Abstract
This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.
One of the eagerly awaited developments in the field of personal data protection was the judgment to be delivered in the Schrems II case. The European Court of Justice had announced through its official Twitter account that the judgment in C-311/18 – Facebook Ireland and Schrems would be delivered on 16 July. The judgment was delivered on that date, and the debate on the transfer of personal data between countries flared up again. This judgment, known as Schrems II, is of great importance, particularly on the question whether standard contractual clauses are a valid method for data transfers to be carried out under the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). At the same time, the adequacy and validity of the level of protection provided by the Privacy Shield Decision between the European Union and the United States of America are also called into question. These examinations were carried out in line with the provisions of the GDPR and of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”).
Full text
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THE SCHREMS II JUDGMENT and Its Consequences
One of the eagerly awaited developments in the field of personal data protection was the judgment to be delivered in the Schrems II case.
The European Court of Justice had announced via its official Twitter account that the judgment in C-311/18 - Facebook Ireland and Schrems would be delivered on 16 July. The judgment was delivered on that date, and the debate on the transfer of personal data between countries flared up once again.
This judgment, referred to as Schrems II, is of great importance particularly as to whether standard contractual clauses are a valid method for data transfers to be carried out under the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). At the same time, the adequacy and validity of the level of protection ensured by the Privacy Shield Decision between the European Union and the United States of America are also called into question.
These examinations were carried out in accordance with the provisions of the GDPR and of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”).
IN GENERAL
THE SCHREMS II CASE In the case referred to as Schrems II, “Data Protection Authority v Facebook Ireland and Maximillian Schrems (Data Protection Commissioner
v Facebook Ireland and Maximillian Schrems)1”, the subject-matter is a request by the Irish High Court for an opinion from the European Court of Justice. Accordingly, the Irish High Court requested an opinion on the validity of the standard contractual clauses No 2010/87, known as “Standard Contractual Clause (the “SCC Decision”)2 ”, which allow data to be transferred outside the EU. The starting point of the case therefore lies in Maximillian Schrems’s criticism of Facebook’s data protection practices and in the allegations that EU legislation and US surveillance laws conflict and that the protection afforded by US law is inadequate.
The nature of the decision at issue here is that it is a preliminary ruling by which the European Court of Justice, at the request of a court of an EU Member State, interprets EU law3. No appeal lies against such preliminary rulings; these rulings are of considerable importance in that they contain final determinations on EU law.
THE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S OPINION
Before turning to the examination of the judgment delivered by the Court, it is necessary to recall the Opinion (the “Advocate General’s Opinion”) delivered on 19 December 2019 by Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe, who serves as Advocate General (Hukuk Sözcüsü) at the European Court of Justice4.
In the opinion he delivered, the Advocate General had taken an important step by stating that the standard contractual clauses were valid. For the application of standard contractual clauses is one of the best mechanisms available, particularly for data transfers to countries not regarded as safe, such as Türkiye. The acceptance of these clauses is therefore of considerable importance for companies that transfer data abroad in the course of their commercial activities. • Otherwise these companies would find themselves in the position of carrying out unlawful data transfers and would have to look for other methods for such transfers.
However, to interpret the opinion delivered by the Advocate General as meaning that data transfers abroad are fully
Ground of Objection
The questions referred for a preliminary ruling are
Decision of the Court
• Under Article 94(1) of the GDPR, Directive 95/46/ EC was repealed with effect from 25 May 2018, whereas the present request for a preliminary ruling was submitted on 9 May 2018.
• The relevant provisions of the Directive referred to in the questions
2.WHY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE GDPR, MUST THE QUESTIONS
BE ANSWERED? According to the Court, the questions must be answered in accordance with the provisions of the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation – “GDPR”). Because:
• The subject-matter of the preliminary ruling arose, following the complaint lodged by Mr
Facebook Ire-
permitted would be wrong. For the opinion states that controllers must, under the standard contractual clauses, ensure protection at GDPR level with regard to the protection of the rights of data subjects.
The Advocate General’s opinion is therefore to the effect that the standard contractual clauses should be accepted on condition that the rights of data subjects are protected at GDPR level. It is also worth underlining that he expressed the view that, otherwise, the data protection authority concerned must suspend or prohibit the data transfer.
THE EXAMINATION CARRIED OUT BY THE COURT AND
ITS DECISION
1.ADMISSIBILITY OF THE REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING The parties claiming that the request for a preliminary ruling
based on the provisions of land Directive 95/46/EC, which have been repealed by the GDPR.
