2019Murat Volkan Dülger, Hasan SınarArticle

Abstract

This work was written in Turkish. The summary on this page is a translation; the citation gives the original title in parentheses.

Both to introduce the National Point of Contact to domestic stakeholders and to create an intellectual resource for future work on a fuller harmonisation of Turkish law with the Convention, judges, public prosecutors, officials of the Ministry of Justice, access providers and hosting providers, and academics were invited to the workshop entitled “Preservation Requests under the Budapest Convention and Practice in Türkiye” (Budapeşte Sözleşmesi Kapsamında Saklama Talebi ve Türkiye Uygulamaları), held in Istanbul on 15–16 April 2019. Before the event, the participants were sent by e-mail 18 questions and scenarios, prepared in the light of the extensive experience of the officials of the National Point of Contact and also reflecting current developments in the fight against cybercrime that are under discussion worldwide, together with the unofficial Turkish translation of the Convention’s Explanatory Report.

On the first day of the workshop, which was also partly funded by the Council of Europe’s iPROCEEDS project, presentations were given by the National Points of Contact of France, Latvia and Romania. The questions and scenarios sent to the foreign National Points of Contact were more general in nature, and the parts concerning only Turkish law were not forwarded to them. For the remainder of the event, the participants held discussions in 5 groups within the time allotted to them by the moderator. The views and opposing views of the groups were then expressed. These discussions, which were recorded electronically, have been anonymised and compiled, with a fine balance being struck between not wearying the reader with a long text and reflecting all the ideas.

Full text

This text is a translation of the Turkish original, prepared for this website. Numbers in square brackets are the page numbers of the original; sources in the footnotes are given as in the original. For citation, the original publication (PDF) is authoritative.

Contents

1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................................3

2. Discussion of the Questions and Scenarios .................................................................................6

2.1 Question 1 - Immediate Assistance .....................................................................................................6

2.2 Question 2 - Data Categories .............................................................................................7

2.3 Question 3 - Authorising the 24/7 Point of Contact to Share Information Outside the Scope of

a Criminal Investigation ...........................................................................................9

2.4 Question 4 - Criminal Liability for Sharing Information ..........................................................10

2.5 Question 5 - Liability for Not Sharing Information ............................................11

2.6 Question 6 - Sharing Information on Turkish Citizens and Foreign Nationals 13

2.7 Question 7 - Obligation of Non-Disclosure ............................................................................14

2.8 Question 8 - Obligation Not to Delete Data ....................................................................16

2.9 Question 9 - Obligations of Legal Persons ....................................................................17

2.10 Question 10 - Avoidance of Cooperation ................................................................................18

2.11 Question 11 - Stopping Suspicious Money Transfers ................................................19

2.12 Question 12 - Freezing of Suspicious Bank Accounts by Law Enforcement of Its Own Motion ......22

2.13 Question 13 - Requiring Formal Complaints from Foreign Victims ......................22

2.14 Question 14 - Use of Data Whose Retention Period Has Expired ................................................23

2.15 Question 15 - Real-Time Collection and Partial Disclosure of Traffic Data ...25

2.16 Question 16 - Interception of Communications for Content Data ...................................27

2.17 Question 17 - Spontaneous Information .........................................................................28

2.18 Question 18 - More Effective Cooperation with Internet Service Providers ................................29

3 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................32

4 List of Participants .........................................................................................................33

Disclaimer:

This technical report does not reflect the official positions of the Council of Europe, of the iPROCEEDS project, which partly funded the event, or of the member states that are parties to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.

1. Introduction

The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (“the Convention”) was signed in 2001 in Budapest, Hungary, and entered into force. As the first international instrument dealing with offences committed on the internet and against computer systems, the Convention has as its main aims: achieving uniformity among countries in defining cybercrime offences in their criminal codes; ensuring that measures enabling judicial authorities to access digital evidence located abroad are taken swiftly; and raising international cooperation and the sharing of technical knowledge in the fight against cybercrime to a more effective level.

More than 60 states are parties to the Convention, including countries that are not members of the Council of Europe, such as the United States and Japan. Moreover, some countries that have not signed the Convention have amended their legal frameworks, drawing inspiration from the offence definitions and other safeguards in the Convention. Türkiye signed the Convention on 10 November 2010 and ratified it on 22 April 2014 after its debate in the General Assembly of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. The Convention entered into force with the publication in the Official Gazette, on 2 May 2014, of Law No. 6533 on the Approval of the Ratification of the Convention on Cybercrime.

Unlike the physical evidence that is the subject of traditional criminal investigations, the availability of digital data is more fragile, and criminal investigations may be hampered if legal measures to preserve such evidence are not applied swiftly. In order to guarantee that the digital evidence requested can be obtained at the end of the letters rogatory procedure, which usually takes months, the Convention created the concept of the “preservation request” in its Article 29. The national points of contact established on the basis of Article 35 of the Convention notify the relevant service providers of preservation requests, and the service providers hand over the digital evidence in question to the judicial authorities of the requesting country once the request for letters rogatory reaches them. In this context, the Department of Combating Cybercrime of the General Directorate of Security performs the function of the 24/7 National Point of Contact on behalf of Türkiye. In addition to preservation requests and requests for information made in emergencies, technical and legal advisory services on matters relating to criminal investigations are also provided to requesting countries.

The National Point of Contact is one of the channels of international police cooperation and, by its nature, is used only in emergencies. Law enforcement authorities make intensive use of the Interpol and Europol channels, and information and experience are also exchanged face to face through foreign police liaison officers. As things stand, the services performed through the National Point of Contact make up a small percentage of overall international police cooperation. The main reason for the small number of preservation requests received by our country may be found in the relatively low number of Türkiye-based service providers used by foreigners and, consequently, the relatively low number of foreign victims. The small number of preservation requests sent from our country, on the other hand, is considered to stem from a lack of awareness within the country of the services provided by the National Point of Contact. Having observed similar difficulties in other countries, the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee adopted a recommendation that the powers of the National Points of Contact be made known more effectively to other stakeholders within each country.1

In Türkiye, harmonisation work has been carried out with regard to the provisions of the Convention concerning substantive criminal law. However, no legislation has been enacted on the matters falling within the remit of the National Point of Contact, above all preservation requests and expedited international information sharing. So far, the National Point of Contact, using the powers conferred on it by law, has acted upon preservation requests and other urgent requests in a manner that does not conflict with the domestic legal system. However, the absence of detailed legislation and possible differences between the legislation to which service providers are subject and the obligations arising from the Convention occasionally give rise to uncertainty in practice.

In order both to promote the National Point of Contact among domestic stakeholders and to provide intellectual input for future work on a more comprehensive harmonisation of Turkish law with the Convention, judges, public prosecutors, officials of the Ministry of Justice, access and hosting providers, and academics were invited to the workshop entitled “Preservation Requests under the Budapest Convention and Practice in Türkiye”, held in Istanbul on 15-16 April 2019. Before the event, the participants were sent by e-mail 18 questions and scenarios, prepared in the light of the extensive experience of the National Point of Contact officials and reflecting current developments debated worldwide in the fight against cybercrime, together with an unofficial Turkish translation of the Explanatory Report to the Convention. On the first day of the workshop, which was partly funded by the Council of Europe iPROCEEDS project,2 presentations were given by the National Points of Contact of France, Latvia and Romania. The questions and scenarios sent to the foreign National Points of Contact were of a more general nature; the parts concerning only Turkish law were not forwarded to them. For the rest of the event, the participants held discussions in 5 groups within the time allotted to them by the moderator. The views of the groups and the opposing views were then presented. These discussions, which were recorded electronically, have been compiled in anonymised form, striking a fine balance between not burdening the reader with a lengthy text and reflecting all the views expressed. The answers of the foreign National Points of Contact have also been summarised where appropriate and added below the relevant answers. It should be noted that, where there are contradictions between the Budapest Convention and its Explanatory Report on the one hand and the legal interpretations of the participants on the other, the Budapest Convention and its Explanatory Report must prevail.

