Introduction
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
The immunity of claim and defence is recognised, and constitutionally guaranteed as a right, in Article 36 of the Constitution, headed “Freedom to Claim Rights”, in the following words: “Everyone has the right, by making use of legitimate means and procedures, to bring claims and to defend themselves as plaintiff or defendant before the judicial authorities, and the right to a fair trial.” The exercise of the right of defence, and in this sense the securing of the freedom to claim rights, depends on this right being immune from any threat of criminal or administrative sanction. The defence must be inviolable, so that individuals can freely exercise and pursue their rights without any fear or hesitation.
In the offence of “Insult”, which is found in Chapter Eight of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) No. 5237, headed “Offences against Honour”, the immunity of claim and defence is recognised by Article 128 as a ground of justification. Under that article, no penalty is imposed on persons making a claim or a defence (subjective condition) where, before judicial or administrative authorities (objective condition: the place of the insult), they set out material facts amounting to a concrete imputation against persons or make negative assessments (objective condition: the form of the insult). For this, however, the imputations and assessments must be based on real and concrete facts and must be connected with the dispute (objective condition: proportionality).
Full text
This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Volkan Dülger
I. Introduction
The immunity of claim and defence is recognised, and placed under constitutional guarantee as a right, by Article 36 of the Constitution, entitled “Freedom to Claim Rights”, in the following words: “Everyone has the right to assert claims and to defend himself or herself, as claimant or defendant, before the judicial authorities, and the right to a fair trial, by making use of legitimate means and procedures.” The exercise of the rights of the defence and, in this sense, the securing of the freedom to claim rights depend entirely on those rights being immune from any threat of criminal or administrative sanction. The defence must be inviolable, so that persons are able to exercise and pursue their rights freely, without being seized by any fear or hesitation.
In the offence of “Insult”, which is contained in Chapter Eight of the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 (TCK), entitled “Offences against Honour”, the immunity of claim and defence is accepted as a ground of justification by Article 128. Under that article, where, before judicial bodies or administrative authorities (objective condition – place of the insult), material facts amounting to a specific imputation in respect of persons are put forward or negative assessments are made (objective condition – form of the insult), no penalty is imposed on those persons who make the claim or the defence (subjective condition). For this, however, the imputations and assessments must be based on real and concrete facts and be connected with the dispute (objective condition – proportionality).
The 18th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, too, in a decision it rendered on the subject, ruled as follows: “In this way, it being envisaged that those who are parties to the case – the defendant, the claimant, the private prosecutor, the intervening party, the accused and the prosecutor – may, under certain conditions, make certain imputations so that the claim and the defence can be put forward as required, and that in doing so they may sometimes use expressions that demean those to whom they are addressed, the acts arising in this way are to be regarded as lawful, provided that they are proportionate to what the claim and the defence require”1.
The focus of this article is the judgment on this subject in which the Constitutional Court held that the punishment of the applicant, a lawyer, for the offence of insult on account of words spoken at a hearing constituted a violation of that person’s freedom of expression2.
II. The Facts
According to the facts giving rise to the application, the applicant, a lawyer, was at the material time defence counsel for one of two accused who were being tried before the Assize Court on the charge of having committed the offence of aggravated homicide. It was alleged that the accused had poured petrol over the deceased and set the deceased on fire. Following the events, one of the accused was taken into police custody and placed in pre-trial detention. The accused for whom the applicant acted as defence counsel was released after being held for one day in police custody and after a statement had been taken. In that statement the accused said that he had clearly seen the other accused kill the person by burning, and described how the incident had taken place.
The applicant attended the second hearing at the trial stage as defence counsel for the accused. At the hearing the floor was given first to the detained accused and that accused’s defence counsel, and counsel for the detained accused claimed that his client was innocent and that the offence had been committed by the accused for whom the applicant was acting. The applicant, taking the floor in turn, claimed that the accused who was being tried in detention had admitted the offence while in custody, in a setting in which the judicial police and doctors were also present, by openly shouting “Why did I become a murderer?”; that the applicant’s client had shed light on the incident by recounting what he had seen in connection with the murder; and that the client was therefore being tried as an accused in this case when he ought to have been heard as a witness. Referring to the public prosecutor who had drawn up the indictment, the applicant used the words “(...) The fact that my client’s punishment is sought in this case, together with the other accused, under the same charging provisions is due to the failure of the prosecutor who brought the case to grasp the incident and to that prosecutor’s officiousness (...)”. Following the applicant’s defence submissions, the prosecutor representing the prosecution at the hearing took the floor and requested that, on account of the applicant’s statement that the public prosecutor who had drawn up the indictment against the accused “acted officiously”, a decision be taken to send a copy of the record of the hearing to the Presidency of the Bar Association and to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office for the necessary action to be taken.
The Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office brought a public prosecution against the applicant for “the offence of insulting a public official”. In the defence submitted during the trial, the applicant stated that, at the hearing in which the applicant had acted as defence counsel for the accused, the prosecutor representing the prosecution, while dictating the prosecution’s opinion for the record, had requested that a criminal complaint be lodged with the Bar Association and the Prosecutor’s Office so that the applicant be tried on account of the word “officious”, which the applicant had used in respect of the prosecutor who had prepared the indictment against the accused whom the applicant was defending. The applicant submitted that this had been hurtful; that the word “officious” had been used in order to indicate that the indictment had been prepared on the basis of superficial work; that the applicant had thereupon stood up and asked to make a statement; that the prosecution had wagged a finger at the applicant and said “do not speak any further”; and that the applicant, in response to those words, had said “will you hang me or cut my throat?”. The applicant stated that, although the applicant had insistently indicated a wish to take the floor in response to the prosecutor’s opinion, the bench of the Assize Court had not given the applicant the floor, and that a decision had subsequently been taken to open an investigation against the applicant for the offence of insult.
At the end of the trial it was decided that the applicant be sentenced twice to 11 months and 20 days’ imprisonment for the offence of insulting a public official and that the pronouncement of the judgment be deferred. In the reasoning of the court’s decision, the following words of the applicant were found to be established: the words directed at the public prosecutor who had drawn up the indictment, “(...)the fact that my client’s punishment is sought in this case, together with the other accused, under the same charging provisions is due to the failure of the prosecutor who brought the case to grasp the incident or to that prosecutor’s officiousness(...)”; the words addressed at the same hearing to the public prosecutor representing the prosecution, “are you thinking of hanging me as well?”; and the words addressed to the bench of the court with that prosecutor in mind, “Do not make me deal with mere children.” It was stated that these words could not be assessed as falling within the scope of freedom of expression; that, since the condition of proportionality was not met, they could not be assessed as falling within the scope of the immunity of claim and defence either; and that by these acts the applicant had overstepped the limits of freedom of expression and of the immunity of claim and defence.
The objection lodged by the applicant against that decision was dismissed. On the other hand, the accused for whom the applicant acted as defence counsel was acquitted on the ground that no conclusive and convincing evidence, free from all doubt and sufficient for a conviction, could be obtained.
III. The View of the Constitutional Court A. The Constitutional Court’s Examination as to Admissibility
The Constitutional Court held that the complaint that freedom of expression had been violated, which was not manifestly ill-founded and in respect of which there was no other ground requiring a finding of inadmissibility, had to be declared admissible.
B. The Constitutional Court’s Examination on the Merits
The Constitutional Court first stated that the decision sentencing the applicant twice to 11 months and 20 days’ imprisonment on account of the words directed at the public prosecutors, and deferring the pronouncement of the judgment, constituted an interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. The Court stated that the profession of lawyer is a public service, that the lawyer plays a part in the judicial process in finding and bringing out justice, and that, in this context, lawyers have the right to criticise the functioning of the judiciary, provided that they do not overstep certain limits. It is stated that words spoken or statements made in writing in the context of criticism must be assessed within the event as a whole, without being detached from the context in which those words or statements were made.
In the assessment it made of the specific case as to whether the interference amounted to a violation, the Court states, with regard to whether the interference with freedom of expression was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, that the words in question were uttered only during the hearing and that it was not even alleged that the case was one known to the public, and that, in this sense, the protection afforded to the public prosecutor against unfounded accusations does not need to be balanced against the interests relating to open debate on matters of public interest.
As regards the conformity of the interference with the requirements of the order of a democratic society and its proportionality, the Court states that the applicant was acting as defence counsel for a client who was being tried for the offence of killing with a monstrous motive, and that such a charge would have grave consequences on both an individual and a societal scale. According to the Court, it is beyond doubt that lodging a criminal complaint against a lawyer while that lawyer is conducting the defence will significantly affect the rights of the defence. The Court then states that the applicant sought to build the defence on the thesis that there was no reason whatsoever to bring proceedings against the client and that the client ought in fact to have been a witness, and that the client was subsequently acquitted; and it notes that the applicant uttered the words at a moment when the atmosphere during the hearing was tense and as a result of the polemic into which the applicant had entered with the public prosecutor.