• The Data Protection Authority did not express a definitive view on the validity of the SCC Decision, but merely its doubts.
• The national court which made the reference to the Court was unable to determine whether Sch- Germany rems had explicitly consented to the data transfers in question; had there been explicit consent, it would have been unnecessary to answer these questions.
The questions referred for a preliminary ruling are hypothetical, since the national
have essentially been reproduced in the articles of the GDPR.
• The Court is required to interpret all the provisions of EU law which national courts need in order to give their decision, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to it.
• Where the questions referred concern the interpretation or the validity of a rule of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling.
• Questions referred by national courts are presumptively relevant.
• The Court may refuse to answer a question referred to it only where the main action or the problem in respect of which the interpretation is sought is hypothetical, or where it does not have before it the material necessary to give an answer.
Schrems, from a request that the Data Protection Authority concerned suspend or prohibit the transfer of personal information by Facebook Ireland to Facebook Inc.
• Although the questions referred for a preliminary ruling refer to the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC, the Data Protection Commissioner had not yet adopted a final decision on the present complaint at the time when that Directive was repealed.
• The absence of a national decision distinguishes the present complaint from cases, like the judgment of 24 September 2019 concerning the territorial scope of Google, in which the decisions had been adopted before the Directive
United Kingdom
is inadmissible, and the grounds for those claims, are briefly as follows:
court has not found that the data were transferred on the basis of the SCC Decision.
• In conclusion, it was held that the request for a preliminary ruling is admissible.
was repealed5.
3.THE QUESTIONS REFERRED TO THE COURT
AND THE ANSWERS
i. As regards the relationship between the scope of the GDPR and the Treaty on European Union, safeguarding national security within the EU is, under the EU Treaty, the responsibility of each Member State and concerns only the EU Member States. According to the Court, therefore, there is no need in the present case to interpret this rule in conjunction with Article 2 of the GDPR, which concerns its scope6.
According to Article 2(1), the provisions of the GDPR apply “to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing, other than by automated means, of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system”. Processing, for its part, is defined in Article 4(2) of the GDPR, which draws no distinction between processing carried out within the EU and processing connected with a third country. Moreover, under the heading “Data transfers to third countries or international organisations”, • Chapter V of the GDPR makes it possible for personal data to be transferred to third countries subject to certain rules. Accordingly, the operation of transferring personal data from a Member State to a third country constitutes, in itself, processing within the meaning of Art. 4(2) GDPR and falls within the scope of Art. 2(1) GDPR. It should also be noted, however, that this activity does not constitute an exception under Art. 2(2) GDPR7.
Turning to the present case, it is clear that no exception under Art. 2(2) GDPR is involved.
For the transfer made from Facebook Ireland to Facebook Inc. cannot constitute the situation referred to in Art. 2(2)(c) GDPR, “by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity”, nor can it be regarded as falling within the exceptions relating to the State or State authorities contained in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) of Art. 2(2). According to the Court, the fact that personal data transferred between two economic operators for commercial purposes are processed, at the time of the transfer or thereafter, by the authorities of the third country concerned for purposes such as public security and defence does not take that transfer outside
the scope of the GDPR. Indeed, this is also apparent from the provision of Art. 45(2)(a) of the GDPR, which must be taken into account by the Commission when assessing the adequacy of the level of protection in a third country8.
In conclusion, pursuant to the provisions of Art. 2(1) and Art. 2(2) of the GDPR, the answer to the first question is as follows:
The GDPR applies to the transfer of personal data for commercial purposes by an economic operator established in a Member State to another economic operator established in a third country, irrespective of whether, at the time of that transfer or thereafter, those data are processed by the State or State authorities for the purposes of public security, defence or national security.
ii.As regards the second, third and sixth questions, concerning transfers made on the basis of standard data protection clauses, the referring court here seeks clarification on the transfer of personal data to a third country under standard data protection clauses in conformity with the level of protection required by Articles 46(1) and 46(2)(c) of the GDPR. The referring court asks in particular which factors must be taken into account in order to determine whether that level of protection is ensured in the context of such a transfer9.