For this workshop, the National Point of Contact officials drew inspiration from the Tallinn Manual, in which NATO addresses the rules of international law that may be applicable to cyber conflict and cyber warfare. By publishing the workshop report in English and Turkish in open online sources, the aim is to inspire both the National Points of Contact of other countries to undertake similar work and domestic academic debate and possible legislation.

As officials of the National Point of Contact, we would like to thank Mr Erdal ÇETİNKAYA, Head of the Department of Combating Cybercrime of the General Directorate of Security, who spared no material or moral support in making the workshop possible, the managers of the Council of Europe iPROCEEDS project, and our esteemed participants, who contributed greatly to this report with their valuable ideas based on their unique experience.

2. Discussion of the Questions and Scenarios

2.1 Question 1 - Immediate Assistance

Discuss the scope of the concept of “Immediate Assistance” defined in Article 35 of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (“the Convention”) in the context of the Turkish legal system and of universal principles of law.

• Should only situations involving an imminent danger to human life or to the physical integrity of

persons be considered within this scope?

• Should situations concerning property or critical digital data also be included within this scope? Please explain your expert opinion with examples.

The moderator opened the session by giving a general overview of the fact that, within the framework of international police cooperation, there are many formal and informal communication channels for the exchange of information between the law enforcement authorities of different countries, including the 24/7 National Point of Contact of the European Convention on Cybercrime (hereinafter “the Convention”), and that the channel most intensively used by countries is Interpol's communication system. The participants reached a consensus that situations involving an imminent danger to human life or to the physical integrity of persons fall within the scope of “immediate assistance”, and that this concept, which has no place in Turkish law, should be expressly regulated. Beyond that, however, differing legal interpretations emerged for other situations. Some participants, referring to the text of the Convention and its Explanatory Report, argued that, since the Convention's concept of “immediate assistance” is a concept of procedural law, it may be applied to any type of offence in which digital evidence is involved. Other participants warned that such a broad interpretation could conflict with the provisions on personal data in Articles 135 and 136 of the Turkish Criminal Code. In this context, they stressed that every request reaching the National Point of Contact should be screened from the standpoint of personal rights and that this avenue should not be resorted to where individual interests outweigh public interests. In addition, many participants, also referring to the concept of “harm that is difficult or impossible to remedy” in Turkish law, argued that the availability of digital data can easily disappear and that the scope of immediate assistance may therefore be extended to cover other offences as well, such as offences against property, cybercrime directed at critical infrastructure and online child sexual abuse. Finally, one participant stated his view that the concept had been misinterpreted altogether as “urgent assistance” and that what is actually meant in the Convention is “immediate assistance”. It was argued that what is defined is in fact the speedy and effective assistance provided by the National Point of Contact to the requesting country, irrespective of the nature of the offence to which the request relates.

The official of the Latvian National Point of Contact stated that in his country threats of terrorist attacks and situations in which the lives of persons are at risk are classified as emergencies.

IMPORTANT NOTE: Not every request sent to the National Point of Contact from other countries may require a judicial investigation to be opened in our country. When answering the questions below, therefore, please consider both the option in which the public prosecutor opens an investigation and the option in which he does not or cannot open one.

2.2 Question 2 - Data Categories

Our country's Point of Contact forwards without delay to the relevant internet service provider a request for immediate assistance transmitted by the National Point of Contact of Country A. The request covers the subscriber information of a particular user on a particular website, all IP addresses from which this user accessed the internet (traffic data) and all content produced by this user on a website within a certain period (content data). Bearing in mind that subscriber information is not expressly defined in our domestic law, set out your expert opinion on the following conceptual questions and possible scenarios.

• In your view, what kinds of data should subscriber information include, and by which legal provision

should its limits be determined?

• Some internet service providers also define the last 50/100 IP addresses from which a user's account was accessed (last login IP addresses) as subscriber information.

In your view, could a similar practice be adopted under the Turkish legal system?

• Our domestic law contains no reference to content data. In your view, should this

legal gap be filled?

Please discuss, with concrete examples, whether the above classification is legally necessary or whether the data

definitions need to be brought into full conformity with the Convention.

In response to the questions raised, the moderator began the session by explaining the concept of last login IP addresses (last login IPs). Websites retain information on the IP addresses from which their users access the site. When the subscriber information of a user is requested, foreign internet service providers transmit to law enforcement IP addresses, usually numbering between 10 and 100, together with the time of access. From this information, no personal information about the user concerned can be obtained other than that he accessed a particular website within a certain period. The rationale behind this practice is that, where only a single IP address and time of access are obtained, it is not possible to identify a user who uses a VPN (Virtual Private Network) or who has been assigned a NAT IP (Network Address Translation) by his internet service provider. Multiple connection records are of great importance for establishing and verifying the real identity of the user concerned.

Although many participants pointed to the detailed definition of subscriber information in Article 18 of the Convention, no full consensus could be reached on the scope of subscriber information. All participants agreed, however, that this gap should be remedied by legislation. For the relevant legislative amendment, most participants pointed to Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes Committed by Means of Such Publications, or to a regulation that would clarify the relevant definition in that law, while one participant suggested that the definition of “subscriber identity and communication information” in the Electronic Communications Law No. 5809 could be broadened. One participant also stressed that the Convention expressly states that subscriber information is distinct from traffic data and underlined that, in procedural terms, the concepts of a “production order” for subscriber information and a “preservation order” for traffic data have been introduced. It was argued that, so as to avoid problems in practice in cooperation with the member states that are parties to the Convention, the expression subscriber information should be removed from the definition of traffic data in Law No. 5651. As regards the last login IP addresses mentioned above, the view emerged that they could be assessed favourably as long as they do not allow a user profile to be created by revealing the user's internet browsing history in a manner that would violate the user's right to respect for private life.

The participants, who agreed that there is a lack of legislation on the scope of content data, made differing proposals as to which law could cover it. It was stressed that one or more of the relevant pieces of legislation, such as Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes Committed by Means of Such Publications, the Electronic Communications Law No. 5809 or Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data, should be updated and uniform terminology established, so as to prevent uncertainty in practice and the grievances that may arise from it. Some participants noted that, while Law No. 5651 lays down clear rules on the obligation of access providers to retain traffic data, there is a large gap with regard to the legal responsibility of content providers and to content data. They pointed to the need to create the relevant legal framework so as to ensure the availability of digital evidence at the investigation and prosecution stages and to enable the civil and criminal liability of content providers to be determined by objective criteria. In addition, one participant offered an interesting perspective on how the concept of content data is reflected in Turkish law. He noted that Law No. 5651 covers content made available on the internet, that Law No. 5809 regulates content data exchanged between two computer systems but not published on the internet, and finally that Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerns content data relating to communication between two persons, thereby revealing the fragmentation of the concept of content data in theory and in practice.