According to the Court, even if it is accepted that the applicant’s criticism of the prosecutor was very harsh and damaged the ethical rules and the dignity of the profession of lawyer, these words relate to the method applied by the prosecutor in bringing the case. It can therefore be said that the applicant’s words targeted neither the private life nor the professional or other qualities of the prosecutor who had prepared the indictment. As for the applicant’s words directed at the prosecutor at the hearing, they are the result of the polemic which took place between the applicant and the prosecutor and which was to some extent caused by the prosecutor. Interference with defence counsel is permissible only in very exceptional circumstances, and a prosecutor who openly interferes with the applicant’s line of defence and enters into a verbal argument with the applicant during the hearing is expected to show greater tolerance towards words directed at him. The imposition of a custodial sentence on account of these words will have a chilling effect on lawyers’ expression of opinion and on their duty to defend their clients’ interests zealously.
In conclusion, the Constitutional Court, also taking into account that the applicant’s statements had been made not in public but only in the courtroom, reached the view that the interference with freedom of expression by means of the imposition of a custodial sentence on the applicant was not in conformity with the requirements of the order of a democratic society.
IV. Legal Assessment of the Judgment
Freedom of expression aims to protect thought, one of the most important values that make a human being human, and in this sense constitutes one of the most important elements of being a free individual and of having a free society. From Descartes’s famous saying “cogito ergo sum” to Montesquieu’s statement that “Man is a dynamic, creative and virtuous being. But these qualities come into operation and develop only in a free environment. An environment that is not free brings doubt, fear, uncertainty, insecurity and lethargy.”, freedom of expression has always had a philosophical past and a dense accumulation of human experience behind it, and in this sense it has found a place in numerous international and national legal texts, first and foremost the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948 and the European Convention on Human Rights of 4 November 1950.
The immunity of claim and defence, too, constitutes one of the manifestations and components both of freedom of expression and of the freedom to claim rights. As a constitutional right, the immunity of claim and defence may be restricted only on the grounds set out in Article 26 of the Constitution and for the reasons for limitation set out in Article 13. From the standpoint of criminal law, this concept ensures that persons can pursue their rights by putting forward claims or a defence before the authorities competent to adjudicate, and that they are not punished on account of the written and oral statements they make in events taking place before the adjudicating authorities. In order for persons to benefit from Art. 128 TCK, which is a ground of justification in respect of the offence of insult, the objective and subjective conditions we have set out above must be fulfilled.
When the judgment is assessed in the context of the rights of the defence, attention must first be drawn to the important role played in the protection of human rights and the rule of law by lawyers and, in particular – because of the severe instruments of sanction which criminal law has at its disposal – by defence lawyers. However, as in the present case, threats and attacks directed at lawyers have been steadily increasing in recent times, and the rights of the defence, too, are in this sense being imprisoned!
Due value must be attached to the role assumed by lawyers and to the heavy burdens they bear. Indeed, when the international texts on this subject are examined, it is seen that Article 20 of the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (United Nations – Havana Decision) states that “Lawyers should enjoy civil and criminal immunity when carrying out their professional activities before a court, tribunal or legal or administrative authority, or for the written or oral submissions they make in good faith in relation to the matter.”, and that Recommendation No. R (2000) 21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the Freedom of Exercise of the Profession of Lawyer contains the statements “All necessary measures should be taken to respect, protect and promote the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer, without discrimination and without improper interference from the authorities or the public, in particular in the light of the relevant provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.” and “Lawyers should not be subjected to, or threatened with, any pressure or sanction when they act in accordance with professional standards.”
When the judgment is considered in terms of Art. 128 TCK, it is seen, first of all, that the necessary conditions are fulfilled in that the insult took place orally (objective condition – form of the insult) before the adjudicating authority (objective condition – place of the insult) and the act was carried out by defence counsel (subjective condition).
Lastly, as regards the condition of proportionality or, in other words, of not overstepping the limit, on which the discussion will concentrate, it is seen that the imputations and assessments are connected with the dispute. For the words uttered by the applicant as defence counsel are seen to contain an assessment relating not to the prosecutor’s personality and private life, but to the manner and method in which the prosecutor carried out the work in respect of the dispute concerned. Secondly, as regards the requirement that the imputations and assessments be based on real and concrete facts, it is seen – also in connection with the situation described by the applicant – that the accused for whom the applicant acted as defence counsel was acquitted on the ground that no conclusive and convincing evidence, free from all doubt and sufficient for a conviction, could be obtained. In this sense, too, that condition must be said to have been fulfilled. And when these words, spoken in the context of criticism, are assessed within the event as a whole, without being detached from the context in which they were uttered, attention must be drawn to the fact that the applicant sought to build the defence against the allegations on a particular thesis and thus constructed a line of defence. In the light of all these assessments of mine, it is seen that the applicant’s acts must be accepted as lawful.