Reading together the provisions on the required level of protection, the Court reaches the conclusion that, in the absence of an adequacy decision under Art. 45(3) GDPR, the transfer may be carried out by means of standard data protection clauses adopted by the Commission, provided that the controller or processor ensures the safeguards of “appropriate measures”, “the conferral of enforceable rights on the data subject” and “effective legal remedies”. Although the conditions of those safeguards are not expressly specified in Article 46 of the GDPR, according to the Court that article must be read together with the general transfer provisions in Article 44, so that the level of protection of natural persons is not undermined. At this point the Court, referring to the Advocate General’s Opinion, drew attention to paragraph 117 of the Opinion; according to it, the provisions of Chapter V of the GDPR are intended to ensure, in accordance with the objectives set out in Recital 6, the continuity of the level of protection to be afforded where personal data are transferred to a third country10.
Art. 45 GDPR provides that the transfer of personal data to a third country may be authorised by a Commission decision without any further authorisation or approval. Although in that case it appears at first sight that protection at the level guaranteed by EU legislation need not be ensured, a look at Recital 104 with regard to the “adequate level of protection” will show that this is not in fact so.
Accordingly, the third country must ensure adequate and valid standards with regard to fundamental rights and freedoms in the context of its own domestic law and its international commitments. In addition, the third country must ensure an adequate level of protection equivalent to that afforded within the Union and, in this context, must in particular ensure effective and independent data protection supervision and provide for cooperation mechanisms with the data protection authorities of the EU Member States.
Moreover, data subjects must be afforded effective and enforceable rights and effective legal mechanisms. In essence, therefore, the level of protection that applies within the EU must be ensured in this case too. For according to the Court the objectives explained in Recital 6 could not otherwise be achieved11.
Can the Commission decide that an adequate level of protection
is not ensured?
Recital 107 provides that the Commission may decide that an adequate level of data protection is not ensured in respect of a third country.
In that case the transfer of data is prohibited unless there are binding corporate rules or another valid basis. Recital 108 offers guidance for determining in which cases a transfer may be made. Accordingly, in the absence of an adequacy decision, the controller or processor will, in order to be able to make the transfer, take certain measures to compensate for the lack of data protection in a third country by way of appropriate safeguards for the data subject.
These safeguards may be provided by binding corporate rules or by standard data protection clauses adopted by the supervisory authorities.
It should be noted, however, that these safeguards must ensure compliance with data protection requirements and the level of protection that applies to data subjects within the EU, including enforceable rights and effective legal remedies. According to the Court,
the provision of such a safeguard means, as is in essence also stated in paragraph 115 of the Advocate General’s Opinion, a level of protection equivalent to the adequate level of protection guaranteed within the EU12.
According to Article 6(3) of the EU Treaty, the fundamental rights contained in the Convention constitute general principles of EU law, and Article 52(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights further provides that the rights contained in the Charter correspond to the rights guaranteed by the Convention and are to be understood as having the same meaning and scope. Against this background, according to the Court of Justice, any examination undertaken by the Court with a view to the interpretation of EU law and the review of EU legislation must be carried out in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter13. Indeed, as will be seen below, many of the examinations carried out by the Court were conducted on the basis of the provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
In conclusion;
The transfer of personal data for commercial purposes by an economic operator established in an EU Member State to another economic operator established in a third country falls within the scope of the GDPR, • The reason for this is to ensure, as stated in Recital 10, a consistent and high level of protection of natural persons, and to ensure that the rules on the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms are applied consistently and homogeneously in accordance with the matters set out in Art. 46(1) GDPR14.
Which factors should be considered in determining the adequate level of protection?
Although Art. 46 GDPR does not list the factors to be taken into account in assessing the adequacy of the level of protection, Art. 46(1) states that appropriate safeguards, enforceable rights for data subjects and effective legal remedies must be available. The Court takes the view that, in assessing the adequate level of protection in the context of a transfer, account must be taken of the contractual clauses between the controller or processor established in the EU and the recipient established in the third country concerned. In addition, regard must be had to the third country’s system governing access by its public authorities to the personal data being transferred. Moreover, the factors to be taken into account in the context of Art. 46 GDPR
are equivalent to the factors laid down in Art. 45(2) GDPR. According to the Court, therefore, the provisions of Art. 45(2) may also be taken as a basis for these factors. iii.As regards the eighth question, concerning the powers of the supervisory authorities in this matter, the referring court enquires, with regard to the powers of the supervisory authorities, into the scope and nature of Art. 58(2)(f) GDPR (the imposition of a temporary or definitive limitation, including a ban on processing) and Art. 58(2)(j) GDPR (ordering the suspension of data flows to a recipient in a third country or to an international organisation).