2.3 Question 3 - Authorising the 24/7 Point of Contact to Share Information Outside the Scope of a Criminal Investigation

By an amendment made in 2017 to Additional Article 6 of the Law on the Duties and Powers of the Police, the following provision was introduced: “In offences committed in cyberspace, the police are authorised, for the purpose of determining the competent Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, to obtain the identity information of internet subscribers and to conduct research in cyberspace. Access providers, hosting providers and content providers shall report the information so requested to the unit established by law enforcement to combat these offences.”

• Where a request for information cannot be the subject of an investigation in Türkiye,

is it possible for the National Point of Contact to share information directly on the basis of the above provision?

• If not, which legislative amendments should be made in order to confer this

power on the National Point of Contact?

The great majority of the participants stated that Additional Article 6 of the Law on the Duties and Powers of the Police (PVSK) permits law enforcement to query subscriber information only for the purpose of determining the competent Public Prosecutor's Office, and that this power cannot be used in scenarios in which no public prosecutor is involved. Some participants pointed out that the need to give the National Point of Contact the power to share information outside criminal investigations should be discussed thoroughly, while others stated that a limited power to share information could be conferred by legislation or by agreements between states. When some participants questioned the compatibility of the provision in question with the existing Turkish legal system, one participant explained in detail why this power had been conferred on law enforcement. Reports from the US non-governmental organisation National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) on users who upload online child sexual abuse material to the platforms of internet service providers likewise based in the US, such as Facebook, Google and Twitter, are sent first to the Department of Combating Cybercrime and then to the Public Prosecutor's Offices of the relevant provinces. Before law enforcement was given the power to query subscriber information directly, the great majority of the reports were concentrated in certain provinces. When the location was established by the Public Prosecutor's Office of the province concerned, it emerged that many users actually resided in other provinces. For these and similar reasons, reaching certain suspects sometimes took up to two years. In order to gain faster access to digital evidence in the fight against crime and to ensure the effective preservation of evidence, the legislature introduced the power of law enforcement to query subscriber information directly, which considerably shortened the process described above.

2.4 Question 4 - Criminal Liability for Sharing Information

Under Article 90 of the Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye, “International agreements duly put into effect have the force of law. In the case of a conflict between international agreements, duly put into effect, concerning fundamental rights and freedoms and the laws due to differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international agreements shall prevail.” Relying on this provision, the internet service provider supplies the necessary information to the National Point of Contact, even though there is no express obligation to do so in domestic law. Later, however, the public prosecutor opens a criminal investigation against the National Point of Contact and the internet service provider on the ground that they acted unlawfully.

• In the above case, do the Point of Contact and the internet service provider bear criminal liability under the Turkish

Criminal Code?

• If your answer is yes, explain in detail the source of the criminal liability and the legal texts

that would need to be amended in order to remove that liability.

If you consider that there is no criminal liability, explain why the act performed is

lawful.

Despite the hesitations of a few participants, the majority view was that the Convention indisputably concerns fundamental human rights and freedoms and is therefore a text that is binding in the Turkish legal system with a rank above that of statutes. As a supporting argument, it was pointed out that the Convention closely affects the right to respect for private life and freedom of expression through coercive measures such as search, seizure and the real-time interception of communications. Accordingly, it was stated that, even in the absence of a power and responsibility expressly defined in domestic law, internet service providers that supply subscriber information to the National Point of Contact on the basis of Article 18 of the Convention would not bear criminal liability. It was stressed that in this case the ground of justification of “performing a duty imposed by law” laid down in Article 24 of the Turkish Criminal Code would apply. As regards the sharing of information by the National Point of Contact with the Points of Contact of other countries, a consensus was reached that the same ground of justification would apply in cases that could be the subject of a criminal investigation in Türkiye. Comments were made to the effect that, even though the Convention does not require dual criminality for international cooperation, legislation is needed for the National Point of Contact to be able to share information with the Points of Contact of other countries in a situation in which no criminal investigation is (or can be) opened in Türkiye. One participant, on the other hand, stated that under Article 8 of Law No. 6698 personal data may not be transferred without the explicit consent of the data subject and that the exceptions to this rule are listed in the same article. In this context, he underlined that the National Point of Contact and the internet service provider would incur criminal liability for having shared information unlawfully, and that, in order to prevent this, legislation should be enacted on international information sharing by the National Point of Contact.

2.5 Question 5 – Liability for Not Sharing Information

The internet service provider, on the ground that there is no rule expressly laid down in domestic law, is reluctant to share information directly with the Point of Contact and asks for an instruction from the public prosecutor or a court order. The judicial authorities, however, state that the necessary action will be taken if the request arrives through diplomatic channels as a request for letters rogatory. In the meantime, the offence in question is committed in Country A and results in material damage, harm or loss.

• From the standpoint of national and international law, can any person or institution be alleged to bear legal liability for the offence committed in

Country A?

• In the above case, is it possible for the judicial authorities to issue a decision of lack of jurisdiction and thereby leave the request for

information unaddressed?

The answers to this question, too, brought to the surface the differences of opinion among the participants regarding the place of the Convention in the Turkish legal system. Some participants argued that the internet service provider would incur criminal liability for failing to perform a duty imposed by law. It was pointed out that, irrespective of any harm occurring in Country A, both the service provider and the public prosecutor could face proceedings for the offences of neglect of duty and/or abuse of office. One participant, referring to the 2001 “Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” of the United Nations International Law Commission, took the view that the clear and systematic failure to fulfil an international obligation is defined as a serious breach and that states may also be held responsible in this framework. Other participants stated that, unless the obligations contained in the Convention are supported by legislation in domestic law, no criminal liability can be imposed on the persons and institutions concerned. One participant also stated that, since the law does not expressly provide otherwise, the rules and procedures applied to Turkish citizens are also binding for requests received by the National Point of Contact.

A consensus emerged that, if the judicial authorities issue a decision of lack of jurisdiction, it may become impossible to respond through legal channels to a request received by the National Point of Contact. One participant recalled that, under the Turkish legal system, proceedings are brought before the competent court, and hence the importance of determining jurisdiction. The same participant also expressed his assessment that, in order to resolve possible jurisdictional problems in practice, the most appropriate solution would be to establish a judicial authority with jurisdiction throughout Türkiye to deal with requests received by the National Point of Contact.

The official of the Latvian National Point of Contact stated that in such a case the offence of “Failure to Comply with the Lawful Requests of Officials of Supervisory or Local Government Institutions” under Article 175(2) of the “Administrative Violations Code” would be committed and that the internet service provider concerned would incur legal liability.

2.6 Question 6 - Sharing Information on Turkish Citizens and Foreign Nationals

This time, the judicial authorities issue the order requested by the internet service provider. The suspect in question is a foreign national living in our country. Can the information of a foreign

national be shared with the authorities of another country?

• If your answer to this question is affirmative, what are the limits of such sharing?

• If the suspect is a citizen of the Republic of Türkiye, do the rules and procedures to be followed

differ?

Please also share your views and proposals on determining the procedures and principles for sharing information with other National Points of Contact according to the type of data requested (subscriber–traffic–content).

All participants stated that, by virtue of the principle of territoriality in Article 8 of the Turkish Criminal Code, there can be no difference in the sharing of information concerning foreign nationals in Türkiye and Turkish citizens. Some participants pointed to exceptional cases of special status, such as diplomatic immunity, and to possible applications of the provision of Article 16 of the Constitution, “Fundamental rights and freedoms in respect to aliens may be restricted by law compatible with international law.” As regards international information sharing by the National Point of Contact, however, the lack of a legal framework in domestic law was once again emphasised. The participants also reached a consensus that a legal distinction should be drawn in information sharing according to the type of data requested.