It is quite clear that lodging a criminal complaint against a lawyer while that lawyer is conducting the defence and on account of what is put forward in the defence, and the resulting imposition of a custodial sentence, will significantly affect the rights of the defence. In this respect, the Court’s view that interferences with freedom of expression carried out in this way will have a chilling effect on lawyers’ expression of opinion and on their duty to defend their clients’ interests zealously is consonant with fundamental human and legal values.
It is frequently observed that lawyers, and in particular defence lawyers acting in criminal cases, from time to time put forward very harsh defences and criticise in severe terms the public prosecutors who prepared the indictment or delivered an opinion on the case, for reasons such as the gravity of the nature of the case, the fact that the accused is in detention, the heaviness of the penalties sought, the pressure to which they are subjected by the accused’s family and relatives and, most importantly, attempts by the judges sitting on the court or by the public prosecutor to obstruct them. Yet this is a normal state of affairs, given the nature of a criminal case. Judges and prosecutors who sit at hearings must therefore be prepared for this, must be tolerant beyond the ordinary and must make room for defence lawyers to be able to do their work well. This should not, of course, be thought of as a case of an attack on personality and dignity. But where it relates to the defence, a measured harshness is inherent in the nature of this work. In this context, where defence counsel appears at a hearing and/or drafts a pleading with the worry that proceedings may be brought against him on account of the statements made and the words used in the defence, it is not possible for the defence to be performed properly. Yet being defended is a need which, like water and air, is appreciated only when one falls into a void or is left without water! For this reason, the rights of the defence must be respected and the obstacles in their way must be removed.
I think that the judgment of the Constitutional Court in question, of which I have given a brief assessment here, makes an extremely positive contribution to fundamental rights and freedoms, to the rights of the defence, to the positions of the subjects of the proceedings and to the functioning of the proceedings. In this respect the judgment needs to be read and discussed by lawyers and to be made the subject of further assessments.
It must be known that, for law to be realised and for rights to be defended, it is imperative that both the claim and the defence be free. Likewise, the functioning of the proceedings can be secured not by opposing and threatening the defence, but only together with the defence!
Footnotes
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Özkan, Onur, “Review of a Constitutional Court Judgment on the Constitutionality of a Norm: Article 34 of the Turkish Criminal Code on Mental Illness” (Anayasa Mahkemesi Norm Denetim Kararının İncelemesi: Türk Ceza Kanunu'nun Akıl Hastalığına İlişkin 34. Maddesinin Anayasaya Uygunluğu Sorunu), Academia.edu, 8 February 2020.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Assessment of the Constitutional Court's Decision on the Provisions Governing the Simplified Trial Procedure” (Anayasa Mahkemesinin Basit Yargılama Usulü Hükümlerine İlişkin Kararının Değerlendirilmesi), Dülger Law Office, 12 October 2023.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Can Individuals Be Expected to Be Prophets in a State Governed by the Rule of Law? A Critique of the Constitutional Court's ‘E.Ü. Application’ Decision” (Hukuk Devletinde Kişilerden Kahin Olması Beklenebilir mi? Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin “E.Ü. Başvurusu” Kararının Eleştirisi), Dülger Law Office, 15 October 2020.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “Assessment of the Constitutional Court's Decision on the Annulment of Various Phrases in the Access-Blocking Provisions of Law No. 5651” (5651 Sayılı Kanun'un Erişimin Engellenmesini Düzenleyen Hükümlerinde Yer Alan Çeşitli İbarelerin İptal Konusu Olduğu Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararına İlişkin Değerlendirme), Academia.edu, 17 February 2018.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “An Assessment of the Constitutional Court's Decision in the Annulment Action Concerning the Personal Data Protection Law” (Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Kanunu'nun Konu Edildiği İptal Davası Kararına İlişkin Bir Değerlendirme), Academia.edu, 5 February 2018.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Taşkın, Şaban Cankat, “The Rules Following the Constitutional Court's Annulment of the Deferral of the Announcement of the Verdict (HAGB): Is the HAGB Era Over?” (Anayasa Mahkemesinin HAGB'nin İptali Kararına İlişkin Düzenlemeler: HAGB Dönemi Kapandı mı?), Dülger Law Office, 10 August 2023.