According to Article 8(3) of the Charter and Articles 51(1) and 57(1)(a) of the GDPR, the national supervisory authorities are responsible for monitoring compliance with the EU rules on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data. Each of those authorities is therefore vested with the power to check whether a transfer of personal data from its own Member State to a third country complies with the requirements laid down by the GDPR. It may be concluded from this that the primary responsibility of the supervisory authorities is to monitor the application of the
provisions of the GDPR and to ensure that they are applied. This responsibility is of particular importance where personal data are transferred to a third country. For, as is also stated in Recital 116, when personal data move across borders outside the Union, the ability of natural persons to exercise their data protection rights in order to protect themselves from the unlawful use or disclosure of their information is put at greater risk15.
Pursuant to Article 57(1)(f) of the GDPR, each supervisory authority which receives, on its own territory, a complaint that the processing of personal data infringes the rules of the GDPR is required to examine the nature of that complaint as necessary.
The supervisory authority must handle such a complaint with all due diligence.
Art. 58(1) GDPR confers on supervisory authorities extensive investigative powers to handle the complaints submitted to them. If, following an investigation, a supervisory authority takes the view that a data subject whose personal data have been transferred to a third country is not afforded an adequate level of protection in that country, it must, under EU law, irrespective of the cause or nature of that inadequacy,
take appropriate measures. Art. 58(2) GDPR, for its part, lists the various corrective powers which supervisory authorities may adopt for that purpose. The supervisory authority will determine which action is appropriate and necessary, taking into account all the circumstances of the transfer of personal data. Indeed, as is also stated in paragraph 148 of the Advocate General’s Opinion, where the standard data protection clauses are not complied with in a third country, the supervisory authority must exercise the powers set out in Art. 58(2) GDPR. According to the Court, this is not at odds with the SCC Decision16.
In conclusion, the power conferred on the Commission by Article 46(2)(c) of the GDPR to adopt standard data protection clauses does not restrict the powers which the national supervisory authorities may exercise under Art. 58(2) GDPR. Therefore, even if the Commission has adopted an adequacy decision, where a complaint is made concerning the protection of rights and freedoms in relation to the processing of personal data, the supervisory authorities may examine whether the transfer in question is being carried out in accordance with the provisions of the GDPR17. iv.As regards the seventh and eleventh questions, concerning the validity of the SCC Decision, Article 1 of the SCC Decision provides that the standard data protection clauses offer adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of the privacy and the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals.
However, although these clauses bind a controller established in the European Union and the recipient of the transfer of personal data established in a third country where they have concluded a contract incorporating those clauses, they cannot bind the other authorities of the third country concerned, since those authorities are not parties to the contract. This may, on the one hand, mean that the validity of the decision cannot be called into question. For the standard data protection clauses in the decision, given that they are contractual in nature, do not, by the very nature of a contract, bind the authorities of the third country to which the data may be transferred. However, the Court, being of the view that this validity depends on whether the SCC Decision complies with the requirements of the GDPR, considered it appropriate to carry out an examination from that angle18.
Indeed, depending on the
law and practices in force in the third country concerned, it is possible that, where such a transfer is based solely on standard data protection clauses, the content of those standard clauses may in practice prove insufficient to ensure the effective protection of personal data. According to the Court, this situation arises in particular where the law of the third country confers on public authorities a power of interference19.
It should be underlined that, in many of the examinations it carried out, the Court paid particular attention to the power of access conferred on public authorities.
So much so that, as will be seen below, the validity of the Privacy Shield Decision was addressed to a large extent in terms of the powers of the US authorities. It follows that, in examining whether the level of data protection in a country is equivalent to that of EU law, the powers of access of public authorities and the limits of those powers are of great importance. According to Art. 46(1) GDPR, in the absence of an adequacy decision, the transfer of personal data may • take place only where a controller or processor provides appropriate security measures and gives effect to the rights of the data subject. Art. 46(2)(c) GDPR, for its part, provides that this may be ensured by standard data protection clauses drawn up by the Commission20. It is therefore possible to make a transfer on the basis of standard contractual clauses. However, as is also stated in paragraph 126 of the Advocate General’s Opinion, the powers of the supervisory authority must be recognised where the controller fails in this transfer operation. The supervisory authority concerned will examine the laws of the country, in particular as to whether there is any obstacle to the application of the standard clauses, and will take a decision accordingly21.
In this context, the power conferred on the supervisory authority to decide to prohibit or suspend the transfer is in no way at odds with the SCC Decision. Accordingly, no problem will arise as regards the validity of the SCC Decision either.