The officials of the French and Latvian National Points of Contact stated that no special rules have been laid down on sharing the information of foreign persons with other Points of Contact. The officials also provided information on information sharing within the framework of international police cooperation in their countries. The official of the French National Point of Contact stated that, in cases that do not require an investigation to be opened in France, broader cooperation is possible with the country requesting information. The official of the Latvian National Point of Contact added that the provisions of the Latvian Constitution, the concepts of state sovereignty and the need not to obstruct domestic investigations set the natural limits of information sharing with other countries.

2.7 Question 7 - Obligation of Non-Disclosure

Country A sends the National Point of Contact a data preservation request in connection with the online grooming of a child living in its territory. The Point of Contact asks the internet service provider not to inform the suspect of this measure. Because of its transparency policy, and because domestic law does not expressly lay down an obligation of non-disclosure in such a case, the company informs the person concerned of the preservation request. Having learnt of the suspicion of an offence in Country A, the person irreversibly deletes all digital material on the electronic devices he uses. When the request for letters rogatory arrives from Country A and the person's computer and mobile phone are examined, no indication can be found that this person attempted to groom children living abroad over the internet.

• In this case, does the internet service provider bear civil, administrative and

criminal liability?

• If your answer is affirmative, what kind of sanction can be applied?

• If your answer is negative, what rules could be introduced in order to impose on the internet service provider

an obligation of non-disclosure in similar cases?

The participants stated that, where the request for information could be the subject of a criminal investigation in Türkiye, an internet service provider that informs the suspect despite an instruction to the contrary from the National Point of Contact would bear criminal liability. Reference was made to Article 285(2) of the Turkish Criminal Code: “A person who violates the confidentiality of decisions taken during the investigation stage that must be kept secret from the parties to the investigation, and of the acts performed in pursuance of them, shall be punished with imprisonment from one to three years or a judicial fine.” They considered that, since the Turkish Criminal Code does not provide for the criminal liability of legal persons, the persons working in the relevant unit of the internet service provider could be punished under this article. Some participants, arguing that this article would be an inadequate sanction in view of the grave consequences that may ensue, expressed the view that it would be appropriate for the non-disclosure obligation of internet service providers in respect of criminal investigations to be made a separate offence subject to a heavier criminal sanction. Comments were made that, in such a case, administrative fines would be more dissuasive from an institutional point of view. It was considered that heavy administrative fines could be imposed for breach of the controller's obligation to preserve data under Article 12 of Law No. 6698 and for breach of the retention obligation of hosting providers and access providers under Law No. 5651. As regards determining the civil liability of the internet service provider, the participants drew attention to the difficulties of establishing the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in the case at hand and of linking that damage to the breach of the non-disclosure obligation ordered, and refrained from offering a clear interpretation.

It was stated that, where no criminal investigation is (or can be) opened in Türkiye, the internet service provider may, if the conditions are met, bear criminal liability under the general provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code, such as neglect of duty and abuse of office. Some participants argued that administrative fines could be applied even in such a case. One participant, however, referring to Article 6(1)(d) of Law No. 5651, which was annulled by the Constitutional Court, stated that this route could not be pursued. That provision required internet service providers to deliver to the Information and Communication Technologies Authority the information it requested, in the form requested, and to implement the measures notified by the Authority. In its decision of 8 December 2015, the Constitutional Court stated that the information requested might include personal data and that the persons concerned therefore had to be informed. Accordingly, it was stated that, in the absence of an obligation regarding disclosure expressly defined by law, such as the obligation not to violate the confidentiality of the investigation, the internet service provider cannot be held administratively liable.

The official of the French National Point of Contact stated that, in practice, thanks to the cooperation of service providers, no similar case had yet occurred in his country. He added that they had received feedback from service providers that the obligation not to inform persons in operational matters is compatible with the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). He stated that, if a service provider wishes to inform the person concerned, the requesting country's Point of Contact is notified and the process is then shaped according to the wishes of the requesting country. He also declared that, if no criminal investigation is under way in France, the service provider incurs no legal liability if it informs the user concerned. The official of the Latvian National Point of Contact, for his part, stated that under the Latvian Code of Criminal Procedure service providers are also held responsible for the retention of the data they process, and that criminal liability may arise if information that should remain confidential is shared.

2.8 Question 8 – Obligation Not to Delete Data

Country A sends a data preservation request to the National Point of Contact of another country. After the necessary steps have been taken, the internet service provider initially agrees to comply with the request and informs the Point of Contact that the data concerned have been preserved. When the request for letters rogatory reaches Türkiye, however, it turns out that all the data have been irreversibly deleted.

• In this case, what is the administrative and/or criminal liability of the internet

service provider?

• As regards legal liability, is there any difference between data having been deleted intentionally

or negligently?

The participants agreed that, where a criminal investigation relating to the request is under way in Türkiye, an administrative fine may be imposed as regards administrative liability, since there is a breach of the obligations under Laws No. 6698 and 5651 mentioned above. As regards criminal liability, the applicability of Article 281 of the Turkish Criminal Code on concealing, destroying or altering evidence of an offence was discussed. It was concluded that the specific intent “to prevent the truth from coming to light” required by that article would not be present in practice or, even if present, could not be proven. The participants stated that criminal liability cannot be imputed because internet service providers usually delete and destroy data automatically and because the offence under Article 281 of the Turkish Criminal Code cannot be committed negligently.

Where there is currently no criminal investigation in Türkiye, the participants stated that their answers to Question 7 (second paragraph) also apply in general to this scenario. The deletion of data can be punished only if it constitutes a breach of the general provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code or of administrative obligations under the relevant laws.

The official of the French National Point of Contact stated that in some cases data subject to a preservation request are deleted by service providers because the countries that sent the data preservation request do not initiate the letters rogatory procedure. In such a case, the service provider bears no legal liability. The official of the Latvian National Point of Contact, for his part, stated that if a service provider intentionally deletes data it is obliged to preserve, the offence of “destruction of evidence” is committed under the Latvian Criminal Law.

2.9 Question 9 - Obligations of Legal Persons

Article 12 of the Convention concerns the legal obligations of legal persons. Let us assume that the data preservation request in question relates to a particular computer forming part of the network of a large company. The company manager officially notifies the National Point of Contact that he will comply with the preservation request. However, the data required are not there when they are needed.

• Under the Turkish legal system, is there any difference in terms of obligations between company managers and

internet service providers?

• If the company manager does not respond positively to the data preservation request,

which legal remedies can the National Point of Contact pursue?

The participants stated that the liability of legal persons emphasised in Article 12 of the Convention also covers legal persons governed by private law other than the service providers on which obligations are imposed by Law No. 5651. It was added that, within legal persons, the retention of data other than internet access data is generally left to the discretion of the information technology departments, and that the legal responsibility of the company concerned should be clearly defined for cases in which the National Point of Contact makes a preservation request. The prevailing view was that, although the law on the protection of personal data imposes various responsibilities on legal persons regarding the processing of data, the relevant provisions cannot serve as a legal basis for complying with a preservation request. It was also stated that, in the context of Article 12 of the Convention, the Convention expressly sets as a precondition for holding a legal person liable that the necessary rules have been enacted in domestic law.

