1982; Hentrich v. Fransa, A 296-A, 1994; Holy Monasteries v. Yunanistan, A310-A, 1994; Pressos Compania Naveira SA v. Belçika, A332, 1995; Aka v. Türkiye, 1998-VI, 1998; Papachelas v. Yunanistan, 25 Mart 1999; Brumarescu v. Romanya, 28 Ekim 1999; Immobiliare Saffi v. İtalya, 28 Ekim 1999; Sapacek v. Çek Cumhuriyeti, 9 Kasım 1999; Beyeler v. İtalya, 5 Ocak 2000; Chassagnou v. Fransa, 29 Nisan 2000; Carbonara ve Ventura v. İtalya, 30 Mayıs 2000; Yunanistan’ın Eski Kralı ve Diğerleri v. Yunanistan, 23 Kasım 2000. ↑
- Durmuş Tezcan/Mustafa Ruhan Erdem/Oğuz Sancakdar, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Işığında Türkiye’nin İnsan Hakları Sorunu, 2. Baskı, Ankara, Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2004, s.529. ↑
- Carss-Frisk, s.6-8. ↑
- Gözübüyük/Gölcüklü, s.425, 426. ↑
- Stran Greek Refinerise ve Stratis Andreadis v. Yunanistan, A301-B, 1994. ↑
- Carss-Frisk, s.12. ↑
- Delcourt v. Belçika, 17 Ocak 1970. ↑
- Nuala Mole/Catharina Harby, The Right to A Fair Trial: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Second Impression, Germany, Human Rights Handbooks No.3, Directorate General of Human Rights Council of Europe, 2003, s.5,6. ↑
- Mole/Harby, s.11. ↑
- Tezcan/Erdem/Sancakdar, s.311. ↑
- Mole/Harby, s.11. ↑
- Sibel İnceoğlu, İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi Kararlarında Adil Yargılanma Hakkı: Kamu ve Özel Hukuk Alanlarında Ortak Yargısal Hak ve İlkeler, İstanbul, Beta Yayıncılık, 2002, s.30, 31. ↑
- Mole/Harby, s.12. ↑
- Bromelid and Malmström v. Sweden 8588/79 ve 8589/79. ↑
- Gözübüyük/Gölcüklü, s.63. ↑
- Gözübüyük/Gölcüklü, s.87. ↑
- Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, London, Blackstone’s Human Rights Series, 2001, s.14. ↑
- Gözübüyük/Gölcüklü, s.101,105. ↑
- The Soering v. UK case concerned the extradition of the applicant from England to the USA. Cases of this kind, which concern the law of extradition, are dealt with as a priority. See: Leach, s.27. ↑
- Mehmet Şükrü Alpaslan, “Türkiye’nin AİHM Macerası”, Görüş, İstanbul, Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği Yayın Organı, Sayı 57 Kasım-Aralık 2003, s.36. ↑
- Cyprus v. Turkey, 10.07.1978, 8007/77, and the application of France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Turkey, 6.12.1983, 9940-9944/82, are two of these. ↑
- Alpaslan, AİHM Macerası, s.40. ↑
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Imprisonment in Defiance of the Law: Enemy Criminal Law in Türkiye in the Light of the European Court of Human Rights Judgments in Osman Kavala and Can Atalay” (Hukuka Rağmen Hapis: Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesinin Osman Kavala ve Can Atalay Kararları Işığında Türkiye’de Düşman Ceza Hukuku), Dülger Law Office, 20 November 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Demanding Accountability Is Not a Crime: On the Investigation Initiated Against Av. Prof. Dr. Osman Korkut Kanadoğlu” (Hesap Sormak Suç Değildir: Av. Prof. Dr. Osman Korkut Kanadoğlu Hakkında Başlatılan Soruşturma Üzerine), Dülger Law Office, 27 October 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “On the Events Known to the Public as the ‘Fund Scandal’: An Assessment in Terms of Criminal Liability, Investor Rights and Supervisory Liability” (Kamuoyunda “Fon Skandalı” Olarak Anılan Olaylar Hakkında: Ceza Sorumluluğu, Yatırımcı Hakları ve Denetim Sorumluluğu Bakımından Bir Değerlendirme), Academia.edu, 1 October 2026.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Delayed Occurrence of the Result (Dolus Generalis / Weber's Intent)” (Gecikmiş Neticenin Gerçekleşmesi (Dolus Generalis / Weber Kastı)), Essays in Honour of Asst. Prof. Dr. Sesim Soyer Güleç (Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Sesim Soyer Güleç’e Armağan), eds. Koray Doğan / Behiye Eker Kazancı, Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2025, pp. 223–288.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Assessment of the Constitutional Court's Decision on the Provisions Governing the Simplified Trial Procedure” (Anayasa Mahkemesinin Basit Yargılama Usulü Hükümlerine İlişkin Kararının Değerlendirilmesi), Dülger Law Office, 12 October 2023.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, Offences and Sanctions Relating to the Laundering of Proceeds of Crime (The Offence of Money Laundering) (Suç Gelirlerinin Aklanmasına İlişkin Suçlar ve Yaptırımlar (Kara Paranın Aklanması Suçu)), 3rd ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2026.