Indeed, the Court stated that, in the examination it carried out under Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, there was nothing to affect the validity of the SCC Decision22.
v.As regards the fourth, fifth, ninth and tenth questions, concerning the US Privacy Shield Decision23, the referring court, by these questions, called into question the Privacy Shield Decision, according to which the US ensures an adequate level of protection, and wished in particular to know to what extent that decision is binding on the supervisory authorities of the EU Member States. With regard to these questions, the examination concerns whether personal data may be transferred under US law and the standard data protection clauses24.
Facebook Ireland claims that the Privacy Shield Decision is binding in that it guarantees the adequacy of the level of protection ensured by the US, and that the transfer made pursuant to the standard data protection clauses in the annex to the SCC Decision is therefore lawful25.
According to the Court, answering the question whether the finding in the Privacy Shield Decision that the US ensures an adequate level of protection is binding bears on whether, in the transfer of personal data pursuant to the SCC Decision, the controller and the recipient ensure adequate protection, and on whether the supervisory authority has powers such as prohibiting or suspending the transfer26.
However, when reading and assessing this part of the judgment, the following point must not be overlooked.
The reason for the applications made by Schrems and for the delivery of these judgments is the surveillance of all kinds of digital communication and sharing by the US intelligence agencies by means of “meta-data”. If the revelations of former National Security Agency (NSA) employee Edward Snowden are anything to go by, the US intelligence agencies do not content themselves with the surveillance they carry out themselves, but also, by cooperating with almost all the major IT, technology and social media companies (or forcing them to cooperate), monitor the data obtained by those companies as well. This includes data transferred to the US under any agreement. For once the data have arrived in the US, the US intelligence and security agencies gain unlimited access to the data on grounds of national security, and resort to all manner of means in order to keep this from judicial scrutiny.27
Is the Privacy Shield Decision binding
on the supervisory authorities?
The Court’s answer to this question was “yes”.
Accordingly, Article 1(1) of the Decision provides that the US ensures an adequate level of protection for the personal data transferred. In addition, Article 1(3) provides that personal data are regarded as transferred under the EU – US Privacy Shield and that, in this context, they may be transferred to the organisations included in the Privacy Shield List28.
Since, under European Union legislation, this Decision provides that the United States of America ensures an adequate level of protection and therefore has the effect of approving personal data transferred under the EU-US Privacy Shield, it is binding on the Member States, and hence on the supervisory authorities of those States, until it is declared invalid.
Accordingly, the Member States and their organs cannot adopt measures contrary to that decision and cannot prohibit the transfer29.
In the event of a complaint, what
will the position be?
Although the Privacy Shield Decision is binding, when a person lodges a complaint with the supervisory authority, that authority must examine whether the transfer of personal
data complies with the requirements laid down by the GDPR.
Where the grounds of objection of a person who has objections to the validity of this decision are well founded, that person may also exercise his rights before the national courts with a view to a preliminary ruling. According to the Court, a finding that the law and practices of the country which is the subject of the complaint do not ensure an adequate level of protection must in fact be understood as relating to whether the decision in question is compatible with the protection of the private life of individuals and of their fundamental rights and freedoms30.
In the present case too, Schrems requested the supervisory authority to prohibit or suspend the transfer of his personal data by Facebook Ireland to Facebook Inc., established in the US, on the ground that a third country did not ensure an adequate level of protection.
The supervisory authority conducting the investigation brought the matter before the national court. In this context, the questions that came before the Court made it necessary to examine the validity of the Privacy Shield Decision as regards its finding that adequate protection is ensured,
and, in order to determine this, it is necessary to examine whether the decision complies with the requirements of the GDPR31
What does the Privacy Shield Decision say? • The US ensures, under the EU – US
Privacy Shield, an adequate level of protection for the personal data transferred (Art. 1(1)).
• The principles issued by the US Department of Commerce are set out in the annex to the decision.
• The EU- US Privacy Shield Framework Principles may be limited to the extent required by national security, the public interest or law enforcement.
(Para.I.5–ANNEX II).
• Accordingly, the exceptions thus determined are framed so as to take precedence over the principles in question and, in this context, an organisation which receives personal data from the EU and has self-certified that it affords adequate protection will be able to disregard the principles, without any limitation, where it considers that they conflict with those requirements
• On this basis,
the way has been opened to an interference that may be carried out32. •
In this context,
can adequate protection
be said to exist?