The participants referred to Article 20 of the Turkish Criminal Code, under which criminal liability cannot be imputed to legal persons. A consensus was also reached that, since the necessary obligation has not been defined by legislation in domestic law, the security measures under Article 60 of the Turkish Criminal Code cannot be applied if a company manager responds negatively to a data preservation request made by the National Point of Contact. It was therefore concluded that there is no legal avenue available to the National Point of Contact by which to compel or ensure the compliance of legal persons with data preservation requests.

The official of the French National Point of Contact stated that, as regards data preservation requests, there is no difference in terms of legal liability between internet service providers and company managers. The official of the Latvian National Point of Contact, for his part, stated that company managers are responsible only for data physically held at the company.

2.10 Question 10 - Avoidance of Cooperation

In connection with a possible terrorist attack, the National Point of Contact makes an urgent request to Country A. Although our national point of contact is expressly listed in the contact list administered by the Council of Europe Cybercrime Committee, the authorities of Country A claim that they cannot verify it and ask us to send our request through the Interpol communication channel, which will take a long time. In the meantime, the terrorist attack takes place and harm that is difficult and impossible to remedy ensues.

• In such a case, is it possible to initiate any legal or diplomatic proceedings

against the Point of Contact of another country?

• Let us assume that the Point of Contact of Country A does not respond at all, or responds very late, to the e-mail address or telephone calls that it must monitor on a 24/7

basis, as provided in the Convention. In this scenario, is it possible for there to be any difference in the legal approach to be applied?

The participants stressed that there would be no difference in the legal and diplomatic measures that could be taken where a National Point of Contact acts in breach of its obligation to respond promptly to requests or does not respond at all. A consensus emerged that, should an incident similar to the situation described in the scenario occur, recourse could mainly be had to diplomatic channels. Referring to Article 45 of the Convention, the participants stated that, in the event of a dispute between two member states, the matter could be brought before an arbitral tribunal, the European Committee on Crime Problems or the International Court of Justice. It was stated that, even if the likelihood is low, compensation for the harm could also be sought by way of civil liability, by establishing a link between the harm that occurred and the negligent conduct of the National Point of Contact concerned. In such a case, uncertainty arose as to whether the claim should be brought before the judicial authorities of the country in which the harm occurred or before those of the foreign country.

The officials of the French and Latvian National Points of Contact drew attention to the existence of other channels of communication that could be used in such a situation, such as Interpol, Europol and embassies. They added that, where harm results from intentional conduct, recourse to diplomatic channels is also possible.

2.11 Question 11- Stopping Suspicious Money Transfers

In Country A, a person who has taken control of the SWIFT system of a resident bank by means of malicious software sends the proceeds of the offence to bank accounts in Türkiye. In order to prevent the money in question from being withdrawn from the accounts or sent to a third country, the Point of Contact of Country A requests that the bank accounts concerned be frozen immediately and the money subsequently returned. Please answer the following questions in turn.

In such a suspicious transaction, can the bank freeze one of its accounts on its own initiative without an instruction

from the public prosecutor or a court order?

• If your answer is yes, for how long at most can it freeze the account?

• Let us assume that the bank has temporarily blocked the account pending a judicial decision.

In the meantime, the account holder threatens to take legal action against the bank so as to be able to withdraw the money. Examine thoroughly the powers and responsibilities of the bank towards the account holder and towards the persons who

reported the suspicious transaction.

• If the bank does not take the initiative to freeze the account and this causes irreversible financial loss to the foreign victims,

is it possible to obtain compensation for the victims' loss through legal channels?

• In cybercrime investigations such as the one in the example, it is often not possible at the first-response stage to collect

all the evidence relating to the unlawful act. The judicial authorities, concluding that the victim country does not have sufficient evidence of the fraud, either take no decision or decide to lift the temporary freezing measure. Under the existing rules of domestic law, what are the conditions and limits for restricting the exercise of a financial right?

If you do not consider them sufficient, please share your proposals.

• Everything goes well and the bank account is frozen by an appropriate judicial decision.

However, the request for letters rogatory relating to the investigation does not arrive in Türkiye. How long should the bank wait before the account in question is reopened for use? In your view, should the account automatically become active again after a certain period, or should the account holder make a personal request?

The participants put forward several legal bases for banks freezing persons' accounts following a suspicious transaction report. It was stressed that the general contracts concluded by banks with their customers contain clauses on the circumstances in which accounts may be directly frozen and closed by the bank, and that in practice banks mostly act on the basis of such contractual powers. How long accounts may be frozen by the bank likewise depends on the contractual provisions and may be indefinite. It was also stated that Article 7 of Law No. 5549 on the Prevention of Laundering of the Proceeds of Crime imposes on banks the obligation, in suspicious transactions, to report to the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) and thereafter to freeze the accounts concerned for 7 days. Apart from these, it was stated that bank accounts may be seized, or the account holder's use of them restricted, under Article 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271, Law No. 6415 on the Prevention of the Financing of Terrorism and the Banking Law No. 5411.

It was stated that a person whose account has been frozen by the bank of its own motion pending a judicial decision may have recourse to legal remedies. If a third party who is not a party to a contract with the bank suffers harm, the bank will be liable for the full amount of the account that was not frozen, together with accrued interest and additional damages. In practice, rather than assume such a heavy liability, banks will prefer to freeze the account concerned and accept the liability arising from the account being unusable for a certain period. The person whose account has been frozen will be able to bring an action for damages on the basis of the provisions on tort in the Code of Obligations. Many participants stressed, however, that where bank accounts are used for unlawful purposes the judicial authorities will rule in favour of the bank, and that therefore in practice no civil or criminal liability will arise in connection with account freezing. Similarly, foreign persons who reported the suspicious transaction to the National Point of Contact and suffered harm because the bank did not freeze the account concerned of its own motion will also be able to seek compensation.

The measure freezing the bank account concerned may be lifted by a court decision, and there is no possibility for the bank to resist such a decision through legal channels. Moreover, in such a case the decision must be implemented without any application by the account holder being required, and the account must be reopened for use immediately. Where the measure has not been lifted by a court decision, on the other hand, the account concerned can under no circumstances be reopened for use upon an application by the account holder unless the court decides otherwise.

The official of the French National Point of Contact stated that law enforcement has not been given the power to freeze bank accounts other than on the orders of the judicial authorities. He added that the freezing of an account is limited to the amount of money involved in the suspicious transaction and that the account holder may continue to use the account concerned. Banks may not freeze accounts of their own motion except in the cases provided for in Articles 561 and 562 of the French Monetary and Financial Code (COMFI). In such exceptional cases, the bank may freeze an account of its own motion until a judicial order is obtained, provided that the financial intelligence unit of the requesting country has contacted its French counterpart and that the request concerned has been approved by the French banking community (Interbank Community). Banks may also use this route among themselves by virtue of their obligations under international agreements. If banks fail to comply with their obligation to identify suspicious transactions, they will incur civil and criminal liability towards the victims under the LCBFT (Lutte Contre Blanchiment et Financement du Terrorisme). The customer has a legal right to challenge the freezing of the account, and if it emerges that the account holder in the suspicious transaction acted in good faith, the damage resulting from the freezing is borne by the state. Finally, since money credited to an account as a result of a suspicious transaction can be returned to the requesting country only by a court decision, the letters rogatory procedure must be initiated.