In reviewing the Privacy Shield Decision’s compliance with the principles of the GDPR in order to determine its validity, the Court first explained the place of personal data in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and in the provisions of the GDPR. In this context it addressed in particular the exceptions concerning the processing of personal data and the circumstances in which the right may be restricted. At this point I shall confine myself to referring to the theoretical explanations given by the Court and shall try to deal with those explanations as they relate to the present case33.
In the present situation, the US essentially claims to ensure, for personal data, a level of protection equivalent to that guaranteed by the GDPR. However, in the examination it carried out in particular with regard to the “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)”, the Court takes the view that the interferences arising from the surveillance programmes used on the basis of the provisions contained therein do not satisfy the requirements of the GDPR and, in particular, the principle of proportionality.
So much so that no supervisory mechanism has been provided for to verify whether individuals are
properly targeted for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information. This shows that no limitation whatsoever has been placed on the interference to be carried out in the context of surveillance practices34.
Indeed, the same point was also made in the Advocate General’s Opinion. The Advocate General is of the view that any interference with the exercise of the rights guaranteed under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, concerning the protection of private life and of personal data, must be examined in particular from the standpoint of the principle of proportionality. Accordingly, the fact that personal data are open to access and use by public authorities without any differentiation, limitation or exception and without objective criteria being laid down, and that the purposes of use are not limited, should give rise to doubts as to the existence of adequate safeguards35.
In addition, the Court found that no rights had been conferred to bring legal proceedings against the US authorities in respect of the interferences arising from the surveillance laws either.
For this reason it is not possible for the Privacy Shield Decision to satisfy, in essence,
the conditions of the level of protection deriving from the Charter and of the requirement, laid down in Art. 45(2)(a) GDPR, that data subjects whose personal data are being transferred to a third country must have effective and enforceable rights36.
In this context, the interferences carried out through surveillance programmes based on US legislation cannot, when assessed in the light of the principle of proportionality that must be observed under EU law, be characterised as “limited to what is necessary”.
Secondly, under Article 47 of the Charter, everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated must have the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in that article. Accordingly, everyone has the right of access to an independent and impartial tribunal.
According to the Court, legislation which does not provide an individual with any possibility of pursuing legal remedies in order to have access to personal data relating to him, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data, does not respect the essence of the fundamental right37.
In conclusion, although Article 1 of the Privacy Shield Decision states that the US ensures an adequate level of protection under the EU – US Privacy Shield, the Court is of the view that this decision does not satisfy the requirements of Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter and of Art. 45 GDPR.
Accordingly, Article 1 of the Decision, which states that it satisfies those requirements, is invalid.
Moreover, since Article 1 of the Privacy Shield Decision is inseparable from Articles 2 and 6 of, and the annexes to, that decision, the invalidity of that article affects the validity of the decision in its entirety. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the Court concluded that the Privacy Shield Decision is invalid38.
In the judgment on the invalidity
of the Privacy Shield Decision,
has any transitional period
for the data that are currently being transferred
been provided for?
The Court did not provide for any transitional period.
Consequently, following the declaration of invalidity in question, data currently being transferred pursuant to the Privacy Shield Decision now constitute the subject of an unlawful transfer. In order to continue such
transfers, therefore, the level of protection set out by the Court must be ensured39.
Does the invalidity of the Privacy Shield
Decision
also affect the other transfer methods?
The answer to this question must be “yes, it does”.
For the declaration of invalidity made by the Court is in fact based on the incompatibility between the national legislation of the US and EU law. It follows that, whatever the transfer method used, these data cannot be protected under US legislation in a manner consistent with the requirements of EU law.
That being so, the judgment should not be read merely as a finding that the Privacy Shield Decision is invalid. What lies beneath are, at a much deeper level, problems relating to the national legislation of the US.
This being the case, the declaration of invalidity in question must also affect the other transfer methods that enable data to be transferred to the US.
Indeed, the document published by the European Data Protection Board to answer frequently asked questions on the Schrems II judgment likewise states that the
data protection threshold set out by the Court applies to all the methods under Article 46 of the GDPR and that this declaration of invalidity will therefore also affect any transfer of data to the US40.
If the basic problem is the national legislation of the US, can it be said that
a transfer to the US carried out pursuant to the SCC Decision
is also invalid?
I think it would be difficult to accept this categorically. Although the Court finds that the basic problem stems from the national legislation of the US, in order to assess the lawfulness of a transfer made to the US pursuant to the SCC Decision, the standard contractual clauses laid down must be examined and a decision taken in that context.
If, in the specific case, it can be said that, taking into account all the circumstances of the transfer, safeguards additional to the national legislation have been provided, the conclusion may be that the transfer is lawful.
I therefore think that no hard-and-fast line should be drawn on this matter and that a decision must be reached only by examining the additional safeguards adopted in the specific transfer.
On this point the European Data Protection Board is likewise of the view that, if an assessment of the circumstances of the transfer and the additional safeguards leads to the conclusion that adequate protection cannot be ensured, the transfer must be suspended or prohibited41.
Where a company is located in the US,
and the transfer is made under Binding Corporate
Rules, what will the validity of that transfer
be?
The answer to this question should be similar to that given to the question above. As I stated above, the Privacy Shield Decision is invalid because US law interferes without limit with the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons whose personal data are transferred to a third country. The same problem therefore persists in a transfer made under Binding Corporate Rules. In this case too, therefore, the additional measures taken within the framework of the Binding Corporate Rules will have to be assessed.
The European Data Protection Board is of the view that, in this respect too, if an assessment of the circumstances of the transfer and the additional safeguards leads to the conclusion that adequate protection cannot be ensured, the transfer made under Binding Corporate Rules • must be suspended or prohibited42.
So will it be impossible
to transfer data to the US
in any way at all?
Although the declaration of invalidity made by the Court rests on grounds that will affect all transfers to the US, to say that as a result of this judgment no data can be transferred to the US in any way would be neither correct nor realistic in practical terms.
First, Article 49 of the GDPR43 is still in force, and it is still possible to transfer data by way of derogation under that article44. For example, data transfers made for purposes such as the consent of the data subject or the conclusion and performance of a contract made in the interest of the data subject will still be valid under Article 49. It must not be forgotten, however, that the place of this article in practice is very limited.
It is therefore still not possible for that article to solve the problem of transfers to be carried out between economic operators for commercial purposes.
Accordingly, in the first place, pursuant to Article 49 of the GDPR and confined to various specific situations, data may be transferred to the US
lawfully. However, following the Court’s declaration of invalidity, serious changes will have to be made to the national legislation of the US in order for transfers made for commercial purposes to economic operators located in the US to be valid.
In conclusion;
The basic conclusions reached by the Court in response to the questions put to it are as follows45:
• Art. 2(1) and Art. 2(2) GDPR apply to the transfer of personal data for commercial purposes by an economic operator established in an EU Member State to another economic operator established in a third country. The fact that the personal data are processed by the authorities of the third country concerned for the purposes of public security, defence or State security does not alter this.
• Art. 46(1) and Art. 46(2)(c) GDPR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights provide for appropriate safeguards, enforceable rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects whose personal data are transferred to a third country pursuant to standard data protection clauses. For this reason, in assessing the level of data protection ensured in the context of such a transfer,
the contractual clauses agreed between the controller or processor established in the EU and the data recipient located in the third country concerned, the access of the public authorities of the third country to the data, and its legal system must also be considered.
• According to sub-paragraphs (f) and (j) of Art. 58(2) GDPR, although, in the absence of a valid adequacy decision, personal data may be transferred in accordance with standard contractual clauses, the competent supervisory authority has the right to suspend or prohibit the data transfer unless, in the light of all the circumstances of that transfer, the level of protection required by EU law is ensured in the third country concerned.
• As regards the validity of the SCC Decision, nothing was found in Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to affect the validity of that decision.
• The Privacy Shield Decision is invalid because US law interferes without limit with the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons whose personal data are transferred to a third country.
CONCLUSION
The conclusions reached specifically in relation to the CJEU’s Schrems II judgment, and some questions that need to be asked, have been addressed above. Beyond that, the problem of transferring data abroad must be viewed from the perspective of the right to the protection of personal data and the principles relating to that right, but without losing sight of the necessity of transfers made for commercial purposes between countries. The transfer of personal data abroad is as great a problem in other countries as it is in ours. Every country has come to appreciate the value of the data belonging to the persons living on its territory and now allows such data to be transferred and processed only under certain strict conditions. This inevitably gives rise to major problems.
For there is a deep difference of philosophical outlook between the US and the EU Member States on the recording, processing and transfer of personal data. Whereas the US regards these data as a commercial commodity, a thing, and resorts to sector-based restrictions, the EU and its Member States regard the matter as the subject of a human right and lay down general rules for this field.