The official of the Latvian National Point of Contact stated that in suspicious transactions a bank account may be frozen for 45 days pending a judicial decision. He added that if no judicial action is taken by the end of this period, the account is automatically reopened for use. It was stated that the victims may seek compensation for the harm resulting from the failure to freeze an account involved in a suspicious transaction under the “Law on the Confiscation of Unlawfully Acquired Property”.

2.12 Question 12 – Freezing of Suspicious Bank Accounts by Law Enforcement of Its Own Motion

In some countries, law enforcement authorities can freeze bank accounts of their own motion in cases of money laundering, terrorist financing and emergencies.

• Please state your views on the conditions and limits of the use of such a possible power, in terms of its compatibility with the Turkish legal system.

• In order to combat cybercrime effectively, what kind of legislation or practice could be developed so that legal procedures can be

overcome quickly and timely and appropriate preventive measures taken?

Most participants stated that law enforcement could be given the power to freeze bank accounts of its own motion in emergencies. They added, however, that, in keeping with the Turkish criminal law system, administrative decisions taken on the basis of such a power would have to be submitted to the judicial authorities within 24 hours, so that an effective avenue of judicial review is provided. The participants also referred to existing practice. Under Law No. 5549, banks report suspicious transactions to MASAK. The reports prepared on bank accounts frozen for a maximum of 7 days are forwarded to the Public Prosecutor's Offices. Under Article 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the seizure decision is taken by the criminal judge of peace at the investigation stage and by the court at the prosecution stage, and, where delay would be prejudicial, by the public prosecutor, subject to subsequent submission to the competent judge. The participants also pointed out that an administrative board established under Law No. 6415 has been vested with similar powers and, unlike existing practice, has been excluded from judicial review.

The official of the Latvian National Point of Contact stated that, if the requesting country is a member of the Egmont Group, requests relating to the laundering of the proceeds of crime must be forwarded to the Latvian Financial Intelligence Unit, or a request for letters rogatory must be sent.

2.13 Question 13 – Requiring Formal Complaints from Foreign Victims

Under Article 158(1)(f) of the Turkish Criminal Code, fraud committed by using information systems, banks or credit institutions as instruments is provided for as an aggravated form of the basic offence. In practice, especially at the beginning of the investigation stage, the statements of foreign victims are requested and, if they are not obtained, no public prosecution is brought. Discuss the reasons for this practice and its compatibility with the Turkish legal system.

The majority of the participants, underlining that the prosecution of offences committed under Article 158(1)(f) of the Turkish Criminal Code is not subject to a complaint, stated that the investigation should be conducted ex officio without requiring the victim's statement. Some participants also pointed out that a wrong practice has been adopted of issuing decisions of non-prosecution in files in which the victim or complainant is abroad. One participant, on the other hand, expressed the opposite view. Stating that for the offence of fraud to be committed the suspect must use deceit and the complainant must be deceived, this participant argued that without the victim's statement it cannot be decided whether the element of deception is present. He therefore stated that the current practice is not contrary to the Turkish legal system.

2.14 Question 14 - Use of Data Whose Retention Period Has Expired

In Türkiye, internet service providers must retain traffic data for between 6 months and 2 years under Law No. 5651. Let us assume that the relevant request for letters rogatory reaches our country long after the maximum retention period has expired. The internet service provider, however, has not deleted the data, and our judicial authorities have sent the retained data to the requesting country.

a. The suspect concerned claims that these data can no longer be used as evidence in respect of the charges brought against him and argues that they should therefore be regarded as invalid in court. In the light of data protection law and the law of criminal procedure, examine

this claim of the suspect.

b. The suspect then brings an action against the internet service provider on the ground that his personal data were unlawfully retained. Does the service provider bear legal liability under the legislation of our country and under the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)?

c. This time, the internet service provider automatically deletes the preserved data when the maximum retention period expires. The request for letters rogatory arrives immediately after the deletion. Can the requesting country blame the internet service provider on the ground that, since the data in question relate to a criminal investigation, they should have been exempted from the obligations of personal data protection? From the standpoint of the Law on the Protection of Personal Data, is there anything unlawful in the action taken?

As regards point a, it was considered that, since the preservation request came from abroad, it must be examined whether data obtained after the expiry of the maximum statutory retention period are admissible under the laws of the requesting country. A participant who gave an example from the German criminal law system stated that in Germany decisions are taken by balancing the right infringed against the protected right, and that data not deleted in Türkiye despite the expiry of the maximum retention period could be accepted as evidence by Germany. If the situation in point a were transposed to a suspect in Türkiye, that is, if data retained by another country for more than 2 years reached the court, the evidence would not be regarded as lawfully obtained under Article 217 of the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271. One participant who did not share this prevailing view argued, on the assumptions that the evidence was lawful at the time it was retained and that the data are not forged, that the data do not lose their evidential character even if the maximum retention period has expired. A majority view also emerged among the participants that, in respect of data retained beyond the maximum period, service providers would commit the offence of “failure to destroy data” under Article 138 of the Turkish Criminal Code. Some participants, however, expressed the opposite view, drawing attention to the difference between the concepts of destruction of data and erasure of data in Law No. 6698. Under the regulation issued on the basis of that law, erasure has the result that the data concerned can no longer be accessed by processors, whereas destruction has the result that they can no longer be accessed by anyone. The participant proposed that a period of 10 years, as in the Code of Obligations, could be set by the processor for the destruction of data, and that data erased at the end of 2 years could be accessed by the judicial authorities for up to 10 years. In this way, since the data would not have been destroyed, service providers would not be held liable under Article 138 of the Turkish Criminal Code, and the judicial authorities would also have the chance to access digital evidence during investigation and prosecution stages lasting many years. The discussions on the legal rights of the suspect in respect of data not erased/destroyed at the end of 2 years, as raised in point b, also followed this line. While most participants argued that the offence of “failure to destroy data” would be committed, one participant argued that retaining data for a longer period is lawful if this is transparently laid down in the company policy and if there are reasonable grounds, as in the case at hand. As regards point c, full consensus was reached that the service provider would incur no legal liability, since it complied with the periods laid down in Law No. 5651 and deleted the data concerned at the end of the 2-year period.

The Latvian National Point of Contact stated that digital data are retained by service providers for a maximum of 18 months and that, in theory, once this period has been exceeded, the data concerned cannot be used as evidence against suspects. The official added that it is for the judicial authorities to decide whether data constitute evidence even where the retention period has been exceeded, and stated that, if such a judicial decision is taken, the civil and criminal liability of the service provider ceases. Where data not regarded as lawful are retained and used after the maximum period has expired, suspects have a legal right to object; in practice, however, no similar case has yet been observed. The official of the French National Point of Contact further stressed that the limits of the information to be shared with other countries are set by the GDPR and that service providers may face heavy sanctions in the event of conduct contrary to the GDPR.

2.15 Question 15 – Real-Time Collection and Partial Disclosure of Traffic Data

Articles 17 and 20 of the Convention allow the parties to collect traffic data in real time and to disclose it partially. In addition, Article 21 allows the parties to obtain content data.

Let us assume that an organised criminal group conducts discussions on illegal arms trafficking in the forum of a website accessible only to its members. The website's server, located in our country, automatically deletes the data of the chats five minutes after the members' communication ends. Country A needs the traffic data in order to identify the members of this criminal organisation in its territory.

• Is it legally possible in our country to collect traffic data in real time and to share the part of this information that will help identify suspects and victims abroad

with other points of contact within the scope of immediate assistance?

• If your answer is affirmative, does the power to apply this security measure exist only

for the types of offence listed in Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or can its scope be kept broader?