It is precisely this outlook on the part of the US that makes it possible for data transferred to the US and to companies located there to be processed by the US intelligence and security agencies as well. While this is legitimate under US law, it is unlawful under EU law. The Privacy Shield Decision, for its part, was adopted in order to overcome this incompatibility.
However, by the judgment delivered by the CJEU the Privacy Shield Decision has become invalid. It is therefore no longer possible to transfer data from the EU to the US on the basis of that Decision. As the solution to this, the CJEU pointed to the SCC.
Although the SCC cannot fully ensure data privacy, they contain conditions that are more binding on the parties and stricter than the regime introduced by the Privacy Shield Decision. Companies transferring data between the EU and the US must design their operations accordingly.
I must say plainly, however, that both in our country and in the EU it is highly probable that, in the near and medium-term future, more regulation will be adopted and more decisions delivered on this subject. There is still a very long way to go before the last word is said on this subject and uniformity of practice is achieved.
FOOTNOTES
1 For the full text of the judgment see: shorturl.at/crzP52 shorturl.at/jpzNQ3 For details on the preliminary ruling system of the Court of Justice of the European Union see: shorturl.at/dhijk4 For the full text of the Advocate General’s Opinion see: shorturl.at/pszB15 Avrupa Birliği Adalet Divanı, 24 Eylül 2019, C-507/17, EU:C:2019:772; shorturl.at/uKQRW6 Para, 81.7 Para 82-84.8 Para, 85-88.9 Para. 90.10 Para 91-93.11 Para 94.12 Para 95, 96.13 Para. 98-100.14 Para 101.15 Para. 107, 108.16 Para. 109 -114.17 Para 120, 121.18 European Data Protection Board, Frequently Asked Questions on the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-311/18 - Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems, 23 Temmuz 2020, s. 1.19 Para. 124 – 127.20 Para. 128.21 Para. 134, 146.22 Para. 148, 149.23 shorturl.at/qDJ36
24 Para. 150.25 Para. 152.26 Para. 154.27 On this subject see: Edward Snowden, Sistem Hatası,28 Para. 155.29 Para. 156, 157.30 Para. 158.31 Para. 159 - 162.32 Para. 163 – 167.33 For the Court’s explanation on the subject see: 168, 177.34 Para. 178 – 180.35 Advocate General’s Opinion, para. 291
– 297.36 Para. 181.37 Para. 183 – 187.38 Para. 198 – 201.39 EDPB, s. 2.40 EDPB, s. 2.41 EDPB, s. 3.42 EDPB, s. 3.43 For details on Article 49 of the GDPR see: European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 2/2018 on derogations of Article 49 under Regulation 2016/679, 25 Mayıs 2018.44 EDPB, s. 4.45 Para. 203.
Related practice areas
More publications on this topic
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Right to Be Forgotten” (Unutulma Hakkı), Essays in Honour of Prof. Dr. Yadigar İzmirli (Prof. Dr. Yadigar İzmirli’ye Armağan), Savaş Publishing, Ankara, 2024, pp. 1019–1141.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Assessment of the Amendments to the KVK Law on the Processing of Special Categories of Personal Data and the Transfer of Data Abroad” (KVK Kanunu’nda Özel Nitelikli Kişisel Verilerin İşlenmesi ve Yurt Dışına Veri Aktarımı Kapsamında Yapılan Değişikliklere İlişkin Değerlendirmeler), Academia.edu, 25 March 2024.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “Our Assessment of the Decision Summaries Published by the Personal Data Protection Board on 18 July 2022” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulunun 18 Temmuz 2022 Tarihinde Yayınlanan Karar Özetlerine İlişkin Değerlendirmelerimiz), Dülger Law Office, 1 September 2022.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, “The Use of Personal Health Data as Evidence in Divorce Proceedings” (Kişisel Sağlık Verilerinin Boşanma Davasında Delil Olarak Kullanılması), Hukuk ve Daha Fazlası Dergisi (Law and More), No. 9, June 2022, pp. 76–84.
Dülger, Murat Volkan, “A Very Important Decision of the Personal Data Protection Board on Lawyers' Access to Enforcement Files Without a Power of Attorney” (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurulu’ndan Avukatların İcra Takip Dosyalarına Vekaletname Olmaksızın Erişebilmesine İlişkin Çok Önemli Bir Karar), Dülger Law Office, 15 August 2021.
Dülger, Murat Volkan / Gümüş, Gülçin, Personal Data Protection Law (Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Hukuku), 4th ed., Seçkin Publishing, Ankara, 2026.