• If your answer is negative, what kind of legislation and practice should be developed in this

regard?

Differing technical, organisational and legal views were put forward on whether the real-time collection of traffic data should be assessed under Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Most participants argued that the measure of interception of communications cannot be taken for offences other than the catalogue offences listed in that article. One participant, however, stated that, since traffic data contain no information on the content of a communication, the measure of determination of communications defined in paragraph 5 of that article could be applied. The measure of determination of communications, known in practice also as HTS, which covers the call records of telephone conversations and information on the base stations to which the target telephone numbers connected, can be used for offences other than the catalogue offences in Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well. Another participant, starting from the fact that in the case at hand the data are stored on the server, even if only for 5 minutes, pointed out that the situation can no longer be regarded in law as real-time communication and that the server concerned should be seized under Article 134 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and subjected to a digital forensic examination. It was stated that, under the current situation and without a legislative amendment, not even partial sharing of real-time traffic data with other National Points of Contact is possible, and that the letters rogatory route must be used. From a technical and organisational point of view, the participants identified as the greatest obstacles the lack of sufficient technical capability or willingness to cooperate on the part of domestic and foreign content providers to collect real-time traffic data, and the dispersal of data and applications across different countries as a result of widely used cloud computing solutions. As regards access to data in the cloud for digital forensic examination, one participant added that Article 17 of the Regulation on Judicial and Preventive Searches authorises law enforcement to search and back up remote computer files; however, since there is no similar authorisation in the Code of Criminal Procedure, this matter is legally controversial and problematic in terms of national sovereignty.

The officials of the French and Latvian National Points of Contact stated that it is possible to collect traffic data in real time in their countries. French domestic law permits this measure in investigations into terrorism and organised crime, and does not regard traffic data regularly requested from a service provider as personal data.

2.16 Question 16 – Interception of Communications for Content Data

Assume that another organised criminal group forces young children to sell sexual images of themselves live, for money, via VoIP (Voice-over-IP) technologies (Webcam Child Prostitution/Live Streaming Child Abuse on Demand). Unlike in traditional offences, the video chat between victim and suspect is the only element that constitutes both the criminal act and the evidence of the offence. Unless one of the parties records the conversation by means of some application, it is not possible to find any other evidence of the criminal act. In this example, the victims and the perpetrators are in different countries, but the server of the VoIP service concerned is located in our country. Since VoIP services are closely connected with persons' rights and freedoms of communication, the internet service provider automatically collects only subscriber data. Country A, in order to identify the victims and to uncover the only evidence of the live online child sexual abuse, asks us to collect content data on a particular suspect in real time and to share it with them.

• At present, all countries have legal powers to intercept communications. Under the Turkish legal system, in particular Articles 135 and 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

is there a sufficient legal basis for taking such a security measure in online

environments?

• In order to prevent possible physical child abuse that may occur in Country A,

is it possible to share quickly data obtained through such exceptional measures?

• Let us assume that a legal basis exists/has been created and that the necessary judicial decision

has been notified to the service provider concerned. The service provider states that compliance with the judicial decision is in fact impossible, explaining that the VoIP system is based on the principles of end-to-end encryption and a P2P Distributed Network in such a way as to make any interference by a third party, including the provider itself, impossible. In such a case, please state your opinion on the practical and legal

arrangements that could be applied.

The participants stated that the collection of real-time content data could in theory be carried out within the framework of Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but that in practice there are technical and practical conditions that make this impossible. One participant argued that, since the data relating to the communication are encrypted, action could also be taken under Article 134 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Another participant explained in detail under which combination of technical conditions it would be possible to intercept the content produced in Türkiye on popular VoIP (Voice-over-IP) applications and social media platforms headquartered abroad. According to him, the content and traffic generated by the applications in question would have to be routed to and stored on servers within Türkiye, and the source code of this software would have to be obtained, with both conditions met together. Many participants pointed out that such a possibility is very remote and that, even if implemented, it would not have the desired effect in practice. The moderator spoke in general terms about the encryption debate, which has intensified in recent years, and gave a short briefing on law enforcement access to applications in certain circumstances, on keeping the private keys used in communications with an independent body and on imposing on service providers by legislation an obligation to provide information. Most participants, however, stressed that there are currently hundreds of similar communication applications and that users would quickly turn to alternative applications or might even develop new technological solutions.

The participants stated that, as regards the sharing of real-time content data for the purpose of identifying the suspect and the victim and preventing the ongoing abuse, there is a lack of legal provisions both in the text of the Convention and in domestic law. It was therefore considered more appropriate first to make a preservation request and then to share the information once the request for letters rogatory arrives. One participant stressed that the Convention permits information sharing in serious cases such as the one in the example and that, if the necessary legislation were enacted in domestic law, the sharing of intelligence information within a limited scope by court decision could be possible. The same participant also stated that the existing legislation is not suited to such rapid interventions. Another participant drew attention to the fact that the contents of communications and their transcripts are subject to special procedures and that, if the content were shared, problems could arise, particularly as regards compliance with the obligation to destroy.

2.17 Question 17 - Spontaneous Information

Intelligence units obtain chat records between two members of a terrorist organisation living in Country A. The conversations indicate that these two persons are planning an attack on an airport located in our country.

• Article 26 of the Convention gives the parties the right to send information spontaneously. Do you think that information

derived from intelligence can also be considered and shared within this framework? Or should this article be considered only within the scope of criminal investigations and prosecutions?

• Let us assume that Country A has also obtained the same information through informants of its intelligence

unit. Country A contacts the internet service provider and obtains the subscriber information of the two terrorists in question. However, Country A gives no information on the matter to the National Point of Contact. After a deadly attack, the National Point of Contact learns through the internet service provider of Country A's omission in this case. What kind of legal and diplomatic steps can be taken against Country A?

Most participants expressed the view that Article 26 of the Convention also permits the sharing of information of an intelligence nature. One participant, arguing that reciprocity and good faith are the prevailing principles of international law, stressed that information relating to any criminal investigation or intelligence work may be shared within the limits drawn by these universal principles. Some participants stated that the term “investigation” used in the Convention might exclude intelligence activities. The moderator added that, unlike in our country, in many countries intelligence-gathering activities are also regarded as falling within the concept of criminal investigation. A participant expressing the opposite view stated that the information to be shared under Article 26 must have been obtained in a criminal investigation. He added that the criminal investigation in question must also concern the cybercrime offences defined in Articles 2 to 11 of the Convention, and that information on a terrorist incident such as the one in the example cannot be given to other National Points of Contact under Article 26. The participants expressed differing views on harm resulting from the failure to share critical information. Some participants stated that diplomatic channels could be used in respect of foreign points of contact and, in respect of the National Point of Contact, general provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code such as “neglect of duty”. One participant, on the other hand, argued that no criminal liability would arise, stating that the article in question imposes no obligation on the National Point of Contact and grants it discretion as to whether to share.

The official of the Latvian National Point of Contact stated that Latvian law permits the sharing of intelligence information and outlined the limits of this power for service providers and for the National Point of Contact. Where delay would be prejudicial and harm that is difficult or impossible to remedy could result, the service provider and the National Point of Contact may transfer information to the extent necessary to prevent it. Where more information than needed is provided or in other forms of abuse, civil and criminal liability will arise in respect of the protection of personal data. The official of the French National Point of Contact, for his part, drew attention to the literal wording of the Convention, stated that the sharing of intelligence information is not an obligation, and drew attention to the existence of alternative communication channels such as Interpol.

2.18 Question 18 - More Effective Cooperation with Internet Service Providers

Türkiye conducts international police cooperation activities with other countries and with international police organisations such as Interpol under bilateral and multilateral agreements. The Budapest Convention, however, is an exceptional instrument providing for ways of taking decisions and sharing information faster than traditional methods, above all with the aims of preserving digital evidence expeditiously and identifying victims and suspects quickly. Please state your views on the following matters in terms of legal and organisational solutions, so that effective international police cooperation can be implemented as envisaged by the Convention and information/data can be shared as quickly as possible.

• The National Points of Contact in some countries have rapid communication channels, mostly by e-mail, with all local service

providers in the country. Is it legally and administratively possible to set up such a system in our

country? If not, what changes need to be made?

• The National Point of Contact is able to obtain information directly from some foreign internet service providers.

In addition, a draft law is being discussed that would enable the police forces of European Union member states to request information directly from internet service providers

located in other member states.

In this context, with regard to a foreign security unit being able to request information directly from an internet service provider resident in Türkiye, state the appropriateness, conditions and

limits thereof.

The moderator opened the discussion by stating that in practice some US-based internet service providers are able to provide subscriber information directly to foreign law enforcement authorities, and that communication between US-based internet service providers and the US National Point of Contact takes place mainly by e-mail.

All participants expressed their concerns about a direct flow of information from Türkiye-based service providers to a foreign National Point of Contact. One participant, claiming that US-based internet service providers have set up such direct communication channels because they are driven by commercial gain, argued that there would be no need for such a practice since Türkiye-based service providers do not have a customer base of similar size in the US or other countries.

The great majority of the participants stated that it would be problematic to bypass judicial and diplomatic channels entirely, since information that is the subject of international sharing must be subjected to many sensitive assessments, such as reciprocity, the country's foreign policy and compliance with domestic law. One participant stressed that US-based internet service providers probably also frequently inform the authorities within their own country and that, if a similar practice were introduced for Türkiye, an external oversight mechanism for direct information sharing would also have to be put in place. Another participant, starting from the premise that the power in question is directly linked to the sovereign rights of states, stated that a unilateral legislative provision in domestic law would not suffice, other than where member states mutually recognise such a power on the basis of an international convention.

All participants agreed on the need for faster communication by e-mail within the country between the National Point of Contact and Türkiye-based service providers. Some participants stressed that service providers handle sensitive personal data and added that detailed legislation on the content of the data to be shared with the National Point of Contact is indispensable. One participant stated that, especially for the execution of preservation requests without loss of time, the transmission of information by e-mail is no longer an option but has become a necessity. From a technical point of view, the prevailing view was that, in order to maximise the security of communication between the two sides, it would be appropriate to share information using predefined e-mail addresses over trusted systems such as Registered E-Mail (KEP) or the National Judicial Network Project (UYAP).

3 Conclusion

The workshop was the scene of a wide range of views from participants with different areas of expertise. Throughout the event, however, certain points were repeatedly emphasised by many participants. Most experts stated that the Convention needs to be thoroughly harmonised with domestic law in both spirit and letter. While the Convention draws a threefold distinction between subscriber data, traffic data and content data, in Turkish law subscriber information is defined as part of traffic data, and the regulation of content data has not yet been completed. Similarly, while Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes Committed by Means of Such Publications draws a fourfold distinction in terms of legal responsibilities between access, hosting, content and mass use providers, the Convention uses no term other than the concept of service providers. Especially on the first day of the workshop, these definitional differences between the Convention and domestic law led to conceptual confusion and misinterpretation.

Another point frequently raised at the event was the need to clarify by legislation the scope of the duties and powers of the National Point of Contact and of internet service providers. As regards preservation requests and international information sharing in emergencies, most participants did not consider reliance on the Convention alone to be sufficient. Strengthening the legal framework on these matters through new legislation was described as an important precondition for acting in conformity with the Convention at the domestic level.

4 List of Participants

Moderator
Kemal Veli AÇARBranch ManagerEGM-Department of Combating Cybercrime
Participants
Erdal ÇETİNKAYAHead of DepartmentEGM-Department of Combating Cybercrime
Kerim ALTIAYDeputy Head of DepartmentEGM-Department of Combating Cybercrime
İbrahim ÖZDEMİRCommissionerEGM-Department of Combating Cybercrime
Murat Volkan DÜLGER Assoc. Prof. Dr. Istanbul Aydın University Hasan SINAR Assoc. Prof. Dr. Altınbaş University Yavuz ERDOĞAN Assoc. Prof. Dr. European University of Lefke
Özgür KARLITEPEBranch Manager for Combating CybercrimeEGM-Istanbul Police Department
Mehmet PAKİŞ Judge Court of Cassation Ömrü YILMAZ Judge Court of Cassation Ministry of Justice-International Law and Ayla SERÇE Assistant Expert Directorate General for Foreign Relations
Mehmet YILDIZPolice SuperintendentEGM- Department of Interpol-Europol
Mahmut Kaan YÜKSEL Public Prosecutor Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office Murat SEMİZ Public Prosecutor Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office Baki Çağrı ONGUN Judge Judge in Istanbul Soner KAYA Public Prosecutor İzmir Chief Public Prosecutor's Office
Enes Koray KOÇAKCommissionerEGM-Department of Combating Cybercrime

Kadir BAĞCI

Ceren KÜPELİ

Burhanettin AL

Judge

Attorney

Attorney

Ministry of Justice

Turkcell İletişim Hizmetleri A.Ş.

Turkcell İletişim Hizmetleri A.Ş.

Ayşe ŞEKER Attorney

Çağrı YALÇIN Attorney

Türk Telekomünikasyon A.Ş.

Türk Telekomünikasyon A.Ş.

Osman Özkan NAZLIMPolice OfficerEGM-Department of Combating Cybercrime
Mustafa SAĞLAMPolice OfficerEGM-Department of Combating Cybercrime
Technology and Security Gökhan BOZDOĞAN Vodafone A.Ş. Operations Manager Sait REÇBER Privacy Manager Vodafone A.Ş. Emre ERGİN Attorney Vodafone A.Ş. Yeliz KILIÇ Attorney Ministry of Interior - Office of Legal Counsel Muhammed DÜLGERLER Attorney İsimtescil A.Ş.
Engin PURCUPolice OfficerEGM-Istanbul Police Department
Müşerref ÇUHADARDeputy CommissionerEGM-Department of Foreign Relations
Ali Rıza ÇELİKPolice SuperintendentEGM-Department of Foreign Relations
Information Technology Mehmet UÇAR Manager İsimtescil A.Ş. Özgür ÖZCAN System Manager Mynet.com A.Ş. Two experts from the Information and Communication Technologies Authority* One expert from the Ministry of Justice* One expert from Turkcell İletişim Hizmetleri A.Ş. * Foreign Guests
Official of the French 24/7 National Point of Contact*
Official of the Latvian 24/7 National Point of Contact*
Official of the Romanian 24/7 National Point of Contact*
* The participant did not wish his name to be included in the workshop report.

Footnotes

  1. Recommendation 5, T-CY değerlendirme raporu: Avrupa Konseyi Sanal Ortamda İşlenen Suçlar Sözleşmesindeki karşılıklı adli yardım maddeleri, 2014, sf. 125 https://rm.coe.int/t-cy-2017-18-opinion-article29-/168076cf95 ↑
  2. https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/iproceeds ↑

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